FIRST DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 162335 & 162605 December 12, 2005

SEVERINO M. MANOTOK IV, FROILAN M. MANOTOK, FERNANDO M. MANOTOK, FAUSTO MANOTOK III, MA. MAMERTA
M. MANOTOK, PATRICIA L. TIONGSON, PACITA L. GO, ROBERTO LAPERAL III, MICHAEL MARSHALL V. MANOTOK, MARY
ANN MANOTOK, FELISA MYLENE V. MANOTOK, IGNACIO MANOTOK, JR., MILAGROS V. MANOTOK, SEVERINO MANOTOK
III, ROSA R. MANOTOK, MIGUEL A.B. SISON, GEORGE M. BOCANEGRA, MA. CRISTINA E. SISON, PHILIPP L. MANOTOK, JOSE
CLEMENTE L. MANOTOK, RAMON SEVERINO L. MANOTOK, THELMA R. MANOTOK, JOSE MARIA MANOTOK, JESUS JUDE
MANOTOK, JR. and MA. THERESA L. MANOTOK, represented by their Attorney-in-fact, Rosa R. Manotok, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF HOMER L. BARQUE, represented by TERESITA BARQUE HERNANDEZ, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

These consolidated petitions for review assail, in G.R. No. 162335, the February 24, 2004 Amended Decision1 of the Third
Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel
petitioners TCT No. RT-22481 and directing the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to reconstitute respondents TCT No.
210177; and in G.R. No. 162605, the November 7, 2003 Amended Decision2 of the Special Division of Five of the Former
Second Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700 directing the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel petitioners TCT No. RT-
22481, and the LRA to reconstitute respondents TCT No. T-210177 and the March 12, 2004 Resolution3 denying the
motion for reconsideration.

The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:

Petitioners, (respondents herein) as the surviving heirs of the late Homer Barque, filed a petition with the LRA for
administrative reconstitution of the original copy of TCT No. 210177 issued in the name of Homer L. Barque, which was
destroyed in the fire that gutted the Quezon City Hall, including the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City,
sometime in 1988. In support of the petition, petitioners submitted the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 210177, real
estate tax receipts, tax declarations and the Plan FLS 3168 D covering the property.

Upon being notified of the petition for administrative reconstitution, private respondents (petitioners herein) filed their
opposition thereto claiming that the lot covered by the title under reconstitution forms part of the land covered by their
reconstituted title TCT No. RT-22481, and alleging that TCT No. 210177 in the name of petitioners predecessors-in-interest
is spurious.

On June 30, 1997, Atty. Benjamin M. Bustos, as reconstituting officer, denied the reconstitution of TCT No. 2101775 on
grounds that:

1. Lots 823-A and 823-B, Fls-3168-D, containing areas of 171,473 Sq. Mtrs. and 171,472 Sq. Mtrs., respectively, covered
by TCT No. 210177, appear to duplicate Lot 823 Piedad Estate, containing an area of 342,945 Sq. Mtrs., covered by TCT
No. 372302 registered in the name of Severino M. Manotok, et. al., reconstituted under Adm. Reconstitution No. Q-213
dated February 01, 1991;

2. The submitted plan Fls-3168-D is a spurious document as categorically stated by Engr. Privadi J.G. Dalire, Chief, Geodetic
Surveys Division, Land Management Bureau, in his letter dated February 19, 1997.6

Respondents motion for reconsideration was denied in an order7 dated February 10, 1998 hence they appealed to the
LRA.

The LRA ruled that the reconstituting officer should not have required the submission of documents other than the
owners duplicate certificate of title as bases in denying the petition and should have confined himself with the owners
duplicate certificate of title.8 The LRA further declared:

Based on the documents presented, petitioners have established by clear and convincing evidence that TCT NO. 210177
was, at the time of the destruction thereof, valid, genuine, authentic and effective. Petitioners duly presented the original
of the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 210177 .... The logbook of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City lists TCT No.
210177 as among the titles lost .... The Register of Deeds of Quezon City himself acknowledged the existence and
authenticity of TCT No. 210177 when he issued a certification to the effect that TCT No. 210177 was one of the titles
destroyed and not salvaged from the fire that gutted the Quezon City Hall on 11 June 1988 ....

It is likewise noteworthy that the technical description and boundaries of the lot reflected in TCT No. 210177 absolutely
conform to the technical description and boundaries of Lot 823 Piedad Estate ... as indicated in the B. L. Form No. 28-37-
R dated 11-8-94 and B. L. Form No. 31-10 duly issued by the Bureau of Lands ....

It therefore becomes evident that the existence, validity, authenticity and effectivity of TCT No. 210177 was established
indubitably and irrefutably by the petitioners. Under such circumstances, the reconstitution thereof should be given due
course and the same is mandatory.9

.

It would be necessary to underscore that the certified copy of Plan FLS 3168 D was duly issued by the office of Engr.
Ernesto Erive, Chief, Surveys Division LMS-DENR-NCR whose office is the lawful repository of survey plans for lots situated
within the National Capital Region including the property in question. Said plan was duly signed by the custodian thereof,
Carmelito Soriano, Chief Technical Records and Statistics Section, DENR-NCR. Said plan is likewise duly supported by
Republic of the Philippines Official Receipt No. 2513818 Q dated 9-23-96 .... Engr. Erive in his letter dated 28 November
1996 addressed to Atty. Bustos confirmed that a microfilm copy of Plan FLS 3168D is on file in the Technical Records
and Statistics Section of his office. Engr. Dalire, in his letter dated 2 January 1997 addressed to Atty. Bustos even confirmed
the existence and authenticity of said plan.

.

The claim of Engr. Dalire in his letter dated 19 February 1997 that his office has no records or information about Plan FLS
3168-D is belied by the certified copy of the computer print-out duly issued by the Bureau of Lands indicating therein that
FLS 3168D is duly entered into the microfilm records of the Bureau of Lands and has been assigned Accession Number
410436 appearing on Page 79, Preliminary Report No. 1, List of Locator Cards and Box Number 0400 and said computer
print-out is duly supported by an Offical Receipt .

The said Plan FLS 3168D is indeed authentic and valid coming as it does from the legal repository and duly signed by the
custodian thereof. The documentary evidence presented is much too overwhelming to be simply brushed aside and be
defeated by the fabricated statements and concoctions made by Engr. Dalire in his 19 February 1997 letter. 10

Nevertheless, notwithstanding its conclusion that petitioners title was fraudulently reconstituted, the LRA noted that it is
only the Regional Trial Court (RTC) which can declare that the same was indeed fraudulently reconstituted. It thus opined
that respondents title may only be reconstituted after a judicial declaration that petitioners title was void and should
therefore be cancelled.11

The dispositive portion of the LRAs decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is hereby ordered that reconstitution of TCT No. 210177 in the name of Homer
L. Barque, Sr. shall be given due course after cancellation of TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) in the name of Manotoks upon
order of a court of competent jurisdiction.

SO ORDERED.12

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was opposed by respondents with a prayer that reconstitution be
ordered immediately.

On June 14, 2001, petitioners motion for reconsideration and respondents prayer for immediate reconstitution were
denied.13

From the foregoing, respondents filed a petition for review14 with the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 66700
and praying that the LRA be directed to immediately reconstitute TCT No. 210177 without being subjected to the condition
that petitioners TCT No. RT-22481 [372302] should first be cancelled by a court of competent jurisdiction.15 Petitioners
likewise filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 66642.

In CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, the Second Division of the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision16 on September 13, 2002, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered the assailed Resolution of the LRA dated June 24, 1998 is AFFIRMED in
toto and the petition for review is ordered DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.17

Respondents moved for reconsideration.18 On November 7, 2003, the Special Division of Five of the Former Second
Division rendered an Amended Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, our decision dated 13 September 2002 is hereby reconsidered. Accordingly, the Register of Deeds of Quezon
City is hereby directed to cancel TCT No. RT-22481 of private respondents and the LRA is hereby directed to reconstitute
forthwith petitioners valid, genuine and existing Certificate of Title No. T-210177.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.19

Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the amended decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700 was denied,20 hence, this
petition docketed as G.R. No. 162605.

Meanwhile, in CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, the Third Division of the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision21 on October 29,
2003, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Resolution of the LRA dated 24 June 1998 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.22

In so ruling, the Third Division of the Court of Appeals declared that the LRA correctly deferred in giving due course to the
petition for reconstitution since there is yet no final judgment upholding or annulling respondents title.23

Respondents motion for reconsideration was granted by the Third Division of the Court of Appeals on February 24, 2004,
thus:

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of this Court dated 29 October 2003 is
RECONSIDERED and a new one is entered ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel petitioners TCT No. RT-
22481 and directing the LRA to reconstitute forthwith respondents TCT No. T-210177.

SO ORDERED.24

From the foregoing decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700 and CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, petitioners filed
separate petitions for review before this Court docketed as G.R. No. 162605 and G.R. No. 162335, respectively.

In G.R. No. 162605, petitioners argue that:

I

THE MAJORITY JUSTICES ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN ORDERING THE CANCELLATION OF PETITIONERS EXISTING
TITLE, CONSIDERING THAT:

a. THEY ORDERED THE CANCELLATION OF TITLE DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE SAME IS NOT PART OF THE RELIEF SOUGHT
IN A RECONSTITUTION PROCEEDINGS.

b. THEY ALLOWED A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON A TORRENS CERTIFICATE OF TITLE; and

c. THE COURT OF APPEALS, IN RESOLVING AN APPEAL OF THE DECISION OF THE LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, DOES
NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO ORDER THE CANCELLATION OF TITLE, SINCE ONLY A PROPER REGIONAL TRIAL COURT CAN
ORDER THE ANNULMENT/CANCELLATION OF A TORRENS TITLE. BY ALLOWING A "SHORT CUT", THE MAJORITY JUSTICES
DEPRIVED THE PETITIONERS OF THEIR PROPERTY AND THEIR CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF
LAW.

II

THE MAJORITY JUSTICES GRAVELY MISAPPLIED THE RULING OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN ORTIGAS V. VELASCO,
CONSIDERING THAT:

a. IN THE ORTIGAS CASE, THERE WERE TWO TITLES EXISTING OVER THE SAME PARCEL OF LAND, AS A RESULT OF THE
RECONSTITUTED TITLE ISSUED IN THE NAME OF MOLINA. IN THE INSTANT CASE, ONLY PETITIONERS HOLD TITLE TO THE
PROPERTY IN QUESTION, AS RESPONDENTS ARE MERELY TRYING TO HAVE TITLE RECONSTITUTED IN THEIR NAMES.

b. IN ORTIGAS, THERE WERE SEVERAL DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT WHICH PREVIOUSLY RESOLVED THE ISSUE OF
OWNERSHIP OF ORTIGAS PROPERTY. HENCE, THERE WAS SUFFICIENT GROUND TO ANNUL MOLINAS TITLE OUTRIGHT.
IN THE INSTANT CASE, THERE ARE NO SUCH DECISIONS IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY THE
CANCELLATION OF THE TITLE OF PETITIONERS WITHOUT ANY HEARING.25

In G.R. No. 162335, petitioners raise the following issues:

I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION) COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND GROSS
IGNORANCE OF THE LAW IN ORDERING THE LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY TO CANCEL TCT NO. RT-22481 OF
PETITIONERS MANOTOK NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT SAID COURT WAS FULLY COGNIZANT THAT IT HAS NO
JURISDICTION TO EXERCISE SUCH AUTHORITY AND POWER AND THE LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY IS EQUALLY DEVOID
OF JURISDICTION ON THE MATTER BECAUSE UNDER THE JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980 SPECIFICALLY
SECTION 19 (2) THEREOF, ONLY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS HAVE EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OVER CIVIL
ACTIONS WHICH INVOLVES TITLE TO, OR POSSESSION OF, REAL PROPERTY, OR ANY INTEREST THEREIN.

II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION) COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND GROSS
IGNORANCE OF THE LAW IN INVOKING EQUITABLE CONSIDERATION TO JUSTIFY ITS CHALLENGED AMENDED DECISION
DATED FEBRUARY 24, 2004 DIRECTING LRA TO CANCEL PETITIONERS MANOTOKS TITLE NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT,
AS STATED, THE LAW EXPLICITLY VESTS EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION TO THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS OVER CIVIL
ACTIONS WHICH INVOLVES TITLE TO, OR POSSESSION OF, REAL PROPERTY, OR ANY INTEREST THEREIN.

III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION IN FAILING TO ORDER THE SETTING ASIDE OF THE CHALLENGED RESOLUTION DATED JUNE 24, 1998 OF
RESPONDENT LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY IN LRC ADMIN. CASE NO. Q-547 [97] VIEWED FROM THE FACT THAT SAID
RESOLUTION OF LRA IS PATENTLY AT WAR WITH LAW AND CONTROLLING JURISPRUDENCE THAT PROHIBITS
RECONSTITUTION OF TITLE BY THIRD PARTY ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN LOST OR DESTROYED IF ANOTHER VALID TITLE IS
EXISTING COVERING THE LAND SUBJECT THEREOF.

IV. THE LRA COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
ORDERING THE RECONSTITUTION OF THE TITLE OF HOMER BARQUE, SR. SUBJECT ONLY TO THE CONDITION THAT THE
TITLE OF PETITIONERS MANOTOK SHOULD FIRST BE ORDERED CANCELLED BY COURT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION IN
THE FACE OF THE GLARING FACTS THAT SAID TITLE IS HIGHLY SUSPECT AND BEARS BADGES OF FABRICATION AND
FALSIFICATION AND THEREFORE NO OTHER LOGICAL AND CREDIBLE CONCLUSION CAN BE DRAWN EXCEPT THAT IT IS A
FAKE AND SPURIOUS TITLE.

V. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF IN EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION IN ALLOWING RESPONDENTS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WHICH WAS CLEARLY FILED OUT OF
TIME.26

On August 2, 2004, the petition in G.R. No. 162605 was consolidated with the petition in G.R. No. 162335.27

In sum, petitioners contend that (a) the LRA has no authority to annul their title; (b) the reconstitution of respondents
Torrens title would be a collateral attack on petitioners existing title; (c) they were not given the opportunity to be heard,
specifically the chance to defend the validity of their Torrens title; (d) the Court of Appeals, in resolving the appeal from
the LRA, has no jurisdiction to order the cancellation of petitioners title; and (e) the ruling in Ortigas was misapplied.

The petitions must be denied.

The LRA properly ruled that the reconstituting officer should have confined himself to the owners duplicate certificate of
title prior to the reconstitution. Section 3 of Republic Act (RA) No. 2628 clearly provides:

Section 3. Transfer certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources hereunder enumerated as may be
available, in the following order:

(a) The owners duplicate of the certificate of title;

....

When respondents filed the petition for reconstitution, they submitted in support thereof the owners duplicate certificate
of title, real estate tax receipts and tax declaration. Plainly, the same should have more than sufficed as sources for the
reconstitution pursuant to Section 3 of RA No. 26 which explicitly mandates that the reconstitution shall be made following
the hierarchy of sources as enumerated by law. In addition, Section 12 of the same law requires that the petition shall be
accompanied with a plan and technical description of the property only if the source of the reconstitution is Section 3(f)
of RA No. 26. Thus:

Section 12. Provided, That in case the reconstitution is to be made exclusively from sources enumerated in section 2(f)
or 3(f) of this Act, the petition shall further be accompanied with a plan and technical description of the property duly
approved by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, or with a certified copy of the description taken from a
prior certificate of title covering the same property.29

Since respondents source of reconstitution is the owners duplicate certificate of title, there is no need for the
reconstituting officer to require the submission of the plan, much less deny the petition on the ground that the submitted
plan appears to be spurious. By enumerating the hierarchy of sources to be used for the reconstitution, it is the intent of
the law to give more weight and preference to the owners duplicate certificate of title over the other enumerated sources.

The factual finding of the LRA that respondents title is authentic, genuine, valid, and existing, while petitioners title is
sham and spurious, as affirmed by the two divisions of the Court of Appeals, is conclusive before this Court. It should
remain undisturbed since only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Findings of fact of administrative bodies are accorded respect, even finality by this Court and, when affirmed by the Court
of Appeals, are no longer reviewable except only for very compelling reasons. Basic is the rule that factual findings of
agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions are accorded not only respect but even finality, aside from the consideration
that this Court is essentially not a trier of facts.30

Such questions as whether certain items of evidence should be accorded probative value or weight, or rejected as feeble
or spurious, or whether or not the proofs on one side or the other are clear and convincing and adequate to establish a
proposition in issue, are without doubt questions of fact. Whether or not the body of proofs presented by a party, weighed
and analyzed in relation to contrary evidence submitted by adverse party, may be said to be strong, clear and convincing;
whether or not certain documents presented by one side should be accorded full faith and credit in the face of protests
as to their spurious character by the other side; whether or not inconsistencies in the body of proofs of a party are of such
gravity as to justify refusing to give said proofs weight all these are issues of fact. Questions like these are not reviewable
by this court which, as a rule, confines its review of cases decided by the Court of Appeals only to questions of law raised
in the petition and therein distinctly set forth.31 A petition for review should only cover questions of law. Questions of
fact are not reviewable.32

In Dolfo v. Register of Deeds for the Province of Cavite,33 this Court categorically declared:

Second. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals made a factual finding that petitioners title to the land is of doubtful
authenticity.

Having jurisdiction only to resolve questions of law, this Court is bound by the factual findings of the trial court and the
Court of Appeals....

In view of the foregoing, it is no longer necessary to remand the case to the RTC for the determination of which title,
petitioners' or respondents', is valid or spurious. This has been ruled upon by the LRA and duly affirmed by the two
divisions of the Court of Appeals.

The LRA has the jurisdiction to act on petitions for administrative reconstitution. It has the authority to review, revise,
reverse, modify or affirm on appeal the decision of the reconstituting officer. The function is adjudicatory in nature it
can properly deliberate on the validity of the titles submitted for reconstitution. Logically, it can declare a title as sham or
spurious, or valid on its face. Otherwise, if it cannot make such declaration, then there would be no basis for its decision
to grant or deny the reconstitution. The findings of fact of the LRA, when supported by substantial evidence, as in this
case, shall be binding on the Court of Appeals.34

In the reconstitution proceedings, the LRA is bound to determine from the evidence submitted which between or among
the titles is genuine and existing to enable it to decide whether to deny or approve the petition. Without such authority,
the LRA would be a mere robotic agency clothed only with mechanical powers.

The Court of Appeals also properly exercised its appellate jurisdiction over the judgment of the LRA. Under Sections 1 and
3, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, the appellate court has jurisdiction on appeals from judgments or final orders of the LRA,
whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.

Indeed, it would be needlessly circuitous to remand the case to the RTC to determine anew which of the two titles is sham
or spurious and thereafter appeal the trial courts ruling to the Court of Appeals. After all, the LRA and the two divisions
of the appellate court have already declared that petitioners title is forged. In Mendoza v. Court of Appeals,35 we ruled
that:

Now, technically, the revocation and cancellation of the deed of sale and the title issued in virtue thereof in de los Santos
favor should be had in appropriate proceedings to be initiated at the instance of the Government. However, since all the
facts are now before this Court, and it is not within de los Santos power in any case to alter those facts at any other
proceeding, or the verdict made inevitable by said facts, for this Court to direct at this time that cancellation proceedings
be yet filed to nullify the sale to de los Santos and his title, would be needlessly circuitous and would unnecessarily delay
the termination of the controversy at bar, .... This Court will therefore make the adjudication entailed by the facts here
and now, without further proceedings, as it has done in other cases in similar premises.

No useful purpose will be served if a case or the determination of an issue in a case is remanded to the trial court only to
have its decision raised again to the Court of Appeals and then to the Supreme Court. The remand of the case or of an
issue to the lower court for further reception of evidence is not necessary where the Court is in position to resolve the
dispute based on the records before it and particularly where the ends of justice would not be subserved by the remand
thereof.36

The Register of Deeds, the LRA and the Court of Appeals have jurisdiction to act on the petition for administrative
reconstitution. The doctrine laid down in Alabang Dev. Corp., et al. v. Hon. Valenzuela, etc., et al.37 does not apply in the
instant case. In Alabang, the Court stressed that:

[L]ands already covered by duly issued existing Torrens Titles cannot be the subject of petitions for reconstitution of
allegedly lost or destroyed titles filed by third parties without first securing by final judgment the cancellation of such
existing titles. The courts simply have no jurisdiction over petitions by such third parties for reconstitution of allegedl y
lost or destroyed titles over lands that are already covered by duly issued subsisting titles in the names of their duly
registered owners. The very concept of stability and indefeasibility of titles covered under the Torrens System of
registration rules out as anathema the issuance of two certificates of title over the same land to two different holders
thereof. 38

The Alabang ruling was premised on the fact that the existing Torrens title was duly issued and that there is only one title
subsisting at the time the petition for reconstitution was filed. In the instant case, it cannot be said that petitioners ti tle
was duly issued much less could it be presumed valid considering the findings of the LRA and the Court of Appeals that
the same is sham and spurious.

The Court of Appeals properly applied the doctrine laid down in Ortigas in refusing to remand the case to the trial court.
As expressly declared in Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco:39

Ordinarily, the relief indicated by the material facts would be the remand of the reconstitution case (LRC No. Q-5405) to
the Court of origin with instructions that Ortigas and the Solicitor Generals appeals from the judgment rendered therein,
which were wrongly disallowed, be given due course and the records forthwith transmitted to the appellate tribunal. This,
in fact, is a relief alternatively prayed for by petitioner Ortigas. Considering however the fatal infirmities afflicting Molinas
theory or cause of action, evident from the records before this Court, such a remand and subsequent appeal proceedings
would be pointless and unduly circuitous. Upon the facts, it is not possible for Molinas cause to prosper. To defer
adjudication thereon would be unwarranted and unjust.

The same rationale should apply in the instant case. As already discussed, the validity of respondents and petitioners
title have been squarely passed upon by the LRA and reviewed and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, which factual findings
are no longer reviewable by this Court.

A careful examination of the case of Spouses Cayetano, et al. v. CA, et al.,40 where this Court, as claimed by petitioners,
have affirmed their title over the disputed property, would reveal that the sole issue resolved therein is whether or not a
tenancy relationship exists between the parties.41 There was no adjudication on ownership. In fact, it cannot even be
discerned if the property subject of the Spouses Cayetano case refers to the property subject of the instant controversy.

There is no basis in the allegation that petitioners were deprived of "their property" without due process of law when the
Court of Appeals ordered the cancellation of their Torrens title, even without a direct proceeding in the RTC. As already
discussed, there is no need to remand the case to the RTC for a re-determination on the validity of the titles of respondents
and petitioners as the same has been squarely passed upon by the LRA and affirmed by the appellate court. By opposing
the petition for reconstitution and submitting their administratively reconstituted title, petitioners acquiesced to the
authority and jurisdiction of the reconstituting officer, the LRA and the Court of Appeals, and recognized their authority
to pass judgment on their title. All the evidence presented was duly considered by these tribunals. There is thus no basis
to petitioners claim that they were deprived of their right to be heard and present evidence, which is the essence of due
process.

As held in Yusingco v. Ong Hing Lian:42

Therefore, it appearing from the records that in the previous petition for reconstitution of certificates of title, the parties
acquiesced in submitting the issue of ownership for determination in the said petition, and they were given the full
opportunity to present their respective sides of the issues and evidence in support thereof, and that the evidence
presented was sufficient and adequate for rendering a proper decision upon the issue, the adjudication of the issue of
ownership was valid and binding.

The reconstitution would not constitute a collateral attack on petitioners title which was irregularly and illegally issued in
the first place.43 As pertinently held in Dolfo v. Register of Deeds for the Province of Cavite:44

The rule that a title issued under the Torrens System is presumed valid and, hence, is the best proof of ownership of a
piece of land does not apply where the certificate itself is faulty as to its purported origin.

In this case, petitioner anchors her arguments on the premise that her title to the subject property is indefeasible because
of the presumption that her certificate of title is authentic. However, this presumption is overcome by the evidence
presented, consisting of the LRA report that TCT No. T-320601 was issued without legal basis

.

Thus, petitioner cannot invoke the indefeasibility of her certificate of title. It bears emphasis that the Torrens system does
not create or vest title but only confirms and records one already existing and vested. Thus, while it may be true, as
petitioner argues, that a land registration court has no jurisdiction over parcels of land already covered by a certificate of
title, it is equally true that this rule applies only where there exists no serious controversy as to the authenticity of the
certificate.

Under similar circumstances, this Court has ruled that wrongly reconstituted certificates of title secured through fraud
and misrepresentation cannot be the source of legitimate rights and benefits.45

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. In G.R. No. 162335, the February 24, 2004 Amended Decision of the Third Division
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel petitioners TCT
No. RT-22481 and directing the Land Registration Authority to reconstitute respondents TCT No. 210177; and in G.R. No.
162605, the November 7, 2003 Amended Decision of the Special Division of Five of the Former Second Division in CA-G.R.
SP No. 66700 directing the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel petitioners TCT No. RT-22481, and the Land
Registration Authority to reconstitute respondents TCT No. T-210177 and the March 12, 2004 Resolution denying the
motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.







THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 111732 February 20, 1996

NEW DURAWOOD CO., INC. petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FELIX S. CABALLES, as Judge, RTC of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 71, WILSON M. GAW, ORLANDO S.
BONGAT , DURAWOOD CONSTRUCTION AND LUMBER SUPPLY CO., INC., respondents.

D E C I S I O N

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The main issue here is: does a court have jurisdiction to issue a new owner's duplicate of a Torrens certificate of title if it
is shown that the existing owner's copy has not, in fact and in truth, been lost or destroyed? The Court resolved this issue
in the negative in this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals2
promulgated on May 31, 1993 and the subsequent Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration. The said Rulings
dismissed the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 25434 and in effect affirmed the "order"3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch LXXI,
Antipolo, Rizal4 dated April 16, 1991 in LRC Case No. 91-924, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:

(a) Declaring the owner's duplicate copy of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 140486, 15645 and 140485 which were
lost, null and void and of no further force and effect and in lieu thereof,

(b) Hereby orders and directs that new copy of the said titles be issued to the petitioner giving them the same faith
and credit and carrying over the same terms and conditions appearing on the originals thereof, upon payment of the
required fees.

SO ORDERED.

By Resolution of the First Division dated November 15, 1995, this case along with several others was transferred to THIRD
DIVISION. After due consultation and deliberation, the Court assigned the undersigned ponente to write this Decision.

The Facts

On February 14, 1990, a "Petition for Judicial Reconstitution of the Lost Owner's Duplicate Certificates of TCT Nos. 140486;
156454 and 140485"5 was filed in the Regional Trial Court, Branch LXXI, Antipolo, Rizal by petitioner-corporation,
"represented by its Branch Manager, Wilson M. Gaw. . ." Attached to said petition was an "Affidavit of Loss" dated
December 31, 1990 6 of respondent Orlando S. Bongat, one of the stockholders of petitioner-corporation.

Finding the petition "to be sufficient in form and in substance," respondent Judge set the case for hearing on March 18,
1991. On April 16, 1991, respondent Judge issued the questioned order.

Sometime in May, 1991, petitioner discovered that the original TCT Nos. N-140485, N-140486 and 156454 on file with the
Register of Deeds of Rizal had been cancelled and, in lieu thereof, TCT Nos. 200100, 200101 and 200102 had been issued
in the name of respondent Durawood Construction and Lumber Supply, Inc. Surprised by this cancellation, petitioner -
after investigation - found out about the reconstitution proceeding in the respondent trial court. So, on July 17, 1991,
petitioner filed7 suit in the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. 25434 praying for the annulment of the assailed order
in LRC Case No. 91-924 penned by respondent Judge. It also prayed for the cancellation of the new certificates (TCT Nos.
200100, 200101 and 200102). On May 31, 1993, the respondent Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision and on
August 30, 1993, the Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration. Hence, the present recourse to the Supreme
Court.

The Issues

Petitioner brought up the following ground as basis for its petition:

The Court of Appeals gravely abused its authority in not declaring the order of respondent Judge Caballes in LRC Case No.
91-924 null and void for want of jurisdiction and in not declaring that the reconstitution of the owner's duplicate transfer
certificates of title Nos. N-140486, N-140485 and 156454 was obtained through fraud.

Petitioner argues that a reconstitution proceeding is one in rem and thus jurisdiction can be acquired only through
publication and notice sent pursuant to Section 13, Republic Act No. 26. It also alleges that fraud is manifest (1) from the
insufficient allegations of the petition filed before the trial court, as it (the petition) does not mention the names of
adjoining land owners and interested persons, as well as (2) from the affidavit of loss attached to the petition.

In their Comment, private respondents aver that in 1990, these three lots were sold by petitioner to Durawood
Construction and Lumber Supply, Inc. but the sale in their favor could not be registered because "the certificates of title.
. . were lost." They also allege that the applicable law is Section 109 of R.A. No. 496, as amended by P.D. 1529, and not
Sec. 13 of R.A. No. 26, and that fraud, in order to serve as basis for the annulment of a judgment "must be extrinsic or
collateral in character", which is not the case in the action before the court a quo. They also fault "(t)he deliberate failure
of Dy Quim Pong (petitioner's board chairman) and his family, who constitute the majority of the stockholders and
directors of (herein petitioner-corporation), to disclose the whereabouts (of) there (sic) son, the President and General
Manager Francis Dytiongsee . . . " who allegedly executed the deed of sale of the lots and who allegedly claimed that the
owner's copies of the TCTs were lost.

In its Reply, petitioner contends that "the very procedure provided under Sec. 109, PD 1529, which they (private
respondents) insist is the applicable provision of law in the matter, was not strictly followed . . ." It also argues that the
owner's duplicate copies of the TCTs were all along in the custody of Dy Quim Pong, whom private respondents should
have sued to compel him to surrender the same in order that the alleged deed or sale in favor of private respondent could
be registered.

Finally, petitioner claims that respondent Wilson Gaw had no authority to institute the petition for reconstitution in the
trial court because "(t)he Court of Appeals itself, in its questioned resolution stated that said board resolution (authorizing
Gaw) was passed without the required quorum."

From the foregoing, the issues may be summed up as follows:

(1) Which law governs the issuance of new owner's duplicate certificates of title in lieu of lost ones?

(2) Did the respondent trial court have jurisdiction to order the issuance of the new owner's duplicate certificates?

(3) Was the reconstitution of the said owner's duplicate certificates of title obtained through fraud?

The First Issue:
Law Governing Issuance of
Lost Owner's Duplicate Titles

To resolve this issue, it is necessary to reexamine the following provisions referred to by the parties:

(1) Section 13, Republic Act No. 26:8

Sec. 13. The court shall cause a notice of the petition, filed under the preceding section, to be published, at the expense
of the petitioner, twice in successive issues of the Official Gazette, and to be posted on the main entrance of the provincial
building and of the municipal building of the municipality or city in which the land is situated, at least thirty days prior to
the date of hearing. The court shall likewise cause a copy of the notice to be sent, by registered mail or otherwise, at the
expense of the petitioner, to every person named therein whose address is known, at least thirty days prior to the date of
hearing. Said notice shall state, among other things, the number of the lost or destroyed certificate of title, if known, the
name of the registered owner, the names of the occupants or persons in possession of the property, the owners of the
adjoining properties and all other interested parties, the location, area and boundaries of the property, and the date on
which all persons having any interest therein must appear and file their claim or objections to the petition. The petitioner
shall, at the hearing, submit proof of the publication, posting and service of the notice as directed by the court,"

(2) Section 109 P.D. 1529 (amending R.A. 496):

Sec. 109. Notice and replacement of lost duplicate certificate. In case of loss or theft of an owner's duplicate
certificate of title, due notice under oath shall be sent by the owner or by someone in his behalf to the Register of Deeds
of the province or city where the land lies as soon as the loss or theft is discovered. If a duplicate certificate is lost or
destroyed, or cannot be produced by a person applying for the entry of a new certificate to him or for the registration of
any instrument, a sworn statement of the fact of such loss or destruction may be filed by the registered owner or other
person in interest and registered.

Upon the petition of the registered owner or other person in interest, the court may, after notice and due hearing, direct
the issuance of a new duplicate certificate, which shall contain a memorandum of the fact that it is issued in place of the
lost duplicate certificate, but shall in all respects be entitled to like faith and credit as the original duplicate, and shall
thereafter be regarded as such for all purposes of this decree.

A reading of both provisions clearly shows that Section 109 of P.D. 1529 is the law applicable in petitions for issuance of
new owner's duplicate certificates of title which are lost or stolen or destroyed. On the other hand, R.A. 26 applies only in
cases of reconstitution of last or destroyed original certificates on file with the Register of Deeds. This is expressly provided
for under Section 110 of P.D. 1529 as follows:

Sec. 110. Reconstitution of lost or destroyed original of Torrens title. - Original copies of certificates of title lost or
destroyed in the offices of Registers of Deeds as well as liens and encumbrances affecting the lands covered by such titles
shall be reconstituted judicially in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Republic Act No. 26 insofar as not
inconsistent with this Decree. The procedure relative to administrative reconstitution of lost or destroyed certificate
prescribed in said Act may be availed of only in case of substantial loss or destruction of land titles due to fire, flood or
other force majure as determined by the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority: Provided, That the number of
certificates of titles lost or damaged should be at least ten percent (10%) of the total number in the possession of the
Office of the Register of Deeds: Provided, further, That in no case shall the number of certificates of titles lost or damaged
be less that five hundred (500).

Notice of all hearings of the petition for judicial reconstitution shall be furnished the Register of Deeds of the place where
the land is situated and to the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority. No order or judgment ordering the
reconstitution of a certificate of title shall become final until the lapse of fifteen (15) days from receipt by the Register of
Deeds and by the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority of a notice of such order or judgment without any
appeal having been filed by any such officials." (As amended by R.A. 6732, emphasis supplied)

The Second Issue: Jurisdiction

In Demetriou vs. Court of Appeals, et al.9 this Court ruled:

In Serra Serra v. Court of Appeals (195 SCRA 482 [1991]), on facts analogous to those involved in this case, this Court
already held that if a certificate of title has not been lost but is in fact in the possession of another person, the reconstituted
title is void and the court rendering the decision has not acquired jurisdiction. Consequently the decision may be attacked
any time.

In the instant case, the owner's duplicate certificates of title were in the possession of Dy Quim Pong, the petitioner's
chairman of the board and whose family controls the petitioner-corporation. Since said certificates were not in fact "lost
or destroyed", there was no necessity for the petition filed in the trial court for the "issuance of New Owner's Duplicate
Certificates of Title: . . ." In fact, the said court never acquired jurisdiction to order the issuance of new certificates. Hence,
the newly issued duplicates are themselves null and void.

It is obvious that this lapse happened because private respondents and respondent judge failed to follow the procedure
set forth in P.D. No. 1529 which, as already stated, governs the issuance of new owner's duplicate certificates of title.

Section 109 of said law provides, inter alia, that "due notice under oath" of the loss or theft of the owner's duplicate "shall
be sent by the owner as by someone in his behalf to the Register of Deeds . . ." (emphasis supplied). In this case, while an
affidavit or loss was attached to the petition in the lower court, no such notice was sent to the Register of Deeds.

Private respondents tried to convince the Court that by their failure to locate Francis Dytiongsee, they had no other
recourse but to file a petition for reconstitution. Sec. 107 of P.D. 1529, however, states that the remedy, in case of the
refusal or failure of the holder - in this case, the petitioner - to surrender the owner's duplicate certificate of title, is a
"petition in court to compel surrender of the same to the Register of Deeds", and not a petition for reconstitution.

The Third Issue: Fraud

The respondent Court of Appeals, in its own words, "confine(d) its discussion" 10 in the assailed Decision only to the
ground of fraud. It ruled that the Rte's decision could be annulled only where extrinsic or collateral fraud is shown - that
is, when the fraudulent acts prevented a party "from exhibiting fully his side of the case . . .". Hence, petitioner could not
claim extrinsic fraud inasmuch as it was duly represented by Gaw in the reconstitution proceeding.

The appellate court explained that while there may not have been a quorum during the board meeting of petitioner-
corporation on May 10, 1984 when a resolution authorizing Gaw to sue on its behalf was allegedly passed, this did "not
mean however, that New Durawood Co., Inc. cannot be bound by Gaw's action'' because "no howl of protest, complaint
or denial came from (said corporation)", and that said corporation in fact had taken advantage of the benefits therefrom.
Hence, petitioner is estopped from questioning Gawls acts. The appellate Court was of the belief that petitioner-
corporation ratified Gaw's "authority" by acquiescence to his acts. The respondent Court thus concluded that petitioner-
corporation's "claim of being a victim of extrinsic fraud is baseless."

We are appalled by this rather novel interpretation of corporate law. It is clear that, there having been no quorum present
during the meeting in question, the board of directors could not have validly given Gaw any express authority to file the
petition. Upon the other hand, the doctrine of "apparent authority" cannot apply as to Gaw because, being a mere branch
manager, he could not be looked upon as a corporate officer clothed with the implied or "apparent" power to file suit for
and in behalf of a corporation 11. Neither will estoppel prevent the corporation from questioning Gaw's acts. Precisely,
these acts were hidden from the company and its top officers. How then can estoppel attach? 12

Suffice it to say then, that by his surreptitious filing of the petition for reconstitution without authority - express or implied
- of his employer, Gaw enabled respondent corporation to acquire the certificates of title in a manner contrary to law.

In petitions for issuance of new owner's duplicate copies of Torrens titles, it is essential - as provided under Sec. 109 of
P.D. 1529 as amended (supra) - that the trial court take steps to assure itself that the petitioner is the "registered owner
or other person in interest". Otherwise, new owner's duplicate certificates might be issued in favor of impostors who
could fraudulently dispose, hypothecate or otherwise deal in and with real estate in mockery of the Torrens system of
titling properties.

Be that as it may, in the case before us, whether Gaw was authorized to file the suit or not is of little significance in finally
resolving this case. Jurisdiction is and remains the main issue. Since we already concluded earlier that the trial court did
not have jurisdiction, necessarily its judgment must fall.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED; the assailed decision SET ASIDE and REVERSED; the proceedings in LRC Case No.
91-924 ANNULLED; and the order issued therein dated April 15, 1991 as well as the reconstituted Transfer Certificates of
Title issued pursuant thereto, namely, TCT Nos. 200100, 200101 and 200102 in the name of private respondent declared
NULL and VOID. Costs against private respondents.

SO ORDERED.















































SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-68303 January 15, 1988

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (now Court of Appeals), and PRINCESS EMME ATIK KIRAM,
respondents.


SARMIENTO, J.:

The Republic appeals from the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, * ordering the
reconstitution of title in favor of private respondent.

The properties in dispute number three undivided lots [Lot No. 465-A; Bsd-864, CAD-159, Lot No. 2408-A, Psd-864 (Lot
2457-Cad. 99), and Lot No. 2410-B, Psd-864 (Lot 2461 Cad 99)] altogether consisting of a total of 1,024 hectares of
ricelands. They are all located in Tiptipon, Panamao, Sulu. The title thereto stood allegedly in the name of Sultan Jamalul
Kiram, who died in 1936. The private respondent, a niece of the late Sultan, now claims that the original certificate of title
(No. P-133) thereto was destroyed as a consequence of a fire that gutted the office of the Register of Deeds of Sulu
sometime in February, 1974. She likewise alleges that the owner's copy thereof was lost on account of the same
misfortune. On October 18,1979, she went to the then Court of First Instance of Sulu, Branch I, at Jolo, now Regional Trial
Court, the Honorable Jainal D. Rasul, District Judge, presiding, for reconstitution.

The then Court of First Instance ruled for the private respondent, a ruling affirmed on appeal. The Republic would now
have the application dismissed on the grounds of: (1) lack of proper publication; (2) absence of proof that Original
Certificate of Title No. P-133 was in force and in effect at the time of its alleged loss; and (3) failure to comply with the
provisions of Republic Act No. 26.

The then Court of First Instance granted reconstitution on the strength, among other things, of. (1) the sheriffs return of
service; (2) certificate of publication in the Official Gazette; (3) the respective survey plans and technical descriptions of
the properties; and (4) the tax declarations covering the same. The private respondent likewise presented a copy of Act
No. 3430, "An Act to provide for the reservation of certain lands of the public domain on the Island of Sulu, the usufruct
thereof to be granted to the Sultan of Sulu and his heirs," among them, those subject of the petition, as well as a copy of
proclamation No. 1530, "Reserving for resettlement purposes certain parcels of land situated in Panamao, Talipao and
Tiptipon, Province of Sulu, Philippines, under the administration and disposition of the Department of Agrarian Reform,"
including the three parcels aforementioned. According to the private respondent, Sultan Kiram acquired the properties in
question pursuant to these land grants.

The Solicitor General presented in the trial court no opposition to the application, and based on the evidence of the private
respondent, the assailed order was issued on June 4, 1980. The Solicitor General appealed to the then Intermediate
Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, which however affirmed in toto, on May 24, 1984, the order of the trial court.
Hence, this petition.

We rule for the Republic.

It is not disputed, to begin with, that the notices (of hearing) were not posted on the main entrances of the provincial and
municipal halls of the locality in which the lands are located. Under Section 13, of Republic Act No. 26:

SEC. 13. The court shall cause a notice of the petition, filed under the preceding section, to be published, at the expense
of the petitioner, twice issues of the Official Gazette, and to be posted on the main of the municipality or city in which the
land is situated, at the provincial building and of the municipal building at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing.
The court shall likewise cause a copy of the notice to be sent, by registered mail or otherwise, at the expense of the
petitioner, to every person named therein whose address is known, at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing. Said
notice shall state, among other things, the number of the lost or destroyed certificate of title, if known, the name of the
registered owner, the names of the occupants or persons in possession of the property, the owners of the adjoining
properties and all other interested parties, the location, area and boundaries of the property, and the date on which all
persons having any interest therein must appear and file their claim or objections to the petition. The petitioner shall, at
the hearing, submit proof of the publication, posting and service of the notice as directed by the court.

We have held that such a mode of publication is a jurisdictional requirement. The failure on the part of the applicant to
comply with it confers no jurisdiction upon the court. 1

Neither is there any showing that the adjacent owners or other interested parties were actually notified of the pending
application. This too taints the petition with a jurisdictional defect. 2

It is not enough that there is publication in the Official Gazette. Publication of the notice in the Official Gazette is but one
requirement. In addition, Republic Act No. 26 decrees that such a notice be posted "on the main entrance" of the
corresponding provincial capitol and municipal building, as well as served actually upon the owners of adjacent lands.
Failure to comply with such requisites will nullify the decree of reconstitution.

It shall be noted that a judicial reconstitution of title partakes of a land registration proceeding. 3 Thus, notice of the
proceedings must be done in the manner set forth by the letter of the law.

It is futile for the private respondent, in connection with the charge that she failed to post the notice at the main entrance
of the municipal building, to invoke the fiction of "performance of duty." 4 The question that remains unanswered is
whether or not she had in fact complied with the requirement. The Court notes that all she presented was a certificate of
service prepared by the sheriff, embodying an order addressed to the Station Commander of Panamao, Sulu, to post the
proper notices and a certificate of publication in the Official Gazette. The order, however, of posting forwarded by the
sheriff to the local Station Commander is not proof that the Station Commander had in fact complied with such an order.
The presumption of "performance of duty" cannot therefore apply. Republic Act No. 26 itself specifically calls upon the
applicant to submit proof of that posting. 5 He cannot rely on the presumption. In this case, fiction must yield to fact.

The Republic cannot be faulted for nursing doubts about the private respondent's assertions. In the first place, the private
respondent claims that two deeds have been lost, the original and the duplicate certificates of title. She furthermore relies
on quite doubtful sources as bases for the reconstitution sought, i.e., certain statutes making references to the properties.
In such a case, the courts are admonished to take utmost caution that the petition and the evidence presented to support
it can stand judicial scrutiny. 6

It is not sufficient, as in the case at bar, that the Solicitor General failed to interpose an opposition to the application. The
court must nonetheless convince itself that the petitioner's evidence is substantial enough to warrant reconstitution.

This Court agrees with the Republic that the private respondent, based on the evidence, has not sufficiently shown her
right to a reconstitution. Neither Act No. 3430 nor Proclamation No. 1530 confers title to any party over the properties
mentioned therein. On the other hand, Republic Act No. 26 entitled, "An Act Providing A Special Procedure For The
Reconstitution Of Torrens Certificates of Title Lost Or Destroyed," enumerates the sources on which the reconstituted
certificate of title may be based. It should be noted that both Sections 2 and 3 thereof list sources that evidence title or
transactions affecting title to property. 7 When Republic Act No. 26 [Sec. 2(f)] therefore speaks of "[a]ny other document,"
8 it must refer to similar documents previously enumerated therein. The statutes relied upon by the private respondent,
so we hold, are not ejusdem generis as the documents earlier referred to. Furthermore, they do not contain the specifics
required by Section 12(a) and (b) of the title reconstitution law. 9

We, therefore, hold that for reconstitution purposes, the two pieces of legislation earlier adverted to, Act No. 3430 and
Proclamation No. 1530, are not enough to support the petition for reconstitution. The private respondent must have
sufficient proof that her predecessor-in-interest had in fact availed himself of the benefits of the land grant the twin
statutes confer.

Proclamation No. 1530, moreover, does not specifically name Sultan Kiram as the owner of the lands reserved for
resettlement. While Act No. 3430 does, this measure was enacted as far back as 1928. 10 Since then, the properties could
have undergone successive transfers. What is more, there is no showing that the title certificate sought to be
reconstituted, Original Certificate of Title No. P-133, stands, in fact, in the name of Sultan Kiram. The fact therefore that
Act No. 3430 grants title to the Sultan (on the assumption that it does) does not yield the presumption that Original
Certificate of Title No. P-133 refers to one and the same property.

The documents alluded to under Sections 2(f) and 3(f), finally, must be resorted to in the absence of those preceding in
order. There is no showing here that the private respondent had in fact sought to secure such prior documents (except
with respect to the owner's duplicate copy of title, which she claims had been likewise destroyed) and failed to find them.
This endangers doubts, indeed, about the existence of the alleged title itself.

The tampering of genuine certificates of title itself.

The tamppering of genuine certificates of title and the issuance of face ones are a widespread malaise that has seriously
threatened the very stability of the Torrens system. Worse, the courts have been at times unwitting accomplices in these
acts of corruption. In Alabang, supra, we sounded this admonition:

... We can take judicial notice of innumerable litigations and controversies that have been spawned by the reckless and
hasty grant of such reconsitution of alleged lost or destroyed titles as well as of the numerous purchasers who have been
victimized only to find that the "lands" purchased by them were covered by forged or fake titles or their areas simply
"expanded" through "table surveys" with the cooperation of unscrupulous officials.

an admonition we find fitting and proper to reiterate here.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) dated May 24, 1984 and its
Resolution dated August 1, 1984 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Petition for Reconstitution of Title is ordered
DISMISSED. No costs.

Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Paras and Padilla, JJ., concur.






















SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-55771 November 15, 1982
TAHANAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL E. VALENZUELA, THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, NICOLAS A. PASCUAL, CRISANTO F.
PASCUAL, ANSELMO F. PASCUAL, MAMERTO F. PASCUAL, PASCUALA A. MEJIA, DAMIANA A. MEJIA, CIRILO S. PASCUAL,
and CATALINA S. PASCUAL, respondents.

Conrado B. Enriquez for petitioner.

Ramon S. Nievo for private respondents.



GUERRERO, J.:

There are three cases recently decided by the Supreme Court that are directly related to and squarely Identified with the
petition at bar, namely, (1) Director of Lands, petitioner, vs. Court of Appeals, et al., respondents, Greenfield Development
Corporation, intervenor, Alabang Development Corporation and Ramon D. Bagatsing, intervenors, No. L-45168,
September 25, 1979, 93 SCRA 238, (2) The Director of Lands, petitioner, vs. The Court of Appeals and Demetria Sta. Maria
Vda. de Bernal, respondents, Greenfield Development Corporation, intervenor, Alabang Development Corporation and
Ramon D. Bagatsing, intervenors, L-45168, January 27, 1981, 102 SCRA 370, and (3) Alabang Development Corp. and
Ramon D. Bagatsing, petitioner, vs. Hon. Manuel F. Valenzuela, et al., respondents, G.R. No. 54094, August 30, 1982.

In the first case, Our Resolution admitted the intervention of the intervenors filed before the Supreme Court at the stage
of the proceedings where trial of the petition for judicial reconstitution had already been concluded, the judgment thereon
granting the reconstitution had been promulgated and on appeal by the losing party, the same was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals and the petition for certiorari to review said judgment was already submitted for decision in the Supreme
Court. The second case is Our decision on the merits of the certiorari petition wherein We ruled, among others, that the
judgment of the lower court granting the petition for judicial reconstitution of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42449 of
the Registry of Deeds of Rizal in the name of Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal covering two parcels of land located in
Barrio San Dionisio, Municipality of Paranaque, Rizal (now Barrio Cupang, Municipality of Muntinlupa, Rizal) denominated
as Lots 1 and 3 of Plan II-4374 based on a survey approved July 25, 1911 with an area of 717,523 square meters and
717,539 square meters, respectively, was null and void for failure to comply with the mandatory requirements of Republic
Act No. 26. We further held that TCT No. 42449 was fake and spurious.

In the third case, the Supreme Court directly ruled that the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City,
Branch XXIX, in Reconstitution Case No. 504-P Land Registration Case No. 9368, Hon. Manuel E. Valenzuela, presiding,
ordering the reconstitution from Decree No. 15170 and the plan and technical descriptions, the alleged certificate of title,
original and owner's duplicate copy over Lots 2 and 4 indicated in Plan II-4374 situated in Barrio San Dionisio, Paranaque,
Rizal, now Barrio Cupang, Muntinlupa, Rizal, in the name of Manuela Aquial, was null and void.

The instant petition for review similarly assails the validity of the same judgment ordering the reconstitution of the
Certificate of Title, original and owner's duplicate copy, over the same lots, Lots 2 and 4, of the same plan, Plan 11-4374,
in the name of the said Manuela Aquial, promulgated in the same Reconstitution Case No. 504-P, Land Registration Case
No. 9368, Court of First Instance of Pasay City, Branch XXIX, Judge Manuel E. Valenzuela, presiding. The said case at bar
was brought by petitioner Tahanan Development Corporation while the third case was instituted by Alabang Development
Corporation and Ramon D. Bagatsing as petitioners.

Whereas the third case categorically ruled and decided the questions of law raised therein, the proceedings being the
special civil action of certiorari attacking the jurisdiction of the lower court, the petition at bar being a petition for review,
a more extended discussion of the issues on the merits is necessary and more appropriate. Thus, We start by noting that
herein petition for review seeks to set aside the Resolution of the Court of Appeals promulgated April 30, 1980 reversing
an earlier decision of the same Court dated November 16, 1979 in C. A.-G.R. No. SP-08680-R entitled "Tahanan
Development Corporation, petitioner, versus Hon. Manuel E. Valenzuela, et al., respondents," as well as the subsequent
resolution dated December 8, 1980 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Petitioner Tahanan Development
Corporation, hereinafter referred to as TAHANAN, claiming grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent Judge,
further seeks the setting aside of the decision rendered by the latter in Reconstitution Case No. 504-P, Land Registration
Case No. 9368, dated October 5, 1978 in favor of herein private respondents Nicolas A. Pascual and his co-heirs, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The Register of Deeds of Metro Manila, Makati Branch IV, is hereby ordered to
reconstitute from Decree No. 15170, Exhibit X, the plan and technical descriptions submitted to the Court-the certificate
of title, original and owner's duplicate copy, in the name of Manuela Aquial, single, Filipino, with residence at 307, 15th
Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City, giving the certificate appropriate number which will not conflict with other titles already
issued upon payment of the prescribed fees. The Branch Clerk of Court is directed to forward a certified copy of this
decision and all documents necessary for the reconstitution. (Rollo, p. 66).

The records of the case show that on October 5, 1977, private respondent hereinafter referred to as the Pascuals, claiming
as intestate heirs of Manuela Aquial who died on January 26, 1967, filed a petition for judicial reconstitution of lost
certificate of title under Republic Act No. 26 docketed as Reconstitution Case No. 504-P, Land Registration Case No. 9368
in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXIX, Pasay City, presided by respondent Judge Manuel E. Valenzuela, alleging
that:

xxx xxx xxx

2. That Manuela Aquial, the petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, while yet single and up to the time she got married,
was the registered owner of those contiguous lands, Lots 2 and 4 as shown in Plan II-4374, situated in Bo. San Dionisio,
Paranaque, Rizal now Bo. Cupang, Muntinlupa, Rizal, and more particularly bounded as follows:

1). A parcel of land (Lot 2 of Plan II-4374, L.R.C. No. ___), situated in the Barrio of San Dionisio, Municipality of
Paranaque, Province of Rizal (Now BO. CUPANG, Muntinlupa, Rizal) (.... containing an area of Three Hundred Seventy Five
Thousand Six Hundred and Twenty-Two (375,622) Square Meters. Bounded on the NE., NW., and W., along lines 1-2-3-4-
5-6-7 by Pedro L. Flores who is in occupation of the same and of which notice maybe served at his office address at No.
959 C. Lerma Street, Sampaloc, Manila or at his residence at No. 707 A. Constancia Street, Sampaloc, Manila; and on the
SE., along lines 7-8-9-10-1 (portion of Lot 1, Plan II-4374) by Maglana & Sons Management Corporation, a private
corporation existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines which is in occupation of the same and of which
notice may be served to it CIO Constancio B. Maglana, its President and Chairman of the Board at No. 513 Lafayette Street,
Greenhills Subdivision, Mandaluyong, Rizal:

2). A parcel of land (Lot 4 of Plan 11-4374, L.R.C. Record No. ___), situated in the Barrio of San Dionisio, Municipality
of Paraaque, Province of Rizal (Now Bo. Cupang, Muntinlupa, Rizal) (.... containing an area of Fifty-Six Thousand Two
Hundred Ninety-Five (56,295) Square Meters. Bounded on the NW., and SW., along lines 1-2-3 (portion of Lot 1, Plan 11-
4374) and on the SE., NE., and NW., along lines 3-4-5-1 (Portion of Lot 3, Plan II-4374), all by Maglana & Sons Management
Corporation, a private corporation existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines which is in occupation of the
same and of which notice may be served to it C/O Constancio B. Maglana, its President and Chairman of the Board, at No.
513 Lafayette Street, Greenhills Subdivision, Mandaluyong, Rizal. The above lots are more particularly described in herein
attached Decree No. 15170 issued on March 4, 1914 with the same boundaries and description contained in the
corresponding original certificate of title (original and owner's duplicate copy) issued therefor in Land Registration Case
No. 9368 on file with the Land Registration Commission; that said lands have not been included in any cadastral survey;

3. That the petitioners, by themselves and thru their predecessors-in-interest Manuela Aquial have been and still
are in the actual, public, exclusive, adverse, continuous and peaceful occupation of the afore-described lands as owners
in fee simple since time immemorial, devoting a small portion thereof to agriculture;

4. That the said original certificate of title, original and owner's duplicate copies, covering said lands have been lost
or destroyed in the last World War II and diligent efforts to locate the same have been all in vain; that said title was
subsisting and in force at the time it was lost or destroyed, free from liens and encumbrances of any kind and nature up
to the present; that the records of the land registration case of the same lots have likewise been lost and destroyed except
such records as hereinafter set forth;

5. That there is no record of any sales patent, sales certificate or any land grant over said lands to any person or
entity; that no Co-owner's, Mortgagee's, Lessee's or any lien holder's copy of said Original Certificate of Title have ever
been issued; that Manuela Aquial as well as her first and second husbands, Esteban Pascual and Cornelio Mejia and
petitioners herein have not at any time delivered the Owner's Duplicate copy of subject certificate of title to any person
or entity to secure the payment of or performance of any obligation whatsoever nor any transaction entered into by them
by which certain deed or other instruments related to or affecting the subject lands presented for or pending registration
in the office of the Register of Deeds for Makati, Metro Manila;

6. That said Manuela Aquial died intestate in Cubao, Quezon City on January 26, 1967 leaning the aforementioned
estate to the herein petitioners as her heirs, without debts;

7. That for purposes of said inheritance, the petitioners desire in this petition to reconstitute the lost original
certificate of title, Original and Owner's Duplicate copies, covering said Lots 2 and 4, Plan II-4374 herein above described,
on the basis of: (1) Said Decree No. 15170 issued on March 4, 1914 (Annex "A") and the certification thereof by the Chief,
Docket Division, Land Registration Commission (Annex "A-1 "); (2) Survey Plan II-4374 from microfilm Reel 560 under
Accession No. 385657 on file with the Bureau of lands (Annex "B "); and certification thereof (Annex "B-1 "), and the
corresponding affidavit of the Chief, Reproduction Section, Bureau of Lands, attesting to such fact (Annex "B-2"); (3)
Certified Technical Description of Lots 2 and 4 under said Plan 11-4374, by the Chief, Surveys Division, Bureau of Lands
(Annexes "C" and "C-1 "); (4) Certification by the Acting Chief, Records Division, Bureau of Lands, that there is no record
of any Sales Patent, Sales Certificates or any land grant affecting or embracing the subject lands to any person (Annex "D
"); (5) Tax Declaration (Annexes "E", "E-1", "E- 2" and "E-3"); (6) Tax Receipts (Annexes "F" and "F-1 "); (7) Affidavit of
adjoining owner Pedro L. Flores executed before Notary Public Atty. F.S. Guanco for Quezon City (Annex "G"); (8) White
print copy of Relocation Plan dated July 7-12, 1974, with the certification of Geodetic Engineer Restituto L. Beltran who
conducted said relocation survey of Lots Nos. 2 and 4, Plan II-4374 in the presence of the adjoining owners (Annex " H ").
All of which are xerox copies and made integral parts of this petition but the originals thereof shall be presented at the
hearing.

On October 5, 1977, the Notice of Hearing was issued by the Court and likewise, for its materiality in resolving the issue
of jurisdiction, We quote the material portions thereof below:

NOTICE OF HEARING

A verified petition dated September 2, 1977 has been filed by petitioners, thru counsel, alleging, among others, that:

(Paragraphs 1 to 7 are omitted, being the same allegations in the Petition for Reconstitution hereinbefore quoted.)

Now, therefore, notice is hereby given that this petition will be heard before this Court, sitting on the 2nd floor, New City
Hall Building, F.B. Harrison, Pasay City, Metro Manila, on the 18th day of November, 1977, at 8:30 o'clock in the morning,
at which date, time and place, all interested parties are hereby cited to appear and show cause, if any why said petition
should not be granted.

Let copies of this Notice be published in the Official Gazette and in the Newspaper of general circulation in the Greater
Manila Area, once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks at the expense of the petitioners, and likewise posted in the
bulletin board of the Court of First Instance of Pasay City.

Let the Office of the Land Registration Commission and the Bureau of Lands be furnished this Notice and copies of the
petition, together with its annexes.

WITNESS the HON. MANUEL E. VALENZUELA, presiding Judge of the Court, this 5th day of October, 1977.

(SGD.) BASILIO B. BOLANTE Branch Clerk of Court

The above notice was published in the Official Gazette in the issues of November 14, 21 and 28 1977 (Exhibits "A", "B",
"B-I", "C", "D", "D-1", "E" and "E-1").Copies of the same notice were also posted by Deputy Sheriff Arsenio de Guzman of
Pasay City in the Bulletin Board of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch located at the Hall of Justice, City
Hall Building, Pasay City on October 5, 1977 (Exhibit "F"). On the same date, copies of the notice were served to the Office
of the Solicitor General and on November 9, 1977. to his Commissioner of Land Registration by Deputy Sheriff De Guzman
(Exhibit "F"), together with copies of the petition and its annexes. The proofs submitted of notice to the adjacent owners
indicated in the Petition and Notice of Hearing, namely, Pedro L. Flores with address at 959 C. Lerma Street, Sampaloc,
Manila and Constancio B. Maglana as President and Chairman of the Board of Maglana & Sons Management Corporation
with office and postal address at 513 Lafayette Street, Greenhills Subdivision, Mandaluyong, Rizal, are their respective
affidavits dated July 17, 1974 and August 6,1974 (Exhibits "H" and "I").

The Director of Lands thru counsel, Atty. Daniel C. Florida, Special Attorney of the Office of the Solicitor General, filed on
April 14, 1978 an Opposition to the petition on the following grounds:

1. That the same petitioners in this Reconstitution Case No. 504-P, Nicolas A. Pascual, et al. claiming to be the heirs
of the late Manuela Aquial, had previously filed a similar petition for reconstitution of the alleged lost original certificate
of title supposed to have been issued in Land Registration Case No. 9368 under Decree No. 15170 in the name of Manuela
Aquial over the same parcels of land, Lots 2 and 4, Plan II-4374 situated at Bo. San Dionisio, Paranaque, Rizal, which
previous petition, docketed as Reconstitution Case No. 77 in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXXVI, Makati,
Rizal, appears to have been dismissed, Oppositor Director of Lands hereby reserves his right to present later a certified
copy of the order of dismissal, as he has not yet received a reply of the Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance, Branch
XXXVI, to our letter to him dated March 14, 1978, duplicate copy hereto attached as Annex "A", requesting for a certified
copy of the order or decision resolving said Reconstitution Case No. 77, which order or decision may be a dismissal with
prejudice and may thus be a bar to the filing of the instant Reconstitution Case No. 504-P based on the principle of res
judicata;

2. That contrary to the claim of petitioners that the aforementioned Lots 2 and 4, Plan II-4374 situated at Bo. San
Dionisio, Paranaque, Rizal were issued Decree No. 15170 on March 4, 1914 in the name of Manuela Aquial in Land
Registration Case No. 9368 and that the corresponding original certificate of title for said Decree were registered and
issued under the said Decree, the truth is that said Decree No. 15170 in Land Registration Case No. 9368 was issued in
favor of Eugenio Tuason, married to Maximina Geronimo, and Eugenio T. Changco, married to Romana Gatchalian,
covering a parcel of land with an area of 422 square meters situated at Bambang; Pasig, Rizal, and not for Lots 2 and 4
Plan 11-4374 with a total area of 431,917 square meters situated at Bo. San Dionisio, Paranaque, Rizal. These facts are
evidenced by the letter dated February 28, 1978 of the Acting Register of Deeds of Rizal, the letter dated March 9, 1978
of the same Acting Register of Deeds of Rizal, and the Report dated November 11, 1974 of the then Register of Deeds of
Rizal submitted to him as required by the court in the previous Reconstitution Case No. 77 filed with Branch XXXVI of this
Honorable Court at Makati, Rizal, xerox copies of said letters and report are hereto attached as ANNEX "B", ANNEX "C"
and ANNEX "D", respectively;

3. That from the documents ANNEXES "B", "C", and "D", it is very clear that no original certificate of title had or has
been issued to Manuela Aquial covering Lots 2 and 4, Plan II-4374, situated at Bo. San Dionisio, Paranaque, Rizal; that
consequently, no original certificate of title in the name of Manuela Aquial has been lost; and that therefore, this instant
petition for reconstitution of an alleged lost original certificate of title has no basis in fact and in law, there being no title
to be reconstituted under Republic Act No. 26;

4. That the applicants for land registration in Land Registration Case No. 9368, Decree No. 15170, of the then Court
of Land Registration were Eugenio Tuason, married to Maximina Geronimo, and Eusebio T. Changco, married to Romana
Gatchalian, and not Manuela Aquial; and that the land subject thereof was a parcel of land in Bambang, Pasig, Rizal, and
not a parcel of land in San Dionisio, Paranaque, Rizal;

5. That the same Decree No. 15170 in Land Registration Case No. 9368 issued in favor of Eugenio Tuason, et al. for
a parcel of land in Bambang, Pasig, Rizal could not have been also issued in the name of Manuela Aquial for a parcel of
land in San Dionisio, Paranaque, Rizal;

6. That the genuineness or authenticity of ANNEX "A" of the petition in this case which is alleged to be a copy of
Decree No. 15170 issued in the name of Manuela Aquial is very questionable on the following grounds and points:

(a) ANNEX "A" is a xerox copy not of the original of Decree No. 15170 or of an authenticated copy thereof but only of
an unauthenticated true copy of said decree as indicated by the typewritten words 'A true copy:' at the bottom of the left
hand corner of page (2) of said document;

(b) The said typewritten words 'A true copy:' is not signed or even initiated by any competent officer of the court of
the Land Registration Commission to give it authenticity;

(c) That ANNEX "A" is a xerox copy of the original of Decree No. 15170 of an authenticated copy thereof but only of
a true copy is also seen from the first line on top of the document on page 1 which reads: 'Copy of Decree No. 15170'. An
original of a Decree is issued without the words 'Copy of' prefixed before the Decree Number;

(d) ANNEX "A" being a mere xerox copy of an authenticated 'true copy', it is very questionable why the true copy
which was reproduced by the xerox copy marked ANNEX "A" bears the written signature of the Clerk of Court, Enrique
Altavas by way of attestation of the decree. It is well known that a mere true copy of any document, public or private,
does not bear the written signature of the party or officer signing or issuing the document. Only the original or duplicate
of the document may bear the written signature of the party or officer signing or issuing the document;

(e) In ANNEX "A-1" of the petition in the instant case, alleged to be a certification of Decree No. 15170, what appears
to have been certified by the Chief, Docket Division of the Land Registration Commission is that the document (Decree
No. 15170) 'is a true and correct reproduction of a true copy of Decree No. 15170.' Where is the original or an authentic
signed duplicate of Decree No. 15170?

(f) ANNEX "F", either the xerox copy of a true copy, or the true copy reproduced by the xerox copy, is an
UNAUTHENTICATED copy of the alleged decree, and therefore, it cannot be the valid basis for reconstitution under Section
2 of Republic Act No. 26;

7. That contrary to the allegation in paragraph 3 of the petition, petitioners by themselves and thru their
predecessor-in-interest Manuela Aquial have not been in the actual, exclusive and continuous occupation of the lands
subject of their petitions since time immemorial, the truth of the matter being that their alleged occupation is only of
recent vintage, having declared the lots for taxation only in 1973, beginning with the year 1970 (ANNEXES "E", "E-1", "E-
2", and "E-3"), and paid the taxes for 1970 to 1973 in lump sum on September 6,1973 (ANNEXES "F " and "F-11');

8. That Lots 2 and 4, Plan II-4374 have never been applied for and registered under the Land Registration Law, Act
No. 496, the same being lands of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines and are portions of the
adjoining public land as indicated in Plan II-4374, subject to disposition only under the pertinent and applicable provisions
of the Public Land Act, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended;

9. That not all the jurisdictional facts of the instant case have been established and therefore, this Honorable Court
has not acquired jurisdiction to hear and resolve the case under Republic Act No. 26, for the reason that petitioners thru
counsel have failed to serve notice of the petition in this case to the owners of the adjoining properties. The affidavits of
the alleged adjoining owners,, Constancio B. Maglana and Pedro L. Flores submitted by petitioners as Exhibits " H " and "
I " respectively, and which were executed in 1974 before the petition in the instant case was filed on November 15, 1977,
cannot be validly admitted as substitute for service of notice of the petition to the adjoining owners as required under
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 26; and

10. That the instant petition for reconstitution should be dismissed outright for lack of factual and legal basis, the
Decree No. 15170 involved by petitioners having been issued in favor of other persons named Eugenio Tuason, et al. for
a different parcel of land located in another barrio and municipality.

On November 18, 1977, the date scheduled for the hearing as indicated in the Notices, the Court re-set the hearing of the
case to February 27, 1978, it appearing that the Notice of Hearing had not been published in the Official Gazette as per
information relayed to the Court by the petitioners. Again, the hearing set on February 27, 1978 was re-scheduled to April
14, 1978 in view of the manifestation of the representative of the Bureau of Lands that they have not received copy of the
petition. Once more, the latter setting was cancelled and re-set to June 2, l978 on the ground that the counsel for
petitioner informed the Court that they have just received the Opposition dated April 11, 1978 filed by Solicitor Daniel
Florida.

Meanwhile, the Pascuals filed their Reply to the Opposition alleging, among others, that they had filed a previous petition
docketed as Reconstitution Case No. 77 in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXXVI, Makati, Rizal which was
voluntarily withdrawn by them on grounds stated by their counsel in his Motion to Withdraw without prejudice and
granted by the Court in its Order dated May 30, 1975; that the report of the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal mentioning
that Decree No. 15170 appears in the name of Eugenio Tuason and Eusebio T. Changco in Original Certificate of Title No.
724 does not preclude the existence of Decree No. 15170 issued in the name of Manuela Aquial in Land Registration Case
No. 9368 since, assuming the report of the Register of Pasig to be accurate, it could have been a clerical error or mistake
of the clerk in the office of the Register of Deeds in typing on the Original Certificate of Title No. 724 the same Decree No.
and the same Registration No. as that issued in favor of Manuela Aquial; and that there may be two decrees bearing the
same number but involving different parcels of land is nothing unusual or surprising, in the same manner that there may
be two or three certificates of titles bearing the same number but in the names of different owners covering properties in
different places and issued at different periods of time.

The trial court granted the petition for reconstitution in its decision dated October 5, 1978. The court said:

The documents presented by the petitioners to establish the existence of the prerequisites to reconstitution of the title in
the name of their predecessor-in-interests were either admitted or not objected to by Atty. Rodolfo J. Flores in
representation of the Director of Lands, except Exhibits O and P on Plan II-4374 on the alleged ground that they were
reproduced from a microfilm reel and not from available approved records, as well as Exhibits X, X-1 and X-2 (Decree No.
15170), on the ground that they were mere xerox copies not of the original of the Decree or an authenticated copy thereof.

Counsel for oppositor overlooks the realities that forced the petitioners to seek reconstitution of the title of their
predecessor-in-interests. The original of the Decree was sent to the register of deeds for the issuance of the certificate of
title. It was in the latter office that it was lost. The copy left in the Land Registration Commission is authenticated by the
signature of the Clerk of Court of the Land Registration Court, Enrique Altavas. To limit the bases of reconstitution to
originals of the official documents is to defeat the purpose of the law. Reason and the law would not justify private
properties to remain forever with their titles unreconstituted.

The grounds for the objection disregards the destruction of many government records during the last world war and
defeats the purpose of the law on reconstitution. If those records were not destroyed, there would be no need for
reconstitution. The loss and destruction underscore the need for reconstitution. Reconstitution or reconstruction relates
to lost original records in the government offices, Any data available may suffice if the Court is convinced of the existence
of the title being reconstituted. This is in accord with the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Villa vs. Fabricante,
L-5531, June 30, 1953. If the law allows reconstitution from testimony a fortiori it must allow reconstitution upon xerox
copies of documents microfilmed in anticipation of possible loss thereof. The microfilm underscores the existence of the
documents, for without them there would be nothing to microfilm, The Government has enjoined by Decree the
microfilming of important documents.

By and large, the presence of the signature of the Clerk of Court of the land registration court on the Decree attests to its
genuineness and authenticity, He is too dead to falsify the Decree Exhibit X.

Except Exhibit 5 which is a xerox copy of a cancelled owner's duplicate copy of Certificate of Title No. 724 and which
mentions Decree No. 15170, the oppositor's documentary evidence are letters of inquiry and replies thereto. By their very
nature, they are too weak as basis to establish any fact. The writers thereof were not presented as witnesses to be cross-
examined on their contents. The witness who was presented to Identify the exhibits was not the receiver nor custodian
of said communications. He admittedly does not know the contents thereof.

Exhibit 5, a supposed cancelled owner's duplicate of the title of Eugenio Tuason which mentions Decree No. 15170 refers
to a 422-square meter lot in Bambang, Pasig, Rizal which is different from the Decree Exhibit X for the two lots in Cupang,
Muntinlupa, Rizal having a total area of 431,917 square meters. The existence of the owner's duplicate copy in the office
of the register of deeds without the original is a suspicious circumstance never explained by anybody. The mystery goes
deeper if we consider that no other document, private or public, was presented to support the existence of the original
title or the decree upon which the title was based. Nobody even testified on the existence of this Exhibit 5 in the office of
the register of deeds.

The Decree Exhibit X enjoys the probative value of an official document existing in the proper depositary unaccompanied
by any circumstance of suspicion. The law reposes probative force upon the official documents as it presumes fidelity in
the discharge of duties of public officers. The authenticity of the Decree issued in favor of petitioners' predecessor having
been established, the Decree Exhibit X 'shall bind the land, and quiet title thereto' and 'shall be conclusive upon all persons,
including the Insular Government and all branches thereof,' and 'incontrovertible' after one year from the issuance of the
Decree (Sec. 30, Act 496).

Reconstitution of destroyed certificates of title is mandatory (Director vs. Gan Tan, L-2664, May 30, 1951). The bases for
judicial reconstitution of certificates of title are numerous (Secs. 2 and 3, Rep. Act 26). Among them are:

(d) An authenticated copy of the decree of registration ...(Sec. 2, Rep. Act 26)

(f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or
destroyed certificate of title (Secs. 2, 3, Rep. Act 26).

In the light of the foregoing impressive and overwhelming evidence adduced by the petitioners in support of their petition
for the reconstitution of the title in the name of Manuela Aquial, the court has no alternative to granting the petition.
Republic Act 26 provides:

SEC. 15. If the court, after hearing, finds that the documents presented, as supported by parole evidence or otherwise,
are sufficient and proper to warrant the reconstitution of the lost or destroyed certificate of title, and that the petitioner
is the registered owner of the property or has an interest therein, that the said certificate of title was in force at the time
it was lost or destroyed, and that the description, area and boundaries of the property are substantially the same as those
contained in the lost or destroyed certificate of title, an order of reconstitution shall be issued.

The requirements of Sections 5, 12, and 13 of Republic Act 26 have been complied with. The Court has no reason to doubt
the credibility of the witnesses for the petitioners, particularly the government officials subpoenaed who had occasion
and reason to know the facts they testified to, being parts of their functions and duties in their respective offices.

The Court discerns nothing from the opposition which Atty. Florida filed for the Director of Lands except his seal to protect
possible interests of the Government. From the sparks created by his opposition, the Court saw the crystal truth.

Copy of the above decision was served the Land Registration Commission on October 16, 1978.

On November 15, 1978, herein petitioner Tahanan Development Corporation filed with the Court a quo verified Petition
To Set Aside Decision and Re-Open Proceedings, alleging that:

xxx xxx xxx

2. Sometime in 1971, in the course of its operations, Oppositor acquired and became the registered owner of six (6)
parcels of land situated in Barrio San Dionisio, Paranaque, Rizal (now Metro Manila) and aggregating some sixty (60)
hectares in area; xerox copies of the certificates of title, all of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Rizal, covering said
parcels of land and issued in Oppositor's name are attached to and made an integral part of this Petition as follows:

Annex "A"-T.C.T. No. 324558

Annex "B"-T.C.T. No. 324559

Annex "C"-T.C.T. No. 324560

Annex "D''-T.C.T. No. 324561

Annex "E "-T.C.T. No. 324562

Annex "F"-T.C.T. No. 351775

All of said certificates of title originated from the 'mother title' ,Original Certificate of Title No. 6567 of the Registry of
Deeds of Rizal, issued pursuant to Decree No. 515888 issued in Land Registration Case No. 776, a copy of said O.C.T. No.
6567 is attached to and made an integral part of Petition as Annex "A";

3. The aforementioned certificates of title, Annexes "A" to "F", were later wholly or partly superseded by individual
certificates of title, about one thousand four hundred (1,400) in all, and also in Oppositor's name, covering the individual
home lots, street lots and other spaces into which the lands above referred to were subdivided in the course of the
development of what are now known as Phase I and Phase II of Oppositor's 'Tahanan Village,' and while ownership of, and
registered title to, some of the home lots have since passed to individual buyers by virtue of final sales, a considerable
number of said certificates of title still remain in the name of Oppositor;

4. Under date of October 5, 1978, this Honorable Court rendered a Decision in the above-entitled proceedings,
granting the Petitioners' petition for reconstitution of a lost certificate of title, original and owner's duplicate, allegedly
issued pursuant to Decree No. 15170 dated March 4, 1914 in Case No. 9368 of the land Registration Court, and directing
the register of deeds of Metro Manila, Makati Branch IV:

... to reconstitute from Decree No. 15170, Exhibit K, the plan and technical descriptions submitted to the court the
certificate of title original and owner's duplicate copy, in the name of Manuela Aquial, single, Filipino, with residence at
307, 15th Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City, giving the certificate appropriate number which will not conflict with other titles
already issued upon payment of the prescribed fees. ...

5. The land supposedly covered by the certificate of title thus ordered reconstituted appears to consist of two (2)
parcels located in Barrio San Dionisio, Paranaque, Rizal, with an aggregate area of forty three (43) hectares, more or less,
the technical descriptions of which are set forth in the alleged copy of Decree No. 15170, Land Registration Case No. 9368
relied upon by Petitioners;

6. Upon a comparison of said technical descriptions with those set forth in the certificates of title, Annexes "A" to
"F" of the present Petition, it would appear that the land supposedly covered by the certificate of title ordered
reconstituted overlap and include substantial portions of Oppositor's lands covered by the titles, Annexes " A " to " F ";
the location and extent of the overlapping, as plotted on the basis of the respective technical descriptions referred to, is
,shown on the sketch plan, marked Annex "H", which is attached to and made an integral part of this Petition;

7. Oppositor, therefore, has a substantial, material and proprietary interest in the subject matter of these
proceedings which is directly and adversely affected by the Decision already referred to;

8. Oppositor, as the owner of lands not only adjacent to, but in fact overlapped by, the land supposedly covered by
the title sought to be reconstituted, was entitled to personal notice of the petition for reconstitution; such requirement
of notice is jurisdictional, being mandated by section 13 of Republic Act No. 26, and the consequence of failure to comply
therewith is that the court never acquires jurisdiction to entertain and hear the petition or render valid judgment thereon.

The salient feature of this method (of judicial reconstitution under Republic Act No. 26) is a petition and a hearing after
two successive insertions in the Official Gazette of the notice of hearing. It partakes of the nature of an original registration
proceedings, personal service of the notice of hearing to the adjoining owners and occupants being essential, as well as
posting of the notice in main entrances of the Provincial and Municipal Buildings where the land lies at least thirty days
prior to the date of hearing. (Ponce, The Philippine Torrens System, p. 272).

9. Oppositor, as such adjoining owner, was not given notice of the petition for reconstitution; these proceedings
were instituted, set for hearing, were heard and went to judgment without Oppositor's knowledge; indeed, it was only on
or about November 9, 1978, more than one month after the date of the Decision allowing and ordering reconstitution,
and only because another adjoining owner similarly affected saw fit to so inform it, that oppositor first learned of the
existence of the present proceedings;

10. Oppositor was denied due process and deprived of its day in court through fraud, accident or mistake, consisting
in that Petitioners, knowing or being chargeable with knowledge that the 'Tahanan Village' is a privately-owned and
operated residential subdivision and that oppositor is the owner/developer thereof, failed-and to all indications by
deliberate design-to name Oppositor as adjoining owner or occupant in their petition for reconstitution; and Petitioners
did more than fail to name Oppositor as an adjoining owner and to serve it notice of these proceedings, it would appear
that they actively concealed or sought to conceal such fact; in the survey plan, Exhibit "V", submitted by them to the Court
which, by its terms, is based on a survey made as late as July 712, 1974, the area where Oppositor's 'Tahanan Village'
would lie is described as public land; and these circumstances directly led to and produced the results already stated,
namely, that oppositor, never having been notified of the petition for reconstitution, was not able to oppose the same or
to be heard thereon;

11. The gravity and inexcusable character of Petitioners' conduct above complained of is made manifest by the fact
that for several years now, the existence of 'Tahanan Village' as a privately owned and occupied residential subdivision
has been made apparent to all and sundry by such prominent features as the perimeter fence or wall separating it from '
adjacent estates, the roads, streets and constantly increasing volume of home construction within the subdivision itself,
the very visible electrical lighting and water supply installations, the presence of private security guards guarding the
premises, to mention only a few; moreover, it has a number of signs of conspicuous size and location Identifyi ng and
advertising it as a housing development owned and/or managed by Oppositor; all of said circumstances render it hardly
conceivable that Petitioners, who hold themselves out as actual possessors of the property involved in these proceedings
(p. 3 Decision), could even innocently misapprehend the adjoining development ('Tahanan Village') as ownerless and
untenanted;

12. oppositor has good and meritorious grounds to oppose the petition for reconstitution; one of such grounds-and
a principal one-is that Land Registration Case No. 9368 and Decree No. 15170 issued therein, which Petitioners invoke and
rely upon, in actual fact refer, not to the lands claimed by said Petitioners, but to another parcel of land only some 422
square meters in area and located in Barrio Bambang, Pasig, Rizal, that by virtue of said Decree, Original Certificate of Title
No. 724 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal was issued in the names of Eugenio Tuason and Eusebio T. Changco, and that said
land eventually passed to its present owners, Pedro Tuason, et al., under the current Transfer Certificate of Title No. 77516
(Rizal) and Agripino Changco, et al., under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 77515 (Rizal) which was later superseded by
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 150102 and 150103;

13. Oppositor is ready, if its present Petition is granted, to produce persuasive evidence of the facts above averred,
evidence which perforce will also show the proofs, both oral and documentary, adduced by Petitioners in support of the
petition for reconstitution to be untrustworthy and wanting in requisite integrity, hence inadequate and insufficient to
warrant grant of the reconstitution sought;

14. The Decision allowing and ordering reconstitution is not yet final, the Land Registration Commission having been
served with copy thereof on October 16, 1978; the thirty-day period for finality prescribed in section 110, 2nd paragraph,
of Presidential Decree No. 1529 has not yet expired;

xxx xxx xxx

On the same day, November 15, 1978, Alabang Development Corporation and Ramon D. Bagatsing filed a Petition To Set
Aside The Decision of October 5, 1978, claiming that the Court has no jurisdiction to grant the petition for reconstitution
since they have not been personally notified of the pendency of the reconstitution case to which they are entitled under
Republic Act No. 26 not only as adjoining owners but as actual possessors thereof; that granting arguendo that the title
subject to be reconstituted is valid, which it is not, the same cannot prevail over the earlier titles of Alabang Development
Corporation and Ramon D. Bagatsing under TCT No. 45397 and TCT No. 45398 which are transfers from the Original
Certificate of Title No. 684 in the name of the Government of the Philippine Islands issued on September 20, 1913 pursuant
to Decree No. 4552 issued August 27, 1910; and that the overlapping of the area of the title sought to be reconstituted on
the area of the parcels of land evidenced by the titles of Alabang Development Corporation and Bagatsing would result in
a case of the same land registered in the name of two different persons.

The Director of Lands, thru the Solicitor General, filed Notice of Appeal and a Motion for Extension to File Record on
Appeal on November 16,1978. Respondent Judge in his Order of November 23, 1978 granted the Solicitor General's
motion, extending the period for appeal for another thirty days from date of its issuance but did not pass upon nor resolve
the petitions to set aside and re-open proceedings filed by Tahanan, Alabang Development Corporation and Ramon D.
Bagatsing, the Court ruling that:

The oppositor director of Lands, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, was a party in the proceedings before
this Court. Said oppositor had adopted to resort to appeal as the appropriate remedy. The Court finds it, therefore,
unnecessary to resolve the Petition To Set Aside Decision and To Re-Open Proceedings filed by Tahanan Development
Corporation and the Petition to Set Aside The Decision of October 5, 1978 filed by the Alabang Development Corporation
and Ramon D. Bagatsing.

Copy of the above Order was served on Tahanan thru counsel on December 12, 1978. On December 14, 1978, petitioner
filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said Order of November 23, 1978 alleging that the "shelving" of its Petition To Set
Aside Decision was equivalent to a denial thereof; that the effect of such "shelving" if maintained up to the perfection of
the appeal of the Director of Lands would be to deny petitioner recourse both in the court of the respondent Judge and
in the appellate court, because the respondent Judge would then lose jurisdiction over the proceedings and petitioner,
not yet actually a party to the proceedings but only seeking to be admitted as such, could not intervene in the appeal to
protect its interest; that the Petition To Set Aside, the purpose of which was precisely to effect the admission of petitioner
as a party and to allow it an opportunity to present evidence opposing the reconstitution, was sufficient in form and
substance to merit resolution and approval; and that considerations of justice, fairness, due process and correct procedure
dictated :hat the Petition To Set-Aside be first resolved before allowing The appeal of the Director of Lands to proceed to
perfection.

The Motion for Reconsideration was set for hearing and submitted on December 19, 1978. As of December 21, 1978,
when the period for appeal extended in favor of oppositor Director of Lands was about to expire on December 23, 1978
and said Director of Lands had not yet filed a record on appeal, the possibility that once the record on appeal is filed, the
approval thereof with the consequent perfection of appeal and transfer of jurisdiction to the appellate court can come at
any moment, Since the Petition To Set Aside and the Motion for Reconsideration were still pending or awaiting resolution,
the same would be rendered moot and academic and petitioner left without remedy in both the trial court and the
appellate court. To forestall that eventuality and to preserve recourse in the matter, petitioner opted to file a Petition for
certiorari with the appellate court without further awaiting resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration, the petition
docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-08680.

The Director of Lands failed to perfect its appeal with the Court of Appeals. Alabang Development Corporation and Ramon
D. Bagatsing did not interpose any appeal.

Petitioner in its Petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. No. SP-08680) claiming arbitrariness and grave abuse of discretion on the
part of respondent Judge for by-passing its Petition To Set Aside, and for not acting on its Motion for Reconsideration after
hearing and submission despite awareness of the fact that the period -)f appeal extended by the Court was about to lapse
and raising the issue of whether the Court acquired jurisdiction over the reconstitution case despite absence of personal
notice to it as adjoining owner, prayed for preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order for the preservation of
the status quo in Reconstitution Case No. 504-P by prohibiting and restraining the respondent Judge, and his successors
in office, from scheduling, conducting or otherwise entertaining, setting in motion, or continuing, all and any further
proceedings and incidents in said case, particularly, but not limited to, proceedings relative or leading to the perfection of
the final judgment on the Petition for certiorari or until further orders from the Court of Appeals.

Respondent Court of Appeals gave due course to Tahanan's petition in the Resolution of December 29, 1978. Respondent
Judge was likewise ordered to resolve petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. A bond was filed by petitioner on January
9, 1979 and thereupon a restraining order was issued "enjoining the respondent Judge from taking any action in
Reconstitution Case No. 504-P which will make him lose jurisdiction over said case such that he can no longer act on
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, dated December 14, 1978. If any such action has already been taken, the same
shall be set aside by respondent Judge. "

Under legal compulsion, respondent Judge resolved Tahanan's Motion for Reconsideration on January 4, 1979. He denied
it.

On November 16, 1979, the Court of Appeals decided in favor of the petitioner, ruling that respondent Judge did not
exercise sound discretion in refusing to re-open the case below so that Tahanan could protect its property rights which
could possibly be impaired by the reconstitution. The appellate court granted the Petition for certiorari on the basis of the
following considerations:

1. The PROPERTY must now be of substantial value because, even at P100.00 per square meter, its more than 43
hectares could be worth some P43 million.

According to TAHANAN (Annex H of its Motion to Reopen), Lot No. 2 of the PROPERTY overlaps a substantial part of its
own land. Although the exact area of the overlap has been given, it can be estimated at about 10 hectares, which r-an be
worth P10 million. The value of the land which TAHANAN seeks to protect is such as should have induced the lower court
to reopen the CASE BELOW to give an opportunity to TAHANAN to prove its contentions. Denial of reopening, even if
technically possible as a matter of law, would not be equitable.

2. It is more or less of public knowledge that the Land Registration Commission has been charged with anomalies.
The lower court should have reopened the CASE BELOW if only to assure itself that Exh. X is not an anomaly committed
by the Commission, a possibility which TAHANAN might be able to show.

The lower court had already shoved aside the proposition advanced by the Director of Lands that Exh. X issued in Land
Registration Case No. 9368 was issued in favor of Eugenio Tuason and Eusebio T. Changco covering a parcel of 422 sq. m.
situated in the Municipality of Pasig. Respondent Judge concluded that the title allegedly issued (Exh. 5) was a result of
that Decree was only a photostat and was weak evidence, as the supposed original could not be found in the office of the
Register of Deeds. But TAHANAN could prove through the Official Gazette of December 13, 1913 (pp. 198, 200, Rollo) that
in Land Registration Case No. 9368, the applicants were Eugenio Tuason and Eusebio T. Changco, and not MANUELA
Aquial. While Exh. X could be a forgery, the Official Gazette cannot be spurious. Accidentally, if respondent Judge found
that Exhibit 5 was weak as it was only a copy, under the same token he should neither have given credence to Exh. X,
which was also merely a xerox copy.

3. It has been noted that the certification made by the deceased Enrique Altavas of Exh. X bears no date. That is an
important factor to ascertain; not only for the determination of the genuineness of his signature, but also for the
determination of the plausible reason why the certification was made. As a rule, signatures can be established as genuine
by comparison with accepted true signatures executed around the same date.

4. It has also been further noted that there is no record that a Torrens title had been issued in the name of MANUELA
as no mention of the number thereof is in the record. It certainly would be strange if no title had been issued since 1914.
If a title ha-d been issued, the number thereof should have been mentioned in one document or other, executed after
1914. For example in the tax declarations submitted by MANUELA before and after the war, the number of her title (or
the fact that it has been lost) would have been mentioned.

5. Exh. X was supposed to have been issued to MANUELA on March 4, 1914 when she was still single. However, her
son, Nicolas A. Pascual, testified in 1977 or 1978 that he was then 67 years old. He must have been born in 1910 which
would belie that MANUELA was still single in 1914.

6. In a re-opening, TAHANAN may ask for a relocation survey to the actually made of the property by placing new
monuments. It should be advisable that such a relocation survey in the presence of the parties be made so that possible
occupants and adjoining owners will have direct and personal knowledge of the reconstitution proceedings.

7. The appeal by the government will not adequately protect the rights of TAHANAN and other land owners who
may be affected by the reconstitution. For one thing, the Government did not introduce its own handwriting expert, which
TAHANAN might do, in order to assail the authenticity of Exh. X. Ordinarily, whether a signature in a xerox copy is genuine
or forged is difficult to determine.

The Court of Appeals further sustained the right of Tahanan to be heard in the case below on the basis of and in accordance
with the Resolution of the Supreme Court of September 25, 1979 in Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-45168,
the first case mentioned at the beginning hereof as one of the three cases recently decided by Us that are directly related
to and squarely Identified with the petition at bar wherein We admitted the intervention of the intervenors filed before
Us even as of the time that the petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals granting reconstitution of the lost
and/or destroyed certificate of title was already submitted for decision in the Supreme Court. "We are duty-bound to
abide with the rulings of the Supreme Court," said the appellate court, and it concludes with the dispositive part, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the Orders of the lower court of November 23, 1978 and January 4, 1979, as well as the Decision of October
5, 1978, are hereby set aside and respondent Judge is hereby directed to reopen the CASE BELOW so that TAHANAN can
present its evidence and cross-examine the witnesses of private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

Private respondents filed their Motion for Reconsideration dated December 4, 1979 of the CA Decision penned by Justice
Corazon Juliano Agrava, arguing that the decision being set aside by the appellate court had long become final and
executory; that the lower court had proper jurisdiction over the reconstitution case; that petitioner's remedy should not
be a petition for certiorari but an ordinary action for determination of the alleged overlapping of land areas; and that the
Court of Appeals erroneously applied the Supreme Court resolution in Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-
45168, September 25, 1979.

Through a Special Division of Five, respondent Court of Appeals granted the Pascual's Motion for Reconsideration and
reversed its previous decision of November 16, 1979, through its Resolution promulgated April 30, 1980. The petition for
certiorari filed by Tahanan was thereby dismissed and the restraining order issued on January 9, 1979 was ordered
dissolved.

With obvious vehemence, Justice Agrava dissented from the findings of the majority, unequivocally observing that "the
alleged difference between that case (Director of Lands vs. CA) and the present case (is) pure casuistry and a failure to
abide by decisions of the Supreme Court.

In the instant appeal before Us, petitioner Tahanan assigns numerous errors committed by the appellate court but the
principal and fundamental issues to be resolved is whether or not the trial court properly acquired and was invested with
jurisdiction to hear and decide Reconstitution Case No. 504-P in the light of the strict and mandatory provisions of Republic
Act No. 26. Upon resolving this pivotal issue, the corollary issue as to respondent Judge's grave abuse of discretion in
denying Tahanan's Petition To Set Aside Decision and To Re-Open the, Proceedings of Reconstitution Case No. 504- P as
well as to whether the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the decision of respondent Judge, will find the correct and
appropriate answers.

Republic Act No. 26 entitled "An act providing a special procedure for the reconstitution of Torrens Certificates of Title
lost or destroyed" approved on September 25, 1946 confers jurisdiction or authority to the Court of First Instance to hear
and decide petitions for judicial reconstitution. The Act specifically provides the special requirements and mode of
procedure that must be followed before the court can properly act, assume and acquire jurisdiction or authority over the
petition and grant the reconstitution prayed for. These requirements and procedure are mandatory. The Petition for
Reconstitution must allege certain specific jurisdictional facts; the notice of hearing must be published in the Official
Gazette and posted in particular places and the same sent or notified to specified persons. Sections 12 and 13 of the Act
provide specifically the mandatory requirements and procedure to be followed. These sections state as follows:

Sec. 12. Petitions for reconstitution from sources enumerated in sections 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(f), 3(c), 3(d), 3(e), and/or 3(f)
of this Act, shall be filed with the proper Court of First Instance, by the registered owner, his assigns, or any person having
an interest in the property. The petition shall state or contain, among other things, the following: (a) that the owner's
duplicate of the certificate of title had been lost or destroyed; (b) that no co- owner's, mortgagee's or lessee's duplicate
had been issued, or, if any had been issued, the same had been lost or destroyed: (c) the location, area and boundaries of
the property; (d) the nature and description of the buildings or improvements, if any, which do not belong to the owner
of the land, and the names and addresses of the owners of such buildings or improvements; (e) the names and addresses
of the occupants or persons in possession of the property, of the owners of the adjoining properties and of all persons
who may have any interest in the property; (f) a detailed description of the encumbrances, if any, affecting the property;
and (g) a statement that no deeds or other instruments affecting the property have been presented for registration, or, if
there be any, the registration thereof has not been accomplished, as yet. All the documents, or authenticated copies
thereof, to be introduced in evidence in support of the petition for reconstitution shall be attached thereto and filed with
the same: Provided, That in case the reconstitution is to be made exclusively from sources enumerated in section 2(f) or
3(f) of this Act, the petition shall be further accompanied with a plan and technical description of the property duly
approved by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, or with a certified copy of the description taken from a
prior certificate of the covering the same property.

Sec. 13. The court shall cause a notice of the petition, filed under the preceding section, to be published, at the expense
of the petitioner, twice in successive issues of the Official Gazette, and to be posted on the main entrance of the
municipality or city in which the land is situated, at the provincial building and of the municipal building at least thirty days
prior to the date of hearing. The court shall likewise cause a copy of the notice to be sent, by registered mail or otherwise,
at the expense of the petitioner, to every person named therein whose address is known, at least thirty days prior to the
date of hearing. Said notice shall state, among other things, the number of the lost or destroyed certificate of title, if
known, the name of the registered owner, the names of the occupants or persons in possession of the property, the
owners of the adjoining properties and an other interested parties, the location, area and boundaries of the property, and
the date on which all persons having any interest therein must appear and file their claim or objections to the petition.
The petitioner shall at the hearing, submit proof of the publication, posting and service of the notice as directed by the
court.

As We have earlier quoted in fun the petition for reconstitution in Reconstitution Case No. 504-P and substantially the
Notice of Hearing issued by the court published in the Official Gazette together with the Certification of Posting by the
Deputy Sheriff, it would not be a difficult task to check and verify whether the strict and mandatory requirements of
Sections 12 and 13 of Republic Act No. 26 have been faithfully complied with by therein petitioners Pascuals, now the
private respondents here.

Upon a cursory reading of both the petition for reconstitution and the notice of hearing, it is at once apparent that Tahanan
has not been named, cited or indicated therein as the owner, occupant or possessor of property adjacent to Lot 2, title to
which is sought to be reconstituted. Neither do the petition and the notice state or mention that Tahanan is the occupant
or possessor of a portion of said Lot 2. The result of this omission or failure is that Tahanan was never notified of the
petition for reconstitution and the hearings or proceedings therein.

According to petitioner Tahanan, this omission was deliberate on the part of the Pascuals who actively concealed or sought
to conceal the fact that Tahanan is the owner, occupant and possessor of property adjacent to the alleged properties of
the Pascuals as well as the fact that Tahanan is in possession or occupancy of portions of the land claimed by the Pascuals.
Indeed, as pointed out by petitioner Tahanan, to which We agree, the Pascuals made it appear in the survey plan, Exhibit
"Y", submitted by them to the Court based on a survey made as of July 7-12, 1974, that the area where "Tahanan Village"
would he is described as public land.

That the Pascuals deliberately omitted, concealed or sought to conceal the fact that Tahanan is the owner, occupant and
possessor of property adjacent to the former's alleged property may be deduced by their failure to comply with the order
of Judge Leo Medialdea issued in the original petition for reconstitution, Case No. 77, dated July 10, 1974 (the records) of
which We ordered forwarded to the Court) wherein "the petitioners are hereby required to amend their petition, within
ten days from receipt hereof, by indicating therein the names and addresses of All boundary owners of the parcels of land
in question as well as the names and addresses of all persons occupying theme.

In complying with the above order, the Pascuals simply filed an Amended Petition and although they allegedly undertook
relocation survey on the subject land by which the supposed adjoining owners and claimants may be definitely ascertained
as well as the-,r actual occupation and respected addresses, they only included Pedro L. Flores as the occupant on the NE.,
NW., and W., along lines 1-2-3-4-5-6-7 with address at 959 C. Lerma St., Sampaloc, Manila; and on the SE., along lines 7-
8-9-10-1 (portion of Lot 1, Plan II-4374) by Maglana & Sons Management Corporation, c/o Constancio B. Maglana,
President and Chairman of the Board, with address at No. 513, Lafayette St., Greenhills Subdivision, Mandaluyong, Rizal.

And as far as Lot 4 is concerned, the Amended Petition then mentioned the boundary owner on the NW., SW., along lines
12-3 (portion of Lot 1, Plan II-4374) and on the SE., NE. and NW., along lines 3-4-5-1, the same Maglana & Sons
Management Corporation as boundary owners.

The amended Petition notwithstanding, the omission of Tahanan as adjoining owner and even as occupant of portions of
the supposed Pascual property is palpable and conspicuous.

It is all too evident that the Pascuals in refiling their Petition for Reconstitution in October, 1977 docketed as Case No.
504-P, had no intention to notify nor give cause for notification and knowledge to all adjacent or boundary owners,
particularly Tahanan.

The Pascuals are duty-bound to know who are their actual adjacent boundary owners on all sides and directions of their
Property. They are charged with the obligation to inquire who their neighbors are in actual possession and occupancy not
only of portions of their own property but also of land adjacent thereto. This duty or obligation cannot be ignored or
simply brushed aside where the location or the properties involved is a prime site for land development, expansion,
suitable for residential, commercial and industrial purposes and where every square inch of real estate becomes a valuable
and profitable investment. It is of public knowledge in the community of Paranaque that "Tahanan Village" is a privately-
owned and occupied residential subdivision, plainly visible to the general public by reason of the perimeter fence or wan
separating it from adjacent estates, the roads and streets therein and leading thereto, the numerous home constructions
and buildings going on, the visible electrical, lighting and water supply installations, the presence of private security guards
thereat and the numerous signs and billboards advertising the estate as a housing development owned and/or managed
by petitioner Tahanan. It is preposterous to claim that the area is public land.

We also find that the Notice of Hearing directed that copies thereof be posted only in the bulletin board of the Court of
First Instance of Pasay City and no more, whereas the law specifically require that the notice of the petition shall be posted
on the main entrance of the municipality or city on which the land is situated, at the provincial building and at the
municipal building at least 30 days prior to the date of hearing. In the instant case as certified to by Deputy Sheriff Arsenio
C. de Guzman, the Notice of Hearing was posted on the bulletin board of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City
Branch located at the Hall of Justice, City Hall Building, Pasay City. Evidently, the Notice of Hearing was not posted at the
main entrance of the provincial-building in Pasig, Rizal; it was not posted at the main entrance of the municipal building
of Muntinlupa where the land is now comprised in Barrio Cupang, or at least in the municipal building of Paranaque where
Barrio San Dionisio was then embraced.

Adverting again to the original records of the Petition for Reconstitution No. 77, We find and note that Judge Leo
Medialdea correctly directed in his order of September 27, 1974 the service of process, thus:

Service of process in this proceedings shall be made as follows: (a) by publication of a copy of this Order in two (2)
successive issues of the Official Gazette, (b) by posting of copies of this Order at the entrance of the Provincial Capitol of
Rizal and the Municipal Buildings of Muntinlupa and Paranaque, Rizal, (e) by furnishing every person named in the
amended petition with copies of this Order by registered mail, (d) by furnishing Pedro L. Flores and the Maglana & Sons
Management Corporation with copies of this Order personally, and (e) by furnishing the Director of Lands, the Commission
of the Land Registration Commission and the Register of Deeds of Rizal with copies of this Order personally, the
publication, posting and notices shall be made at least thirty (30) days prior to the date of the hearing, at the expense of
the petitioners.

The Deputy Clerk of this Court is hereby ordered to implement the directives herein set forth.

Further proceedings in this original petition show that the above directives were faithfully and strictly followed.
Nevertheless, this Reconstitution Case No. 77 was withdrawn by the Pascuals, apparently for the reason that there having
been filed conflicting reports by the Director of Lands and the Land Registration Commission favorable to the Pascuals and
another submitted by the Register of Deeds which was adverse to them and the reports could not be reconciled, the case
would only clog the calendar of the court" pending continued research by the government offices concerned and
availability of certain documentary evidence of the Pascuals. The Court granted the Motion to Withdraw in its Order of
May 30, 1975.

It is necessary that We quote hereunder the Report of the Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal submitted in the
Original Reconstitution Case No. 77 as follows:

REPORT

COMES NOW, the undersigned Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal and unto this Honorable Court most respectfully
manifests:

1. That on June 4, 1974, the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal has been furnished a copy of the petition in the
above entitled reconstitution case;

2. That on October 8, 1974, the Register of Deeds was furnished with a copy of the order of the Court dated
September 27, 1974, by way of service of process in the proceedings;

3. That the property subject of the petition for reconstitution, known as Lot 2 and Lot 4 of plan II-4374 are situated
in the Barrio of San Dionisio, Municipality of Paranaque, Province of Rizal (Now as Bo. Cupang, Muntinlupa, Rizal)
containing an area of 375,622 sq. meters, and 56,295 sq. meters, respectively, was allegedly covered by Decree No. 15170
issued or, March 4, 1911;

4. That a verification of the records of this office, show that Decree No. 15170 of the Court of Land Registration in
Case No. 9368 was issued in favor of Eugenio Tuason, married to Maximina Geronimo and Eusebio T. Changco, married to
Romana Gatchalian, under Original Certificate of Title No. 724, Book A-7-B, and covers a property situated at Bambang,
Pasig, Rizal, with an area of 422 sq. meters.

The failure or omission to notify Tahanan as the owner, possessor or occupant of property adjacent to Lot 2 or as claimant
or person having an interest, title or claim to a substantial portion (about 9 hectares more or less) of Lot 2, as well as the
failure or omission to post copies of the Notice of Hearing on the main entrance of the municipality on which the land is
situated, at the provincial building and at the municipal building thereat, are fatal to the acquisition and exercise of
jurisdiction by the trial court. This was Our ruling in Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 102 SCRA 370, 438. It was also
stressed in Alabang Development Corp., et al. vs. Hon. Manuel E. Valenzuela, et al., G.R. No. 54094, August 30, 1982. And
We reiterate it herein, to wit:

In view of these multiple omissions which constitute noncompliance with the above-cited sections of the Act, We rule that
said defects have not invested the Court with the authority or jurisdiction to proceed with the case because the manner
or mode of obtaining jurisdiction as prescribed by the statute which is mandatory has not been strictly followed, thereby
rendering all proceedings utterly null and void. We hold that the mere Notice that 'an interested parties are hereby cited
to appear and show cause if any they have why said petition should not be granted' is not sufficient for the law must be
interpreted strictly; it must be applied rigorously, with exactness and precision. We agree with the ruling of the trial court
granting the motion to amend the original petition provided all the requisites for publication and posting of notices be
complied with, it appearing that the amendment is quite substantial in nature. As We have pointed above, respondent
Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal failed to comply with all the requirement for publication and posting of notices, which
failure is fatal to the jurisdiction of the Court.

The above rule is a reiteration of the doctrine laid down in Manila Railroad Company vs. Hon. Jose M. Moya, et al., L-
17913, June 22, 1965, 14 SCRA 358, thus:

Where a petition for reconstitution would have the certificates of title reconstituted from the plans and technical
descriptions of the lots involved, which sources may fall properly under section 3(e) or 3(f) of Republic Act No. 26, the
possessor thereof or the one who is known to have an interest in the property should be sent a copy of the notice of the
petition at the expense of the petitioner, pursuant to section 13 of the said Act.

If no notice of the date of hearing of a reconstitution case is served on a possessor or one having interest in the property
involved, he is deprived of his day in court and the order of reconstitution is null and void, even if otherwise the said order
should have been final and executory.

Under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 26, notice by publication is not sufficient but such notice must be actually sent or
delivered to parties affected by the petition for reconstitution.

Having resolved the fundamental issue that the trial court had not properly acquired nor was it duly invested with
jurisdiction to hear, determine and decide the petition for reconstitution and accordingly all proceedings conducted
thereon were rendered null and void including the judgment issued granting the reconstitution, the resolution of the
corollary issues need no extended discussion but considering the obvious intent to circumvent the ruling of the Supreme
Court laid down in the case of Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 93 SCRA 238, We find it imperative to make a
reiteration of the pertinent doctrines applicable to the case at bar.

In the above-cited case, We allowed the intervention of adjacent owners even during the pendency of the appeal from
the decision granting reconstitution, the appeal then in the Supreme Court, in the paramount interest of justice and as an
exception to Section 2, Rule 12 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner Tahanan having sought to intervene in the court below
and alleging material and substantial interest in the property to which title is sought to be reconstituted, in its Motion To
Set Aside Decision and Re-Open Proceedings duly verified and attaching therewith xerox copies of its transfer certificates
of title of its properties adjoining and even overlapped by that of the Pascuals to the extent of some 9 hectares in area,
the trial court ought to have admitted said motion. There was reversible error in refusing to do so. Once more, We must
emphasize the reasons in relaxing the strict application of the rule abovecited as We did in Director of Lands vs. CA, et al.,
93 SCRA 238, in this wise:

But Rule 12 of the Rules of Court like all other Rules therein promulgated is simply a rule of procedure, the whole purpose
and object of which is to make the powers of the Court fully and completely available for justice. The purpose of procedure
is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties. It
was created not to hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. It does not constitute the
thing itself which courts are always striving to secure to litigants. It is designed as the means best adopted to obtain that
thing. In other words, it is a means to an end.

The denial of the motions for intervention arising from the strict application of the Rule due to alleged lack of notice, or
the alleged failure of, movants to act seasonably will lead the Court to commit an act of injustice to the movants, to their
successors-in-interest and to all purchasers for value and in good faith and thereby open the door to fraud, falsehood and
misrepresentation, should intervenors' claims be proven to be true. For it cannot be gainsaid that if the petition for
reconstitution is finally granted, the chaos and confusion arising from a situation where the certificates of title of the
ovants covering large areas of land overlap or incroach on properties the title to which is being sought to be reconstituted
by private respondent, who herself indicates in her Opposition that, according to the Director of Lands, the overlapping
embraces some 87 hectares only, is certain and inevitable. The aggregate area of the property claimed by respondent
covering Lot 1 and Lot 2 is 1,435,062 sq. meters which is situated in a fast-growing, highly residential sector of Metro
Manila where growth and development are in rapid progress to meet the demands of an urbanized, exploding population.
Industries, factories, warehouses, plants, and other commercial infrastructures are rising and spreading within the area
and the owners of these lands and the valuable improvements thereon will not simply fold their hands but certainly will
seek judicial protection of their property rights or may even take the law into their own hands, resulting to multiplicity of
suits.

The holding of respondent Court of Appeals that Our resolution in Director of Lands vs. CA, 93 SCRA 238, allowing
intervention is not applicable to the case at bar because there was no motion to intervene filed before the Supreme Court
by Tahanan is without merit. Such holding fails to see that the intervention. of Tahanan while the reconstitution ease was
still in the trial court below was more expedient for the trial court is in a better and more suitable position to hear and
decide the question of encroachment and overlapping raised by Tahanan in its Motion To Set Aside Decision and Re-Open
Proceedings, and where the witnesses may be examined and cross-examined by the parties and the court, whereas the
Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.

Since the highest Tribunal has allowed intervention almost at the end of the proceedings, there should and there ought
to be no quibbling, much less hesitation or circumvention on the part of subordinate and inferior courts to abide and
conform to the rule enunciated by the Supreme Court. A well- becoming sense of modesty and a respectful awareness of
its inferior position in the judicial hierarchy is to be expected of trial courts and the appellate court to the end that a well-
ordered and disciplined administration of justice may be preserved and maintained, We cannot allow, permit or tolerate
inferior courts to ignore or circumvent the clear and express rulings of this Court.

There is grave abuse of discretion committed by the trial court when it denied Tahanan's Petition To Set Aside Decision
and Re-Open Proceedings. While said petition is not captioned "Motion for Intervention" the allegations of the petition
clearly and succinctly aver Tahanan's legal interest in the matter in litigation, which interest is substantial and material,
involving as it does the boundaries, possession and ownership of about 9 hectares of land covered by certificates of title
registered under the Torrens System in Tahanan's name and issued from the mother title "Original Certificate of Title No.
6567 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal issued pursuant to Decree No. 515888, Land Registration Case No. 776 dated
September 18, 1930.

Aside from arbitrarily refusing to admit Tahanan's intervention sought in the trial court below, We find also grave abuse
of discretion committed by respondent Judge in not considering Tahanan as an indispensable party to the proceedings, it
having been shown positively that it has such an interest in the controversy or subject matter that a final adjudication
cannot be made, in its absence, without injuring or affecting such interest. Again, We refer to Our ruling in Director of
Lands vs. CA, 93 SCRA 238, and more recently in Alabang Development Corp. vs. Hon. Manuel E. Valenzuela, G. R. No.
54094, Aug. 30, 1982, that. "The joinder must be ordered in order to prevent multiplicity of suits, so that the whole matter
in dispute may be determined once and for all in one litigation. The evident aim and intent of the Rules regarding the
joinder of indispensable and necessary parties is a complete determination of all possible issues, not only between the
parties themselves but also as regards to other persons who may be affected by the judgment. A valid judgment cannot
even be rendered where there is want of indispensable parties.

Time and again, the integrity and inviolability of Torrens titles issued pursuant to the Land Registration Act (Act 496) and
Presidential Decree No. 1529 have been shaken by the very courts whose unwavering duty should be to protect the rights
and interests of title holders but instead have favored claimants under the guise of reconstitution filed after a long lapse
of time after the Japanese occupation, alleging the existence of original and duplicate certificates of title issued pursuant
to a court decree but have subsequently been lost or destroyed including the records of the land registration case on
account of the war and lay claim and title to valuable parcels of land previously titled and registered under the Torrens
registration system and are even able to dispose these properties to unsuspecting homelot buyers and speculating land
developers. The courts must be cautious and careful in granting reconstitution of lost or destroyed certificates of title,
both original and duplicate owner's, based on documents and decrees made to appear authentic from mere xerox copies
and certifications of officials supposedly signed with the seals of their office affixed thereon, considering the ease and
facility with which documents are made to appear as official and authentic. It is the duty of the court to scrutinize and
verify carefully all supporting documents, deeds and certifications. Each and every fact, circumstance or incident which
corroborates or relates to the existence and loss of the title should be examined.

The claim of the Pascuals that their predecessor-in-interest, Manuela Aquial, had an original certificate of title to Lots 2
and 4 of Plan II-4374 is extremely difficult to believe and sustain. There are too many omissions and blanks, too many
failures and unanswered questions that belie such a claim. Thus, it is at once noted that the number of the certificate of
title issued to and registered in the name of respondents' mother and predecessor-in-interest, Manuela Aquial, is
unknown. Nowhere in the voluminous records do the Pascuals cite, state, or mention the number of said certificate of
title. Not even in the tax declaration of Lot 2 (Tax Declaration No. 15423, Exh. "S" and Tax Declaration No. 10187, Exh. "S-
1 ") and Lot No. 4 (Tax Declaration No. 15424, Exh. "T" and Tax Declaration No. 10 188, Exh. "T-1") is the number of the
certificate of title indicated. And there is absolutely no document, private or official, presented by the Pascuals mentioning
the number of the certificate of title.

There is also no proof as to when the certificate of title was issued. Assuming that the certificate of title was issued
pursuant to Decree No. 15170 dated March 4, 1914, the date of issue of the certificate of title must be subsequent thereto.
Assuming further that her duplicate copy was lost in 1944 during the Japanese occupation, why did she wait until 1974
[when the first petition for reconstitution was filed which was after thirty (30) years] to seek reconstitution of her owner's
copy.

The survey plan allegedly conducted January 9-29, 1911 and approved July 25, 1911 as shown in Exhibit "O" is titled "Plan
of Property of Olimpia B. Sta. Maria, et al., Case No. ____, Court of Land Registration. Unperfected Title No. ____, Bureau
of Lands." In the case of Director of Lands vs. CA and Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal, et al., 102 SCRA 370 which
involved the reconstitution of the certificate of title to Lots 1 and 3 of Plan II-4374, Bernal, petitioner therein, claimed
ownership to Lots 1 and 3 by virtue of a sales patent issued to her by the Government, which patent, however, We ruled
as fictitious. In the instant petition at bar, We find no claim of Aquial nor her successors, the Pascuals, as to how they
acquired title in fee simple to Lots 2 and 4, whether thru sales patent, composicion con el estado, or informacion
possesoria. The only allegation of the basis of their ownership is paragraph 3 of the petition for reconstitution which
alleges "That the petitioners, by themselves and thru their predecessors-in-interest Manuela Aquial have been and still
are in the actual, public, exclusive, adverse, continuous and peaceful occupation of the afore-described lands as owners
in fee simple since time immemorial, devoting a small portion thereof to agriculture. "

Decree No. 15170 which supposedly decreed Lots 2 and 4 to Manuela Aquial is claimed by the Pascuals to have been
issued in land Registration Case No. 9368. On its face, the attestation clause of the decree reads:

Witness: the Honorable Dionisio Changco, Associate Judge of said Court of Land Registration, the 10th day of January, A.D.
nineteen hundred and fourteen.

Entered at Manila, P.I., the 4th day of March, A.D. 1914, at 8:38 A.M.

Attest:

Seal of the Court (SGD.) ENRIQUE ALTAVAS Clerk of the Court

(SGD.) ENRIQUE ALTAVAS

A true copy. Clerk of the Court

In the official report submitted to the court by the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal in the original petition for
reconstitution, No. 77, CFI of Rizal, Branch XXXVI, Makati, Rizal, marked Exhibit "2", Decree No. 15170 was issued in Land
Registration Case No. 9368 in the name of Eugenio Tuason, married to Maximina Geronimo, and Eusebio T. Changco,
married to Romana Gatchalian, in whose names the Original Certificate of Title No. 724, Book A-7-B of the Registry of
Deeds of Rizal covering a property situated at Barrio Bambang, Pasig, Rizal with an area of 422 sq. meters was likewise
issued.

The Tuason-Changco decree is dated January 10, 1914 and entered on March 4, 1914 at 8:38 A.M. and the Certificate of
Title No. 724 was issued January 10, 1914. The attestation clause of the certificate of title reads:

Witness: the Honorable Dionisio Chanco, Associate Judge of said Court of Land Registration, the 10th day of January, A.D.
nineteen hundred and fourteen.

Entered at Manila, P. I., the 4th day of March, A. D. 1914 at 8:38 A.M.

Attest: ENRIQUE ALTAVAS

Clerk of the Court.

Received for transcription at the Office of the Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal, Philippine Islands, this 7th day
of March, nineteen hundred and fourteen, at 9:15 o'clock in the A.M.

(SGD.) (unintelligible)

Register of Deeds

Comparing the Aquial decree and the Tuason-Changco title, both appears to have been entered at Manila on the same
day, that is March 4, 1914, and at the same hour, 8:38 A.M. That the Tuason property and that of Aquial would bear the
same decree number (15170), the same land registration case number (9368), the same land registration court (Pasig,
Rizal), the same presiding judge (The Honorable Dionisio Chanco) is indeed incredible, if not incomprehensible.

But contrary to the claim of the Pascuals that the records of Land Registration Case No. 9368 have been lost, destroyed or
missing, there was presented copies of the Official Gazette of December 10 and 17, 1913, Volume 11, Nos. 50 and 51, duly
certified by the Librarian of the Ministry of Justice wherein the Notice of Hearing in Land Registration Case No. 9368 was
published, the applicants for the registration and confirmation of their title to a parcel of land situated in Barrio Bambang,
Municipality of Pasig, Province of Rizal being Eugenio Tuason and Eusebio T. Tuason (sic). The Notice of Hearing set the
date on December 22, 1913 and "Witness the Honorable Dionisio Chanco, Associate Judge of the Court this 14th day of
November, in the year 1913.

Since the Tuason-Changco property was issued Certificate of Title No. 724 pursuant to Decree No. 15170 issued in Land
Registration Case No. 9368 whereas Aquial, claiming the same decree number and the same land registration case
number, cannot present her owner's duplicate copy nor the original certificate which she claims were lost or destroyed,
including the records of Land Registration Case No. 9368 (which is not true as the Notice of Hearing therein was shown
and exhibited in copies of the Official Gazette), We find and so hold that it is the Aquial certificate of title that is suspicious,
if not non-existent, and not that of the Tuason-Changco Certificate No. 724.

At the back of Certificate of Title No. 724, We find annotated therein a number of documents registered by the heirs of
Tuason and also the heirs of co-owner Changco. The deeds or transactions executed on different dates and registered
thereon appear normal and there is no reason to doubt their authenticity. On the other hand, no deed, document or
transaction had been shown by the Pascuals relating to or affecting their land from which We can infer or deduce the
existence of the original certificate of title if one was in truth and in fact issued to Aquial.

The Pascuals claim that they have paid taxes on the land but they can only present Exhibits "U", "U-1", "V" and "V-1" to
prove their payment in lump sum of the taxes thereon for four (4) years only, from 1970 to 1973. They have not presented
proof of tax payment from 1914 to 1969, more than five (5) decades. All these omissions and failures cannot but show the
spuriousness and falsity of their claim that they were granted a decree by the Land Registration Court, that a certificate
of title was issued in their name and that said certificate of title was existing and subsisting at the time they filed the
petition for reconstitution.

We reject the trial court's finding that the absence in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal of the Original Certificate
of Title No. 724, although the owner's duplicate is on file therein, is suspicious, for it is satisfactorily explained in the letter
of the Acting Register of Deeds Guillermo San Pedro, Exhibit "4", that.

Original Certificate of Title No. 724 was cancelled on June 24, 1960 and transferred to the heirs by virtue of the settlement
of the estate of the deceased registered owners. The original copy of OCT No. 724 is no longer available but the cancelled
owner's duplicate copy of OCT No. 724 is still existing in our files.

xxx xxx xxx

Likewise, We do not agree with the holding of the trial court that "in the light of the foregoing impressive and
overwhelming evidence adduced by the petitioners in support of their petition for reconstitution of the title in the name
of Manuela Aquial, the Court has no alternative to granting the petition," the Court having "no reason to doubt the
credibility of the witnesses for the petitioner, particularly the government officials subpoenaed who had occasion and
reason to know the facts they testified to, being parts of their functions and duties in their respective offices.

It is to be noted that the supposedly impressive and overwhelming evidence adduced by the petitioners centered on
showing the alleged authenticity and genuineness of the survey plan denominated Plan II-4374. The list of petitioner's
exhibits is indeed long but the basic, specific and relevant piece of evidence is Exhibit "O" with the certification of Roman
Mataverde, Chief, Survey Division, Bureau of Lands dated October 27, 1972 that "Exhibit "O" is a photographic copy of the
original plan as reproduced from the microfilm negative which is on file in the Bureau of Lands, Manila.

This is the crucial question on which hinges the veracity of respondents' claim of title and ownership to 431,917 sq. meters
of prime land (Lots 2 and 4) in Paranaque, Rizal is there such an original survey plan known as Plan II-4374?

The oppositor Director of Lands strongly and stoutly maintains that there is no such plan and in support thereof, Exhibit
"7" is submitted to the Court, the same being the official communication of Amante R. Dumag, Officer-In-Charge, Metro
Manila Region, Bureau of Lands, stating "that Plan II-4374 could not be the basis for any verification because the original
plan thereof is not subsisting in the files and records of this Bureau." Enclosed with said communication is the xerox copy
of the letter dated 30 January 1978 of Staff Supervisor Privadi JG. Dalire. Said Exhibit "7 " further states: "However,
assuming that Plan II-4374 exists and using its technical description, the same overlaps Muntinlupa Estate and Plan 61581,
Lot 1, Decree No. N-515888, O.C.T.-6567 Identical to Lot 4762, Cad-299, Paranaque Cadastre."

Exhibit "8" of the Director of Lands is the xerox copy of the letter referred to above, which for its materiality and relevance
to the vital question hereinbefore stated and stressed, is reproduced in fun below:

Republic of the Philippines Department of Natural Resources BUREAU OF LANDS Manila

SUBJECT: Plan 11-4374

Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal

Paraaque, Rizal

30 January 1978

Mr. Amante Dumag

Officer-in-Charge

Region IV, Metro Manila

Anent your Memorandum of 17 January 1978 requesting for an authenticated plan of II-4374 Lot I and Lot 3 situated in
Paranaque, Metro Manila, please be informed of the following:

1. Inventory record book of the maps and plans salvaged after the last world war and subsequently microfilmed
during the Booz, Allen and Hamilton Consultancy, clearly shows that Plan II-4374 was not among those salvaged. Indeed,
there is no copy of this plan in the file of Technical Reference Section which records were recently turned over to the
Records Division. A perusal of the folder of the case in the Records Division also shows that on July 17, 1972 Mr. Gabriel
Sansano, the then Chief of the records division certified that his division (Survey Records Section in particular) has no copy
of II-4374 (page 183 of the folio).

2. A further perusal of the records (pages 1 and 2) shows that on May 15, 1970 Mr. Angel Sogueco, retired surveyor,
issued technical descriptions of Lots I and 3 of II-4374 allegedly approved on July 25, 1911. This record was submitted to
the Court. Stated therein is the alleged source of data Accession No. 195551. This record turns out to be Plan II-4005
approved on February 7, 1911 and the land is the property of Municipality of Liloan, Island of Pandan, Province of Leyte.

3. Apparently because of this finding, on November 5, 1971, Mr. Anselmo an, then Chief of Reconstruction Section
upon request of the interested party, issued technical descriptions for Lots I and 3 of II-4374. (This document was
submitted to the Court as part of the petition for reconstitution of title (pp. 1 and 2 of folio). As to how the data were
reconstituted by the then Chief of Reconstruction Section in the absence of the original copy of the plan is now known.
This is not our standard operating procedure since we always issue technical, descriptions based on available approved
survey records.

4. It appears in the records of the case that later Mr. Modesto Eloriaga, then Chief, Reproduction Section, certified
a copy of the microfilm enlargement of a frame with Accession No. 385637 which frame bears the survey number II-4374.
As to how a record that was not salvaged after the war got microfilmed is a mystery. Furthermore, as to how this frame is
pinpointed without the locator card indeed confound us. We are not now privy to the testimonies made in Court regarding
this microfilm.

5. We are surprised to learn that Reel No. 560 now bears 114374. For this reason, we caused the preparation of an
enlargement of said microfilm for further examination and evaluation.

6. A closer examination of said microfilm enlargement showed the following significant discrepancies and deviations
from similar survey plans on record:

a) The date of approval appears to be July 25, 1911 and the signature appearing as the approving official (Director
of Lands) of the alleged Plan II-4374 is not the same official approving plans during the period. Samples of surveys and
inventoried original survey plans on file in this Bureau clearly shows that on July 25, 1911 or thereabouts the Acting
Director of Lands and therefore proper approving official for survey plans was John R. Wilson. The following original plans
(partial list) available in our records and approved within the month of July 1911 or thereabouts all bear the signature of
Acting Director of Lands John R. Wilson.

*TABLE DELETED

b) Authentic plans like that of II-4858 (original copy on file) approved on December 19,1911 show the BL Form No.
52 and the format then in use during the period. Likewise, this plan (marked 0) shows the signature of the Director of
Lands at that time, Chas H. Sleeper. What is being represented as the signature of Chas H. Sleeper as Director of Lands on
the microfilm of II-4374 appears to be very far from the genuine signature of Chas H. Sleeper appearing on original plans
on file. Chas H. Sleeper was the incumbent Director of Lands from November 1, 1905 up to October 15, 1913. However,
during his term of office, the then Assistant Director of Lands in the person of John R. Wilson had occasion to assume
duties as Acting Director of Lands as evidenced by the above-listed survey plans mostly approved on July 25, 1911 by
Acting Director of Lands John R. Wilson. Considering the fact that on various dates within the month of July 1911,
specifically those of July 25, 1911, the original survey plans available in the file show John R. Wilson as the approving
official in his capacity as Acting Director of Lands, and the observation that the signature appearing on microfilm II-4374
is very far from the genuine signature of the incumbent Director of Lands Chas H. Sleeper, the appearance now of the
microfilm of II-4374 purportedly approved on July 25, 1911 showing Chas H. Sleeper as the approving official is highly
questionable. For this reason and the facts stated elsewhere in this memorandum we cannot certify authenticity of the
microfilm copy of II-4374.

c) The form used for the questionable plan II-4374 differs from the standard survey plans approved during the time
(year 1911) in the following respects:

(1) Authentic plans during the time are prepared on B.L. Form No., 52 which is on upper left hand corner; the
questionable plan (II-4374) was prepared on B.L. Form No. 52-A which appears on upper left hand corner and on upper
center which is unusual.

(2) Authentic plans indicate the name of the surveyor immediately below the line that shows the date of survey,
followed by the designation (surveyor) and thereunder Bureau of Lands; the questionable plan, on the other hand, does
not conform with the said format.

(3) Authentic plans do not contain the paragraph "The original field notes,..." as in the case of the questioned plan II-
4374 but immediately Bureau of Lands" below the surveyor's name is "Approved: ____date___ followed by the title and
signature of the approving official

7. Considering the discrepancies and deviations of the microfilm enlargement of the frame that purports to be that
of survey plan II-4374 bearing Accession No. 385637, our conclusion is that said plan is not authentic and does not and
has never represented any parcel of land properly surveyed and approved by this Bureau.

8. Nevertheless, our investigation is still continuing purposely to find out how the frame of such microfilm got in into
microfilm Reel No. 560 of this Bureau.

9. Records of the Case show that this was handled by the late Atty. Pedro Flores in collaboration with Assistant
Solicitor General Ricardo L. Pronove, Jr. and Trial Attorney Antonio G. Castro. This pertains to the petition of Demetria Sta.
Maria Vda. de Bemal for the reconstitution of T.C.T. (12/T-79) 42449 (Sales Patent) covering area of 143.5062 hectares.
The case is opposed in the sala of CFI, Seventh Judicial District, Branch XIII of Rizal by the Director of Lands and Aurora R.
Favila, et al. In cases like this, we take action in close collaboration with the Legal Division.

10. Enclosed for your ready reference are:

a) Enlargement copy of alleged II-4374 whose original copy was not inventoried as salvaged after the war;
b) Microfilm copies of Authentic Plans;
c) Xerox copies of relevant papers in the Folio:

1) Certification of Mr. Gabriel Sansano, dated 17 July 1972.
2) Petition for Reconstitution of Title (Filed with the Court)

3) Opposition of the Director of Lands.
4) Motion to dismiss the petition for reconstitution of title filed by the other oppositors.

For the Director of Lands:

(SGD.) PRIVADI JG. DALIRE

Staff Supervisof for

Technical Plans & Standards

From the evidence submitted by the Director of Lands, it is officially and clearly shown that Plan II-4374 was not among
those salvaged after the last World War and subsequently microfilmed during the Booz, Allen and Hamilton Consultancy;
that Plan II-4374 bearing Accession No. 385637 is not authentic and does not and has never represented any parcel of
land property surveyed and approved by the Director of Lands; that on July 17, 1972, Mr. Gabriel Sansano, the then Chief
of the Survey Records Division, certified that his division has no copy of Plan II-4374 and that on May 15, 1970, Mr. Angel
Sogueco, retired surveyor, issued technical descriptions of Lots 1 and 3 of Plan II-4374, the alleged source of data being
Accession No. 195551 which, however, turned out to be Plan II-4005 approved on February 7, 1911 and the land pertaining
thereto is the property of the Municipality of Liloan, Island of Pandan, Province of Leyte.

Subsequent certifications issued by Anselmo Almazan, Chief, Survey Reconstruction Section, Bureau of Lands dated
November 24,1971 marked Exhibits "M" and "N" indicating the technical descriptions of Lots 1 and 3 of Plan II-4374 with
Accession No. 385637 cannot be relied upon because said plan was not among those salvaged after the last World War.
Our ruling in the Bernal case, 102 SCRA 370, 447 that "the technical descriptions cannot have two accession numbers as
sources thereof " stands.

Incidentally, We must point out that the above official report (marked Exhibit "8") was submitted to the Supreme Court
in the Bernal case as Annex "A" to the Final Report of Amante R. Dumag, Officer-In-Charge, NCR, Bureau of Lands, pp. 425-
428, in compliance with Our Resolution of September 25, 1979, which was accepted and approved by Us and admitted as
evidence of this Court. In the case at bar, it is part of the evidence of the oppositor Director of Lands, admitted by the trial
court and hence, reviewable on appeal in the petition at bar, he being a respondent herein.

The Torrens titles of petitioner Tahanan and the numerous transfers therefrom to innocent purchasers for value must be
respected and protected in order to achieve the "real purpose of the Torrens System which is to quiet title to the land x x
x and once a title is registered, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court or
sitting in the mirador de su casa to avoid the possibility of losing his land." (Salao vs. Salao, 70 SCRA 65, 84; Legarda And
Prieto vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, 593; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 102 SCRA 370, 451).

In summation, We find no factual and legal basis for the judgment granting the petition for reconstitution in Reconstitution
Case No. 9368, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXIX, Pasay City. Fundamentally, the trial court lacked jurisdiction
to hear and decide said petition for reconstitution and for this jurisdictional infirmity, its decision including all proceedings
therefrom are null and void, including the assailed Resolutions of April 30, 1980 and December 8, 1980 of the respondent
Court of Appeals.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXIX, Pasay City
in Reconstitution Case No. 504-P, Land Registration Case No. 9368 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Resolutions of
April 30, 1980 and December 8, 1980 of the respondent Court of Appeals are likewise declared null and void. Costs against
private respondents.

Petition granted.

SO ORDERED.