ORAP VS.

SANDIGANBAYAN
139 SCRA 252

NATURE: Petition for certiorari and prohibition to review the decision of the Sandiganbayan

FACTS:
Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor Rodolfo Aquino
Char ged Vi cent e Or ap, pr esi di ng j udge of t he Muni ci pal Cour t of
Mangat ar em, Pangasinan
With violation of Section 39e) of Rep Act 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act
Juan Sison, then Chief Special prosecutor of the Tanodbayan approved information and
the latter was docketed as Crim. Cases Nos. SB-020, 021, 022.
Clerk of Court, Melanio Fernandez was also charged.
Orap contended that Tanodbayan had no power to conduct preliminary investigations,
file informations, and prosecute criminal cases against judges and their appurtenant
judicial staff.
Alleged crime of Orap: took sums of money from several persons in connection with the
case of People vs. Pepito Iglesias, for reckless imprudence resulting in multiple
homicide, serious physical injuries and damage to property

ISSUE:
WON Tanodbayan has authority to conduct preliminary investigation of the complaint
WON Tanodbayan had authority to file corresponding information before the
Sandiganbayan and prosecute the same

HELD:
NO. As Ombudsman, his investigatory powers are limited to complaints initiated against
offices and personnel of administrative agencies as defined in Section 9(a) of PD 1607.
YES. As prosecutor, the authority of the Tanodbayan is plenary and without exceptions.
Section 17 of PD 1607 empowers special



















INTIG VS. TANODBAYAN
97 SCRA 494

NATURE: Petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction and restraining order

FACTS:
1. Inting filed complaints for perjury at the City Fiscal of Davaos office, against Angelina S.
Salcedo (in latters personal data sheets, she indicated that she completed the 1-year
Secretarial Science course at USC in Cebu although she never enrolled in, and neither
did she complete the course) Salcedo is an appurtenant of the judicial staff of the City
Court of Davao

2. City Fiscal of Davao thru Special Counsel Rodrigo R. Duterte conducted preliminary
investigation.

3. found prima facie case for perjury and filed 3 separate counts of perjury under article183
of RPC

4. Salcedo interposed appeal to the ministry of Justice.

5. Ministry of Justice forwarded records to Tanodbayan, pursuant to Section 10 (f) of the
PD No. 1630, which vests on the latter the power to file and prosecute offenses
committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office.

6. Tanodbayan Vicente Ericta reversed decision of City Fiscal.

7. directed city fiscal to move for dismissal of the 3 criminal cases for perjury against
Salcedo

Powers of Tanodbayan: PD 1603Section 10 (a) he may investigate, on complaint by any person
or on his own motion or initiative, any administrative actwhether amounting to any criminal
offense or not of any administrative agency including any GOCC.(f) he may file and prosecute
civil and administrative cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such other
offensescommitted by public officers and employees, including those in GOCC, in relation to
their office.

ISSUE: Whether or not Tanodbayan has jurisdiction and authority to review and nullify the
resolutions of the City Fiscal of Davao

HELD: Yes

RATIO:
1. Tanodbayan has authority to file and prosecute Salcedos case even if it
does not involve graft and corrupt offices because it falls under such other offenses
covered by section 10 (f) of PD 16302 . A c t o f p e r j u r y wa s i n r e l a t i o n t o
S a l c e d o s o f f i c e . S e c t i o n 1 8 o f PD 1 6 3 0 g i v e s Tanodbayan authority to
conduct investigations and file case for such occurrence.3.Tanodbayan therefore had
authority to null ify and review resoluti ons of the City Fiscal of Davao as the
case involved the actions of a government official related to his office. PETITION
DISMISSED.

UY VS SANDIGANBAYAN
MARCH 20, 2001

FACTS: In Uy vs Sandiganbayan [G.R. Nos. 105965-70. August 9, 1999], petitioner
Uy, who was Deputy Comptroller of the Philippine navy and designated as Assistant
Chief of Naval Staff for Comptrollership was charged with estafa through falsification of
official documents and violation of RA 3019. The petitioner filed a motion to quash,
arguing that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the offense charged and that
the Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor had no authority to file the offense.
The court ruled that:

1. It is the court-martial, not the Sandiganbayan, which has jurisdiction to try
petitioner since he was a regular officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and fell
squarely under Article 2 of the Articles of War mentioned in Section 1(b) of P.D. 1850,
Providing for the trial by courts-martial of members of the Integrated National Police
and further defining the jurisdiction of courts-martial over members of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines

2. As to the violations of Republic Act No. 3019, the petitioner does not fall within the
rank requirement stated in Section 4 of the Sandiganbayan Law, thus, exclusive
jurisdiction over petitioner is vested in the regular courts , as amended by R.A. No.
8249, which states that In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions
corresponding to Salary Grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No.
6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction
thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court,
municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to
their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.

In this connection, it is the prosecutor, not the Ombudsman, who has the
authority to file the corresponding information/s against petitioner in the regional
trial court. The Ombudsman exercises prosecutorial powers only in cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.

In February 20, 2000, a motion for clarification which in fact appeared to be a partial
motion for reconsideration was filed by the Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor
filed, which was denied.
The instant case is a Motion for Further Clarification filed by Ombudsman Aniano A.
Desierto of the Court's ruling in its decision dated August 9, 1999 and resolution dated
February 22, 2000.

ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecutory power of the Ombudsman extends only to
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and that the Ombudsman has no authority to
prosecute cases falling within the jurisdiction of regular courts.



RULING: No. The Ombudsman is clothed with authority to conduct preliminary
investigation and to prosecute all criminal cases involving public officers and
employees, not only those within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, but those within
the jurisdiction of the regular courts as well. The power to investigate and to prosecute
granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. It pertains to any act or
omission of any public officer or employee when such act or omission appears to
be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The law does not make a distinction
between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular
courts. It has been held that the clause "any illegal act or omission of any public official"
is broad enough to embrace all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance
committed by public officers and employees during their tenure of office.

The exercise by the Ombudsman of his primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan is not incompatible with the discharge of his duty to investigate and
prosecute other offenses committed by public officers and employees. The prosecution
of offenses committed by public officers and employees is one of the most important
functions of the Ombudsman. In passing RA 6770, the Congress deliberately endowed
the Ombudsman with such power to make him a more active and effective agent of the
people in ensuring accountability in public office.

Even a perusal of the law (PD 1630) originally creating the Office of the Ombudsman
then (to be known as the Tanodbayan), and the amendatory laws issued subsequent
thereto will show that, at its inception, the Office of the Ombudsman was already vested
with the power to investigate and prosecute civil and criminal cases before the
Sandiganbayan and even the regular courts.























BUENASEDA VS FLAVIER
226 SCRA 645
Legal EthicsLegal ProfessionMotion for Disbarment Improperly Filed
Administrative Law Power of the OmbudsmanPreventive Suspension

FACTS: In 1992, the NCMH Nurses Association (NCMH) filed a case of graft and
corruption against Dr. Brigida Buenaseda and several other government officials of the
Department of Health (DOH). The Ombudsman (then Conrado Vasquez), ordered the
suspension of Buenaseda et al. The suspension was carried on by then DOH Secretary
Juan Flavier, being the officer in charge over Buenaseda et al. Buenaseda et al then
filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus,
questioning the suspension order. NCMH submitted its Comment on the Petition where
they attached a Motion for Disbarment against the lawyers of Buenaseda et al.

Allegedly, the lawyers of Buenaseda et al advised them not to obey the suspension
order, which is a lawful order from a duly constituted authority. NCMH maintains that
such advice from the lawyers constitute a violation against the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

The Solicitor General, commenting on the case, agreed with Buenasedas lawyers as
he maintained that all the Ombudsman can do is to recommend suspensions not
impose them. The Sol-Gen based his argument on Section 13 (3) of the 1987
Constitution which provides that the Office of the Ombudsman shall have inter alia the
power, function, and duty to:

Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or
employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure
or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.

ISSUES: Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power to suspend government
officials. Whether or not a Motion for Disbarment may be filed in a special civil action.

HELD: Yes, the Ombudsman may impose suspension orders. The Supreme Court
clarifies that what the Ombudsman issued is an order of preventive suspension pending
the resolution of the case or investigation thereof. It is not imposing suspension as a
penalty (not punitive suspension). What the Constitution contemplates that the
Ombudsman may recommend are punitive suspensions.
Anent the issue of the Motion for Disbarment filed with the Ombudsman, the same is not
proper. It cannot be filed in this special civil action which is confined to questions of
jurisdiction or abuse of discretion for the purpose of relieving persons from the arbitrary
acts of judges and quasi-judicial officers. There is a set of procedure for the discipline of
members of the bar separate and apart from the present special civil action. However,
the lawyers of Buenaseda were reminded not be carried away in espousing their clients
cause. The language of a lawyer, both oral or written, must be respectful and restrained
in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession and with his behavioral attitude toward
his brethren in the profession.

ALMONTE VS VASQUEZ
MAY 23, 1995

FACTS: This is a case wherein respondent Ombudsman, requires petitioners Nerio
Rogado and Elisa Rivera, as chief accountant and record custodian, respectively, of the
Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to produce "all documents
relating to Personal Services Funds for the year 1988" and all evidence such as
vouchers from enforcing his orders.

Petitioner Almonte was formerly Commissioner of the EIIB, while Perez is Chief of the
EIIB's Budget and Fiscal Management Division. The subpoena duces tecum was issued
by the Ombudsman in connection with his investigation of an anonymous letter alleging
that funds representing savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB had been illegally
disbursed. The letter, purporting to have been written by an employee of the EIIB and a
concerned citizen, was addressed to the Secretary of Finance, with copies furnished
several government offices, including the Office of the Ombudsman.

May be erased: [The letter reads in pertinent parts: that the EIIB has a syndicate
headed by the Chief of Budget Division who is manipulating funds and also the brain of
the so called "ghost agents" or the "Emergency Intelligence Agents" (EIA); that when
the agency had salary differential last Oct '88 all money for the whole plantilla were
released and from that alone, Millions were saved and converted to ghost agents of
EIA; Almost all EIIB agents collects payroll from the big time smuggler syndicate
monthly and brokers every week for them not to be apprehended.]

In his comment on the letter-complaint, petitioner Almonte denied all the allegations
written on the anonymous letter. Petitioners move to quash the subpoena and the
subpoena duces tecum but was denied.

Disclosure of the documents in question is resisted with the claim of privilege of an
agency of the government on the ground that "knowledge of EIIB's documents relative
to its Personal Services Funds and its plantilla . . . will necessarily [lead to] knowledge
of its operations, movements, targets, strategies, and tactics and the whole of its being"
and this could "destroy the EIIB."

ISSUE: Whether petitioners can be ordered to produce documents relating to personal
services and salary vouchers of EIIB employees on the plea that such documents are
classified without violating their equal protection of laws.

HELD: YES. At common law a governmental privilege against disclosure is recognized
with respect to state secrets bearing on military, diplomatic and similar matters and in
addition, privilege to withhold the identity of persons who furnish information of violation
of laws. In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets will be
disclosed by the production of records pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB. Indeed,
EIIB's function is the gathering and evaluation of intelligence reports and information
regarding "illegal activities affecting the national economy, such as, but not limited to,
economic sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, dollar salting." Consequently, while in
cases which involve state secrets it may be sufficient to determine from the
circumstances of the case that there is reasonable danger that compulsion of the
evidence will expose military matters without compelling production, no similar excuse
can be made for a privilege resting on other considerations.

The Ombudsman is investigating a complaint that several items in the EIIB were filled
by fictitious persons and that the allotments for these items in 1988 were used for illegal
purposes. The plantilla and other personnel records are relevant to his investigation as
the designated protectors of the people of the Constitution.

Nor is there violation of petitioners' right to the equal protection of the laws. Petitioners
complain that "in all forum and tribunals . . . the aggrieved parties . . . can only hale
respondents via their verified complaints or sworn statements with their identities fully
disclosed," while in proceedings before the Office of the Ombudsman anonymous
letters suffice to start an investigation. In the first place, there can be no objection to this
procedure because it is provided in the Constitution itself. In the second place, it is
apparent that in permitting the filing of complaints "in any form and in a manner," the
framers of the Constitution took into account the well-known reticence of the people
which keep them from complaining against official wrongdoings. As this Court had
occasion to point out, the Office of the Ombudsman is different from the other
investigatory and prosecutory agencies of the government because those subject to its
jurisdiction are public officials who, through official pressure and influence, can quash,
delay or dismiss investigations held against them. On the other hand complainants are
more often than not poor and simple folk who cannot afford to hire lawyers.

Finally, it is contended that the issuance of the subpoena duces tecum would violate
petitioners' right against self-incrimination. It is enough to state that the documents
required to be produced in this case are public records and those to whom the
subpoena duces tecum is directed are government officials in whose possession or
custody the documents are. Moreover, if, as petitioners claim the disbursement by the
EII of funds for personal service has already been cleared by the COA, there is no
reason why they should object to the examination of the documents by respondent
Ombudsman.















DIAZ VS SANDIGANBAYAN
MARCH 8, 1993

Milagros L. Diaz, erstwhile postmistress of Tandag, Surigao del Sur, was found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of malversation of public funds defined by Article 217, paragraph 4, of the Revised
Penal Code, in a decision rendered by the Sandiganbayan on 15 March 1996 in Criminal Case No.
11295. The Sandiganbayan adjudged:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court hereby finds the accused Milagros L. Diaz GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of malversation of public funds as described and penalized in Art.
217 of the Revised Penal Code for the amount of P9,813.99, and after considering the mitigating
circumstances of full restitution in her favor and applying the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, hereby sentences her to suffer the following penalties:
(a) imprisonment for an indeterminate period ranging from a minimum of six (6) years and one
day of prision mayor to a maximum of ten (10) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal;
(b) fine in the amount of P9,813.99, the amount equal to the amount malversed; and
(c) perpetual special disqualification for public office.
She is likewise ordered to pay the Bureau of Posts the amount of P6.70 only to complete the restitution
made by the accused.
SO ORDERED.
In her petition for review before this Court, Milagros Diaz assails her conviction by the
Sandiganbayan and continues to profess her innocence.
The case against petitioner sprung from the implementation of Office Order No. 83-15, dated 03
March 1983, issued by Provincial Auditor Diosdado Lagunday, Surigao del Sur, that directed Auditor II
Dominico L. Quijada and Auditing Examiners I Victor B. Tecson and Zenaida C. Cueto to examine the
cash and other accounts of petitioner Milagros L. Diaz, then postmistress of Tandag, Surigao del Sur.
The following day of 04 March 1983, Quijada required petitioner Diaz to produce all cash, treasury
warrants, checks, money orders, paid vouchers, payrolls and other cash items that she was officially
accountable for. Petitioner, who was bonded for P100,000.00, was found to have made cash payments
in the total amount of six thousand one hundred seventy-one pesos and twenty three centavos
(P6,171.23), hereunder itemized:
Nature of Claims Date Amount
Telephone Rental Nov. 1980 P 250.00
Office Rental, S. Haguisan Mar. 1981 570.00
TEV, Milagros L. Diaz Dec. 1980 385.20
Spare Parts, Phil. Mail Jun. 1979 50.50
Gasoline, Phil. Mail Aug. 1979 1,020.20
Spare Parts, Phil. Mail Dec. 1979 684.80
Spare Parts, Phil. Mail Jan. 1980 353.55
Repair, Phil. Mail Oct. 1980 64.00
Repair, Phil. Mail Dec. 1980 46.00
Registration Fee, Phil. Mail Dec. 1980 25.50
Office Rental, S. Haguisan Aug. 1981 640.00
TEV, Milagros L. Diaz Nov. 1981 468.50
Repair, Phil. Mail Jan. 1982 32.00
Mail Carriage, Postmaster Jan. 1982 6.00
Gasoline, Phil. Mail Sept. 1982 228.44
Mail Carriage, Postmaster Feb. 1982 12.50
Gasoline, Phil. Mail Feb. 1982 238.95
Fare, Pedro D. Sindo Oct. 1982 5.00
TEV, Milagros L. Diaz Nov. 1982 250.50
Salary, Carlos M. Acevedo 839.59
TOTAL P6, 171.23
i

The audit team also found petitioner to have sold postage stamps in the sum of P8,020.40 which she had
failed to record in her cash book, and since Quijada neither considered the cash items in the aforesaid
amount of P6,171.23 as having been validly disbursed, he reported that petitioner had incurred a total
cash shortage of P14,191.63. He then referred the matter to the Regional Director of the Bureau of
Posts.
In a letter, dated 15 April 1983, Quijada asked petitioner to explain why criminal and administrative
charges should not instituted against her. Petitioner did not respond. On 24 May 1985, Quijada executed
an affidavit attesting to the incurrence by petitioner of a cash shortage of P14,191.63 and her failure to
make a restitution thereof. On 05 March 1986, an information for malversation of public funds was filed
against petitioner with the Sandiganbayan; it read;
That on March 4, 1983 or for sometime prior thereto, in the Municipality of Tandag, Province of
Surigao del Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused Milagros L.
Diaz, a public officer being then the Postmaster III of the Bureau of Posts of Tandag, Surigao del Sur and
as such is responsible and accountable for the public funds entrusted to her by reason of her position,
with grave abuse of confidence and taking advantage of her public position as such, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, embezzle and take from said public funds the amount
of P14,191.63, Philippine Currency, which he (sic) appropriated and converted to her own personal use,
to the damage and prejudice of the government in the aforementioned amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
ii

Petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued by the Sandiganbayan. On 24 March 1986,
she posted bail in the amount of P20,000.00; she was forthwith ordered release from custody by the
Regional Trial Court of Tandag, Surigao del Sur, Branch XXVII.
The arraignment of petitioner scheduled for 15 May 1986 was reset to 16 June 1986 due to
petitioners illness and later to the following month at her request. Meanwhile, petitioner filed a motion for
reinvestigation with the Sandiganbayan contending that the Acting Provincial Fiscal of Tandag, Surigao
del Sur, who had conducted the preliminary investigation ultimately recommended the dismissal of the
complaint on the ground that petitioner was able to fully account for the alleged shortage of P14,191.63.
The motion was granted. The Tanodbayan reinvestigated the case. On 24 April 1987, Mariflor
Punzalan-Castillo, the investigating prosecutor, issued an order dismissing the complaint on the basis of
her finding that there was no showing of bad faith on the part of the accused when she defrayed the
expenses subject of the audit;
iii
that the shortage was incurred to defray operational expenses for the
Tandag post office; and that the shortage in cash should instead be blamed on the failure, or delay, of the
Regional Office of the Bureau of Posts in replenishing the amount spent for office operation. The
investigating prosecutor said:
Only the amount of P1,786.89 has so far been replenished by the Regional Office. The accountant
of the Regional Office, Bureau of Post, Davao City, issued a certification that the amount of P4,384.34
representing claims of Mrs. Diaz were listed in the statement of payables but unbooked in their book of
accounts due to lack of funds. The remaining shortage in the amount of P9,807.29 was paid by the
accused also pending replenishment from the Regional Office.
Lastly, the new Postmaster of Tandag, Surigao del Sur issued a certification that Mrs. Milagros Diaz
has already been cleared of her money accountability.
The prosecutor thereupon filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to withdraw the information against
petitioner from which the Commission on Audit (COA), through its General Counsel, excepted when
directed by the Sandiganbayan to comment. On 19 August 1987, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion
to withdraw the information and held that the restitution made by petitioner would not exculpate her from
liability.
On 01 December 1987, petitioner was arraigned. She pleaded no guilty to the indictment.
A pre-trial was conducted on 03 December 1987 during which petitioners counsel informed the
Sandiganbayan that the Regional Office of the Bureau of Posts had reimbursed the entire amount for
which petitioner was held accountable thereby confirming that the assailed disbursements were truly
legitimate. On 18 December 1987, petitioner wrote Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena a letter
iv

submitting to the Sandiganbayan a carbon copy of the certification of Eduardo F. Cauilan, Chief of the
Finance Section of Region XI of the Bureau of Posts to the following effect:
CERTIFICATION
To Whom It May Concern:
This is to certify that according to the records of this office, the following expenses forming part of
the accountability of former Postmaster Milagros L. Diaz of Tandag, Post Office, Tandag, Surigao del Sur,
were legitimate expenses having to do with postal operations of said post office all incurred in the
exigencies and interest of public service, which were all considered and taken cognizance by this office,
details of which are listed in separate statement forming a part of this certification covering the total
amount of P14,503.31.
This certification is issued upon request and representation by said Milagros Diaz for whatever legal
purpose it may serve on her behalf.
Issued this 18
th
day of December, 1987 at Davao City, Philippines.
EDUARDO F. CAUILAN
Chief, Finance Section
NOTED:
DIOSCORO A. GELITO
Asst. Regional Director
Officer-In-Charge
The statement referred to in the certificate indicated that the expenses incurred had, in fact, been
liquidated. On 08 February 1988, Special Prosecutor Fidel D. Galindez informed the Sandiganbayan of
the advice he had received from the Bureau of Posts that the questioned items were appropriate
expenses by the Bureau.
v
On 22 March 1988, the prosecutor manifested that with the aforequoted
certification of the Chief of the Finance Section of Region XI of the Bureau of Post, holding to be
legitimate expenses the amount covered by the supposed shortage incurred by petitioner, there was no
prima facie case of malversation. The motion drew observation from COA, through Assistant Director
Jose G. Molina, that the statement of petitioners total accountability of P14,503.31 was inaccurate.
On 17 June 1988, the Sandiganbayan again denied the motion to withdraw the information and ruled
that the withdrawal of the information was not justified because petitioner had already been arraigned and
that the resolution of the conflict on the propriety of the disbursements made by petitioner was a matter of
evidence that should instead be threshed out during trial.
Trial ensued with the prosecution and the defense presenting their respective version of the case.
On 15 March 1996, following the submission of evidence, the Sandiganbayan promulgated its
decision convicting petitioner of the crime of malversation. Touching base on the evidence of petitioner
that the expenses she had incurred were office related, the Sandiganbayan said that the ruling in
Villacorta vs. People
vi
where such expenses were held to be payments made in good faith, thus
destroying in these instances the presumption of peculation in Art. 217 of the Revised Penal Code,
would only give the accused the benefit of the doubt by allowing her to show that the expenses were
indeed office related expenses, and thus valid cash items requiring thereby for presentation at audit of
the required receipts accompanied by the duly accomplished and approved vouchers, as well as a
demonstration that these claims had not been reimbursed and were still outstanding at the time of audit.
Conceding that the amounts of P1,081.00 and P3,296.64, or a total of P4,377.64, were allowable, the
Sandiganbayan said that petitioner was still short of funds by P9,813.99 which petitioner would be
presumed to have malversed x x x there being no satisfactory proof presented to substantiate the
legitimate disbursement thereof.
In tackling the claim of petitioner that she had liquidated rather than restituted the cash items, the
Sandiganbayan explained:
The distinction between liquidation and restitution, of course, is important. A liquidation of cash item
means the validation of the transaction, while restitution means that the accountable officer had to dig
from his or her private resources to cover the amount involved. The amount paid by the accused as
evidenced by the official receipts she presented in court represented the amounts which she had already
received but she never turned over until long after the audit. This only meant that she has paid these
amounts to cover her cash shortage. Thus, these items do not represent liquidation but restitution.
vii

It likewise noted that restitution is merely recognized in jurisprudence (to be) a mitigating circumstance in
malversation cases.
viii

In her petition for review before this Court, petitioner insists that she did not appropriate or convert to
her personal use the final sum of P9,813.99 held by the Sandiganbayan to have been malversed by her;
that the amount has been used to defray the expenses for office rentals, telephone rentals, spare parts,
gasoline and registration fees, and that she did have the corresponding authority to pay those items of
expenses.
The crime of malversation for which petitioner has been indicted is defined and penalized under
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code; its pertinent provisions read:
ART. 217. Malversation of public funds or property Presumption of malversation Any public
officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall
appropriate the same, or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, or through abandonment or
negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public funds or property, wholly or partially, or shall
otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation of malversation of such funds or property, shall suffer:
x x x x x x x x x
4. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved is
more than twelve thousand pesos but is less than twenty-two thousand pesos. If the amount exceeds the
latter, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual special
disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal to the total value of the
property embezzled.
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is
chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put
such missing fund or property to personal uses.
The felony involves breach of public trust, and whether it is committed through dolo or culpa the law
makes it punishable and prescribes a uniform penalty therefor. Even when the information charges willful
malversation, conviction for malversation through negligence may still be adjudged if the evidence
ultimately proves that mode of commission of the offense.
ix
The elements of malversation of public funds
are that (a) the offender is a public officer, (b) he has custody or control of the funds or property by reason
of the duties of his office, (c) the funds or property are public funds or propertyfor which he is
accountable, and, most importantly, (d) he has appropriated, taken, misappropriated or consented, or,
through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take them.
x

Concededly, the first three elements are present in this case. It is the last element, i.e., whether or
not petitioner really has misappropriated public funds, where the instant petition focuses itself. In
convicting petitioner, the Sandiganbayan cites the presumption in Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code
that the failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds with which he is chargeable,
upon demand by any duly forthcoming any public funds with which he is chargeable, upon demand by
any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property
to personal uses. The presumption is, of course, rebuttable. Accordingly, if the accused is able to
present adequate evidence that can nullify any likelihood that he had put the funds or property to personal
use, than that presumption would be at an end and the prima facie case is effectively negated. This
Court has repeatedly said that when the absence funds is not due to the personal use thereof by the
accused, the presumption is completely destroyed; in fact, the presumption is deemed never to have
existed at all.
xi

The prosecution, upon whose burden was laden the task of establishing by proof beyond reasonable
doubt that petitioner had committed the offense charged, mainly relied on the statutory presumption
aforesaid and failed to present any substantial piece of evidence to indicate that petitioner had used the
funds for personal gain. The evidence submitted, just to the contrary, would point out that not a centavo
of the so-called missing funds was spent for personal use, a matter that was later acknowledged by the
Special Prosecutor who thereupon recommended the withdrawal of the information earlier filed against
petitioner. The alleged shortages in the total amount of P14,191.63 claimed by Auditor Quijada had been
explained by petitioner. On the day of the audit, she presented a list of cash items showing that she had
spent the amount of P6,171.23 for telephone and office rentals, spare parts of the vehicle being utilized
for the delivery of mails, registration and repair of that vehicle, gasoline, fare of an employee, the salary of
another employee and petitioners travel expense voucher.
xii
The auditor disallowed these cash items only
because at the time of the audit, these payments were not yet approved by the Regional Office.
xiii
The
records, nevertheless, would show that petitioners use of the cash in her possession for operational
expenses was founded on valid authority. COA Circular No. 76-37 allowed postmasters to make
payments for gasoline, spare parts and minor repairs of vehicles subject to reimbursement by the
Regional Office. She advanced payments of salaries of employees on the basis of the Circular No. 82-21
issued by the Postmaster General. The Regional Office, through the chief of the finance section,
certified that all the payments made by petitioner were legitimate operational expenses. Exhibit 7-a,
attached to the certificate of 18 December 1987, disclosed that thirty-two items of the operational
expenses were later approved and liquidated with checks bearing dates between 07 November 1982 and
28 February 1983. It would appear that somehow the Sandiganbayan failed to consider the fact that, on
20 November 1982, petitioner had to vacate her post upon her promotion. Notably, while the thirty-two
checks were issued prior to the audit, there was nothing to suggest that she already had the checks in her
possession at the time.
Liquidation of obligations incurred by accountable public officials involves a long process; pertinent
government accounting principles, require the (a) preparation of the disbursement voucher, (b)
processing of the request for allotment supported by such documents as payrolls, disbursement
vouchers, purchase/job orders, requisitions for supplies/materials, etc., and (c) issuance of the
corresponding check.
xiv
Each time, when accomplished, the corresponding amount is debited or deducted
from the available funds of the agency which would then consider the claim settled and paid although
there may have yet been no actual transfer of cash involved from the government to the payee of the
check. The term to liquidate means to settle, to adjust, to ascertain or to reduce to precision in
amount.
xv
Liquidation does not necessarily signify payment,
xvi
and to liquidate an account, can mean to
ascertain the balance due, to whom it is due, and to whom it is payable;
xvii
hence, an account that has
been liquidated can also mean that the item has been made certain as to what, and how much, is
deemed to be owing.
xviii

It would indeed be a folly and too restrictive a usage to construe the word liquidated as being solely
the receipt of checks by petitioner or encashment of the check by petitioner, and to thereby conclude
that she should be held to have malversed the amount of P5,600.84 merely for her failure to transfer the
sum either to her successor the day she was promoted or to the auditor on the day the audit was made.
xix

The defense evidence, the authenticity and genuineness of which were not controverted by the
prosecution, would show that the Regional Office issued thirty checks bearing dates between 07
November 1982 and 21 March 1984. The checks were not issued forthrightly. The probability that
ineptitude on the part of the personnel taking charge of the issuance of the checks, not to mention the
commonly-experienced long trail of red tape in government transactions, had engendered delay in such
issuance should not be discounted. According to petitioner, again not contested by the prosecution, after
substantiating her claim that the shortage represented legitimate operational expenses, she followed up
the approval of the case items with the Regional Office. Upon finally receiving the thirty-three checks,
with her as payee, she encashed them and immediately turned the cash over the Bureau of Posts of
Tandag.
xx
Forthwith, on 01 July 1983, petitioner paid the amount of P5,652.15 to the Bureau of Posts
under O.R. No. 6645668
xxi
which amount, incidentally, is even slightly over the total amount of P5,600.84
found by the Sandiganbayan.
The payment by postal employees who made vales from petitioner were deposited by her to the
account of the Bureau of Posts of Tandag under O.R. No. 6645670, dated 06 July 1983, in the amount of
P4,155.14. Petitioner explained that this sum was P294.69 less that the total amount of salaries due the
employees because the employees did not always make vales for the full amount of their salaries.
xxii

While this Court would consider the practice of disbursing public funds under the "vale" system to be
unmeritorious were the disbursing officer had not been authorized to grant vales or to make advances of
salaries,
xxiii
in this case, however, the conditions appended to the authority granted by the Postmaster
General to advance salaries of employees under Circular No. 82-21 sanctioned the practice.
The conclusion made by the Sandiganbayan that the amounts paid by petitioner to the Bureau of
Posts under O.R. No. 6645668 and No. 6645670 were restitutions would seem to be less than accurate.
The amounts were replenishment
xxiv
coming from the Regional Office in checks issued out in petitioners
name which she paid, after encashment, to the Bureau of Posts. The sum of P9,807.29 that was
replenished, when added to the ten items certified to accounts payable and to two items replenished by
the checks issued after 04 March 1983, approved as operational expenses in the amount of P4,377.64,
totalled P14,284.43, or even P92.80 more than the supposed shortage of P14,161.63.
While it was not made clear which of the office expenses had been taken from the proceeds of the
postage stamp sales, the fact still remained, nevertheless, that the Regional Office cleared petitioner of
such accountabilities, indicating at the very least that she did not spend the amount for personal use. The
Court had heretofore recognized situations that could necessitate the use by accountable public officials
of cash on hand for pertinent expenditures in the conduct official business. In Bugayong vs. People,
xxv

the Court acquitted an accused government physician for malversation for a shortage in cash account
upon audit examination because the collections in the hospital were found to have been used as its
revolving fund for such official expenditures. In Palma Gil vs. People,
xxvi
where donated logs were
disposed of to construct municipal projects, the Court held that if funds or property entrusted to a public
officer were validly used for public purposes he should not be held liable for malversation.
The Sandiganbayan noticeably depended on the recommendations of COA in convicting appellant.
The Court could not help but observe that upon being informed that the Bureau of Posts had reimbursed
the entire amount alleged to be her shortage, Auditor Quijada opined that his audit report had to be
altered to reflect that fact. Auditor Quijadas acquiescence to the alteration of his report to conform to the
advice would somehow manifest that the audit was not conducted with sufficient thoroughness. In Tinga
vs. People,
xxvii
the Court said:
At this juncture, it may not be amiss to state that considering the gravity of the offense of
Malversation of Public Funds, just as government treasures are held to strict accountability as regards
funds entrusted to them in a fiduciary capacity, so also should examining COA auditors act with greater
care and caution in the audit of the accounts of such accountable officers to avoid the perpetration of any
injustice. Accounts should be examined carefully and thoroughly to the last detail, with absolute
certainty in strict compliance with the Manual of Instructions. Special note should be taken of the fact
that disallowances for lack of pre-audit are not necessarily tantamount to malversation in law. Imperative
it is likewise that sufficient time be given examined officers to reconstruct their accounts and refute the
charge that they had put government funds to their personal uses. Access to records must be afforded
them within a reasonable time after audit when disbursements are still fresh in their minds and not years
after when relevant official records may no longer be available and the passage of time has blurred
human memory.
In Dumagat vs. Sandiganbayan
xxviii
where the ruling in Tinga was reiterated, the Court added:
Since the audit examination left much to be desired in terms of thoroughness and completeness as
there were accounts which were not considered, the same cannot be made the basis for holding
petitioner liable for malversation.
xxix

Hopefully, the Court is not being pertinent if it were to urge COA, in the exercise of its awesome
powers, to act with extreme care and judicious consideration of all attendant circumstances in order to
ensure that innocent public officials may not have to undergo the trial and the pains that always go with
an indictment for an offense.
Generally, the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan are conclusive upon this Court but there are
established exceptions to that rule, such as, sans preclusion, when (1) the conclusion is a finding
grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) the inference made is manifestly an error or
founded on a mistake; (3) there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on
misapprehension of facts; and (5) the findings of fact are premised on a want of evidence are
contradicted by evidence on record. In these instances, this Court is bound to review the facts in order to
avoid a miscarriage of justice. The case at bar, as may be gleaned from the foregoing disquisition, is one
such instance.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Sandiganbayan appealed from is SET ASIDE, and petitioner
Milagros Diaz ACQUITTED of the crime of malversation of public funds for insufficiency of proof beyond
reasonable doubt. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.