1951-2 84/105 US military plans for Middle East

Removal and Demolition of Oil Facilities, Equipment and Supplies in the Middle East
Further action required to implement NSC 26 includes further development of Aramco-type
denial plans to Kuwait, Kuwait Neutral Zone, Bahrein and Qatar; [less than 1 line not
1952 100 Crusade for Freedom
agreed that the Crusade for Freedom would be continued in 1952 but in a considerably lower
key in comparison with the 1951 Crusade. The precise nature of the Crusade is to be worked
out cooperatively by NCFE, CIA and the Department of State.
Mr. Jackson said that the most troublesome aspect of the 1951 Crusade was its length of three
months. He said that a shorter Crusade pitched at a lower level would solve many of the
problems that had occurred in the past year. He said that one good idea that had been
developed by local committees was to have a one-day civic organization doorbell ringing
campaign. Some buildup of publicity would be necessary for a national doorbell ringing
campaign but it would be nothing to compare with the extended Crusade of this year. Mr.
Jackson said that the direct mail approach had been tried this year with some success and
could be expanded. He added that he felt the short campaign would have the additional
advantage of removing the possibility of the public's making invidious comparisons between
RFE and VOA. He said that with the short campaign there would not be time for the public to
reflect on such issues.
Mr. Barrett reminded the group that NCFE had started as an organization to look after and
make use of the various Eastern European refugee groups. He recalled that giving these
groups a radio voice was something of a later development. He also recalled that the Crusade
was established primarily as a cover for the governmental support of the enterprise. Mr.
Barrett raised the question of whether or not the Crusade had grown to such proportions that
it was now a case of the tail wagging the dog. He also raised the question of whether the two
or three million dollars that might be raised in the Crusade might be endangering the
$85,000,000 involved in the appropriations for the USIE operations. He thought it was
important to get back to the idea of just enough of a Crusade to give the minimum necessary
cover to NCFE. Mr. Barrett suggested direct mail solicitation of funds, magazine
advertisements and coupons, and corporation solicitations. He also said that he thought the
device of large anonymous gifts might be looked into further.
Mr. Jackson said that after the 1951 campaign it became clear to him that the Crusade had
actually done an important selling job on the American public in the matter of psychological
warfare and the importance of such an effort to our nation. He felt that this was a most
Mr. Jackson said that the international nature of the balloon message did not add anything to
its effectiveness. He said that current attempts to set up committees in France and England
along the lines of NCFE were not succeeding and he doubted seriously whether that was a
fruitful line of further endeavor. Mr. Jackson said that he felt the development should be
toward the Munich-type of operation to Czechoslovakia where the program has acquired such
a predominantly local coloration that the American connection is almost completely
submerged. Mr. Dulles agreed that an international committee was not a workable
arrangement.
Ed.note 15
The Central Intelligence Agency's Office of Policy Coordination sought to make use of
ostensibly private organizations and businesses in carrying out its cold war covert action
mandate. The National Committee for Free Europe (NCFE) was one of the first such
organizations, incorporated in 1949.
1953 - State/CIA problems, criticisms
The British meet the problem of political guidance on secret intelligence activities, as well as
the larger problem of coordinating all other foreign intelligence activities, by giving an inter-
agency committee, of which the Foreign Office representative is automatically Chairman,
close policy control over the entire foreign intelligence effort of the U.K. The MI6 man in
the field, although he belongs to an independent organization whose chief reports directly to
the Prime Minister, is given the specific responsibility of clearing with the Ambassador when
his activities are likely to affect the conduct of overt relations. The MI6 man is able to
discern the likelihood of political consequences because he is part of a small highly-trained
professional corps, and because awareness of political factors is an essential qualification. A
serious failure to do so costs him his job.
1952 153 Psychological operations
4. Outside of the Soviet orbit the developments on the psychological front have been
characterized by a disappointing deterioriation in the attitudes towards the U.S. Non-
Communist press and public opinion in Western Europe has reflected mounting criticism of
U.S. foreign policy (the possible trend back to isolationism), and alleged anti-Communist
hysteria. These unfavorable attitudes in combination with a generally more receptive
reaction among Western European peoples to the Soviet peace offensive now constitute an
intensification of anti-American feeling among significant elements of European opinion.
5. World opinion has also been markedly unfavorable towards the development of U.S.
foreign trade policies. At the same time that we are sharply reducing our programs for
economic assistance, it has felt that we are providing little indication that our markets are to
be opened up to foreign goods. Congressional criticism of our allies for their practices in the
field of East-West trade, in combination with the new Soviet line on expansion of trade with
the free world, has begun to have an adverse psychological impact around the world.
13. Among the principal problems that have confronted U.S. psychological efforts in Western
Europe during the past six months are increased criticism of the U.S. and, especially since
Stalin's death, the Soviet Peace Offensive. It is evident that many, if not all, Western
European governments have been influenced to some extent by the Kremlin's tension-
reducing tactics. The effect has been to retard progress toward a number of our objectives,
including the build-up of Western defenses, the ratification of EDC, and attainment of
European integration.
The U.S. counter-offensive has included fullest exploitation by the Department of State's
Information Program of the President's Inaugural address
3
and of his April 16 speech
challenging the new leaders of the USSR to prove their peaceful professions by deeds, not
words. Copies of the latter were presented to Foreign Offices all over the world in advance of
delivery and kinescopes of the entire speech were sent to seventy-three posts within a day of
its delivery. One of these was shown over BBC television on April 20 to an estimated
audience of 6,000,000.
17. In the United Kingdom also, there appears to have been a marked increase in neutralism
in its special British form of Bevanism. Although the belief is still widely held that Western
unity must be preserved, three major elements contribute to the growth of anti-American
feeling:
(1) The belief that the U.S. is deeply divided on basic international policies,
(2) The development of the Soviet peace offensive, and
(3) The desire to exercise a more positive and independent initiative in international affairs.

1955 242 Balloons over USSR
I have been fully briefed by the Air Force on Operation Grayback.
3
It is my view that while
I would not today start the operation in view of possible newer techniques, nevertheless the
operation is already mounted at a cost of approximately $70,000,000, with personnel all over
the world. The operation will probably produce intelligence data of considerable significance.
Also, reasonable cover has been devised in that similar operations have, in fact, been
conducted from a good many points in the United States and elsewhere, designed to obtain
meteorological data. This cover will probably not fool the Soviets, but it will create a
situation such that they cannot take any very great offense publicly.
4

On balance, I would be inclined to go ahead with it if Sir Anthony Eden is also prepared to do
so. While some operations will be started from Norway, Germany and Turkey, there is, I
believe, primary dependence upon the British Isles.
I would suggest your authorizing me to advise Eden of the foregoing attitude on our part and
see what his reaction is.
5

5
A handwritten note on the memorandum reads: I concur C.E. Wilson O.K. Below this
note President Eisenhower wrote: Original query to be of a non-pressure type. D. Secretary
Dulles wrote a December 1 letter to British Ambassador Sir Roger Makins in which he noted
195 The President then said that regardless of how the matter progressed, it is timely to
consider what should be done now. He understood that a plane that is being developed is
coming along very well.
5
It also appeared that if the balloons were discovered, as they will
be, certain questions become importantsuch as what will public reaction be in the UK and
Japan, how many of them are likely to be shot down, whether their release will spur the
development of

5 249
The President then said that regardless of how the matter progressed, it is timely to consider
what should be done now. He understood that a plane that is being developed is coming along
very well.
5
It also appeared that if the balloons were discovered, as they will be, certain
questions become importantsuch as what will public reaction be in the UK and Japan, how
many of them are likely to be shot down, whether their release will spur the development of
Secretary indicated at the briefing that the British had given their go ahead on December 25,
and the President approved the operation subject to certain modifications, which included
slowing down the rate of launching, extending the time period of the operation, and
COCOM secret allied program to block exports of strategic items to USSR
1952 - 24
i. UK took major part in discussion. Emphasized differences between what govts say about
their own controls and what they say publicly about collective action thru COCOM.
Statements in latter field affect all other countries. Thought it useful to collect and review all
that has been said publicly, but did not consider it necessary confirm all matters which may
have leaked to press. Stated UK had not been firmly pro-secrecy in past. General UK belief
was that, on the whole, it is better maintain secrecy over as wide an area as possible, main
consideration being whether it would help or hurt efficiency of controls if more disclosures
made. Recognized that views differ on this, according to situation in various countries. UK
took no position itself. Felt, however, that it was not consistent with concept of an informal
ad hoc body that there should be publicity concerning its existence and activities as though it
were a formal organization. Such confirmation wld naturally start chain of inquiries. Nothing
more needed than mere recognition that there is an informal ad hoc group. Recommended
problem be remitted to COCOM with instr to collect published material, study what
extension can be given to present publicity, and make positive recommendations to govts.
At early stage in CG discussion, UK stated that it wld pose fol question to other dels: How
embarrassing wld it be if there were no strictly uniform rule on publicity but some flexibility
admitted for individual countries to handle their own problems? UK later withdrew this
question, stating that COCOM wld consider what might be said and that whatever is agreed
cld be permissive, with some countries using it and others not, hence there wld be flexibility
in any event.
1954 - 100
The President asked the indulgence of the Council, but said that he could not refrain from
reemphasizing the invariable difficulties the United States stored up for itself by telling other
nations they should not trade with Communist China. He felt that this whole problem
deserved special study. Our current policy was completely negative, since it amounted to
telling non-Communist nations that they should not trade with Communist nations, while at
the same time ourselves refusing to buy their staple products. The President said he believed
that a skillful use of trade was the best hope for peace, and that the United States was being
very shortsighted in its attempts to hurt the enemy by stifling trade with him.
Governor Stassen commented that in the current negotiations with Great Britain and France,
reviewing the International Lists of items which should be controlled in East-West trade,
rubber was almost certainly going to be released from export control. Only thus could we
induce our allies to continue really strategic materials, such as nickel, on the list of controlled
commodities.