COMPARE AND CONTRAST THE DEFENCE REVIEWS OF THE MID-1960S, 1974 AND

1981
By Jeffrey Peter Bradford

Since the beginning of the cold war, Britain has sought to cope with the responsibilities of international
security as a Great power, whilst facing up to economic decline, towards status comparable to that of a
middle ranking power. With this central premise in mind, it is my intention in this paper to examine
the defence reviews of the mid-1960s, focusing primarily on the 1966 Defence white paper, 1974 and
the 1981 paper ‘the way forward’ which was also known as the Nott review.

In terms of methodology, each review shall be analysed in three parts, firstly by providing a
succinct summary of the paper itself, looking specifically at the political emphasis placed on the
commitments of the services world-wide, before looking at the changes made to the conventional
forces, and finally the place of the strategic nuclear deterrent within the review. Secondly the paper
will analyse the issues and arguments which shaped the paper, before lastly bringing in each case, the
two parts together into the broader context of Britain's defence policy. After this in conclusion the
paper will attempt to assess the significance of these reviews, and their relevance in understanding
Britain's capabilities and commitments in the post cold war order.

THE 1966 DEFENCE REVIEW

The Review itself had a simple premise articulated clearly at the outset, ‘Military strength is of little
value if it is achieved at the expense of economic health’ (1) to this a target figure of a budget of £2,000
million in 1969-1970 was aimed for, resulting in a cut within this paper of £400m. However the paper
decided that rather than apply the cuts indiscriminately, they would be targeted at two perceived
problems, that of ‘manpower stretch’ and the foreign exchange costs of maintaining defence abroad i.e.
East of Suez.

Manpower stretch was a buzz-word which implied logically the problem of maintaining
commitments abroad with the current manpower. The political will was not present to raise manning
levels, and indeed the services were experiencing problems with retention of the personnel they had
due to the problems of maintaining commitments, along with interventions in the early 1960s such as in
the confrontation between Malaysia and Indonesia, and in Tanganyika, Africa. The immediate measure
to combat this in the paper was to close the garrison in South Arabia upon its independence in 1968, as
well as closing the Aden base. With regard to the far east however the bases in Malaysia and
Singapore were to be maintained for as long as the host governments agreed.

With regard to the forces themselves, the Navy was arguably to suffer most from this review.
The CVA-01 project was cancelled, leading to a loss of the large carriers. It was decided therefore that
in future all naval air cover would be provided by land based aircraft, leading to the disbanding of the
Fleet Air Arm. The government also decided to purchase 50 F-111 bombers from the United States in
order to maintain RAF capabilities in the early 1970s whilst awaiting the replacement for the Canberra
(2)

The army escaped from this review relatively unscathed, but still awaiting the next generation
tank, the Chieftain. The strategic nuclear deterrent was still referred to as the V-bomber force, whilst
awaiting the Polaris submarines due in service in 1968. The projected maintenance costs of the
deterrent were £105 million for 1966-1967, this compared with the financial commitment to BAOR
which itself was £169 million.

BACKGROUND TO THE 1966 DEFENCE REVIEW

Defence policy in the early 1960s broadly aimed towards maintaining and expanding the capability of
the services to intervene abroad militarily. This could in part be suggested as being a consequence of
the operation mounted to protect Kuwait from Iraqi aggression which was foremost on the minds of
decision-makers when formulating the 1962 white paper. As Darby noted the paper set out
requirements for an expansion in the Royal marines and naval craft to move and support them (3) This
paper heartened many in the Conservative party for whom the paper emphasised ‘the old beats of
empire rather than the grey realities of Germany and the Rhine’ (4)
 With the accession to power of a Labour government after the 1964 election, Prime Minister
Harold Wilson in an address to the House articulated two policy aims with regard to defence, firstly
that in order to fulfil Britain`s world role, in Europe, East of Suez, and a strategic deterrent force, some
areas of defence would have to be strengthened. His second aim was to cut back on defence. In order
to achieve this he set in motion a major review which cumulated in the 1966 Defence Review.
Meanwhile the 1965 White Paper was seen widely as a holding action, with projects such as the
replacement for a fighter and transport aircraft cancelled, as well as the fifth Polaris submarine. In this
paper other projects such as the TSR-2 bomber, and CVA-01 aircraft carrier were placed under review,
of note however was the decision to integrate the individual service ministries into a unified Ministry of
Defence on the first of April, 1964 responsible to an individual minister (5) Darby wrote of the 1966
review that it;

‘May be regarded as a reasonable compromise between political exigency and economic necessity...
less charitably it may be described as the final monument to the inability of post-war governments to
bring commitments into line with capability.’ (6)

The review could be seen as being important in a couple of contexts. Firstly it could be suggested that
in this paper were sown the seeds of a decision to abandon the East of Suez commitment. This review
suggested that psychologically Britain was no longer willing to maintain its world role in the manner it
had previously, but there was no clarity in the review concerning how this should be implemented,
leaving the decision to the forces at work in the international system to dictate the pace. Secondly with
the presence of new government, it was able to approach defence with a fresher perspective, and
mandate from the electorate. Under previous Conservative administrations there had been a turn over
of several defence ministers, resulting in a common political joke that ministers for defence started
their statements to the House with an apology for their ignorance in defence matters (7) Britain`s aims
at this time seemed to be to maintain a high profile in Europe, whilst hoping to attain membership of
the European Economic Community, whilst also maintaining sufficient presence abroad to keep the
peace in British possessions pending independence.

However as the decade progressed, it was the political crises which dictated the pace of events
affecting defence policy. Decisions to prioritise butter over guns led to the cancellation of the TSR-2
bomber, and in the next stage of the review process in 1967 saw a decision to leave Malaysia following
the end of the period of confrontation there (8) After the review in July the prime Minister declared the
abandonment of the east of Suez policy, and after the November devaluation of Sterling, it could be
suggested that a perception of major economic crisis led to strong measures being taken in the 1968
review. Immediately the statement declared a British commitment to in ‘future be concentrated mainly
in Europe and the North Atlantic area’ (9) further a withdrawal from Malaysia, Singapore and the
Persian Gulf by 1971 was announced, as well as a decision not to maintain the capability for extra-
European adventures. The F-111 bomber, in somewhat bizarre manner described as procured for a
‘peacekeeping role’ (10) was also cancelled.

This shift was interesting in that it signalled a political decision to finally rid itself of the
burden of imperial commitments, concentrating on Europe, where it could be assumed the government
wished to exact the quid pro quo in terms of being finally admitted to the EEC.

In concluding my analysis of the mid 1960s defence reviews I have tried to show how they
presented not a coherent strategy to the problem of balancing commitments, and maintaining
capabilities, but rather as documents reflecting the reactionary nature of policy-making, where the
goals were based upon immediate needs to cure psychological insecurities rather than reaching
structured goals. However as will become apparent in the analysis of the following two reviews, the
debate about the European commitment versus global capabilities tends to permeate the following
discourse.

THE 1974 DEFENCE REVIEW

The introduction to the review published in March 1975 declared it to be the result of a review initiated
in March of the previous year to look at ‘current commitments and capabilities’ (11) Because of
economic pressures induced both by domestic failures to achieve political promises and international
pressures resulting from the increased costs of oil from the Middle East, the government decided to
switch resources towards the economy from the provision of defence whilst noting that ‘clear strategic
priorities were established at the outset; but no arbitrary financial limit was set’ (12)

In deciding which roles should be emphasised in future, the paper declared unambiguously
that ‘NATO - the lynch pin of British security - should remain the first and overriding charge on the
resources available for defence’ (13) With regard to overseas commitments outside of Europe, Britain
declared its continuing membership of SEATO, but intended to take part in fewer exercises in future.
The Five Power Defence Agreements in the far east were mentioned, but with particular emphasis of
the fact that no obligation existed to maintain British forces in either Malaysia or Singapore (14) In the
Middle East however Britain still was present assisting the Sultan of Oman who;

‘is fighting against a professionally organised and externally supported rebellion which threatens the
stability of the Arabian Peninsula, an area of great economic importance to Britain and from which we
receive a lot of our oil. We do not therefore think that it would be right in the circumstances to make
any change in the arrangements.’ (15)

The conventional forces bore the brunt of the review, with the RAF regarded as the service worst
affected by the changes. The Royal Navy had its planned number of surface ships reduced by one
seventh , conventionally powered submarines were to be reduced by a quarter as the RN sought to
maintain a nuclear submarine fleet, and naval support vessels were to be cut by one third. The RAF
was to lose half its entire transport fleet in line with the decision to centre on Europe. The RAF also
lost one quarter of both its helicopter transport fleet, and maritime patrol aircraft, and the MRCA
collaborative programme was to be slowed by a third.

The army was reorganised, losing 15,000 personnel, while having to reduce, postpone and
have cancelled equipment projects, whilst suffering a cut in the level of mines and ammunition
maintained in case of conflict. In personnel terms the RAF lost 18,000 personnel, the army 15,000, the
RN 5,000 whilst 30,000 civilian jobs were also terminated. The nuclear deterrent however only
warranted one sentence in this review, ‘The Polaris submarines Resolution, Repulse, Renown, and
Revenge provide a continuous patrol as the United Kingdoms contribution to the Alliances strategic
deterrent.’ (16)

BACKGROUND TO THE 1974 DEFENCE REVIEW

By 1974, a combination of factors had arisen once more which perceived defence to be draining both
economic and political resources. Since 1969 there had been a growing commitment of personnel to
the `troubles` in Northern Ireland, Cyprus had been partitioned, and the Superpower detente was raising
fears about the special relationship. This was coupled with newly acquired membership of the
European Economic Community (EEC) in January 1973 and the period of adjustment for Britain
psychologically which all contributed to the composition of the 1974 review. In March the new Labour
Minister of Defence initiated a review, articulating the following month the two principles which
would guide its formulation;

i - NATO will have first call on the resources of the government.

ii - Whilst desirable to cut defence to improve standards of living, it was just important to maintain a
necessary defence network to preserve it (17)

The nuclear deterrent warranted little attention once more in the official documentation however at the
Labour party conference of 1974 opposition was expressed towards a reliance upon nuclear weapons
for defence. In practise however the Labour government allowed the stationing of increased numbers
of USAF F-111 nuclear capable bombers in the UK. Dan Keohane puts forward a reason for this
dichotomy between Labour party policy and practise. With few exceptions the Labour ministers with
direct responsibility for defence and foreign policy (for example Prime Ministers Harold Wilson and
James Callaghan, Minister Crossland and other junior ministers) came from the centre and centre-right
of the party i.e. they were supportive by-and-large of a strong defence establishment in the UK.
However those with the most influence in the Labour party executive came from the left wing of the
party, in particular Tony Benn and Ian Mikardo and possessed greater influence upon the conference
body than the government (18)
 As the time of the December announcement drew nearer the debate in the media sharpened.
Mr Mason declared defence economies to be a ‘dangerous luxury’ (19) others chose to blame the
Ministry of Defence for cancelling or deferring new contracts rather than re-assessing their place in
Britain's future defensive requirements, whilst others retorted ‘does it really matter if the Navy has to
wait a year or two more for a new frigate ?’ (20) In a rare comment on the strategic implications of the
review, Air Vice Marshal Menaul, Director of RUSI claimed that further conventional cuts would
threaten the early release of nuclear weapons in time of war.’ (21)

In essence the 1974 review could be viewed as an act of surrender by the government to the
ideal of maintaining global capabilities as in the past. The reviews of the mid-1960s never truly
threatened the entire power projection capability of the armed services, endangering but a fragment of
it. The 1974 review signalled the start of the end with regard to maintaining bases world-wide, with the
decision to negotiate withdrawal from another symbol, the Simonstown base in South Africa. The
system of bases world-wide to which British troops could be deployed in a crisis were by and large
made redundant by the 50% cut in air transport, due to perceived financial economies and the political
attitude towards the inevitability of European commitments being key to the future of Britain.

THE 1981 DEFENCE REVIEW

The 1981 review as those which have preceded it was the cumulation of political soul-searching. The
Conservative government under Margaret Thatcher was committed to strong defence, having
negotiated the purchase of the Trident missile the previous year, to modernise the British deterrent in
the 1990s.

However, these aspirations were challenged by a weak economy, suffering from recession and
economic unrest. Internationally a new phase of confrontation began between East and West following
the invasion of Afghanistan some 18 months earlier. The 1981 statement ostensibly aimed at both
change which was claimed to be ‘overdue and new programmes are needed to exploit new technology
and tactical concepts.’ (22) In terms of roles, here once more the primacy of collective security through
NATO was emphasised. With regard to outside of Europe the statement noted;

Our political and economic interests have traditionally stretched world-wide and been
supported by several kinds of defence activity. Reinstatement of the former British presence ‘East of
Suez’ whatever the arguments for and against it is no longer a political or an economic possibility (23).

At the heart of this statement however remained the reconciliation between the purchase of
Trident and the remaining division of the defence budget towards maintaining the conventional forces.
The paper noted that Trident ‘Had clear advantages on both operational and cost grounds’ noting that
‘the choice to continue with nuclear... submarines was decided essentially by the need for
invulnerability; other platforms would need to be deployed in large numbers [emphasis added]’ (24)
Also the paper reaffirmed the commitment to allow the stationing of US cruise missiles of Greenham
Common, decisions which came at a time when the nuclear lobby was suffering an explosion in
membership. The statement itself was remarkably coy about the impending review, using statistics
covering the late 1970s until 1980 to illustrate future manning levels and new equipment. In order to
understand the Nott review, it shall be necessary to understand the following background to the review.

BACKGROUND TO THE 1981 PAPER ‘THE WAY FORWARD’

May 8th, 1981 saw a statement to the press proclaiming the Nott review ‘should end the almost annual
series of defence cuts’ (25) To that end each service supplied the Ministry with models projecting
requirements for the next decade, the government having final say on which to implement. As a
sweetener the armed services received a 10.3% pay award, far in excess of the public sector pay limits
imposed by the government. The following month an under-secretary was removed form his post for
claiming that the cuts would endanger security (26) Media leaks suggested the plan itself would cut
£8,000 m from the budget during the next decade, 75% coming from the Navy alone, in cancelled
ships, sales and retirements, some claiming the losses to be as high as 50% of the surface fleet (27)

In the July debate of the white paper, the cuts amounted to an increase of 3% per year in real
terms for the next four years. Observers declared that ‘Mr Nott seems to have applied merchant banker
techniques learnt as a young man at Warburg`s’ (28) In the final analysis regarding the cuts in naval
capabilities it was commented ‘unless the Royal Navy`s required to fight a real... battle no-one will
really know whether the Nott assumptions are valid.’ (29) The paper was passed by a Government
majority of sixty-nine.
CONCLUSIONS

In Summary having examined the reviews and the background to them, what could be identified as the
key points which are of worth in considering contemporary British defence policy ? The three reviews
in my opinion have several common elements, firstly they all attempt to struggle with the problem of
British defence as being orientated towards Europe, or away from Europe seeking glory East of Suez.
But as Neville Brown argues, ‘the unsubtle contrast between remaining East of Suez and joining
Europe has led to a neglect of the fact that strategic choices are usually ones of emphasis and
proportion rather than of stark alternatives.’ (30) This statement could be seen as being born out by the
British reversal of Argentinian aggression against the Falklands, and support as the second largest
contributor of forces to the UN force in the Gulf both in 1991, and more recently last month. In sum
Britain never sacrificed its ability to operate out-of-area regardless of rhetoric, and defence reviews.

However economic considerations, though not the primary driving force have made politicians
consider thoughtfully at least, the amount devoted to defence rather than tackling strategic
considerations in the long term. As put by Bellini and Pattie ‘for over a generation British defence
policy has suffered from a fundamentally damaging frame of mind born of territorial withdrawal and
diminished economic circumstances.’ (31)

With regards to the cuts themselves, always the nuclear deterrent received full funding in
development, possibly because of its perception as being key to great power status, and at the very east
guaranteed access to the top able of international politics, giving Britain opportunity to shape the future
agenda. The conventional forces themselves have it could be suggested defied probability time and
again in being able to perform whilst under budgetary constraints, when compared to their vastly better
equipped allies across the Atlantic. Neville aptly described the situation - ‘The natural protection
offered by the sea has continually tempted us to prune our peacetime forces; the unique mobility
afforded by it has encouraged us to stretch these forces to the limit.’ (32)

Of the actual reviews themselves, financial targets have often been set arbitrarily, whilst rarely
in practise adhered to in the long run, and yet always the temptation from both new and returned
governments has been to fundamentally review Britain's defence budget without regard to strategy, as
put in a timeless comment by the Secretary of State for Defence in 1966, ‘making defence cuts is
rather like throwing herrings to a sealion. It gulps them down and a second later is back looking for
more.’ (33)
Appendice A: Abbreviations

BAOR British Army Of the Rhine

CVA-01 Aborted Aircraft Carrier project in mid 1960s Review
EEC European Economic Community (Britain joined in January 1973)
MRCA Multi-Role Combat Aircraft collaborative project. In service known as
`Tornado`
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
RAF Royal Air Force
RN Royal Navy
RUSI Royal United Services Institute. Defence research institute based in London
SEATO South East Asian Treaty Organisation
TSR-2 Tactical Strike Reconnaissance aircraft project. Cancelled in the mid 1960s
UN United Nations
USAF United States Air Force

FOOTNOTES
(1) Cmnd. 2901 (1966) The Defence Review (HMSO) pp 1
(2) ibid. pp 12. The Canberra replacement was to be the Anglo-French collaboration, the Jaguar.
(3) Phillip Darby British defence policy East of Suez (1973 Oxford University Press) pp 268. In 1962
the strength of the Royal Marine commandos (battalions) were increased from 600 to 750, whilst
marines were included aboard smaller surface ships
(4) ibid. pp 225
(5) Cmnd. 2592 (1965) Statement on the Defence Estimates 1965 (HMSO) pp 37
(6) Op. Cit. (Darby) pp 304
(7) C.J. Bartlett The Long Retreat (1972 Macmillan) Ch. 6 pp 192
(8) Cmnd. 3205 (HMSO) Statement on the defence estimates 1967 pp 7
(9) Cmnd. 3540 (HMSO) Statement on the defence estimates 1968 pp 2
(10) Op. Cit. (Darby) pp 307
(11) Cmnd. 5796 (HMSO) Statement on the defence estimates 1975 Ch. 1 pp 1
(12) ibid. pp 2
(13) ibid. pp 7
(14) The five power defence agreement was signed by Australia, Britain, Malaysia, New Zealand and
Singapore. It was both a consultative forum, and an arrangement allowing Britain to maintain a limited
military presence in the area.
(15) Op. Cit. (Cmnd. 5796) Ch. 2 pp 15
(16) Op. Cit. (Cmnd. 5796) Ch. 3 pp 39
(17) The Times (29.04.74) ‘Time to take a realistic view of defence’
(18) Dan Keohane Labour party defence policy since 1945 (1993 Leicester University Press) Ch. 2
(19) The Times (29.04.74) ‘Time to take a realistic view of defence’
(20) The Times (13.08.74) ‘Better an axe than snipping scissors’
(21) The Times (04.12.74) ‘Defence costs to be reduced by £4,700 m over 10 years’
(22) Cmnd. 8212-1 (1981) Statement on the defence estimates 1981 (HMSO) Ch. 1 pp 1
(23) ibid. Ch. 4 pp 30
(24) ibid. Ch. 2 pp 15
(25) The Times (08.05.81)
(26) The Times (19.05.81) ‘Thatcher dismisses Minister over defence cut speech’
(27) The Times (18.05.81) ‘Plan to cut £8,000m from defence budget over next ten years’
(28) The Times (07.07.81) ‘Uncovering the real defence cuts’
(29) ibid.
(30) Neville Brown Arms without empire (1967 Penguin) Ch. 2 pp 27
(31) James Bellini & Geoffrey Pattie A new world role for the medium power: the British opportunity
(1977
RUSI) Ch. 1 pp 1
(32) Op. Cit. (Brown) Ch. 1 pp 15
(33) Op. Cit. (Darby) pp 332
BIBLIOGRAPHY

The following Statements on the defence estimates - 1965, 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1970, 1975, 1981
(HMSO) Reference numbers Cmnd -2592, 2901, 3203, 3540, 3927, 4290, 5976, 8212
The following editions of National income and expenditure 1970, 1973, 1982 (CSO)
Bartlett C J (1972) The Long Retreat (Macmillan) Ch. 6
Bellini & Pattie (1977) A new world role for the medium power: the British opportunity (RUSI) Ch. 1
Brown N (1967) Arms without empire (Penguin) Ch. 2
Darby P (1973) British defence policy East of Suez (Oxford University Press) Ch. 7
Department of Employment (1985) Retail Price Indices 1914-1984 (HMSO)
Keohane D (1993) Labour party defence policy since 1945 (Leicester University Press) Ch. 2
Ovendale R (1994) British defence policy since 1945 (Manchester University Press) Ch. 4, 5 pp 131 -
158

The Times newspaper (various copies)