Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 167523 June 27, 2008
NILDA V. NAVALES, petitioner,
vs.
REYNALDO NAVALES, respondent.
*

D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J .:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the
Decision
1
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 76624
promulgated on February 16, 2005 which affirmed the Judgment
2
of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 59 of Toledo City, in Civil Case No.
T-799 dated January 2, 2002, declaring the nullity of the marriage of
Reynaldo and Nilda Navales on the ground of psychological incapacity.
The facts are as follows:
Reynaldo Navales (Reynaldo) and Nilda Navales (Nilda) met in 1986 in
a local bar where Nilda worked as a waitress. The two became lovers
and Nilda quit her job, managed a boarding house owned by her uncle
and studied Health Aide financed by Reynaldo. Upon learning that
Nilda's uncle was prodding her to marry an American, Reynaldo, not
wanting to lose her, asked her to marry him. This, despite his knowledge
that Nilda was writing her penpals and was asking money from them and
that she had an illegitimate son by a man whose identity she did not
reveal to him.
3
The two got married on December 29, 1988, before the
Municipal Trial Court Judge of San Fernando, Cebu.
4

Reynaldo claims that during the first year of their marriage, their
relationship went well. Problems arose, however, when Nilda started
selling RTWs and cosmetics, since she could no longer take care of him
and attend to household chores.
5
Things worsened when she started
working as an aerobics instructor at the YMCA, where, according to
Reynaldo, Nilda's flirtatiousness and promiscuity recurred. She wore
tight-fitting outfits, allowed male clients to touch her body, and
introduced herself as single. Reynaldo received phone calls from
different men looking for Nilda. There was also a time when Nilda chose
to ride with another man instead of Reynaldo; and another when Nilda
went home late, riding in the car of the man who kissed her. Reynaldo
also claims that Nilda refused to have a child with him, as it would
destroy her figure.
6
On June 18, 1992, Reynaldo left Nilda and never
reconciled with her again.
7

On August 30, 1999, Reynaldo filed a Petition for Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Marriage and Damages before the RTC, Toledo City,
Cebu, docketed as Civil Case No. T-799 claiming that his marriage with
Nilda did not cure Nilda's flirtatiousness and sexual promiscuity, and that
her behavior indicates her lack of understanding and appreciation of the
meaning of marriage, rendering the same void under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
8

Reynaldo testified in support of his petition and presented telephone
directories showing that Nilda used her maiden name "Bacon" instead of
"Navales."
9
Reynaldo also presented Josefino Ramos, who testified that
he was with Reynaldo when Reynaldo first met Nilda at the bar called
"Appetizer," and that he (Ramos) himself was attracted to Nilda since
she was sexy, beautiful, and jolly to talk with.
10
Reynaldo also presented
Violeta Abales, his cousin, who testified that she was a vendor at the
YMCA where Nilda worked and was known by her maiden name; that
she knows Nilda is sexy and wears tight fitting clothes; that her
companions are mostly males and she flirts with them; and that there
was one time that Reynaldo fetched Nilda at YMCA but Nilda went with
another man, which angered Reynaldo.
11

Finally, Reynaldo presented Leticia Vatanagul, a Clinical Psychologist
and Social Worker who drafted a Psychological Assessment of Marriage
dated March 28, 2001.
12
In said Assessment, Vatanagul concluded that
Nilda is a nymphomaniac, who has a borderline personality, a social
deviant, an alcoholic, and suffering from anti-social personality disorder,
among others, which illnesses are incurable and are the causes of
Nildas psychological incapacity to perform her marital role as wife to
Reynaldo.
13

Nilda, for her part, claims that Reynaldo knew that she had a child
before she met him, yet Reynaldo continued courting her; thus, their
eventual marriage.
14
She claims that it was actually Reynaldo who was
linked with several women, who went home very late, kept his earnings
for himself, and subjected her to physical harm whenever she called his
attention to his vices. She worked at the YMCA to cope with the needs
of life, and she taught only female students. Reynaldo abandoned her
for other women, the latest of whom was Liberty Lim whom she charged,
together with Reynaldo, with concubinage.
15
Nilda presented a
certification from the YMCA dated October 17, 2001 stating that she was
an aerobics instructress for a program that was exclusively for
ladies,
16
as well as a statement of accounts from PLDT showing that she
used her married name, Nilda B. Navales.
17

On January 2, 2002, the RTC rendered its Decision disposing as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered in the above-entitled case declaring defendant Nilda B.
Navales as psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her marital
obligations with plaintiff Reynaldo V. Navales and further
declaring their marriage contracted on December 29, 1988,
before the Municipal Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of San
Fernando, Cebu, as null and void.
18

The RTC held that:
x x x From the testimonies and evidences x x x adduced, it was
clearly established that the defendant had no full understanding
of [the] effects of marriage and had no appreciation of [the]
consequences of marriage as shown by her x x x act of
concealing her marital status by using her maiden name "Nilda
T. Bacon", augmenting her pretense of being still single through
the telephone directories; by her refusal to accompany with [sic]
her husband despite of the latter's insistence, but rather opted to
ride other man's jeep, whose name her husband did not even
know; by her act of allowing a man other than her husband to
touch her legs even in her husband's presence; by allowing
another man to kiss her even in the full view of her husband; by
preferring to loss [sic] her husband rather than losing her job as
aerobic instructress and on top of all, by refusing to bear a child
fathered by her husband because it will destroy her figure, is a
clear indication of the herein defendant's psychological
incapacity.
19

Nilda filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the RTC denied on April
10, 2002.
20

The CA dismissed Nildas appeal, ruling that the RTC correctly held that
Nilda concealed her marital status, as shown by the telephone listings in
which Nilda used her maiden name; that nymphomania, the condition
which the expert said Nilda was afflicted with, was a ground for
psychological incapacity; and that the RTC correctly gave weight to the
four pieces of testimonial evidence presented by Reynaldo vis-a-vis the
lone testimony of Nilda.
21

Nilda now comes before the Court alleging that:
I
The petitioner is not psychologically incapacitated to
comply [with] her marital obligations as a wife.
II
Psychological incapacity, if ever existing, of the wife is NOT
PERMAMENT or INCURABLE and was NEVER EXISTING AT
THE TIME OF THE CELEBRATION OF MARRIAGE.
III
The petitioner is not a nymphomaniac.
IV
The effort of herein petitioner into the case shows that she
is consciously and nobly preserving and continue to believe
that marriage is inviolable rather [sic].
V
The guidelines of Molina case in the application of Article 36
of the New Family Code has not been strictly complied
with.
22

Nilda claims that she did not fail in her duty to observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity; that she never had any illicit relationship with any
man; that no case for inchastity was initiated by Reynaldo against her,
and that it was actually Reynaldo who had a pending case for
concubinage.
23
She questions the lower courts finding that she is a
nymphomaniac, since she was never interviewed by the expert witness
to verify the truth of Reynaldo's allegations. There is also not a single
evidence to show that she had sexual intercourse with a man other than
her husband while they were still living together.
24

Nilda also avers that the guidelines in Republic of the Phillippines. v.
Molina
25
were not complied with. The RTC resolved the doubt on her
motive for using her maiden name in the telephone directory in favor of
the dissolution of the marriage instead of its preservation. The expert
opinion was given weight, even though it was baseless to establish that
petitioner had psychological incapacity to comply with her marital
obligations as a wife; and that, assuming that such incapacity existed, it
was already existing at the time of the marriage; and that such
incapacity was incurable and grave enough to bring about the disability
of the wife to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
26

Reynaldo, for his part, argues that while the petition is captioned as one
under Rule 45, it is actually a petition forcertiorari under Rule 65, since it
impleads the CA as respondent and alleges that the CA acted without or
in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of or excess of jurisdiction.
27
Reynaldo also claims that the issues
raised by Nilda necessarily require a review of the factual findings of the
lower courts, which matters have already been decided and passed
upon, and factual findings of the courts a quo are binding on this Court;
that only questions of law may be raised before this Court; that the RTC,
in reaching its decision, complied with the requirements of Molina; that
the Solicitor General was represented by the City Prosecutor of Toledo
City; and that Reynaldo discharged the burden of proof to show the
nullity of his marriage to Nilda.
Reynaldo further averred that he testified on his behalf; presented
corroborating witnesses, one of whom is an expert clinical psychologist,
as well as documentary evidence in support of his cause of action;
that Molina did not require that the psychologist examine the person to
be declared psychologically incapacitated; that Nilda did not rebut the
psychologist's findings and did not present her own expert to disprove
the findings of Vatanagul; that Nilda's psychological incapacity, caused
by nymphomania, was duly proven to have been existing prior to and at
the time of her marriage to Reynaldo and to have become manifest
during her marriage, based on the testimonies of Reynaldo and his
witnesses; and that such incapacity was proven to be incurable, as
shown by the report of Vatanagul.
28

Nilda filed a Reply, and both parties filed their respective memoranda
reiterating their arguments.
29

Simply stated, the issue posed before the Court is whether the marriage
between Reynaldo and Nilda is null and void on the ground of Nilda's
psychological incapacity.
The answer, contrary to the findings of the RTC and the CA, is in the
negative.
Preliminarily, let it be stressed that it is the policy of our Constitution to
protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social
institution, and marriage as the foundation of the family.
30
The
Constitution decrees marriage as legally inviolable and protects it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties.
31
The Family Code under Article
48
32
therefore requires courts to order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
assigned, in cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage, to appear on behalf of the State in order to take steps to
prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that the evidence
is not fabricated or suppressed. Indeed, only the active participation of
the Public Prosecutor or the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) will
ensure that the interest of the State is represented and protected in
proceedings for annulment and declarations of nullity of marriage by
preventing collusion between the parties, or the fabrication or
suppression of evidence.
33

While the guidelines in Molina requiring the OSG to issue a certification
on whether or not it is agreeing or objecting to the petition for annulment
has been dispensed with by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the Rule on the
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages,
34
still, Article 48 mandates the appearance and
active participation of the State through the fiscal or the prosecuting
attorney.
35

In this case, contrary to the assertion of the RTC that the OSG actively
participated in the case through the Office of the City Prosecutor,
records show that the State's participation consists only of the Report
dated November 29, 1999 by Assistant City Prosecutor Gabriel L.
Trocio, Jr. stating that no collusion exists between the parties;
36
the
OSG's Opposition to the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
dated June 2, 2000;
37
and the cross-examination conducted by
Prosecutor Trocio on Reynaldo
38
and his witness Abales.
39
There were
no other pleadings, motions, or position papers filed by the Public
Prosecutor or OSG; and no controverting evidence presented by them
before the judgment was rendered. Considering the interest sought to be
protected by the aforestated rules, the Court finds the State's
participation in this case to be wanting.
40

But even on the merits, the Court finds that the totality of evidence
presented by Reynaldo, contrary to its appreciation by the RTC and the
CA, is insufficient to sustain a finding that Nilda is psychologically
incapacitated.
Generally, factual findings of trial courts, when affirmed by the CA, are
binding on this Court. Such principle however is not absolute, such as
when the findings of the appellate court go beyond the issues of the
case; run contrary to the admissions of the parties; fail to notice certain
relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different
conclusion; or when there is a misappreciation of facts.
41
Such is the
case at bar.
Psychological incapacity, in order to be a ground for the nullity of
marriage under Article 36
42
of the Family Code, refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of
marriage. It is a malady that is so grave and permanent as to deprive
one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial
bond one is about to assume. As all people may have certain quirks and
idiosyncrasies, or isolated traits associated with certain personality
disorders, there is hardly any doubt that the intention of the law has
been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.
43

In Santos v. Court of Appeals,
44
the Court held that psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability.
45
In Republic of the Philippines v.
Molina,
46
the Court further set forth guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Article 36 of the Family Code, thus:
1. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. x x x
2. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological --- not physical, although its
manifestation and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence
must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could
not have known that obligations he was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although
no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to
limit the application of the provision under the principleejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained.
Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.
3. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of
the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that
the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I
do's". The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at
such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such
moment, or prior thereto.
4. Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. x x x.
5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person
from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.
6. The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code
in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied
marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven
by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
7. Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts. x x x.
47

In this case, Reynaldo and his witnesses sought to establish that Nilda
was a flirt before the marriage, which flirtatiousness recurred when she
started working as an aerobics instructress. The instances alleged by
Reynaldo,i.e., the occasion when Nilda chose to ride home with another
man instead of him, that he saw Nilda being kissed by another man
while in a car, and that Nilda allowed other men to touch her body, if
true, would understandably hurt and embarrass him. Still, these acts by
themselves are insufficient to establish a psychological or mental defect
that is serious, incurable or grave as contemplated by Article 36 of the
Family Code.
Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take
cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations.
48
Mere
"difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of marital obligations
or "ill will" on the part of the spouse is different from "incapacity" rooted
on some debilitating psychological condition or illness.
49
Indeed,
irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves
warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the
same may only be due to a person's refusal or unwillingness to assume
the essential obligations of marriage and not due to some psychological
illness that is contemplated by said rule.
50

As admitted by Reynaldo, his marriage with Nilda was not all that bad; in
fact, it went well in the first year of their marriage. As in other cases, an
admission of a good and harmonious relationship during the early part of
the marriage weakens the assertion of psychological defect existing at
the time of the celebration of the marriage which deprived the party of
the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and its
concomitant responsibilities.
51

In determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36,
the same must be read in conjunction with, although to be taken as
distinct from, Articles 35,
52
37,
53
38
54
and 41
55
of the Family Code that
would likewise, but for different reasons, render the marriage void ab
initio; or Article 45 that would make the marriage merely voidable; or
Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal separation.
56
These
various circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the law
were indifferent on the matter.
57
Indeed, Article 36 should not be
equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted
in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure,
moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like.
58

Reynaldo presented telephone directories in which Nilda used her
maiden name "Bacon" to prove that Nilda represented herself as single.
As noted by the CA, however, the telephone listings presented by
Reynaldo were for the years 1993 to 1995,
59
after Reynaldo admittedly
left Nilda on June 18, 1992. Apart from Reynaldo and Abalales's
testimony, therefore, Reynaldo has no proof that Nilda represented
herself as single while they were still living together. The Court cannot
agree with the RTC, therefore, that said telephone listings show that
Nilda represented herself to be single, which in turn manifests her lack
of understanding of the consequences of marriage.
Reynaldo also presented Clinical Psychologist Vatanagul to bolster his
claim that Nilda is psychologically incapacitated. While it is true that the
Court relies heavily on psychological experts for its understanding of the
human personality,
60
and that there is no requirement that the defendant
spouse be personally examined by a physician or psychologist before
the nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity may be
declared,
61
still, the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be
identified as a psychological illness, its incapacitating nature fully
explained,
62
and said incapacity established by the totality of the
evidence presented during trial.
63

The Court finds that the psychological report presented in this case is
insufficient to establish Nilda's psychological incapacity. In her report,
Vatanagul concluded that Nilda is a nymphomaniac, an emotionally
immature individual, has a borderline personality, has strong sexual
urges which are incurable, has complete denial of her actual role as a
wife, has a very weak conscience or superego, emotionally immature, a
social deviant, not a good wife as seen in her infidelity on several
occasions, an alcoholic, suffers from anti-social personality disorder,
fails to conform to social norms, deceitful, impulsive, irritable and
aggresive, irresponsible and vain.
64
She further defined "nymphomia" as
a psychiatric disorder that involves a disturbance in motor behavior as
shown by her sexual relationship with various men other than her
husband.
65

The report failed to specify, however, the names of the men Nilda had
sexual relationship with or the circumstances surrounding the same. As
pointed out by Nilda, there is not even a single proof that she was ever
involved in an illicit relationship with a man other than her husband.
Vatanagul claims, during her testimony, that in coming out with the
report, she interviewed not only Reynaldo but also Jojo Caballes,
Dorothy and Lesley who were Reynaldo's sister-in-law and sister,
respectively, a certain Marvin and a certain Susan.
66
Vatanagul
however, did not specify the identities of these persons, which
information were supplied by whom, and how they came upon their
respective informations. Indeed, the conclusions drawn by the report are
vague, sweeping and lack sufficient factual bases. As the report lacked
specificity, it failed to show the root cause of Nilda's psychological
incapacity; and failed to demonstrate that there was a "natal or
supervening disabling factor" or an "adverse integral element" in Nilda's
character that effectively incapacitated her from accepting, and thereby
complying with, the essential marital obligations, and that her
psychological or mental malady existed even before the
marriage.
67
Hence, the Court cannot give weight to said assessment.
The standards used by the Court in assessing the sufficiency of
psychological reports may be deemed very strict, but that is only proper
in view of the principle that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
validity of the marriage and the indissolubility of the marital vinculum.
68

Reynaldo also claims that Nilda does not want to get pregnant which
allegation was upheld by the trial court. A review of the records shows,
however, that apart from the testimony of Reynaldo, no other proof was
presented to support such claim. Mere allegation and nothing more is
insufficient to support such proposition. As petitioner before the trial
court, it devolves upon Reynaldo to discharge the burden of establishing
the grounds that would justify the nullification of the marriage.
69

While Reynaldo and Nilda's marriage failed and appears to be without
hope of reconciliation, the remedy, however, is not always to have it
declared void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity. A
marriage, no matter how unsatisfactory, is not a null and void
marriage.
70
And this Court, even as the highest one, can only apply the
letter and spirit of the law, no matter how harsh it may be.
71

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76624 promulgated on February
16, 2005 and the Decision dated January 2, 2002 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 59 of Toledo City, in Civil Case No. T-799
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage and damages, docketed as Civil Case No. T-
799, is DISMISSED.
Costs against respondent.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice


WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice

A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Courts Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division


C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice











G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985
ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX,
Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region Pasay City and
RICHARD UPTON respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J .:\
In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice Reyes Van
Dorn seeks to set aside the Orders, dated September 15, 1983 and
August 3, 1984, in Civil Case No. 1075-P, issued by respondent Judge,
which denied her Motion to Dismiss said case, and her Motion for
Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order, respectively.
The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of the
Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of the United States;
that they were married in Hongkong in 1972; that, after the marriage,
they established their residence in the Philippines; that they begot two
children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975, respectively; that
the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that
petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van
Dorn.
Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in
Civil Case No. 1075-P of the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in
Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila, (the
Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the parties, and asking
that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and
that private respondent be declared with right to manage the conjugal
property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the
cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce
proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had
acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community property" as of
June 11, 1982. The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the
mentioned case on the ground that the property involved is located in
the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case.
The denial is now the subject of this certiorari proceeding.
Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is
interlocutory and is not subject to appeal. certiorari and Prohibition are
neither the remedies to question the propriety of an interlocutory order of
the trial Court. However, when a grave abuse of discretion was patently
committed, or the lower Court acted capriciously and whimsically, then it
devolves upon this Court in a certiorari proceeding to exercise its
supervisory authority and to correct the error committed which, in such a
case, is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
1
Prohibition would then lie since
it would be useless and a waste of time to go ahead with the
proceedings.
2
Weconsider the petition filed in this case within the
exception, and we have given it due course.
For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their
alleged conjugal property in the Philippines.
Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the
alleged conjugal property because of the representation he made in the
divorce proceedings before the American Court that they had no
community of property; that the Galleon Shop was not established
through conjugal funds, and that respondent's claim is barred by prior
judgment.
For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the
Nevada Court cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines
and its declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign
Court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest
Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction.
For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether
the property relations between petitioner and private respondent, after
their marriage, were upon absolute or relative community property, upon
complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. The pivotal
fact in this case is the Nevada divorce of the parties.
The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained
jurisdiction over petitioner who appeared in person before the Court
during the trial of the case. It also obtained jurisdiction over private
respondent who, giving his address as No. 381 Bush Street, San
Francisco, California, authorized his attorneys in the divorce case, Karp
& Gradt Ltd., to agree to the divorce on the ground of incompatibility in
the understanding that there were neither community property nor
community obligations.
3
As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he
executed in favor of the law firm of KARP & GRAD LTD., 336 W. Liberty,
Reno, Nevada, to represent him in the divorce proceedings:
xxx xxx xxx
You are hereby authorized to accept service of
Summons, to file an Answer, appear on my behalf and
do an things necessary and proper to represent me,
without further contesting, subject to the following:
1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of
incompatibility.
2. That there is no community of property to be
adjudicated by the Court.
3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations to be
adjudicated by the court.
xxx xxx xxx
4

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any
of the States of the United States. The decree is binding on private
respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent
cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What
he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding
in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of
the Civil Code,
5
only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of
public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law.
6
In this case, the divorce in Nevada
released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of
American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by
the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45
L. Ed. 794, 799:
The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the
bond of matrimony by a court of competent jurisdiction
are to change the existing status or domestic relation of
husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond.
The marriage tie when thus severed as to one party,
ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife
without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law
provides, in the nature of a penalty. that the guilty party
shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is
still absolutely freed from the bond of the former
marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the
husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case
below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal
assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which
validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not
repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court
from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner
has to be considered still married to private respondent and still subject
to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot
be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe
respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter
should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to
conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own
country if the ends of justice are to be served.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby
ordered to dismiss the Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 1075-P of his
Court.
Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989
IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner,
vs.
HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C.
VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH
EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents.

REGALADO, J .:
An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner which ended in a
foreign absolute divorce, only to be followed by a criminal infidelity suit
of the latter against the former, provides Us the opportunity to lay down
a decisional rule on what hitherto appears to be an unresolved
jurisdictional question.
On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino
citizen, and private respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German
national, were married before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and
Deaths at Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. The
marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for
some time in Malate, Manila where their only child, Isabella Pilapil
Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980.
1

Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between
the spouses, followed by a separation de facto between them.
After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial
disharmony eventuated in private respondent initiating a divorce
proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local
Court in January, 1983. He claimed that there was failure of their
marriage and that they had been living apart since April, 1982.
2

Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support
and separation of property before the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch XXXII, on January 23, 1983 where the same is still pending as
Civil Case No. 83-15866.
3

On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court,
Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on the
ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child
was granted to petitioner. The records show that under German law said
court was locally and internationally competent for the divorce
proceeding and that the dissolution of said marriage was legally founded
on and authorized by the applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction.
4

On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the
divorce decree, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery
before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said
respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as early
as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in
1983". Assistant Fiscal Jacinto A. de los Reyes, Jr., after the
corresponding investigation, recommended the dismissal of the cases
on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.
5
However, upon review, the
respondent city fiscal approved a resolution, dated January 8, 1986,
directing the filing of two complaints for adultery against the petitioner.
6
The
complaints were accordingly filed and were eventually raffled to two
branches of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The case entitled "People of
the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and William Chia", docketed as Criminal
Case No. 87-52435, was assigned to Branch XXVI presided by the
respondent judge; while the other case, "People of the Philippines vs.
Imelda Pilapil and James Chua", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52434
went to the sala of Judge Leonardo Cruz, Branch XXV, of the same court.
7

On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of
Justice asking that the aforesaid resolution of respondent fiscal be set
aside and the cases against her be dismissed.
8
A similar petition was
filed by James Chua, her co-accused in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. The
Secretary of Justice, through the Chief State Prosecutor, gave due course
to both petitions and directed the respondent city fiscal to inform the
Department of Justice "if the accused have already been arraigned and if
not yet arraigned, to move to defer further proceedings" and to elevate the
entire records of both cases to his office for review.
9

Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her
arraignment and to suspend further proceedings thereon.
10
As a
consequence, Judge Leonardo Cruz suspended proceedings in Criminal
Case No. 87-52434. On the other hand, respondent judge merely reset the
date of the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 to April 6, 1987.
Before such scheduled date, petitioner moved for the cancellation of the
arraignment and for the suspension of proceedings in said Criminal Case
No. 87-52435 until after the resolution of the petition for review then pending
before the Secretary of Justice.
11
A motion to quash was also filed in the
same case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction,
12
which motion was denied
by the respondent judge in an order dated September 8, 1987. The same
order also directed the arraignment of both accused therein, that is,
petitioner and William Chia. The latter entered a plea of not guilty while the
petitioner refused to be arraigned. Such refusal of the petitioner being
considered by respondent judge as direct contempt, she and her counsel
were fined and the former was ordered detained until she submitted herself
for arraignment.
13
Later, private respondent entered a plea of not guilty.
14

On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action
for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a temporary restraining
order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her
motion to quash. The petition is anchored on the main ground that the
court is without jurisdiction "to try and decide the charge of adultery,
which is a private offense that cannot be prosecuted de officio (sic),
since the purported complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an
offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his
national law prior to his filing the criminal complaint."
15

On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining the respondents from implementing the aforesaid order of
September 8, 1987 and from further proceeding with Criminal Case No.
87-52435. Subsequently, on March 23, 1988 Secretary of Justice
Sedfrey A. Ordoez acted on the aforesaid petitions for review and,
upholding petitioner's ratiocinations, issued a resolution directing the
respondent city fiscal to move for the dismissal of the complaints against
the petitioner.
16

We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed for shall accordingly
issue.
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code,
17
the crime of adultery, as
well as four other crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except
upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long
since been established, with unwavering consistency, that compliance with
this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement.
18
While in
point of strict law the jurisdiction of the court over the offense is vested in it
by the Judiciary Law, the requirement for a sworn written complaint is just
as jurisdictional a mandate since it is that complaint which starts the
prosecutory proceeding
19
and without which the court cannot exercise its
jurisdiction to try the case.
Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and
concubinage the person who can legally file the complaint should be the
offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the offenses of seduction,
abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, no provision is made for the
prosecution of the crimes of adultery and concubinage by the parents,
grandparents or guardian of the offended party. The so-called exclusive
and successive rule in the prosecution of the first four offenses above
mentioned do not apply to adultery and concubinage. It is significant that
while the State, as parens patriae, was added and vested by the 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure with the power to initiate the criminal action
for a deceased or incapacitated victim in the aforesaid offenses of
seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, in default of her
parents, grandparents or guardian, such amendment did not include the
crimes of adultery and concubinage. In other words, only the offended
spouse, and no other, is authorized by law to initiate the action therefor.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to
institute the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the
status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of
the criminal action. This is a familiar and express rule in civil actions; in
fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion to dismiss in
civil cases, is determined as of the filing of the complaint or petition.
The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of criminal
cases does not mean that the same requirement and rationale would not
apply. Understandably, it may not have been found necessary since
criminal actions are generally and fundamentally commenced by the
State, through the People of the Philippines, the offended party being
merely the complaining witness therein. However, in the so-called
"private crimes" or those which cannot be prosecuted de oficio, and the
present prosecution for adultery is of such genre, the offended spouse
assumes a more predominant role since the right to commence the
action, or to refrain therefrom, is a matter exclusively within his power
and option.
This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who
might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through the
scandal of a public trial.
20
Hence, as cogently argued by petitioner, Article
344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital
relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal
action for, adultery. This is a logical consequence since the raison d'etre of
said provision of law would be absent where the supposed offended party
had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing
of the criminal case.
21

In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity
of the complainant to commence the action be definitely established
and, as already demonstrated, such status or capacity must indubitably
exist as of the time he initiates the action. It would be absurd if his
capacity to bring the action would be determined by his
status before or subsequent to the commencement thereof, where such
capacity or status existed prior to but ceased before, or was acquired
subsequent to but did not exist at the time of, the institution of the case.
We would thereby have the anomalous spectacle of a party bringing suit
at the very time when he is without the legal capacity to do so.
To repeat, there does not appear to be any local precedential
jurisprudence on the specific issue as to when precisely the status of a
complainant as an offended spouse must exist where a criminal
prosecution can be commenced only by one who in law can be
categorized as possessed of such status. Stated differently and with
reference to the present case, the inquiry ;would be whether it is
necessary in the commencement of a criminal action for adultery that
the marital bonds between the complainant and the accused be
unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of the action by the
former against the latter.
American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction
which are in pari materia with ours, yields the rule that after a divorce
has been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the right to
institute proceedings against the offenders where the statute provides
that the innocent spouse shall have the exclusive right to institute a
prosecution for adultery. Where, however, proceedings have been
properly commenced, a divorce subsequently granted can have no legal
effect on the prosecution of the criminal proceedings to a conclusion.
22

In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that
'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except
on the complaint of the husband or wife.' Section 4932,
Code. Though Loftus was husband of defendant when
the offense is said to have been committed, he had
ceased to be such when the prosecution was begun; and
appellant insists that his status was not such as to entitle
him to make the complaint. We have repeatedly said that
the offense is against the unoffending spouse, as well as
the state, in explaining the reason for this provision in the
statute; and we are of the opinion that the unoffending
spouse must be such when the prosecution is
commenced. (Emphasis supplied.)
We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this
case and in our jurisdiction, considering our statutory law and jural policy
on the matter. We are convinced that in cases of such nature, the status
of the complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be determined as of the
time the complaint was filed. Thus, the person who initiates the adultery
case must be an offended spouse, and by this is meant that he is still
married to the accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the complaint.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid
divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted.
Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines
insofar as private respondent is concerned
23
in view of the nationality
principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons.
Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al.,
24
after a
divorce was granted by a United States court between Alice Van Dornja
Filipina, and her American husband, the latter filed a civil case in a trial court
here alleging that her business concern was conjugal property and praying
that she be ordered to render an accounting and that the plaintiff be granted
the right to manage the business. Rejecting his pretensions, this Court
perspicuously demonstrated the error of such stance, thus:
There can be no question as to the validity of that
Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States.
The decree is binding on private respondent as an
American citizen. For instance, private respondent
cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of
the Union. ...
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied
in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals
are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the
same being considered contrary to our concept of public
policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law. ...
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is
no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no
standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's
husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal
assets. ...
25

Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being
no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence
the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse
at the time he filed suit.
The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this
case before the decree of divorce for lack of knowledge, even if true, is
of no legal significance or consequence in this case. When said
respondent initiated the divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that
there would no longer be a family nor marriage vows to protect once a
dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither would there be a danger
of introducing spurious heirs into the family, which is said to be one of
the reasons for the particular formulation of our law on adultery,
26
since
there would thenceforth be no spousal relationship to speak of. The
severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former
spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or
cast obloquy on the other.
The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be successfully
relied upon by private respondent. In applying Article 433 of the old
Penal Code, substantially the same as Article 333 of the Revised Penal
Code, which punished adultery "although the marriage be afterwards
declared void", the Court merely stated that "the lawmakers intended to
declare adulterous the infidelity of a married woman to her marital vows,
even though it should be made to appear that she is entitled to have her
marriage contract declared null and void, until and unless she actually
secures a formal judicial declaration to that effect". Definitely, it cannot
be logically inferred therefrom that the complaint can still be filed after
the declaration of nullity because such declaration that the marriage is
void ab initio is equivalent to stating that it never existed. There being no
marriage from the beginning, any complaint for adultery filed after said
declaration of nullity would no longer have a leg to stand on. Moreover,
what was consequently contemplated and within the purview of the
decision in said case is the situation where the criminal action for
adultery was filed before the termination of the marriage by a judicial
declaration of its nullity ab initio. The same rule and requisite would
necessarily apply where the termination of the marriage was effected, as
in this case, by a valid foreign divorce.
Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et al. vs.
Vamenta, hereinbefore cited,
27
must suffer the same fate of inapplicability.
A cursory reading of said case reveals that the offended spouse therein had
duly and seasonably filed a complaint for adultery, although an issue was
raised as to its sufficiency but which was resolved in favor of the
complainant. Said case did not involve a factual situation akin to the one at
bar or any issue determinative of the controversy herein.
WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to
quash is SET ASIDE and another one enteredDISMISSING the
complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 for lack of jurisdiction. The
temporary restraining order issued in this case on October 21, 1987 is
hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PARAS, J ., concurring:
It is my considered opinion that regardless of whether We consider the
German absolute divorce as valid also in the Philippines, the fact is that
the husband in the instant case, by the very act of his obtaining an
absolute divorce in Germany can no longer be considered as the
offended party in case his former wife actually has carnal knowledge
with another, because in divorcing her, he already implicitly authorized
the woman to have sexual relations with others. A contrary ruling would
be less than fair for a man, who is free to have sex will be allowed to
deprive the woman of the same privilege.
In the case of Recto v. Harden (100 Phil. 427 [1956]), the Supreme
Court considered the absolute divorce between the American husband
and his American wife as valid and binding in the Philippines on the
theory that their status and capacity are governed by their National law,
namely, American law. There is no decision yet of the Supreme Court
regarding the validity of such a divorce if one of the parties, say an
American, is married to a Filipino wife, for then two (2) different
nationalities would be involved.
In the book of Senate President Jovito Salonga entitled Private
International Law and precisely because of theNational law doctrine, he
considers the absolute divorce as valid insofar as the American husband
is concerned but void insofar as the Filipino wife is involved. This results
in what he calls a "socially grotesque situation," where a Filipino woman
is still married to a man who is no longer her husband. It is the opinion
however, of the undersigned that very likely the opposite expresses the
correct view. While under the national law of the husband the absolute
divorce will be valid, still one of the exceptions to the application of the
proper foreign law (one of the exceptions to comity) is when the foreign
law will work an injustice or injury to the people or residents of the forum.
Consequently since to recognize the absolute divorce as valid on the
part of the husband would be injurious or prejudicial to the Filipino wife
whose marriage would be still valid under her national law, it would
seem that under our law existing before the new Family Code (which
took effect on August 3, 1988) the divorce should be considered void
both with respect to the American husband and the Filipino wife.
The recent case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. (139 SCRA [1985]) cannot
apply despite the fact that the husband was an American can with a
Filipino wife because in said case the validity of the divorce insofar as
the Filipino wife is concerned was NEVER put in issue.






























G.R. No. 183896 January 30, 2013
SYED AZHAR ABBAS, Petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA GOO ABBAS, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
VELASCO, JR., J .:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, questioning the Decision
1
of the Court of
Appeals (CA) dated March 11, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760, which
reversed the Decision
2
in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM dated October 5,
2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 109, Pasay City, and the
CA Resolution dated July 24, 2008, denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration of the CA Decision.
The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner Syed Azhar
Abbas (Syed) for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gloria Goo-
Abbas (Gloria) with the RTC of Pasay City, docketed as Civil Case No.
03-0382-CFM, and raffled to RTC Branch 109. Syed alleged the
absence of a marriage license, as provided for in Article 4, Chapter I,
Title 1 of Executive Order No. 269, otherwise known as the Family Code
of the Philippines, as a ground for the annulment of his marriage to
Gloria.
In the Marriage Contract
3
of Gloria and Syed, it is stated that Marriage
License No. 9969967, issued at Carmona, Cavite on January 8, 1993,
was presented to the solemnizing officer. It is this information that is
crucial to the resolution of this case.
At the trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria, a
Filipino citizen, in Taiwan in 1991, and they were married on August 9,
1992 at the Taipei Mosque in Taiwan.
4
He arrived in the Philippines in
December of 1992. On January 9, 1993, at around 5 oclock in the
afternoon, he was at his mother-in-laws residence, located at 2676 F.
Muoz St., Malate, Manila, when his mother-in-law arrived with two men.
He testified that he was told that he was going to undergo some
ceremony, one of the requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but
was not told of the nature of said ceremony. During the ceremony he
and Gloria signed a document. He claimed that he did not know that the
ceremony was a marriage until Gloria told him later. He further testified
that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a marriage license,
and that he had never resided in that area. In July of 2003, he went to
the Office of the Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to check on their
marriage license, and was asked to show a copy of their marriage
contract wherein the marriage license number could be found.
5
The
Municipal Civil Registrar, Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued a
certification on July 11, 2003 to the effect that the marriage license
number appearing in the marriage contract he submitted, Marriage
License No. 9969967, was the number of another marriage license
issued to a certain Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan.
6
Said
certification reads as follows:
11 July 2003
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify as per Registry Records of Marriage License filed in this
office, Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued in favor of MR.
ARLINDO GETALADO and MISS MYRA MABILANGAN on January 19,
1993.
No Marriage License appear [sic] to have been issued to MR. SYED
AZHAR ABBAS and MISS GLORIA F. GOO on January 8, 1993.
This certification is being issued to Mr. Syed Azhar Abbas for whatever
legal purpose or intents it may serve.
7

On cross-examination, Syed testified that Gloria had filed bigamy cases
against him in 2001 and 2002, and that he had gone to the Municipal
Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite to get certification on whether or not
there was a marriage license on advice of his counsel.
8

Petitioner also presented Norberto Bagsic (Bagsic), an employee of the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite. Bagsic appeared under a
letter of authority from the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite,
and brought documents pertaining to Marriage License No. 9969967,
which was issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January
20, 1993.
9

Bagsic testified that their office issues serial numbers for marriage
licenses and that the numbers are issued chronologically.
10
He testified
that the certification dated July 11, 2003, was issued and signed by
Leodivina Encarnacion, Registrar of the Municipality of Carmona,
Cavite, certifying that Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued for
Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 19, 1993, and that
their office had not issued any other license of the same serial number,
namely 9969967, to any other person.
11

For her part, Gloria testified on her own behalf, and presented Reverend
Mario Dauz, Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez, Felicitas Goo and May Ann Ceriola.
Reverend Mario Dauz (Rev. Dauz) testified that he was a minister of the
Gospel and a barangay captain, and that he is authorized to solemnize
marriages within the Philippines.
12
He testified that he solemnized the
marriage of Syed Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo at the residence of the
bride on January 9, 1993.
13
He stated that the witnesses were Atty.
Lorenzo Sanchez (Atty. Sanchez) and Mary Ann Ceriola.
14
He testified
that he had been solemnizing marriages since 1982, and that he is
familiar with the requirements.
15
Rev. Dauz further testified that Atty.
Sanchez gave him the marriage license the day before the actual
wedding, and that the marriage contract was prepared by his
secretary.
16
After the solemnization of the marriage, it was registered
with the Local Civil Registrar of Manila, and Rev. Dauz submitted the
marriage contract and copy of the marriage license with that office.
17

Atty. Sanchez testified that he was asked to be the sponsor of the
wedding of Syed Abbas and Gloria Goo by the mother of the bride,
Felicitas Goo.
18
He testified that he requested a certain Qualin to secure
the marriage license for the couple, and that this Qualin secured the
license and gave the same to him on January 8, 1993.
19
He further
testified that he did not know where the marriage license was
obtained.
20
He attended the wedding ceremony on January 9, 1993,
signed the marriage contract as sponsor, and witnessed the signing of
the marriage contract by the couple, the solemnizing officer and the
other witness, Mary Ann Ceriola.
21

Felicitas Goo testified that Gloria Goo is her daughter and Syed Azhar
Abbas is her son-in-law, and that she was present at the wedding
ceremony held on January 9, 1993 at her house.
22
She testified that she
sought the help of Atty. Sanchez at the Manila City Hall in securing the
marriage license, and that a week before the marriage was to take
place, a male person went to their house with the application for
marriage license.
23
Three days later, the same person went back to their
house, showed her the marriage license before returning it to Atty.
Sanchez who then gave it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer.
24
She
further testified that she did not read all of the contents of the marriage
license, and that she was told that the marriage license was obtained
from Carmona.
25
She also testified that a bigamy case had been filed by
Gloria against Syed at the Regional Trial Court of Manila, evidenced by
an information for Bigamy dated January 10, 2003, pending before
Branch 47 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
26

As to Mary Ann Ceriolas testimony, the counsels for both parties
stipulated that: (a) she is one of the sponsors at the wedding of Gloria
Goo and Syed Abbas on January 9, 1993; (b) she was seen in the
wedding photos and she could identify all the persons depicted in said
photos; and (c) her testimony corroborates that of Felicitas Goo and
Atty. Sanchez.
The respondent, Gloria, testified that Syed is her husband, and
presented the marriage contract bearing their signatures as proof.
27
She
and her mother sought the help of Atty. Sanchez in securing a marriage
license, and asked him to be one of the sponsors. A certain Qualin went
to their house and said that he will get the marriage license for them,
and after several days returned with an application for marriage license
for them to sign, which she and Syed did. After Qualin returned with the
marriage license, they gave the license to Atty. Sanchez who gave it to
Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer. Gloria testified that she and Syed
were married on January 9, 1993 at their residence.
28

Gloria further testified that she has a daughter with Syed, born on June
15, 1993.
29

Gloria also testified that she filed a bigamy case against Syed, who had
married a certain Maria Corazon Buenaventura during the existence of
the previous marriage, and that the case was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 02A-03408, with the RTC of Manila.
30

Gloria stated that she and Syed had already been married on August 9,
1992 in Taiwan, but that she did not know if said marriage had been
celebrated under Muslim rites, because the one who celebrated their
marriage was Chinese, and those around them at the time were
Chinese.
31

The Ruling of the RTC
In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held that no valid
marriage license was issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite in favor of Gloria and Syed, as Marriage License No.
9969967 had been issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan,
and the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite had certified that
no marriage license had been issued for Gloria and Syed.
32
It also took
into account the fact that neither party was a resident of Carmona,
Cavite, the place where Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued, in
violation of Article 9 of the Family Code.
33
As the marriage was not one
of those exempt from the license requirement, and that the lack of a
valid marriage license is an absence of a formal requisite, the marriage
of Gloria and Syed on January 9, 1993 was void ab initio.
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner,
and against the respondent declaring as follows:
1. The marriage on January 9, 1993 between petitioner Syed
Azhar Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas is hereby
annulled;
2. Terminating the community of property relations between the
petitioner and the respondent even if no property was acquired
during their cohabitation by reason of the nullity of the marriage
of the parties.
3. The Local Civil Registrar of Manila and the Civil Registrar
General, National Statistics Office, are hereby ordered to cancel
from their respective civil registries the marriage contracted by
petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas
on January 9, 1993 in Manila.
SO ORDERED.
34

Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated November 7, 2005, but
the RTC denied the same, prompting her to appeal the questioned
decision to the Court of Appeals.
The Ruling of the CA
In her appeal to the CA, Gloria submitted the following assignment of
errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE
MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND
RESPONDENT AS NULL AND VOID DUE TO THE ABSENCE
OF A MARRIAGE LICENSE DESPITE EVIDENCE CLEARLY
SHOWING THAT THERE WAS ONE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING, AS A
REQUISITE OF A VALID MARRIAGE, THE OVERWHELMING
EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT A MARRIAGE CEREMONY
TOOK PLACE WITH THE APPEARANCE OF THE
CONTRACTING PARTIES BEFORE THE SOLEMNIZING
OFFICER AND THEIR PERSONAL DECLARATION THAT
THEY TOOK EACH OTHER AS HUSBAND AND WIFE IN THE
PRESENCE OF NOT LESS THAN TWO WITNESSES OF
LEGAL AGE.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE ISSUE
OF ESTOPPEL BY LACHES ON THE PART OF THE
PETITIONER, AN ISSUE TIMELY RAISED IN THE COURT
BELOW.
35

The CA gave credence to Glorias arguments, and granted her appeal. It
held that the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar failed to
categorically state that a diligent search for the marriage license of
Gloria and Syed was conducted, and thus held that said certification
could not be accorded probative value.
36
The CA ruled that there was
sufficient testimonial and documentary evidence that Gloria and Syed
had been validly married and that there was compliance with all the
requisites laid down by law.
37

It gave weight to the fact that Syed had admitted to having signed the
marriage contract. The CA also considered that the parties had
comported themselves as husband and wife, and that Syed only
instituted his petition after Gloria had filed a case against him for
bigamy.
38

The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The
Decision dated 05 October 2005 and Order dated 27 January 2006 of
the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109, in Civil Case No. 03-
0382-CFM are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is DISMISSED. The marriage between
Shed [sic] Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo Abbas contracted on 09 January
1993 remains valid and subsisting. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
39

Syed then filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 1, 2008
40
but
the same was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated July 24, 2008.
41

Hence, this petition.
Grounds in Support of Petition
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW IN CITING REPUBLIC VS. COURT
OF APPEALS AS THE SAME IS DIAMETRICALLY
INCONSISTENT AND CONTRARY TO THE COURTS OWN
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS IN THIS CASE.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED
IN REVERSING AND SETTING ASIDE, WITHOUT ANY
FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS, THE DECISION OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRANTING THE PETITION FOR
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.
42

The Ruling of this Court
The petition is meritorious.
As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on January 9, 1993,
Executive Order No. 209, or the Family Code of the Philippines, is the
applicable law. The pertinent provisions that would apply to this
particular case are Articles 3, 4 and 35(3), which read as follows:
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in
Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance
of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their
personal declaration that they take each other as husband and
wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall
render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage
voidable as provided in Article 45.
An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the
marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be
civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
x x x x
(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the
preceding Chapter.
There is no issue with the essential requisites under Art. 2 of the Family
Code, nor with the formal requisites of the authority of the solemnizing
officer and the conduct of the marriage ceremony. Nor is the marriage
one that is exempt from the requirement of a valid marriage license
under Chapter 2, Title I of the Family Code. The resolution of this case,
thus, hinges on whether or not a valid marriage license had been issued
for the couple. The RTC held that no valid marriage license had been
issued. The CA held that there was a valid marriage license.
We find the RTC to be correct in this instance.
Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a
copy thereof, and relied on the marriage contract as well as the
testimonies of her witnesses to prove the existence of said license. To
prove that no such license was issued, Syed turned to the office of the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite which had allegedly issued
said license. It was there that he requested certification that no such
license was issued. In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals
43
such
certification was allowed, as permitted by Sec. 29, Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court, which reads:
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. A written statement signed by an
officer having the custody of an official record or by his deputy that after
diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in
the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above
provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain
no such record or entry.
In the case of Republic, in allowing the certification of the Civil Registrar
of Pasig to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license, the Court held:
The above Rule authorized the custodian of the documents to certify
that despite diligent search, a particular document does not exist in his
office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in
a register. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public
officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book
where they are required to enter all applications for marriage licenses,
including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage license was
issued and such other relevant data.
44

The Court held in that case that the certification issued by the civil
registrar enjoyed probative value, as his duty was to maintain records of
data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage
license of Gloria and Syed was allegedly issued, issued a certification to
the effect that no such marriage license for Gloria and Syed was issued,
and that the serial number of the marriage license pertained to another
couple, Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. A certified machine
copy of Marriage License No. 9969967 was presented, which was
issued in Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the names of Gloria and Syed
do not appear in the document.
In reversing the RTC, the CA focused on the wording of the certification,
stating that it did not comply with Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court.
The CA deduced that from the absence of the words "despite diligent
search" in the certification, and since the certification used stated that no
marriage license appears to have been issued, no diligent search had
been conducted and thus the certification could not be given probative
value.
To justify that deduction, the CA cited the case of Republic v. Court of
Appeals.
45
It is worth noting that in that particular case, the Court, in
sustaining the finding of the lower court that a marriage license was
lacking, relied on the Certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig,
which merely stated that the alleged marriage license could not be
located as the same did not appear in their records. Nowhere in the
Certification was it categorically stated that the officer involved
conducted a diligent search, nor is a categorical declaration absolutely
necessary for Sec. 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court to apply.
Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable
presumption that an official duty has been regularly performed, absent
contradiction or other evidence to the contrary. We held, "The
presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative
evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty."
46
No such
affirmative evidence was shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar was
lax in performing her duty of checking the records of their office, thus the
presumption must stand. In fact, proof does exist of a diligent search
having been conducted, as Marriage License No. 996967 was indeed
located and submitted to the court. The fact that the names in said
license do not correspond to those of Gloria and Syed does not overturn
the presumption that the registrar conducted a diligent search of the
records of her office.
It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a copy
thereof to the court. She failed to explain why the marriage license was
secured in Carmona, Cavite, a location where, admittedly, neither party
resided. She took no pains to apply for the license, so she is not the best
witness to testify to the validity and existence of said license. Neither
could the other witnesses she presented prove the existence of the
marriage license, as none of them applied for the license in Carmona,
Cavite. Her mother, Felicitas Goo, could not even testify as to the
contents of the license, having admitted to not reading all of its contents.
Atty. Sanchez, one of the sponsors, whom Gloria and Felicitas Goo
approached for assistance in securing the license, admitted not knowing
where the license came from. The task of applying for the license was
delegated to a certain Qualin, who could have testified as to how the
license was secured and thus impeached the certification of the
Municipal Civil Registrar as well as the testimony of her representative.
As Gloria failed to present this Qualin, the certification of the Municipal
Civil Registrar still enjoys probative value.
It is also noted that the solemnizing officer testified that the marriage
contract and a copy of the marriage license were submitted to the Local
Civil Registrar of Manila. Thus, a copy of the marriage license could
have simply been secured from that office and submitted to the court.
However, Gloria inexplicably failed to do so, further weakening her claim
that there was a valid marriage license issued for her and Syed.
In the case of Cario v. Cario,
47
following the case of Republic,
48
it was
held that the certification of the Local Civil Registrar that their office had
no record of a marriage license was adequate to prove the non-issuance
of said license. The case of Cario further held that the presumed
validity of the marriage of the parties had been overcome, and that it
became the burden of the party alleging a valid marriage to prove that
the marriage was valid, and that the required marriage license had been
secured.
49
Gloria has failed to discharge that burden, and the only
conclusion that can be reached is that no valid marriage license was
issued. It cannot be said that there was a simple irregularity in the
marriage license that would not affect the validity of the marriage, as no
license was presented by the respondent. No marriage license was
proven to have been issued to Gloria and Syed, based on the
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite and
Glorias failure to produce a copy of the alleged marriage license.
To bolster its ruling, the CA cited other evidence to support its
conclusion that Gloria and Syed were validly married. To quote the CA:
Moreover, the record is replete with evidence, testimonial and
documentary, that appellant and appellee have been validly married and
there was compliance with all the requisites laid down by law. Both
parties are legally capacitated to marry. A certificate of legal capacity
was even issued by the Embassy of Pakistan in favor of appellee. The
parties herein gave their consent freely. Appellee admitted that the
signature above his name in the marriage contract was his. Several
pictures were presented showing appellant and appellee, before the
solemnizing officer, the witnesses and other members of appellants
family, taken during the marriage ceremony, as well as in the restaurant
where the lunch was held after the marriage ceremony. Most telling of all
is Exhibit "5-C" which shows appellee signing the Marriage Contract.
x x x x
The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and has
[sic] one offspring, Aliea Fatima Goo Abbas, who was born on 15 June
1993. It took appellee more than ten (10) years before he filed on 01
August 2003 his Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under
Article 4 of the Family Code. We take serious note that said Petition
appears to have been instituted by him only after an Information for
Bigamy (Exhibit "1") dated 10 January 2003 was filed against him for
contracting a second or subsequent marriage with one Ma. Corazon
(Maryam) T. Buenaventura. We are not ready to reward (appellee) by
declaring the nullity of his marriage and give him his freedom and in the
process allow him to profit from his own deceit and perfidy.
50

All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was
conducted and a marriage contract was signed does not operate to cure
the absence of a valid marriage license. Article 4 of the Family Code is
clear when it says, "The absence of any of the essential or formal
requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in
Article 35(2)." Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides that a
marriage solemnized without a license is void from the beginning, except
those exempt from the license requirement under Articles 27 to 34,
Chapter 2, Title I of the same Code.
51
Again, this marriage cannot be
characterized as among the exemptions, and thus, having been
solemnized without a marriage license, is void ab initio.1wphi1
As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it
may well be that his motives are less than pure, that he seeks to evade
a bigamy suit. Be that as it may, the same does not make up for the
failure of the respondent to prove that they had a valid marriage license,
given the weight of evidence presented by petitioner. The lack of a valid
marriage license cannot be attributed to him, as it was Gloria who took
steps to procure the same. The law must be applied. As the marriage
license, a formal requisite, is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria and
Syed is void ab initio.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is hereby
GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated March 11, 2008 and
Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 86760 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 109, Pasay City dated October 5, 2005 in
Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM annulling the marriage of petitioner with
respondent on January 9, 1993 is hereby REINSTATED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice