Central planning failed in Eastern European and Asian economies due to severe supply constraints and soft budgets. Severe supply constraints resulted from a lack of incentives under central planning, which led to shortages, low innovation, and inefficiencies. Soft budgets, where governments would bail out failing industries, created moral hazard and wasted resources. Together, these problems resulted in inefficiency, shortages, and inflation, eventually causing the collapse of communist regimes in the late 1980s.
Central planning failed in Eastern European and Asian economies due to severe supply constraints and soft budgets. Severe supply constraints resulted from a lack of incentives under central planning, which led to shortages, low innovation, and inefficiencies. Soft budgets, where governments would bail out failing industries, created moral hazard and wasted resources. Together, these problems resulted in inefficiency, shortages, and inflation, eventually causing the collapse of communist regimes in the late 1980s.
Central planning failed in Eastern European and Asian economies due to severe supply constraints and soft budgets. Severe supply constraints resulted from a lack of incentives under central planning, which led to shortages, low innovation, and inefficiencies. Soft budgets, where governments would bail out failing industries, created moral hazard and wasted resources. Together, these problems resulted in inefficiency, shortages, and inflation, eventually causing the collapse of communist regimes in the late 1980s.
Central planning failed because it was based on severe
aggregate supply constraints and soft budgets. Explain and discuss.
Between the 1920s and the 1980s, many Eastern European and Northern Asian economies were centrally planned. This meant that their economies were under complete government control allowing for no free market and with targets and policies set by a central authority. Prices were even set by government; there was no invisible hand of Capitalism to find natural price equilibrium. In theory, a centrally planned system has several merits; inefficiencies could be eliminated due to coordination between industries, resources can be directed into investment leading to rapid growth, the lowering of unemployment can be made possible, and business cycles that had plagued the Western world in the 1920s to 1930s could be avoided. However, in practice, this system had major issues, which eventually led to the collapse of the former communist bloc countries. The waste and economic inefficiency of the command system, along with problems that resulted from severe aggregate supply constraints and soft budgets, which were supposed to embody them, proved, in the end, terminal.
There were several factors that contributed toward the severe aggregate supply constraints in the planned economies. To begin with, targets in the planning system, as opposed to profits, resulted in a lack of incentive to respond to shortages in the economy. Without profit, there is no pareto optimality as there is in a market economy and therefore there is no incentive to render issues of shortages. Furthermore, this lack of incentive led to a lack of innovation in planned systems. The system offers no reward for quality and therefore products are made with the lowest costs and are no further developed. Policy for import substitution also meant that no new technology or innovative thinking was being gained from abroad. Prior to the creation of the planned system, Schumpeter predicted Soviet planners would lack entrepreneurship while Kornai found that out of fifty revolutionary innovations, just four had come from Socialist backgrounds. European Formative 2012/13 Jack Mauduit
Centrally planned systems displayed high levels of static inefficiency. The lack of a price mechanism meant there was no good signaling device causing inefficient resource allocation. The bureaucracy involved failed to lend hand to creating a flexible economy. The planners used aggregated measures when setting targets that failed to pay attention to detail. For example, the so called Big Nail problem explains that if an industry is told to produce as many nails as possible, they would produce lots of tiny nails, but if it is told to produce as greater weight of nails as possible, it would produce several huge, useless, nails. This meant that producers only cared about quantity and not quality. Bureaucrats also made market entry very rigid leading to a lack of competition in markets. The Mises and Hayek Austrian critique of socialism between 1920 and 1945 draws attention to the consequences of eradicating the price mechanism. Where there is no market, there is no pricing mechanism, without a pricing mechanism, there is no economic calculation Socialism is the abolition of a rational economy. (Mises, 1920). Hayek follows Mises statement by emphasizing that planners can never have the necessary knowledge to plan an economy efficiently (1920).
This diagram shows a production possibility frontier with indifference curve SWF representing the optimal position for society to be operating on the frontier. Society European Formative 2012/13 Jack Mauduit wants to be at point B, however, as Hayek mentioned in his critique, planners lack knowledge from price mechanism signaling that is available in capitalist economies. Although planned economies are capable of operating at full capacity, on the frontier curve, there is no way however that central authority are able to know what society needs and therefore are more likely to operate at A which is allocatively inefficient.
These bureaucratic problems led to coordination problems throughout the system leading to allocation errors. The lack of price mechanism led to shortages and bottlenecks as it was too complex for planners to simulate, as predicted by Hayek at the start of planning. Problems upstream also meant problems downstream were inevitable due to inefficiencies in the organisation of the system.
Alongside aggregate supply constraints, soft budgets are also marked as a fundamental flaw of centrally planned systems. Due to the defensive posture of planned systems and insistence for self-sufficiency or autarky, the structure of the economy was very dependant on certain high-priority sectors. These sectors were offered soft budgets which effectively suggests that if they fail to meet targets, the government would simply bail them out. This created a moral hazard. There were no incentives for firms to be efficient or cut costs and workers lost productivity. Figures of coal consumption per $1000 GDP emphasize the severity of the effect of these soft budgets; for example, Poland used 1515 kg of Coal per $1,000 GDP whereas France used just 502kg. Governments accumulated deficits, printed money and borrowed against the future to finance their high-priority sectors that essentially bankrupted the Soviet system.
Soft budget constraints in the economy led to both shortages and repressed inflation. Soft budgets meant that companies bid for as much input as they can regardless of need simply because the government is paying for it and they can sell whatever they produce with no risk. Demand for inputs became insatiable as it did for investment also. The unconstrained nature of the socialist market, compared to that of a capitalist one, created the incentive to hoard, leading to shortages. Inflation European Formative 2012/13 Jack Mauduit was high as a result of the excess demand, however, it would have no effect on shortages due to the still enforced soft budget constraints. This enterprise sphere showed how prices and money had no influence on limiting demand, only vertical and horizontal shortages caused by allocation to suppliers effectively curtailed demand.
Another issue caused by the runaway spending was a huge monetary overhang. The soft budget constraints combined with hard budget constraints consumers faced led to repeated shortages causing repressed inflation as the central planners refuse to increase prices meaning that consumers are forced into saving as there is nothing else to spend their money on. This creates a monetary overhang and is referred to as a consequence of the consumer sphere highlighting that repressed inflation is inevitable as a result of the economic policy enforced in socialist systems.
Leibenstein in 1966 introduced the concept of X-inefficiency to the socialist world. The lack of competition in markets caused by rigidities domestically and internationally meant there was a lack of pressure on management and workers leading to lower productivity. For example, while the socialist East Germany produced 2699 tons of brown coal per worker, the capitalist West Germany produced 5905 tons, stressing the wasteful nature of centrally planned systems. Economist Holzman in 1976 labeled this hidden unemployment they pretend to pay us and we pretend to work. X-inefficiency is shown on the production possibility frontier diagram shown previously by point C. This is inside the frontier showing that the economy is not only allocatively inefficient, it is also failing to operate at full capacity as a result of a lack of competition and low productivity.
Despite the many failures highlighted regarding aggregate supply constraints and soft budgets, the socialist system did have some successes. Soviet nations displayed rapid, if distorted and inefficient, industrialisation as a product of directing resources into these high-priority areas. It is also argued that the centrally planned structure was fundamental in finding victory for socialist nations in World War II. Centrally planned systems also introduced the concept of mass education that has European Formative 2012/13 Jack Mauduit revolutionized countries around the world. Furthermore, although technological progress was a weak feature of these economies due to lack of competition, incentive and import substitution, some areas excelled in technological progress as a result of targeted investment. At the time, the race to space was a very important political milestone for the USSR and hence investment was pumped into the space programme. In 1957, Sputnik saw Russia send the first Earth satellite into space and in 1961 sent the first man into space, both huge technological achievements.
These successes are however insignificant I when looking at the big picture. Shortages are an inevitable consequence of a system with a lack of incentive and a corrupt and inefficient government. The soft budget constraints of enterprises aggravate the shortages and lead to inflation in the economy albeit repressed. Soviet policy is to blame for the repressed inflation rather than being endemic to the system. These two major failures of the centrally planned system contributed largely to the downfall of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s.
By the mid 1980s, the USSR economy was in crisis and politicians were becoming restive as a result of unprecedented stagnation. The paramount reason for such decline is the inefficiency of central planning as an allocative mechanism for advanced societies. As a system, planning has an inherent bias towards producing quantity rather than quality. Quality is not easy to measure or enforce. Economist Lavigne in 1999 summarized by saying that the socialist model was very wasteful in human and material resources, failed to achieve modernization and left all the countries lagging behind the developed market economies.