Thesc mixings-together of w holly di fferent thi ngs are blamed for the frightful unclarity. Logic can answer question why and with what right we acknowledge a law of logic to be true. If we step away from logic, we may say: we are compelled to make judgments by our own nature and by externa! circumstances. But what is given is not a reason for something's being true, but for our taking it to be
Thesc mixings-together of w holly di fferent thi ngs are blamed for the frightful unclarity. Logic can answer question why and with what right we acknowledge a law of logic to be true. If we step away from logic, we may say: we are compelled to make judgments by our own nature and by externa! circumstances. But what is given is not a reason for something's being true, but for our taking it to be
Thesc mixings-together of w holly di fferent thi ngs are blamed for the frightful unclarity. Logic can answer question why and with what right we acknowledge a law of logic to be true. If we step away from logic, we may say: we are compelled to make judgments by our own nature and by externa! circumstances. But what is given is not a reason for something's being true, but for our taking it to be
former a law of people's taking-to-be-true. The content of the two is wholly different and they are independent of one another; neither can be inferred from the other. Hence it is extremely confusing to designate both by the same name, "Principie of Identity". Thesc mixings-together of w holly di fferent thi ngs are to blame for the frightful unclarity that we encounter among the psychological logicians. The question why and with what right we acknowledge a law of logic to be true, logic can answer only by reducing it to an- other law of logic. Where that is not pos si ble, logic can gi ve no answer. If we step away from logic, we may say: we are compelled to make judgments by our own nature and by externa! circumstances; and if we do so, we cannot reject this law-of ldentity, for example; we must acknowledge it unless we wish to reduce our thought to confusion and finally renounce all judg- ment whatever. 1 shall neither dispute nor support this view; 1 shall merely remark that what we have here is nota logical con- sequence. What is given is not a reason for something's being true, but for our taking it to be true. Not only that: this impos- si bility of our rejecting the law in question hinders us not at al! in supposing beings who do reject it; where it hinders us is in supposing that these beings are right in so doing, it hinders us in having doubts whether we or they are right. At least this is true of myself. If other persons presume to acknowledge and doubt a law in the same breath, it seems to me an attempt to jump out of one's own skin against which 1 can do no more than urgently warn them. Anyone who has once acknowledged a law of truth has by the same token acknowledged a law that pre- scribes the way in which one ought to judge, no matter where, or when, or by whom tho judgmont is mado, Surveying the whole question, it seems to me that the source of the dispute lies in a difference in our conceptions of what is true. For me, what is true is something objective and inde- pendent of the judging subject; for psyc;:hological logicians it xviii is not. What Herr B. Erdmann calls 'objective certainty' is merely a general acknowledgmenton the part of the subjects who judge, which is thus not independent of them but susceptible to alteration with the constitution of their minds. We can generalize this still further: for me there is a domain 15