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TOLENTINO v.

SECRETARY OF FINANCE
Doctrine: Steps in the enactment of a statute
Petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RA No. 7716 (Expanded Value Added Tax). Petitioners
claim that EVAT Law did not originate in the House of Representatives as required by the Constitution.
HB 11197 was passed in the HoR (passed 3 readings) then sent to Senate. After 1st reading, Senate
assigned it to the Senate Ways and Means Committee. Petitioners contend that it did not pass 3 readings
in the Senate, instead, the Senate passed their own version (S No. 1630), which is against the
constitution. According to petitioners, what the Senate should have done is to just amend HB 11197 and
not pass their on version. Tolentino also argues that the addition of the word "exclusively" in Art. VI, 24
was a modification of the word "originate" in Art. I, 24 of the US Constitution (so it would read as
"exclusively originating"), and in so doing, the Philippine Constitution intended to treat revenue bills as a
special. Petitioners also argue that the President's certification of the Bills was void. Only one Bill was
certified and because the petitioners (mistakenly) thought that H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630 are
DISTINCT AND SEPARATE Bills, then Presidential certification for one would NOT APPLY to the other.
Petitioners also argue that the manner with which the Conference Committee was conducted (closed-
door, two days in executive session, only the conferees present, and not with the
Senators/Congressmen) is contrary to the peoples' right to know.
(1) Whether or not the Senate committed a grave abuse of discretion when it passed its own version of the
Bill - No, the Senate did not. It is well within its power to submit its own version of the Bill, and the
enactment of S. No. 1630 was not the only instance in which the Senate passed its own version of a bill
originating from the House. The Senate, in passing its own version, merely exercised its power to make
amendments to bills required to originate in the House.
(2) Whether or not RA7716 (EVAT Law) violated Article VI Sec 24 of the Constitution, which is contingent on
whether or not the EVAT Law originated from the House of Representatives - NO, RA7716 was NOT in
violation of Art VI Sec 24 of the Constitution. The intention of the provision is to require the BILL to
originate from the House, not for the LAW to originate from the House. S. No. 1630 was MERELY AN
AMENDMENT OF HB No. 11197 and IS NOT AN INDEPENDENT AND DISTINCT BILL, which was
precisely the error of the petitioners.
(3) Whether or not the EVAT Law violated Article VI Sec 26(2), which is contingent on whether or not the
Presidential certification of S. No. 1630 is void - NO, the EVAT Law was NOT in violation of Art VI Sec
26(2), as the Presidential certification is valid. The Court ruled that "[I]t is enough that he certifies the bill
which, at the time he makes the certification, is under consideration." An earlier presidential certification
for an earlier version of a Bill being considered would also apply to a revised version of a Bill.
(4) Whether or not the Conference Committee, during the passage of this law, violated Art. II, 28 and Art.
III, 7 (constitutional policies of (a) full public disclosure and (b) people's right to know)
- Presidential Certification classifies a particular Bill as "immediate" or "urgent," which would allow the
Congress to DISPENSE WITH/SUSPEND the "reading on separate days" requirement. Because of
Presidential certification, in this case valid, THE EVAT LAW DID NOT VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTION.
NO, the passage of the EVAT Law did NOT violate the mandate on full public disclosure and people's
right to know. The Conference Committee had, in fact, submitted a report detailing the amendments
made on the Senate and House versions of the Bill. Moreover, "the jurisdiction of the conference
committee is not limited to resolving differences between the Senate and the House. It may propose an
entirely new provision. What is important is that its report is subsequently approved by the respective
houses of Congress." (Philippine Judges Association v. Prado).
ARROYO v. DE VENECIA
Doctrine: Steps in the enactment of a statute
Joker Arroyo questions the validity of RA 8240 that imposes "sin taxes" (specific taxes) on beer and
cigarettes on the ground that the rules of the House in the passage of the bill were not properly observed,
violating section 16 of Art 6, as well as section 27 of the same article. The law originated from the House
of Representatives as House No. 7198. This bill was approved on 3rd reading and transmitted to the
Senate which approved it with certain amendments on 3rd reading. A bicameral conference committee
was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. During
the last session before the bill was approved, Arroyo announced that he was going to raise a question on
the quorum, although until the end of his interpellation he never did. Petitioner alleged that there was
failure to conduct a proper vote (yeas or nays), that the proceedings were "railroaded," etc. His principal
argument is that RA 8240 shall be null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the
House that these rules embody the "constitutional mandate" in Art 6 Sec 16 (3) that "each House may
determine the rules of its proceedings and that, consequently, a violation of the House rules is a violation
of the Constitution itself.
Issue: WON RA 8240 is unconstitional because it violated the internal rules of Procedure of the House?
Ruling: (1) It is clear that what is alleged to have been violated are merely internal rules of procedure of
the House rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment of the law, thus the courts are denied
the power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its
own rules, in the absence of showing that there was violation of a constitutional provision or right of
private individuals. Each of the 3 departments has its separate sphere which the others may not invade
without upsetting the delicate balance on which our Constitutional order rests. (2) Courts cannot declare
an act of legislation void just because of noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself; the
approval of the bicameral committee report had the same way or method of approval of the Local
Government Code and the Tariffs and Customs Code -- there is no rule in the House of Representatives
that the chair must restate the motion and conduct a viva voce or nominal voting - the fact that nobody
objected means a unanimous action of the House.
ARAULLO V. AQUINO
Doctrine: Specific provisions for the General Appropriations Act
Petitioners, acting as taxpayers assail the constitutionality of the Disbursement Acceleration Program or
the DAP. The 9 petitions in majority, pray for certiorari and prohibition with regards to the continuance of
the DAP. These consolidated petitions turned out after the privilege speech of Sen. Jinggoy Estrada
relating the additional 50 million they've received for voting in favor of the impeachment trial of former CJ
Corona to ensue. As such, court required for DBM to provide the sources of the funds which were
released in relation to DAP. Funds under the DAP were usually taken from (1) unreleased appropriations
under Personnel Services; (2) unprogrammed funds; (3) carry-over appropriations unreleased from the
previous year; and (4) budgets for slow- moving items or projects that had been realigned to support
faster-disbursing projects. The proliferators of DAP also used as a legal bases Chapter 5, Book VI of
Executive Order (EO) No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987) as well as the General Appropriations Acts
(GAAs) of 2011, 2012 and 2013, particularly their provisions on the (a) use of savings; (b) meanings of
savings and augmentation; and (c) priority in the use of savings. Main precepts for unconstitutionality
which the petitioners assail regarding DAP are due to the it being violative to:

1.) Article VI Section 5 part 5 - No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations;
however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be
authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings
in other items of their respective appropriations.

2.) Sec. 29, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, which provides: "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law."
ISSUE: WON the release of unprogrammed funds under the DAP was in accord with the GAA
RULING: NO. DBM committed a mistake in interpreting the definitions and provisions in the GAA.

- Courts reiterate such provisions according to GAA. From their interpretation savings refer to portions or
balances of any programmed appropriation in this Act free from any obligation or encumbrance which are:
(i) still available after the completion or final discontinuance or abandonment of the work, activity or
purpose for which the appropriation is authorized;
(ii) from appropriations balances arising from unpaid compensation and related costs pertaining to vacant
positions and leaves of absence without pay; and
(iii) from appropriations balances realized from the implementation of measures resulting in improved
systems and efficiencies and thus enabled agencies to meet and deliver the required or planned targets,
programs and services approved in this Act at a lesser cost.
- DBM in this regard, had a different interpretation as the funds of DAP did not merely come from
"savings" per se (see facts for source of DAP funds)
- GAAs of 2011 and 2012 lacked valid provisions to authorize transfers of funds under the DAP; hence,
transfers under the DAP were unconstitutional
- Sourcing the DAP from unprogrammed funds despite the original revenue targets not having been
exceeded was invalid.
- No funds from savings could be transferred under the DAP to augment deficient items not provided in
the GAA.
Mabanag v. Lopez Vito
Doctrine: Enrolled bill theory
Petitioners are 3 senators and 8 members of the H.O.R. who assail the validity of R.A. 73. R.A. 73 is the
ordinance of the resolution of both Houses to proposing an amendment to the Constitution. The
petitioners were suspended in participating in the Congress because of irregularities in their election. The
petitioners however insist that their votes for the said resolution should be counted because the law
requires 3/4 votes of the members of Congress to be able to pass a resolution.
ISSUE: WON the proposed amendment to the Constitution was duly enacted by the Congress?
RULING: YES. The due enactment of the law may be proved in either of the two ways provided for in the
old Civil Procedure. The Court found that no irregularity was found in the passage of the law and that no
discrepeancy between the two documents exists. Also, the Court ensists that even if discrepancy exists it
would NOT give greater weight to the journals and disregard the explicit provision that duly certified
copies "shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.
CASCO PHILIPPINE CHEMICAL V. GIMENEZ
Doctrine: Enrolled bill theory
Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. was engaged in the production of synthetic resin glues used primarily
in the production of plywood. The main components of the said glue are urea and formaldehyde which
are both being imported abroad. Pursuant to RA 2609 (Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law), the Central
Bank of the Philippines issued its Circular No. 95, fixing a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange
transactions. It also placed IRR to aooky the law. In compliance, Casco paid the fees but later moved for
reimbursement as Casco maintained that urea and formaldehyde are exempted from such fees. The CBP
issued the vouchers for refund but the bank did not honor becuase RA 2609 which provides: The margin
established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the provision of section one hereof shall not be imposed
on urea formaldehyde. But the provision should be construed as urea and formaldehyde He further
contends that the bill approved in Congress contained the copulative conjunction and between the terms
urea and, formaldehyde, and that the members of Congress intended to exempt urea and
formaldehyde separately.
ISSUE: WON "urea" and "formaldehyde" are exempt by law from the payment of the 25% margin fee
RULING: NO. Urea Formaldehyde is a finished and combined product and the other are two separate
products. Petioner argued the statements of the members of the Senate/House of Representatives show
that they intended "urea' and "formaldehyde" and not "urea formaldehyde" as the finished product.
Statements of Congress do not represent the entirety of the Congress itself. What is printed in the
enrolled bill is conclusive upon the courts.
MORALES V. SUBIDO
Doctrine: Enrolled bill theory
Morales has served as captain in the police department of a city for at least three years but does not
possess a bachelors degree, is qualified for appointment as chief of police. Morales was the chief of
detective bureau of the Manila Police Department and holds the rank of lieutenant colonel. He began
his career in 1934 as patrolman and gradually rose to his present position. Upon the resignation of
the former Chief , Morales was designated acting chief of police of Manila and, at the same time,
given a provisional appointment to the same position by the mayor of Manila. Subido approved the
designation of the petitioner but rejected his appointment for failure to meet the minimum
educational and civil service eligibility requirements for the said position. Instead, the respondent
certified other persons as qualified for the post. Subido invoked Section 10 of the Police Act of 1966,
which Section reads:
Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of Police Agency. No person may be appointed
chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelors degree from a recognized institution of
learning and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of
Investigation, or has served as chief of police with exemplary record, or has served in the police
department of any city with rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years; or any
high school graduate who has served as officer in the Armed Forces for at least eight years
with the rank of captain and/or higher.
Nowhere in the above provision is it provided that a person who has served the police department
of a city can be qualified for said office. Morales however argued that when the said act was
being deliberated upon, the approved version was actually the following:
No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelors degree and
has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation or
police department of any city and has held the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least
three years or any high school graduate who has served the police department of a city or who
has served as officer of the Armed Forces for at least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher.
Morales argued that the above version was the one which was actually approved by Congress but
when the bill emerged from the conference committee the only change made in the provision was
the insertion of the phraseor has served as chief of police with exemplary record. Morales
went on to support his case by producing copies of certified photostatic copy of a memorandum
which according to him was signed by an employee in the Senate bill division, and can be found
attached to the page proofs of the then bill being deliberated upon.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must look upon the history of the bill, thereby inquiring upon the
journals, to look searchingly into the matter.

HELD: The enrolled Act in the office of the legislative secretary of the President of the Philippines
shows that Section 10 is exactly as it is in the statute as officially published in slip form by the
Bureau of Printing. The SC cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover what really happened. The
respect due to the other branches of the Government demands that the SC act upon the faith and
credit of what the officers of the said branches attest to as the official acts of their respective
departments. Otherwise the SC would be cast in the unenviable and unwanted role of a sleuth trying
to determine what actually did happen in the labyrinth of lawmaking, with consequent impairment of
the integrity of the legislative process. The SC is not of course to be understood as holding that in all
cases the journals must yield to the enrolled bill. To be sure there are certain matters which the
Constitution expressly requires must be entered on the journal of each house. To what extent the
validity of a legislative act may be affected by a failure to have such matters entered on the journal,
is a question which the SC can decide upon but is not currently being confronted in the case at bar
hence the SC does not now decide. All the SC holds is that with respect to matters not expressly
required to be entered on the journal, the enrolled bill prevails in the event of any discrepancy.

ASTORGA V. VILLEGAS
Doctrine: Journal entry rule
A bill was passed, HB 9266, passed in the third reading in HoR and was transmitted to the Senate,
passed three readings with minor amendments. There were two versions of amendments: Sen. Roxas'
version and Sen. Tolentino's version. The version approved by the Congress was the Roxas' version.
When the bill was approved by the President and became a law as RA 4065 ("An Act Defining the
Powers, Rights and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of
the City of Manila, Further Amending for the Purpose Sections Ten and Eleven of Republic
Act Numbered Four Hundred Nine, as Amended, Otherwise Known as the Revised Charter
of the City of Manila.") Sen. Tolentino's version was contained therein rather than the one approved which
is Roxas' version. Sen. Tolentino issued in a press statement that the enrolled bill (HB 9266) is a wrong
version. The President declared the withdrawal of his signature as well as the Senate President. Astroga,
being then the Vice Mayor of Manila, contended that the law was duly passed and in effect. On the other
hand, Mayor Villegas issued circulars to disregard RA 4065 throughout the City of Manila. Respondent's
position is that RA 4065 never became a law and the entries in the Journal should be followed rather than
the enrolled bill.
ISSUE: WON RA 4065 was duly passed as a law?
RULING: NO. The Court ruled that the legislative journals is no ordinary record. The consitution requires
it. In the circumstances of the facts of this case, the withdrawal of the signatures signifies a rectification
that there is a manifest error. The Court held that to perpetuate this error will be to sacrfice truth to fiction
and declared that RA 4065 NEVER BECAME A LAW. Petition denied.

ISSUE: WON Journal Entries of Congress can be used to determine whether a bill has been duly enacted.
(YESSSS!)
RULING: The enrolled bill doctrine falls upon the principle of the great departments of the country as
being coequal and independent of one another and thus the judicial must give respect and accept what
the congress has passed.
However, it cannot be truly said that the question has been laid to it. The Court then went on to determine
the value of attestation or signature. This is relevant to the case because the Senate President declared
his signature to be invalid. Thus it was determined by the Court that the attestation is merely a mode of
authentication. It was the APPROVAL by Congress and not the signatures of the presiding officers that is
essential.
Absent the attestation however, what evidence could be used to determine if the bill has been duly
enacted? In such a case the entries in the journal should be consulted. Although they are not
authenticated and is the subject of to the risk of misprinting, they can point to determine whether the text
of the House Bill 9266 both signed by the Chief Executive was the same text passed by both Houses of
Congress. The Journal discloses that the amendments introduced and approved by the Senate were not
incorporated in the printed text sent to the President. Thus the Court declares that the bill was not duly
enacted and therefore did not become law.
TANADA V. TUVERA
Doctrine: When statutes become effective
Petitioner seeks the disclosure of a number of presidential decrees which they claimed had not been
published or required by law. The government in their defense said that publication is necessary "unless
otherwise provided". The Solicitor-General also state that publication is not always imperative.
ISSUE: WON publication is mandatory for a statute to be effective?
RULING: Yes --> "unless otherwise provided by law" refers to the date of effectivity and not on the
requirement of publication itself; omission of publication would offend due process because the public will
be denied of the knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it
Philippine Veterans Bank Employees v. Vega
Doctrine: When statutes become effective
Central Bank filed with Branch 39 of RTC-Manila a petition for assistance in the liquidation of the
Philippine Veterans Bank. Phil Veterans Bank Employees represented by Perfecto V. Fernandez filed
claims for accrued and unpaid employee wages and benefits. After lengthy hearings, partial payments of
sums due to employees were made but many remain unpaid due to piecemeal hearings on the benefits.
On May 1992, Central Bank issued a certification allowing Phil. Veterans Bank to reopen. Despite the
legislative mandate for rehabilitation and reopening of PVB, respondent judge Vargas continued
liquidation proceedings of the bank. Petitioners argue that within the passage of R 7169 (An Act to
rehabilitate The Phil. Veterans Bank), the liguidation court became functus officio and no longer had the
authority to continue with the proceedings. Liquidation connotes a winding up or settling with creditors
and debtors. Rehabilitation connotes a reopening or reorganization. To allow liquidation to continue
[demand Phil Vet to pay employees separation fee, debts etc.] would seriously hinder the rehabilitation of
the bank [Pay employees current salaries]. Respondents claims that RA 7169 became effective only on
March 10,1992 or 15 days after its publication.

Note: Petitioners here are the bank employees, liquidation or rehabilitation would affect them directly.
Since PVB is suppose to be on its rehabilitation but lower court continues on its liquidation, the assets of
the bank are of importance to them as the if liquidation continues, how will the bank pay them their
current salaries if the assets are being dissolved.
Issue: Can a liquidation court proceed with the proceeding despite a legislative mandate to rehabilitate
the bank was already made effective by its effectivity clause, with respect to its publication period?
Ruling: As a rule, laws take effect 15 days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazetteor in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. The legislature has authority to provide
for exceptions, as indicated in the clause "unless otherwise provided".

RA 7169 provides the effectivity clause: This Act shall take effect upon its approval. It is clear that
legislature intended to make the law effective immediately. RA 7169 was signed by Cory Aquino on Jan
2, 1992. Therefore, the said law became effective on its date.

Assuming for the sake of argument that publication is necessary for the effectivity of RA 71639 [Yes,
court said that, I'm just quoting], then it became legally effective on Feb 24, 1992, the date when it was
published in the Official Gazette and not March 10, 1992 as erroneously claimed by the liquidators and
Central Bank.

PETITION GRANTED AND RESPONDENT JUDGE IS PERMANENTLY ENJOINED FROM FURTHER
PROCEEDING WITH LIQUIDATION CASE
People v. Que Po Lay
Doctrine: When regulation becomes effective
Que Po Lay was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of U. S. dollars, U. S. checks and U. S.
money orders amounting to about $7,000 failed to sell the same to the Central Bank through its agents
within one day following the receipt of such foreign exchange as required by Circular No. 20. Finding him
guilty of violating Central Bank Circular No. 20 in connection with section 34 of Republic Act No. 265, he
is being sentenced to suffer six months imprisonment, to pay a fines
Issue: WON Circular 20 is valid even without being published?
Ruling: NO. Commonwealth Act No. 638 and 2930 do not require the publication in the Official Gazette
of said circular issued for the implementation of a law in order to have force and effect. The court agreed.
The 2 Acts enumerated what should be published In the Official Gazette, for the guidance of the different
branches of the Government issuing same, and of the Bureau of Printing.
In the present case, although Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank was issued in the year 1949, it was not
published until November 1951, that is, about 3 months after appellant's conviction of its violation. It is
clear that said circular, particularly its penal provision, did not have any legal effect and bound no one
until its publication in the Official Gazette or after November 1951.
Yaokasin v. Commissioner of Customs
Doctrine: When regulation becomes effective
The Philippine Coast Guard seized 9000 bags/sacks of refined sugar which were unloaded from M/V
Tacloban. Customs filed a petition stating that the bags were of foreign origin and on July 7, 1998 District
Collector of Customs ordered the release of sugar. Jimmy Yaokasin, petitioner, secured a writ of replevin
to the Regional Trial court of Leyte for damages with preliminary injunction and restraining order. On July
15, 1998 Customs reconsidered their decision stating that the sugar in question are of foreign origin,
smuggled in the country and is forfeited in favor of the government. It was ordered that the sugar should
be immediately transferred to any bodega to any customs warehouse, preferably in Manila.
Issue: WON the Commissioner of Customs has the power of Automatic Review over the decisions of the
Collector of Cusotms in seizure and protest cases.
Ruling: The Commision of Customs in his Customs Memorandum Order, states that collectors are asked
to strictly follow the collection of taxes and custom duties to protect the interest of the government.
Without the automatic review by the Commisioner of Customs and the Secretary of Finance, a collector in
any country's ports would have absolute and unbrindled disrection to determine whether goods are seized
locally or of foreign origin therefore subject to custom duties and taxes. Under Sec 12 of the Plan and Sec
2313 of Tariff and Customs Code provides general proceudre for collector in seizure and protect cases
upon appeal by aggrieved party. The CMO on the ground they had not been published in the Official
Gazette is not considered since it does not have general applicability. The Plan under the PD No. 1 states
"adopted, approved, and made as part of the law of the land"
GMA Network v. MTRCB
Doctrine: When regulation takes effect
Petitioner GMA Network, Inc., who manages and operates EMC Channel 27, received a suspension
order, issued on Janury 7, 2000, from respondent MTRCB for airing "Muro Ami: The Making" without first
securing a permit from the latter, as provided in Section 7 of PD 1986. The penalties of such and similar
violations are expressed in the Memorandum Circular 98-17 dated December 15, 1998. GMA Network
complied with the suspension and went offline on the midnight of January 11, 2000. This notwithstanding,
they wrote a letterprotest and filed an MR regarding the suspension. MTRCB denied both. Petitioner then
filed a petition for cetiorari in the CA, which was likewise dismissed. Hence, this recourse to the Supreme
Court.
Issue: 1. WON the MTRCB has the power or authority to review the show "Muro Ami: The Making" prior
to its boradcast by television;

2. WON the Memorandum Circular No. 98-17 was enforceable and binding on petitioner
Ruling: 1. YES. Sec 3 of PD 1986 empowers the MTRCB to screen, review, and examine ALL motion
pictures and television programs including publicity materials. The only exceptions are those stated in
Section 7 , such as (1) TV programs imprinted or exhibited by the Philippine Government and/or
departments and agencies, and (2) newsreels. Since the subject program was a publicity for the movie,
"Muro Ami: The Making," and does not fall under any of the expressed exemptions, it is therefore within
the power of review of the MTRCB.

2. NO. Memorandum Circular 98-17, which was the basis of the suspension order, was NOT binding on
petitioner because said Circular has not been registered with the Office of the National Administrative
Registrar (ONAR) as of January 27, 2000. Hence, it cannot be effectively used to suspend the subject
program in the present case, and the petitioner should not have been meted the sanction provided
thereunder.

Final ruling:
Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The CA's decision regarding the jurisdiction of the MTRCB is hereby
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the SUSPENSION ORDER issued against petitioner GMA
Network is hereby declared NULL and VOID.
Bagatsing v. Ramirez
When ordinance takes effect
City Mayor of Manila, Ramon D. Bagatsing enacted Ordinance No. 7522 on June 15, 1974 "AN
ORDINANCE REGULATING THE OPERATION OF PUBLIC MARKETS AND PRESCRIBING FEES FOR
THE RENTALS OF STALLS AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEROF AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES". Federatio of Manila Market Vendors, Inc. filed a civil case against the enactment
of the ordinance on the fround that publication requirement under revised charter of city of Manila has not
complied with. Respondent Judge ruled in declaring the ordinance null and void.
Issue: WON publication requirement has been complied with
Ruling: Yes, pursuant to Section 43 of the Local Tax Code. The prescribe publication is after the
approval of ordinances levying or imposing texes, fees, or other charges. either in newspaper or
publication widely circulated within the jursidiction of the local government or by posting rhe ordinance in
the local legislative hall or premises and in two other conspicious places within the territorial jurisdiction of
the local government. Additional info "the petitoners were assialing that the publication must follow the
Section 17 of the revised charter - requires publication before enactment of the ordinance and after the
approval thereof in two daily newspapers of general circulation in the city. The court ruled that Special
provisions governs over general provision. Especially, when the law containing the particular provision
enacted later than one containing the general provison. The Local Tax code (June 1, 1973-enacted)
states particular provision not like Revised Charter of the City of Manila (June 18, 1949) which is a
general provision regarding publication of ordinances.
Yapdiangco v. Buencamino
Manner of computing time
On February 1, 1965, the City Fiscal of Quezon City filed before the City Court a case for slight physical
injuries allegedly committed by the petitioner-appellant on December 2, 1964 against Mr. Ang ChoChing.
The petitioner-appellant moved to quash the criminal prosecution on the ground that the information
having been filed on the 61st day following the commission of the offense, the sixty days prescriptive
period had lapsed.
The City Court of Quezon City denied the motion to quash stating that the 60th day fell on a Sunday and
considering the rule that when the last day for the filing of a pleading falls on a Sunday, the same may be
filed on the next succeeding business day, the action had not prescribed.
After a motion for reconsideration was denied by the City Court, the petitioner-appellant filed a petition
for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary injunction before the CFI of Rizal. CFI of Rizal dismissed the
petition. A motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied. Hence, this appeals.
Issue: Whether or not a Sunday or a legal holiday is a legal efficient cause which interrupts the
prescription of an offense,
Ruling: No. The rules contained in Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code and Section 1, Rule
28 of the Old Rules of Court deal with the computation of time allowed to do a particular act, such as, the
filing of tax returns on or before a definite date, filing an answer to a complaint, taking an appeal, etc.
They do not apply to lengthen the period fixed by the State for it to prosecute those who committed a
crime against it.
The waiver or loss of the right to prosecute such offenders is automatic and by operation of law. Where
the sixtieth and last day to file information falls on a Sunday or legal holiday, the sixty-day period cannot
be extended up to the next working day.
Prescription has automatically sets in. The remedy is for the fiscal or prosecution to file theinformation
on the last working day before the criminal offense prescribes.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Primetown Property Group
Manner of computing time
Gilbert Yap, vice-chair of Primetown wants a refund for income tax paid in 1997. Because of increasing
costs of labor and materials, difficulty in securing financing and difficulty in collecting recievables, the
company posted a loss of about 71 million. They paid about 26 million anyways so they are asking for a
credit becuase they should not be liable for the tax. This tax return was filed on 4/14/1998.

Revenue officer Elizabeth Santos asked for additonal documents and these were provided but no action
was taken. Therefore the Primetown filed a case in the CTA on 4/14/2000. CTA ruled that Primetown filed
one day late; there is a two year prescriptive period from filing of the return to filing a case per sec229 of
the National Internal Revenue Code. They refered to art 13 of the Civil code with states that there are 365
days per year and deduced that the filing should be done withing 730 days (2 years), but in this case it
was done in 731 days.

Primetown appealed to the CA and the CA reversed the preivous ruling. They rules that the year 2000,
though it is a leap year should be counted as 365 days and therefore the filing would be within the
prescriptive period.
Issue: WON the filing was within the prescriptive period
Ruling: The waiver or loss of the right to prosecute such offenders is automatic and by operation of law.
Where the sixtieth and last day to file information falls on a Sunday or legal holiday, the sixty-day period
cannot be extended up to the next working day.
People v. Sumilang
Prospective v. retroactive application
The petitioner was convicted of the crime of arson and sentenced to the indeterminate penalty from 5 yrs
and 4 mos and 21 days of prision correctional to 10 yrs and 1 day of prision mayor. On appeal, both the
CA and SC affirmed the sentence of the lower court. Based on record, a copy of the resolution of the
court denyoing the motion for reconsideration was mailed to the petitioner's atty. However, the atty.
alleges in his petition that he did not receive the notice becaus ethen he was already hiding in the
mountains of Laguna as a guerilla officer of the Markings guerilla. The atty. prays that the reading of the
sentence be suspended and that petitioner be allowed to file whatever pleading that may be allowed by
this honorable tribunal necessary for the protection of the rights of the petitioner.
Issue: WON the petition to suspend reading of sentence and to file pleading or motion should be granted.
Ruling: NO. It is a well established rule of statutory construction that statutes regulating the procedure of
the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage. Procedural laws are restrospective in that sense and to that extent.
Salcedo v. Carpio
Prospective v. retroactive application
On July 16, 1949, petitioners Dr. Alfonso Salcedo and Dr. Pascual Ignacio were appointed, together with
Dr. Gervasio Erana, as chairman of the Board of Dental Examiners by the Acting Secretary of Health
under the provisions of Sec. 2 and 5 of RA 417. Erana was to hold office for a year, Salcedo for two years
and Ignacio for three years. On June 17, 1950 RA 546 was approved and Sec. 1 thereof amended Sec.
10 of the Reorganization Act. No 4007 by making the Commissioner of Civil Service an Executive Officer
of all the Boards of Examiners and by providing that the Board of Dental Examiners and all other Boards
of Examiners shall be composed of a chairman and two members who shall be appointed by the
President upon the recommendation of the Commissioner of Civil Service. The first Boards to be
appointed after the approval of RA 546 shall hold office for 3 years (chairman and one member) and two
years for another member. Under RA 546, on November 23, 1950, a new Board of Dental Examiners was
appointed by the President. It was composed of the ff: Dr. Gervasio Erana as Chairman for 3 years, Dr.
Germanico Carreon a member for two years and Dr. Diosdado Carpio a member for one year. The
petitioners seek to oust Carreon and Carpio on the ground that the petitioners' term of office have not yet
expired and they have not either been removed from office. The appointment of the respondents to their
position should be null and voil because they are unlawfully holding the office of members of the Board of
Dental Examiners.
Issue: W/N it was the intention of Congress in enacting RA 546, to abolish all the pre-existing Boards of
Examiners existing before the time of its enactment thus rendering the appointment of the respondents as
valid?
Ruling: Yes, the appointment of the respondents is valid because although there is no express provision
in RA 546 abolishing the pre-existing Board of Dental Examiners, it is obvious that it was the intention of
Congress to do so. The intent of Congress to abolish the pre-existing Board of Dental Examiners is clear
because the provisions of RA 546 are inconsistent with those of the Revised Administrative Code as
amended by Act 4007 and RA 417, which by virtue of the provisions stated therein, created the pre-
existing boards of examiners. Also it was stated in the last paragraph of Sec. 1 of RA 546 that "except as
modified by this act, all laws governing examinations given by the above-mentioned boards shall continue
in force." The petitioners contend that the provisions RA 546 be applied to them, however, it would be
contrary to the general principle of law to the effect that unless otherwise provided, the provisions of law
should be applied prospectively. To apply the provision of RA 546 to the petitioners is not to apply it
retrospectively, because to do so is to make the said Act merely effective, not before, but after the date it
was approved or became effective, and it will affect their continuance in office. The fact that they were
appointed before the act was approved does not make RA 546 of retroactive effect because they are still
holding office. A retroactive law is that which creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty or attaches a
new disability in respect to a transaction already past.
DBP v. CA
Prospective v. Retroactive
On October 25, 1955 DBP entered into an agreement of sale to it by the PHHC of 159 contiguous lots
having a total area of 91,188.30 square meters located in the Diliman Estate Subdivision West Triangle,
Quezon City, paying them a down payment of P400,000.00 of the P802,155.56 stipulated purchase price.
The Secretary of Justice, however, in an opinion, ruled that the Bank's resolution is violative of the
express prohibition of its Organic Act, specifically Section 23 of Republic Act No. 85 which expressly bars
any bank officer or employee from borrowing or getting a loan from the Bank. This was followed by a
Presidential directive ordering the Bank to cancel its purchase resolution.
The foregoing transaction notwithstanding, on October 14, 1958, the then Acting General Manager of the
PHHC, Sergio Ortiz, approved an order of sale of lots Nos. 2 and 4, which were among the above 159, to
private respondent spouses, the Nicandros. Matters were at such stage, when on June 17, 1961,
Republic Act No. 3147 amending Section 23 of the Organic Act of the Bank, Republic Act 85, was
approved and became effective. To definitely clear up matters, on November 10, 1961, the subject action
was filed by respondent spouses praying for the rescission of the sale to the Bank of the two lots in
question and the consequent cancellation of the Bank's certificate of title thereto. After due proceedings,
both the trial court and Court of Appeals ordered the rescission prayed for, but in SC's decision of
February 28, 1980, We held otherwise, on the sole ground that the passage of Republic Act 3147 cured
retroactively the lack of authority and violation of law relied upon by those lower courts.
Issue: WON retroactivity applies
Ruling: No.
**All laws are intended to be prospective in their effect unless there are express provisions in the contrary
(Art 4 of Civil Code)
**RA 3417 contained no provision imparting to it retroactive effect
**Under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, it is made clear that "contracts expressly prohibited by law or
declared void by law" are "inexistent and void from the beginning" and "cannot be ratified," thereby
making emphatic that as far as prohibitory laws are concerned, their invalidity is not waivable.
Considering that the contract between the PHHC and the Bank of October 25, 1955 was void from its
inception being expressly prohibited by law, PHHC could not have waived such invalidity and was
therefore, free to disengage itself therefrom as if it did not exist. No court action was necessary in that
respect.
Tac-An v. CA
Retro v. Prospective
Felipe Tac-An is the lawyer of the Acopiado brothers who were accused of frustrated murder and theft of
a large cattle in New Pinan, Zamboanga Del Norte. On April 4, 1960, Tac-An issued a "Deed of Quitclaim"
for the sum of P1,200 as his fee, but the Acopiado brothers just gave him a 3 hectare land as payment.
On April 6. the brothers told Tac-An that they were terminating his services, but Tac-An continued to
represent them. On April 2, 1961, one of the brothers sold his share of the land (the land that was paid to
Tac-An). On July 2, 1964, Tac-An secured the approval of the Governor to the Deed of Quitclaim. Tac-An
then filed a complaint against the brothers, and to those whom the land was sold. He prayed to be
declared the owner of the land, to annul the sale to the others, and that he be paid damages.
The CA voided the transfer of land to Tac-An but held that he be paid the P1,200 as fee for his services.
Moreover, the CA found as a fact that the Acopiado brothers are Non-Christians (they're Subanons)
which means that Sec. 145 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu will be applied. However,
petitioner argues that the Administrative Code of MIndanao and Sulu was repealed on June 19, 1965 by
RA 4252.
Issue: W/N RA 4252 repealed the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu
Ruling: NO. During the time material to the case, the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu was still
in full force and effect and since they were substantive in nature, the repealing statute cannot be given
retroactive effect.
Alunan v. Mirasol
Retro v. Prospective
The Commission on Elections issued Resolution No. 2499, providing guidelines for the holding of the
general election for the SK on September 30, 1992. The guidelines placed the SK elections under the
direct control and supervision of the DILG. The DILG, however, through then Secretary Rafael M. Alunan
III, issued a letter-resolution exempting the City of Manila from holding election for the SK on the ground
that the election previously held on May 26, 1990 was to be considered the first under the newly enacted
Local Government Code. Private respondents filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus in the RTC of
Manila to set aside the resolution of the DILG, arguing that the Secretary of the DILG had no power to
amend the resolutions of the COMELEC calling for general elections of SKs and that the DILG resolution
in question denied them the equal protection of the laws.
Issue: WON then DILG Secretary Rafael M. Alunan III had authority to determine whether under section
532(d) of the Local Government Code, the City of Manila was required to hold its first elections for SK?

WON the SK election conducted on May 26, 1990 can be considered the first election under Section 532
(d) of the LGC?
Ruling: Yes. The choice of the DILG for the task in question was appropriate and was in line with the
legislative policy evident in several statutes. Thus, P.D. No. 684 (April 15, 1975), in creating Kabataang
Barangays in every barangay throughout the country, provided in 6 that the "Secretary of Local
Government and Community Development shall promulgate such rules and regulations as may be
deemed necessary to effectively implement the provisions of this Decree."
Yes. If elections had been conducted, then no new elections had to be held on December 4, 1992 since
by virtue of 532(d) the term of office of the kabataang barangay officials so elected was "extended
correspondingly to coincide with the term of office of those elected under [the Local Government Code of
1991]. Section 532(d) may thus be deemed to be a curative law.
PVA v. Bautista
Retroactive effect of statutes
Mr. Calixto Gasilao, a veteran of the last Word War, was rendered disabled due to his military service.
On July 23, 1955, he filed a claim for disability pension under Sec. 9 of R.A. 65 with Philippine Veterans
Association but the same was disapproved for his failure to complete his supporting papers and submit
evidence to establish his service-connected illness, Primary Tuberculosis.On August 8, 1968, after
complying with the necessary requirements, he was awarded the full benefits under the law but only from
the date of such approval and he was given a pension of P100.00 a month with an additional P10.00 a
month for each of his unmarried minor children. He requested to PVA that his claim be made retroactive
as of the date when his original application was filed or disapproved in 1955. Respondents did not act on
his request. On June 22, 1969, R.A. 5753 provided for an increase in the basic pension to P200.00 a
month and an additional P30.00 a month for the wife and each of the unmarried minor children. However,
petitioner's monthly pension was increased only on January 15, 1971 by only 25% of the increases
provided by law due to the fact that it was only then that funds were released for the purpose and the
amount released was only sufficient to pay such percentage. Private respondent filed a case to compel
payment to him of the full benefits under the law retroactive as of the date when his original application
was filed or disapproved in 1955. Judge Bautista of the Court of First Instance - Manila rendered
judgment in his favor, hence this present action by the Board of Administrators of the PVA.
ISSUE: WON retroactive effect may be accorded to the grant of the pension award
RULING: Yes. It would be more in consonance with the spirit of the law that the benefits granted be
received and enjoyed at the earliest possible time by according retroactive effect to the grant of the
pension award. If the awards are made effective only upon approval of the corresponding application
which would be dependent on the discretion of the Board of Administrators, the same could be abused
through inaction and the noble and humanitarian purposes for which the law had been enacted could
easily be thwarted or defeated.

It is incumbent upon the implementing Board to carry out the provisions of RA 5753 without unnecessary
delay. The Court held that Bautista's pension benefits should start from the date of the disapproval of his
claim on December 18, 1955 (and not commence from the approval thereon on August 8, 1968 as
contended by the Board of Administrators); that the claim is deemed filed within the 10-year prescriptive
period counted from the date of the passage of the law on September 25, 1946; but the payment of
differentials in pension due to private respondent, his wife and minor children from the period June 22,
1969 to January 14, 1972, when more funds were released to allow payment in full of the benefits under
the law, were declared subject to the availability of government funds appropriated for the purpose.
Insular Lumber v. CTA
Retro v. Prospective
Insular Lumber (ILC) is an American company engaged as a licensed forest concessionaire. The ILC
purchased manufactured oil and motor fuel which it used in the operation of its forest concession. In
1956, RA 1435 was passed. Sec 5 thereof provides that there should be a partial tax refund to those
using oil in the operation of forest and mining concessions. In 1964 ILC filed with the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue to have a tax refund of P19,921.37 pursuant to the said RA. The Court of Industrial
Relations (CIR) ruled that ILC is not covered by such provision because Sec 5, RA 1435 is only effective
5 years from its enactment. Hence, in 1961 the provision ceased to be effective. ICL appealed the issue
to the CTA and the CTA ruled the operation of a sawmill is distinct from the operation of a forest
concession, hence, the refund provision of Sec 5, RA1435 allowing partial refund to forest and mining
concessionaires cannot be extended to the operators of a sawmill. And out of the P19,921.37 claimed,
only the amount of P14,598.08 was paid on oil utilized in logging operations. The CTA did not allow the
refund of the full amount of P14,598.08 because the ILCs right to claim the refund of a portion thereof,
particularly those paid during the period from January 1, 1963 to April 29, 1963 had already prescribed.
Hence, ICL was credited the refund of P10,560.20 only. Both parties appealed from the decision of the
CTA. The CIR averred that CTA should not have ruled this way. The title of RA 1435 is An Act to Provide
Means for Increasing The Highway Special Fund. The CIR contends that the subject of RA 1435 was to
increase Highway Special Fund. However, Section 5 of the Act deals with another subject which is the
partial exemption of miners and loggers. And this partial exemption on which the Company based its
claim for refund is clearly not expressed in the title of the aforesaid Act. More importantly, Section 5
provides for a decrease rather than an increase of the Highway Special Fund.
ISSUE: Whether or not to grant the partial tax refund to ICL.
RULING: The SC ruled that there is no merit in the contention of the CIR. RA 1435 deals with only one
subject and proclaims just one policy, namely, the necessity for increasing the Highway Special Fund
through the imposition of an increased specific tax on manufactured oils. The proviso in Sec 5 of the law
is in effect a partial exemption from the imposed increased tax. Said proviso, which has reference to
specific tax on oil and fuel, is not a deviation from the general subject of the law. The primary purpose of
the aforequoted constitutional provision is to prohibit duplicity in legislation the title of which might
completely fail to apprise the legislators or the public of the nature, scope and consequences of the law or
its operation. But that is not so for in the passage of RA 1435 since, as the records of its proceedings
bear out, a full debate on precisely the issue of whether its title reflects its complete subject was held by
Congress which passed it.
People v. Ferrer
Retrospective
The Anti Subversive Act of 1957 was approved June 20, 1957. It is an act to outlaw the Communist Party
of the Philippines (CPP) and similar associations penalizing membership therein, and for other purposes.
It defined the Communist Party being although a political party is in fact an organized conspiracy to
overthrow the Government, not only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversion and other illegal
means. It declares that the CPP is a clear and present danger to the security of the Philippines. Hon.
Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court judge that declared RA1700 or the Anti-Subversive Act of
1957 as a bill of attainder. Thus, dismissing the information of subversion against officers/leaders of the
(CPP) and the NPA. The trial court is of opinion that 1.) The Congress usurped the powers of the judge
2.) Assumed judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CPP without any forms of safeguard of a
judicial trial. 3.) It created a presumption of organizational guilt by being members of the CPP regardless
of voluntariness.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA1700 is a bill of attainder
RULING: NO. A bill of attainder is solely a legislative act. It punishes without the benefit of the trial. It is
the substitutionof judicial determination to a legislative determination of guilt. In order for a statute be
measured as a billof attainder, the following requisites must be present: 1.) The statute specifies persons,
groups. 2.) thestatute is applied retroactively and reach past conduct. (A bill of attainder relatively is also
an ex postfacto law.) In the case at bar, the statute simply declares the CPP as an organized conspiracy
for the overthrow of the Government for purposes of example of SECTION 4 of the Act. The Act applies
not only to the CPP but also to other organizations having the same purpose and their successors. The
Acts focus is on the conduct not person.
Furthermore, the statute is PROSPECTIVE in nature. Section 4 prohibits acts committed after approval of
the act.
"It is not for the courts to reexamine the validity of legislative findings and reject them. ... They are the
product of extensive investigation by Committees of Congress over more than a decade and a half. We
certainly cannot dismiss them as unfounded or irrational imaginings. ... And if we accept them, as we
must, as a not unentertainable appraisal by Congress of the threat which Communist organizations pose
not only to existing government in the United States, but to the United States as a sovereign, independent
Nation. ... we must recognize that the power of Congress to regulate Communist organizations of this
nature is extensive." This statement of the U.S. Supreme Court in Communist Party vs. S.A.C. Board, 367
U.S. 94 (1961), mutatis mutandis, may be said of the legislative findings articulated in the Anti-Subversion
Act.

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