C. D. C.

PRIESTLEY
EMPTINESS IN THE SATYASIDDHZ
The Satyasiddhi is a handbook of abhidharma written by Harivarman, who (according
to Paramatha) was a follower of the Bahukutiyas. The only surviving version of it
is Kumlrajivas Chinese translation of 412 A.D.
The Satyasiddhi (,&, pl sm,
* * Cheng Shih Lun)l consists of five
sections. The first 2 deals %th the Triratna3 and then goes on to give a
brief account of Buddhist doctrine in general; it describes the Four
Truths, the Five Groups, the Twelve Spheres, and so on4, and then
discusses certain points of disagreement among the early schools, such
as whether past and future exist, whether there is an intermediate exist-
ence, whether the Four Truths are attained successively or simultaneously,
and so on.5 The remaining sections deal respectively with the Four
Truths: sufferings, its origin7, cessation*, and the way.9
Most of the important explanations of the doctrine of emptiness
(&zyatti) in the Satyasiddhi are in the section on cessation (=
,,I& q,
Mieh-ti Chii). This is the shortest section of the five; it occupies on y
seven pages in the Taishd edition. Nevertheless, it is central in the work,
for according to Harivarman, there is really only one truth, the Truth of
Cessation; seeing cessation, he says, is called seeing the Noble
TruthslO- and by the one truth is the way attained; the term for it is
,
cessation.ll He defends this position in a subsection of the section on
the way called Seeing the One Truth (9) - &$J, Chien I Ti).12 His
reason for giving cessation pre-eminence among the Four Truths is that
the other three are concerned with things which do not ultimately exist;
he says, The contemplation of such truths as that the Five Groups are
suffering, . . . and that the cause of suffering is desire . . . would not exhaust
the influences (@srava), for they are all mundane truths, not ultimate.ls
The Truth of Cessation, on the contrary, is concerned with the ultimate
nature of things; to understand the truth of cessation is thus also truly
to understand the truths of suffering, its origin, and the way.
Harivarman defines the Truth of Cessation as the extinguishing of
Journal of Indian Philosophy 1 (1970) 30-39. Aii Rights Reserved
Copyright 8 1970 by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland
EMPTINESS IN THE SATYASIDDHI 31
three kinds of awareness.14 The three kinds of awareness are awareness
of concepts (prajiiapti), awareness of phenomena (dharma), and
awareness of emptiness.ls The explanation of these three kinds of
awareness and their extinction comprises the entire section on cessation.
The first part, on awareness of concepts, begins by explaining that con-
cepts are names conventionally attached to associations of phenomena;
the concept of a wagon is thus dependent on the association of wheels,
axles, and so forth, and the concept of a man is dependent on the associ-
ation of the Five Groups. 1s These concepts are unreal, for there are no
entities to which they correspond; but they are useful to us in the ordinary
course of living.17 There follows an account of the two truths, conven-
tional and ultimate. Conventional truth is truth in terms of conceptsls;
ultimate truth is reality: phenomena such as matter, and so on, and
Nirvrina.ls
The section continues with a more detailed discussion of the character
of concepts.20 Concepts have no peculiar characteristic (svalakSana)21;
they are not the source of our knowledge22; they can be doubted2s; and
so on. Concepts can be destroyed according to their constituents, and
their constituents, which are also concepts, can be destroyed according
to the real phenomena on which they depend. Real phenomena can only
be destroyed by emptiness.24
There is then a long discussion of the relationship between the concept
and the real phenomena. Four positions are successively examined and
rejected: first, that a pot is identical with the phenomena of matter, and
so on; second, that the pot exists apart from the phenomena; third, that
it cannot be said either that the pot is identical with the phenomena or
that it exists apart from them; and finally, that the pot does not exist.25
The first three of these are dealt with fairly quickly. If the pot were
identical with the phenomena, the phenomena would be called a pot
even when they occurred separately. 2s If it existed apart from the phe-
nomena, it would occur, and could be apprehended apart from them.27
And the relationship is not indeterminate, for the identity or difference
of real phenomena is not indeterminate.28 In reality there are no inde-
terminate phenomena; only the identity or difference of concepts is said
to be indeterminate.29
The refutation of the fourth position is more complex. It begins with
the observation that if the pot does not exist at all, then there are no
32 C. D. C. PRIESTLEY
phenomena such as the rewards of guilt and merit or bondage and
release, and that if nothing conceptual exists, the theory of non-existence
is also non-existent, since there is no one to express it and no one to
listen to it.30 Moreover, the pot evidently exists, since it can produce our
awareness of it; and we distinguish it from other things : how can we do
so if neither it nor they exists?
31 And if nothing exists, there can be no
reasons to explain this position; the opposite position, which is supported
by reasons, will naturally be accepted, and this position is then refuted.
If there existed any reason to prove the position, that very fact would
also refute it.32
The nihilist then replies at great length .a3 He argues that all things are
indeed non-existent, since the senses and their objects cannot be grasped;
for no whole can be grasped.34 And parts can be analysed into atoms,
and when the atoms are destroyed, there is nothing.35 He goes on to
attack the relationship between matter and eye-consciousness, and be-
tween matter and mind-consciousnessas, and then the relationships be-
tween sound and the earsr,
scent and the nose, and the other sensations
and their organsa*, and between things and the mind.39 He concludes
with an attack on causation: if there is a result, either the quality exists
previously in the cause and then is produced, or the quality does not
exist previously in the cause and then is produced; but both alternatives
are false.4a Moreover, the cause must occur either before the result, to-
gether with it, or after it; but in none of these cases can it create the
result.41 Furthermore, the cause and the result must be either the same
or different; but both alternatives are absurd.42 And again, the result
must be created by itself, by something else, by both, or by nothing;
but none of these is possible.4s And finally, the result must be created
either intentionally or unintentionally; but it cannot be created inten-
tionally, since an intention in the past does not exist, nor unintentionally,
since its character will be determined by the motives of the person
creating it in the present.44
To this rebuttal, Harivarman replies that the nihilist has failed to
answer his original objection, that if nothing exists, the argument that
nothing exists cannot exist.45 Moreover, this is a matter that is excluded
from the Buddhas sutras, for it is one of the five inconceivable subjects;
these are subjects which can be understood only by the omniscient.46
Knowledge of emptiness is easy to attain, but the wisdom that can dis-
EMPTINESS IN THE SATYASIDDHI
33
criminate rightly among all phenomena arises only with difficulty.47 The
Buddha taught only as much as might lead to the cessation of suffering;
but what he did not choose to speak of may still exist.48 The nihilist is
like a man born blind who denies that there is black or white.49 But the
wise believe the Buddhas; and the Buddha taught that the Five Groups
exist. Like pots and so on, they exist according to conventional truth.50
The second part, on awareness of phenomena, defines this awareness
as the idea that the Five Groups really exist. It is extinguished by the
knowledge of emptiness, which shows us that the Five Groups are
empty.51 The emptiness of the Five Groups is not merely their lack of
a self or any other permanent entity, for then they could still be observed
and so would not really be empty. 5s It is true that the siitras speak of
them as empty in that sense; but this view of them is impure. Viewed
purely, they are extinct.53 The destruction of the notion of beings is thus
conceptual emptiness; the destruction of phenomena such as matter is
phenomenal emptiness.54 The Five Groups, matter and so on, are thus
really non-existent; but according to conventional truth they exist.55 As
the sutra says, the ultimate truth is emptiness.56 In relation to the notion
of beings, the Five Groups are said to be the ultimate truth, but because
some people then think of the Five Groups as real, they are said to be
ultimately empty.57 All contingent things (sa~sk~tadhar~u) change and
thus are deceitful and illusory; they are unreal.58 Cessation is the ultimate
reality, not the Groups; for it is by perceiving the Truth of Cessation that
the Path is attained.59 All contingent things (sq&iru) cease. If they
really existed, there would be no cutting off, separation, or cessation;
what ceases, then, is non-existent. All contingent things are thus ultimately
non-existent.60
The third part explains that the cessation of the awareness of emptiness
is achieved in two cases : in mindless contemplation, and at the time when
the stream (su@nna) is cut off in entering Nirvana without residue.61
In the former case, awareness of emptiness is extinguished because its
cause has ceased; in the latter, it is extinguished because the karma of
that stream is exhausted.62 Harivarman then concludes the section with
an explanation of why the karma of one who has gained release cannot
come to fruition: his old karma is paid off with a token sum (9 #)
in the present, and no new karma is created.63 Thus, by extinguishing the
three kinds of awareness, he gains everlasting release from all suffering.64
34 C. D. C. PRIESTLEY
Harivarmans doctrine of emptiness can be summarized, then, as fol-
lows. There are two degrees of emptiness, the first resulting from the
destruction of concepts, and the second, from the destruction of phe-
nomena. At each level, emptiness is identified as ultimate truth; the
existence of phenomena such as matter and so on is ultimate truth at the
first level (conceptual emptiness). but conventional truth at the second
(phenomenal emptiness). Emptiness is equivalent to cessation, and thus
to non-existence; to know things as empty is to know them as ceased,
as non-existent. The Truth of Cessation is thus the truth of emptiness.
But although all contingent things are ultimately non-existent, it cannot
be denied that they exist conventionally. Like illusions, they exist to the
extent that we are aware of them.
Certain points in his account of emptiness are ambiguous. In the first
place, he seems generally to understand emptiness as a state in which
nothing exists. The awareness of emptiness is then not simply a philo-
sophical realization of the illusory nature of phenomena, but rather an
awareness of non-existence attained in meditation. Otherwise, he could
hardly say, as he does, that if the Five Groups are observed, they are not
said to be empty.65 Awareness of emptiness, then, seems to be similar to
the meditations described in the Cii~m&Eatasutta.~~
On the other hand, Harivarmans remark that contingent things do
not really exist, because if they did there would be no cessations, sug-
gests that at that point he regards them as empty in the sense that they
change and so are illusory. On that basis, they could be said to be empty
even when observed, and they would then be empty in a philosophical
sense, as really neither existent nor non-existent. Harivarman seems to be
putting forward two theories of emptiness at once: one, according to
which phenomena exist, but can be made empty through meditation, and
another, according to which even existing phenomena are empty because
their existence is not real existence.
There is a corresponding ambiguity in Harivarmans doctrine of the
two truths. His distinction between conceptual emptiness and phenome-
nal emptiness forces him to decide whether to have one emptiness which
is ultimate and another which is merely conventional, or whether to call
both ultimate and then to say that one is less ultimate than the other.
On the face of it, the former alternative seems easier, since he already
has two kinds of emptiness and two kinds of truth to assign to them.
EMPTINESS IN THE SATYASIDDHI 35
But if he chose this alternative, he would have to admit that the Truth
of Cessation is ultimate truth only in part, to the extent that it is con-
cerned with phenomenal emptiness; or he could argue that conceptual
emptiness is not really cessation. In either case, his definition of the
truth of cessation as the extinguishing of three kinds of awareness would
have to be abandoned.
He chooses, then, to distinguish between two degrees of ultimate truth.
He thus keeps cessation intact as ultimate truth, but in so doing weakens
the theory of two truths by admitting an ultimate truth which is, in fact,
only conventionally ultimate. The ambiguity of this conventional ulti-
mate truth, conventional in terms of phenomenal emptiness, but ultimate
in terms of conceptual emptiness, is a further product of what appears
to be Harivarmans confusion concerning the status of the Five Groups.
If the Five Groups really exist, then conceptual emptiness is ultimate
truth; but in that case Nirvana is no more real than SarpsBra. If the Five
Groups do not really exist, San&ha is unreal and the exclusive reality
of Nirvana is preserved; but conceptual emptiness, as distinct from phe-
nomenal emptiness, is only conventionally true. The two degrees of ulti-
mate truth provide Harivarman with a way of ascribing both reality and
unreality to the Five Groups.
This doctrine amounts to an imperfectly formulated theory of three
truths: conventional truth, which is truth based on concepts; conven-
tional ultimate truth, which is based on phenomena; and ultimate truth,
which is the truth of Nirvana. Awkward as this theory no doubt is, it is
by no means unparalleled in Buddhist thought: the three truths corre-
spond rather closely to the Three Natures of the Vijiianavada; and the
ambiguity of the conventional ultimate truth in this theory is more than
matched by the ambiguity of the VijEnavadins dependent nature (para-
tantrasvabhdva). There is no need, of course, to assume any influence of
either philosophy on the other; the two theories are probably similar
attempts to deal with the same problem. They agree that all things except
Nirvana are unreal; nevertheless, some must be more unreal than others :
if the Five Groups were real, release would be impossible; but if they
are entirely unreal, release ought to be unnecessary. The Madhyamikas
deal with this problem by rejecting the opinions that create it: they deny
that there is any difference between Saqrs&a and Nirvanas*, and admit
that neither Nirvana nor release is possiblejs; for if Samsara does not
36 C. D. C. PRIESTLEY
exist, neither does Nirvana. Harivarman and, in a more sophisticated
way, the Vijfilnavadins try to deal with it by making the Five Groups
a kind of half-reality, real by comparison with concepts, but unreal by
comparison with Nirvana.
Harivarmans position admittedly is similar to that of the Madhya-
mikas in certain respects. Like them, he says that concepts are not utterly
non-existent, since they are the basis for conventional truth; and, as noted
above, he implies at one point that the Five Groups are empty even before
they have been extinguished. But at all other points, his conception of
emptiness is fundamentally different from the Madhyamikas. For Nagar-
juna, emptiness is conditioned origination (prutityasamutpcZda).70 Hari-
varman, on the other hand, defines emptiness as cessation.Tl Nagarjuna
accordingly regards existence and non-existence as equally unreal72; but
Harivarman identifies non-existence with ultimate truth. The result is that
Harivarman has to argue that the cessation of the Five Groups is ulti-
mately real, but that the Five Groups that cease are only conventionally
real. Now to the extent that he admits that the Five Groups are indeed
unreal, he undermines the reality of their cessation; but to the extent that
he maintains their reality, he contradicts his original position. In practice,
he seems to waver between these two alternatives, accepting the former
when he wants to maintain the supremacy of Nirvana and the latter when
he wants to emphasize the reality of the cessation by which Nirvana is
attained.
Since Harivarman is what Nagarjuna would call a nihilist (n&fika), it
is rather ironic that many of the arguments that Harivarman ascribes to
the nihilist &, & 5#) are similar to Nagarjunas. It is possible, of
course, that his attack on nihilism is indeed an attack on the Madhyamika,
although if it is, he has seriously misunderstood the Madhyamika posi-
tion. But it is perhaps more likely that Harivarman, like the Madhyamikas,
realized that his own views might be mistaken for nihilism, and so
hastened to attack nihilism in order to establish his own position among
the righteous.
The fact remains, however, that Harivarman is not only attacking
nihilism; he is also, at least by implication, attacking the method by
which the nihilist arrives at his conclusions. Harivarman evidently thinks
that the prasaiga73 of the nihilist leads him to a denial of conventional
truth; and as Harivarman and NBgSrjuna both realize, conventional truth
EMPTINESS IN THE SATYASIDDHI
37
cannot consistently be denied, since the denial itself must have at least
conventional existence. The prusuliga, then, seems to be too wholesale in
its effect: although it certainly can put an end to the depredations of
heterodoxy, it is liable to devour also the domestic concepts of Buddhism
which it was meant to protect. Nagarjuna is of course not unaware of
this danger; his V~grahavydvartani contains a detailed reply to what is
essentially Harivarmans objection. But even if Harivarman had seen and
accepted Nagarjunas defense, he would still have been obliged to reject
the prusufigu. For in trying to maintain simultaneously the reality of
cessation and the reality of non-existence, he involves himself, as we have
seen, in precisely the kind of inconsistencies that the prusmigu is designed
to expose.
It appears, then, that the ambiguity of Harivarmans conception of
emptiness, his half-formulated doctrine of three truths, his uncertainty
concerning the reality of the Five Groups, and even his rejection of the
prusuliga can all be traced, at least in part, to this conviction of his that
both cessation and non-existence are real. A conviction so impossible in
its implications is not, perhaps, what one would expect to find at the
bottom of a philosophical system. But the conviction is there; and that
Harivarman clung to it, even though he could see the difficulties to which
it led, requires explanation.
The explanation seems to be this. The word nirodhu ($&, cessation),
as Harivarman uses it, is ambiguous: like the English word extinction,
it means both becoming non-existent and being non-existent. The
reality of nirodhu, then, is the reality of cessation and non-existence, and
by maintaining the reality of nirodhu without qualification, Harivarman
commits himself to the absurdities noted above. It is unlikely that
Harivarman was more than dimly aware of this ambiguity, if he was
aware of it at all; but it would have been difficult in any case for him to
restrict the meaning of nirodhu to either cessation or non-existence, for
it was well established in the Buddhist tradition that the virtually syn-
onymous word nirv@zu meant both an event and a state. The incon-
sistencies in Harivarmans philosophy are thus not altogether his own
creation; they spring ultimately from a problem that is at the very root
of Buddhism, in the doctrine of Nirvana.
University of Toronto
38 C. D. C. PRIESTLEY
BI?L;IJqRAPHY
Harivarman Cheng Sbik Lun (& * A
B mm Satyasiddhi). tr. Kum8rajiva. T1646.
Ia WI& Pdussin, Louis de, MrilamadhyantakakririkrSs de N&irjuna avec la Prasanna-
padti de Candrakfrti (Bibliotheca Buddhica, Vol. IV). Imperial Academy of Sciences,
St. Petersburg, 1913. (photographically reprinted; no publisher or date).
Majhimanikaya, Vol. III., ed. by Lord Chalmers. Oxford University Press, London
(for the Pali Text Society), 195 1.
NOTES
1 T1646. All references not otherwise marked are to this work.
a pp. 139a-26Oc.
3 pp. 139a-24lb.
4 pp. 247b-253~.
5 pp. 253c-260~.
f) pp. 26Oc-289~.
7 pp. 289c-327a.
8 pp. 327a-334b.
0 pp. 334b-373b.
10 p, 362c, 1. 1.
11 p. 363a, 1.28.
la pp. 362c-364a.
18 p. 363a, 1.21.
l4 p. 327a, 1.8.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid., 1.15.
17 Ibid., 1.24.
18 Ibid., 1.21.
19 Ibid.
20 pp. 327c-328~.
a1 p. 328a, 1.27.
2a p. 328b, 1.15.
23 Ibid., 1.19.
24 p. 328c, 1.15.
a5 Ibid, 1.18.
26 Ibid., 1.27.
$ p. 329b, 1.9.
28 p. 33Oa, 1.18.
28 Ibid., 1.29.
8O p. 33Ob, 1.2.
*l Ibid., 1.9.
aa Ibid., 1.20.
88 pp. 33ob-332a.
a4 p. 33Ob, 1.26.
86 p. 33Oc, 1.9.
86 Ibid., 1.22.
sr pp. 331a-331b.
** p. 331b.
EMPTINESS IN THE SATYASIDDHI 39
39 pp. 331b-331c.
40 p. 331c, 1.3.
41 Ibid., 1.25.
42 p. 332a, I. 1.
43 Ibid., 1.4.
44 Ibid., 1.14.
45 Ibid., 1.25.
46 Ibid., 1.28.
47 p. 332b, 1.6.
48 Ibid., I. 11.
49 Ibid., 1.16.
50 Ibid., 1.19.
51 p. 332c, I. 6.
52 Ibid., 1. 8.
53 Zbid., 1.14.
54 p. 333a, 1.1.
55 Ibid., 1.8.
56 Ibid., 1.10.
57 Ibid., 1.13.
58 p. 333b, 1.1.
59 Ibid., 1.5.
60 p. 333c, 1.14.
61 Ibid., 1.21.
62 Ibid., I. 23.
63 p. 334a, I. 28.
64 Ibid., 1.29.
85 p. 332c, I. 12.
66 Mujjhimaniktiya, 121.
67 p. 333c, 1.14.
68 Nlg&rjuna, Mrilamadhyarnukak&ik~, XXV, 19.
69 Ibid., XVI, 4,5.
70 Ibid., XXIV, 18.
71 p. 335c, I. 2.
72 NSgIgarjuna, Miilamadhyamakaktirikrf, XV, 10.
79 The prusarigu is a mode of argument characteristic of the MSidhyamikas. It is a
reductio ad absurdum, by which an opponents position is shown to contradict itself
according to principles which the opponent himself accepts.