R Ko, A Pope, D Cooper, J Shave, J Lane 1

BRIDGE DESIGN PROVISIONS OF UK NA FOR EN1991-1-7

AND PD6688-1-7
Ron Ko, Highways Agency, Dorking, UK
Adrian Pope, Mouchel, London, UK
David Cooper, Flint and Neill, London, UK
Jon Shave, Parsons Brinckerhoff, Bristol, UK
John Lane, RSSB, London, UK
Abstract
BS EN 1991-1-7 was published in 2006 to provide the requirements due to accidental actions
on bridges. The UK National Annex to BS EN 1991-1-7 and the associated UK Publication
Document PD 6688-1-7 were both published in 2008.

The preparations of UK National Annex and Publication Document were undertaken by
Mouchel, Flint and Neill and Parsons Brinckerhoff for the Highways Agency and by RSSB.

This paper describes the background to the development of the NA and PD that support BS
EN 1991-1-7.

Introduction
This paper describes the background to the development of the UK National Annex to BS EN
1991-1-7:2006
[2]
and Published Document PD 6688-1-7:2009
[3]
relating to road bridges,
footbridges, rail bridges and other road structures. It does not give background to BS EN
1991-1-7:2006
[1]
as this will be prepared by CEN (Comit Europen de Normalisation) in due
course.

This paper covers various accidental actions on different types of structures. These are the
accidental actions caused by road vehicles impacting with road bridges, footbridges and
lightweight structures such as sign/signal gantries, lighting columns; by derailed rail traffic
under or adjacent to structures; by ship traffic and by internal explosions inside tunnels.

Accidental Actions Caused by Road Vehicles Impact on
Supporting Substructures

Road bridges, including accommodation bridges
In the UK, impact loads on bridge supports have previously been designed to the requirements
of BD 60
[7]
. In accordance with BD 60, 2.2, a bridge support needs to be designed to
withstand the vehicle collision loads if it is located at a horizontal distance less than 4.5m
from the edge of the carriageway. If the bridge support is located at 4.5m or more from the
edge of carriageway, the designer is required to analyse the vulnerability of the support to
vehicular impact using engineering judgement and risk assessment. However it is doubtful
R Ko, A Pope, D Cooper, J Shave, J Lane 2

whether a risk assessment is carried out in practice, possibly because there is no guidance
given to analyse the vulnerability of the support to vehicular impact. In practice it is likely
that designers will locate the support at 4.5m from the edge of carriageway in order to avoid
designing the support to withstand the vehicle collision loads.

While the 4.5m rule is pragmatic and easy to apply, the basis of its derivation is unknown. It
should be noted that in accordance with BS EN 1991-1-7, Annex C, it would not be possible
to fully justify the 4.5m rule given in BD 60. On 28 February 2001 a vehicle came off the
M62 motorway at Great Heck, near Selby, ran down the railway embankment and onto the
East Coast Main Line, where it was struck by a passenger train. The passenger train was
derailed and then struck by a freight train travelling in the opposite direction. Ten people on
the trains were killed. The subsequent reports by the Health and Safety Commission
[13]
, the
Department for Transport
[14]
and the Highways Agency
[15]
, form the basis for the development
of guidance on the application of measures to manage risk where roads meet, cross or run
close to railways.

Absolute safety cannot be attained at a cost that would be considered to be acceptable to
society, given the competing needs for valuable resources. A risk-based approach to the
allocation of the available resources does not therefore aim to meet an objective of absolute
safety at any cost everywhere, but aims to ensure that finite resources are utilized so as to
make the road system as safe as reasonably practicable for the largest number of people. It
has been decided that, for the design for vehicular impact on bridge supports, risk assessment
methods should be adopted in order to fall in line with the principles recommended in the
Selby reports.

At the time of development of the risk assessment procedure the Highways Agency published
its Highway Economic Note No. 1, in which the cost and value of preventing a fatality was
given as approximately 1.5m. For most highway bridges, the additional costs to society due
to traffic delays will be considerably higher than this. Therefore judgements about the level
of impact protection for highway bridges are usually governed by economic evaluations of
traffic delay costs and benefits rather than by the potential danger to life. The historical
record indicates that the risk to human life from the collapse of road bridges following
accidental impact, is too low to justify any particular action to mitigate such risks. However,
the economic argument is much more significant, and it was found that special protection
measures were justifiable where the combination of risk and consequence at a particular
location was more than 2.4 times the average historical value. The risk ranking factors are
designed to require higher level of safety provisions where this risk level is exceeded.

In the case of footbridges, the risk to life could be much higher, and the risk assessment
parameters are weighted accordingly. The design values for impact loads on supports adjacent
to motorways, trunk and principal roads in the UK NA to BS EN 1991-1-7, are generally
based on the BD 60 requirements. In the Eurocodes, the design values of accidental actions
are given directly, and there are no additional safety factors applied (see the UK NA to BS EN
1991-1-7, Introduction). For this reason, the nominal loads in BD 60 should be multiplied
by 1.65, which is a product of the partial safety factor
fL
of 1.5 and the
f3
factor of 1.1, to
obtain the design values. Therefore, the equivalent static design forces F
dx
in the UK NA to
BS EN 1991-1-7, Table NA.1 for motorways for example, should be equal to 1650 kN, based
on the value of 1000 kN in BD 60, Table 3 multiplied by 1.65. It should be pointed out that
R Ko, A Pope, D Cooper, J Shave, J Lane 3

the current design values in the UK NA to BS EN 1991-1-7, Table NA.1, do not include the

f3
factor of 1.1. In order to be equivalent to previous practice in BD 60, the values in the UK
NA to BS EN 1991-1-7, Table NA.1, therefore need to be multiplied by 1.1. An amendment
to the UK NA to include the
f3
factor is currently being considered.

Depending on the risk ranking factor R
de
, as defined in the UK NA to BS EN 1991-1-7,
NA.2.11.2.3.3, an adjustment factor Fa is determined based on the threshold values of T
a
and
T
b
. The risks are categorised into high, normal and low for which adjustment factors of 2, 1
and 0.5 are applied respectively. The adjustment factor is intended to be a factor which is
applied to the design loads given in the NA to BS EN 1991-1-7, Table NA.1, except for the
minimum robustness requirement.

The default threshold values for T
a
and T
b
, are given as 2.4 and 0.5 respectively in the UK NA
to BS EN 1991-1-7, NA.2.11.2.4. These values are based on a calibration study using the
bridges in Highways Agency Area 11 (Warwickshire, Leicestershire and Staffordshire), and
are intended to provide the level of safety required without a disproportionate number of
structures falling into the high risk category. It should be noted that the UK NA to BS EN
1991-1-7, NA.2.11.2.4, requires that these threshold values are used unless otherwise
specified for the individual project. This provides a mechanism for different threshold
values to be used by other highway authorities to suit the requirements of their particular
bridge stock. The adjustment factor of 2 defined in the UK NA to BS EN 1991-1-7,
NA.2.11.2.4.2, for high risk bridge supports, is based on the full scale dynamic testing carried
out by TRL and Ove Arup. This testing report
[16]
suggested a factor of 2.8 to be applied to the
design values in BD 60. However, it was considered that this would be extremely
conservative, with all the unfavourable factors occurring simultaneously.

The dynamic factor of 2 is a classical solution, derived from the behaviour of a weight, sitting
on top of an unloaded span, which is suddenly released. The dynamic effect of the sudden
load takes the mass through the static equilibrium point and then a similar distance beyond.
The stored energy of the span, due to its bending stiffness, then returns the mass back through
the equilibrium point to the starting point, with the cycle then repeating. In an undamped
scenario, this is classic simple harmonic motion. The measured collision loads might be
argued to require a dynamic factor of only one, since they were measured during actual
testing and therefore represent all of the dynamic interactions. The factor might even be
argued as less than one, since the forces are of such short duration that the mass of the pier
might not have time to accelerate and hence deflect. This is an important consideration when
attempting to rationalise the static equivalent loads used in design. However, it was decided
that the factor of 2 was appropriate as a conservative upper bound.

In the design, it is best to achieve a lower risk ranking factor (R
de
) so that the risk is reduced
from high to normal. If this is not practicable, the preferred option is to provide safety
barriers in accordance with PD 6688-1-7, 2.7.

The adjustment factor of 0.5 in the UK NA to BS EN 1991-1-7, NA.2.11.2.4.4 for low risk
supporting structures, is based on engineering judgement. As an alternative option to
designing a support for the impact values in the UK NA to BS EN 1991-1-7, Table NA.1, a
higher containment barrier may be used in accordance with PD 6688-1-7, 2.7.

R Ko, A Pope, D Cooper, J Shave, J Lane 4

It is rare for a Heavy Goods Vehicle (HGV) to collide with a bridge support. It is even more
rare for there to be significant structural damage. Collisions that cause a bridge closure or
structural collapse are rarer still. It was therefore difficult to directly calculate the actual risks.
Only one bridge collapse was found in records of the past 40 years, and that was for a bridge
design that was particularly vulnerable to impact from vehicular collision. Since this was not
a good statistical sample, it was assumed that this event was representative of low
consequence events for a series with a typically one in ten year collapse frequency.

Historically, due to the lack of statistical data, some risk ranking systems have chosen
arbitrary scales for the individual risk contributions, typically one to five or one to ten.
However, it was considered to be more reasonable to base the scales on engineering
judgement, with justifications, rather than choosing an arbitrary scale: just because we cannot
rigorously assign risk factors does not mean that we should not at least provide a best estimate
which can be revised in the future in the light of experience and improved knowledge. Some
factors, such as road type, might have a small effect, with a range of factors around five, but
other factors, like the number of HGVs, might be vastly different between a country lane and
a major motorway for example.

The risk assessment method developed, calculates an average risk, and utilises factors that
modify this average risk. Its value depends on the influence of the factors described in the
following.

F
1
Road class below bridge
Accident rates for different road types are published each year, giving accident rates per
vehicle kilometre. This factor was based on these accident rates assuming that the rates of
HGV collisions with piers follow the general trend of road accidents.
F
2
Factor for HGV flow under bridge
Although the accident rates may be non-linear, with medium traffic flows causing
proportionally more vehicle conflict than low flows, and high flows sometimes causing slow
moving traffic jams, it seemed reasonable to equate collision risk to the number of HGVs
passing the site under consideration.
F
3
Influence of speed limit under bridge
Intuitively, it appears logical that the forces will increase with the square of the speed and that
the speed factors should therefore be greater than the values in the UK NA to BS EN 1991-1-
7, Table NA.4. However, the historical impact tests showed that the resultant force on the
structure, depended on how strong certain elements of the vehicle were (e.g. engine bolts
shearing off at the first 5000 kN peak). Furthermore, it was evident that the energy involved
is more likely to determine how long the forces are applied for, rather than determining the
actual force. This has some effect on the equivalent static force applied to the structure but it
is not a direct link. The speed limit factors are therefore somewhat arbitrary, and assume that
vehicles travelling at higher speeds have less time to react to problems, thereby increasing the
risk of an impact.
R Ko, A Pope, D Cooper, J Shave, J Lane 5

F
4
- Influence of junctions
This is a set of factors that requires judgement. The factor was included because more sudden
weaving manoeuvres happen near junctions and hence the accident risk is higher.
F
5
Influence of clearance
Historically there was an all or nothing decision to apply the full collision load based on a cut
off of 4.5m from the edge of the carriageway. The definition of carriageway included hard
shoulders on motorways since lorries would use these during highway maintenance. The
clearance factors used in the UK NA to BS EN 1991-1-7, Table NA.6 were, however, based
on the distance from the centreline of the nearest lane, since that was the starting point for
most incidents. Hard shoulder is rarely used, although it may be necessary to use judgement
where hard shoulder running in peak times is applied routinely.

The 4.5m Cliff edge cut off is no longer applied and a system based on graduated clearance
from the centreline of the nearest running lane for HGVs, is used instead. This was based on
a Monte Carlo analysis, with a large sample of possible incidents using controlling values of
initial speed, initial departure angle, deceleration and cornering ability. The initial speed and
departure angles, were based on average values of 55mph and 20
o
, with the assumed lorry
handling characteristics based on discussions with an experienced lorry driver.

The analysis showed that lorries can run a long way off of the carriageway, even if the driver
is trying to recover from an incident.
F
6
Number of columns for each support type and F
7
- Factor for stability of deck
These values were chosen based on engineering judgement, with a range of values proposed
by contributors to development of the risk assessment process.

It should be noted that curvature of the road was, counter-intuitively, not taken into account in
the F factors because a study
[17]
indicated that accident rates are higher on straight roads than
on curves.
F
8
Consequence factor for road bridges
This factor takes the risk to life into account. The number of lives that might be lost are
related to the number of vehicles, and hence road users, that might be crushed under, or crash
into the side of, a collapsing bridge, as well as those who might lose their lives whilst
travelling over a collapsing bridge.
Factor F
8
contains three terms:

i) A constant term, that is proportional to the average justifiable spend to reduce fatal
accidents
ii) A variable term that is proportional to the cost of interrupting the flow of vehicles passing
under the bridge
iii) A variable term that is proportional to the cost of interrupting the flow of vehicles passing
over the bridge

Where flows below and on the bridge are similar, the cost of interrupting flow is assumed to
be much higher for over-bridge traffic, since under-bridge traffic ought to be able to flow
freely after the wreckage has been cleared away, whilst over-bridge traffic must wait for a
R Ko, A Pope, D Cooper, J Shave, J Lane 6

new or temporary bridge. Since the formulation of F
8
only varies with traffic flow, it cannot
be applied to footbridges. In order to achieve a minimum level of robustness to resist impact
forces for all bridges, minimum values for the design forces are specified. BS EN 1991-1-7,
4.1(1) Note 3, permits guidance to be given for the transmission of impact forces to
foundations as non-contradictory complementary information (NCCI). The UK NA to BS EN
1991-1-7, NA.2.10 refers to PD 6688-1-7, 2.6, for recommendations on design of the
foundations for impact. Resistance to the impact forces from the ground should be
established for design using BS EN 1997-1 with the following qualifications:

i. Only ULS checks are required
ii. when checking against the sliding of the base and bearing capacity, the collision loads
should be reduced by 50% and,
iii. full loading should be considered for checking against overturning.

Lightweight bridges such as foot and cycle track bridges
In accordance with BS EN 1991-1-7, 4.1(1) Note 1, the requirements for accidental actions on
lightweight bridges, such as foot and cycle bridges, can only be referenced in the UK NA to
BS EN 1991-1-7 as NCCI. The UK NA to BS EN 1991-1-7, NA.2.9, refers to PD 6688-1-7
for this information. PD 6688-1-7, 2.5.1, provides recommendations for the design impact
forces to be used for foot and cycle track bridges.

It is assumed that footbridges are intrinsically lightweight and the risk assessment is
undertaken to determine the adjustment factor (F
a
) to be applied to the equivalent static
design forces in PD 6688-1-7, Table 1 and, where appropriate, the level of containment of the
barrier to be used to protect the footbridge support.

The risk assessment method in the UK NA to BS EN 1991-1-7 has been adopted for
footbridges. However it is extremely sensitive to factor F
8
which is given in PD 6688-1-7,
Table 2.
Consequence for foot/cycle track bridges - Factor F
8

The F
8
value for foot/cycle track bridges, is used to ensure that the available resources are
allocated in proportion to the potential value to society in allocating resources where they can
achieve maximum benefit. A bridge which carries very few pedestrians does not merit the
same degree of protection as one that is very heavily used by pedestrians/cyclists or which
carries occasional large crowds (sports events for example).

i. The standard value 1.0 applies to bridges in urban areas where, typically, a bridge
might well be most likely to be struck when roads and footways are busy and a typical
bridge might be expected to be carrying somewhere in the region of 40 persons at any
one time.
ii. Sub-urban bridges are assumed to be likely to carry about half as many people at
any one time as their urban counterparts, so they have a factor of 0.5.
iii. Rural bridges are assumed to carry typically only one tenth as many persons, and a
factor of 0.1 is applied.
iv. Heavily used crossings, where dense crowds are likely to congregate, are treated as
special cases, and a factor of 5 is applied in these circumstances, in order to maximize
the likelihood that protection will be provided.
R Ko, A Pope, D Cooper, J Shave, J Lane 7


Lightweight structures such as sign/signal gantries
The requirements for design of sign/signal gantry supports to resist collision forces are given
in BD 51
[6]
and TD 19
[9]
. No further information is given in PD 6688-1-7.
However, it is envisaged that a risk assessment method will be developed in future for the
design of sign/signal gantry supports to resist collision forces. As walkway access is unlikely
to be provided for new gantries, the consequence factor F
8
and the level of containment of
barriers required, should be much less onerous than those specified for foot/cycle track
bridges.

Lightweight structures such as minor structures described in BD 94; e.g.,
lighting columns, traffic sign/signal posts
No information is given in PD 6688-1-7 for design for collision forces to be applied to the
supports of minor structures. It is envisaged that the requirements will be based on existing
standards such as BD 94
[8]
, TD 19
[9]
and TD 89
[11]
.
Accidental Actions Caused by Road Vehicles Impact on
Supporting Superstructures
The design values for impact loads on superstructures above motorways, trunk and principal
roads in the UK NA to BS EN 1991-1-7, NA.2.16, are generally based on BD 60
[7]
. As for
the loads on supports, there is no additional safety factor for accidental actions and the design
values are given directly. For this reason, the design loads should be based on the nominal
loads in BD 60 multiplied by 1.65, which is a product of the partial safety factor
fL
of 1.5 and
the
f3
factor of 1.1. Therefore, the equivalent static design forces F
dx
(825 kN) and F
dy
(415
kN) in the UK NA to BS EN 1991-1-7, Table NA.9 for motorways, are derived from the BD
60, Table 4 values, multiplied by 1.65.

For other rural and urban roads, the equivalent static design forces given in the UK NA to BS
EN 1991-1-7, Tables NA.9 and NA.10 are based on the values that are pro-rata to those given
in BS EN 1991-1-7, Table 4.2, except for courtyards and parking garages.
The threshold value of the headroom clearance h
1
, above which there is no need to design for
impact on superstructures, in the UK NA to BS EN 1991-1-7, NA.2.17, is taken as 5.7m
which is the same as BD 60, Table 2.

The vertical sag curve compensation values given in PD 6688-1-7, Table 3 are based on the
values in TD 27, Table 6-1.

The recommendations for provision of restraint to the deck of foot/cycle track bridges in PD
6688-1-7, 2.5.2, are similar to the recommendations in BD 60, 2.2. However, as these impact
forces are applicable where the headroom is h
1
and above, they need only be designed for
within the deck restraint and the forces need not be designed for in the supporting column
and foundation. The aim is to ensure there is adequate restraint on the deck in order to prevent
the deck being removed from the support when subjected to these impact forces.
R Ko, A Pope, D Cooper, J Shave, J Lane 8

Accidental Actions Caused by Derailed Rail Traffic Under or
Adjacent to Structures
Background
The current requirements for the design of railway structures to resist derailment actions, are
set out in Railway Group Standard GC/RT5112, Issue 2
18
, Part 7. This document superceded
the following standards and sources of guidance:

GC/RT5112, Issue 1
19
GC/RC5510
20
GC/TT0112
21

GC/RT5112, Part 7, allows for the situation that existed prior to the introduction of the
Eurocodes, where designs were undertaken to BS 5400-2
22
, and also the current situation,
where railway bridges are required to be designed to the Eurocodes. The Eurocode design
requirements for derailment and other actions are set out in BS EN 1991-2, 6.7. The scope of
BS EN 1991-2, 6.7 is limited to derailment actions that impose loads on the bridge deck (see
BS EN 1991-2, 6.7.1). The requirements for actions due to derailment under or adjacent to a
structure, are stated in BS EN 1991-2, 6.7.2(1). This clause requires the actions due to
collision following a derailment, to be based on the requirements of BS EN 1991-1-7 and,
where relevant, its National Annex.
Types of rail traffic
The types of rail traffic for which the design rules in the UK NA to BS EN 1991-1-7 are
applicable, are set out in UIC 777-2R
23
. The recommendations are linked to the class of
structure, type of traffic and line speed, as shown in Table 1:

Class of structure
Type of traffic Line speed (km/h)
A Mixed traffic 120
B Passenger 300
B Freight 160
Table 1. UIC Rail traffic types

Formerly, BS 5400-2 did not provide information for the design loads to be used for impact
with the supports and superstructures of bridges over railways. The design requirements for
supports are contained within GC/RT5112, although the design forces given for supports are
not explicitly linked to the class of structure or the line speed. The design impact forces are
deemed to be appropriate for mixed traffic and it is generally assumed that, for non-high
speed lines, the limit of validity for the impact forces in GC/RT5112, Part 7, is based on
impacts from conventional rail traffic travelling at a maximum possible line speed of 200
km/h.

For line speeds greater than 200 km/h (appropriate to passenger trains only), no provisions are
made in GC/RT5112, Part 7 but the possibility is recognised in UIC 777-2R for Class B
structures.
R Ko, A Pope, D Cooper, J Shave, J Lane 9


Classification of structures
BS EN 1991-1-7, Table 4.3, provides a classification for structures that may be subject to
impact from derailed traffic. The classification is based on structures that span across or
near to the operational railway that have the characteristics set out in Table 2:


Class of Structure Characteristics
A i. Buildings that are permanently occupied.
ii. Buildings that serve as a temporary gathering place for
people.
iii. Buildings that consist of more than one storey.
B i. Bridges carrying vehicular traffic.
ii. Single storey buildings that are not permanently
occupied.
iii. Single storey buildings that do not serve as a
temporary gathering place for people.
Table 2. Classification of structures

Although bridges are excluded from being categorised as Class A structures according to the
BS EN 1991-1-7 classification, it is possible that certain heavily trafficked bridges over busy
railway lines, could be classified as Class A structures. The UK NA to BS EN 1991-1-7,
NA.2.23, allows for this possibility.
Design values of impact force
The design values for impact force on Class A structures are stated in BS EN 1991-1-7,
4.5.1.4 (1), as being relevant for rail traffic with a maximum speed of 120 km/h. The UK NA
to BS EN 1991-1-7, NA.2.25, accepts the recommended values in BS EN 1991-1-7, 4.5.1.4(1)
for Class A structures. These values are greater than the design impact forces in GC/RT5112,
Part 7, but are intended to be relevant where there is a high risk to people in buildings where
the supports are vulnerable to impact. The design impact forces for Class A structures from
BS EN 1991-1-7, Table 4.4, are summarised in Table 3 below:

R Ko, A Pope, D Cooper, J Shave, J Lane 10


Distance d from structural elements
to the centreline of the nearest track
(m)
Force F
dx
a

(kN)
Force F
dy
a

(kN)
Structural elements: d < 3m To be specified for the
individual project.

Further information is
set out in Annex B.
To be specified for the
individual project.

Further information is
set out in Annex B.
For continuous walls and wall type
structures:
3m < d < 5m

4000

1500
d < 5m 0 0
a x = track direction; y = perpendicular to track direction
Table 3. Design impact forces for Class A structures


It may be inferred from the values quoted and the associated traffic speeds (see Table 1) that
there is a direct link between the design impact forces according to train type and speed and
distance from the track. However, the nature of derailments is very uncertain and the way in
which a train behaves following a derailment, is likely to be influenced by a number of
factors. Guidance on the factors to be taken into account is included in BS EN 1991-1-7
Annex B. This guidance is based on that contained in UIC leaflet 777-2R, which contains
additional recommendations and guidance to that in BS EN 1991-1-7 Annex B. This
guidance is intended to be used in conjunction with a risk assessment undertaken to establish
the likelihood and consequences of a derailment close to the structure supports.

The intentions in the UK NA to BS EN 1991-1-7 NA.2.30, are that a minimum level of
robustness is provided for Class B structures, such as bridge supports, located within the
hazard zone and also that collapse of the bridge deck onto passing rail traffic is prevented.
This is achieved by designing the supports to sustain light impacts from derailed traffic and
the deck structure to continue to function under the influence of reduced traffic load on the
bridge over the track(s). These design requirements will achieve the design objectives to
maintain safety of the railway, the safety of users of overbridge structures and to minimise the
disruption to rail and road traffic or pedestrian access, in the event of an impact following
derailment. In this way, it does not matter if the impact force is actually greater than the
design force and, the design of structures to resist impact can be achieved at a reasonable cost.

Where design solutions involve the provision of resistance to impact, it may be helpful to
consider what the selected design forces might mean in terms of the design situation that they
represent. The design impact force is a function of the mass of the train acting on the
structure, the speed at impact, and the stiffness of the structure and the train. For a typical ten
car passenger train, the total train weight might be 400 tonnes (10 x 40 tonnes) and the line
speed could be up to 200 km/h (125 mph). In a head-on collision, it is possible, but unlikely,
that the full weight of the train will be taken by the structure, as individual vehicles may
become detached or continue to be resisted by the track. The particular circumstances of a
derailment situation are likely to be complex and will depend on, for example, the train speed
R Ko, A Pope, D Cooper, J Shave, J Lane 11

and track geometry. If it is assumed in a particular derailment situation, that the weight of the
train impacting the structure is 80 tonnes and also that the soft impact conditions described in
BS EN 1991-1-7, C.2.2 are relevant, the required impact resistance may be determined from
the assumption that the kinetic energy of the train is arrested by the work done in deforming
the structure.

Expression C.5 from BS EN 1991-1-7, Annex C, is repeated below:
mv
r
2
= F
0
y
0

and F
0
= mv
r
2
/2y
0
Equation 1
Where:

F
0
= Impact force that the structure can resist to coincide with the limit of its plastic
strength
y
0
= The limit of displacement of the structure in achieving its plastic strength
m = mass of the train resisted by the structure v
r
= velocity of the train at impact

For a reasonably flexible structure with a displacement of say 100 mm, the impact forces
range from 77 MN for impact at 50 km/h to 1235 MN for impact at 200 km/h. For a structure
of similar flexibility (100 mm assumed) and a reduced proportion of the train mass acting on
the structure, the impact forces range from 4 MN for impact at 50 km/h to 62 MN for impact
at 200 km/h. This demonstrates the following characteristics of dynamic impacts:

The impact force is significantly influenced by the energy dissipated during impact (in
this case by a factor of approximately 20 and pro-rata to the reduction in train mass
acting on the structure)
Impact forces can be very large for only a proportion of the full train weight
impacting at moderate speeds
An impact force of 4 MN, which is appropriate for design of Class A structures, might
be achieved for impacts from a mass as little as 4 tonnes at a speed of 50 km/h.

Forces of very large magnitude were clearly involved in the Eschede train disaster, where a 12
car ICE train travelling at a speed of 200 km/h between Hanover and Hamburg in Germany
on 3 June 1998, demolished the supports of the bridge over the track, causing the bridge to
collapse. Despite the very great number of fatalities and severe injuries (101, 88) out of a
total of 287 passengers, the likelihood of such events is mercifully very low. In practice,
designing structure supports to resist such enormous forces cannot be economically achieved
or justified.

Designing the structure itself to resist impact forces is only one solution that may be
employed to achieve the design objectives stated previously. Other solutions that might be
employed are:
R Ko, A Pope, D Cooper, J Shave, J Lane 12


i. Preventing impact with a structure (protection provided to the structure or preventing
the train from leaving the track for example).
ii. Reducing the likelihood of impact with a structure to a tolerable level (locating
switches and crossings away from structure, reducing speed and increasing clearance,
for example).

Clearly, options involving all or part of the solutions described above, are also possible as
long as the risks are considered to be controlled to an extent that is sufficient.
Structures located in areas beyond track ends
Situations where rail traffic may overrun the end of the track (for example at terminal
stations), may give rise to high risk situations, particularly where buildings are located in
areas beyond the track ends. The limit of the hazard zone, beyond which it is not considered
to be necessary to design for impact from overrunning trains, is specified in the UK NA to BS
EN 1991-1-7, NA.2.31.

Where it is necessary to locate structures within the hazard zone, BS EN 1991-1-7, 4.5.2(4),
recommends that an impact wall be provided to prevent the train impacting the structure. The
design loads are summarised in Table ? below:
Accidental Actions Caused by Ship Traffic
The UK NA to BS EN 1991-1-7, NA.2.34, NA.2.37, NA.2.40 and NA.2.41, does not provide
alternative design values to those recommended in BS EN 1991-1-7. It is recommended that
the design requirements should be specified for the individual project. This is consistent with
previous practice, where the design requirements were dependent on the specified shipping
movements below the proposed bridge, in consultation with those responsible for the
navigable waterway concerned. However, advice on the design requirements for immersed
tube tunnels subject to loads from a sunken/grounding ship or falling/dragging anchors, is
given below.
Immersed tube tunnels.
Immersed tube tunnels are frequently selected as the most appropriate design solution for
crossings beneath navigable waterways. Typically, immersed tube tunnels are placed below
the river / sea bed, with a rock or other protection layer over the roof of the tunnel and the
adjacent backfill, to protect the tunnel from local damage and the effects of scour.

The marine conditions can vary considerably from case to case. The depth of water over the
tunnel, and the profile of marine traffic, have a significant bearing on the magnitude of
potential accidental actions due to impact from a sunken/grounding ship or a falling/dragging
anchor.

The likelihood and magnitude of these actions are likely to be site specific and they should
therefore be established on an individual project basis, with reference to data provided by the
local harbour master, or other similar marine authority. The characteristics of vessels using
the waterway should be taken into consideration (for example, length, beam, hull depth,
propeller type and deadweight), as should the frequency and nature of the cargo transported.
R Ko, A Pope, D Cooper, J Shave, J Lane 13

Sunken/grounding ship
The depth of water over the tunnel may be sufficient for large ships to sink and be completely
immersed. However, the under keel clearance of immersed tube tunnels, is frequently just
sufficient to allow clearance for ships with the deepest draft. Consequently, in shallow water,
the case of grounding, or stranding, may be more appropriate.

Typically, immersed tube tunnels are designed for a uniformly distributed static loading of
50kN/m
2
applied to a 30m length of tunnel across the full width, but the magnitude and
pattern of loading will depend on the ship(s) considered in design, and magnitudes up to
200kN/m
2
are possible. An equivalent static concentrated load may be derived to represent
the impact from a sunken/grounded ship.

Ship loading should be considered in the design of the structure, the provision of watertight
joints and, the assessment of settlements, taking into account the time taken to salvage the
sunken/grounded vessel.
Falling/dragging anchor
The effects of an anchor impacting the tunnel structure directly, or being dragged across the
line of the tunnel structure, should be considered. Either the tunnel structure should be
designed to resist the full loading imposed by the design anchor, or the tunnel protection
should be designed to mitigate the effects. The design anchor should be appropriate to the
shipping using, or expected to use, the waterway.

The penetration of a falling anchor in a concrete or rock layer, is normally estimated using the
report Concrete Structures Under Impact and Impulsive Loading, Synthesis Report, Bulletin
d'Information No. 187, Comit Euro-International du Beton (CEB), 1988. An equivalent
static load is applied to the tunnel roof.

If designed to mitigate the effects of a dragging anchor, the tunnel protection layer should be
sufficient in depth and extent either side of the tunnel, to ensure that anchors break free from
the protection layer before snagging the tunnel structure.
Internal Explosions in Road and Rail Tunnels
The UK NA to BS EN 1991-1-7:2006, NA.2.42, specifies that internal explosions in road and
rail tunnels should be specified for individual project. The NA recommends consideration of
the method set out in BS EN 1991-1-7, D.3 for determination of design pressures in road and
rail tunnels. However, this may not be appropriate in all cases and it is possible that clients
may wish to define the design situations for explosions in road and rail tunnels. It is further
recommended that specialist advice be sought where necessary.
Acknowledgement
The authors are grateful for the contributions made by and/or supports from John Menzies,
Sam Luke, Steve Parkinson, Lionel Brown and the members of BSI committees B525/1 and
B525/10.
References
[1] BS EN 1991-1-7:2006 Eurocode 1: Actions on structures Part 1-7: Accidental
actions
R Ko, A Pope, D Cooper, J Shave, J Lane 14

[2] NA to BS EN 1991-1-7:2006 National Annex to Eurocode 1: Actions on structures
Part 1-7: Accidental actions
[3] PD 6688-1-7:2009 Published Document Recommendations for the design of structures
to BS EN 1991-1-7
[4] NA to BS EN 1990:2002+A1:2005 UK National Annex for Eurocode Basis of
structural design
[5] BS EN 1991-2:2003 Eurocode 1: Actions on structures Part 2: Traffic loads on
bridges
[6] BD 51/98: Portal and cantilever sign/signal gantries (Highways Agency Design
Manual for Roads and Bridges Volume 2 Section 2 Part 4)
[7] BD 60/94: The design of highway bridges for vehicle collision loads (Highways
Agency Design Manual for Roads and Bridges Volume 1 Section 3 Part 5)
[8] BD 94/07 Design of minor structures (Highways Agency Design Manual for Roads
and Bridges Volume 2 Section 2 Part 1)
[9] TD 19/06: Requirements for road restraint systems (Highways Agency Design Manual
for Roads and Bridges Volume 2 Section 2 Part 8)
[10] TD 27/05: Cross-sections and headrooms (Highways Agency Design Manual for
Roads and Bridges Volume 6 Section 1 Part 2)
[11] TD 89/04: Use of passive safety signposts to BS EN 12767 (Highways Agency Design
Manual for Roads and Bridges Volume 8 Section 2 Part 2)
[12] Highways Agency Interim Advice Note 86/07: Amendments to design requirements
for portal and cantilever sign/signal gantries
[13] Obstruction of the railway by road vehicles. Health and Safety Commission February
2002
[14] Managing the accidental obstruction of the railway by road vehicles. Department for
Transport February 2003
[15] To review the standards for the provision of nearside safety fences on major roads.
Highways Agency 2003
[16] Ove Arup & Partners. Computer simulation of heavy goods vehicle collision with
bridges Phase 2 November 1997
[17] Roadside barriers, accident frequencies and severity, C Ghee of Ross Silcock
proceedings of the conference road safety in Europe held in Birmingham, United
Kingdom, 9-11 September 1996
[18] Railway Group Standard GC/RT5112, Issue 2, Rail Traffic Loading Requirements for
the Design of Railway Structures, December 2008
[19] Railway Group Standard GC/RT5112, Issue 1, Loading Requirements for the Design
of Bridges
[20] Railway Group Approved Code of Practice GC/RC5510, Issue 1, Recommendations
for the Design of Bridges, August 1998
[21] Group Standard GC/TT0112, Issue 1, Revision A, Standard for Bridge Loading,
December 1992
[22] BS 5400-2:2006, Steel, concrete and composite bridges Part 2: Specification for
Loads
[23] UIC Leaflet 777-2R, Structures Built over Railway Lines (Construction Requirements
in the Track Zone)