1

Determinants of Electoral Support for

Marijuana Legalization in the United States
By Sam Tracy



University of Connecticut
Department of Political Science
Advisor: Professor Sam Best



2
Abstract
This paper provides one of the first examinations of causes of support for
marijuana legalization. Using a combination of data sources, including public opinion
polling, county-level vote counts, and county-level demographic information, it analyzes
determinants of support for the general concept and specific ballot measures that would
put it into practice. This study finds that support for marijuana legalization is associated
with age, gender, religiousness, ideology, and party affiliation, though many of these
gaps are closing over time. It also detects strong correlations between voting patterns for
specific marijuana legalization ballot initiatives and voting for presidential candidates,
same-sex marriage initiatives, and abortion access initiatives in all states; correlations
with medical marijuana enrollment in Colorado; and no noticeable correlations with the
presence of mega-churches or the severity of marijuana prohibition enforcement. These
findings help place marijuana legalization in the political science literature, and will serve
to inform future debates on the issue.









3
Table of Contents
A Brief History of Marijuana Policy. 4
Significance 10
Questions and Hypotheses. 14
Research Methods.. 15
Results from Polling Data.. 18
Overall Support.. 18
Religiousness.. 20
Gender 23
Party Affiliation... 25
Ideology... 27
Age... 29
Region... 33
Case Study: the 2010 and 2012 Elections. 36
Religiousness 37
Partisanship... 44
Marijuana Prohibition Enforcement.. 55
Enrollment in Medical Marijuana Programs 58
Support for Same-Sex Marriage... 63
Support for Abortion Access 70
Age... 75
Conclusions and Looking Forward.. 79
Bibliography. 81
4
A Brief History of Marijuana Policy
When marijuana legalization is mentioned, it typically elicits giggles, puns, or
knowing winks from some people, and eye-rolls or outright hostility from others. This is
because many people, from everyday Americans to high-level elected officials, (USA
Today, Dont Legalize) equate support for marijuana legalization with support for
marijuana use. However, this is an oversimplification of an incredibly serious issue that
has grown in prominence over the past few decades, and shows no indication of falling
by the wayside.
The prohibition of marijuana was introduced gradually, slowly transforming the
plant from a source of many widely-used industrial and medicinal products into a taboo
and harmful substance considered by many to be the gateway to a lifetime of drug
abuse.
Early in American history, the recreational use of marijuana was unheard of, and
the cannabis plant was widely cultivated for its fiber. Many of Americas founding
fathers, including George Washington, grew cannabis on their plantations in order to
produce rope, textiles, and other commercial goods (NCC Staff). It was also used in
many medicines, and cannabis-based tinctures were sold on pharmacy shelves along with
drugs ranging from aspirin to narcotics. In 1906, the Pure Food and Drug Act became the
first federal law to address marijuana, requiring labeling for over-the-counter remedies
containing its extracts (Page).
In the early 20
th
century, Americans were introduced to the recreational use of
marijuana by Mexican immigrants, who often smoked it in the evening to relax after
work. However, many Americans were hostile to this influx of Mexican immigrants, and
5
their affiliation with marijuana led to the demonization of its use, with news outlets like
the San Francisco Caller referring to it as, a kind of loco weed more powerful than
opium (It Brings). Similarly, a 1906 article in the Pacific Drug Review stated, The
habitual user of mariahuana [sic] finally loses his mind and becomes a raving maniac.
There are scores and scores of such instances in Mexico. It is said that those who smoke
mariahuana frequently die suddenly (Gieringer). These fears led many governments to
take action against the drug, and by 1931, 29 states had outlawed marijuana (Frontline).
The first federal law to ban the sale or possession of marijuana was the 1937
Marijuana Tax Act, passed under heavy pressure from Harry Anslinger, head of the
Federal Bureau of Narcotics and the nations major anti-drug crusader at the time
(Anslinger). As Congress did not believe it had the authority to ban marijuana outright,
the Tax Act was presented as a revenue measure, requiring anyone wanting to produce,
sell, or possess marijuana to purchase a special stamp from the government. However,
those stamps were never offered for sale, effectively banning the drug. On October 2,
1937, Samuel Caldwell became the first person to be arrested for the sale of marijuana.
He was quickly convicted and sentenced to four years of hard labor (First Pot POW).
Anti-marijuana sentiment continued to increase in the United States, due in large
part to propagandistic films like Reefer Madness (Hirliman) and efforts by Harry
Anslinger and others seeking to further criminalize and eradicate all recreational drug
use. In the 1950s, Congress passed harsh drug laws that required mandatory minimum
sentences for many drug offenses, including marijuana possession (Frontline).
Shortly after, the United States began to use its influence in the United Nations to
internationalize the criminalization of marijuana and other drugs, resulting in the
6
adoption of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs in 1961. The Convention included
a wide span of commonly used drugs, including opiates, coca, and marijuana. It required
signatories to criminalize cultivation, production, manufacture, extraction, preparation,
possession, offering, offering for sale, distribution, purchase, sale, delivery on any terms
whatsoever, brokerage, dispatch, dispatch in transit, transport, importation and
exportation of drugs contrary to the provisions of this Convention (Single Convention).
As an international treaty, the Convention had no enforcement mechanism, and
instead required signatories to adopt domestic legislation to implement its requirements
in their respective countries. In the United States, this took the form of the Controlled
Substances Act, which took effect in 1970. The Act divided drugs into five schedules, or
categories, with different requirements and restrictions for each schedule. Since the
passage of the law, marijuana has been included in Schedule 1, the most restrictive
category which is reserved for drugs with a high potential for abuse, no accepted medical
use in treatment, and a lack of safety for use even under medical supervision
(Controlled).
The late 1960s saw a sharp increase in the popularity of marijuana among young
Americans, and became one aspect of the counterculture that characterized the period
(Harrison). Due in part to its popularity among his political opponents, President Richard
Nixon took a hard stance against the use of marijuana and other drugs, devoting
unprecedented amounts of federal resources into anti-drug efforts and declaring the War
on Drugs in 1971 (Dufton).
While the federal government continued its hard stance on marijuana, some states
began to reconsider their own policies. In 1973, Oregon became the first state in the
7
nation to decriminalize the possession of small amounts of marijuana, with the legislature
passing a law that replaced criminal penalties with a civil fine of $100 (Blachly).
Colorado passed a similar law in 1975, and in the same year, the Alaska Supreme Court
ruled that state constitutions right to privacy allowed citizens to possess marijuana for
personal use in the home (Scott).
Following these reforms, President Jimmy Carter publicly expressed his support for
federal marijuana decriminalization, endorsing the conclusions of the Schafer Report,
which was commissioned by President Nixon and then ignored by him after it
recommended decriminalization. In a message to Congress on the topic of drug abuse,
Carter stated, We can, and should, continue to discourage the use of marijuana, but this
can be done without defining the smoker as a criminal. States which have already
removed criminal penalties for marijuana use, like Oregon and California, have not noted
any significant increase in marijuana smoking (Carter).
Surely due in part to President Carters endorsement, by 1980, eleven states had
decriminalized marijuana. These included California, Maine, Minnesota, and Ohio in
1976; and Mississippi, Nebraska, New York, and North Carolina in 1977 (Scott).
However, despite the support of the president, the federal government did not make
similar progress on decriminalization. In October 1977, the US Senate Judiciary
Committee voted to decriminalize marijuana possession, but the bill never made it to
President Carters desk (DPA).
This wave of marijuana policy reform then stalled for many years, beginning with
President Ronald Reagans election in 1980. His term saw not only the First Ladys
famous Just Say No campaign, but also a large number of increased penalties for drug
8
crimes, including the first mandatory minimum sentences passed since the 1950s and a
law allowing the death penalty for drug kingpins (Merritt). From 1980 to 1995,
advocates of marijuana legalization had to focus on defending against new restrictions
rather than pushing for reforms.
The next step towards marijuana legalization came in 1996, when California voters
approved Proposition 215, which legalized marijuana for medical use. This was the first
law of its kind, and allowed individuals with certain illnesses to not only possess
marijuana for personal use, but to grow it and form growing collectives with other
patients as well (CA SoS, Text of). Unlike decriminalization, which simply lowered
state penalties for marijuana possession, medicalization made the use and growth of
marijuana completely legal for certain individuals under state law. However, these
individuals were, and continue to be, in conflict with many federal laws. Despite this
conflict, many states followed Californias lead and passed their own medical marijuana
laws. The following table shows every district that has legalized medical marijuana as of
this writing, along with the year it was passed and whether it was passed by ballot
measure or through the legislative process (ProCon).
State Year Passed Method Passed
California 1996 Ballot measure
Alaska 1998 Ballot measure
Oregon 1998 Ballot measure
Washington 1998 Ballot measure
Maine 1999 Ballot measure
Colorado 2000 Ballot measure
Hawaii 2000 Legislative
Nevada 2000 Ballot measure
Montana 2004 Ballot measure
Vermont 2004 Legislative
Rhode Island 2006 Legislative
New Mexico 2007 Legislative
Michigan 2008 Ballot measure
9
Arizona 2010 Ballot measure
DC 2010 Legislative
New Jersey 2010 Legislative
Delaware 2011 Legislative
Connecticut 2012 Legislative
Massachusetts 2012 Ballot measure

As shown above, 18 states and the District of Columbia now allow the medical use
of marijuana, though the details of each states law vary widely. For example, some allow
patients to grow their own marijuana while some require it to be purchased at a state-
licensed dispensary, and some states maintain a centralized registry of all medical
marijuana patients, while others keep no such records (NORML, Legal Issues). This
steady stream of victories coincided with more states passing decriminalization as well,
bringing the total in 2012 to 15 (NORML, States that).
These victories in medicalization and decriminalization emboldened marijuana
reform advocates, who began attempting to pass ballot measures legalizing the possession
of marijuana for all adults. The first such measure, Alaskas Measure 5, was voted on in
2000, receiving just over 40% support (State of Alaska). Over the next six years, further
attempts were made in Nevada and Colorado, with advocates focusing more on raising
awareness and sparking a debate than hoping to actually pass a measure (Ferner). Below
is a table displaying every state-level marijuana legalization ballot measure ever
considered in the United States.
Year State Title % Voting
Yes
2000 Alaska Measure 5 40.9
2002 Nevada Question 9 39.13
2004 Alaska Measure 2 44.3
2006 Colorado Amendment 44 41.08
10
2006 Nevada Question 7 44.08
2010 California Proposition 19 46.5
2012 Oregon Measure 80 44.93
2012 Colorado Amendment 64 54.83
2012 Washington Initiative 502 55.7


Significance
Societal Significance
As can be seen in the table at the end of the last section, support for marijuana
legalization has grown quickly over the past decade, with Washingtons 2012 measure
passing with nearly 15 percentage points higher approval than the first attempt at
legalization in Alaska in 2000. Colorado and Washingtons successful measures were
unprecedented, making them the only legal jurisdictions in the world to legalize
marijuana for all adults (Kelley).
This has major implications, societally and politically. Over 900,000 Americans
are arrested for marijuana crimes every year, harming individuals by giving them a
criminal record, and harming state finances through exorbitant law enforcement, court,
and incarceration costs (Armentano). These high arrest rates have contributed heavily to
the ballooning of the American correctional population, with over 4,000,000 Americans
currently in prison, in jail, on probation, or on parole (DeRoche). In fact, the United
States imprisons its citizens at a rate higher than any other nation (Gopnik). It contains
about 5% of the worlds population, but a whopping 25% of the worlds prison
population (Liptak).
Marijuana prohibition is incredibly costly, putting great strain on local, state, and
11
federal budgets. Harvard economist Jeffrey Miron is one of the leading authorities on the
economics of marijuana and other drugs, and has calculated that marijuana prohibition
enforcement costs $81 billion per year in police expenditures alone. In his report, The
Budgetary Impact of Drug Prohibition, he estimates that taxing marijuana sales could
raise about $3 billion per year nationwide (Miron).
Its clear that state-level marijuana legalization initiatives, like those passed in
Colorado and Washington, will have a large budgetary impact, both in saving
enforcement costs and taxing previously black market marijuana sales. Such state-level
reforms actually have the potential to make huge changes in national marijuana
enforcement, since state police are responsible for 97% of marijuana arrests (Caulkins).
These state-level reforms are considerably more significant due to trends in
American history. Unbeknownst to many, the repeal of alcohol prohibition actually began
at the state level, with New York the first to repeal its state prohibitions in 1923. Many
other states followed, combining with many other factors to lead to federal repeal in the
form of the 21
st
Amendment in 1933 (Sullum). Given this precedent, its plausible that
state-level marijuana legalization could be the first step towards federal legalization.

Significance in the Political Science Literature
Not only are these state-level marijuana legalization initiatives significant for
American society and politics, theyre also significant for the political science literature
as well. As the first such initiative was only placed on the ballot in 2000, and none had
passed until the end of 2012, there simply has not been time for political scientists to
analyze and attempt to understand this new and growing issue.
12
At first glance, one would be tempted to lump together such initiatives with
referenda for medical marijuana. After all, both concern the same drug, and both are
efforts to lessen restrictions on its use. However, this is not a perfect comparison. While
the two initiatives do concern marijuana, each is about a very different issue surrounding
the drug, with different concerns and solutions. In fact, in her dissertation on medical
marijuana initiative campaigns, Kathleen Ferraiolo writes, In initiative campaigns,
medical marijuana advocates were able to separate the question of medical use an idea
that received strong support in public opinion polls from the more controversial issue of
recreational use (Ferraiolo, 2004). These issues have shown to be separate in the minds
of not only advocates, but voters as well.
This raises an important concern are the issues truly that similar? The literature
on medical marijuana widely cites it as a classic example of a moral issue, but it is
unclear whether marijuana legalization can fit as neatly into this category. Mooney
describes moral issues as those which seek to regulate social norms or which evoke
strong moral responses from citizens for some other reason. It would appear that
marijuana legalization would be included in this definition. However, the author then
goes on to say that morality policy is about principles, while non-morality policy
typically evokes debate over economic interests. Marijuana legalization would appear
to fit into this latter category as well, as much of the debate surrounding the issue is about
spending on enforcement and incarceration, the effectiveness of prohibition, and the tax
revenues that could be realized by legalization. This level of discussion of economics is
not seen in the medical marijuana debate, as medical marijuana laws are typically
revenue-neutral (Office).
13
The subliterature on morality politics is populated with many case studies on
issues such as gay rights and abortion. All of these case studies draw conclusions about
morality politics as a whole, and may be able to inform the discussion of marijuana
legalization. Further, learning more about marijuana legalization may help inform studies
on these potentially related issues.
Studies on support for gay rights, particularly opinions on ballot initiatives
banning same-sex marriage, have shown that the predispositions of voters on both sides
of the issues tended to decrease the effect of advertisements about the issue (Becker).
This is certainly relevant when discussing initiative campaigns for moral issues, as it
would indicate that the return on investment for advertisements is lower than for other
types of issues, and may suggest that campaigns would do well to focus their efforts on
activating existing supporters. Other scholars have found that support for gay marriage
bans is positively related to the proportion of a population that is evangelical, but
negatively related to the proportion of Catholics (Fleischmann), suggesting that
considerations of demographics must be careful to study individual religious groups
rather than simply looking at levels of religiosity (Burnett).
Another major area of the morality politics literature concerns votes on abortion
regulations. Three factors that influence voting on abortion have been identified: group
forces such as religious beliefs, partisanship and other political forces, and various
demographic characteristics (Roh). As marijuana legalization may be related to this issue,
it will be important to see if these factors influence voting on marijuana regulations as
well. However, it is possible that partisanship will not be a highly influential factor for
marijuana legalization. While issues like abortion and gay marriage have been embraced
14
by Democrats and opposed by Republicans, the leadership of both major parties are
dominated by anti-marijuana legalization sentiment.
As can be seen, while few if any political scientists have examined the specific
issue of electoral support for marijuana legalization, there is a wealth of literature on
issues that may help inform my examination, and that stand to benefit from such a study.
Thus, by researching this topic I hope to blaze a new trail for the political science field,
providing a foundation of knowledge and encouraging other political scientists to address
this important area of public policy.

Questions and Hypotheses
On a broad level, I seek to answer two main questions. Firstly, what factors lead
to support for marijuana legalization as a general concept? And secondly, what factors
led to support for specific state-level marijuana legalization ballot initiatives?
For the first question, I hypothesize that religiousness is not closely tied to support
for marijuana legalization, as many religious leaders have come out in support for the
issue, and religious organizations that have campaigned against issues such as abortion
and gay marriage have largely stayed silent on the topic of marijuana legalization
(Rainey). Due to my readings over the years, I anticipate men to be more supportive of
legalization than women, and I will attempt to confirm this and, if correct, identify
potential causes. I also hypothesize that, while leaders of both major parties have been
hostile to marijuana legalization proposals, Democratic voters will be more likely to
support legalization than Republican voters. Finally, I believe that younger Americans
will prove to be more supportive than older voters.
15
On the topic of the state-level initiatives, I hypothesize that in Washington,
support for I-502 will be lower than general support in counties with higher numbers of
registered medical marijuana patients, as the initiatives main opponent was medical
marijuana dispensaries angry about its DUI provisions (Quinn). However, I also
hypothesize that support among conservatives will be higher than average due to the
campaigns use of law enforcement officials as their primary spokesmen. In Colorado, I
predict that support will be higher in counties with higher numbers of registered medical
marijuana patients, as the initiative was designed to ensure the support of the medical
community. Colorado may also enjoy higher Republican support than typical due to the
libertarian leanings of state Republicans. In Oregon and California, I do not anticipate
any notable reasons for the difference between those who supported general legalization
and those who voted for the initiatives.

Research Methods
The basic method for my study will be the examination and comparison of
scientific polls, as well as county-level electoral results and other county-level data. For
my first question, looking for what determines support for marijuana legalization, I will
be focusing on national scientific polls on legalization as a general concept. This is an
appropriate method for my work, since I will be looking at aggregate support for
marijuana legalization. As the scientific polls are composed of many questions, they will
be very useful for connecting support for various issues with many demographic and
ideological factors. Alternatives, such as conducting personal interviews of large, random
samples of voters would be far too expensive and time-consuming to seriously consider.
16
For my second question, looking to explain the differences between support for
general legalization and specific ballot initiatives, I will be focusing on four states, listed
below. I will examine state-level polls on the specific initiatives, county-level electoral
results from each election, and county data on a variety of possibly related areas. This
method is appropriate due to the wealth of data provided by each of these sources, as well
as the easy availability of each source.
Out of the six states that have considered marijuana legalization ballot initiatives, I
will focus on Colorado, California, Washington, and Oregon because of the recentness
and seriousness of their campaigns. These four states have considered legalization most
recently, all in 2010 or 2012. Due to the rapid increase in national support for marijuana
legalization in general, it is important to compare states in a similar time period. These
states were also widely regarded as the most serious, with millions of dollars poured into
their campaigns in comparison to the shoestring budgets of earlier attempts. Also, two
passed and two failed, a convenient coincidence which will help me to compare the
factors that contributed to the success or failure of each.
In the likely case that the polls do not include enough data on religiousness, I plan
to quantify the variable by employing the method used by Fleischmann and Moyer in
their paper, Competing Social Movements and Local Political Culture: Voting on Ballot
Propositions to Ban Same-Sex Marriage in the United States. In order to analyze the link
between religiousness and support for same-sex marriage bans, the authors looked at the
number of mega-churches in each county and compared them to the election results in the
counties. They based their research on the work of the Hartford Institute for Religion
Research, which has a precise definition of mega-church and maintains a database
17
listing every mega-church in the United States (HIRR). According to their database,
California has 218 mega-churches, Colorado has 32, Oregon has 19, and Washington has
51. The database identifies each individual church and makes it easy to group them by
county. While not a perfect measure, the number of these mega-churches is an
established indicator of the religiousness of a county, and will be useful to compare with
electoral support for marijuana legalization initiatives.
To study the correlation between medical marijuana enrollment and support for
recreational legalization, I will obtain county-level statistics on enrollment from the
entities that administer the medical marijuana programs in each state, and compare these
numbers to county-level electoral results.
To study the correlation between the enforcement of marijuana laws and support for
marijuana legalization, I will be using the Federal Bureau of Investigations Uniform
Crime Report (UCR). According to the FBI, the UCR is a nationwide, cooperative
statistical effort of nearly 18,000 city, university and college, county, state, tribal, and
federal law enforcement agencies voluntarily reporting data on crimes brought to their
attention, and it currently includes agencies that cover over 96% of the United States
population (FBI, Summary of). This nearly comprehensive study of crime in
America will provide me with easy access to county-level arrest statistics, which I will
then compare to county-level support for each initiative.
To see how partisanship relates to support for marijuana legalization, I intend to
look at polling data, in addition to county-level electoral results for the 2012 presidential
race (or in the case of California, its 2010 gubernatorial race). This latter measure will
allow me to compare voting behavior to voting behavior, which could prove more useful
18
than looking at party registration alone, as many unaffiliated voters have preferences for
one of the two major parties (Monson).
To examine correlations between support for marijuana legalization, abortion
access, and same-sex marriage, I will identify the most recent state-level ballot initiatives
on the latter two issues and compare their county-level results to the results from the
marijuana legalization initiatives. I will also examine polling data that addresses multiple
issues.

Results from Polling Data
Overall Support
Looking at national polling data on the topic of marijuana legalization, it is clear
that support has been increasing consistently since the early 1990s, with a near or slight
majority of Americans currently in support, depending on the poll. For example, data
from the General Social Survey taken by the National Opinion Research Center at the
University of Chicago indicates increases in support every year since 1990, illustrated in
the graph below.

19
This conclusion is also supported by data collected by Gallup, which has
published its findings going back to 1970, illustrated in the following graph (Newport,
2012).

Gallups data shows a sharp increase in support from 1970 to 1978, followed by a
two-decade period of stagnation and slight decline. This initial burst of support, which
peaked at only 28%, is likely a result of increases in marijuana use during the time
period, detailed in the age section below. The period of stagnation included Reagans
well-known Just Say No campaign, as well as the heavily publicized crack cocaine
epidemic, both of which likely contributed to decreased support for liberalizing drug
laws.
In order to better understand the large increase in support since the mid-1990s, I
have broken down trends among various demographic factors religiousness, gender,
party affiliation, ideology, age, and region.

20
Religiousness
One of my hypotheses was that more religious individuals would be less likely to
support marijuana legalization, but that religiousness would not have as strong an effect
on this issue as it does on issues like abortion.
Concerning religiousness and support for marijuana legalization, evidence
appears to support my hypothesis. Gallup regularly conducts national surveys on support
for legalizing marijuana, and in their 2003 poll, they included questions about
respondents church-going habits. Specifically, they asked respondents whether they
attended church weekly, monthly, or seldom/never. When compared to respondents
opinions on marijuana, there were stark differences: only 14% of weekly churchgoers and
29% of monthly churchgoers supported legalization, compared to 51% support by those
who seldomly or never attend church (Lyons). These differences are even more
pronounced when considering that the poll found 34% approval among the general
public, meaning weekly and monthly churchgoers were 20 points and 5 points below the
national average, respectively. Unfortunately, Gallup did not include this question in their
poll in previous or later years, making it impossible to use their data to examine trends in
this area over time.
However, the General Social Survey has been asking Americans about both their
churchgoing habits and opinions on marijuana legalization for many years. Below is a
line graph illustrating respondents rates of attending a religious service (Church
attendance). Over the graph, I have drawn a line representing respondents support for
marijuana legalization in the same survey over a similar timeline. As can be seen, the rate
of support for marijuana legalization has increased along with the proportion of
21
Americans who never go to church. The latter increase appears to be driven largely by a
decrease in those attending weekly, while those attending monthly decreased at a more
modest rate.

Regional statistics on religion and marijuana legalization also give some insight
into this relationship. In 2009, Gallup asked Americans whether they believed in God, a
higher power, or neither. Illustrated in the bar graphs below, respondents in the West had
a much lower rate of belief in God than their Eastern, Midwestern, and Southern
counterparts (Newport, 2008). While not a perfect representation of religiousness, this
does give us a valuable insight into regional rates of religiosity, particularly adherence to
a more formal and traditional belief system.
22

In the same year, Gallup also asked Americans about their opinions on marijuana
legalization. While only 44% of the general public voiced their support for legalization,
the concept was supported by 53% of Westerners, 46% of Easterners, 42% of
Midwesterners, and 40% of Southerners (Saad). Thus, on a regional level, religiousness
and support for marijuana legalization do appear to be inversely related.
Another interesting observation in the area of religiousness also comes from
Gallup, this time in a graphic displaying which states contain above-average, average,
and below-average rates of those identifying as having no religion (Newport, 2009). It is
worth noting that Colorado, Washington, Oregon, Alaska, and Nevada five of the six
states that have ever voted on marijuana legalization were among the nine states with
above-average rates of religionlessness. California is the only state with an average
religiousness rate to have considered legalization.
23



Gender
While examining national polling data, one trend that stuck out was the gender
gap in support for marijuana legalization. According to Gallup surveys since 2003, men
have always been more supportive of legalizing marijuana than women. However, this
gap appears to be shrinking. In 2003, 41% of men supported legalization, compared to
only 29% of women. In 2011, the latest year for which data is available, 55% of men and
46% of women were in support (Lyons).
This means that the gender gap has narrowed by 3 percentage points over the past
eight years, which is a small but important improvement. This shrinking gap is even more
impressive given the rapid growth in overall support over this time period, as support
among men increased by 34%, while female support increased a staggering 59%. If this
trend continues, the gender gap will be closed in the near future. This seems even more
24
probable given the fact that female support nearly matched male support in 2009, when
Gallup reported 44% and 45% support respectively. There is little explanation for this
upsurge in female support, or for the subsequent dip in 2010.

As it has been demonstrated that men are more supportive of marijuana
legalization than women, one must wonder why this gender gap exists. One possible
explanation is that people who have used marijuana are more likely to support its
legalization, either because they would like to purchase and use it legally, or because
their personal experience allows them to see through anti-legalizers exaggerations about
its harms or the insistence that it leads to using harder drugs. Therefore, if one gender is
more likely to use marijuana, we could infer that that gender would be more likely to
support its legalization.
Examining federal data on drug use lends support to this idea. The Monitoring the
Future study consistently shows that men are more likely than women to have used
marijuana at some point in their lives, the former exceeding the latter by over ten
percentage points (Harrison). Interestingly, this 10-point gender gap in lifetime marijuana
use mirrors the gender gap in support for legalizing the drug.
25
Of course, marijuana use alone cannot explain the gender gap in support, as a
larger proportion of Americans support legalization than have used the drug. The gender
gap in support for legalization may be tied to gender gaps in areas that may contribute to
support, such as religiousness, discussed above. According to polling by Gallup, women
are significantly more likely than men to say that religion is very important in their lives.
They are also much more likely to attend religious services, say that religion can answer
todays problems, and read the Bible regularly (Winseman).



Party Affiliation
If one were to look only at party leaders statements on the topic of marijuana
legalization, it would appear as if both Democrats and Republicans were overwhelmingly
26
opposed to the proposal. Despite his support for drug policy reforms like ending the
crack-powder cocaine disparity (Baker), and his own personal marijuana use during his
youth (Shear), President Obama has frequently made remarks stating his opposition to
marijuana legalization (Wing) and has actually conducted far more raids on medical
marijuana dispensaries than his Republican predecessor (Dickinson). Similarly,
Republican leaders such as Mitt Romney often laugh off the idea of legalization (Sherry)
and maintain a tough-on-crime stance when it comes to drug policy.
However, when it comes to rank-and-file party members, there is a huge gap in
opinion between Republicans and Democrats. As demonstrated in the graph below,
Democrats are consistently more supportive of legalization than the general public, while
Republicans are largely opposed to the idea. Gallup has been including party affiliation in
its marijuana legalization polling since 2005, and also included the question in their 1999
poll (Moore). This data shows an interesting history of the growing party divide on this
important issue.
In 1999, the political landscape was much different than it is today. With public
support for marijuana legalization at only 29%, Independents were actually the most
supportive affiliation at 37%, compared to only 27% of Democrats and 22% of
Republicans. Today, the public stands at 48% support, with 61% of Democrats, 50% of
Independents, and 33% of Republicans in favor of legalization. This means that the 19-
point increase in public support from 1999 to 2012 was largely driven by Democratic
voters changing their minds. In those 13 years, support from Democrats increased by 34
points; Independent support grew by 19 points, the same growth as the general public;
and support from Republicans grew by only 11 points.
27

However, the growth in Republican support cannot be discounted, as its 50%
increase in 13 years is actually slightly higher than the 35% increase among Independents
in the same time frame. Recent Republican electoral losses and internal debate about the
direction of the party may lead to greater support for marijuana legalization and other
social issues typically characterized as liberal or libertarian.
Trying to determine a cause for this opinion gap is nearly as difficult as
examining the gender gap, and is similarly due to underlying gaps between the parties.
For example, Republicans tend to be much more religious than Democrats (Cillizza), and
are also much more conservative.

Ideology
Conservatism brings us to the closely related, but still separate, topic of ideology
and support for marijuana legalization. Similar to the Democrat/Independent/Republican
breakdown on the issue, liberals are the most supportive, while self-identified moderates
are roughly as supportive as the general public, and conservatives trail behind as the least
supportive of the three groups.
28

While it may seem like common sense that liberals would be more supportive of
marijuana legalization, and conservatives more against the idea, this is interesting when
examined more closely. Modern political conservatism is characterized by a belief in
small government as well as strong moral beliefs, which contradict one another when it
comes to marijuana legalization. Prominent conservatives have come down on both sides
of the issue. For example, journalist David Frum recently published an opinion piece in
which he wrote, A world of legal drugs will be a world in which the fates of the top one
third of Americans and the lower two thirds will diverge even more than they already do.
A world of weaker families, absent parents, and shriveling job opportunities is a world in
which more Americans will seek a cheap and easy escape from their depressing reality.
Conversely, economist Milton Friedman has written, There is no logical basis for the
prohibition of marijuana. $7.7 billion is a lot of money, but that is one of the lesser evils.
Our failure to successfully enforce these laws is responsible for the deaths of thousands
of people in Colombia. I haven't even included the harm to young people. It's absolutely
disgraceful to think of picking up a 22-year-old for smoking pot (Hardy). Clearly, moral
and fiscal conservatism are at odds when it comes to marijuana legalization, and self-
29
identified conservatives come down on both sides of the issue. The pro-legalization camp
appears to be growing, and it seems possible that it will continue to grow as more states
remove their criminal penalties for the drug and the issue becomes more mainstream.

Age
One of the demographics with the most striking differences in opinion is among
various age groups. In both 1999 and 2011, Gallup found significant differences by age in
support for legalization. In 1999, the 18-29 and 30-49 age groups supported legalization
at rates above the national average, while the 50-64 and 65+ groups were less supportive.
In 2011, this was the same case, although the 50-65 group was only 1 point below the
national average.
The various age groups all increased their support for legalization over this time
period, but to varying degrees. As shown in the table below, while the younger groups
have always been more supportive than older groups. However, the older groups have
had the largest proportional increase in their support, with Americans over 65 years of
age increasing their support by a whopping 182% from 1999 to 2011, more than four
times the rate of increase for those aged 18 to 29.
1999 2011 Change % Change
Public 29 50 +21 72%
18 to 29 44 62 +18 41%
30 to 49 30 56 +26 87%
50 to 64 21 49 +28 133%
65+ 11 31 +20 182%

While it is obvious that groups with less support have more room to grow and a
higher potential to increase by large amounts, there may be something more to this
increase among older Americans. For this, there are two major explanations. Either
30
individuals are maintaining their beliefs over time and merely aging into new groups, or
individuals are changing their beliefs about the issue.
This first explanation certainly has some merit. For example, an individual who
was 18 years old in 1999 would have been 30 in 2011, meaning every individual in the
18-29 group in 1999 would have moved into the 30-49 group in 2011. A similar effect
could be seen with every other age group, including children aging into the 18-29 bracket
and people in the 65+ bracket passing away. Because of this, there has been a significant
amount of movement between brackets by individuals who brought their beliefs about
marijuana legalization with them.
However, the second explanation is important as well. Many Americans may be
becoming more supportive of legalization due to viewing pro-legalization arguments and
news articles in the media, and this may apply even more strongly to older voters.
Campaigns for medical marijuana have often featured elderly patients as their primary
spokespeople (Ferriaolo). By portraying marijuana use by the elderly as a normal
behavior, these campaigns may have made senior citizens more comfortable with the
drug, as well as more supportive of its legalization. And these portrayals of older people
using marijuana is not false a 2010 article on the American Association for Retired
People (AARP)s website titled Older Americans Increasingly Use Marijuana for
Nausea, Pain speaks for itself (Jaret). A 2013 article in the New York Times focused on
increasing recreational marijuana use among older Americans, emphasizing that, the
National Survey on Drug Use and Health reported in 2011 that 6.3 percent of adults
between the ages of 50 and 59 used the drug. That number has risen from 2.7 percent in
2002 (Krueger). Additionally, internal polling by the AARP has also shown huge
31
support for medical marijuana, with a 2004 poll finding 72% support among its members
(Associated Press). Those who use medical marijuana themselves, or have friends who
use it, may be more likely to support full-scale legalization of the drug, an idea that I
examine more closely in my analysis of the 2012 election.
However, while older Americans are beginning to support marijuana legalization
at increasing rates, there is still a major age gap in support. Similar to the changing levels
of support, the presence of the gap has two possible explanations either individuals who
were born earlier are less likely to support legalization, or a significant number of
individuals are supportive of legalization when they are young, and change their minds as
they grow older. And once again, both of these explanations hold some merit.
Due to the shifting political climate surrounding marijuana legalization, people
who were born more recently are more likely to have grown up with people supportive of
the issue. Also, older people are significantly less likely to have grown up around
marijuana use. According to a paper from the University of Amsterdam, in 1967, The
nationally-based telephone poll of college students found a 5% lifetime prevalence of
marijuana use. Two years later, this proportion jumped to 22%. By 1971, over half
(51%) of the nation's college students reported lifetime use, and annual and thirty day
prevalence rates stood at 41% and 30% respectively. These Gallup telephone polls
document the explosion in marijuana use among college students during the late 1960s,
with a leveling occurring in the early 1970s, such that by 1971, over half of the nation's
college students had at least tried marijuana (Harrison). Therefore, people who were
above the college age in 1967, who would be in the 65+ age bracket in 2012, grew up in
an environment where marijuana use was not at all common. Conversely, those who were
32
of the college age during or after this period would have grown up very familiar with
marijuana, either trying it themselves or having friends who used it. This would make
them more comfortable with the drug, and less likely to support its prohibition.
However, the alternative explanation that individuals become less supportive of
marijuana legalization as they grow older may contain some truth as well. For example,
in a New York Times article by statistician Nate Silver reflecting on the failure of
Proposition 19 in California, he wrote, As you might expect, both age and parenthood
status are important predictors of views on marijuana. Controlling for parenthood status,
support for legalization is actually quite steady from ages 18 through 59: about half of
childless adults in these age ranges favor legalizing marijuana. The percentages are about
10-15 points lower, however, for adults in this age range who have had kids. This
analysis is incredibly important for understanding the underlying causes for support and
opposition to marijuana legalization. If having children does in fact lead to a decline in
support, then it is possible that support may decline in the future, as demographic trends
predict a higher proportion of parents in coming years. As The Atlantics Megan Mcardle
writes, Maybe we have reached the high-water mark of this sort of personal liberty. As
the baby boomers age, they will be less interested in directly exercising their right to
smoke pot, which means that even if they still support legalization, they will be less
motivated on the issue. Meanwhile, there will be more people in the electorate with
young adult children who they worry about--and fewer young adult children. It will be
important for those studying this issue to carefully monitor support among parents, to see
if these trends continue and lead to a decline in support for legalization.

33
Region
The final subgroup to examine is geographical regions. As explained above in the
religiousness section, the West is most supportive, followed by the East, Midwest, and
South, in that order. However, this was not always the case. According to Gallup, in 2005
the Midwest was actually less supportive than the South, and the West and East both
supported legalization at 40% (Saad). Since this time, the Midwest has increased most
dramatically, falling just one percentage point short of Western support in 2011
(Newport, 2011). Meanwhile, the South and East have both increased at a slower pace
than the general public, and the West has increased moderately.

These trends do make it seem as if the Midwest is as ripe for marijuana
legalization as the West, but in practice this has not been the case. All three states that
voted on marijuana legalization in 2012 were in the Western United States, as has been
every state to vote on the issue except for Alaska, and there was not a serious effort to
pursue legalization in any Midwestern state. However, there are some Midwestern states
with liberalized marijuana laws that may be fertile ground for future legalization efforts
Michigan is the only Midwestern state with legal medical marijuana, but Ohio,
34
Minnesota, and Nebraska have each decriminalized small amounts of the drug. The map
below shows the current state of marijuana laws in the country. Blue represents
recreational legalization, yellow is medical marijuana only, light green is
decriminalization, and dark green is for states with both medical and decriminalization
(Lokal_Profil).


As is made clear in the map, the West is home to the loosest marijuana laws. Dark
green states are the most likely areas for legalization, and those are found only in the
West and East. Therefore, those areas will probably be the focus of most or all campaigns
in 2014 and 2016, but the Midwests high levels of support could lead to efforts in the
region in 2018 or 2020.
It is unclear why exactly the various regions have differing opinions on marijuana
legalization, or why the Midwest recently saw such a large surge in support. As described
35
above, it is strongly linked to the level or religiousness in the region. It is also linked to
ideology and party affiliation. As demonstrated in the following map of which party
currently controls each states lower legislative chamber, every state but Alaska that has
either fully legalized marijuana or has both decriminalized and medicalized its use is
controlled by Democrats (Cassowary).

Regional variations in support may also be linked to general beliefs about
social issues, which is affiliated with, but separate from, ideology and partisanship. For
example, a CBS poll in 2009 found the most support for abortion rights in the Northeast
and West, and the most support for a complete ban in the Midwest and South (Roberts). It
is not very surprising that support for marijuana legalization falls along similar lines.



36
Case Study: the 2010 and 2012 Elections
Introduction
In order to gain a better understanding of the determinants of electoral support for
marijuana legalization, I closely examined state-level ballot initiatives on the topic in
2010 and 2012. While the question has also been posed to voters in 2000, 2002, 2004,
and 2006, I decided to focus on the 2010 and 2012 elections for a few reasons. First of
all, it is the most recent, an important factor considering the recent surge in support for
legalization. As national support has increased by nearly 20 points since 2000, examining
measures from that far ago would do little to help us understand the current political
environment. These most recent campaigns also received the highest amount of media
attention due to their possibility of passing, thus providing more analysis and opinion to
examine. Conveniently, focusing on the two most recent election years also gives us a
manageable sample size of four ballot initiatives in four separate states, two of which
were successes, and two of which were failures.
In this case study, I focused on county-level data in a variety of areas, including
religiousness, partisanship, marijuana possession arrest rates, enrollment in medical
marijuana programs, and support for other social issues like same-sex marriage and
abortion access. By looking at county data, it will be possible to gain a stronger
understanding than by looking at state data alone, while also providing an opportunity to
examine important relationships that would not be possible to examine on an individual
level. I supplement this county information with statewide public opinion polls by
SurveyUSA, the only polling organization to conduct extensive state-level polling on all
four initiatives.
37

Religiousness
One of my hypotheses was that support for marijuana legalization would not be as
strongly tied to religiousness as support for abortion access has been demonstrated to be.
As described in the methods section, I quantified county-level religiousness by
employing the method used by Fleischmann and Moyer in their paper, Competing
Social Movements and Local Political Culture: Voting on Ballot Propositions to Ban
Same-Sex Marriage in the United States. Using data from the Hartford Institute for
Religion Research, I was able to ascertain that California has 218 mega-churches,
Colorado has 32, Oregon has 19, and Washington has 51 (HIRR). I then grouped these
mega-churches by county and compared that data to county results for the various
marijuana legalization ballot initiatives. Finally, I ran linear regressions with this data to
determine the strength of the correlation in each state, omitting counties with zero mega-
churches in order to avoid skewing the data. Overall, this analysis did not yield any
strong correlations, but there are some interesting results worth discussion.
In California, the 218 mega-churches were located in 28 of the states 58 counties.
Of those 58 counties, only 12 of approved Proposition 19, the failed marijuana
legalization measure in 2010 (Bowen). Interestingly, counties with mega-churches were
more likely to approve legalization, with 8 of the 28 counties approving a 29% success
rate, higher than the overall rate of 21%. However, all ten of the counties with the highest
number of mega-churches per capita rejected the measure, with the remaining 18 counties
having mixed results.

38
County Population % Yes 19 % No 19 # MC's People / MC
San Luis Obispo 98,764 42.31% 40.07% 2 49,382
Placer 177,223 45.26% 57.96% 3 59,074
Ventura 94,737 36.50% 53.77% 1 94,737
Orange 3,010,232 37.11% 58.81% 31 97,104
Stanislaus 514,453 34.96% 58.35% 5 102,891
Solano 348,432 45.44% 56.50% 3 116,144
Fresno 930,450 36.21% 63.80% 8 116,306
Sacramento 1,418,788 47.96% 65.56% 12 118,232
San Bernardino 2,035,210 47.14% 67.65% 17 119,718
Monterey 262,382 38.79% 61.79% 2 131,191
Santa Barbara 269,637 51.56% 57.33% 2 134,819
Shasta 413,344 55.25% 55.54% 3 137,781
San Diego 3,095,313 63.62% 54.58% 22 140,696
Riverside 2,189,641 41.54% 50.15% 15 145,976
Santa Clara 1,781,642 64.06% 53.26% 11 161,967
Alameda 839,631 35.23% 64.80% 5 167,926
San Joaquin 685,306 51.47% 50.15% 4 171,327
San Mateo 181,058 40.38% 59.70% 1 181,058
Los Angeles 9,818,605 48.04% 52.00% 53 185,257
Sutter 200,849 39.58% 60.42% 1 200,849
Santa Cruz 415,057 50.01% 50.89% 2 207,529
Nevada 423,895 49.25% 37.69% 2 211,948
El Dorado 220,000 42.18% 57.90% 1 220,000
Contra Costa 1,049,025 48.90% 51.20% 4 262,256
Kern 1,510,271 56.32% 43.60% 5 302,054
San Francisco 718,451 51.91% 63.44% 1 718,451
Butte 805,235 39.36% 66.89% 1 805,235
Yolo 823,318 49.11% 56.24% 1 823,318
39
Table of all counties in California that have at least one mega-church (MC), sorted by the ratio of
population to number of mega-churches in the county. Counties with a lower People / MC score have
more mega-churches per person, which may indicate they are more religious than other counties.

However, when looked at statistically, it appears that these relationships may be
more coincidence than anything, or perhaps the result of mega-churches being
concentrated in areas with higher population density. As can be seen in the regression
below, there is only a very weak correlation between the presence of mega-churches and
the rate of support for Proposition 19, with an r-squared of only .0638.

Next, Colorado has 64 counties, 10 of which have at least one mega-church
within their borders. Seven of these ten counties approved Amendment 64, while three
rejected it by various margins, one of them quite slim. In total, 33 of Colorados 64
counties approved marijuana legalization, while 31 did not a nearly even split (Denver
Post). The fact that the counties with mega-churches actually have a higher rate of
approving marijuana legalization than counties without mega-churches is an indication
that the issue may not be closely tied to religiousness, or that high religiousness may
actually increase the chances of a county being in favor of marijuana legalization.
40
County Population % Yes 64 % No 64 # MC's People / MC
Larimer 299,630 54.60% 45.30% 5 59,926
Douglas 285,465 45.40% 54.50% 4 71,366
El Paso 622,263 49.30% 50.60% 7 88,895
Arapahoe 572,003 52.80% 47.10% 6 95,334
Boulder 294,567 66.10% 33.80% 3 98,189
Mesa 146,723 46.40% 53.50% 1 146,723
Jefferson 534,543 53.70% 46.20% 3 178,181
Weld 252,825 50.20% 49.70% 1 252,825
Adams 441,603 56.00% 43.90% 1 441,603
Denver 600,158 65.90% 34.00% 1 600,158
Table of all counties in Colorado that have at least one mega-church (MC), sorted by the ratio of population
to number of mega-churches in the county. Counties with a lower People / MC score have more mega-
churches per person, which may indicate they are more religious than other counties.

However, once again, a linear regression shows little evidence for a relationship
between the concentration of mega-churches and support for Amendment 64. With an r-
squared of .2553, there does appear to be a weak relationship, but it is not large enough to
be considered statistically significant.

A similar situation exists for Washington. The state has 39 counties, 20 of which
41
approved Initiative 502 again, a nearly even split (Seattle Times). Yet when looking
only at the counties with mega-churches, one sees that there are only a total of twelve,
nine of which approved marijuana legalization. Again, counties with mega-churches have
a higher rate of approving marijuana legalization than the states counties as a whole.
County Population % Yes 502 % No 502 # MC's People / MC
Walla Walla 58,781 44.9 55.1 1 58,781
Whatcom 201,140 56.8 43.2 3 67,047
Chelan 72,453 51.9 48.1 1 72,453
King 1,931,249 63.5 36.5 23 83,967
Pierce 795,225 54 46 7 113,604
Skagit 116,901 54.6 45.4 1 116,901
Kitsap 251,133 56 44 2 125,567
Clark 425,363 49.7 50.3 3 141,788
Snohomish 713,335 54.6 45.4 5 142,667
Spokane 471,221 52.1 47.9 3 157,074
Benton 175,177 43.5 56.5 1 175,177
Thurston 252,264 55.6 44.4 1 252,264
Table of all counties in Washington that have at least one mega-church (MC), sorted by the ratio of
population to number of mega-churches in the county. Counties with a lower People / MC score have
more mega-churches per person, which may indicate they are more religious than other counties.

Yet when it comes to the results of the regression, Washington is closer to
California than Colorado, with an r-squared of only .0077. While this is not evidence of a
correlation, it is somewhat interesting that the line of best fit is actually slightly negative,
implying that higher religiousness is tied to more, not less, support for legalization.
However, due to the statistical insignificance of the relationship, this is more of an
interesting coincidence than evidence of a unique aspect to drug policy in Washington.
42

There is less of an interesting correlation for Oregon, due in part to the failure of
its marijuana legalization initiative, Measure 80. The state has 36 counties, only 4 of
which approved Measure 80, a very small showing (Brown). There are a total of 7
counties with mega-churches, two of which approved marijuana legalization. While 2 out
of 7 is a much higher showing than 4 out of 36 29% vs. 11% it is too small of a
sample size to see if there is a strong relationship.
County Population % Yes 80 % No 80 # MC's People / MC
Jackson 203,206 43.25% 56.75% 2 101,603
Multnomah 735,334 60.77% 39.23% 7 105,048
Marion 315,335 39.50% 60.50% 3 105,112
Deschutes 157,733 45.32% 54.68% 1 157,733
Washington 529,710 43.91% 56.09% 3 176,570
Clackamas 375,992 41.82% 58.18% 2 187,996
Lane 351,715 51.03% 48.97% 1 351,715
Table of all counties in Oregon that have at least one mega-church (MC), sorted by the ratio of population
to number of mega-churches in the county. Counties with a lower People / MC score have more mega-
churches per person, which may indicate they are more religious than other counties.

As with the other states, Oregons regression leaves little hope for a statistical
43
relationship between the prevalence of mega-churches and support for legalization. With
an r-squared of only .0161, its statistical insignificance pales only to Washington.

In conclusion, while it is interesting that counties with mega-churches were more
likely to support legalization measures than the average county in their state, there does
not appear to be any statistically significant relationship between religiousness and
support for these four state-level marijuana legalization ballot initiatives.
There are also some clear limitations of this analysis. For example, the
concentration of mega-churches could be explained more by the rural/urban divide than
by how religious a population actually is. The Hartford Institute for Religion Research
defines a mega-churches as having very large, Protestant congregations [with] 2000 or
more persons in attendance at weekly worship; a charismatic, authoritative senior
minister; a very active 7 day a week congregational community; a multitude of social and
outreach ministries; and a complex differentiated organizational structure (HIRR). As
mega-churches are so large and require the constant engagement of their members, they
seem to be better suited to urban areas than rural areas, which may opt to have smaller
community-based churches instead. Upon closer examination, this explanation seems to
44
hold some weight. The 10 counties with mega-churches in Colorado are all among the 11
most populous counties in the state, meaning none of the 53 least populous counties have
a single mega-church (Population Totals). This is similar in Washington, but to a
lesser extent: the 12 counties with mega-churches are among the 21 most populous, so
none of the 18 least populous counties have a single mega-church. Also, 10 of the 12
counties with mega-churches are among the 11 most populous counties, showing that
counties with mega-churches are disproportionately populous (OFM). It is well known
that rural areas are typically more conservative on many issues, and this finding may
simply be a proxy for the rural/urban divide, merely proving that urban areas are more
supportive of legalization.
Also, some scholars have found that support for gay marriage bans is positively
related to the proportion of a population that is evangelical, but negatively related to the
proportion of Catholics (Fleischmann), suggesting that considerations of demographics
must be careful to study individual religious groups rather than simply looking at levels
of overall religiosity (Burnett). Focusing on the number of mega-churches as defined by
HIRR ignores the Catholic and non-Christian population by definition, and does not
differentiate between different types of Protestants. Future researchers should consider
looking into a broader selection of religions to see if these findings apply to all religious
individuals, or only to Protestants.

Partisanship
Another hypothesis of mine was that partisanship would be a major factor in
determining the electoral outcomes for marijuana legalization initiatives, and also that the
45
initiatives in Washington and Colorado would do better among Republicans than in
Oregon and California, due in part to their heavy advertising directed towards those
groups. Colorados Republican Party is more libertarian than conservative in nature, and
the Denver Republican Assembly actually came close to endorsing Amendment 64
before the election (Roberts, Majority of).
To examine this relationship, I compared county-level support for each states
respective initiative with county-level support for the 2012 presidential election, or in the
case of California, the 2010 gubernatorial election. I also examined survey data from
SurveyUSA that addressed party affiliation.
As one could infer from the large partisan differences in support for legalization
in national polling, party affiliation appears to have had a moderate to large impact on
determining electoral support for each of these state initiatives.
Of the four states, California has the weakest correlation between the results for
its marijuana legalization initiative and its largest partisan office in the same election. As
seen in the two regressions below, the r-squared for the relationship between support for
Democratic candidate Jerry Brown and Proposition 19 was .5180 evidence for a
relationship, but not strong enough to be certain (Bowen).
46

Due to the presence of many third-party candidates, I also ran a regression for
support for Republican candidate Meg Whitman and Proposition 19, which yielded a
similar r-squared of .5082. Again, this is evidence for a relationship, but it is not as strong
as in the other states, which I will examine shortly.

When looking at the polling data, there appears to be a very strong relationship
between party affiliation and support for Proposition 19. The following table shows a
comparison between 2010 national polling data taken by Gallup regarding the general
issue of marijuana legalization, and the final statewide poll of California voters on the
specific topic of Proposition 19 (SurveyUSA, Poll #17597). All figures represent the
47
percent of individuals in support of the idea or proposition.
All Voters Republican Democratic Independent
Prop 19
(CA) 44% 29% 50% 54%
National 46% 29% 55% 54%

As can be clearly seen, the polling for Proposition 19 nearly mirrored the national
polling, with the percent of Republicans and Independents in support matching exactly.
The only difference is among Democratic voters, who were less supportive of Proposition
19 than the rest of the nations Democrats were of the broad concept of marijuana
legalization.
When it comes to Colorado, there was a much more statistically significant
relationship between support for partisan candidates and marijuana legalization. As
shown in the following graph, county-level support for Democratic presidential candidate
Barack Obama was tied closely to the counties support for Amendment 64 (Gessler).
The relationship has an r-squared value of .7914, indicating a very strong statistical
relationship.

Again, due to the presence of third-party candidates and other factors, I also ran a
48
regression for Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney. The following graph
demonstrates that support for Romney was inversely related to support for marijuana
legalization, with a slightly higher r-squared value of .8016.

Finally, I was also interested in the relationship between support for Libertarian
presidential candidate Gary Johnson and Amendment 64. Johnson was a strong supporter
of marijuana legalization, and campaigned heavily on the issue (Ball). As Colorado was a
swing state and Johnsons strategy focused on tipping the outcome of the presidential
race in swing states, he held many campaign events in the state and voters were likely
highly aware of his candidacy (Chris Roberts). This regression, with an r-squared of
.3429, shows some evidence of a correlation between support for Johnson and 64, but it is
too insignificant to draw any solid conclusions from.
49

Once again, polling data shows a strong relationship between party affiliation and
support for marijuana legalization. The following table shows a comparison between
2012 national polling data taken by Gallup regarding the general issue of marijuana
legalization, and the final statewide poll of Colorado voters on the specific topic of
Amendment 64 (SurveyUSA, Poll #19661). All figures represent the percent of
individuals in support of the idea or amendment.
All Voters Republican Democratic Independent
Amen 64
(CO) 51% 38% 60% 55%
National 48% 33% 61% 50%

As can be seen, there is a large difference in support among voters affiliated with
the two major parties. However, this difference is smaller than the gap among the general
public, with Democrats leading Republicans by only 22 points, rather than 28. This data
also supports my hypothesis that marijuana legalization would perform better among
Republicans in Colorado than in other states or nationwide. This may be due to the
libertarian-leaning nature of Colorado Republicans, or the concerted effort by the
Amendment 64 campaign to reach out to conservative voters in the months leading up to
50
the election with advertisements featuring prominent conservatives such as former
Congressman Tom Tancredo (Yes on 64, Radio Ad).
The state of Washington appears to have nearly as strong a relationship between
support for partisan candidates and marijuana legalization. As shown in the following
graph, county-level support for Democratic presidential candidate Barack Obama was
tied closely to the counties support for Initiative 502 (Seattle Times). The relationship
has an r-squared value of .7790, a very strong statistical relationship that is only slightly
less than that in Colorado.

The correlation between support for Republican Mitt Romney is also strong, and
once again, is nearly the same as the correlation in Colorado. The r-squared value of
.7927 indicates a statistically significant inverse relationship.
51

I also examined the relationship between support for Libertarian Gary Johnson
and Initiative 502, in order to see if there was a stronger or weaker relationship than in
Colorado. As Washington was a safe state for President Obama, Johnson did not
campaign there as heavily as in Colorado, so voters there may have had less familiarity
with his candidacy and what issues he focused on. The regression for this relationship
shows an r-squared of only .0264, which is far too insignificant to draw any conclusions
from.

An examination of the polling data shows a strong relationship between party
affiliation and support for marijuana legalization. The following table shows a
52
comparison between 2012 national polling data taken by Gallup regarding the general
issue of marijuana legalization, and the final statewide poll of Washington voters on the
specific topic of Initiative 502 (SurveyUSA, Poll #19382). All figures represent the
percent of individuals in support of the idea or initiative.
All Voters Republican Democratic Independent
Init 502
(WA) 55% 37% 68% 59%
National 48% 33% 61% 50%

As can be seen in the table, Initiative 502 enjoyed higher-than-average levels of
support from every party affiliation, including Republicans. The initiative polled among
the voting public at seven points higher than the national average. Support from
Democrats was also seven points higher than nationally, while support from Independents
was a full nine points higher. Meanwhile, Republican support only exceeded the national
average by four points. While nearly the same as Amendment 64s level of support
among Republicans, 502s higher level of overall support 55% versus 64s 51% -
makes this less significant. Washington Republicans do not have as much of a reputation
for libertarianism as their counterparts in Colorado, and it is also possible that the
campaigns heavy emphasis on taxation may have convinced some fiscal conservatives to
oppose the measure.
Finally, despite the failure of Measure 80, Oregon appears to have the strongest
correlation between support for partisan candidates and marijuana legalization. As shown
in the following graph, county-level support for Democratic presidential candidate
Barack Obama was tied closely to the counties support for Measure 80 (Brown). The
relationship has an r-squared value of .8304, more significant than the correlations in any
of the three other states.
53

Oregon also saw the strongest correlation of all four states between support for
Republican Mitt Romney and Measure 80, with an r-squared of .8406.

Concerning the relationship between support for Libertarian Gary Johnson and
Measure 80, it appears to be as statistically insignificant as the relationship in
Washington. This is likely for the same reasons, as Oregon was a solidly blue state in the
2012 election, so Johnson did not campaign heavily there.
54

An examination of the polling data in Oregon shows an interesting relationship
between party affiliation and support for marijuana legalization. The following table
shows a comparison between 2012 national polling data taken by Gallup regarding the
general issue of marijuana legalization, and the final statewide poll of Oregon voters on
the specific topic of Measure 80 (SurveyUSA, Poll #19925). All figures represent
the percent of individuals in support of the idea or initiative. The bottom line shows the
relationship between support in Oregon and support nationwide, and was calculated
simply by dividing the former by the latter.
All Voters Republican Democratic Independent
Meas 80
(OR) 36% 20% 45% 48%
National 48% 33% 61% 50%
OR /
National 75.00% 60.61% 73.77% 96.00%

As is shown, support for Measure 80 was only three-fourths the level of support
nationwide, and with only 36% of the public in support, no subgroup topped the 50%
mark. However, it is interesting to note the differences in support among the various
partisan groups. Republicans supported Measure 80 at only 60% their national level of
55
support for general legalization, Democrats supported Measure 80 in a ratio very close to
the proportion among the public in each instance, and Independents supported the
measure nearly as strongly as national Independents support the broad concept of
legalization. It is unclear as to why Republicans were so much more opposed to the
measure than may have been expected, or why Independents supported the measure so
strongly.
Considering county results and statewide polling in all four states, it is clear that
partisanship has a major relationship with individuals decision to support marijuana
legalization.

Marijuana Prohibition Enforcement
I had hypothesized that counties with higher rates of arrest for marijuana
possession would have higher levels of support for marijuana legalization, as residents in
those areas would be intimately familiar with the effects of marijuana prohibition and
want it to end. It is well known that marijuana prohibition, and drug prohibition in
general, is enforced much more in urban environments, low-income areas, and in
communities of color (McKinley). Wealthier, whiter areas see much less marijuana
enforcement, and this may lead residents to be more ambivalent about marijuana
legalization since they are less affected by the harms of prohibition.
To examine this relationship, I gathered county-level marijuana possession arrest
data from the Federal Bureau of Investigations Uniform Crime Report, as compiled by
NORML in their 2002 project, The NORML Almanac of Marijuana Arrest Statistics. I
then preformed linear regressions with county-level support for the various state-level
56
marijuana legalization ballot initiatives. Unfortunately, this did not prove very successful,
and I was unable to find statistically significant relationships for any of the four states
under consideration. However, there are some finds that I would like to quickly address.
In California, there was no significant correlation, with an r-squared of only
.0634. A vast majority of counties had arrest rates of less than 500 per 100,000
population, but Alpine boasted a rate of nearly 3,150 per 100,000. However, this is
slightly misleading, as there were only 37 marijuana possession arrests in the county in
2002, but the countys miniscule population of 1,175 makes this small number appear
much more significant.

Colorado saw the largest correlation out of all four states, but with an r-squared of
only .1590, it was still far too small to be considered statistically significant.
57

Washington saw a much smaller correlation, with an r-squared of only .0742.
Also, the line of best fit actually trended downward, indicating that counties with higher
arrest rates were less supportive of legalization. Of course, due to the statistical
insignificance of the relationship, this is largely irrelevant.

Oregon had the weakest correlation of all four states, with an r-squared of only
.0072. Like Washington, it saw an inverse relationship between the marijuana arrest rate
and support for legalization, but also like Washington, this correlation was far too small
for the observation to be noteworthy.
58

Considering these findings, it appears that there is not a measurable relationship
between the severity of enforcement of marijuana prohibition and support for the
legalization of the drug, at least on a county level. Further analysis of this relationship
should be done, perhaps breaking it down by geographic areas smaller than counties in
order to get a more accurate understanding of the disparities in enforcement, as there
could be great variation within counties.

Enrollment in Medical Marijuana Programs
I also hypothesized that medical marijuana patients in Colorado would be very
supportive of the states marijuana legalization measure, while patients in Washington
would be much less supportive of, if not opposed to, their states measure. In order to
examine the veracity of this hypothesis, I sought out the number of registered medical
marijuana patients in the county of each state, in order to compare this with each countys
support of their respective marijuana legalization ballot initiatives. Unfortunately, in my
search I discovered that only two of the four states Colorado and Oregon have a
statewide registry for medical marijuana patients, while the other two Washington and
59
California have medical marijuana programs that do not require patients to register with
a state agency. This limited my ability to examine this hypothesis, but I was still able to
make some important discoveries in this area.
In Colorado, there appears to be a moderately significant correlation between
county-level medical marijuana enrollment and county support for Amendment 64. 19 of
the 20 counties with the highest proportion of their population enrolled in Colorados
medical marijuana program all approved Amendment 64, most of them by rather large
margins. Similarly, 19 of the 20 counties with the lowest proportion of their population
using medical marijuana all rejected Amendment 64, also often with rather large margins
the only bottom-20 county to approve the measure was Weld County, which only
approved it by 50.2% (Center for Health).
County % Yes % No % MMJ County % Yes % No % MMJ
Gilpin 64.70% 35.20% 7.13% Arapahoe 52.80% 47.10% 1.81%
San Miguel 79.10% 20.80% 4.85% Pueblo 54.90% 45.00% 1.81%
Clear Creek 64.00% 35.90% 4.76% Adams 56.00% 43.90% 1.79%
Park 58.10% 41.80% 4.45% Larimer 54.60% 45.30% 1.73%
Pitkin 75.20% 24.70% 4.22% Alamosa 56.30% 43.60% 1.66%
Routt 62.90% 37.00% 4.02% Montrose 42.90% 57.00% 1.64%
Teller 51.50% 48.40% 4.00% Mesa 46.40% 53.50% 1.54%
Costilla 60.40% 39.50% 3.89% Las Animas 52.40% 47.50% 1.53%
Saguache 64.80% 35.10% 3.70% Moffat 47.10% 52.80% 1.47%
Summit 69.20% 30.70% 3.68% Cheyenne 35.60% 64.30% 1.42%
La Plata 61.70% 38.20% 3.42% Mineral 52.50% 47.40% 1.40%
Huerfano 56.70% 43.20% 3.25% Crowley 44.30% 55.60% 1.39%
Archuleta 55.60% 44.30% 3.23% Weld 50.20% 49.70% 1.37%
Boulder 66.10% 33.80% 3.17% Elbert 45.70% 54.20% 1.33%
San Juan 65.30% 34.60% 3.15% Rio Grande 49.10% 50.80% 1.33%
Chaffee 54.70% 45.20% 3.14% Otero 45.70% 54.20% 1.30%
Dolores 45.00% 54.90% 3.10% Washington 38.50% 61.40% 1.25%
60
Ouray 61.50% 38.40% 2.95% Baca 36.70% 63.20% 1.24%
Denver 65.90% 34.00% 2.85% Jackson 45.70% 54.20% 1.15%
Lake 59.70% 40.20% 2.80% Douglas 45.40% 54.50% 1.13%
Montezuma 48.90% 51.00% 2.74% Conejos 45.00% 54.90% 1.11%
Custer 45.30% 54.60% 2.61% Rio Blanco 40.70% 59.20% 1.05%
Grand 58.40% 41.50% 2.52% Logan 43.40% 56.50% 0.90%
Garfield 56.80% 43.10% 2.42% Prowers 40.70% 59.20% 0.89%
Hinsdale 48.40% 51.50% 2.37% Sedgwick 39.50% 60.40% 0.88%
El Paso 49.30% 50.60% 2.35% Yuma 37.30% 62.60% 0.87%
Fremont 48.60% 51.30% 2.31% Bent 49.40% 50.50% 0.82%
Gunnison 67.30% 32.60% 2.27% Phillips 37.10% 62.80% 0.81%
Jefferson 53.70% 46.20% 2.23% Kiowa 31.90% 68.00% 0.79%
Eagle 66.50% 33.40% 2.14% Lincoln 38.10% 61.80% 0.79%
Delta 44.10% 55.80% 1.89% Morgan 42.30% 57.60% 0.74%
Broomfield 52.80% 47.10% 1.85% Kit Carson 37.50% 62.40% 0.74%
Table of all counties in Colorado, sorted by the percentage of the county population enrolled in Colorados
medical marijuana program. In order to fit the table on one page, it has been split into two columns. %
Yes and % No represent the electoral results for Amendment 64. % MMJ represents the proportion of
the countys population that is enrolled in Colorados medical marijuana program.

I also ran a linear regression to more closely examine this relationship, which
resulted in a moderately statistically significant correlation with an r-squared value of
.5776. While this is not as strong as the relationship between partisanship and support for
legalization, it is a much more significant correlation than any other factor not directly
concerned with voting.
61

Unfortunately, there was not a similarly significant correlation in Oregon, which
only had an r-squared value of .0366. The four counties which approved of Measure 80
were also spread out amongst the rankings of counties with the most registered patients,
coming in at numbers 6, 10, 21, and 32 out of 36 total counties (Oregon Health
Authority).

Yet returning to the results from Colorado, there is clearly a relationship between
the prevalence of medical marijuana and the countys support of legalization for
recreational use. The difficult part is uncovering the reason for this relationship. There
are many ways to explain the reason for this correlation, some of which complement each
62
other and some of which are contradictory. Support for the various explanations would
likely break down along pro-legalization and anti-legalization lines.
One explanation is that people in counties with higher levels of medical marijuana
users are more comfortable with marijuana, and were therefore more supportive of
allowing its use by all adults. Someone who is prescribed marijuana and has experience
with the drug may be less likely to believe sensationalist claims about its harms, and may
view the drug positively thanks to it alleviating the symptoms of their condition. Friends
and families of medical marijuana patients may also be more likely to support
recreational legalization due to them seeing the drug helping their loved ones. These
medical marijuana users and their associates also may have wanted to allow marijuana
possession for all adults in order to decrease their own fears of arrest or prosecution, as
they would be among a larger group of individuals who could be targeted by federal
authorities. This explanation would likely be supported by pro-legalization individuals, as
they would want to cast the states medical marijuana program as a legitimate institution
that is helping the sick.
Those who believe this explanation may also assert that low enrollment in
Colorados medical marijuana program in certain counties does not signify a healthier
population that does not need medicine, but a more conservative population that views
marijuana as a harmful gateway drug with a high potential for abuse. Those who have a
negative view of marijuana would not be likely to use it, even if their doctor recommends
it to them for medical purposes, and would likely be opposed to Amendment 64 or other
attempts to relax marijuana policies.
An alternative explanation, which would likely be supported by the anti-
63
legalization camp, would be that a majority of those registered as medical marijuana
patients are already using marijuana recreationally. Colorados medical marijuana
program has been criticized for being too relaxed, allowing healthy people to access what
some view to be a dangerous drug (Daily Mail). It is true that 94% of medical marijuana
patients in Colorado have been prescribed the drug for the treatment of chronic pain,
which some view to be a legitimate condition and others view to be an excuse used by
healthy people to obtain marijuana legally (Gogek). Those who believe the latter would
not be surprised by this chart, as people who are faking illnesses to obtain marijuana for
recreational use would almost certainly support recreational legalization, as it would
make it easier for them to obtain their drug of choice.
It is difficult to ascertain which of these two viewpoints is correct, and it is
possible that they both hold some weight or that neither of them addresses the reasons
behind this data. It would be beneficial for the literature if future researchers were to
tackle this question and determine a provable explanation for the relationship between
medical marijuana prevalence and support for recreational marijuana legalization.

Support for Same-Sex Marriage
Another hypothesis of mine was that support for marijuana legalization would be
closely correlated with support for other social issues, such as same-sex marriage and
abortion. All three of these topics would be considered moral issues, which Mooney
describes as those which seek to regulate social norms or which evoke strong moral
responses from citizens for some other reason. First, I will examine the relationship
between marijuana legalization and same-sex marriage support, and then I will move on
64
to examine its relationship with support for abortion access.
In order to examine county-level support for the two topics, I first had to identify
ballot initiatives that concerned the topic of same-sex marriage. Ideally, each state would
have voted on this issue the same year it voted on marijuana legalization, which would
ensure that the populations under examination were the same. However, this was only the
case for Washington state, while California, Oregon, and Colorado did not vote on same-
sex marriage the same year they voted on marijuana legalization. Therefore, I identified
the most recent occurrence of the state voting on same-sex marriage, and performed a
linear regression with that vote and the states vote on marijuana legalization in 2010 or
2012. The maximum span of time between these two votes was eight years. Overall, this
resulted in strong correlations in every state, and I will go into detail about each case.
In California, the most recent vote on same-sex marriage occurred in 2008, when
voters passed Proposition 8, an amendment to the state constitution which stated that
only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California
(Bowen, 2008). This was voted on only two years before marijuana legalization, so it
provides a very good look into the relationship between the two results. If my hypothesis
was correct, county support for Proposition 8 would be inversely related to county
support for Proposition 19.
As seen in the graph below, this is the case. The linear regression found an r-
squared of .7878, indicating a strong correlation between the two votes. As predicted,
county support was inversely related, meaning that counties which supported marijuana
legalization more strongly were more likely to oppose the same-sex marriage ban.
65

In Colorado, the most recent vote on same-sex marriage occurred in 2006, when
voters passed Amendment 43, an amendment to the state constitution which defined
marriage as only a union between one man and one woman (CNN, 2006). This was voted
on six years before marijuana legalization, so it provides a decent look into the
relationship between the two results. If my hypothesis was correct, county support for
Amendment 43 would be inversely related to county support for Amendment 64.
As seen in the following graph, this also proved to be true. The r-squared value of
.8194 is slightly stronger than that in California, and indicates a statistically significant
relationship between the two amendments. And, as was the case in California, the votes
were inversely related, showing that support for marijuana legalization and support for
same-sex marriage or at least opposition to its ban are closely tied together.

66

Oregon had the largest gap between its marijuana legalization and same-sex
marriage votes, with the most recent vote on marriage taking place in 2004, when voters
passed Measure 36 and defined marriage as only between one man and one woman
(Oregon Secretary of State). The eight-year gap between the votes is somewhat
problematic, as public opinion on both issues may have shifted significantly in that time
period. However, it is the best measure available.
As in California and Colorado, this linear regression helped to confirm my
hypothesis that support for marijuana legalization and same-sex marriage are linked. It
found the weakest correlation out of any states, with an r-squared of .7070, but this is still
high enough to indicate a significant correlation.
67

Washington was the only state to have voted on marijuana legalization and same-
sex marriage in the same year, 2012. It is also unique in that its citizens voted to approve
legal same-sex marriage, rather than an initiative that would ban such marriages. This
took the form of Referendum 74, a vote on whether to uphold or reject a bill passed by
the legislature to allow same-sex marriage in the state (Wyman). Due to the uniqueness
of the timing and content of this same-sex marriage vote, it serves as the best measure to
determine whether support for marijuana legalization and same-sex marriage are
correlated.
Importantly, this linear regression also produced the strongest correlation out of
all four states, with an r-squared of .8578. County votes in approval of marijuana
legalization and same-sex marriage were very closely correlated, providing strong
evidence to support my hypothesis.
68

As Washington was unique in the timing, content, and correlation of its ballot
measures, I decided to take a closer look at the data in order to unearth any other trends.
Interestingly, while both ballot measures passed on the state level, 20 of Washingtons 39
counties approved Initiative 502, compared to only 10 counties supporting Referendum
74. Also, only three counties in the entire state supported Referendum 74 more strongly
than Initiative 502. Below is a map of Washingtons counties, each with the percentage
point difference between the two votes. Lighter counties had a smaller difference
between the two votes, while darker counties supported marijuana legalization
significantly more than same-sex marriage.
69

From this map, it is clear that the difference in support is linked to geographic
location, with the biggest differences located in the northeastern section of the state and
the smallest difference located along the coast. I hypothesized that this may be linked to
the urban or rural nature of each county, so I ran a linear regression to compare the
difference in support with the population density of each county, shown in the graph
below.
70

Unfortunately, this regression only returned a weak correlation with an r-squared
of .3269, hardly strong enough to be statistically significant. Future research should be
done to examine the reasons for intra-state regional variations in support for marijuana
legalization and same-sex marriage.
In conclusion, it is clear that there is a very strong connection between support for
marijuana legalization and same-sex marriage, as there were statistically significant
correlations in all four states. As both are examples of the government allowing
individuals to make their own decisions about what to do with their bodies, this should
not be surprising.

Support for Abortion Access
I also hypothesized that support for marijuana legalization would be related to
support for abortion access, another moral issue that is traditionally supported by
individuals with a more liberal or libertarian political philosophy. However, as abortion
can be a much more heated issue than same-sex marriage since its opponents view it as a
matter of life and death, I determined that it would be worth examining this relationship
71
separately to see if there is a difference between the correlations with same-sex marriage
rights.
To examine this question, I took a similar approach to my examination of same-
sex marriage, identifying the most recent state-level votes on abortion access and
comparing them to the 2010 or 2012 results on marijuana legalization. All four states had
voted on abortion-related questions, although the largest gap between the two was 14
years as opposed to the mere 8-year gap for same-sex marriage. However, the other three
states had much more recent votes, with the largest gap being six years. Overall, it
appears that there is also a strong correlation between support for marijuana legalization
and abortion access.
In California, the most recent vote on abortion access was 2008s failed
Proposition 4, which would have required minors seeking abortions to notify their parents
or legal guardians of their intent at least 48 hours prior to the procedure (CA Attorney
General). If my hypothesis were correct, there would be a statistically significant
correlation between opposition to this amendment and support for the marijuana
legalization proposition voted on two years later.
As shown in the graph below, this does appear to be the case. The linear
regression returned an r-squared of .7601, signifying a statistically significant relationship
between the two votes. As demonstrated by the negative slope of the line of best fit,
counties that were more supportive of marijuana legalization tended to be less supportive
of imposing restrictions on abortion access.
72

Colorado also voted on abortion access only two years before voting on marijuana
legalization. In 2010, the state solidly rejected proposed Amendment 62 that, if passed,
would have defined fetuses as legal persons, effectively banning all abortion procedures
(Jorgensen).
As shown by the regression below, there is a moderately strong correlation
between support for marijuana legalization and support for the abortion ban, with an r-
squared of .6288. Again, as can be seen by the negative slope of the line of best fit,
counties more supportive of marijuana legalization tended to be less supportive of the
abortion ban.

73
Colorado is unique among the four states in that some of the public opinion
polling for its marijuana legalization measure included data about respondents views on
abortion access (SurveyUSA, Poll #19661). When SurveyUSA pollsters asked
Colorado voters whether they supported, opposed, or were not sure about Amendment
64, they also asked if they believed abortion should be completely legal, legal only in
certain cases, or completely illegal. The results of this poll are shown in the table below.

All
Respondents Legal
Legal in
certain
cases Illegal
Yes 51% 62% 46% 22%
No 40% 30% 46% 65%
Not Sure 8% 8% 8% 13%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
Composition
of Adults 100% 50% 39% 10%

As can be seen, support for marijuana legalization was highest among individuals
who supported the highest level of abortion access, moderate among individuals who
supported limited abortion access, and low among individuals who thought abortion
should be illegal in all cases. Interestingly, those who opposed abortion access were over
60% more likely than other subgroups to be unsure about their stance on marijuana
legalization. This may indicate that the issues are more linked in the minds of individuals
who support abortion access than among individuals who oppose it.
As stated above, Washington was the state with the largest gap between its votes
on marijuana legalization and abortion access. The most recent statewide vote concerning
abortion was in 1998, when Washingtonians rejected the Late Term Abortion Act, also
known as Initiative 694. If passed, the initiative would have banned partial-birth
abortions in the state (SmartVoter).
74
Despite the 14-year gap between the votes, they have an even stronger statistical
relationship than was seen in California. The regression shows an r-squared of .8033, a
very strong correlation that reinforces the hypothesis that support for marijuana
legalization and abortion access are related.

Oregon residents most recently voted on abortion access in 2006, when they
rejected Measure 43. If passed, the measure would have required doctors planning to
perform an abortion on a minor to notify the minors parents at least 48 hours before the
procedure (Brown, 2006), and failure to do so would have resulted in a revocation of the
doctors license to practice, as well as allowed parents to sue the physician.
The relationship between this vote and the vote on Measure 80 in 2012 was the
strongest of all four states, with an r-squared value of .8041. This statistically significant
correlation is further evidence of the close relationship between the two issues.
75

In conclusion, every state showed a relationship between the issues of marijuana
legalization and abortion access, with three of the four states showing correlations with r-
squared values of over .75. Therefore, we can say with relative certainty that support for
the two issues is related, much like the issues of marijuana legalization and same-sex
marriage.

Age
Polling data from SurveyUSA also gives us the ability to examine support for the
various 2010 and 2012 marijuana legalization initiatives among various age
demographics. Unfortunately, SurveyUSA used different age brackets (18 to 34, 35 to 49,
50 to 64, and 65 plus) than the national Gallup polls in 2010 (18 to 29, 30 to 49, 50 to 64,
and 65 plus) and 2012 (18 to 29, 30 to 64, and 65 plus), making it impossible to do a
direct comparison of all age demographics. However, this data can still provide a
valuable insight into how each initiative fared with voters of different ages.
In California, the poll respondents were two percentage points less supportive of
Proposition 19 than the national respondents were supportive of general legalization that
76
same year. However, Californias 50 to 64 age bracket was three points higher than the
state average, compared to the same age groups support of marijuana legalization being
three points below average in national polling. Relatively speaking, this means that
Proposition 19 appealed more to mid- to upper-aged people than the general idea of
marijuana legalization. Perhaps these older voters were more supportive due to the
regulations proposed by Prop 19, or the campaigns appeals to older people.
The age bracket of 65+ was identical for both polls, displaying 32% in support.
The other two age brackets of each poll did not match, making it impossible to discern
any confirmable differences in opinion between Proposition 19 and the general idea of
legalization, or compare the groups to the older two age brackets.
All Voters 18 to 34 35 to 49 50 to 64 65+
Prop 19 (CA) 44% 50% 44% 47% 32%

All Voters 18 to 29 30 to 49 50 to 64 65+
National
(2010) 46% 61% 49% 43% 32%

Unfortunately, Gallups polling data in the 2012 races simplified the age brackets
even further than its 2010 results, grouping together the 30 to 49 bracket and the 50 to 64
bracket into one large 30 to 64 bracket. This makes it impossible to glean much
information from the polls in Colorado, Washington, and Oregon. However, there are
some small details worth noting.
In Colorado, the only result worth noting is the surprisingly high level of support
among 50- to 64-year olds, who supported the measure almost as strongly as the youngest
age bracket. This could be due to two major factors. Firstly, the amendment imposed
tight regulations on the production and sale of marijuana, which may have assuaged older
voters fears of children accessing the drug or of marijuana use having a negative impact
77
on their own lives. Secondly, Colorado was home to the countrys most regulated and
respected medical marijuana industry, so much so that the federal government has not
conducted any raids on medical marijuana businesses within the state, in contrast to the
numerous raids in less-regulated states like California. The presence of this well-
regulated industry may have made older voters more comfortable with the drug, but this
would not explain the lower levels of support among those older than 65. However,
unlike some of its counterparts, Amendment 64 would have left the medical marijuana
industry as-is, and this may have encouraged medical marijuana-using Coloradoans in
this age bracket to support the measure (Clark).
Additionally, the Yes on 64 campaign made a strong push to gain the support of
older Coloradoans, putting out advertisements geared towards these groups. For example,
in May 2012 the campaign published an advertisement entitled Dear Mom, depicting a
recent college graduate writing an email to her mom about why she believes marijuana is
a safer alternative to alcohol. Ads like this were aimed at Coloradoans roughly 40 to 60
years of age, and may have helped persuade these voters to support the measure.
All Voters 18 to 34 35 to 49 50 to 64 65+
Amen 64 (CO) 51% 61% 44% 58% 37%

All Voters 18 to 29 30 to 64 65+
National
(2012) 48% 60% 48% 36%

In Washington, on the other hand, the 65+ age bracket was significantly more
supportive than their national counterparts, even taking into account the higher support in
the state as a whole. Washington voters 55% approval of Initiative 502 was 14.5%
higher than the national approval number of 48%. In contrast, 45% of Washingtonians
over 65 years of age supported Initiative 502, which is 25% more supportive than their
78
national counterparts were of the general idea of legalization. This is likely due to the
incredibly strict regulations included in the measure, such as the harsh DUI regulations
and a ban on home growing, that led some drug policy reformers to come out against the
measure because it was overly restrictive (Rose).
It is also worth noting that Washingtons 50 to 64 bracket was the most supportive
of any age group, with two-thirds of those voters expressing their support to pollsters.
While the different national age brackets makes it impossible to make a direct
comparison, its worth noting that this level of support was significantly higher than even
the national age bracket of 30- to 64-year olds, which one would assume would be higher
due to its inclusion of adults aged 30 to 49. Once again, this can likely be explained by
the initiatives strict regulations.
Surprisingly, support by Washingtonians aged 18 to 34 was below the state
average. Conventional wisdom would have predicted that this would be the most
supportive group polled, but they may have been opposed to the measure due to the same
strict regulations that led older Washingtonians to be more supportive.
All Voters 18 to 34 35 to 49 50 to 64 65+
Init 502 (WA) 55% 54% 53% 66% 45%

All Voters 18 to 29 30 to 64 65+
National
(2012) 48% 60% 48% 36%

Unfortunately, polling data from Oregon did not yield any notable results, and
levels of support from each group fell along expected lines, with younger brackets being
the most supportive, and support steadily dropping off among older voters. The closeness
of state support to national support may be due to the very small budget of the Yes on 80
campaign, which limited their ability to persuade voters to support their measure
79
(Borden). Thus, those supporting the measure likely already supported legalization as a
general concept.
All Voters 18 to 34 35 to 49 50 to 64 65+
Meas 80 (OR) 36% 45% 39% 35% 25%

All Voters 18 to 29 30 to 64 65+
National
(2012) 48% 60% 48% 36%

Conclusions, and Looking Forward
I hope that this examination serves as the first among many studies into the
determinants of support for marijuana legalization. If the rapidly increasing levels of
support continue, it is likely to be on the ballot in many states in the future, and may be
an issue that remains in the national discussion for decades. Many opinion leaders have
compared the path of marijuana legalization with that of gay marriage, due to its rapid
increases in support, generational gaps, and recent victories on certain state ballots
(Walker). If it is in fact similar, then it is possible that a presidential candidate, or even
president, from one of the major parties could endorse it in the foreseeable future. And if
it follows the path of alcohol prohibition repeal, its possible that we may see federal
action on the topic by 2022.
As was seen in the sections above, of all the factors examined, support for
marijuana legalization appears to most closely correlated with opinions on other social
issues, like abortion access and same-sex marriage, and to voting behavior for partisan
office. While public opinion polls show a connection with religiousness, the presence of
mega-churches did not appear to influence opinion on marijuana legalization. This former
observation implies that if religiosity continues to decrease in the United States, then
support for marijuana legalization will continue to increase. More studies should be done
80
on the interaction between religion and support for marijuana policy reform, as varying
religious groups have very different stances on the issue.
One important take-away is that enrollment in medical marijuana programs has a
positive correlation with support for marijuana legalization. As discussed in the
introduction, more and more states are adopting medical marijuana laws, and many are
considering bills at the time of this writing (MPP). As medical marijuana becomes more
prevalent, support for recreational marijuana legalization is likely to increase. Therefore,
if marijuana policy reform advocates are pursuing recreational legalization as the ultimate
goal, it would do them well to continue devoting substantial efforts to medical marijuana
campaigns in order to lay the foundation for future recreational initiatives.
If the 2010 and 2012 elections are any indicator, reformers should also take care
to tailor future initiatives to the voting population, and include tight regulations in order
to sway older voters to support the measures. The initiatives in Washington and Colorado
had much more support among older Americans than the measure in California and
Oregon, and were widely viewed as more restrained and reasonable.
Despite the historic passage of marijuana legalization in two states in 2012, and
encouraging trends in public opinion, advocates must also take care not to become
overconfident. In the 1960s, many reformers believed that marijuana would be legal in a
matter of years, only to see their progress stall, or in some cases, reverse (Nadelmann).
Modern reformers should mind this lesson, and work to make sure that their recent
progress does not meet a similar fate.


81
Bibliography
18 Legal Medical Marijuana States and DC. ProCon.org. 22 Feb. 2013. Web. 29 Mar. 2013.
http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000881
Anslinger, Harry J. Statement of Harry J. Anslinger on the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937.
Schaffer Library of Drug Policy. 1937. Web. 29 Mar. 2013.
http://www.druglibrary.org/SCHAFFER/hemp/taxact/t10a.htm
Armentano, Paul. Pot Prisoners Cost Americans $1 Billion a Year. Alternet. 9 Feb. 2007.
Web. 29 Mar. 2013.
http://www.alternet.org/story/47815/pot_prisoners_cost_americans_$1_billion_a_year
Associated Press. AARP Poll Shows Most Support Legalizing Medicinal Marijuana. The
New York Times. 19 Dec. 2004. Web. 29 Mar. 2013.
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/19/national/19marijuana.html?_r=0
Ball, Molly. Why Gary Johnson Wont Shut Up About Marijuana. The Atlantic. 21 Sept.
2012. Web. 29 Mar. 2013. http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/09/why-
gary-johnson-wont-shut-up-about-marijuana/262634/
Baker, Peter. Obama Signs Law Narrowing Cocaine Sentencing Disparities. The New York
Times. 3 Aug. 2010. Web. 29 Mar. 2013.
http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/08/03/obama-signs-law-narrowing-cocaine-
sentencing-disparities/
Becker, Amy, and Dietram Scheufele. Moral Politicking: Public Attitudes toward Gay
Marriage in an Election Context. The International Journal of Press/Politics. 14:2
(2009).
Blachly, P. H. Effects of Decriminalization of Marijuana in Oregon. National Criminal
Justice Reference Service. 1976. Web. 29 Mar. 2013.
https://www.ncjrs.gov/App/Publications/abstract.aspx?ID=57208
Borden, David. Oregon Measure 80. StopTheDrugWar.org. 18 Dec. 2012. Web. 29 Mar.
2013. http://stopthedrugwar.org/taxonomy/term/249
Bowen, Debra. General Election - Statement of Vote. California Secretary of State. 2 Nov.
2010. Web. 29 Mar. 2013. http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2010-general/
Bowen, Debra. Qualified Statewide Ballot Measures. CA Secretary of State. 2008. Web. 29
Mar. 2013. http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ballot-measures/qualified-ballot-
measures.htm
Brown, Kate. Measure 43. Oregon Secretary of State. 7 Nov. 2006. Web. 29 Mar. 2013.
http://oregonvotes.org/pages/history/archive/nov72006/guide/meas/m43_bt.html
Brown, Kate. November 6, 2012, General Election Abstract of Votes. Oregon Secretary of
State. 6 Nov. 2012. Web. 29 Mar. 2013. http://www.oregonvotes.gov/
82
Burnett, Raymond, and William Salka. Determinants of Electoral Support for Anti-Gay
Marriage and Environmental Ballot Initiatives: An Examination of 2008 Ballot Issues in
California. 2012 Annual Meeting of the Western Political Science Association. Presented
Mar 22, 2012.
California Attorney General. Proposition 4 - Title and Summary - Voter Information Guide
2008. California Secretary of State. 2008. Web. 29 Mar. 2013.
http://voterguide.sos.ca.gov/past/2008/general/title-sum/prop4-title-sum.htm
California Secretary of State. Text of Proposition 215. CA Secretary of State. 1996. Web. 29
Mar. 2013. http://vote96.sos.ca.gov/bp/215text.htm
Carter, Jimmy. Drug Abuse Message to the Congress. The American Presidency Project. 2
Aug. 1977. Web. 29 Mar. 2013. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=7908
Cassowary. Map of USA by State Lowerhouse. Wikimedia Commons. Web. 29 Mar. 2013.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Map_of_USA_by_state_lowerhouse.svg
Center for Health & Environment Information and Statistics. Medical Marijuana Statistics.
Colorado Dept of Public Health and Environment. 2012. Web. 29 Mar. 2013.
http://www.colorado.gov/cs/Satellite/CDPHE-CHEIS/CBON/1251593017044
Caulkins, John. Marijuana Legalization: What We Know and What We Dont. RAND
Corporation. 17 July 2012. Web. 29 Mar. 2013.
http://www.rand.org/multimedia/video/2012/07/17/marijuana-legalization.html
Church Attendance Is Declining. FamilyFacts.org. 2010. Web. 29 Mar. 2013.
http://www.familyfacts.org/charts/620/church-attendance-is-declining
Cillizza, Chris. The Politics of Race and Religion in Two Pie Charts. The Washington
Post. Spetember 2012. Web. 29 Mar. 2013. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-
fix/wp/2012/09/10/the-politics-of-race-and-religion-in-two-pie-charts/
Clark, Maggie. Colorado Medical Marijuana Businesses Prepare for Legal Recreational
Marijuana Users. Stateline - The Daily News Service of the Pew Charitable Trusts. 16
Jan. 2013. Web. 29 Mar. 2013.
http://www.pewstates.org/projects/stateline/headlines/colorado-preps-for-recreational-
marijuana-85899443068
CNN. Colorado | Amendment 43: Ban Same-Sex Marriage. America Votes 2006. 2006.
Web. 29 Mar. 2013.
http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2006//pages/results/states/CO/I/05/frameset.exclude.ht
ml
Controlled Substances Act. US Food and Drug Administration. Web. 29 Mar. 2013.
http://www.fda.gov/regulatoryinformation/legislation/ucm148726.htm
Daily Mail. Its now easier to get medical marijuana than a Starbucks coffee in Denver. The
Daily Mail. Web. Retrieved Dec 6, 2012. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
2011659/More-medical-marijuana-dispensaries-Starbucks-Denver-Colorado.html
83
Denver Post. Results: Elections: Amendment 64 - Legalize Marijuana. The Denver Post. 7
Nov. 2012. Web. 29 Mar. 2013.
http://data.denverpost.com/election/results/amendment/2012/64-legalize-marijuana/
DeRoche, Craig. A Failing Criminal Justice System. New York Times. 12 Mar. 2012. Web.
29 Mar. 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/03/12/young-black-and-
male-in-america/a-failing-criminal-justice-system
Dickinson, Tim. Obamas War on Pot. The Rolling Stone. 16 Feb. 2012. Web. 29 Mar.
2013. http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/obamas-war-on-pot-20120216
Drug Policy Alliance. A Brief History of the Drug War. Drug Policy Alliance. Web. 29
Mar. 2013. http://www.drugpolicy.org/new-solutions-drug-policy/brief-history-drug-war
Dufton, Emily. The War on Drugs: How President Nixon Tied Addiction to Crime. The
Atlantic. 26 Mar. 2012. Web. 29 Mar. 2013.
http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/03/the-war-on-drugs-how-president-
nixon-tied-addiction-to-crime/254319/
Federal Bureau of Investigations. Summary of the Uniform Crime Reporting Program.
Web. Retrieved Nov 7, 2012. http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/killed/2009/aboutucr.html
Federal Bureau of Investigations. Uniform Crime Report: Crime in the United States, 2011.
Sep 2012. Web. Retrieved Nov 7, 2012. www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-
u.s/2011/crime-in-the-u.s.-2011/persons-arrested/arrestmain_final.pdf
Ferner, Matt. Mason Tvert Talks Marijuana Legalization In Colorado On Real Time With
Bill Maher. The Huffington Post. 12 Nov. 2012. Web. 29 Mar. 2013.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/12/mason-tvert-real-time-bill-
maher_n_2118262.html
Ferraiolo, Kathleen. Popular 'medicine': Policymaking by direct democracy and the medical
marijuana movement of the 1990s. University of Virginia. 2004.
Fleischmann, Arnold, and Laura Moyer. Competing Social Movements and Local Political
Culture: Voting on Ballot Propositions to Ban Same-Sex Marriage in the U.S. States.
Social Science Quarterly. 90:1 (2009).
FRONTLINE, PBS. Marijuana Timeline. Web. 29 Mar. 2013.
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/dope/etc/cron.html
Frum, David. David Frum on the Perils of Legalizing Pot. The Daily Beast. 17 Dec. 2012.
Web. 29 Mar. 2013. http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2012/12/16/david-frum-
on-the-perils-of-legalizing-pot.html
Gessler, Scott. CO - Election Results. Colorado Secretary of State. 24 Jan. 2013. Web. 29
Mar. 2013. http://results.enr.clarityelections.com/CO/43032/114663/en/select-
county.html
84
Gieringer, Dale H. "The Forgotten Origins of Cannabis Prohibition in California,"
Contemporary Drug Problems, Vol 26 #2, Summer 1999.
Gogek, Ed. Medical marijuana a health risk for society. The San Francisco Chronicle.
Apr 22, 2012. Web. Retrieved Dec 4, 2012.
http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/article/Medical-marijuana-a-health-risk-for-society-
3498533.php
Gopnik, Adam. The Caging of America. The New Yorker. 30 Jan. 2012. Web. 29 Mar. 2013.
http://www.newyorker.com/arts/critics/atlarge/2012/01/30/120130crat_atlarge_gopnik
Hardy, Quentin. Milton Friedman: Legalize It! Forbes. 6 June 2005. Web. 29 Mar. 2013.
http://www.forbes.com/2005/06/02/cz_qh_0602pot.html
Harrison, Lana D., Michael Backenheimer and James A. Inciardi (1995), Cannabis use in the
United States: Implications for policy. In: Peter Cohen & Arjan Sas (Eds)(1996),
Cannabisbeleid in Duitsland, Frankrijk en de Verenigde Staten. Amsterdam, Centrum
voor Drugsonderzoek, Universiteit van Amsterdam. pp. 206-230.
Hartford Institute for Religion Research. Database of Megachurches in the US. Web.
Retrieved Nov 7, 2012. http://hirr.hartsem.edu/megachurch/database.html
Hirliman, George A. Reefer Madness. IMDb. 1936. Web. 29 Mar. 2013.
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0028346/
"It Brings Ravishing Dreams of Bliss," San Francisco Call, October 24, 1897, p. 17.
Jaret, Peter. Older Adults Increasingly Using Medical Marijuana to Combat Nausea, Pain.
AARP.org. 29 Oct. 2010. Web. 29 Mar. 2013.
Jorgensen, Leslie. Personhood Amendment Revised and Revived. Colorado Statesman. 3
July 2009. Web. 29 Mar. 2013. http://www.coloradostatesman.com/content/991130-
personhood-amendment-revised-and-revived
Kelley, Michael. Colorado And Washington Are The First Places In The World Where Weed
Is Truly Legal. Business Insider. 8 Nov. 2012. Web. 29 Mar. 2013.
http://www.businessinsider.com/legal-marijuana-colorado-washington-2012-11
Krueger, Alyson. Shuffleboard? Oh, Maybe Lets Get High Instead. The New York Times.
22 Mar. 2013. Web. 29 Mar. 2013.
Liptak, Adam. Inmate Count in U.S. Dwarfs Other Nations. The New York Times. 23 Apr.
2008. Web. 29 Mar. 2013.
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/23/us/23prison.html?pagewanted=all
Lokal_Profil. Map of US State Cannabis Laws. Wikimedia Commons. Web. 29 Mar. 2013.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Map-of-US-state-cannabis-laws.svg
85
Lyons, Linda. Americans Remain Opposed to Legalizing Marijuana. Gallup.com. 3 Dec.
2003. Web. 29 Mar. 2013. http://www.gallup.com/poll/9817/Americans-Remain-
Opposed-Legalizing-Marijuana.aspx
Mcardle, Megan. Will Pot Become Legal? The Atlantic. 5 Nov. 2010. Web. 29 Mar. 2013.
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2010/11/will-pot-become-legal/66174/
McKinley, Carol. Marijuana enforcement disproportionately impact minorities. Nov 1,
2012. Web. Retrieved Dec 2, 2012. http://www.kvnf.org/post/marijuana-enforcement-
disproportionately-impact-minorities
Merritt, Jeralyn. Reagans Drug War Legacy. Alternet. 18 June 2004. Web. 29 Mar. 2013.
http://www.alternet.org/story/18990/reagan%27s_drug_war_legacy
Miron, Jeffrey A., and Katherine Waldock. The Budgetary Impact of Ending Drug
Prohibition. Cato Institute. 27 Sept. 2010. Web. 29 Mar. 2013.
http://www.cato.org/publications/white-paper/budgetary-impact-ending-drug-prohibition
Monson, Quin. Party Identification, Party Registration, and Unaffiliated Voters. Utah
Data Points. 22 Dec. 2012. Web. 29 Mar. 2013. http://utahdatapoints.com/2012/12/party-
identification-party-registration-and-unaffiliated-voters/
Mooney, Christopher, and Mei-Hsien Lee. Legislating Morality in the American States: The
Case of Pre-Roe Abortion Regulation Reform. American Journal of Political Science,
39:3 (1995).
Moore, David W. Americans Oppose General Legalization Of Marijuana. Gallup.com. 9
Apr. 2009. Web. 29 Mar. 2013. http://www.gallup.com/poll/3937/Americans-Oppose-
General-Legalization-Marijuana.aspx
MPP. Marijuana Policy Reform Bills 2013. Marijuana Policy Project. 2013. Web. 29 Mar.
2013. http://www.mpp.org/legislation/marijuana-policy-reform-bills.html
Nadelmann, Ethan. UConn SSDP Presents Ethan Nadelmann. UCTV. 26 Feb. 2013. Web.
29 Mar. 2013. http://uctv.uconn.edu/shows/ucspan/2013/ssdp-presents-ethan-nadelmann/
National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, 1972-2010. University of
Chicago. March 2011.
NCC Staff. Busting Some Myths About the Founding Fathers and Marijuana. Constitution
Daily. 11 Nov. 2012. Web. 29 Mar. 2013.
http://blog.constitutioncenter.org/2012/11/busting-some-myths-about-the-founding-
fathers-and-marijuana/
Newport, Frank. Americans Want Federal Govt Out of State Marijuana Laws. Gallup.com.
10 Dec. 2012. Web. 29 Mar. 2013. http://www.gallup.com/poll/159152/americans-
federal-gov-state-marijuana-laws.aspx?version=print
Newport, Frank. Belief in God Far Lower in Western U.S. Gallup.com. 28 July 2008. Web.
29 Mar. 2013. http://www.gallup.com/poll/109108/belief-god-far-lower-western-us.aspx
86
Newport, Frank. Record-High 50% of Americans Favor Legalizing Marijuana Use.
Gallup.com. 17 Oct. 2011. Web. 29 Mar. 2013.
http://www.gallup.com/poll/150149/Record-High-Americans-Favor-Legalizing-
Marijuana.aspx
Newport, Frank. Religious Identity: States Differ Widely. Gallup.com. 7 Aug. 2009. Web.
29 Mar. 2013. http://www.gallup.com/poll/122075/Religious-Identity-States-Differ-
Widely.aspx
NORML. The First Pot POW. National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws
(NORML). Web. 29 Mar. 2013. http://norml.org/component/zoo/category/the-first-pot-
pow
NORML. Medical Marijuana: Legal Issues. National Organization for the Reform of
Marijuana Laws (NORML). Web. 29 Mar. 2013. http://norml.org/legal/medical-
marijuana-2
NORML. The NORML Almanac of Marijuana Arrest Statistics. National Organization for
the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML). Web. 29 Mar. 2013.
http://norml.org/component/zoo/item/state-reports?category_id=590
NORML. States That Have Decriminalized. National Organization for the Reform of
Marijuana Laws (NORML). Web. 29 Mar. 2013.
http://norml.org/aboutmarijuana/item/states-that-have-decriminalized
Office of Financial Management. Population Density. Washington Office of Financial
Management. 2012. Web. 29 Mar. 2013. http://www.ofm.wa.gov/pop/popden/default.asp
Office of Fiscal Analysis. HB-5389: An Act Concerning the Palliative Use of Marijuana.
Connecticut General Assembly. Web. Retrieved Oct 10, 2012.
http://www.cga.ct.gov/2012/FN/2012HB-05389-R01-FN.htm
Oregon Health Authority. Oregon Medical Marijuana Program Statistics. Oregon.gov. 1 Jan.
2013. Web. 29 Mar. 2013.
http://public.health.oregon.gov/DiseasesConditions/ChronicDisease/MedicalMarijuanaPr
ogram/Pages/data.aspx
Oregon Secretary of State. November 2, 2004, General Election Abstract of Votes. Oregon
Secretary of State. 2 Nov. 2004. Web. 29 Mar. 2013.
www.oregonvotes.org/doc/history/nov22004/abstract/m36.pdf
Page, Walter Hines, and Arthur Wilson Page. The Worlds Work. Doubleday, Page &
Company, 1907. Print.
Population Totals for Colorado Counties. Colorado Dept of Local Affairs. 2012. Web. 29
Mar. 2013. http://www.colorado.gov/cs/Satellite?c=Page&childpagename=DOLA-
Main%2FCBONLayout&cid=1251593346867&pagename=CBONWrapper
87
Quinn, Garrett. Inside the Internecine Battle Over Washington States Marijuana Ballot
Measure. Reason. Nov 5, 2012. Web. Retrieved Nov 7, 2012.
http://reason.com/blog/2012/11/05/marijuana-legalization-advocates-against
Rainey, Clint. Colorado Drug Legalization and Evangelicals: Why Didnt Religious Right
Fight Marijuana Amendment? Slate. 4 Jan. 2013. Web. 29 Mar. 2013.
http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/science/2013/01/colorado_drug_legaliz
ation_and_evangelicals_why_didn_t_religious_right_fight.html
Roberts, Chris. In Colorado, Marijuana Candidate Gary Johnson Aims to Be Obamas
Nader. SF Weekly. 5 Nov. 2012. Web. 29 Mar. 2013.
http://blogs.sfweekly.com/thesnitch/2012/11/in_colorado_marijuana_candidat.php
Roberts, Michael. Marijuana: Majority of Denver Republican Assembly Supports
Amendment 64. Westword. 16 Mar. 2012. Web. 29 Mar. 2013.
http://blogs.westword.com/latestword/2012/03/marijuana_denver_county_republican_ass
embly_amendment_64.php
Roberts, Joel. Poll: Strong Support For Abortion Rights. CBS News. 11 Feb. 2009. Web. 29
Mar. 2013. http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-500160_162-537570.html
Roh, Jongho, and Donald P. Haider-Markel. All Politics is Not Local: National Forces in
State Abortion Initiatives. Social Science Quarterly, 84:1 (2003).
Rose, Joseph. Washingtons New Driving High DUI Law for Marijuana Users Stirs Fears
(poll). Oregon Live. 5 Dec. 2012. Web. 29 Mar. 2013.
http://blog.oregonlive.com/commuting/2012/12/washingtons_new_driving_high_d.html
Saad, Linda. U.S. Support for Legalizing Marijuana Reaches New High. Gallup.com. 19
Oct. 2009. Web. 29 Mar. 2013. http://www.gallup.com/poll/123728/U.S.-Support-
Legalizing-Marijuana-Reaches-New-High.aspx
Scott, Emilee Mooney. Marijuana Decriminalization. Connecticut General Assembly. 5 May
2010. Web. 29 Mar. 2013. http://www.cga.ct.gov/2010/rpt/2010-R-0204.htm
Seattle Times. 2012 Washington State Election Results. The Seattle Times. 27 Nov. 2012.
Web. 29 Mar. 2013. http://seattletimes.com/flatpages/politics/2012-washington-election-
results.html
Shear, Michael D. Book Details Obamas Pot-Smoking Youth. The New York Times. 25
May 2012. Web. 29 Mar. 2013. http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/25/book-
details-obamas-pot-smoking-youth/
Sherry, Allison. Mitt Romney Would Honor Obama Administrations Illegal Immigrant
Work Permits. The Denver Post. 1 Oct. 2012. Web. 29 Mar. 2013.
http://www.denverpost.com/nationalpolitics/ci_21676605/romney-wont-deport-young-
illegals-who-have-temporary
Silver, Nate. Are Parents Just Saying No to Marijuana Legalization? The New York Times.
10 Nov. 2010. Web. 29 Mar. 2013.
88
http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/11/10/are-parents-just-saying-no-to-
marijuana-legalization/
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. United Nations treaty collection. 30 Mar. 1961. Web.
29 Mar. 2013. http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?mtdsg_no=VI-
15&chapter=6&lang=en
Smartvoter.org. Initiative 694: Termination of a Fetus Life. Smartvoter.org. 3 Nov. 1998.
Web. 29 Mar. 2013. http://www.smartvoter.org/1998nov/wa/state/meas/i694/
State of Alaska. Election Summary Report. 5 Dec. 2000. Web. 29 Mar. 2013.
http://www.elections.alaska.gov/results/00GENR/data/results.htm
Sullum, Jacob. The Marijuana Rebellion: State Ballot Initiatives Aimed at Legalizing Pot
Pose a New Challenge to Prohibition. Reason.com. 26 Sept. 2012. Web. 29 Mar. 2013.
http://reason.com/archives/2012/09/26/the-marijuana-rebellion
SurveyUSA. Election Poll #17597. SurveyUSA.com. 1 Nov. 2010. Web. 29 Mar. 2013.
http://www.surveyusa.com/client/PollReport.aspx?g=be46a92b-9a28-456a-90d1-
84e9bb60cd4a
SurveyUSA. Election Poll #19382. SurveyUSA.com. 18 July 2012. Web. 29 Mar. 2013.
http://www.surveyusa.com/client/PollReport.aspx?g=2786ebbd-3348-4795-b0a8-
0ee124a9707d
SurveyUSA. Election Poll #19661. SurveyUSA.com. 13 Sept. 2012. Web. 29 Mar. 2013.
http://www.surveyusa.com/client/PollReport.aspx?g=7812eda4-2bb8-488e-8c78-
b0e278a065b9
SurveyUSA. Election Poll #19925. SurveyUSA.com. 18 Oct. 2012. Web. 29 Mar. 2013.
http://www.surveyusa.com/client/PollReport.aspx?g=242a16b4-1a4c-47eb-a09e-
52040667cc42
USA Today Editorial Board. Editorial: Dont Legalize Pot Just so Adults Can Get High. 29
Oct. 2012. Web. 29 Mar. 2013.
http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2012/10/29/legalize-marijuana-pot-
states/1666755/
Walker, Jon. Demographics Is Destiny for Marriage Equality and Marijuana Legalization.
Just Say Now. 25 Mar. 2013. Web. 29 Mar. 2013.
http://justsaynow.firedoglake.com/2013/03/25/demographics-is-destiny-for-marriage-
equality-and-marijuana-legalization/
Wing, Nick. Marijuana Legalization Petition Draws White House Response. The Huffington
Post. 9 Jan. 2013. Web. 29 Mar. 2013.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/09/marijuana-legalization_n_2440352.html
Winseman, Albert L. Religion and Gender: A Congregation Divided. Gallup.com. 3 Dec.
2003. Web. 29 Mar. 2013. http://www.gallup.com/poll/7336/religion-gender-
congregation-divided.aspx
89
Wyman, Kim. Proposed Referendum Measures - 2012. Washington Secretary of State.
2012. Web. 29 Mar. 2013.
http://www.sos.wa.gov/elections/initiatives/referendum.aspx?y=2012
Yes on 64. YES on 64 Ad - Dear Mom - YouTube. Youtube.com. 10 May 2012. Web. 29
Mar. 2013. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rCVc_kLfjMg
Yes on 64. Yes on 64 Radio Ad - Tom Tancredo. Youtube.com. 13 Oct. 2012. Web. 29 Mar.
2013.https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lVedreyiK5U&list=UUt638IcXqOJL8q8XhNd
sO3w&index=12