17th S.C. Javali Memorial National Moot Court Competition Case

17
th
S.C. Javali Memorial National Moot Court
Competition, 2014
17
th
S.C. Javali Memorial National Moot Court Competition, 2014
17
th
S.C. Javali Memorial National Moot Court
Competition, 2014

IN THE
HONBLE SUPREME COURT OF CINDIA
AT NEW DELHI

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION U/ARTICLE. 136

MEERA
(PETITIONER)
v.
SHIRISH
(RESPONDENT)

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE PETI TI ONER

i

T TA AB BL LE E O OF F C CO ON NT TE EN NT TS S
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .................................................................................................... III
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ...................................................................................................... VI
STATUTES & CONSTITUTIONS REFERRED: .......................................................................... VI
INDIAN JUDGEMENTS:........................................................................................................ VI
FOREIGN JUDGMENTS: ........................................................................................................ X
TREATISES: ....................................................................................................................... XI
DICTIONARIES REFERRED ................................................................................................. XII
ARTICLES ......................................................................................................................... XII
INTERNATIONAL REPORTS /STATUTES............................................................................... XII
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ......................................................................................... XIV
STATEMENT OF FACTS ....................................................................................................... XV
QUESTION PRESENTED .................................................................................................... XVII
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ............................................................................................. XVIII
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED ...................................................................................................... 1
[I] THE SAID PETITION QUALIFIES MAINTAINABILITY TEST. ............................................ 1
[II] JUDGES HAVE A RESTRICTED RIGHT TO FACEBOOK ................................................... 1
[II.A] RIGHT TO EQUALITY IS RESTRICTIVE IN NATURE..................................................... 2
[II.B] FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IS NOT AN ABSOLUTE RIGHT. ....................................... 2
[II.C] THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF JUDGES CAN BE CURTAILED AS THAT OF MEMBER
OF ARMED FORCES ......................................................................................................... 5
[III] THE IMPUGNED ORDER PASSED BY THE HIGH COURT IS NULL AND VOID. ................ 5
[III.A] THE SAID ORDER VIOLATES THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL JUSTICE ......................... 6
[III.B] THE SAID ORDER VIOLATES THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT UNDER ARTICLE 14 ........... 7
[III.C] THE SAID CONDUCT OF THE JUDGE IS AGAINST THE PRINCIPLES ENSHRINED IN THE
OATH OF THE HIGH COURT JUDGE..................................................................................... 8
[III.D] THE SAID JUDGE DID NOT DISCLOSE HIS RELATION WITH THE RESPONDENT. ........... 9
[IV] CHATTING ON FACEBOOK BY MEERA DID NOT CONSTITUTE MENTAL CRUELTY
UNDER SEC.13(1)(IA) OF THE HINDU MARRIAGE ACT, 1955. ........................................... 9
[IV.A] MENTAL CRUELTY DEPENDS UPON THE SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT OF THE PARTIES. .... 9
[IV.B] THE PETITIONER WAS EXERCISING HER RIGHT TO COMMUNICATE AND SOCIALIZE.10

ii

[IV.C] THE CAUSE OF MENTAL CRUELTY IS NOT GRAVE AND WEIGHTY. .......................... 10
[IV.D] THE CONDUCT IS NOT OF SUCH NATURE THAT THE PARTIES CANNOT REASONABLY
BE EXPECTED TO LIVE TOGETHER ................................................................................... 11
[V] GUIDELINES ON THE USE OF FACEBOOK BY THE JUDGES .......................................... 12
[V.A] USE OF FACEBOOK AS PUBLIC FORUM .................................................................. 12
[V. B] LAWYERS AND PARTIES AS JUDGES FACEBOOK FRIEND ...................................... 13
PRAYER FOR RELIEF .......................................................................................................... 14


iii

L LI IS ST T O OF F A AB BB BR RE EV VI IA AT TI IO ON NS S

ABBREVIATIONS FULL FORM
Section
Paragraph
AC Appeal Cases
AIR All India Reporter
All ER All English Reports
Anr. Another
AP Andhra Pradesh
Art Article
CA Civil Appeal
Cal Calcutta
Civ LJ Civil Law Journal
CLR Common Law Review
CP Common Pleas Cases
CriLJ Criminal Law Journal
Cur Civ Cas Curative Civil Cases
Del Delhi
DLT Delhi Law Times
DMC District Magistrate Cases
EBC Eastern Book Cases
Ed Edition

iv

ex.p. Ex. Parte
Fam Law Family Law
FCR Family Cases Reporter
FLR Federal Law Reports
HL House of Lords
HP Himachal Pradesh
Ibid Ibidium
ILR Indian Law Reporter
Jhar Jharkhand
Kant Karnataka
Ker Kerala
LJKB Lower Judge Kings Bench
Ltd. Limited
MP Madhya Pradesh
NSWCA New South Wales Court of Appeal
NSWLR New South Wales Law Reports
Nt Note
Ori Orissa
Ors Others
OUP Oxford University Press
Para Paragraph
Pat Patna
Pg Page Number

v

PLR Punjab Law Review
Punj Punjab
QB Queens Bench
R Rex
Raj Rajasthan
SC Supreme Court
SCC Supreme Court Cases
SCC(LS) Supreme Court Cases (Labour & Service)
SCR Supreme Court Reporter
Supp. Supplement
USC United States Cases
Viz Videlicet
Vol. Volume
WL Westlaw citation
WLR Westminster Law Review


vi

I IN ND DE EX X O OF F A AU UT TH HO OR RI IT TI IE ES S

STATUTES & CONSTITUTIONS REFERRED:
THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 1950.
THE HINDU MARRIAGE ACT, 1955.
THE FAMILY COURTS ACT,1984
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

INDIAN JUDGEMENTS:
Cases Citation Page No.
A.K Sharma v. Director General of Civil Aviation AIR 2002 Del 357 6
Amar Nath Choudhary v. Braithwaite & Co. Ltd AIR 2002 SC 678 6
Anna v. Tarabai, AIR 1970 MP 36 11
Arun Kumar Bhardwaj v. Anila Bhardwaj AIR 1993 Del 135 10
Bhagat v. Mrs. D. Bhagat AIR 1994 SC 710 9
Bidyut kumar Saha v. Smiti Tapan Saha AIR 2007 Gau 1 10
Bhavana Sharma v. Devendra Kumar Sharma AIR 2007 Raj 157 11
Bihar Motor Transport Federation v. State of Bihar AIR 1995 Pat 188 7
Braja Kishore Ghose v. Krishna Ghose (1988) 2 Cur Civ Cas 188
(192) Cal.
11
Canara Bank v. Debasis Das AIR 2003 SC 2041 6
Chaitali Dey v. Badal Kumar Dey AIR 2005 Jhar 83 11
Chikkarange Gowda v. State of Mysore AIR 1956 SC 731 1

vii

Delhi Police Non-Gazetted Karmchari Sangh v
Union of India
AIR 1987 SC 379 5
DTC v. DTC Mazdoor (1991) Supp. (1) SCC 600 6
Francis Coralie Mullin Vs. Administrator, Union
Territory of Delhi and Ors.
AIR1981SC746 10
G Padmini v. G Sivananda Babu AIR 2000 AP 176 10
G.N.Nayak v .Goa University AIR 2002 SC 790 6
Gauri Shankar v. Union of India AIR 1995 SC 55 2
Gujarat Water Supply v. Unique Electro (Gujarat)
(P)
IR 1989 SC 973 4
Gurbux singh v. Harminder Kaur AIR 2011 SC 114 11
Harjit Kaur v. Roop Lal AIR 2004 P&H 22 1
Indian Express Newspaper (Bombay) v. Union of
India
AIR 1986 SC 515 3, 10
Indira Gangele v. Shailendra Kumar Gangele AIR 1993 MP 59 10
Jagannath Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 961 SC 1245 2
Jagroop Singh Gill v. State of Punjab AIR 1995 P&H 303 7
Jaswant Singh Mathura Singh v. Ahmedabad
Municipal Corp
AIR 1991 SC 2130 7
Jiwan Kumar Lohia v. Durga Dutt Lohia (1992) 1 SCC 56 7
K. Veeraswami v.Union of India (UOI) and Ors. (1991) 3 SCC 655 4
Kamini Gupta v. Mukesh Kumar Gupta (1985) 1 Cur Civ Cas 465 11
Kapoor v. Jagmohan AIR 1981 SC 136 6

viii

Kerela Hotel & Restaurant Assn v. State of Kerela 1990 SCR (1) 516 2
Keshab Devi Mishra v. Pradeep Kumar Mishra 1991 (2) DMC 284 (MP) 11
Krishna Swami Vs. Union of India and another AIR1993SC1407 13
L.S.T.M and L.L.C Coop Society. Ltd. v.
Government of A.P
AIR 2003 AP 226 6
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India AIR 1978 SC 597 3
Mayadevi v. Jagdish Prasad AIR 2007 SC 1426 10
Narayan v. Prabha AIR 1964 MP 28 10
National Central Co-operative Bank Ltd Vs Ajay
Kumar
AIR 1994 SC 39 6
Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli (2006) 4 SCC 558 9
Neelam Tiwari v. Sunil Tiwari AIR 2009 MP 225 1
O.P Gupta v.Union of India (1987) 4 SCC 328 7
Padma v. Parma Ram AIR 1959 HP 37 9
Parag Mittal v. Vikita Mittal AIR 2000 Del 304 10
Pareena Swarup v. Union of India (2008) 14 SCC 107 1
Prasad Laxmi Narayan v. State of UP AIR 1954 SC 224 4
Prithi Pal Singh Bedi v. Union of India AIR 1982 SC 1413 5
Raghuveer Singh v. Shiv Kumar Swami And Ors RLW 2006 (3) Raj 2266 1
Rajkumari v. Ram Prakash (1968) 70 PLR 879 10
Ramdoss And Others v. State Of Tamil Nadu And
Another
1993 CriLJ 2147 3
Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India (1987) 4 SCC 611 7

ix

Rattan Lal Sharma v.Managing Co. Dr. Hari Ram
(Co-education) Higher Secondary School
AIR 1993 SC 2155 7
S. Khushboo v. Kanniammal & Anr [2010] INSC 347. 3
Sachindra Kumar Swami Vs State of Orissa AIR 1995 Ori 224 6
Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh (2007) 4 SCC 511, 530 11
Santosh Kumari Kewari v. Praveen Kumar AIR 1987 Punj 33 10
Savitri Pandey v. Prem Chand Pandey AIR 2002 SC 591 11
Scheduled Caste and Weaker Section Welfare
Association v. State of Karnataka
AIR 1991 SC 1117 7
Shakti Bhog Foods Ltd. v. Kola Shipping Ltd &
Anr
193 (2012) DLT 421 3
Shiveshwar Narayan Vs. High Court of Judicature,
Patna and Anr
(2014)1SCC(LS)553 13
Sri Srinivasa Theatre v. Government of Tamil Nadu AIR 1992 SC 1004 2
State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab
Jamat
(2005) 8 SCC 534 4
State of U.P v. Nooh AIR 1958 SC 86 5
State of West Bengal v. Shivananda Pathak (1998) 5 SCC 513 6
Subimal Das v. State of West Bengal (1992) ILR 2Cal 138 11
Sukumar Mukherjee v. Tripti Mukherjee AIR 1992 Pat 32 9
Tapan v. Anjali AIR 1993 Cal 10 10
Union of India v. Tulsiram AIR 1985 SC 1416 6
Vinita Saxena v. Pankaj Pandit (2006) 3 SCC 778 11

x

Vishaka v.. State of Rajasthan AIR 1997 SC 3011 12
Vishwanath Agrawal v. Sarla Vishwanath Agrawal (2012) 7 SCC 288 9
Yasoda v. Krishnamoorthy AIR 1992 Kant 360 10

FOREIGN JUDGMENTS:
Case Name Citation Page No.
Board of Education v. Rice 1911 AC 179: LJKB 796 8
Domville, v. State of Florida, No. 4D12556, 103; So.3d
184
7
Dr Bonham Case (1610) 77 ER 638 (CP). 7
Ebner v. Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2001) 205 CLR 337 9
General Council of Medical Education &
Registration of U.K v. Spackman
(1943)2 All ER 337 8
Gillies v. Secretary of State for Work and Pension [2006] 1 WLR 781 7
Gollins v. Gollins (1963) 2 All ER 966 11
Haque v Haque (1977) 1 WLR 888 11
J Najjar v. Hames (1991) 25 NSWLR 224 9
Metropolitan Properties Co (FGC) Ltd v. Lannon [1969] 1 QB 577 7
Porter v. Magill [2002] 2 AC 357 7
R v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary
Magistrate and Ors, ex.p. Pinochet Ugarte (No2)
[2000] 1 AC 119 (HL) 7
R v. Gough [1993] AC 646, 670 (HL) 8

xi

R v. S (RD) [1997] 3 SCR 484 7
R v. Sussex Justices, ex p. McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256,259 7
Re Gilmores Application (1957) 1 All ER 796 (800)
CA
6
Webb v. R (1994) 181 CLR 41 7
Welfare v. Welfare (1977) 8 Fam Law 55 11
TREATISES:
ARVIND P. DATAR, COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA (2ND ED., 2007)
D. SMITH WOOLF AND JOWELLS, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS (5TH ED.,
1983)
D.D. BASU, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2ND ED., 2008)
GRANT HAMMOND, JUDICIAL RECUSAL: PRINCIPLES, PROCESS AND PROBLEMS, HART
PUBLICATION, 2009
H.M. SEERVAI, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA (4TH ED., 1993)
HALSBURYS LAWS OF ENGLAND (5TH ED., 2009)
HALSBURYS LAWS OF INDIA (1ST ED., 2008)
JAGDISH SWARUP, CONSTITUTION OF INDIA (3RD ED.,2013)
KUMUD DESAI, DIVORCE (9TH ED. 2014)
M.P JAIN AND S.N. JAIN, PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (7TH ED. 2011)
M.P. JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (6TH ED., 2010)
MAYNE, HINDU LAW AND USAGE (16TH ED. 2012)

xii

PARAS DIWAN, LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE (4TH ED. 2002)
SIR DINSHAW FARDUNJI MULLA, MULLA HINDU LAW (21ST ED., 2013)
DICTIONARIES REFERRED:
K.J AIYER; JUDICIAL DICTIONARY; LEXIS NEXIS BUTTERWORTHS WADHWA, 15TH ED., 2011

P. RAMANATHA AIYAR, THE MAJOR LAW LEXICON, LEXIS NEXIS BUTTERWORTHS, 4TH ED.,
2010
P. RAMANATHA AIYAR, CONCISE LAW DICTIONARY, LEXIS NEXIS BUTTERWORTHS, 4TH ED.,
2012
BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY, BRYAN A. GARDNER, WEST PUBLICATION, 9TH ED
ARTICLES:
P DEVLIN, THE JUDGE AS LAWMAKER.THE JUDGE (OXFORD, OUP) 3 (1981).
ANKITA SINGHANIA; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ON JUDICIAL REVIEW AND JUDICIAL
ACCOUNTABILITY - INDIAN EXPERIENCE; H.M SEERVAI GOLD MEDAL ESSAY COMPETITION,
2002
AM GLEESON, THE RULE OF LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION 82 (SYDNEY, ABC BOOKS, 2000);
AND
S KENNY, MAINTAINING PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THE JUDICIARY: A PRECARIOUS
EQUILIBRIUM, (1999) 25 MONASH UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, 209.
INTERNATIONAL REPORTS /STATUTES
14TH REPORT LAW COMMISSION OF INDIA, VOL.1, 1958
2
ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, FEBRUARY 2007 1
OPINION 66, CALIFORNIA JUDGES ASSOCIATION, JUDICIAL ETHICS COMMITTEE 12,13
THE BANGALORE PRINCIPLES OF CONDUCT, 2002 3,5

xiii

CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, 2005
RESTATEMENT OF VALUES OF JUDICIAL LIFE ADOPTED BY THE CHIEF JUSTICES
CONFERENCE OF INDIA, 2005


xiv

S ST TA AT TE EM ME EN NT T O OF F J JU UR RI IS SD DI IC CT TI IO ON N

The Petitioner has approached the Honble Supreme Court of Sincida under Article 136 of the
Constitution of India, 1950.


xv

S ST TA AT TE EM ME EN NT T O OF F F FA AC CT TS S

(I) Parties
Shirish [hereinafter Respondent] and Meera [hereinafter Petitioner] met in New York while
working in an investment bank and got married. Three years after marriage, the couple shifted to
Chingalore, Cindia, along with their girl child.
(II) Differences between the Parties
One year after shifting, the couple developed differences. The Respondent moved to Family
Court, Chingalore for dissolution of the marriage on the ground of mental cruelty under the
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter the Act). The Respondent alleged that the Petitioner
spends most of her time chatting on the Facebook, particularly with her former colleagues in
New York & Petitioners self imposed isolation by persistent chatting on the Facebook has
denied him his family life, disturbing his mental peace.
While not disputing that she chatted on the Facebook with her former colleagues in the US, the
Respondent Meera responded that the Respondent goes on frequent excursions with his friends
from the Nature Lovers Club and cares little for their family life.
(III) Family Courts Decision
On X July, 2014, the Family Court granted divorce to the Respondent.
(IV) Appeal dismissed by the High Court
The Petitioner filed an appeal in the High Court at Chingalore under Sec. 19 of the Family

xvi

Courts Act, 1984. However, the appeal was dismissed by the Court and divorce was upheld.
(V) Special Leave Petition
The Petitioner filed a Special Leave Petition under Article 136 of the Constitution of Cindia
before the Supreme Court. At the threshold, the Petitioner alleged that the impugned order
passed by the High Court dismissing the appeal is null and void on the ground of apparent bias,
since one of the Judges of the High Court bench which passed the impugned order, was and is a
Facebook friend of Respondent the fact now found. She also produced material and alleged that
Respondent had expressed his like on several occasions to the Judges postings concerning
environmental issues on the Facebook. Judges, social networking with litigants, violate the
unwritten rule against conflict of interest, submitted Petitioner.
(VI) Present Status of the matter
The Supreme Court granted Special Leave to appeal on X September, 2014 and posted the
appeal for hearing before the Division Bench on X October, 2014. The matter therefore lies
before the Divisional Bench of this Honble Supreme Court of Cindia.
Cindia and Chingalore are pari materia to India and Bangalore respectively.


xvii

Q QU UE ES ST TI IO ON N P PR RE ES SE EN NT TE ED D

I. WHETHER THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE OR NOT?
II. WHETHER JUDGES HAVE A RIGHT TO SUBSCRIBE TO THE FACEBOOK OR SOCIAL
NETWORK ON WEB AND INVITE OR ACCEPT FRIENDS?
III. WHETHER, THE IMPUGNED ORDER DATED X AUGUST, 2014 PASSED BY THE HIGH
COURT IN APPEAL UNDER SEC. 19 OF THE FAMILY COURTS ACT, 1984, WAS NULL AND
VOID?
IV. WHETHER, CHATTING ON THE FACEBOOK BY MEERA CONSTITUTED A MENTAL
CRUELTY UNDER SEC. 13 (1) (IA) OF THE HINDU MARRIAGE ACT, 1955, FOR
DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE?
V. WHAT GUIDELINES SHOULD BE FRAMED ON THE USE OF FACEBOOK BY THE JUDGES?


xviii

S SU UM MM MA AR RY Y O OF F A AR RG GU UM ME EN NT TS S

[I] THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE
The Special Leave Petition under Article 136 is maintainable on the grounds of violation of
principles of natural justice and irregularity of procedure. There has been bias or partiality in the
judgement of the High Court since one of the judges in the bench was a facebook friend of the
respondent. Also the family court and the High Court have not followed the proper procedure of
reconciliation before directly granting divorce.

[II] JUDGES HAVE A RESTRICTED RIGHT TO FACEBOOK.
Judges have right to subscribe to Facebook but with reasonable restrictions. To maintain
impartiality in the judgments it is necessary to restrict the use of Facebook by the judges. Since
judges are at a higher pedestal than common citizens due to the importance of their office, they
can be reasonably restricted without affecting their right to equality. Also the right to freedom
and expression is not a an absolute right, hence it can be reasonably restricted.

[III] THE IMPUGNED ORDER PASSED BY THE HIGH COURT IS NULL AND VOID.
The impugned order of the High Court is null and void as it violates the principle of Natural
Justice. There is apparent bias in the judgment as the Respondent is the Facebook friend of one
of the Judges of the bench. It has denied the petitioner of her right to fair hearing.


xix

[IV] CHATTING ON FACEBOOK BY MEERA DID NOT CONSTITUTE MENTAL CRUELTY.
Chatting on Facebook by Meera did not constitute mental cruelty as it did not cause any mental
suffering to the respondent as the parties come from modern society and she was merely
exercising her right to communicate. Also the conduct was not grave and weighty so as to render
cohabitation between the parties impossible.

[V] SOME GUIDELINES ARE SUGGESTED ON THE USE OF FACEBOOK BY THE JUDGES.
To ensure fair trial some guidelines are suggested on the use of Facebook by the judges as a
legislature on this issue is the need of the hour. Judges must maintain the dignity of the office
which he is holding and thus must be careful while commenting on political issues and regarding
the interactions with the lawyers.

M ME EM MO OR RA AN ND DU UM M O ON N B BE EH HA AL LF F O OF F T TH HE E P PE ET TI IT TI IO ON NE ER R

1

A AR RG GU UM ME EN NT TS S A AD DV VA AN NC CE ED D
[I] THE SAID PETITION QUALIFIES MAINTAINABILITY TEST.
It is submitted that Article 136 confers plenary jurisdiction to the Supreme Court in the matter of
entertaining and hearing appeals by granting special leave.
1
The Supreme Court may grant leave
where there is illegality or an irregularity of procedure or violation of the principles of natural
justice, resulting in the absence of a fair trial or gross miscarriage of justice.
2

In the instant case the Special Leave Petition is maintainable as there is gross violation of a
principle of natural justice, i.e., audi alterum paltrem, as it is affected by the biasness and
partiality of the Judge
3
.
The special leave petition can also be granted where the court has failed to follow the correct
procedure in dispensing justice. Thus in the instant case it was the duty of the Family court
4
and
High court
5
to follow the procedure and provide for any reconciliation between the parties before
granting divorce.
6

[II] JUDGES HAVE A RESTRICTED RIGHT TO FACEBOOK
It is humbly submitted that the office of judge, being the most important position in the judicial
system is attached with various duties and responsibilities one of them being to impart justice
with impartiality,
7
impropriety
8
and integrity.
9
The idea of fairness embodies equality before
law, which implies that everyone has an equal right of fair hearing. Therefore, in order to provide

1
Mahendra Pal Singh, V.N. Shuklas Constitution of India, 534 (12
th
ed. 2013).
2
Chikkarange Gowda v. State of Mysore, AIR 1956 SC 731.
3
Flick, Natural Justice,112 (1
st
ed. 1979).
4
9 of the Family Courts Act, 1984.
5
23(2) of the Act.
6
Harjit Kaur v. Roop Lal, AIR 2004 P&H 22; Neelam Tiwari v. Sunil Tiwari, AIR 2009 MP 225.
7
Pareena Swarup v. Union of India, (2008) 14 SCC 107.
8
Canon 2, MODEL CODE OF CONDUCT,
9
Raghuveer Singh v. Shiv Kumar Swami And Ors., RLW 2006 (3) Raj 2266

2

impartial fair trial certain restrictions have to be imposed on the freedom of speech and
expression
10
of the Judges.
[II.A] RIGHT TO EQUALITY IS RESTRICTIVE IN NATURE.
Right to equality
11
has two concepts viz., equality before law
12
and equal protection of law.
13

This Article is based on the concept of equals should not be treated unlike and unlikes should
not be treated alike. Likes should be treated alike.
14

The varying needs of different classes or sections of people require differential treatment. This
leads to classification between different groups of person and differentiation between classes.
15

The Supreme Court established a test in a case for validation of classification. As per this test
those grouped together must possess common characteristics justifying their inclusion in the
group, but distinguishing them from those excluded; and the performance of the exercise must
bear rational nexus with the reason for existence.
16

In the instant case, all the judges are differentiated from the ordinary citizens in respect of the
position and responsibility they hold
17
. Disposal of justice by judges is the reason as well as
objective of the said classification. Hence, the classification done is valid.
[II.B] FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IS NOT AN ABSOLUTE RIGHT.
Freedom of speech is essential for proper functioning of the democratic process.
18
The freedom
of speech and expression is the mother of all other liberties.
19
It has been variously described as a

10
Article 19(1a), The Constitution of India, 1950.
11
Article 14, The Constitution of India, 1950.
12
Sri Srinivasa Theatre v. Government of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1992 SC 1004.
13
Jagannath Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 961 SC 1245.
14
Gauri Shankar v. Union of India, AIR 1995 SC 55, at 58 : (1994) 6 SCC 349.
15
M.P Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, 880 (7
th
ed. 2014).
16
Kerela Hotel & Restaurant Assn v. State of Kerela, 1990 SCR (1) 516.
17
14
th
Report Law Commission of India , Vol.1, pg. 42, 1958.

3

basic human right, natural right and the like.
20
These rights represent the basic values of a
civilized society.
21

[II.B.i] The right also includes expression of thoughts in social media.
Freedom of expression includes any act of seeking, receiving and imparting information or ideas,
regardless of the medium used.
22
It includes the right to participate in the public
communicative systems.
23
This system also includes right to express views on social media.
Freedom of speech and expression though an important right but it is not absolute.
24
It is subject
to reasonable restriction
25
a judge should always conduct himself or herself in such a manner as
to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the
judiciary.
26
The judges and justices are required to avoid the mere appearance of impropriety.
27

It may happen that a judge facing a lawyer, whose case is pending before him, is his Facebook
friend, hence creating an apprehension in the mind of people that the judge may be involved in
ex-parte communication,
28
which is against the public policy.
29
Hence, the use of Facebook or
other social networking sites by the judges may have reasonable restriction. So that justice can be
imparted impartially.

18
M.P Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, 1019 (7
th
ed. 2014).
19
Report of the Second Press Comm., Vol. I, 34-35
20
ibid 18
21
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597.
22
Article 19 (2), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 (ICCPR).
23
Indian Express Newspaper (Bombay) v. Union of India, AIR 1986 SC 515.
24
S. Khushboo v. Kanniammal & Anr, [2010] INSC 347.
25
Ramdoss And Others v. State Of Tamil Nadu And Another, 1993 CriLJ 2147.
26
Clause (4.6), The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct, 2002
27
Clause (1), Restatement of Values of Judicial Life (1999)
28
Youkers v. The State of Texas, No. 051101407CR, 2013 WL 2077196
29
Shakti Bhog Foods Ltd. v. Kola Shipping Ltd & Anr., 193 (2012) DLT 421.

4

Restriction or regulation includes prohibition and in order to determine whether total prohibition
would be reasonable, the court has to balance the direct impact on the fundamental right of the
citizen as against greater public or social interest sought to be safe guarded.
30
In the instant case,
when we look at the greater good of public, partial restriction to the rights of judges will satisfy
the object of fair disposition of justice and also does not deprive judge from their rights.
[II.B.ii] Restriction should be reasonable
The restriction imposed on the right to freedom of speech and expression should be reasonable.
31

It is difficult to exactly define the word reasonable.
32
In examining the reasonableness of a
provision whether it is violating the right, one has to keep in mind Directive Principle of State
Policies, restriction should not be arbitrary or excessive and there should be balance between
restrictions imposed and social control.
33
This restriction promotes the Directive Principle of
equality of justice,
34
by providing fair trial to all the people. There is partial restriction to the
point where judges personal conduct interferes with impartial disposition of justice.
35
There is a
direct link between the restriction and the object. The restriction is on use of Facebook and
objective is to impart justice. Thus, judges should be protected from any such situation when
there is a possibility of them being biased while providing justice
36
.

30
State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat, (2005) 8 SCC 534.
31
32
Gujarat Water Supply v. Unique Electro (Gujarat) (P), IR 1989 SC 973.
33
Prasad Laxmi Narayan v. State of UP, AIR 1954 SC 224
34
Article 39A, The Constitution of India, 1950.
35
Restatement of Values of Judicial Life, (1999). Clause (1), May 1997
36
K. Veeraswami v.Union of India (UOI) and Ors., (1991) 3 SCC 655.

5

[II.C] THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF JUDGES CAN BE CURTAILED AS THAT OF MEMBER
OF ARMED FORCES
A government servant is also entitled to enjoy fundamental rights. Parliament is endowed with
power to restrict or abrogate the Fundamental Rights of a few categories of government
servants
37
such as in case of the members of the Armed Forces;
38
or the members of the forces
charged with the maintenance of public order
39
.
The office of judge being a position of equal importance and responsibility like that of the above
mentioned government servants. The imparting of justice in a fair and free manner is as
important as the security of a nation. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge must
accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen
and should do so freely and willingly.
40

Hence, there can be partial restriction on the use of social networking sites by the judges, as they
hold a very special position in the system for maintaining public order and delivering justice to
all without any being biased.
[III] THE IMPUGNED ORDER PASSED BY THE HIGH COURT IS NULL AND VOID.
The order passed by the High Court contrary to the rules of natural justice and all accepted rules
of procedure and offends the superior courts sense of fair play.
41
Therefore the said impugned
order renders a degree of nullity and is void. The Supreme Court may issue a writ of Certiorari
42

37
38
Prithi Pal Singh Bedi v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 1413 : (1982) 3 SCC 140.
39
Delhi Police Non-Gazetted Karmchari Sangh v Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 379.
40
Clause (4.2), THE BANGALORE PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, 2002
41
State of U.P v. Nooh AIR 1958 SC 86.
42
Aricle 32(2), The Constitution of India, 1950

6

in the present matter as it may think in the interest of justice since there is manifest violation the
principles of natural justices even though the authority has acted within its jurisdiction.
43

[III.A] THE SAID ORDER VIOLATES THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL JUSTICE
It is humbly submitted that the Supreme Court has held that observance of natural justice is an
integral part of the guarantee of equality under the Article 14; non-observance of which renders
the decision arbitrary
44
and prejudice for vitiating the impugned action.
45
In Canara Bank v.
Debasis Das,
46
it was held that natural justice is another name for common-sense justice and
Rules of natural justice are not codified canons... Justice is based substantially
on natural ideals and human values. The administration of justice is to be freed from
the narrow and restricted considerations
[III.A.i] The said relation with the litigant creates an apprehension of bias.
Bias may be defined as a condition of mind which sways judgment, and the judge unable to
exercise impartiality in a particular case.
47
It may be generally defined as partiality or preference
which is not founded on reason and is actuated by self-interest whether pecuniary or personal.
48

In the present case there is an absence of any pecuniary interest but still there is a real danger
of apparent bias, which is material to consider
49
due to indirect relationship,
50
experience or
contact with the respondent involved in the proceeding.

43
Re Gilmores Application, (1957) 1 All ER 796 (800) CA
44
Union of India v. Tulsiram, (1985) 3 SCC 398 (para 95); DTC v. DTC Mazdoor, (1991) Supp. (1) SCC 600 (para
202, 209); L.S.T.M and L.L.C Coop Society. Ltd. v. Government of A.P, AIR 2003 AP 226, A.K Sharma v.
Director General of Civil Aviation, AIR 2002 Del 357.
45
Kapoor v. Jagmohan, ,AIR 1981 SC 136; also in Sachindra Kumar Swami v. State of Orissa, AIR 1995 Ori 224;
46
AIR 2003 SC 2041. Also in National Central Co-operative Bank Ltd v. Ajay Kumar, AIR 1994 SC 39.
47
State of West Bengal v. Shivananda Pathak (1998) 5 SCC 513. Also in Amar Nath Choudhary v. Braithwaite &
Co. Ltd., AIR 2002 SC 678.
48
G.N.Nayak v .Goa University, (2002) 2 SCC 712.
49
On bias, HALSBURYS LAWS OF ENGLAND

7

It is submitted that for appreciating a case of personal bias or bias to the subject matter the test is
whether there was a real likelihood of a bias, even though such a bias has not in fact taken
place.
51
In the present case, from the point of a reasonable man
52
and comprehending all
circumstances
53
there is a substantial possibility of bias and prejudice acting against the
petitioner,
54
since the judge is a Facebook friend of the litigant and both of them share a mutual
interest.
55
It is said that due to this friendship the judge may be perceived to be a judge in his
own case.
56
This test also extends to the personal life of the judge, at the post-hearing stage.
57
A
reasonable suspicion of bias is proved as impossible to determine whether the decision-maker
approached the matter with a truly biased state of mind
58
therefore it is sufficient to quash the
judicial determination.
59

[III.B] THE SAID ORDER VIOLATES THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT UNDER ARTICLE 14
It is submitted that the order of the High Court violated the principle of natural justice and
equality before law resulting in violation of Article 14.
60
In the present case the judge having the
power to decide and determine to the prejudice of the parties, had duty to act judicially,
61
which
was not rightly exercised. It is also against the principle of petitioners right to fair hearing
62
or

50
Webb v. R, (1994) 181 CLR 41
51
Grant Hammond, JUDICIAL RECUSAL: PRINCIPLES, PROCESS AND PROBLEMS, Hart Publication, 2009,Pg 41.
52
Ibid, Pg 60
53
Porter v. Magill, [2002] 2 AC 357; also in Gillies v. Secretary of State for Work and Pension, [2006] 1 WLR 781
54
Rattan Lal Sharma v.Managing Co. Dr. Hari Ram (Co-education) Higher Secondary School, AIR 1993 SC 2155 ;
Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India, (1987) 4 SCC 611; Jiwan Kumar Lohia v. Durga Dutt Lohia, (1992) 1 SCC 56
55
Moot proposition, 6, Domville, v. State of Florida, No. 4D12556, 103 So.3d 184.
56
Lord Browne-Wilkinson in R v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and Ors, ex.p. Pinochet Ugarte
(No2), [2000] 1 AC 119 (HL) Pg 132-33. Sir Edward Coke CJ in Dr Bonham Case, (1610) 77 ER 638 (CP).
57
Supra Nt. 50 Pg 81.
58
R v. S (RD), [1997] 3 SCR 484.
59
Lord Hewart CJ in R v. Sussex Justices, ex p. McCarthy, [1924] 1 KB 256,259. Also in Metropolitan Properties
Co (FGC) Ltd v. Lannon, [1969] 1 QB 577, 598-600 (CA).
60
Jaswant Singh Mathura Singh v. Ahmedabad Municipal Corp., AIR 1991 SC 2130
61
Scheduled Caste and Weaker Section Welfare Association v. State of Karnataka, (1991) 2 SCC 604 : AIR 1991
SC 1117. Also in Jagroop Singh Gill v. State of Punjab, AIR 1995 P&H 303; Bihar Motor Transport Federation v.
State of Bihar, AIR 1995 Pat 188
62
O.P Gupta v.Union of India, (1987) 4 SCC 328.

8

against Audi Alteram Partem since he already knew the respondent.
63
Also the decision was not
in conformity to the principle of qui aliquid statuerit, parte inaudita altera acquum licet dixerit,
haud acquum fecerit which means Justice should not only be done, but should be seen to be
done
64
. Therefore the award is not enforceable
65
and is liable to be set aside. The court should
ask itself whether, having regard to those circumstances, there was a real danger of bias on the
part of the relevant member of the tribunal in question
66
or an inappropriate inclination on the
part of a judge to decide an issue influenced by some consideration other than its merits
67
.
[III.C] THE SAID CONDUCT OF THE JUDGE IS AGAINST THE PRINCIPLES ENSHRINED IN THE
OATH OF THE HIGH COURT JUDGE.
It is further submitted that the courts of law are essential to act and assume their role as guardians
of the Rule of Law
68
and a judge must subscribe
69
to an oath to be without fear or favour,
affection or ill-will.
70
These are the principles to maintain public acceptance and integrity of the
judiciary
71
and non observance of them leads to would collapse
72
of the very notion of a legal
system as a fundamental pillar of society. In the present case these principles are not followed
rendering the decision against the public policy.

63
Also LORD WRIGHT in Board of Education v. Rice 1911 AC 179: LJKB 796. He observed that the Board can
obtain information in any way they think best, always giving a fair opportunity to those who are parties to the
controversy for correcting or contradicting any relevant statement prejudicial to their view.
64
Restatement of Values of Judicial Life (1999), Clause 1, May 7, 1997
65
General Council of Medical Education & Registration of U.K v. Spackman, 1943 AC 179 : (1943)2 All ER 337
66
R v. Gough, [1993] AC 646, 670 (HL).
67
Grant Hammond, JUDICIAL RECUSAL: PRINCIPLES, PROCESS AND PROBLEMS, Hart Publication, 2009, Pg. 33
68
In New Zealand, see Oaths and Declarations Act 1957 18. The oath for each federal justice or judge in the
United States is set out at 28 USC 453
69
Article 219 of the Indian Constitution. According to Blacks Law Dictionary 5th Edition: Subscription- The act
of writing ones name under a written instrument; the affixing ones signature to any document, whether for the
purpose of authenticating or attesting it, of adopting its terms as ones own expressions, or of binding ones self by
an engagement which it contains.
70
Oath of High Court judge, Schedule 3
rd
, VIII of The Constitution of India, 1950
71
Supra Pg. 13
72
See AM GLEESON, THE RULE OF LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION 82 (Sydney, ABC Books, 2000); and S Kenny,
Maintaining Public Confidence in the Judiciary: A Precarious Equilibrium, (1999) 25 Monash University Law
Review, 209.

9

[III.D] THE SAID JUDGE DID NOT DISCLOSE HIS RELATION WITH THE RESPONDENT.
It is humbly submitted that the judges action and their every word spoken or written must show
and reflect correctly that they hold the office as a public trust
73
and they are determined to strive
continuously to enhance and maintain peoples confidence in the judicial system.
74
As a matter
of prudence and professional practice, judges should disclose interests and association.
75
The
interest must be disclosed it is then left to the parties to make submissions as to Recusal
76
of
judge or to indicate they raise no objection.
77
In the present case, the judge did not disclose his
relation with the respondent leading to apprehension of bias.
78

[IV] CHATTING ON FACEBOOK BY MEERA DID NOT CONSTITUTE MENTAL CRUELTY UNDER
SEC.13(1)(IA) OF THE HINDU MARRIAGE ACT, 1955.
It is humbly submitted that mental cruelty under Section 13(1) (i-a) of the Act can broadly be
defined as that conduct which inflicts on the other party such mental pain and suffering
79
as
would make it not possible for that party to live with the other.
80
It may be by words, gestures or
by mere silence.
81

[IV.A] MENTAL CRUELTY DEPENDS UPON THE SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT OF THE PARTIES.
The question of mental cruelty has to be considered in the light of the norms or marital ties of
the particular society to which the parties belong, their social value, status, environment
82
in

73
P Devlin, The Judge as Lawmaker. The Judge (Oxford, OUP) 3 (1981).
74
Supra nt 72 Pg 14
75
Ebner v. Official Trustee in Bankruptcy, (2001) 205 CLR 337,[69]-[72].
76
28 USC 455(a).
77
Said by Kirby, J Najjar v. Hames, (1991) 25 NSWLR 224 (NSWCA).
78
Najjar v. Hames, (1991) 25 NSWLR 224 (NSWCA).
79
Padma v. Parma Ram, AIR 1959 HP 37; Bhagat v. Mrs. D. Bhagat, AIR 1994 SC 710.
80
Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli, (2006) 4 SCC 558, 571-72; P Ramanath Aiyar, THE MAJOR LAW LEXICON, 4272
(4
th
ed. 2010).
81
Sukumar Mukherjee v. Tripti Mukherjee, AIR 1992 Pat 32.
82
Vishwanath Agrawal v. Sarla Vishwanath Agrawal (2012) 7 SCC 288

10

which they live.
83
The social environment from which Petitioner and Respondent belong to is
such that it is imperative to maintain relations with ones former colleagues for help and
assistance in future professional endeavors. This behavior cannot be considered as something
unusual which would cause mental suffering to the respondent.
[IV.B] THE PETITIONER WAS EXERCISING HER RIGHT TO COMMUNICATE AND
SOCIALIZE.
Every person has a freedom of speech and expression
84
and right to communicate freely is an
extension of this Fundamental Right.
85
The conduct of the Petitioner that is chatting on the
Facebook is mere exercise of her right to communicate and cannot be seen as an act which would
treat respondent with cruelty. The same can be understood from the case of Bidyut kumar Saha v.
Smiti Tapan Saha
86
where it was held that talking over phone by the wife to a person stranger to
husband does not constitute cruelty. In the same way chatting over Facebook and socializing
87
is
the mere exercise of her right to communicate and should not be seen as constituting mental
cruelty.
[IV.C] THE CAUSE OF MENTAL CRUELTY IS NOT GRAVE AND WEIGHTY.
It is submitted that the maxim of De minimis non curat lex finds its applicability in the present
case. The maxim means that law does not concern itself with trifles.
88
To amount to cruelty, the
acts must be of a more serious nature than mere wear and tear
89
of married life.
90
The petitioner

83
Mayadevi v. Jagdish Prasad, AIR 2007 SC 1426, 1427, para 9; P Ramanath Aiyar, The Major Law Lexicon,4272
(4
th
ed. 2010).
84
Article 19(1)(a), The Constitution of India, 1950.
85
Indian Express Newspaper (Bombay) v. Union of India, AIR 1986 SC 515
86
AIR 2007 Gau 1 at 4.
87
Francis Coralie Mullin Vs. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi and Ors AIR 1981 SC 746.
88
P Ramanatha Aiyar, Concise Law Dictionary, ( 4
th
ed. 2012).
89
G Padmini v. G Sivananda Babu AIR 2000 AP 176; Parag Mittal v. Vikita Mittal AIR 2000 Del 304; Yasoda v.
Krishnamoorthy, AIR 1992 Kant 360; Indira Gangele v. Shailendra Kumar Gangele, AIR 1993 MP 59; Tapan v.
Anjali, AIR 1993 Cal 10; Rajkumari v. Ram Prakash, (1968) 70 PLR 879; Santosh Kumari Kewari v. Praveen
Kumar, AIR 1987 Punj 33; Arun Kumar Bhardwaj v. Anila Bhardwaj, AIR 1993 Del 135; Narayan v. Prabha, AIR

11

must have treated the respondent with cruelty.
91
Mental cruelty does not depend on the numerical
count of such incidents but on the intensity and gravity of the said act.
92
The Supreme Court has
stated
93
that for mental cruelty the treatment complained of and the resultant danger or
apprehension must be very grave, substantial and weighty
94
. In this case, the conduct of the
Petitioner of chatting with her former colleagues cannot be considered grave and weighty as it is
a normal interaction going by the professional and social background of the Petitioner and cannot
be considered as mental cruelty. Thus a decree of divorce cannot be passed on mere trifles.
95

[IV.D] THE CONDUCT IS NOT OF SUCH NATURE THAT THE PARTIES CANNOT REASONABLY
BE EXPECTED TO LIVE TOGETHER
The conduct should be of such a nature that the respondent cannot reasonably be expected to live
with the Petitioner.
96
The married life should be assessed as a whole and a few isolated instances
over certain period will not amount to cruelty.
97
In the instant case chatting of the petitioner with
her former colleagues is a normal interaction which is not capable of creating any apprehension
in the mind of the respondent. Thus this conduct cannot be considered mental cruelty.
A very important aspect of determining mental cruelty is the impact it has caused on the
respondent.
98
Clearly in this case the conduct complained of has not caused any severe damage,

1964 MP 28; Anna v. Tarabai, AIR 1970 MP 36; Keshab Devi Mishra v. Pradeep Kumar Mishra, 1991 (2) DMC
284 (MP) at 287; Braja Kishore Ghose v. Krishna Ghose, (1988) 2 Cur Civ Cas 188 (192) Cal.
90
Savitri Pandey v. Prem Chand Pandey, AIR 2002 SC 591; Chaitali Dey v. Badal Kumar Dey, AIR 2005 Jhar 83;
Bhavana Sharma v. Devendra Kumar Sharma, AIR 2007 Raj 157.
91
13 (1) (IA), the Act.
92
Vinita Saxena v. Pankaj Pandit, (2006) 3 SCC 778; K J Aiyar , Judicial Dictionary, 1035-1036( 15
th
ed. 2011).
93
Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh, [2007]4SCR428.
94
Gollins v. Gollins, (1964) AC 644, (1963) 2 All ER 966.
95
Subimal Das v. State of West Bengal, (1992) ILR 2Cal 138.
96
Kamini Gupta v. Mukesh Kumar Gupta, (1985) 1 Cur Civ Cas 465; Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh, (2007) 4 SCC
511, 530, para 42.
97
Gurbux singh v. Harminder Kaur, AIR 2011 SC 114.
98
The behaviour of the respondent must be looked at in the light of all surrounding circumstances, including the
degree provocation: Welfare v. Welfare (1977) 8 Fam Law 55. The test of behaviour is a subjective test: Birch v.
Birch (1992) 2 FCR 545, (1992) 1 FLR 564, CA. There is no rule that the respondent is required to plead more than
a simple denial: see Haque v. Haque (1977) 1 WLR 888 (cited in Para 782 note 1).

12

he is complaining of is the result of his over expectations from his wife who is a working
independent woman.

[V] GUIDELINES ON THE USE OF FACEBOOK BY THE JUDGES
It is humbly submitted that under Art. 142 the Supreme Court is empowered to pass orders or
guidelines when there is a question of public importance and no legislation is available for it,
which will have the effect of law passed by the Parliament. Under the same jurisdiction some
guidelines can also be suggested here as the question of conduct of judges with regards to social
networking sites is of great public importance and since there is no particular law available on it,
some guidelines can be suggested. In some cases the Supreme Court has issued specific
guidelines on a particular subject.
99
The Judiciary is also manned by Judges who are human and
human beings are occasionally motivated by considerations other than an objective value of law
and justice
100
.
[V.A] USE OF FACEBOOK AS PUBLIC FORUM
Any comments a judge makes on a social networking site can be treated as public
comments.
101
He should not make comment or express his views
102
on his pending cases or
political matter in a public forum like Facebook.
103

99
Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1997 SC 3011.
100
Ankita Singhania; Constitutional Law on Judicial Review and Judicial Accountability - Indian Experience; H.M
Seervai Gold Medal Essay Competition, 2002
101
The Ethical Challenges Of Internet Use By Judges, Magistrates Ethics and Deontology
102
CALIFORNIA JUDGES ASSOCIATION, Judicial Ethics Committee, Opinion 66
103
clause (8) of Restatement of Values of Judicial Life (1999)

13

A judge is obligated to delete, hide from public view or otherwise repudiate demeaning or
offensive comments made by others that appear on the judges timeline. Even the private life
of a judge must adhere to standards of probity and propriety, acceptable to others.
104

Facebook allows its users to post photos and videos onto the users pages. A Judge is always
under the public gaze, thus his acts should not demean the office that he is holding.
105

[V. B] LAWYERS AND PARTIES AS JUDGES FACEBOOK FRIEND
It may be possible that the lawyer who is judges Facebook friend may not have any
influence on the judge. If interacting with an attorney on a social networking site would
create the impression the attorney is in a special position to influence the judge and cast
doubt on the judges ability to be impartial depends on the factors such as: the number of
Facebook friends in judges account, the judges practice in determining whom to include,
privacy settings of the judges account and how regularly the attorney appears before the
judge.
106

If the judge and the attorney are both friends on Facebook, the judge should disclose this fact
as well as the extent and nature of the professional and online contacts. It may be permissible
for the judge to interact with lawyers but it is not permissible for the judge to interact with
the lawyer whose case is pending before him. As doing such would create an apprehension
on peoples mind that the judge is biased. Judge should unfriend such lawyer. Impartial
performance is the relevant factor for judges conduct to be kept in mind.
107

104
Krishna Swami v. Union of India and another, AIR 1993 SC 1407.
105
Clause (16) of Restatement of Values of Judicial Life (1999).
106
CALIFORNIA JUDGES ASSOCIATION, Judicial Ethics Committee, Opinion 66
107
Shiveshwar Narayan v. High Court of Judicature, Patna and Anr., (2014)1SCC(LS)553.

14

P PR RA AY YE ER R F FO OR R R RE EL LI IE EF F

Wherefore, in the light of the facts stated, issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities
cited, this Court may be pleased to adjudge and declare:

1. That the Special Leave Petition is Maintainable.
2. That the order of the High Court is null and void.
3. There was not mental cruelty on part of the Petitioner.
And/or pass any other order in favour of the petitioner as it may deem fit in the ends of justice,
equity, and good conscience.
All of which is most humbly submitted.

Place: New Delhi S/d-
Date: 27-09-2014 On Behalf of the Petitioners

17th S.C. Javali Memorial National Moot Court Competition Case

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

17th S.C. Javali Memorial National Moot Court Competition Case

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

17

You might also like