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Law 156 - ELECTORAL PROCESS AND PUBLIC OFFICE | B2015

CASE DIGESTS

Re: Gross Violation of


Civil Service Law on the
Prohibition Against Dual
Employment and Double
Compensation in the
Government Service
Committed by Mr. Eduardo
V. Escala, SC Chief Judicial
Staff Officer, Security
Division, Office of
Administrative Services.
Per Curiam
July 5, 2011
Luisa
SUMMARY: Escala applied for and got accepted to the
position of Chief Judicial Staff Officer, Security Division of
the Office of Administrative Services while he had an
existing employment with PNP. He accepted benefits and
salaries from both of the offices. He was charged with
gross violation of the Civil Service Law on the prohibition
against dual employment and double compensation in the
government service. SC found him guilty of such and
dismissed him from office.
DOCTRINE:
The prohibition against government officials and
employees,
whether
elected
or
appointed,
from
concurrently holding any other office or position in the

government is contained in the following:


Section 7, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution:
o x x x Unless otherwise allowed by law or by
the primary functions of his position, no
appointive official shall hold any other office
or employment in the Government, or any
subdivision,
agency
or
instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
Sections 1 and 2, Rule XVIII of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292:
o Sec. 1.
No appointive official shall hold
any other office or employment in the
Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality
thereof,
including
government-owned
or
controlled
corporations with original charters or their
subsidiaries, unless otherwise allowed by law
or by the primary functions of his position.
o Sec. 2. No elective or appointive public
officer or employee shall receive additional,
double, or indirect compensation, unless
specifically authorized by law, xxxxx.
Section 5, Canon III of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel
o Sec. 5 The full-time position in the Judiciary
of every court personnel shall be the
personnels
primary
employment.
For
purposes
of
this
Code,
primary
employment means the position that
consumes the entire normal working hours
of the court personnel and requires the
personnels
exclusive
attention
in
performing official duties.
Outside employment may be allowed by the
head of office provided it complies with all of
the following requirements:
(a)
The outside employment is not
with a person or entity that practices law

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before the courts or conducts business with


the Judiciary;
(b)
The outside employment can be
performed outside of normal working hours
and
is
not
incompatible
with
the
performance of the court personnels duties
and responsibilities;
(c)
The outside employment does
not require the practice of law; Provided,
however, that court personnel may render
services as professor, lecturer, or resource
person in law schools, review or continuing
education centers or similar institutions;
(d)
The outside employment does
not require or induce the court personnel to
disclose confidential information acquired
while performing duties; and
(e)
The outside employment shall
not be with the legislative or executive
branch of government, unless specifically
authorized by the Supreme Court.
Where a conflict of interest exists, may
reasonably appear to exist, or where the
outside employment reflects adversely on
the integrity of the Judiciary, the court
personnel shall not accept the outside
employment.
FACTS:
On January 2008, Eduardo V. Escala applied for
optional retirement as a member of PNP. At that time, he
was informed that his application would be effection six
months after his date of submission (July 2008).
Pending approval of the said optional retirement,
Escala applied with the Supreme Court for the position of
Chief Judicial Staff Officer, Security Division, Office of

Administrative Services (OAS). In the course of his


interview, he declared that PNP had yet to formally approve
his application for optional retirement.
Due to the urgent need to fill-in the vacant SC
position, he was hired as an employee on July 2008. But
then his application for optional retirement was not
immediately acted upon within the original period set by
PNP. He was officially optionally retired only on September
30, 2009.
During the period where his SC employment
overlapped with PNP, he was receiving salaries and other
benefits both from SC and from PNP.
During the course of his employment, an anonymous
letter reached the OAS reporting the Escalas gross violation
of the Civil Service Law on the prohibition against dual
employment and double compensation in the government
service.
OAS inquiries confirmed that he was currently an active
member of the PNP assigned with the Aviation Security
Group 2nd Police Center for Aviation Security at the Manila
Domestic Airport in Pasay City, with a permanent status and
rank of Police Chief Inspector. They found out that While
employed in the Court and receiving his regular
compensation, he continued to be a bonafide member of the
PNP assigned with the Aviation Security Group with the
same status and rank of Police Chief Inspector until the date
when he optionally retired on September 30, 2009. Also,
they were informed that the Internal Affairs Office (IAO) of
the PNP is likewise carrying out a separate probe and
investigation on respondent for the same alleged gross
violation of the Civil Service Law.

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Escala was preventively suspended by the Court


pending the results of the IAOs investigations and the
separate administrative investigation of the OAS. He was
also asked to explain why he should not be administratively
charged with gross dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service for violation of the Civil Service
Law on the prohibition against dual employment and double
compensation in the government service.
In his letter comment, he admitted that the facts
were true but reasoned that he only accepted the salaries
and benefits from the offices for economic reasons that he
appealed to OAS magnanimity not to charge him with any
violation.
OAS recommended that Escala is guilty of gross
dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service and that he be dismissed from service with
forfeiture of all benefits and with prohibition from
reemployment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of
the government including GOCCs (the OAS recommendation
was fully adopted by the SC in full so I will just use that as
my ratio.)

Escalas indirect claim of good faith is unavailing. His


regular receipt of his salaries from the PNP despite
presumably exclusively working with the Court implies a
deliberate intent to give unwarranted benefit to himself and
undue prejudice to the government especially so by his
regular submission of monthly/daily time record as a
mandatory requirement for inclusion in the payroll. Also,
Escalas actuation even amounts to gross dishonesty. His
receipt of salaries from the PNP despite not rendering any
service thereto is a form of deceit.
That Escala actually rendered services to the PNP, if
any, despite employment in the Court, is inconsequential.
The prohibition against government officials and
employees, whether elected or appointed, from concurrently
holding any other office or position in the government is
contained in the following:

ISSUE: WON Escala is guilty YES


RATIO:
Escalas claim that he applied for optional retirement
as early as January 2008 is merely an afterthought. The PNP
service record that he himself submitted was dated only
August 26, 2007. Likewise, his certificates of clearance are
dated August and October 2008. These show that Escala
only
started
processing
the
optional
retirement
requirements when he was already connected with SC.

Section 7, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution:


o x x x Unless otherwise allowed by law or by
the primary functions of his position, no
appointive official shall hold any other office
or employment in the Government, or any
subdivision,
agency
or
instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
Sections 1 and 2, Rule XVIII of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292:
o Sec. 1.
No appointive official shall hold any
other
office
or
employment
in
the
Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality
thereof,
including
government-owned or controlled corporations
with original charters or their subsidiaries,
unless otherwise allowed by law or by the
primary functions of his position.

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Sec. 2. No elective or appointive public officer


or employee shall receive additional, double,
or indirect compensation, unless specifically
authorized by law, xxxxx.
Section 5, Canon III of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel
o Sec. 5 The full-time position in the Judiciary of
every court personnel shall be the personnels
primary employment. For purposes of this
Code, primary employment means the
position that consumes the entire normal
working hours of the court personnel and
requires the personnels exclusive attention in
performing official duties.
Outside employment may be allowed by the
head of office provided it complies with all of
the following requirements:
(a)
The outside employment is not
with a person or entity that practices law
before the courts or conducts business with
the Judiciary;
(b)
The outside employment can be
performed outside of normal working hours
and is not incompatible with the performance
of the court personnels duties and
responsibilities;
(c)
The outside employment does
not require the practice of law; Provided,
however, that court personnel may render
services as professor, lecturer, or resource
person in law schools, review or continuing
education centers or similar institutions;
(d)
The outside employment does
not require or induce the court personnel to
disclose confidential information acquired
while performing duties; and
o

(e)
The outside employment shall
not be with the legislative or executive
branch of government, unless specifically
authorized by the Supreme Court.
Where a conflict of interest exists, may
reasonably appear to exist, or where the
outside employment reflects adversely on the
integrity of the Judiciary, the court personnel
shall not accept the outside employment.
In the case at bar, there is sufficient evidence to
support a finding that Escala is liable for gross dishonesty
and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
His non-disclosure of the material fact that he was still
employed as an active member of the PNP and receiving his
monthly salaries therein during the period that he is already
a Court employee is considered substantial proof that he
tried to cheat/defraud both the PNP and the Court. This is an
affront to the dignity of the Court. Indeed, Escala has
transgressed the Constitution and the Civil Service law on
the prohibition on dual employment and double
compensation in the government service.
All court personnel ought to live up to the strictest
standards of honesty and integrity, considering that their
positions primarily involve service to the public. For
knowingly and willfully transgressing the prohibition on dual
employment and double compensation, as well as the
Courts rules for its personnel on conflict of interest, Escala
violated the trust and confidence reposed on him by the
Court.
HELD: guilty of gross dishonesty and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service; dismissal from
the service and forfeiture of all benefits with prejudice to re-

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employment in any government agency,


government-owned and controlled corporations.

including

Duterte v. Sandiganbayan
April 27, 1998
Kapunan, J.
Oswald P. Imbat
SUMMARY: Duterte, as Mayor of Davao, and de Guzman,
as City Administrator, who participated in the execution of
a contract between Davao City and Systems Plus, Inc. and
Goldstar for the computerization of the city government,
which contract was later rescinded, were charged with
violation of, among others, RA 3019 before the
Ombudsman. The investigating prosecutor required them
to file a comment, but did not furnish them with a copy of
the affidavits of the Special Audit Team, whose report on
the transaction, was the basis of the complaint. Duterte
and de Guzman filed their comment. After 4 years, they
received
a
memorandum
from
the
Ombudsman
recommending the filing of an information against them for
violation of Section 3(g), RA 3019. Their MR before the
Ombudsman was denied, as well as their MTQ before the
Sandiganbayan. The Supreme Court, however, ordered the
dismissal of the case because (1) the preliminary
investigation was improperly conducted, (2) there was
inordinate delay, and (3) there was no contract to speak of
because it was rescinded.
DOCTRINE: To establish probable cause against the
offender for violation of Section 3(g), RA 3019, the
following elements must be present: (1) the offender is a
public officer; (2) he entered into a contract or transaction
in behalf of the government; (3) the contract or transaction

is grossly and
government.

manifestly

disadvantageous

to

the

FACTS:
1. In 1990, the Davao City Government launched its Local
Automation Project.
a. A Computerization Program Committee (Committee)
was thus formed with Benjamin de Guzman, City
Administrator, as Chairman, and Mariano Kintanar,
COA Resident Auditor, and Jorge Silvosa, Acting City
Treasurer, as among the members.
b. The Committee was tasked to conduct a thorough
study of computers in the market for the purposes of
the project.
c. The
Committee
recommended
acquisition
of
computers manufactured by Goldstar Information and
Communications, Ltd., South Korea, and exclusively
distributed in the Philippines by Systems Plus, Inc. (SPI)
for a total contract cost of P11.6M.
2. On November 5, 1990, the Davao City Sangguniang
Panlungsod unanimously passed Resolution 1402 and
Ordinance 173 approving the contract with SPI. It also
authorized Mayor Rodrigo Duterte to sign the contract in
behalf of the City.
a. The Sanggunian also allocated P3M for the project in
the General Supplemental Budget No. 07 for CY 1990.
b. The contract was thus signed. De Guzman released to
SPI a check for P1.7M as downpayment.
3. In February 1991, a complaint was filed before the RTC of
Davao City to declare as nullity the contract as well as
the resolutions, ordinances related thereto.
4. On February 22, 1991, Goldstar proposed to Duterte the
cancellation of the contract.
a. The Sanggunian issued a resolution and an ordinance
accepting the offer to cancel the contract, provided
that the downpayment is returned within a month.
b. On May 6, 1991, Duterte, in behalf of Davao City, and
SPI rescinded the contract and the downpayment was
refunded.

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5. In the meantime, a Special Audit Team of the COA was


tasked to conduct an audit of the project.
a. On May 31, 1991, the team, in its Special Audit Report
(SAR), recommended rescission of the subject
contract. The SAR was sent to Duterte.
b. The team found that:
i. The award of the contract was done through
negotiated contract, rather than a competitive
public bidding in violation of Sections 2 and 8, PD
526.
ii. There was no sufficient appropriation for the
contract in violation of Section 85, PD 1445.
iii. The advance payment of P1.7M covered 15% of the
contract cost, in violation of Section 45, PD 477 and
Section 88, PD 1445.
iv. The cost of computers differed from the teams
canvass by as much as 1200% or a total of P1.8M.
v. The City had no Information System Plan prior to the
award, in direct violation of Malacaang Memo.
Order 287 and NCC Memo. Circular 89-1, resulting in
undue disadvantage to the City Government.
6. Davao City, to pursue its computerization plan, sought
the assistance of the National Computer Center (NCC),
which recommended the acquisition of Philips computers
for P15.8M.
7. On August 1, 1991, the Anti-Graft League Davao City
Chapter filed a complaint with the Ombudsman
Mindanao, against Duterte, De Guzman, Kintanar, Silvosa,
Davao City, and SPI (Duterte, et al.) for violation of RA
3019, PD 1445, COA circulars, RPC, and other laws.
a. Graft Investigation Officer Pepito Manriquez sent a
letter to COA Chairman Eufemio Domingo requesting
the Special Audit Team to submit their joint affidavit to
substantiate the complaint.
b. [On October 14, 1991, the civil case for nullification
before the RTC of Davao City was dismissed for being
moot.]
c. Manriquez also ordered Duterte, et al., to submit their
comment on the allegations of the complaint in the

civil case before the RTC of Davao City [which was


already dismissed] and the SAR.
d. On December 4, 1991, the Ombudsman received a
copy of the affidavits of the Special Audit Team, but
failed to furnish Duterte, et al., copies thereof.
e. On February 18, 1992, Duterte and de Guzman
adopted the comments of Silvosa and Kintanar.
f. Four years later, Duterte, et al., received a copy of a
Memorandum addressed to Ombudsman Aniano
Desierto recommending the filing of charges for
violation of Section 3(g), RA 3019, for having entered
into a contract manifestly and grossly disadvantageous
to the government [the contract being overpriced by
1200%], the elements of profit, unwarranted benefits
or loss to the government being immaterial.
g. The
information
was
thus
filed
before
the
Sandiganbayan.
8. Duterte and de Guzman filed an MR arguing that (1) they
were deprived of their right to preliminary investigation
(PI), (2) Duterte acted in good faith and was clothed with
authority, and (3) the contract was rescinded.
a. The Ombudsman denied their MR.
b. They filed a MTQ before the Sandiganbayan, which was
denied, on the ground that whatever the accused had
to say in their behalf were already stated in their MR
before the Ombudsman.
c. The Sandiganbayan also denied their MR.
ISSUE/RULING:
Should the criminal case be dismissed? Yes.
RATIO:
1. The PI was not conducted in the manner laid down in
Administrative Order 07 (AO 07 or the Rules of Procedure
of the Office of the Ombudsman).
a. The order of Manriquez directing Duterte, et al., to
submit their comment on the allegations of the civil
case for the nullification of the contract, which has
been dismissed, was not accompanied by a single
affidavit of the persons charging them.

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b. There was, in fact, no indication in the order that a PI


was being conducted.
c. If Manriquez intended merely to adopt the allegations
in the civil case or the SAR as his basis for prosecution,
then the procedure was anomalous and highly
irregular, in violation of due process.
2. Sections (2) and (4), Rule II, AO 07 are relevant. 1
3. There is a difference between Section 2(b) and Section
4(b).
a. Section 2(b) is not a part of a PI. Under said provision,
the filing of comment is filed because the investigator
needs more facts and information for the evaluation of
the merits of the complaint, after which he may
recommend any action under Section 2, including PI.
b. Section 4, which refers to PI, takes on an adversarial
quality. Its purpose is to secure the innocent against
hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution, and to
protect him from an open and public accusation of a
crime, from the trouble, expenses and anxiety of public
trial. While it is a statutory right, PI is a substantive

4.

5.

Section 2. Evaluation. Upon evaluating the complaint, the investigating


officer shall recommend whether or not it may be: (a) dismissed outright for
want of palpable merit; (b) referred to respondent for comment; (c)
endorsed to the proper government office or agency which has jurisdiction
over the case; (d) forwarded to the appropriate office or official for factfinding investigation; (e) referred for administrative adjudication; or (f)
subjected to a PI. xxx
Section 4. Procedure. The PI of cases xxx shall be conducted in the
manner prescribed in Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, subject to
the following provisions: (a) If the complaint is not under oath or is based
only on official reports, the investigating officer shall require the
complainant or supporting witnesses to execute affidavits to substantiate
the complaints. (b) After such affidavits have been secured, the
investigating officer shall issue an order, attaching thereto a copy of the
affidavits and other supporting documents, directing the respondent to
submit, within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, his counter-affidavits and
controverting evidence with proof of service thereof on the complainant.
The complainant may file reply affidavits within ten (10) days after service
of the counter-affidavits. (c) If the respondent does not file a counteraffidavit, the investigating officer may consider the comment filed by him, if
any, as his answer to the complaint. In any event, the respondent shall
have access to the evidence on record. xxx

6.

7.

right, denial of which deprives a person of the full


measure of due process rights.
c. It must be noted also that what is required to be filed
in a PI is a counter-affidavit, not a comment. It is only
when there is failure to file such counter-affidavit that
the comment is considered as the answer (Section
4(c)).
In this case, all that Duterte, et al., were required to do
was to file a comment. Manriquez, the investigating
officer, considered such filing as substantial compliance
with the requirements of PI.
Also, he requested the Special Audit Team to file their
affidavits, then required Duterte, et al., to file a comment
before such affidavits were submitted. Even after the
affidavits were submitted, however, Duterte, et al., were
not furnished with the copies of the affidavits of the
Special Audit Team.
a. The argument of the Ombudsman, that this failure is
immaterial since Duterte, et al., were well aware of the
existence of the civil case and the SAR, is flawed.
b. The civil case and the SAR are not equivalent to the
complaint-affidavits. The civil case was already
rendered moot and academic. The SAR merely
recommended rescission of the contract, which was
done even before the release of the SAR.
In Olivas v. Ombudsman, it was held that it is mandatory
for the complainant to submit his affidavit and those of
his witnesses before the respondent can be compelled to
submit his counter-affidavits and other supporting
documents.
There was also undue and unreasonable delay. This
inordinate delay (4 years) in the conduct of the supposed
PI infringed upon their constitutionally guaranteed right
to a speedy disposition of their case.
a. In Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan, an undue delay of close to
3 years in the termination of the PI of failure to file
SAL, bribery, and giving of unwarranted benefits to
relatives warranted the dismissal of the case, so much
so that undue delay cannot be corrected, compared to
absence of PI.

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b. In Angchangco, Jr. vs. Ombudsman, the delay of more


than 6 years was considered a transgression of due
process and the right to speedy disposition of cases.
c. The Ombudsman argument that Tatad does not apply
since this case is not politically motivated. Also,
Angchangco does not apply because, unlike in that
case, Duterte, et al., did not file motions for early
resolution.
d. However, the constitutional right to speedy disposition
of cases does not come into play only when political
considerations are involved. Also, Duterte, et al., could
not have urged the speedy resolution of their case
because they were completely unaware that the
investigation against them was still on-going.
e. In fact, they were merely asked to comment, and not
file counter-affidavits as in a PI.
8. The Ombudsman failed to present any plausible, special
or even novel reason which could justify the 4-year delay.
a. On the contrary, the case does not involve complicated
factual and legal issues.
b. The delay cannot be imputed to the 3-month extension
granted to Duterte, et al., to file a comment, since they
were not under obligation to make any move as there
was no PI yet.
9. In any case, there is no legal or factual basis to charge
Duterte and de Guzman for violation of Section 3(g), RA
3019, which has the following elements: (a) the offender
is a public officer; (b) he entered into a contract or
transaction in behalf of the government; (c) the contract
or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous
to the government. The second element is absent, since
the contract was rescinded.
DISPOSITIVE:
Criminal case was ordered dismissed.

ASILO vs PEOPLE
March 9, 2011
Justice Perez
Mich

SUMMARY: Visitacions store was demolished outright by


Asilo and Angeles pursuant to the mayors order based on
the 2 resolutions of the Sangguniang Bayan. However, the
first resolution only authorized the mayor to file an
ejectment case with damages if the demolition was
refused. The second resolution authorized the mayor to
demolish the store through legal means. A criminal
complaint was filed by the SPs. Bombasi (Visitacion and her
husband) against the mayor, Anegels and Asilo. The Court
found them guilty of violation of RA 3019. The market stall
cannot be considered as a nuisance per se because as
found out by the Court, the buildings had not been affected
by the 1986 fire. The 2 resolutions did not authorize the
mayor to order the demolition of the store. They were also
held civilly liable under Art 32 of the Civil Code for not
according due process to the Sps, Bombasi before the
demolition.
DOCTRINE:
The elements of the offense under Sec 3(e) of RA 3019are
as follows: (1) that the accused are public officers or
private persons charged in conspiracy with them; (2) that
said public officers commit the prohibited acts during the
performance of their official duties or in relation to their
public positions; (3) that they caused undue injury to any
party, whether the Government or a private party; (4) OR

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that such injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits,


advantage or preference to the other party; and (5) that
the public officers have acted with manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
The civil action based therein is an independent one, thus,
will stand despite the death of the accused during the
pendency of the case. The civil liability arises out of law
(provisions on Human Relations), not out of delict.
Art. 32(6) states:Any public officer or employee, or any
private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs,
defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any
of the following rights and liberties of another person shall
be liable to the latter for damages:
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due
process of law;

FACTS:
1. Respondent Visitacions late mother (Vda. De Coronado)
and the Municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna entered into a
lease contract whereby Visitacions late mother was
allowed the use of the lot and a store for a period of 20
years(1978-1998) . The contract provided Vda. De
Coronado can build a firewall as high as the store and
that, in case if modification of the public market, she or
her heirs will be given preferential rights.
2. When her mother died, Visitacion took over the store.
She secured yearly Mayors permits from then until
present.
3. A fire razed the public market of Nagcarlan in 1986.
Upon Visitacions request for inspection, City Engineer

Gorospe found that the store was still intact. However,


this finding was contested by the Municipality.
4. Visitacions store continued to operate until 1993
when she received a letter from Mayor Comendador
directing her to demolish her store. Attached to the
letter were copies of Sangguniang Bayan Resolution
and a Memorandum issued by the Asst. Provincial
Prosecutor. The Resolution authorized the mayor to
file an ejectment case with damages if the occupant
refused to vacate the premises. (This was for the
purpose of constructing a new municipal marker
building.)
5. Subsequently, the Asst. Provincial Prosecutor sent a letter
to Visitacion ordering her to vacate the portion of the
public market she was occupying within 15 days from her
receipt of the letter; else, a court action will be filed
against her.
6. A month after, the Sangguniang Bayan of Nagcarlan,
Laguna
issued
a
Resolution
authorizing
Mayor
Comendador to demolish the store being occupied by
Visitacion using legal means.
7. Municipal Administrator Paulino S. Asilo, Jr. (Asilo) also
sent a letter to Visitacion informing her of the impending
demolition of her store the next day.
8. The next day, Mayor Comendador relying on the strength
of the Sangguniang Bayan Resolutions authorized the
demolition of the store by Asilo and Angeles. The store
was demolished.
9. Visitacion and her husband (Sps. Bombasi) filed with the
RTC an action for damages with preliminary injunction
against the Municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna, Mayor
Demetrio T. Comendador, Paulino S. Asilo, Jr., and Alberto
S. Angeles. The complaint was amended to include the
Spouses Benita and Isagani Coronado and Spouses Alida
and Teddy Coroza as formal defendants because they
were then the occupants of the contested area
10.
The Sps. Bombasi also filed a criminal complaint
against Mayor COmendador, Asilo and Angeles for
violation of Sec of Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019

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otherwise known as the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices


Act" before the Office of the Ombudsman.
11.
The Sandiganbayan consolidated the 2 cases
pursuant to PD 1606. During the pendency of the case,
Angeles dies so the case against him was dismissed.
Mayor Comendador also died afterwards.
12.
The Sandiganbayan found Comendador and Asilo
guilty of violation of RA 3019. In the civil case, the
defendants Municipality, Comendador and Asilo were
ordered to pay actual and moral damages.
ISSUES:
1.
WON there was a violation of Sec 3(e) of RA 3019.YES
2.
WON the death of the accused also extinguished
their criminal liabilities.-YES but civil liability remains
3.
WON the award for actual damages should be
affirmed.-NO
CONTENTIONS OF ASILO:
1. To sustain conviction under Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act No.
3019, the public officer must have acted with manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross negligence.
2. He also contended that he and his co-accused acted in
good faith in the demolition of the market and, thereby, no
liability was incurred.
CONTENTIONS OF VICTORIA:
1. The death of Mayor Comendador prior to the
promulgation of the decision extinguished NOT ONLY Mayor
Comendadors criminal liability but also his civil liability.
2. She also asserted good faith on the part of the accused
public officials when they performed the demolition of the
market stall.
3. Assuming arguendo that there was indeed liability on the
part of the accused public officials, the actual amount of

damages being claimed by the Spouses Bombasi has no


basis and was not duly substantiated.
RATIO:
ISSUE 1:
1. The Sangguniang Bayan resolutions are not enough to
justify demolition. It only authorized Mayor Comendador to
file an unlawful detainer case in case of resistance to obey
the order or to demolish the building using legal means. The
present Local Government Code does not expressly provide
for the abatement of nuisance.
2. The elements of the offense are as follows: (1) that the
accused are public officers or private persons charged in
conspiracy with them; (2) that said public officers commit
the prohibited acts during the performance of their official
duties or in relation to their public positions; (3) that they
caused undue injury to any party, whether the Government
or a private party; (4) OR that such injury is caused by
giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to the
other party; and (5) that the public officers have acted with
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence.
3. The issue hinged on the existence of elements 3 and 5. As
to Element 3, in jurisprudence, "undue injury" is consistently
interpreted as "actual." Undue has been defined as "more
than necessary, not proper, or illegal;" and injury as "any
wrong or damage done to another, either in his person,
rights, reputation or property, that is, the invasion of any
legally protected interest of another.

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4. In the case at bar, demolition of the store was carried out


without a court order, and notwithstanding a restraining
order which the plaintiff was able to obtain. The demolition
was done in the exercise of official duties which apparently
was attended by evident bad faith, manifest partiality or
gross inexcusable negligence as there is nothing in the 2
resolutions which gave the accused the authority to
demolish plaintiffs store.

ISSUE 2: WON the death of the accused also extinguished


their criminal liabilities.-YES but civil liability remains

5. For Element 5, the accused public officials committed bad


faith in performing the demolition.

2. The civil action based therein is an independent one,


thus, will stand despite the death of the accused during the
pendency of the case. The civil liability arises out of law
(provisions on Human Relations), not out of delict.
Art. 32(6) states:

a. First, there can be no merit in the contention that the


structure is a public nuisance. The abatement of a nuisance
without judicial proceedings is possible if it is nuisance per
se. Nuisance per se is that which is nuisance at all times and
under any circumstance, regardless of location and
surroundings. In this case, the market stall cannot be
considered as a nuisance per se because as found out by
the Court, the buildings had not been affected by the 1986
fire. This finding was certified to by Supervising Civil
Engineer of the Laguna District Engineer Office.
b. Second, the Sangguniang Bayan resolutions are not
enough to justify demolition. Unlike BP 337, the present
Local Government Code does not expressly provide for the
abatement of nuisance. And even assuming that the power
to abate nuisance is provided for by the present code, the
accused public officials were still devoid of any power to
demolish the store. The resolution only authorized Mayor
Comendador to file an unlawful detainer case in case of
resistance to obey the order or to demolish the building
using legal means.
c. Municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna was placed in estoppel
after it granted yearly business permits to Visitacion.

1. The civil liability of Mayor Comendador survived his


death. Angeles liability would have survived if the
resolution of the Sandiganbayan that his death extinguished
the civil liability was questioned and not allowed to lapse
into finality.

Any public officer or employee, or any private


individual, who
directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats,
violates or in any
manner impedes or impairs any of the
following rights and liberties of another person shall be
liable to the latter for
damages:
(6) The right against deprivation of property without
due
process of law;
3. The accused public officials should have accorded the
spouses the due process of law guaranteed by the
Constitution and New Civil Code. The Sangguniang Bayan
Resolutions does not justify demolition of the store without
court order.
4. Even if there is already a writ of execution, there must
still be a need for a special order for the purpose of
demolition issued by the court before the officer in charge
can destroy, demolish or remove improvements over the
contested property. Before the removal of an improvement
must take place, there must be a special order, hearing and
reasonable notice to remove.
Section 10(d), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides:

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(d) Removal of improvements on property subject of


execution. When the property subject of execution
contains improvements constructed or planted by
the judgment obligor or his agent, the officer shall
not destroy, demolish or remove said improvements
except upon special order of the court, issued upon
motion of the judgment obligee after due hearing
and after the former has failed to remove the same
within a reasonable time fixed by the court.

ISSUE 3: WON the award for actual damages should be


affirmed.-NO
- To seek recovery of actual damages, it is necessary to
prove the actual amount of loss with a reasonable degree of
certainty, premised upon competent proof and on the best
evidence obtainable. In this case, the Court finds that the
only evidence presented to prove the actual damages
incurred was the itemized list of damaged and lost items56
prepared by an engineer commissioned by the Spouses
Bombasi to estimate the costs. Instead, the Court awarded
temperate damages.
DISPOSITIVE: Appeal is denied. Paulino S. Asilo, Jr. and
Demetrio T. Comendador are guilty of violating Section 3(e)
of RA3019. In view of the death of Demetrio T. Comendador
pending trial, his criminal liability is extinguished; but his
civil liability survives. The Municipality of Nagcarlan, Paulino
Asilo and Demetrio T. Comendador, as substituted by
Victoria Bueta Vda. De Comendador, are hereby declared
solidarily liable to the Spouses Bombasi for temperate
damages and moral damages.

JAVELLANA vs. DILG


August 10, 1992
Grio-Aquino, J.
From LocGov Digest by Oswald P. Imbat (Mica)

SUMMARY: An administrative case was filed against


Javellana, Bago City Sanggunian member, for representing
Javiero and Catapang in an illegal dismissal case against
City Engineer Divinagracia, based on circulars of the DLG
requiring prior authorization for private employment or
practice of profession and prohibiting practice of law
adverse to the interest of the LGU. Javellana moved to
dismiss on the grounds that the circulars are
unconstitutional for (1) impairing the authority of the
Supreme Court to regulate the practice of law and (2)
being an invalid class legislation against officials who are
lawyers and doctors. The DLG dismissed. The Supreme
Court affirmed the dismissal, ruling that the circulars, along
with Section 90, LGC (1) validly regulate the practice of
profession allowed by law to avoid conflict of interest, and
(2) provides particular limitations to the practice of law
since
it
is
likely
to
affect
public
service.
DOCTRINE: Section 90, LGC. Practice of Profession. (a)
All governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited
from practicing their profession or engaging in any
occupation other than the exercise of their functions as
local
chief
executives.
(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions,
engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except
during session hours: Provided, That sanggunian members
who
are
members
of
the
Bar
shall
not:
(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case

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wherein a local government unit or any office, agency, or


instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;
(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an
officer or employee of the national or local government is
accused of an offense committed in relation to his office;
(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative
proceedings involving the local government unit of which
he
is
an
official;
and
(4) Use property and personnel of the Government except
when the sanggunian member concerned is defending the
interest
of
the
Government.
(c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even
during official hours of work only on occasions of
emergency: Provided, That the officials concerned do not
derive
monetary
compensation
therefrom.
[The provision does not conflict with the authority of the
Supreme Court to regulate the practice of law.]

FACTS:
On October 5, 1989, City Engineer Ernesto Divinagracia filed
an administrative case, before the Department of Local
Government (DLG), against Atty. Erwin Javellana, city
councilor, Bago City, Negros Occidental, alleging that
Javellana, while an incumbent councilor, has continuously
engaged in the practice of law without securing authority
from the Regional Director, DLG, thereby violating by DLG
Memo. Circs. 80-38 and 74-58, and Section 7(b)(2), RA 7613
(Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees). Specifically, Javellana was counsel for
Antonio Javiero and Rolando Catapang, who filed a case
against Divinagracia for illegal dismissal, putting him in
public ridicule. Javellana also appeared in other civil and
criminal cases in the city without authorization.

DLG Memo. Circ. 80-38 provides that, since Sanggunian


members (provincial, city, or municipal) are not required to
report daily as other employees, they may be allowed to
practice their professions provided that in so doing an
authority xxx first be secured from the Regional Directors
pursuant to Memo. Circ. 74-58. The practice should also be
favorably recommended by the Sanggunian concerned and
the governor or mayor.
Pending resolution of the case, Javellana requested the DLG
for a permit to continue his practice of law. Secretary Luis
Santos replied that the DLG has no objection thereto,
provided that it will not conflict with his official functions.
Then on September 21, 1991, Secretary Santos issued
Memo. Circ. 90-81, also setting forth guidelines for practice
of profession of local elective officials, which, inter alia,
provides that officials whose duties require their entire time
are absolutely prohibited from engaging in private
employment or practice of profession, and, if otherwise
allowed, authority should be granted by the Secretary of
Local Government. Also, the employment or practice should
not impair the efficiency of the official, should not involve
government funds or property, and should give rise to a
conflict of interest between the office and the employment
or practice.
Javellana filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that DLG
Memo. Circs. 80-38 and 90-81 are unconstitutional, because
the Supreme Court has the sole and exclusive authority to
regulate the practice of law. This, as well as his MR, were
denied.
Then the LGC was signed into law. Section 90 provides,
among others, that, while Sanggunian members may
practice their professions except during session hours,

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members of the bar shall not (1) appear as counsel where


the LGU or any government agency is the adverse party,
and (2) collect any appearance fee in administrative
proceedings involving the LGU.
When the administrative case was set again for hearing,
Javellana filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme
Court to nullify the circulars and Section 90, LGC, on the
grounds that (1) they impair the power of the Supreme
Court to regulate the practice of law, and (2) they constitute
class legislation, being discriminatory against Sanggunian
members who are lawyers and doctors, but not against
other professions.
ISSUE/RULING:
Should the circulars and Section 90 be nullified? No. They
validly regulate the practice of profession of public officials.
RATIO:
As a matter of policy, great respect is accorded to the
decisions of administrative authorities for their expertise
and by virtue of the doctrine of separation of powers. In this
case, there is no grave abuse of discretion in the denying
the
motion
to
dismiss
the
administrative
case:
(1) The complaint for illegal dismissal, where Javellana is the
counsel, is in effect a complaint against Bago City, the real
employer, and where Javellana is a Sanggunian member.
Thus, judgment against Divinagracia is a judgment against
Bago City. It clearly violates the circulars, prohibiting
practice adverse to the interest of the government.
(2) The argument that the circulars and Section 90, LGC
trenches upon the authority of the Supreme Court under
Section 5, Article VIII, Constitution (to prescribe rules on the
practice of law) is completely off tangent. They simply
prescribe
rules
to
avoid
conflict
of
interest.

(3) Section 90 does not discriminate against lawyers and


doctors. It applies to all officials engaged in any occupation.
If there are prohibitions which particularly apply to lawyers,
it is because their professions is more likely to affect public
service.
DISPOSITIVE: Circulars and Section 90 valid.

Tuzon v. CA
21 August 1992
Justice Cruz
Lindain
SUMMARY: The Municipal Treasurer and the Mayor of
Camalaniugan, Cagayan are questioning the decision of the CA
holding them liable in damages to Jurado for refusing to issue him
a mayors permit and license to operate his palay-threshing
business. To help finance the completion of the construction of the

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sports and nutrition center building, the Sangguniang Bayan
adopted Resolution No. 9. Said Resolution solicits a donation
equivalent to 1% of all the palay threshed, from the thresher
operators. Jurado filed an application for his palay threshing
business by paying the license fee to the municipal treasurers
office. The said office required Jurado to secure the mayors permit
first. For failing to comply with Resolution No. 9, a mayors permit
was not issued. Jurado filed a petition for mandamus to compel the
issuance of the mayors permit. Later on, he filed a petition for
declaratory relief to determine the validity of the said Resolution.
The trial court and CA upheld the validity of the Resolution.
However, in the CA, the municipal treasurer and the mayor were
held liable to Jurado for acting with bad faith and malice in refusing
to issue the mayors permit. The SC held that the said public
officers were NOT liable. The SC said that the public officers acted
within the scope of their authority and in consonance with their
honest interpretation of the Resolution in question. As executive
officials of the municipality, they had the duty to enforce it as long
as it had not been repealed by the Sangguniang Bayan or annulled
by the courts.
DOCTRINE: As a rule, a public officer, whether judicial, quasijudicial or executive, is not personally liable to one injured in

consequence of an act performed within the scope of his official


authority, and in line of his official duty. An erroneous interpretation
of an ordinance does not constitute nor does it amount to bad
faith, that would entitle an aggrieved party to an award for
damages. (Phil. Match Co. v. City of Cebu)
FACTS:
To help finance the continuation of the construction of the
Sports and Nutrition Center Building, the Sangguniang Bayan of
Camalaniugan, Cagayan adopted a resolution (Resolution No. 9).
Said resolution seeks to solicit 1% donation (equivalent to 1% of all
the palay threshed) from the thresher operators who will apply for
a permit to thresh.
To implement the said Resolution, Lope Mapagu, the
municipal treasurer, prepared a document 2 for signature of all
thresher/ owner, operators applying for mayors permit.
The private respondent in this case, Saturnino Jurado (a
thresher operator) paid to the treasurers office the license fee of P
285 for thresher operators. The municipal treasurer refused to
accept the payment and required him to first secure a mayors
permit. Before a mayors permit can be issued, Jurado was
informed that he must first comply with the Resolution and sign the
agreement. For refusing the sign the agreement, no mayors
permit was issued.
Jurado filed a mandamus petition with actual and moral
damages to compel the issuance of the mayors permit and
license. Subsequently, he filed a petition for declaratory judgment
2

AGREEMENT

That I, _____________ thresher-owner-operator hereby voluntarily agree to


donate to the municipality of Camalaniugan, Cagayan, one percent (1%) of
all palay threshed by me within the jurisdiction of Camalaniugan, Cagayan,
to help finance the completion of the construction of the sports and
nutrition center building of Camalaniugan per Resolution No. 9 dated March
14, 1977 of the Sanggunian Bayan;
That I also agree to report weekly the total number of palay threshed by me
to the municipal treasurer and turn over the corresponding 1% share of the
municipality for the said project mentioned above.
Signed this day of __________, 1977.

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against the Resolution (and the implementing agreement) for being
illegal either as a donation or as a tax measure. The defendants
were the municipal treasurer, the mayor, and the members of the
Sangguniang Bayan.
Trial court Resolution was valid. No damages.
Court of Appeals Resolution was valid. The municipal
treasurer and mayor acted maliciously and in bad faith when they
denied Jurados application. These public officers were liable for P
20 000 as actual damages, P 5 000 as moral damages, and P 3 000
as attorneys fees.
ISSUE:
1. Are the municipal treasurer and the mayor guilty of bad faith
and malice when they denied Jurados application for the mayors
permit and license? NO.
2. Is the Resolution valid? Not raised in the petition before the
Supreme Court. (But SC still discussed this!)
RATIO:
Issue 1
Jurado anchors his claim for damages on Article 27 3 of the
Civil Code. One of the purposes of this article is to end the bribery
system, where public officials delay or refuse the performance of
their duties until they get some kind of a pabagsak. According to
Phil. Match Co. Ltd. V. City of Cebu, Article 27 presupposes that the
refusal or omission of a public official to perform his official duty is
attributable to malice or inexcusable negligence. The public officer
is punishable under Article 27 for whatever loss or damage the
complainant has sustained.
In the case at bar, it was not alleged that Mayor Tuzons
refusal to act on Jurados application was an attempt to compel
him to resort to bribery to obtain the mayors permit. It cannot be
said that the mayor and the municipal treasurer were motivated by
3

Art. 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public
servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his
official duty may file an action for damages and other relief against the
latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action that may
be taken.

personal spite or were grossly negligent in refusing to issue the


permit and license.
Aside from the absence of allegations of bad faith or gross
negligence, no evidence was proffered to show that the said public
officers singled out Jurado for persecution. Neither does it appear
the said public officers gained personally from refusing to issue the
permit. On the contrary, the resolution was uniformly applied to all
the threshers in the municipality.
The public officers acted within the scope of their authority
and in consonance with their honest interpretation of the
Resolution. They presumed the validity of the Resolution, in the
absence of a judicial decision invalidating it. As executive official,
they had the duty to enforce it as long as it had not been repealed
by the Sangguniang Bayan or annulled by the courts. As a rule, a
public officers, whether judicial, quasi-judicial or executive, is not
personally liable to one injured in consequence of an act performed
within the scope of his official authority, and in line of his official
duty. An erroneous interpretation of an ordinance does not
constitute nor does it amount to bad faith that would entitle an
aggrieved party to an award for damages. (Phil. Match Co. v. City
of Cebu)
What Jurado could have done was to sign the agreement
under protest and later challenged it in court to relieve him of the
obligation to donate.
Issue 2
The CA did not explain why the challenged Resolution is
valid. It did not discuss the nature of the Resolution. While it
appears from the wording of the Resolution that the municipal
government merely intends to solicit the 1% contribution from
the threshers, the implementing agreement seems to make the
donation obligatory and a condition precedent to the issuance of
mayors permit. This goes against the concept of donation, which is
an act of liberality.
If the Resolution is to be considered a tax ordinance, it
must be shown that it was enacted in accordance with the
requirements of the Local Tax Code. There must be a public sharing
on the measure and its subsequent approval by the Secretary of
Finance, in addition to the publication of the ordinance.

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RULING: ACCORDINGLY, the appealed decision is reversed insofar
as it holds the petitioners liable in damages and attorneys fees to
the private Respondent. No costs.

Wylie v. Rarang
May 28, 1992
Gutierrez, Jr., J.
Jadd Pinaka-steads sa Inter-C 2014 Dealino
I have no idea what topic this case falls under.

SUMMARY: Wylie is the Assistant Administrative Officer of


the US Naval Base in Subic. One installment of a feature in
the publication he supervises contained a statement to the
effect that an Auring was a disgrace to her division and
the Office of the Provost Marshal and would publicly
consume items confiscated from base personnel. Aurora
Rarang was the only one known as Auring in the Office of
the Provost Marshal. She sued Wylie and Williams (the
officers), who was the captain and commanding officer of
the base, for damages, at the Zambales CFI. The officers
moved to dismiss, on three grounds: (1) lack of jurisdiction
over the parties and subject-matter since (2) they were
acting in the performance of their official functions as US
Navy Officers, and (3) the US base was an instrumentality
of the US government which cannot be sued without its
consent. The MD was denied. The CFI eventually found for
Rarang, ordering the officers to pay damages. On appeal,
the CA increased the damages awarded. The SC upheld the
CA, holding that American naval officers committing crimes
or tortuous acts while discharging their official functions
are not covered by the principle of state immunity from
suit.
DOCTRINE:
If the judgment against officials requires the state itself to
perform an affirmative act to satisfy the judgment (e.g.,
make an appropriation to pay damages), the suit is

regarded as one against a state itself even though not


formally impleaded. (Citing Garcia v. Chief of Staf)
Officials may be personally liable when their acts are ultra
vires or there is bad faith. (Citing Chavez v. SB, 1991)
Foreign militaries assigned and stationed in Philippine
territory enjoy State Immunity.
Philippine law does not allow the commission of crimes
(and torts) in the name of official duty. So crimes or torts
committed in the name of official duty are ultra vires.
FACTS:
Parties:
o Petitioners:
M.H. Wylie:
is the Assistant Administrative officer of
the US Naval Base in Subic.
supervises the Plan of the Day, (POD) a
daily US Naval Base publication featuring
announcements, precautions, and general
matters of interest to military personnel.
o One regular feature is an Action Line
Inquiry where personnel can access
the Commanding Officer (CO) for
matters for correction or investigation.
Captain James Williams:
is the CO of the base.
as CO, directs and authorizes the
publication of the POD
o Respondent:
Aurora Rarang:
is a Merchandise Control Guard under the
Office of the Provost Marshal.
is the only one known as Auring in her
office.

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would receive commendations for her


service prior to the incident.
February 3, 1978: The Action Line Inquiry contained a
statement asking if the head of the Merchandise
Control division was aware of Merchandise Control
Guards public consumption of confiscated items,
especially on the part of Auring who was a disgrace
to her division and to the Office of the Provost
Marshal.
Rarang was investigated by her superiors.
February 7, 1978: Wylie wrote a letter of apology to
Rarang, for the inadvertent publication.
Rarang sued Wylie and Williams (the officers) for
damages, in the Zambales CFI, alleging defamation
and libel.
o The officers Moved to Dismiss:
(1) They were immune from suit due to acting in
the performance of their official functions as
US Navy officers.
(2) The US Naval bases character as an
instrumentality of the US govt, which cannot
be sued w/o its consent.
(3) A lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter
and parties.
The MD was denied. The CFI eventually found for
Rarang and ordered the officers to pay moral
damages, exemplary damages, attorneys fees,
litigation expenses, and costs of the suit, while
dismissing the suit against the US Naval Base.
On appeal, the officers reiterated the lack of
jurisdiction and said that the publication was not
intentional and maliciously-caused. Rarang appealed
for an increase in the award of damages.
The CA found for Rarang, increasing the amount of
damages awarded.

ISSUES: Whether the Assistant Administrative Officer


(Wylie) and the Commanding Officer (Williams) are immune

from a suit for damages despite their participation in the


publication of a defamatory feature item.
RULING: No. The American officers performance of
tortuous acts while discharging official functions is not
covered by the Doctrine of State Immunity.
RATIO:
No, the American officers performance of tortuous acts
while discharging official functions is not covered by the
Doctrine of State Immunity, as our laws do not allow the
commission of crimes in the name of official duty. (US laws
are presumed to be the same on that point.) Such acts are
ultra vires and cannot be part of official duty. The officers
are being sued in their personal capacities.
1) The SC heavily quoted the case of USA v. Guinto
(1990).
2) The concept of State Immunity (from suit) was
discussed.
A) Two bases: Constitutional and International Law.
i) Constitutional: Sec. 3, Art. 16: The State may
not be sued without its consent.
ii) Generally-accepted
international
law
principle, adopted under the Doctrine of
Incorporation in Sec. 2, Art. 2, Const.
a) A state that is a member of the society of
nations is automatically obligated to
comply with certain principles.
B) Two levels of application: Local and Foreign.
i)
Local (against the state where the suit is
brought?):
a) Rationale: "[T]here can be no legal right
against the authority which makes the law
on which the right depends." (citing
Holmes in Kawanakoa v. Polybank)
ii)
Foreign (against another state):
a) Rationale: Par in parem, non habet
imperium (All states are sovereign equals

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and cannot assert jurisdiction over one


another.) Otherwise, relations between
nations would be vexed. (Citing Da Haber
v. Queen of Portugal).
C) Two Entities covered by State Immunity:
i)
States (duh.)
ii)
Officials discharging their duties.
a) Test to determine whether a suit is
regarded as being against a state: If the
judgment against officials requires the
state itself to perform an affirmative act to
satisfy the judgment (e.g., make an
appropriation to pay damages), the suit is
regarded as one against a state itself even
though not formally impleaded. (Citing
Garcia v. Chief of Staf)
b) States remedy: Move to dismiss on
ground that suit was filed w/o its consent.
c) Invocation of State Immunity by Officials:
1) Mere invocation does not by itself
result in dismissal.
2) The question of whether an officer is
acting in the discharge of their official
functions requires the presentation of
evidence.
d) Officials may be personally liable (citing
Chavez v. SB, 1991):
1) Two instances:
(1) Ultra vires acts; and
(2) Where there is bad faith.
2) Rationale: This immunity is like that of
judges and the PCGG officials (citing
PCGG v. Pea).
3) Remedies: Human Relations Torts suits
(CC 19-21, 32)
e) There is a nuance to Officials: Foreign
militaries assigned and stationed in
Philippine territory:
1) State Immunity was restated with
specificity in the RP-US Bases Treaty:

It is mutually agreed that the


United States shall have the
rights, power and authority
within the bases which are
necessary
for
the
establishment, use, operation
and
defense
thereof
or
appropriate for the control
thereof and all the rights, power
and authority within the limits
of the territorial waters and air
space adjacent to, or in the
vicinity of, the bases which are
necessary to provide access to
them or appropriate for their
control.
2) In jurisprudence:
A) Governments
exempt
foreign
armies permitted to march through
or be stationed in a friendly
country, from civil and criminal
jurisdiction. (Citing Raquiza v.
Bradford, which cited Coleman v.
Tennessee)
D) Criticism against State Immunity: Derisively
called The Royal Prerogative of Dishonesty as
any legitimate claim can be defeated by
invocation of State Immunity.
i)
Response to criticism: Not absolute. An
exception is when the state itself
consents.
E) State Consent to Suit:
i)
Two Forms: Express and Implied
a) Express: Stated in general law or special
law.
1) Requisite: Legislative will through
statutory enactment. (Citing Republic
v. Purisima)

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CASE DIGESTS

b) Implied:
Two
Forms
(ContractCommencement)
1) State itself enters into contract. This
has qualifications depending on the act
(citing USA v. Ruiz):
A) May
be
sued

Proprietary/Private/Commercial/Bus
iness acts (Jure gestionis)
i) This is termed the Restrictive
Application of State Immunity,
which is the rule in the West (US,
UK, West. Eur.)
ii) Rationale: A state is said to
descend to an individuals level and
tacitly gives its consent to be sued
in business contracts.
B) May
not
be
sued

Sovereign/Governmental
acts/functions (Jure imperii)
i) Example: Projects that are
integral parts of naval bases for
defense.
2) State itself commences litigation.
3) In this case: The officers were performing their
official functions.
A) The publication (POD) was published under the
direction and authority of the CO (Williams).
i) The Administrative Assistant Officer (Wylie)
prepares and distributes the publication.
B) The feature (Action Line Inquiry) is a regular one.
Its purpose is allowing personnel access to the
CO for matters the personnel feel should be
brought
to
the
COs
attention
for
correction/investigation.
C) The question naming Auring was forwarded 3 wks
prior to publication.
D) The question was forwarded to Aurings office
(Provost Marshal) for comment.
i) PMs Response: Remove the name in case of
publication.

E) The PMs response was forwarded to the


executive and CO for approval.
F) The COs approval was forwarded to the Office of
the Administrative Assistant
i) A clerk typist (Dologmodin) prepared the
smooth copy.
ii) Wylie signed the smooth copy but failed to
notice the reference to Auring.
4) However, the officers are being sued for tortuous
acts in their personal capacities, so they must be
personally liable. Criminal and tortuous acts are not
allowed in the commission of official duty.
A) Philippine law does not allow the commission of
crimes in the name of official duty. US laws are
presumed to be the same.
B) Analysis of the liability based on the framework of
CC 2176 Defining Quasi-Delicts:
i) Act: Publication of an article stating that
Auring was a disgrace to her office and division,
and that she would consume confiscated items.
ii) Damage:
Defamation
against
Rarangs
character and reputation.
iii) Fault or negligence:
a) Publication
despite
PMs
explicit
recommendation to remove the reference
to Auring.:
1)
Wylie supervised the publication.
2)
Williams approved the publication.
C) This specific act of publication is ultra vires and
not part of official duty.
DISPOSITIVE:
AFFIRMED.

Petition

DISMISSED.

IAC/CA

decision

DISSENTING OPINION: N/A


CONCURRING OPINION: N/A

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CASE DIGESTS

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