Cooking the Books

Introduction to How Cooking the Books Works

The year 2002 saw the end of an era of skyrocketing stock prices and booming
businesses. Things that had seemed to be too good to be true were just that.
Companies that we previously thought of as unstoppable didn't have the
earnings they told us they did.
Instead they had been "cooking the books" to create the appearance of
earnings that really didn't e!ist. " company is guilty of cooking the books when it
knowingly includes incorrect information on its #nancial statements $$
manipulating e!penses and earnings to improve their earnings per share of
stock %&'().
In this article we'll look at the tricks that some companies used to beef up their
#nancial documents as well as why they do it. *e'll also e!amine some of the
fallen giants like &nron and *orldCom to see what happened and where they are
now.
Why Cook the Books?
+anaging earnings %or ,cooking the books,) is simply a way of making things
look better than they actually are to keep stockholders happy entice new
investors meet budgets and most importantly earn e!ecutive bonuses.
&!ecutive bonuses are tied to speci#c levels of earnings making it e!tremely
tempting to do just about anything to meet $$ or appear to meet $$ the goal. -ut
not all book cooking is motivated by greed. -y making revenues appear larger
than they actually are a struggling company could stay a.oat with investors'
money until it can turn a true pro#t.
/ere's an e!ample. Imagine you're a kid with a lemonade stand and you want to
build a roof over it so that you and your customers aren't in the hot sun. 0ou
don't have the money because business hasn't been that good. 0our brother has
the money but he won't lend it to you unless he knows that he'll make
something in the deal. 0ou're sure that having a covered lemonade stand will
make all the di1erence for your business because your customers will enjoy
sipping their drinks in the cool shade. (o you decide to creatively boost your
current sales #gures and o1er your brother a chance to invest in your business.
/e gives you the money to build your roof in e!change for 22 percent of your
pro#ts. 3or reasons unknown to you the covered stand doesn't really sell any
more lemonade than the uncovered stand did. 4ow your brother is mad because
the pro#t he thought he was going to make was based on phony sales #gures. "t
this rate it'll take four summers to break even and much more to actually make
a pro#t.
Investors are attracted by rising stock prices of public companies which make
the company's #nancial statements e!tremely important documents. *all (treet
analysts depend on the documents and input from the companies themselves for
their recommendations. The public company depends on the infusion of cash
from investors to fund company growth. (tockholders e!pect the price per share
to go up once they buy stock. *hen the price goes down they lose money.
Accounting Background
The most important documents that a company puts together are its #nancial
statements. These include a balance sheet a cash .ow statement and a pro#t
and loss statement. These documents 5uantitatively describe the #nancial health
of a company and are used by almost every entity that deals with the company
including the company e!ecutives and managers themselves.
The following #nancial statements are usually compiled on a 5uarterly and
annual basis6
The balance sheet gives a snapshot or bird's eye view of the company's
#nancial situation at a given date in time. It includes assets and liabilities and
tells the business's net worth.
The cash fow statement shows cash that is coming in as well as the cash
needed to go out over a period of time. It is very helpful for planning for large
purchases or to help be prepared for slow periods in the business. In simple
terms the cash .ow e5uals cash receipts minus cash disbursements.
The proft and loss statement %also referred to as an income statement)
lists revenues and e!penses. It also lists the pro#t or loss of the business for a
given period of time. It is helpful for planning and helps to control operating
e!penses.
-anks review the #nancial statements to decide if they will lend the company
money %and at what interest rate if they choose to lend it). Investors review the
documents to decide if they feel con#dent in the company enough to invest their
hard$earned money. Company managers use them to analy7e the business and
determine how well they are doing. +any others also use the documents so it is
critical that they are accurate.
3or public companies these documents are audited by outside accounting #rms
that certify that the documents are compiled according to generally accepted
accounting principles or 8""'. These #rms are still at the mercy of the
information provided by the company however. They are also interested in
keeping their largest customers happy.
*e'll look at the (arbanes$9!ley "ct of 2002 in the ne!t section.
he !arbanes"#$ley Act
In 2002 'resident -ush signed the !arbanes"#$ley Act into law to ,re$
establish investor con#dence in the integrity of corporate disclosures and
#nancial reporting,. The act was brought on by the large number of corporate
#nancial fraud cases %such as those of &nron *orldCom Tyco "delphia "9:
and others) and by the end of the ,boom, years for the stock market. The "ct
re5uires all public companies to submit both 5uarterly and annual assessments
of the e1ectiveness of their internal #nancial auditing controls to the !ecurities
and %$change Commission.
&ach company's e!ternal auditors must also audit and report on the internal
control reports of management and any other areas that may a1ect internal
controls. The company's principal e!ecutive o;cer and principal #nancial o;cer
must personally certify that the #nancial reports are true and that everything has
been disclosed. +any of the "ct's provisions apply to all companies <nited
(tates and foreign. /owever some provisions apply only to companies that have
e5uity securities listed on an e!change or 4"(=">.
Important organi7ations related to the (arbanes$9!ley "ct include6
The !ecurities and %$change Commission %(&C)6The <.(. (ecurities and
&!change Commission %(&C) protects investors by maintaining the integrity of
thesecurities markets based on the idea that all investors should have access
to certain basic facts about an investment. The (&C re5uires public
companies to disclose meaningful #nancial information %and other types of
information) to the public so all investors can determine whether or not a
company's securities are a good investment.The (&C also oversees stock
e!changes broker$dealers investment advisors mutual funds and public
utility holding companies. &ach year the (&C #les between ?00$200 civil
enforcement actions against individuals and companies that break securities
laws.
&inancial Accounting !tandards Board %3"(-)6The 3inancial "ccounting
(tandards -oard establishes standards for #nancial accounting and reporting.
Those standards dictate how #nancial reports must be prepared.
'enerally Accepted Accounting (rinciples %8""')68""' is the accepted
method for accountancy %the practice of accounting). It works with the
authority of the 3"(- and establishes a common set of procedures for
compiling #nancial statements.
The details of the (arbanes$9!ley "ct address many of the tactics companies
have used to ,cook the books, over the years. In the ne!t few sections we'll go
over some of the more popular methods of improving a company's bottom line $$
if only on paper.
#)"balance !heet Accounting and *anipulation *ethods
*ith o)"balance sheet accounting a company didn't have to include certain
assets and liabilities in its balance sheet $$ it was ,o1$sheet, and therefore not
part of their #nancial statements. *e'll talk more later about how the (arbanes$
9!ley "ct changed this practice. *hile there are legitimate reasons for o1$
balance$sheet accounting it is often used to make a company look like it has far
less debt than it actually does. (ome types of o1$balance$sheet accounting move
debt to a newly created company speci#cally for that purpose which was the
case with &nron. These are called special purpose entities %('&s) and are also
known as +ariable interest entities %@I&s).
91$balance$sheet entities can be created for several reasons such as when a
company needs to #nance a business venture but doesn't want to take on the
risk or when there is too much debt to get a loan. -y starting a new ('& they
can secure a loan through the new entity. There are situations where it makes
sense to start an ('&. If your company wants to branch out into another area
outside of its core business an ('& will keep that risk from a1ecting the main
balance sheet and pro#tability of the company. 'rior to 200A a company could
own up to BC percent of an ('& without having to report the liabilities of the ('&
on its balance sheet.
!ynthetic ,eases
(ynthetic leases often use ('&s to hold title to a company's property and lease
that property back to the company. -ecause of o1$balance$sheet accounting
synthetic leases allowed companies to reap the ta! bene#ts of ownership without
having to list it as a liability on their balance sheets.
(ynthetic leases could also be signed with some entity other than an ('&. -anks
for e!ample would often purchase property for businesses and lease it back to
them via a synthetic lease. The company leasing the property avoids the liability
on the balance sheet but still gets to deduct interest and depreciation from its
ta! bill.
he %nd o- the Hiding 'ame
4ew re5uirements from the 3inancial "ccounting (tandards -oard now re5uire
('&s to be listed on a company's balance sheet. (ection ?0D%a) of the (arbanes$
9!ley "ct re5uires that annual and 5uarterly #nancial reports disclose all
material o1$balance sheet transactions arrangements and obligations. The rules
also re5uire most companies to provide an overview of known contractual
obligations in an ,easy$to$read tabular format,ErefF.
This new ruling has essentially ended the days of the ('& and the synthetic lease
$$ even though they are still legitimate practices.
%$pense *anipulation
"ccelerating a company's e!penses may not seem to be the way to boost the
appearance of earnings but it depends on when those earnings need to be
boosted. There are legitimate and illegitimate reasons to accelerate e!penses. "
legitimate e!ample would be making e5uipment purchases when earnings are
high rather than when they were planned.
/ere's an e!ample of a less legitimate earnings acceleration. " manager's bonus
is based on his meeting a certain earnings goal. 9nce the target earning level
has been e!ceeded that manager might decide to spend money now that was
budgeted to be spent in the ne!t year because having higher earnings this year
won't mean a bigger bonus for him. (pending money this year that was
budgeted for ne!t year however could help ensure he meets ne!t year's level
as well.
*hile this may seem like the same thing as making purchases when earnings are
high it depends on the circumstances. If making those purchases earlier than
planned has no adverse a1ect on the business then perhaps there is no
problem. In many instances there is an adverse a1ect however. 3or instance
buying computer e5uipment si! months earlier than e!pected can mean a big
di1erence in the actual e5uipment purchased $$ power features and price can
all change dramatically.
.elaying %$penses
Companies that are cooking the books have been known to capitali7e e!penses
that are really everyday e!penses. "9: was charged with engaging in various
acts of securities fraud $$ among other things $$ between DBB2 and DBBG. In one
part of a larger case "9: was accused of listing advertising e!penses %the cost
of creating those C=s and diskettes they send out) as capital e!penses rather
than regular e!penses. This presented a false picture of the company's
pro#tability and boosted the stock price. The disks should have been e!pensed
as they were mailed.
In an upcoming case study you'll see that *orldCom capitali7ed e!penses that
should have been operating e!penses to the tune of billions of dollars.
*hen companies land a big contract to provide a product or service over a long
period of time they're supposed to spread the revenue over the cost of the
service contract. (ome companies have been known to show the sale and
revenue in the 5uarter in which the contract was signed.
/ere are some other e!amples of premature revenue booking6
Hecording sales after the products were ordered but before they were shipped
to the customer
Hecording revenues when the sales involved contingencies that allowed the
customer to return the merchandise
9verstating revenues by speeding up the estimated percentage of completion
for a project in process
Hecording revenues by shipping products that weren't ordered by the
customer or by shipping defective products and recording revenues at full
rather than discounted prices.
Hecording revenues when unassembled products are shipped from the
manufacturing plant $$ they must set up a separate assembly location and
assemble the products before the products can actually go to the customers
Trying to improve future earnings by ,front loading, future e!penses and booking
them in the current 5uarter is another e!ample. This has been done during the
ac5uisition of a company. The company will pay o1 %or even pre$pay) e!penses in
order to increase the earnings per share %&'() over that of previous 5uarters
for the combined company.
/on"recurring %$penses and (ension *anipulation
*hile this category of e!penses was meant for things that would only occur once
in order to keep it from a1ecting regular operating e!penses it has been abused
in the world of ,managed earnings., -y over$budgeting for a ,non$recurring,
e!pense companies have been known to then move the e!cess money over as
earnings.
"nother way companies have increased their earnings per share is through in$
process HI= %Hesearch I =evelopment) charge$o1s. /ere's how it works. " large
company buys a small company that has new technology in development. The
technology is not yet ready for commerciali7ation so the large company writes
o1 the related costs. :ater on the technology is further developed and ready for
market but with a much lower HI= e!pense.
4ow the 8""' re5uires companies to charge o1 that e!pense. This charge will
reduce earnings and must be disclosed in the #nancial statements.
9perating e!penses are the everyday costs of running a business. Capital
e!penses are business e!penses for long$term assets such as e5uipment. They
are notta! deductible as business e!penses but may be used for depreciation or
amorti7ation $$ in other words the e!pense is somewhat delayed by being
stretched over several years.
(ension (lan *anipulation
+any companies have de#ned bene#t pension plans for their employees. These
are plans that pay out a speci#c de#ned amount at retirement. Companies are
re5uired to maintain enough money in their retirement account to pay bene#ts
to everyone in the event that the company goes out of business.
It makes sense for companies to invest that money so it will grow. Hather than
investing in something safe like bonds some companies invest in the stock
market. "ccounting rules allow any ,e!tra, money that the fund earns to be
claimed as company pro#t. Companies can ,estimate, how much it believes the
money will grow each year rather than going by actual numbers. They use their
estimate to #gure how much money they should plan to put into the fund and
how much they can consider pro#t.
The potential for companies to in.ate their earnings by underestimating the
contributions re5uired to fully fund their retirement funds is high. &ven assuming
a percentage point or less can mean a di1erence of hundreds of millions of
dollars on a company's balance sheet. +any company pension plans have been
underfunded because the companies assumed that the stock market will perform
as it did in the late nineties which is nowhere near the rate of returns right now.
These methods for earnings management are just the tip of the iceberg when it
comes to ways to manipulate a company's earnings. There's a #ne line between
legitimate earnings management and ,cooking the books., :et's take a look at
some real$life cases and learn how they did it.
Case !tudy0 %nron
Background
9nce the seventh largest company in "merica &nron was formed in DBJ2 when
Inter4orth ac5uired /ouston 4atural 8as. The company branched into many non$
energy$related #elds over the ne!t several years including such areas
as Internet bandwidth risk management and weather derivatives %a type of
weather insurance for seasonal businesses). "lthough their core business
remained in the transmission and distribution of power their phenomenal growth
was occurring through their other interests. 3ortune +aga7ine selected &nron as
,"merica's most innovative company, for si! straight years from DBBG to 200D.
Then came the investigations into their comple! network of o1$shore
partnerships and accounting practices.
How the &raud Happened
The &nron fraud case is e!tremely comple!. (ome say &nron's demise is rooted
in the fact that in DBB2 Ke1 (killing then president of &nron's trading operations
convinced federal regulators to permit &nron to use an accounting method
known as ,mark to market., This was a techni5ue that was previously only used
by brokerage and trading companies. *ith mark to market accounting the price
or value of a security is recorded on a daily basis to calculate pro#ts and losses.
<sing this method allowed &nron to count projected earnings from long$term
energy contracts as current income. This was money that might not be collected
for many years. It is thought that this techni5ue was used to in.ate revenue
numbers by manipulating projections for future revenue.
<se of this techni5ue %as well as some of &nron's other 5uestionable practices)
made it di;cult to see how &nron was really making money. The numbers were
on the books so the stock prices remained high but &nron wasn't paying high
ta!es. Hobert /ermann the company's general ta! counsel at the time was told
by (killing that their accounting method allowed &nron to make money and grow
without bringing in a lot of ta!able cash.
&nron had been buying any new venture that looked promising as a new pro#t
center. Their ac5uisitions were growing e!ponentially. &nron had also been
forming o1 balance sheet entities %:K+ :K+2 and others) to move debt o1 of the
balance sheet and transfer risk for their other business ventures. These ('&s
were also established to keep &nron's credit rating high which was very
important in their #elds of business. -ecause the e!ecutives believed &nron's
long$term stock values would remain high they looked for ways to use the
company's stock to hedge its investments in these other entities. They did this
through a comple! arrangement of special purpose entities they called the
Haptors. The Haptors were established to cover their losses if the stocks in
their start$up businesses fell.
*hen the telecom industry su1ered its #rst downturn &nron su1ered as well.
-usiness analysts began trying to unravel the source of &nron's money. The
Haptors would collapse if &nron stock fell below a certain point because they
were ultimately backed only by &nron stock. "ccounting rules re5uired an
independent investor in order for a hedge to work but &nron used one of their
('&s.
The deals were so comple! that no one could really determine what was legal
and what wasn't. &ventually the house of cards began falling. *hen &nron's
stock began to decline the Haptors began to decline as well. 9n "ugust D?
200D &nron's C&9 Ke1 (killing resigned due to ,family issues., This shocked
both the industry and &nron employees. &nron chairman Len :ay stepped in as
C&9.
In the ne!t section we'll look at how the fraud was discovered.
%nron0 .isco+ering &raud
9n "ugust D2 (herron *atkins an &nron @' wrote an anonymous letter to Len
:ay that suggested (killing had left because of accounting improprieties and
other illegal actions. (he 5uestioned &nron's accounting methods and speci#cally
cited the Haptor transactions. :ater that same month Chung *u a <-(
'aine*ebber broker in /ouston sent an e$mail to CA investment clients saying
&nron was in trouble and advising them to consider selling their shares.
(herron *atkins then met with Len :ay in person adding more details to her
charges. (he noted that the ('&s had been controlled by &nron's C39 3astow
and that he and other &nron employees had made their money and left only
&nron at risk for the support of the Haptors. %The Haptor deals were written such
that &nron was re5uired to support them with its own stock.) *hen &nron's stock
fell below a certain point the Haptors' losses would begin to appear on &nron's
#nancial statements. 9n 9ctober DG &nron announced a third 5uarter loss of
MGDJ million. =uring 200D &nron's stock fell from MJG to A0 cents. 9n 9ctober
22 the (&C began an investigation into &nron's accounting procedures and
partnerships. In 4ovember &nron o;cials admitted to overstating company
earnings by M2C million since DBBC. &nron or ,the crooked &, #led
for bankruptcy in =ecember of 200D.
Where Are hey /ow?
&nron's C39 "ndrew 3astow was behind the comple! network of partnerships
and many other 5uestionable practices. /e was charged with CJ counts of fraud
conspiracy and money laundering. 3astow accepted a plea agreement in Kanuary
200?. "fter pleading guilty to two counts of conspiracy he was given a D0$
yearprison sentence and ordered to pay M2A.J million in e!change for testifying
against other &nron e!ecutives.
Ke1 (killing and Len :ay were both indicted in 200? for their roles in the fraud.
"ccording to the &nron *eb site ,&nron is in the midst of li5uidating its
remaining operations and distributing its assets to its creditors.,
9n +ay 22 200G a jury in a /ouston Te!as federal court found both (killing and
:ay guilty. Ke1 (killing was convicted of DB counts of conspiracy fraud insider
trading and making false statements. Len :ay was convicted of si! counts of
conspiracy and fraud. In a separate trial :ay was also found guilty on four counts
of bank fraud.
Lenneth :ay died of a heart attack on Kuly 2 200G and a federal judge ruled that
his conviction was void because he died before he had a chance to appeal. 9n
9ctober 2A 200G (killing was sentenced to 2? years in prison.
4e!t we'll learn how *orldCom and Tyco cooked the books.
Case !tudy0 WorldCom
WorldCom took the telecom industry by storm when it began a fren7y of
ac5uisitions in the DBB0s. The low margins that the industry was accustomed to
weren't enough for -ernie &bbers C&9 of *orldCom. 3rom DBB2 until 2000
*orldCom purchased over si!ty other telecom #rms. In DBBC it bought +CI for
MAC billion. *orldCom moved into Internet and data communications handling
20 percent of all <nited (tates Internet tra;c and 20 percent of all e$
mails worldwide. -y 200D *orldCom owned one$third of all data cables in the
<nited (tates. In addition they were the second$largest long distance carrier in
DBBJ and 2002.
How the &raud Happened
(o what happenedN In DBBB revenue growth slowed and the stock price began
falling. *orldCom's e!penses as a percentage of its total revenue increased
because the growth rate of its earnings dropped. This also meant *orldCom's
earnings might not meet *all (treet analysts' e!pectations. In an e1ort to
increase revenue *orldCom reduced the amount of money it held in reserve %to
cover liabilities for the companies it had ac5uired) by M2.J billion and moved this
money into the revenue line of its #nancial statements.
That wasn't enough to boost the earnings that &bbers wanted. In 2000
*orldCom began classifying operating e!penses as long$term capital
investments. /iding these e!penses in this way gave them another MA.J2 billion.
These newly classi#ed assets were e!penses that *orldCom paid to lease phone
network lines from other companies to access their networks. They also added a
journal entry for M200 million in computer e!penses but supporting documents
for the e!penses were never found.
These changes turned *orldCom's losses into pro#ts to the tune of MD.AJ billion
in 200D. It also made *orldCom's assets appear more valuable.
How it Was .isco+ered
"fter tips were sent to the internal audit team and accounting irregularities were
spotted in +CI's books the (&C re5uested that *orldCom provide more
information. The (&C was suspicious because while *orldCom was making so
much pro#t "TIT %another telecom giant) was losing money. "n internal audit
turned up the billions *orldCom had announced as capital e!penditures as well
as the M200 million in undocumented computer e!penses. There was also
another M2 billion in 5uestionable entries. *orldCom's audit committee was
asked for documents supporting capital e!penditures but it could not produce
them. The controller admitted to the internal auditors that they weren't following
accounting standards. *orldCom then admitted to in.ating its pro#ts by MA.J
billion over the previous #ve 5uarters. " little over a month after the internal
audit began *orldCom #led for bankruptcy.
Where Are hey /ow?
*hen it emerged from bankruptcy in 200? *orldCom was renamed +CI. 3ormer
C&9 -ernie &bbers and former C39 (cott (ullivan were charged with fraud and
violating securities laws. &bbers was found guilty on all counts in +arch 2002
and sentenced to 22 years in prison but is free on appeal. (ullivan pleaded
guilty and took the stand against &bbers in e!change for a more lenient sentence
of #ve years.
Case !tudy0 yco
yco Background
Tyco International has operations in over D00 countries and claims to be the
world's largest maker and servicer of electrical and electronic componentsO the
largest designer and maker of undersea telecommunications systemsO the larger
maker of #re protection systems and electronic security servicesO the largest
maker of specialty valvesO and a major player in the disposable medical
products plastics and adhesives markets. (ince DBJG Tyco has claimed over ?0
major ac5uisitions as well as many minor ac5uisitions.
How the &raud Happened
"ccording to the Tyco 3raud Information Center an internal investigation
concluded that there were accounting errors but that there was no systematic
fraud problem at Tyco. (o what did happenN Tyco's former C&9 =ennis
Loslowski former C39 +ark (wart7 and former 8eneral Counsel +ark -elnick
were accused of giving themselves interest$free or very low interest
loans %sometimes disguised as bonuses) that were never approved by the Tyco
board or repaid. (ome of these ,loans, were part of a ,Ley &mployee :oan,
program the company o1ered. They were also accused of selling their company
stock without telling investors which is a re5uirement under (&C rules.
Loslowski (wart7 and -elnick stole MG00 million dollars from Tyco International
through their unapproved bonuses loans and e!travagant ,company, spending.
Humors of a MG000 shower curtain M2000 trash can and a M2 million dollar
birthday party for Loslowski's wife in Italy are just a few e!amples of the misuse
of company funds. "s many as ?0 Tyco e!ecutives took loans that were later
,forgiven, as part of Tyco's loan$forgiveness program although it was said that
many did not know they were doing anything wrong. /ush money was also paid
to those the company feared would ,rat out, Lo7lowski.
&ssentially they concealed their illegal actions by keeping them out of the
accounting books and away from the eyes of shareholders and board members.
How it Was .isco+ered
In DBBB the (&C began an investigation after an analyst reported 5uestionable
accounting practices. This investigation took place from DBBB to 2000 and
centered on accounting practices for the company's many ac5uisitions including
a practice known as ,spring$loading., In ,spring$loading, the pre$ac5uisition
earnings of an ac5uired company are underreported giving the merged company
the appearance of an earnings boost afterwards. The investigation ended with
the (&C deciding to take no action.
In Kanuary 2002 the accuracy of Tyco's bookkeeping and accounting again came
under 5uestion after a tip drew attention to a M20 million payment made to Tyco
director 3rank *alsh Kr. That payment was later e!plained as a #nder's fee for
the Tyco ac5uisition of CIT. In Kune 2002 Lo7lowski was being investigated for ta!
evasion because he failed to pay sales ta! on MDA million in artwork that he had
purchased in 4ew 0ork with company funds. "t the same time Lo7lowski
resigned from Tyco ,for personal reasons, and was replaced by Kohn 3ort. -y
(eptember of 2002 all three %Lo7lowski (wart7 and -elnick) were gone and
charges were #led against them for failure to disclose information on their
multimillion dollar loans to shareholders.
The (&C asked Lo7lowski (wart7 and -elnick to restore the funds that they took
from Tyco in the form of undisclosed loans and compensations.
Where Are hey /ow?
Lo7lowski and (wart7 were found guilty in 2002 of taking bonuses worth more
than MD20 million without the approval of Tyco's directors abusing an employee
loan program and misrepresenting the company's #nancial condition to
investors to boost the stock price while selling M2C2 million in stock. -oth are
serving J DPA$to$22$year prison sentences. -elnick paid a MD00000 civil penalty
for his role. (ince replacing its -oard +embers and several e!ecutives Tyco
International has remained strong.
The di1erence in the Tyco case and some of the others is that it is more related
to greed than accounting fraud. 3or more information on cooking the books and
related topics check out the links on the ne!t page.
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-easley +. Carcello K. and /ermanson =. ,C9(9's new fraud study6 what it
means for C'"s., Kournal of "ccountancy +ay DBBB. 3ind"rticles.com.
http6PPwww.#ndarticles.comPpParticlesPmiQmG2J0PisQ2QDJCPaiQ2?GAGBDG
Corporate (candal 'rimer. *ashington 'ost.
http6PPwww.washingtonpost.comPwp$srvPbusinessPscandalsPprimerPinde!.html
=omash /arry. ,A 'creative accounting' .ags for investors., +(4 +oney
2002.
http6PPmoneycentral.msn.comPcontentPInvestingP(implestrategiesP
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