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BELINDA TAREDO, FOR HERSELF AND IN REPRESENTATION OF HER BROTHERS AND
SISTERS, AND TEOFILA CORPUZ TANEDO, REPRESENTING HER MINOR DAUGHTER
VERNA TANEDO V THE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 104482; JANUARY 22, 1996

FACTS: On October 20, 1962, Lazardo Taedo executed a notarized deed of absolute sale
in favor of his eldest brother, Ricardo Taedo, and the latters wife -- private
respondents herein, whereby he conveyed to the latter in consideration of
P1,500.00, one hectare of whatever share I shall have over Lot No. 191Gerona,
Province of Tarlac the said property being his future inheritance from his
parents. Upon the death of his father Matias, Lazaro executed an Affidavit of
Conformity dated February 28, 1980 to re-affirm, respect. acknowledge and
validate the sale I made in 1962.

On January 13, 1981, Lazaro executed another notarized deed of sale in favor of
private respondents covering his undivided ONE TWELVE (1/12) of a parcel of
land known as Lot 191. He acknowledged therein his receipt of P 10,000.00 as
consideration therefor.

In February 1981, Ricardo learned that Lazaro sold the same property to his
children, petitioners herein, through a deed of sale dated December 29, 1980. On
June 7, 1982, Sps. Tanedo recorded the Deed of Sale in their favor.

Petitioners then filed a complaint for rescission (plus damages) of the deeds of
sale executed by Lazaro in favor of private respondents covering the property
inherited by Lazaro from his father.

The trial court decided in favor of private respondents. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, ruling that the Deed of Sale dated
January 13, 1981 was valid and that its registration in good faith vested title in
said respondents.

ISSUE: Is a sale of future inheritance valid?

RULING: No. We hereby categorically rule that, pursuant to Article 1347 of the Civil Code,
(n)o contract may be entered into upon a future inheritance except in cases
expressly authorized by law. Consequently, said contract made in 1962 is not
valid and cannot be the source of any right nor the creator of any obligation
between the parties.

Hence, the affidavit of conformity dated February 28, 1980, insofar as it sought
to validate or ratify the 1962 sale, is also useless and, in the words of the
respondent Court, suffers from the same infirmity. Even private respondents in
their memorandum concede this.
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ELEUTERIO, ANATALIA, JOSELITO, ROGELIO, EVANGELINE, NOEL, GUILLERMO,
LORENZO, DOMINGO, AMADO, AND VICTORIA, ALL SURNAMED LOPEZ V THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 127827; MARCH 5, 2003

FACTS: Fermin Lopez filed a homestead application for a land situated in Makatubong,
Barrio De la Paz, Antipolo, Rizal which he occupied, possessed, and declared for
taxation purposes. But his application was not acted upon until his death in
1934. When he died, he was survived by the following: (1) Hermogenes Lopez,
now deceased, leaving his children, respondents herein; (2) petitioner Eleuterio
Lopez; (3) Juan Lopez, now deceased, leaving his children as his heirs and (4)
Nazario, now deceased, leaving his wife, petitioner Anatalia, and children, herein
petitioners heirs.

Following Fermins death, Hermogenes, in 1936, inquired before the Bureau of
Lands and was informed that the application remained unacted upon and
suggested that he file a new application. Hermogenes filed a homestead
application in his own name and after ascertaining that the land was free from
claim of any private person, the Bureau approved his application and there was
issuance of the corresponding certificate of title in his name.

Unaware that he has been awarded a homestead patent, Hermogenes executed
on February 11, 1956 an Extra-judicial Partition of the disputed land with his
brothers - petitioner Eleuterio, Juan, and Nazario. On September 12, 1958,
however, the three executed a Deed of Absolute Sale of their share in the land in
favor of Hermogenes.

The succeeding year, Hermogenes applied with the Land Registration
Commission for the registration of the property in his name. To his surprise, he
found that the land has been registered in the names of Fernando Gorospe,
Salvador de Tagle, Rosario de Tagle, Beatriz de Suzuarrequi and Eduardo Santos,
who collectively opposed his application. In December 1959, Hermogenes filed a
complaint for the annulment of the free patent and title against these persons.
Some of the defendants moved for its dismissal alleging that Hermogenes was
not a real party in interest since he previously sold his right to the land to one
Ambrocio Aguilar on July 31, 1959. The case was dismissed.

Aguilar instituted on November 18, 1976 a new civil action and was declared by
lower court as the absolute owner of the land. This decision was affirmed in toto
by the Court of Appeals. In G.R. No. 90380, we affirmed the decision of the
appellate court in a decision promulgated on September 13, 1990.

After the declaration that Aguilar was the absolute owner, and while the case
was on appeal, respondent Lopezes, as heirs of Hermogenes, filed a complaint
against Aguilar before the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal for the cancellation of the deed
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of sale executed by Hermogenes in favor of Aguilar dated July 31, 1959 and/or
reconveyance. The lower court declared the deed of absolute sale null and void
ab initio and the respondents (heirs of Hermogenes) as the true and absolute
owner of the disputed land. Aguilar sought relief with the Court of Appeals,
which affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC.

On May 31, 1985, petitioners Eleuterio, Anatalia, Joselito, Rogelio, Evangeline
and Noel, all heirs of Nazario Lopez, along with Guillermo, Lorenzo, Domingo,
Amado, and Victoria, all heirs of Juan Lopez, instituted the present action against
the respondents before the RTC. They prayed, among others, that they be
declared co-owners of the property subject matter hereof and that private
respondents be ordered to reconvey to them 3/5 thereof as its co-owners, or in
the alternative, to pay its value.

On June 26, 1985, respondents filed their Answer with Compulsory
Counterclaim alleging that they are the absolute owners of the contested land on
the basis of the homestead grant to their predecessor-in-interest, Hermogenes.


On June 25, 1987, the court a quo rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners
ordering the division of the disputed lot in equal portions among the four
children of Fermin or their heirs.

While the case was on trial, complainants therein Guillermo, Lorenzo, Domingo,
Amado and Victoria, all children of Juan Lopez, entered into a compromise
agreement with the respondent Lopezes, heirs of Hermogenes, recognizing the
latters ownership and possession of the property subject of the case. They
confirmed the sale made by their father Juan to Hermogenes. On July 20, 1992,
the court a quo rendered a partial decision approving the compromise
agreement.


ISSUE: Is their co-ownership between the parties rendering partition proper?

RULING: No. At the time Hermogenes applied for a homestead grant over the disputed
property, it was still part of alienable public land. As he applied for it in his own
name, his application inures to his sole benefit. After complying with the
cultivation and residency requirements, he became a grantee of a homestead
patent over it, thereby making him its absolute and exclusive owner.

Prescinding from the lack of co-ownership, petitioners argument that they are
entitled to have the land partition must be rejected. Partition, in general, is the
separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common among those to
whom it may belong. The purpose of partition is to put an end to co-ownership.
It seeks a severance of the individual interests of each co-owner, vesting in each
a sole estate in specific property and giving to each one a right to enjoy his estate
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without supervision or interference from the other. Not being co-owners of the
disputed lot, petitioners cannot demand its partition. They do not have any
interest or share in the property upon which they can base their demand to have
it divided.