Valisno v.

Adriano
161 SCRA 398

DOCTRINE: Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage ditch for irrigation purposes,
which are appurtenant to a parcel of land, pass with the conveyance of the land, although not
specifically mentioned in the conveyance

FACTS:
Plaintiff Valisno file against the Defendant Adriano an action for damages. The complaint
alleged that the plaintiff is the absolute owner and actual possessor of a parcel of land in Nueva
Ecija. Plaintiff bought the land from the defendants sister, Honorata. Both parcels of land had
been inherited by defendant and her sister from their father. At the time of the sale of the land to
Valisno, the land was irrigated by water from the Pampanga River through a canal about 70
meters long, traversing the appellee's land.

Adriano levelled a portion of the irrigation canal so that Valisno was deprived of the irrigation
water and prevented from cultivating his 57-hectare land. Plaintiff Adriano filed in the Bureau of
Public Works and Communications a complaint for deprivation of water rights. A decision was
rendered in favor of the plaintiff. Defendant asked for a reinvestigation of the case and was
granted. Meanwhile, plaintiff Valisno rebuilt the irrigation canal at his own expense because of
urgency. He also filed a complaint for damages in the CFI against respondent.

Defendant Adriano claims that he merely allowed his sister to use his water rights when she still
owned the adjacent land. According to the appellant, the water right was the primary
consideration for his purchase of Honorata's property, for without it the property would be
unproductive.

ISSUE:
WON the water rights pass with the conveyance of the land. -- YES

HELD:
Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage ditch for irrigation purposes, which are
appurtenant to a parcel of land, pass with the conveyance of the land, although not specifically
mentioned in the conveyance. The purchaser's easement of necessity in a water ditch running
across the grantor's land cannot be defeated even if the water is supplied by a third person. The
fact that an easement by grant may also have qualified as an easement of necessity does
detract from its permanency as property right, which survives the determination of the necessity.

As an easement of waters in favor of the plaintiff has been established, he is entitled to enjoy it
free from obstruction, disturbance or wrongful interference such as the appellee's act of levelling
the irrigation canal to deprive him of the use of water from the Pampanga River.

Ronquillo v. Roco
103 Phil. 84

DOCTRINE: An easement of right of way being discontinuous, cannot be acquired through
prescription but only by virtue of a title.

FACTS:
Petitioners Ronquillo have been in the continuous and uninterrupted use of a road or passage
way which traversed the land of the Respondents Roco and their predecessors in interest, in
going to Igualdad Street and the market place of Naga City, from their residential land and back,
for more than 20 years.

Respondents Roco and his men started constructing a chapel in the middle of the said right of
way construction actually obstructed the continuous exercise of the rights of the plaintiffs over
said right of way. Respondents also forcibly planted wooden posts, fenced with barbed wire and
closed the road passage way.

ISSUE:
WON an easement of right of way can be acquired thru prescription -- NO

HELD:
The dismissal was based on the ground that an easement of right of way though it may be
apparent is, nevertheless, discontinuous or intermittent and, therefore, cannot be acquired
through prescription, but only by virtue of a title.

Easements may be Continuous or discontinuous, apparent or non-apparent, discontinuous
being those used at more or less long intervals and which depend upon acts of man.
Continuous and apparent easements are acquired either by title or prescription, continuous non-
apparent easements and discontinuous ones whether apparent or not, may be acquired only by
virtue of a title. Both Manresa and Sanchez Roman are of the opinion that the easement of right
of way is a discontinuous one.

Costabella Corp. v. CA
193 SCRA 333

DOCTRINE:An easement of right of way is discontinuous and as such cannot be acquired by
prescription. Convenience of the dominant estate is not a gauge for the grant of compulsary
right of way.

While a right of way is legally demandable, the owner of the dominant estate is not at liberty to
impose one based on arbitrary choice. Under Article 650 of the Code, it shall be established
upon two criteria: (1) at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and (2) where the
distance to a public highway may be the shortest.

FACTS:
Petitioners owned a lot wherein they started constructing their beach hotel.
Before such construction, the private respondent, in going to and from their respective
properties and the provincial road, passed through a passageway, which traversed the
petitioners property.
As a result of the construction, this passageway, including the alternative route, was
obstructed.
Private respondent filed for injunction plus damages.
In the same complaint the private respondents also alleged that the petitioner
had constructed a dike on the beach fronting the latters property without the necessary
permit, obstructing the passage of the residents and local fishermen, and trapping debris of
flotsam on the beach.
The private respondent also claim that they have acquired the right of way
through prescription.
They prayed for the re-opening of the ancient road right of way (what they called
the supposed easement in this case) and the destruction of the dike.
Petitioner answered by saying that their predecessor in interests act of allowing
them to pass was gratuitous and in fact, they were just tolerating the use of the private
respondents. CA ruled in favor of the private respondents.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not easement of right and way can be acquired through prescription? -- NO
2. Whether or not the private respondents had acquired an easement of right of way in the
form of a passageway, on the petitioners property? -- NO

HELD:
1. Easement of right of way is discontinuous thus it cannot be subject to acquisitive
prescription.

2. One may validly claim an easement of right of way when he has proven the: (1) the
dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a
public highway; (2) proper indemnity has been paid; (3) the isolation was not due to acts
of the proprietor of the dominant estate; (4) the right of way claimed is at point least
prejudicial to the servient estate. The private respondent failed to prove that there is no
adequate outlet from their respective properties to a public highway; in fact the lower
court confirmed that there is another outlet for the private respondents to the main road
(yet they ruled in favor of the private respondents).

Apparently, the CA lost sight of the fact that the convenience of the dominant estate was
never a gauge for the grant of compulsory right of way. There must be a real necessity
and not mere convenience for the dominant estate to acquire such easement. Also, the
private respondents made no mention of their intention to indemnify the petitioners. The
SC also clarified that least prejudicial prevails over shortest distance (so shortest
distance isnt necessarily the best choice).

Encarnacion v. CA
195 SCRA 74

FACTS:
The servient estate of respondent heirs are what stands between the dominant estate and the
national road. When the servient estate was not yet enclosed with a concrete fence, persons
going to the national highway just crossed the servient estate at no particular point.

When a fence was constructed, a roadpath measuring 25 meters long and a meter wide was
constituted to provide access to the highway, with one-half meter taken from the servient estate
and another one-half from another lot.

Petitioner's plant nursery business through sheer hard work flourished and he bought an owner-
jeep which he could use for transporting his plants. However, the jeep could not pass through
the roadpath. He offered the servient estate owners that they sell him one and one-half meters
of their property to be added to the existing pathway. His request was turned down.

During the trial, the attention of the lower court was called to the existence of another exit, a
dried river bed, to the highway, only eighty meters away from the dominant estate.

ISSUE:
WON petitioner is entitled to a widening of an already existing easement of right-of-way. -- YES

HELD:
Just because the second egress is nearer to the highway by a difference of only 65 meters, are
not amount the conditions specified by Article 649 of the Civil Code. While there is a dried river
bed closer to the dominant tenement, that access is grossly inadequate. Generally, the right of
way may be demanded:(1) when there is absolutely no access to a public highway, and (2)
when, even if there is one, it is difficult or dangerous to use or is grossly insufficient.

The river bed route is traversed by a semi-concrete bridge and there is no ingress nor egress
from the highway. For the jeep to reach the level of the highway, it must literally jump four to five
meters up. During the rainy season, the river bed is impassable due to the floods. Thus, it can
only be used at certain times of the year. The river bed which make passage difficult, if nor
impossible, it is if there were no outlet at all. There is a real and compelling need for such
servitude in his favor.

Article 651 provides that the width of the easement of right of way shall be that which is
sufficient for the needs of the dominant estate, and may accordingly be changed from time to
time. It is the needs of the dominant property which ultimately determine the width of the
passage, and these may vary from time to time. To force petitioner to leave his jeepney in the
highway, exposed to the elements and to the risk of theft simply because it could not pass
through the improvised pathway, is sheer pigheadedness on the part of the servient estate and
can only be counter-productive for all the people concerned.

Petitioner should not be denied a passageway wide enough to accommodate his jeepney since
that is a reasonable and necessary aspect of the plant nursery business.

Solid Manila v. Bio Hong Trading
195 SCRA 748

DOCTRINES:
1. Servitudes are merely accessories to the tenements of which they form part, and even if
they are possessed of a separate juridical existence, they cannot be alienated from the
tenement or mortgaged separately.

2. The vendee of real property in which a servitude or easement exists, did not acquire the
right to close that servitude or put up obstructions thereon, to prevent the public from using
it.

FACTS:
Solid Manila Corp. (petitioner) owns a parcel of land located in Ermita, Manila. The same lies in
the vicinity of another parcel owned by Bio Hong Trading (respondent). The latters title came
from a prior owner, and in their deed of sale, the parties thereto reserved as an easement of
way approx. 914sqm converted as a private alley for the benefit of the neighboring estates. As a
consequence, an annotation was entered in the respondents title. The petitioners and its
neighbors made use of the private alley and maintained and contributed to its upkeep.
Thereafter, respondent constructed steel gates that precluded unhampered use. Respondent
filed a case to remove said gates and to allow full access to the easement, which was granted.
In the Court of Appeals, it was held that since respondent has acquired title to the property,
merger brought about an extinguishment of the easement.

ISSUE:
Whether the easement still exists or had been extinguished by merger?

HELD:
The easement still exists on the property of Bio Hong Trading.

It is true that the sale did include the alley. On this score, the Court rejects the petitioner's
contention that the deed of sale "excluded" it, because as a mere right-of-way, it cannot be
separated from the tenement and maintains an independent existence. Thus: Art. 617.
Easements are inseparable from the estate to which they actively or passively belong.
Servitudes are merely accessories to the tenements of which they form part. Although they are
possessed of a separate juridical existence, as mere accessories, they cannot, however, be
alienated from the tenement, or mortgaged separately.
The fact, however, that the alley in question, as an easement, is inseparable from the main lot is
no argument to defeat the petitioner's claims, because as an easement precisely, it operates as
a limitation on the title of the owner of the servient estate, specifically, his right to use (jus
utendi). As the petitioner indeed hastens to point out, the deed itself stipulated that "a portion
thereof [of the tenement] measuring 914sqm, more or less, had been converted into a private
alley for the benefit of the neighboring estates. . ." and precisely, the former owner, in
conveying the property, gave the private owner a discount on account of the easement.
Hence, and so we reiterate, albeit the private respondent did acquire ownership over the
property including the disputed alley as a result of the conveyance, it did not acquire the
right to close that alley or otherwise put up obstructions thereon and thus prevent the public
from using it, because as a servitude, the alley is supposed to be open to the public.
The Court is furthermore of the opinion, contrary to that of the Court of Appeals, that no genuine
merger took place as a consequence of the sale in favor of the private respondent corporation.
According to the Civil Code, a merger exists when ownership of the dominant and servient
estates is consolidated in the same person. Merger then, as can be seen, requires full
ownership of both estates. One thing ought to be noted here, however. The servitude in
question is a personal servitude, that is to say, one constituted not in favor of a particular
tenement (a real servitude) but rather, for the benefit of the general public.
Personal servitudes are referred to in the following article of the Civil Code: Art. 614. Servitudes
may also be established for the benefit of a community, or of one or more persons to whom the
encumbered estate does not belong.
In a personal servitude, there is therefore no "owner of a dominant tenement" to speak of, and
the easement pertains to persons without a dominant estate, in this case, the public at large.
Merger, as we said, presupposes the existence of a prior servient-dominant owner relationship,
and the termination of that relation leaves the easement of no use. Unless the owner conveys
the property in favor of the public if that is possible no genuine merger can take place that
would terminate a personal easement.

Floro v. Llenado
244 SCRA 713

DOCTRINE: One may not claim a legal easement merely out of convenience.

FACTS:
Floro is the owner of the Floro Park Subdivision in Bulacan
The subdivision has access roads from MacArthur Highway through road lot 4
Llenado is the owner of the Llenado Homes Subdivision, formerly known as Emmanuel
Homes Subdivision prior to his purchase of the project.
This subdivision is bounded on the south and separated from Floro Park Subdivision by
Planas Creek. To its west lies a parcel of land owned by Marcial Ipapo
Llenado Homes does not have any existing access to MacArthur Highway. However, a
proposed access road traversing the property of Ipapo had been provided for in the
subdivision plan of Emmanuel Homes which was approved by the HLURB.
Llenado sought and was granted the (oral and provisional, as they were still drafting a
formal contract) permission of Floro to use lots 4 and 5 of Floro Park Subdivision as a
passage to and from MacArthur Highway.
Several months later, Floro barricaded road lot 5 to prevent Llenado from further using
the property on account of the damage done to the property due to the passage of heavy
equipment.
Llenado filed an easement claim with the RTC but was denied.
The CA ruled in favor of Llenado and ordered Floro to remove the barricade.

ISSUE:
W/N Llenado can demand a compulsory easement of right of way over the existing roads of an
adjacent subdivision instead of developing his subdivision's proposed access road as provided
in his duly approved subdivision plan. -- NO

HELD:
A compulsory easement of right of way may be granted only upon the acquisitions of the
conditions required by Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code. To wit, these conditions are:

1. That the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate
outlet to a public highway;
2. That proper indemnity has been paid
3. That the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate
4. That the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate and, in
so far as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a
public highway may be the shortest.

In this case, the elements are incomplete. The original subdivision development plan presented
by Llenado indicates an existing and prior agreement which creates a right of way through the
abandoned Ipapo ricefield. Ipapo had long agreed to these terms but Llenado apparently
thought it too much work and cost to develop such road. It was easier for him to create an
easement via the Floro property.

Jurisprudence has dictated that one may not claim a legal easement merely out of convenience.
It was convenience motivated Llenando to abandon the Ipapo access road development and
pursue an access road through the Floro estate. He was stacking the cards in his favor to the
unnecessary detriment of his neighbor.

Quimen v. CA
257 SCRA 163

DOCTRINE: Where the easement may be established on any of several tenements surrounding
the dominant estate, the one where the way is shortest and will cause the least damage should
be chosen. However, as elsewhere stated, if these two (2) circumstances do not concur in a
single tenement, the way which will cause the least damage should be used, even if it will not be
the shortest.

FACTS:
Petitioner Anastacia Quimen together with her brothers Sotero, Sulpicio, Antonio and sister
Rufina inherited a piece of property situated in Pandi, Bulacan. They agreed to subdivide the
property equally among themselves, as they did, with the shares of Anastacia, Sotero, Sulpicio
and Rufina abutting the municipal road. Located directly behind the lots of Anastacia and Sotero
is the share of their brother Antonio designated as Lot No. 1448-B-C which the latter divided into
two (2) equal parts, now Lots Nos. 1448-B-6-A and 1448-B-6-B. The latter Lot is behind the
property of Sotero, father of private respondent Yolanda Oliveros. Yolanda purchased Lot No.
1448-B-6-A from her uncle Antonio through her aunt Anastacia who was then acting as his
administratrix.

According to Yolanda, when petitioner offered her the property for sale she was hesitant to buy
as it had no access to a public road. But Anastacia prevailed upon her to buy the lot with the
assurance that she would give her a right of way on her adjoining property.

Thereafter, Yolanda constructed a house on the lot she bought using as her passageway to the
public highway a portion of Anastacia's property. But when Yolanda finally offered to pay for the
use of the pathway Anastacia refused to accept the payment. In fact she was thereafter barred
by Anastacia from passing through her property.


Later, Yolanda purchased the other lot of Antonio Quimen, Lot No. 1448-B-6-B, located directly
behind the property of her parents who provided her a pathway between their house from the lot
of Yolanda behind the sari sari store of Sotero, and Anastacia's perimeter fence. The store is
made of strong materials and occupies the entire frontage of the lot measuring four (4) meters
wide and nine meters (9) long. Although the pathway leads to the municipal road it is not
adequate for ingress and egress. The municipal road cannot be reached with facility because
the store itself obstructs the path so that one has to pass through the back entrance and the
facade of the store to reach the road.

Finally, Yolanda filed an action with the proper court praying for a right of way through
Anastacia's property. The report was that the proposed right of way was at the extreme right of
Anastacia's property facing the public highway, starting from the back of Sotero's sari-sari store
and extending inward by one (1) meter to her property and turning left for about five (5) meters
to avoid the store.

TC dismissed Yolandas complaint, but the CA reversed the decision declaring that she was
entitled to a right of way on petitioners property and that the way proposed by Yolanda would
cause the least damage and detriment to the servient estate.

ISSUE:
Whether or not passing through the property of Yolanda's parents is more accessible to the
public road than to make a detour to her property and cut down the avocado tree standing
thereon. -- YES

HELD:
The conditions sine quo non for a valid grant of an easement of right of way are: (a) the
dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables without an adequate outlet to a public
highway; (b) the dominant estate is willing to pay the proper indemnity; (c) the isolation was not
due to the acts of the dominant estate; and, (d) the right of way being claimed is at a point least
prejudicial to the servient estate.

The criterion of least prejudice to the servient estate must prevail over the criterion of shortest
distance although this is a matter of judicial appreciation. While shortest distance may ordinarily
imply least prejudice, it is not always so as when there are permanent structures obstructing the
shortest distance; while on the other hand, the longest distance may be free of obstructions and
the easiest or most convenient to pass through. In other words, where the easement may be
established on any of several tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the one where the
way is shortest and will cause the least damage should be chosen. However, as elsewhere
stated, if these two (2) circumstances do not concur in a single tenement, the way which will
cause the least damage should be used, even if it will not be the shortest.

As between a right of way that would demolish a store of strong materials to provide egress to a
public highway, and another right of way which although longer will only require an avocado tree
to be cut down, the second alternative should be preferred.

Alcantara v. Rita
372 SCRA 364

DOCTRINE: Construction of a house on the lot of another to facilitate the utilization of usufruct
may constitute as personal easement pursuant to Article 614. (batasnatin)

FACTS:
Petitioner filed a complaint against Cornelio B. Reta, Jr. for the exercise of the right of right of
first refusal under Presidential Decree No. 1517, injunction with preliminary injunction, attorneys
fees and nullity of amicable settlement. The plaintiffs claimed that they were tenants or lessees
of the land located in Barangay Sasa, Davao City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
72594, owned by Reta; that the land has been converted by Reta into a commercial center; and
that Reta is threatening to eject them from the land. They assert that they have the right of first
refusal to purchase the land in accordance with Section 3(g) of Presidential Decree No. 1517
since they are legitimate tenants or lessees thereof.

On the other hand, Reta claimed that the land is beyond the ambit of Presidential Decree No.
1517 since it has not been proclaimed as an Urban Land Reform Zone; that the applicable law
is Batas Pambansa Blg. 25 for failure of the plaintiffs to pay the rentals for the use of the land;
and that the amicable settlement between him and Ricardo Roble was translated to the latter
and fully explained in his own dialect.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners have the right of first refusal under Presidential Decree No. 1517.
-- NO

HELD:
None of the petitioners is qualified to exercise the right of first refusal under P. D. No. 1517. The
area involved has not been proclaimed an Urban Land Reform Zone (ULRZ).To be able to
qualify and avail oneself of the rights and privileges granted by the said decree, one must be:
(1) a legitimate tenant of the land for ten (10) years or more; (2) must have built his home on the
land by contract; and, (3) has resided continuously for the last ten (10) years. Obviously, those
who do not fall within the said category cannot be considered legitimate tenants and,
therefore, not entitled to the right of first refusal to purchase the property should the owner of the
land decide to sell the same at a reasonable price within a reasonable time. Respondent Reta
allowed petitioner only usufruct to the property of another with the obligation of preserving its
form and substance, unless the title constituting it or the law otherwise provides. Petitioner
Roble was allowed to construct his house on the land because it would facilitate his gathering of
tuba. This would be in the nature of a personal easement under Article 614 of the Civil Code.

A contract has been defined as a meeting of the minds between two persons whereby one
binds himself, with respect to the other, to give something or to render some service. Clearly,
from the moment respondent Reta demanded that the petitioners vacate the premises, the
verbal lease agreements, which were on a monthly basis since rentals were paid monthly,
ceased to exist as there was termination of the lease. Indeed, none of the petitioners is qualified
to exercise the right of first refusal under P. D. No. 1517. Another factor which militates against
petitioners claim is the fact that there is no intention on the part of respondent Reta to sell the
property. Hence, even if the petitioners had the right of first refusal, the situation which would
allow the exercise of that right, that is, the sale or intended sale of the land, has not happened.
P. D. No. 1517 applies where the owner of the property intends to sell it to a third party.


Villanueva v. Velasco
346 SCRA 99

DOCTRINE: A legal easement is one mandated by law, constituted for public use or for private
interest and becomes a continuing property right. As a compulsory easement, it is inseparable
from the estate to which it belongs as provided for Article 617 of the Civil Code.

FACTS:
Villanueva is currently registered owner of land that he bought from Pacific Bank Corporation.
The bank is the mortgagee of the land and bought it from Maximo and Justina Gabriel at a
public auction. It is noted that before Villanueva purchased the property, a two-meter wide
easement of right of way was granted by the spouses Gabriel in favor of the Espinolas, the
predecessor-in-interest of private respondents Sebastian and Lorilla. In addition, Gabriel
constructed a small house that encroached one-meter of the easement right.

A Civil Case was filed by Sebastian and Lorilla against the spouses Gabriel praying for the
easement right to be enforced. The trial court and Court of Appeals ruled in their favor and
ordered the demolition of the house. Consequently, an Alias Writ of Demolition was issued. It is
noted that at this time, Villanueva is now the owner of the property. Villanueva filed a Third Party
Claim with Prayer to Quash Alias of Demolition which was later on denied. The Court of Appeals
also dismissed his petition for certiorari.

Villanueva is arguing that the civil case decision cannot be enforced against him since (1) the
easement right of way was not annotated in his title and (2) he was not a party in the civil case.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not a right of way can be enforced against Villanueva although it was not
annotated in his title YES
2. Whether or not the civil case decision can be enforced against Villanueva even though
he was not a party to the civil case YES

HELD:
The Court of Appeals correctly identified that the contract of easement present in this case is
both voluntary and legal easement. A legal easement is one mandated by law, constituted for
public use or for private interest, and becomes a continuing property right. As a compulsory
easement, it is inseparable from the estate to which it belongs, as provided for in Article 617 of
the Civil Code.

The essential requisites for an easement to be compulsory are:
1. The dominant estate is surrounded by other immovable and has no adequate outlet to a
public highway
2. Proper indemnity has been paid
3. The isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate
4. The right of way claimed is at a point at least prejudicial to the servient estate
5. To the extent consisted with the foregoing rule, where the distance from the dominant
estate to a public highway may be the shortest.

Having established that the easement right present in this case is legal in nature, it follows that
the servient estate (Villanueva) is legally bound to adhere to his obligation of providing the
dominant estate (Sebastian and Lorilla) its right of way. Applying this to the case, the one-meter
wide easement is insufficient for the needs of the private respondents which is why Villanueva is
obligated to demolish the house to be able to conform to what is stated in the contract of
easement.

As regards Villanuevas second argument, a decision in a case is conclusive and binding upon
the parties as well as to its successor in interest by title. It is clear from the facts that the civil
case was decided almost four years before Villanueva purchased the property. Being the
successor in interest, the civil case decision binds Villanueva.