CARLOS SUPERDRUG CORP., ET. AL. vs.

DSWD
Facts: Petitioners are domestic corporations and proprietors operating drugstores in the Philippines.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 4(a) of RA 9257, otherwise known as the Expanded
Senior Citizens Act of 2003. Section 4(a) of RA 9257 grants twenty percent (20%) discount as privileges
for the Senior Citizens. Petitioner contends that said law is unconstitutional because it constitutes
deprivation of private property.

Issue: Whether or not RA 9257 is unconstitutional

Held: Petition is dismissed. The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power
of eminent domain, has general welfare for its object.

Accordingly, it has been described as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers,
extending as it does to all the great public needs. It is the power vested in the legislature by the
constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and
ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be
for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same.

For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, property rights must
bow to the primacy of police power because property rights, though sheltered by due process, must
yield to general welfare.

REYES VS. ALMANZOR
FACTS:Petitioners (J.B.L. Reyes and Edmundo Reyes) are owners of parcels of land leased to tenants.RA
6359 was enacted prohibiting for one year an increase in monthly rentals of dwelling unitsand said Act
also disallowed ejectment of lessees upon the expiration of the usual period of lease. City assessor of
Manila (one of the respondents) assessed the value of petitionersproperty based on the schedule of
market values duly reviewed by the Secretary of Finance.The revision entailed an increase to the tax
rates and petitioners averred that the reassessmentimposed upon them greatly exceeded the annual
income derived from their properties.
ISSUE:
Whether or not income approach is the method to be used in the tax assessment and not
thecomparable sales approach.
RULING:
Petition Granted.By no stretch of the imagination can the market value of properties covered by PD 20
beequated with the market value of properties not so covered. In the case at bar, not even
factorsdeterminant of the assessed value of subject properties under the comparable sales
approachwere presented by respondent namely:1.That the sale must represent a bonafide arms length
transaction between a willing seller and a willing buyer 2.The property must be comparable property. As
a general rule, there were no takers so that there can be no reasonable basis for theconclusion that
these properties are comparable.Taxes are lifeblood of government, however,such collection should be
made in accordance with the law and therefore necessary to reconcileconflicting interests of the
authorities so that the real purpose of taxation, promotion of thewelfare of common good can be
achieved.

CIR vs. CA261 SCRA 236
FACTS: On 22 August 1986, Executive Order No. 41 was promulgated declaring a one-time tax
amnestyon unpaid income taxes, later amended to include estate and donor's taxes and taxes on
business, forthe taxable years 1981 to 1985. Availing itself of the amnesty, respondent R.O.H. Auto
ProductsPhilippines, Inc., filed, in October 1986 and November 1986, its Tax Amnesty Return No. 34-F-
00146-41and Supplemental Tax Amnesty Return No. 34-F-00146-64-B, respectively, and paid the
correspondingamnesty taxes due. Prior to this availment, petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
in acommunication received by private respondent on 13 August 1986, assessed the latter
deficiencyincome and business taxes for its fiscal years ended 30 September 1981 and 30 September
1982 in anaggregate amount of P1,410,157.71. However, the request to cancel the deficiency taxes was
denied
.ISSUES: WON private respondent can avail of the tax amnesty
RULING: YES. Executive Order No. 41 is quite explicit and requires hardly anything beyond a
simpleapplication of its provisions. If, as the Commissioner argues, Executive Order No. 41 had not
beenintended to include 1981-1985 tax liabilities already assessed (administratively) prior to 22 August
1986,the law could have simply so provided in its exclusionary clauses. It did not. The conclusion
isunavoidable, and it is that the executive order has been designed to be in the nature of a general
grantof tax amnesty subject only to the cases specifically excepted by it. It might not be amiss to recall
thatthe taxable periods covered by the amnesty include the years immediately preceding the
1986revolution during which time there had been persistent calls, all too vivid to be easily forgotten, for
civilDisobedience , most particularly in the payment of taxes, to the martial law regime. It should
beunderstandable then that those who ultimately took over the reigns of government following
thesuccessful revolution would promptly provide for a broad, and not a confined, tax amnesty.


GOMEZ v. PALOMAR

FACTS: Petitioner Benjamin Gomez mailed a letter at the post office in San Fernando, Pampanga. It did not
bear
the special anti-TB stamp required by the RA 1635. It was returned to the petitioner. Petitioner now assails the
constitutionality of the statute claiming that RA 1635 otherwise known as the Anti-TB Stamp law is violative
of
the equal protection clause because it constitutes mail users into a class for the purpose of the tax while leaving
untaxed the rest of the population and that even among postal patrons the statute discriminatorily grants
exemptions. The law in question requires an additional 5 centavo stamp for every mail being posted, and no
mail
shall be delivered unless bearing the said stamp.

ISSUE: Is the Anti-TB Stamp Law unconstitutional, for being allegedly violative of the equal protection
clause?

HELD: No. It is settled that the legislature has the inherent power to select the subjects of taxation and to grant
exemptions. This power has aptly been described as "of wide range and flexibility." Indeed, it is said that in the
field of taxation, more than in other areas, the legislature possesses the greatest freedom in classification. The
reason for this is that traditionally, classification has been a device for fitting tax programs to local needs and
usages in order to achieve an equitable distribution of the tax burden.
The classification of mail users is based on the ability to pay, the enjoyment of a privilege and on
administrative
convenience. Tax exemptions have never been thought of as raising revenues under the equal protection
clause.



Eastern Theatrical Co. vs. Alfonso
Second Division, Perfecto (J): 5 concur
Facts:
The municipal board of Manila enacted Ordinance 2958 (series of 1946) imposing a fee on the price
ofevery admission ticket sold by cinematograph theaters, vaudeville companies, theatrical shows and
boxingexhibitions, in addition to fees imposed under Sections 633 and 778 of Ordinance 1600. Eastern
TheatricalCo., among others, question the validity of ordinance, on the ground that it is unconstitutional
for beingcontrary to the provisions on uniformity and equality of taxation and the equal protection of
the lawsinasmuch as the ordinance does not tax other kinds of amusement, such as race tracks,
cockpits, cabarets,concert halls, circuses, and other places of amusement.
Issue:
Whether the ordinance violates the rule on uniformity and equality of taxation.
Held:
Equality and uniformity in taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same
classshall be taxed at the same rate. The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable and
naturalclassifications for purposes of taxation; and the theater companies cannot point out what places
of amusementtaxed by the ordinance do not constitute a class by themselves and which can be
confused with those notincluded in the ordinance. The fact that somew places of amusement are not
taxed while others, like the onesherein, are taxed is no argument at all against the equality and
uniformity of the tax imposition.


Manila Race Horse v. Dela Fuente
Facts: This action was instituted for a declaratoryrelief by the Manila Race Horses TrainersAssociation,
Inc., a non-stock corporation dulyorganized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the
Philippines, who allege that theyare owners of boarding stables for race horsesand that their rights as
such are affected byOrdinance No. 3065 of the City of Manilaapproved on July 1, 1947.
1
They made theMayor of Manila defendant and prayed thatsaid ordinance be declared invalid as
violativeof the Philippine Constitution.The case was submitted on the pleadings, andthe decision was
that the ordinance in question"is constitutional and valid and has beenenacted in accordance with the
powers of theMunicipal Board granted by the Charter of theCity of Manila."
Issue
: WON the ordinance makes an arbitraryclassification--- thus being violative of theconstitution.
Held:
In taxing only boarding stables for race horses,we do not believe that the ordinance, makesarbitrary
classification. In the case of EasternTheatrical Co. Inc., vs. Alfonso, it was said thereis equality and
uniformity in taxation if allarticles or kinds of property of the same classare taxed at the same rate.Thus,
it was held in that case, that "the fact thatsome places of amusement are not taxed whileothers, such as
cinematographs, theaters,vaudeville companies, theatrical shows, andboxing exhibitions and other kinds
of amusements or places of amusement are taxed,is not argument at all against the equality
anduniformity of tax imposition." Applying thiscriterion to the present case, there would
bediscrimination if some boarding stables of thesame class used for the same number of horseswere not
taxed or were made to pay less ormore than others.From the viewpoint of economics and publicpolicy
the taxing of boarding stables for racehorses to the exclusion of boarding stables forhorses dedicated to
other purposes is notindefensible.The owners of boarding stables for race horsesand, for that matter,
the race horse ownersthemselves, who in the scheme of shifting maycarry the taxation burden, are a
class bythemselves and appropriately taxed whereowners of other kinds of horses are taxed lessor not
at all, considering that equity in taxationisgenerally conceived in terms of ability to pay inrelation to the
benefits received by thetaxpayer and by the public from the business orpropertytaxed. Race horses are
devoted to gambling if legalized, their owners derive fat income andthe public hardly any profit from
horse racing,and this business demands relatively heavypolice supervision.Taking everything into
account, thedifferentiation against which the plaintiffscomplain conforms to the practical dictates of
justice and equity and is not discrimatory withinthe meaning of the Constitution.


PUNSALAN v. MUN. BOARD OF CITY OF MANILA

FACTS: The plaintiffs--two lawyers, medical practitioner, a dental surgeon, a CPA, and a pharmacist--sought
the
annulment of Ordinance No.3398 of the City of Manila which imposes a municipal occupation tax on persons
exercising various professions in the city and penalizes non-payment of the tax, contending in substance that
this
ordinance and the law authorizing it constitute class legislation, are unjust and oppressive, and authorize what
amounts to double taxation. The burden of plaintiffs' complaint is not that the professions to which they
respectively belong have been singled out for the imposition of this municipal occupation tax, but that while
the
law has authorized the City of Manila to impose the said tax, it has withheld that authority from other chartered
cities, not to mention municipalities.

ISSUE: Does the law constitute a class legislation? Is it for the Court to determine which political unit should
impose taxes and which should not?

HELD: No. It is not for the courts to judge what particular cities or municipalities should be empowered to
impose
occupation taxes in addition to those imposed by the National Government. That matter is peculiarly within the
domain of the political departments and the courts would do well not to encroach upon it. Moreover, as the seat
of the National Government and with a population and volume of trade many times that of any other Philippine
city or municipality, Manila, no doubt, offers a more lucrative field for the practice of the professions, so that it
is
but fair that the professionals in Manila be made to pay a higher occupation tax than their brethren in the
provinces.

CITY OF BAGUIO vs. DE LEON

FACTS: The City of Baguio passed an ordinance imposing a license fee on any person, entity or
corporation doing business in the City. The ordinance sourced its authority from RA No. 329, thereby
amending the city charter empowering it to fix the license fee and regulate businesses, trades and
occupations as may be established or practiced in the City. De Leon was assessed for P50 annual fee it
being shown that he was engaged in property rental and deriving income therefrom. The latter assailed
the validity of the ordinance arguing that it is ultra vires for there is no statury authority which expressly
grants the City of Baguio to levy such tax, and that there it imposed double taxation, and violates the
requirement of uniformity.
ISSUE: Are the contentions of the defendant-appellant tenable?
HELD: No. First, RA 329 was enacted amending Section 2553 of the Revised Administrative Code
empowering the City Council not only to impose a license fee but to levy a tax for purposes of revenue,
thus the ordinance cannot be considered ultra vires for there is more than ample statury authority for
the enactment thereof.
Second, an argument against double taxation may not be invoked where one tax is imposed by the
state and the other is imposed by the city, so that where, as here, Congress has clearly expressed its
intention, the statute must be sustained even though double taxation results.
And third, violation of uniformity is out of place it being widely recognized that there is nothing
inherently obnoxious in the requirement that license fees or taxes be exacted with respect to the same
occupation, calling or activity by both the state and the political subdivisions thereof.


Sison v Ancheta
Facts: Sison assails the validity of BP 135 w/c further amended Sec 21 of the National Internal Revenue
Code of 1977. The law provides that thered be a higher tax impost against income derived from
professional income as opposed to regular income earners. Sison, as a professional businessman, and as
taxpayer alleges that by virtue thereof, he would be unduly discriminated against by the imposition of
higher rates of tax upon his income arising from the exercise of his profession vis-a-vis those which are
imposed upon fixed income or salaried individual taxpayers. He characterizes the above section as
arbitrary amounting to class legislation, oppressive and capricious in character. There is a transgression
of both the equal protection and due process clauses of the Constitution as well as of the rule requiring
uniformity in taxation.
ISSUE: Whether the imposition of a higher tax rate on taxable net income derived from business or
profession than on compensation is constitutionally infirm.
HELD: The SC ruled against Sison. The power to tax, an inherent prerogative, has to be availed of to
assure the performance of vital state functions. It is the source of the bulk of public funds. Taxes, being
the lifeblood of the government, their prompt and certain availability is of the essence. According to the
Constitution: The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. However, the rule of uniformity does
not call for perfect uniformity or perfect equality, because this is hardly attainable. Equality and
uniformity in taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class shall be taxed
at the same rate. The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable and natural classifications for
purposes of taxation. Where the differentiation complained of conforms to the practical dictates of
justice and equity it is not discriminatory within the meaning of this clause and is therefore uniform.
There is quite a similarity then to the standard of equal protection for all that is required is that the tax
applies equally to all persons, firms and corporations placed in similar situation.
What misled Sison is his failure to take into consideration the distinction between a tax rate and a tax
base. There is no legal objection to a broader tax base or taxable income by eliminating all deductible
items and at the same time reducing the applicable tax rate. Taxpayers may be classified into different
categories. In the case of the gross income taxation embodied in BP 135, the discernible basis of
classification is the susceptibility of the income to the application of generalized rules removing all
deductible items for all taxpayers within the class and fixing a set of reduced tax rates to be applied to
all of them. Taxpayers who are recipients of compensation income are set apart as a class. As there is
practically no overhead expense, these taxpayers are not entitled to make deductions for income tax
purposes because they are in the same situation more or less. On the other hand, in the case of
professionals in the practice of their calling and businessmen, there is no uniformity in the costs or
expenses necessary to produce their income. It would not be just then to disregard the disparities by
giving all of them zero deduction and indiscriminately impose on all alike the same tax rates on the basis
of gross income. There is ample justification then for the Batasang Pambansa to adopt the gross system
of income taxation to compensation income, while continuing the system of net income taxation as
regards professional and business income.


Juan Luna Subdivision vs. Sarmiento 91 PHIL 371
Facts: Juan Luna Subdivision, Inc. brought a suit against the City treasurer and thePhilippines Trust
Company as defendants in the alternative to determine which of thetwo defendants is liable for
plaintiffs checks. Is appears that the plaintiff issued tothe City treasurer of Manila a check to be applied
to plaintiffs land tax for the secondsemester of 1941, the exact amount of which was yet undetermined
. On Feb. 20,1942, after the amount had been verified , which was P341.60, the balance of P1,868.92,
covered by voucher no 1487 of the City Treasurers Office , was noted inthe ledger as a credit to Juan
Luna Subdivision, Inc. Thereafter, the books of thePhilippine Trust Company revealed that plaintiffs
check was deposited by the City Treasurer with the Philippine National Bank, and the latter was paid the
cashequivalent thereof by the Philippines Turst Company, which debited the amountagainst Juan Luna
Subd.. However the City Treasurer refused after liberation torefund the plaintiffs deposit or apply it to
such future taxes as maybe found due. Theplaintiff claims the whole amount of the check contending
that the taxes for the lastsemester of 1941 had been remitted by CA No. 703.
Held:
The law is clear that it applies to taxes and penalties due and payable, i.e.taxes owed or owing. The
remission of taxes due and payable to the exclusion of taxes already collected does not constitute unfair
discrimination. Each set of taxes isa class by itself, and the law would be open to attack as class
legislation only if alltaxpayers belonging to one class were not treated alike. Herein, they are not.
Thetaxpayers who paid their taxes before liberation and those who had not were not onthe same
footing on the need of material relief. Taxpayers who had been in arrears intheir obligation should have
to satisfy their liability with genuine currency, while thetaxes paid during the occupation had been
satisfied in Japanese War Notes, many of them at a time when those notes were well-nigh worthless. To
refund those taxeswith restored currency would be unduly enrich many of the payers at a
greaterexpense to the people at large.

ASSOCIATION OF CUSTOM BROKERS, INC. vs. MUNICIPAL BOARD
G.R. No. L-4376 May 22, 1953
FACTS:The Association of Customs Brokers, Inc., which is composed of all brokers and public service
operators of motor vehicles in the City of Manila challenge the validity Ordinance No. 3379 on the
ground that (1) while it levies a so-calledproperty tax it is in reality a license tax which is beyond the
power of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila; (2) saidordinance offends against the rule of
uniformity of taxation; and (3) it constitutes double taxation.The respondents contend on their part that
the challenged ordinance imposes a property tax which is within thepower of the City of Manila to
impose under its Revised Charter [Section 18 (p) of Republic Act No. 409], and that the taxin question
does not violate the rule of uniformity of taxation, nor does it constitute double taxation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the ordinance is null and void
RULING:
The ordinance infringes the rule of the uniformity of taxation ordained by our Constitution. Note that
the ordinanceexacts the tax upon all motor vehicles operating within the City of Manila. It does not
distinguish between a motor vehiclefor hire and one which is purely for private use. Neither does it
distinguish between a motor vehicle registered in the City
2

of Manila and one registered in another place but occasionally comes to Manila and uses its streets and
publichighways. This is an inequality which we find in the ordinance, and which renders it offensive to
the Constitution.

Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., plaintiff-appellant
vs The Treasurer of Ormoc City, etc., defendants-appellees

Facts: January 29, 1964, the municipal board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance No. 4 Series of 1964
imposing a municipal tax for all productions of centrifugal sugar milled equivalent to 1% per export sale
to USA and other foreign countries. Payments were made under protest by Ormoc sugar Company.

Sugar Company filed before CFI of Leyte a complaint against the City of Ormoc alleging that the
ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause and the rule of uniformity
of taxation. In response, defendants asserted that the tax ordinance was within the city's power to enact
under Local Autonomy Act and the same did not violate constitutional limitations.
After pre-trial and submission of case memoranda, CFI declared the ordinance constitutional, that it is
within the charter of the city.
Appeal was then taken to SC by the Ormoc Sugar Company alleging the same statutory and
constitutional violations. Appellant questions the authority of the Municipal Board to levy such tax in
view of the Revised dministrative Code which denies municipal councils to impose export tax.

Issue: Whether constitutional limits on the power of taxation, and equal protection clause and rule of
uniform taxation were infringed?

Held:
We ruled that the equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and does
not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a classification is reasonable where
(1) it is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the
purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future
conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the classification applies only to
those who belong to the same class.
A perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the questioned ordinance does not meet them, for
it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none
other. At the time of the taxing ordinance's enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the
only sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms
applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to
exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, for the coverage of the
tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the
ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc City Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.
The ordinance is unconstitutional.


Reyes v Almanzor
Kasumo same facts change the issue hehehe ;-)


VILLEGAS v. HIU CHIONG TSAI PAO HO
FACTS:On February 22, 1968, the Municipal Board of Manila passed City Ordinance No. 6537. The said
city ordinancewas also signed by then Manila Mayor Antonio J. Villegas (Villegas).Section 1 of the said
city ordinance prohibits aliens from being employed or to engage or participate in anyposition or
occupation or business enumerated therein, whether permanent, temporary or casual, without first
securing anemployment permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying the permit fee of P50.00 except
persons employed in thediplomatic or consular missions of foreign countries, or in the technical
assistance programs of both the PhilippineGovernment and any foreign government, and those working
in their respective households, and members of religiousorders or congregations, sect or denomination,
who are not paid monetarily or in kind.Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho (Tsai Pao Ho) who was employed in
Manila, filed a petition with the CFI of Manila todeclare City Ordinance No. 6537 as null and void for
being discriminatory and violative of the rule of the uniformity intaxation.The trial court declared City
Ordinance No. 6537 null and void. Villegas filed the present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not City Ordinance No. 6537 is a tax or revenue measure.
4

RULING:
Yes. The contention that City Ordinance No. 6537 is not a purely tax or revenue measure because its
principalpurpose is regulatory in nature has no merit. While it is true that the first part which requires
that the alien shall secure anemployment permit from the Mayor involves the exercise of discretion and
judgment in the processing and approval or disapproval of applications for employment permits and
therefore is regulatory in character the second part which requiresthe payment of P50.00 as employee's
fee is not regulatory but a revenue measure. There is no logic or justification inexacting P50.00 from
aliens who have been cleared for employment. It is obvious that the purpose of the ordinance is toraise
money under the guise of regulation.


MISAMIS ORIENTAL ASSOCIATION OF COCO TRADERS, INC.
vs.DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE SECRETARY

FACTS:Petitioner Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc. is a domestic corporation engaged
in the buying andselling of copra in Misamis Oriental. The petitioner alleges that prior to the issuance of
Revenue Memorandum Circular 47-91 on June 11, 1991, which implemented VAT Ruling 190-90, copra
was classified as agricultural food product under Sec. 103(b) of the National Internal Revenue Code and,
therefore, exempt from VAT at all stages of production or distribution.Petitioner sought to nullify
Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 47-91 and enjoin the collection by respondentrevenue officials of
the Value Added Tax (VAT) on the sale of copra by members of petitioner organization as
theclassification had the effect of denying to the petitioner the exemption it previously enjoyed when
copra was classified asan agricultural food product under Sec. 103(b) of the NIRC
ISSUE:
Whether there is violation of equal protection clause because while coconut farmers and copra
producers areexempt, traders and dealers are not, although both sell copra in its original state.
RULING:
There is a material or substantial difference between coconut farmers and copra producers, on the one
hand, andcopra traders and dealers, on the other. The former produce and sell copra, the latter merely
sell copra. The Constitutiondoes not forbid the differential treatment of persons so long as there is a
reasonable basis for classifying them differently.

TOLENTINO vs. SECRETARY OF FINANCE
FACTS:
Motions were filed seeking reconsideration of the Supreme Court decision dismissing the petitions for
the declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added
Tax Law. The motions, of which there are 10 in all, have been filed by the several petitioners in these
cases.
ISSUES:
1.Whether or not R.A. No. 7716 did not "originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives as
required by Art.VI Sec. 24 of the Constitution.
3.Whether or not there is violation of the rule on taxation under Art. VI Sec. 28 (1) of the Constitution.
5.Whether or not there is violation of the due process clause under Art. III Sec. 1 of the Constitution.
RULING:
1. While Art. VI Sec. 24 provides that all appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of
the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills must "originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives," it also adds, "but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments." In the
exercise of this power, the Senate may propose an entirely new bill as a substitute measure.
3. The Constitution does not really prohibit the imposition of indirect taxes which, like the VAT, are
regressive.What it simply provides is that Congress shall "evolve a progressive system of taxation."
5. On the alleged violation of due process, hardship to taxpayers alone is not an adequate justification
for adjudicating abstract issues. Otherwise, adjudication would be no different from the giving of
advisory opinion that doesnot really settle legal issues. We are told that it is our duty under Art. VIII, Sec.
1 (2) to decide whenever a claim is madethat "there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government." This duty
can only arise if an actual case or controversy is before us.