People v. Buling 107 Phil 712 http://bit.ly/ZL7d9Y People vs. Buling 107 Phil 712 Section 21 Supervening facts FACTS: Accused was charged with less serious physical injury to another person in which the former pleaded guilty. After serving his sentence, the wounds inflicted by the accused allegedly did not heal. So, another complaint was filed against him, this time, he was charged with serious physical I injury. This is now the case at bar sought to be reversed and set aside by the accused. ISSUE: Whether the prosecution and conviction of Balaba for less serious physical injuries is a bar to the second prosecution for serious physical injuries. RULING: YES. Unlike in the case of Melo v. People, there was no supervening facts in this case which would allow for the subsequent charge against the accused even after serving his sentence. The physical injury then committed was the same physical injury being brought up by the prosecution. Thus, there was no change in the nature of the injury suffered by the complainant. The decision appealed from is hereby reversed. The judgment of conviction is set aside and the defendant- appellant acquitted of the charge of serious physical injuries. Without costs. 4. Same Offenses Lamera v. CA 198 SCRA 186 LAMERA v. CA, 198 SCRA 186SECTION 21, Same offenses FACTS:An owner type jeepney, driven by petitioner, hit a tricycle resulting to the damage of the tricycle,and physical injuries to the passengers of the said tricycle.Two informations were filed against petitioner. First is reckless imprudence resulting to damageto property and physical injuries under Article 365 of the Revised penal Code and second,abandonment of ones victim under Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code. The secondinformation was filed because the petitioner, instead of giving assistance to the victims, fled andleft them.He invoked his right against double jeopardy saying that his conviction of reckless imprudenceresulting to damage to property and multiple physical injuries is a bar for the prosecution tocharge him with the crime of abandonment of ones victim.The lower court and the Court of Appeals ruled against the petitioner, hence this appeal. ISSUE: Could there be a valid charge for alleged abandonment under Article 275, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code which provides as basis for prosecution. "2. Anyone who shall fail to helpanother whom he has accidentally wounded or injured" when, he was previously charged with"reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with multiple physical injuries" under Article 365 (sic) of the Revised Penal Code? RULING:There is no double jeopardy, because these two offenses are not identical. Reckless imprudenceis a crime falling under the chapter on criminal negligence, while abandonment of ones victim is a crime falling under the chapter on crimes against security. The former is committed by meansof culpa, while the latter is committed by means of dolo. Failure to help ones victim is not anoffense by itself nor an element of reckless imprudence. It merely Increases the penalty by onedegree. Gonzales v. CA 232 SCRA 667 Article XIV 12/12/2012 12nn Section I DECS v. San Diego 180 SCRA 534 FACTS: Roberto Rey San Diego, the private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of Bachelor of Science in Zoology. The petitioner claims that he took the NMAT three times and flunked it as many times. ISSUE: Petition whether the private respondent who has thrice failed the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) is entitled to take it again as it is a requirement for admission to any Medical School in the Philippines. He invoked of his constitutional rights to academic freedom and quality education, squarely challenging the constitutionality of MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972. HELD: The private respondent cannot take the NMAT again and pursue his medical profession because of the following grounds:For the purpose of gauging at least initially by the admission test and by the three-flunk rule, a student shall not be allowed to take the NMAT again after three successive failures.The State ensures that medical profession is not permeated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily hand over their lives and health.It is not enough to simply invoke the right to quality education as a guarantee of the Constitution, while one has the right to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have the constitutional right to be a doctor; one must show that he is entitled to it because of his preparation and promise.The conflict that the challenged rule violates the equal protection clause is not well-taken.Conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution, a law does not have to operate with equal force on all person or things. Non v. Judge Dames 185 SCRA 523 Facts: Petitioners, students in private respondent Mabini Colleges, Inc. in Daet, Camarines Norte, were not allowed to re-enroll by the school for the academic year 1988-1989 for leading or participating in student mass actions against the school in the preceding semester. The subject of the protests is not, however, made clear in the pleadings.Petitioners filed a petition in the court seeking their readmission or re-enrollment to the school, but the trial court dismissed the petition. They now petition the court to reverse its ruling in Alcuaz vs. PSBA1, which was also applied in the case. The court said that petitioners waived their privilege to be admitted for re-enrollment with respondent college when they adopted, signed, and used its enrollment form for the first semester of school year 1988-89, which states that: The Mabini College reserves the right to deny admission of students whose scholarship and attendance are unsatisfactory and to require withdrawal of students whose conduct discredits the institution and/or whose activities unduly disrupts or interfere with the efficient operation of the college. Students, therefore, are required to behave in accord with the Mabini College code of conduct and discipline. Issue: Whether or Not the students right to freedom of speech and assembly infringed. Held: Yes. The protection to the cognate rights of speech and assembly guaranteed by the Constitution is similarly available to students is well-settled in our jurisdiction. However there are limitations. The permissible limitation on Student Exercise of Constitutional Rights within the school presupposes that conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior should not materially disrupt classwork or must not involve substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others. Section III Miriam College v. CA 348 SCRA 265 Facts Miriam college has found its school paper (Chi-Rho), and magazine ( AngMagasing Pampanitikan ng Chi- Rho) contents of the September-October 1994 issueObscene, vulgar, indecent, gross, sexually explicit, injurious to youngreaders, and devoid of all moral values. Following the publication of the paper andthe magazine, the members of the editorial board, author, all students of MiriamCollege, received a letter signed by Dr. Aleli Sevilla, Chair of the Miriam CollegeDiscipline Committee to inform them that their are letters of complaint filed againstthem by members of the Miriam Community and a concerned Ateneo grade fivestudent that had been forwarded to the Discipline Committee for inquiry andinvestigation and required them submit a written statement in answer to thecharge/s on or before the initial date of hearing, but none of the students submittedtheir respective answers. They instead requested Dr. Sevilla to transfer the case tothe Regional Office of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS),which they contested, that had jurisdiction over the case. Dr. Sevilla again requiredthe students to file their written answers. In response, the lawyer for the studentssubmitted a letter to the Discipline Committee reiterating his clients position thatsaid Committee had no jurisdiction over them. The Discipline Committee proceededwith its investigation ex parte. Thereafter, the Discipline Board, after a review of the Discipline Committees report, imposed disciplinary sanctions upon thestudents. The students were suspended, expelled, dismissed, and one was notallowed to attend her graduation. The students thus filed a petition for prohibition andcertiorari with preliminaryinjunction/restraining order before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon Cityquestioning the jurisdiction of the Discipline Board of Miriam College over them. TheRTC issued an order denying the plaintiffs prayer for a Temporary RestrainingOrder. The students thereafter filed a Supplemental Petition and Motion forReconsideration. The RTC issued an Order granting the writ of preliminaryinjunction. Both parties moved for a reconsideration of the order. On the matterraised by both parties that it is the DECS which has jurisdiction, the RTC DISMISSEDthe case and all orders it issued are recalled and set aside. The CA issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining Miriam College from enforcing letters of dismissal/suspension, but it eventually declared the RTC Order, as well as thestudents suspension and dismissal, void. Issue: 1. Whether or not the trail court has the jurisdiction to entertain the petitionfor certiorari filed by the students 2. Whether or not Miriam College has the jurisdiction over the complaintsagainst the students. Held: 1. YES, the grounds invoked by the students in their refusal to answer thecharges against them were limited to the question of jurisdiction a questionpurely legal in nature and well within the competence and the jurisdiction of the trial court, not the DECS Regional Office. This is an exception to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.As the Court held in Phil. Global Communications, Inc. vs. Relova. Absentsuch clarity as to the scope and coverage of its franchise, a legal questionarises which is more appropriate for the judiciary than for anadministrative agency to resolve. The doctrine of primary jurisdictioncalls for application when there is such competence to act on the part of an administrative body.A court having jurisdiction of a case has not only the right and the poweror authority, but also the duty, to exercise that jurisdiction and to rendera decision in a case properly submitted to it. 2. YES, Section 7 of the Campus Journalism Act should be read in a manner asnot to infringe upon the school's right to discipline its students. At the sametime, however, we should not construe said provision as to unduly restrict theright of the students to free speech. Consistent with jurisprudence,we read Section 7 of the Campus Journalism Act to mean that the schoolcannot suspend or expel a student solely on the basis of the articleshe or she has written,except when such articles materially disruptclass work or involve substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others. The power of the school to investigate is an adjunct of its power to suspendor expel. It is a necessary corollary to the enforcement of rules andregulations and the maintenance of a safe and orderly educationalenvironment conducive to learning. That power, like the power to suspend orexpel, is an inherent part of the academic freedom of institutions of higherlearning guaranteed by the Constitution.SC rule that Miriam College has the authority to hear and decide thecases filed against students.