Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 71977 February 27, 1987
DEMETRIO G. DEMETRIA, M.P., AUGUSTO S. SANCHE, M.P., OR!ANDO S. MERCADO, M.P.,
HONORATO ". A#UINO, M.P., AFIRO !. RESPICIO, M.P., DOUG!AS R. CAGAS, M.P., OSCAR
F. SANTOS, M.P., A!$ERTO G. ROMU!O, M.P., CIRIACO R. A!FE!OR, M.P., ISIDORO E. REA!,
M.P., EMIGDIO !. !INGAD, M.P., RO!ANDO C. MARCIA!, M.P., PEDRO M. MARCE!!ANA, M.P.,
%ICTOR S. IGA, M.P., a&' ROGE!IO %. GARCIA. M.P., petitioners,
vs.
HON. MANUE! A!$A (& )(* +a,a+(-y a* -)e MINISTER OF THE $UDGET a&' %ICTOR
MACA!INGCAG (& )(* +a,a+(-y a* -)e TREASURER OF THE PHI!IPPINES, respondents.

FERNAN, J.:
Assailed in this petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary inunction is the
constitutionality of the first para!raph of "ection ## of Presidential $ecree No. %%&&, otherwise
'nown as the (Bud!et Reform $ecree of %)&&.(
Petitioners, who filed the instant petition as concerned citi*ens of this country, as members of the
National Assembly+Batasan Pambansa representin! their millions of constituents, as parties with
!eneral interest common to all the people of the Philippines, and as ta,payers whose vital interests
may be affected by the outcome of the reliefs prayed for(
1
listed the !rounds relied upon in this
petition as follows-
A. "EC./0N ## 01 .2E 3B4$5E. RE10RM $ECREE 01 %)&&3 /N1R/N5E"
4P0N .2E 14N$AMEN.A6 6A7 B8 A4.20R/9/N5 .2E /66E5A6 .RAN"1ER
01 P4B6/C M0NE8".
B. "EC./0N ## 01 PRE"/$EN./A6 $ECREE N0. %%&& /" REP45NAN. .0 .2E
C0N"./.4./0N A" /. 1A/6" .0 "PEC/18 .2E 0B:EC./;E" AN$ P4RP0"E"
10R 72/C2 .2E PR0P0"E$ .RAN"1ER 01 14N$" ARE .0 BE MA$E.
C. "EC./0N ## 01 PRE"/$EN./A6 $ECREE N0. %%&& A6607" .2E
PRE"/$EN. .0 0;ERR/$E .2E "A1E54AR$", 10RM AN$ PR0CE$4RE
PRE"CR/BE$ B8 .2E C0N"./.4./0N /N APPR0;/N5 APPR0PR/A./0N".
$. "EC./0N ## 01 .2E "AME $ECREE AM04N." .0 AN 4N$4E $E6E5A./0N
01 6E5/"6A./;E P07ER" .0 .2E E<EC4./;E.
E. .2E .2REA.ENE$ AN$ C0N./N4/N5 .RAN"1ER 01 14N$" B8 .2E
PRE"/$EN. AN$ .2E /MP6EMEN.A./0N .2ERE01 B8 .2E B4$5E. M/N/".ER
AN$ .2E .REA"4RER 01 .2E P2/6/PP/NE" ARE 7/.204. 0R /N E<CE"" 01
.2E/R A4.20R/.8 AN$ :4R/"$/C./0N.
2
Commentin! on the petition in compliance with the Court resolution dated "eptember %), %)=>, the
"olicitor 5eneral, for the public respondents, ?uestioned the le!al standin! of petitioners, who were
alle!edly merely be!!in! an advisory opinion from the Court, there bein! no usticiable controversy
fit for resolution or determination. 2e further contended that the provision under consideration was
enacted pursuant to "ection %@A>B, Article ;/// of the %)&C ConstitutionD and that at any rate,
prohibition will not lie from one branch of the !overnment to a coordinate branch to enoin the
performance of duties within the latter3s sphere of responsibility.
0n 1ebruary E&, %)=@, the Court re?uired the petitioners to file a Reply to the Comment. .his, they
did, statin!, amon! others, that as a result of the chan!e in the administration, there is a need to
hold the resolution of the present case in abeyance (until developments arise to enable the parties to
concreti*e their respective stands.(
.
.hereafter, 7e re?uired public respondents to file a reoinder. .he "olicitor 5eneral filed a reoinder
with a motion to dismiss, settin! forth as !rounds therefor the abro!ation of "ection %@A>B, Article ;///
of the %)&C Constitution by the 1reedom Constitution of March E>, %)=@, which has alle!edly
rendered the instant petition moot and academic. 2e li'ewise cited the (seven pillars( enunciated by
:ustice Brandeis in Ashwander v. TVA, E)& 4.". E== F%)C@G
/
as basis for the petition3s dismissal.
/n the case of Evelio B. Javier v. The Commission on Elections and Arturo F. Pacificador, 5.R. Nos.
@=C&)H=%, "eptember EE, %)=@, 7e stated that-
.he abolition of the Batasan! Pambansa and the disappearance of the office in
dispute between the petitioner and the private respondents I both of whom have
!one their separate ways I could be a convenient ustification for dismissin! the
case. But there are lar!er issues involved that must be resolved now, once and for
all, not only to dispel the le!al ambi!uities here raised. .he more important purpose
is to manifest in the clearest possible terms that this Court will not disre!ard and in
effect condone wron! on the simplistic and tolerant prete,t that the case has become
moot and academic.
.he "upreme Court is not only the hi!hest arbiter of le!al ?uestions but also the
conscience of the !overnment. .he citi*en comes to us in ?uest of law but we must
also !ive him ustice. .he two are not always the same. .here are times when we
cannot !rant the latter because the issue has been settled and decision is no lon!er
possible accordin! to the law. But there are also times when althou!h the dispute
has disappeared, as in this case, it nevertheless cries out to be resolved. :ustice
demands that we act then, not only for the vindication of the outra!ed ri!ht, thou!h
!one, but also for the !uidance of and as a restraint upon the future.
/t is in the dischar!e of our role in society, as aboveH?uoted, as well as to avoid !reat disservice to
national interest that 7e ta'e co!ni*ance of this petition and thus deny public respondents3 motion to
dismiss. 6i'ewise noteworthy is the fact that the new Constitution, ratified by the 1ilipino people in
the plebiscite held on 1ebruary E, %)=&, carries verbatim section %@A>B, Article ;/// of the %)&C
Constitution under "ection E#A>B, Article ;/. And while Con!ress has not officially reconvened, 7e
see no co!ent reason for further delayin! the resolution of the case at bar.
.he e,ception ta'en to petitioners3 le!al standin! deserves scant consideration. .he case
of Pascual v. Secretary of Pulic !or"s, et al., %%J Phil. CC%, is authority in support of
petitioners3 locus standi. .hus-
A!ain, it is wellHsettled that the validity of a statute may be contested only by one
who will sustain a direct inury in conse?uence of its enforcement. 8et, there are
many decisions nullifyin! at the instance of ta,payers, laws providin! for the
disbursement of public funds, upon the theory that the e,penditure of public funds by
an officer of the state for the purpose of administerin! anunconstitutional
act constitutes a misa##lication of such funds which may be enoined at the re?uest
of a ta,payer. Althou!h there are some decisions to the contrary, the prevailin! view
in the 4nited "tates is stated in the American :urisprudence as follows-
/n the determination of the de!ree of interest essential to !ive the
re?uisite standin! to attac' the constitutionality of a statute, the
!eneral rule is that not only persons individually affected, but
also ta$#ayers have sufficient interest in #reventin% the ille%al
e$#enditures of moneys raised y ta$ation and may therefore
&uestion the constitutionality of statutes re&uirin% e,penditure of
public moneys. A %% Am. :ur. &@%, Emphasis supplied. B
Moreover, in Tan v. 'aca#a%al, #C "CRA @&& and Sanidad v. Comelec, &C "CRA CCC, 7e said that
as re!ards ta,payers3 suits, this Court enoys that open discretion to entertain the same or not.
.he conflict between para!raph % of "ection ## of Presidential $ecree No. %%&& and "ection %@A>B,
Article ;/// of the %)&C Constitution is readily perceivable from a mere cursory readin! thereof. "aid
para!raph % of "ection ## provides-
.he President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the
different departments, bureaus, offices and a!encies of the E,ecutive $epartment,
which are included in the 5eneral Appropriations Act, to any pro!ram, proect or
activity of any department, bureau, or office included in the 5eneral Appropriations
Act or approved after its enactment.
0n the other hand, the constitutional provision under consideration reads as follows-
"ec. %@A>B. No law shall be passed authori*in! any transfer of appropriations,
however, the President, the Prime Minister, the "pea'er, the Chief :ustice of the
"upreme Court, and the heads of constitutional commis ions may by law be
authori*ed to au!ment any item in the !eneral appropriations law for their respective
offices from savin!s in other items of their respective appropriations.
.he prohibition to transfer an appropriation for one item to another was e,plicit and cate!orical under
the %)&C Constitution. 2owever, to afford the heads of the different branches of the !overnment and
those of the constitutional commissions considerable fle,ibility in the use of public funds and
resources, the constitution allowed the enactment of a law authori*in! the transfer of funds for the
purpose of au!mentin! an item from savin!s in another item in the appropriation of the !overnment
branch or constitutional body concerned. .he leeway !ranted was thus limited. .he purpose and
conditions for which funds may be transferred were specified, i.e. transfer may be allowed for the
purpose of au!mentin! an item and such transfer may be made only if there are savin!s from
another item in the appropriation of the !overnment branch or constitutional body.
Para!raph % of "ection ## of P.$. No. %%&& unduly over e,tends the privile!e !ranted under said
"ection %@A>B. /t empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department,
bureau, office or a!ency of the E,ecutive $epartment to any pro!ram, proect or activity of any
department, bureau or office included in the 5eneral Appropriations Act or approved after its
enactment, without re!ard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savin!s in the
item from which the same are to be ta'en, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of
au!mentin! the item to which said transfer is to be made. /t does not only completely disre!ard the
standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amountin! to an undue dele!ation of le!islative
powers, but li'ewise !oes beyond the tenor thereof. /ndeed, such constitutional infirmities render the
provision in ?uestion null and void.
(1or the love of money is the root of all evil- ...( and money belon!in! to no one in particular, i.e.
public funds, provide an even !reater temptation for misappropriation and embe**lement. .his,
evidently, was foremost in the minds of the framers of the constitution in meticulously prescribin! the
rules re!ardin! the appropriation and disposition of public funds as embodied in "ections %@ and %=
of Article ;/// of the %)&C Constitution. 2ence, the conditions on the release of money from the
treasury A"ec. %=F%GBD the restrictions on the use of public funds for public purpose A"ec. %=FEGBD the
prohibition to transfer an appropriation for an item to another A"ee. %@F>G and the re?uirement of
specifications A"ec. %@FEGB, amon! others, were all safe!uards desi!ned to forestall abuses in the
e,penditure of public funds. Para!raph % of "ection ## puts all these safe!uards to nau!ht. 1or, as
correctly observed by petitioners, in view of the unlimited authority bestowed upon the President, (...
Pres. $ecree No. %%&& opens the flood!ates for the enactment of unfunded appropriations, results in
uncontrolled e,ecutive e,penditures, diffuses accountability for bud!etary performance and
entrenches the por' barrel system as the rulin! party may well e,pand AsicB public money not on the
basis of development priorities but on political and personal e,pediency.(
0
.he contention of public
respondents that para!raph % of "ection ## of P.$. %%&& was enacted pursuant to "ection %@F>G of
Article ;/// of the %)&C Constitution must perforce fall flat on its face.
Another theory advanced by public respondents is that prohibition will not lie from one branch of the
!overnment a!ainst a coordinate branch to enoin the performance of duties within the latter3s
sphere of responsibility.
.homas M. Cooley in his (A Treatise on the Constitutional (imitations,( ;ol. %, Ei!ht Edition, 6ittle,
Brown and Company, Boston, e,plained-
... .he le!islative and udicial are coordinate departments of the !overnment, of
e?ual di!nityD each is ali'e supreme in the e,ercise of its proper functions, and
cannot directly or indirectly, while actin! within the limits of its authority, be subected
to the control or supervision of the other, without an unwarrantable assumption by
that other of power which, by the Constitution, is not conferred upon it. .he
Constitution apportions the powers of !overnment, but it does not ma'e any one of
the three departments subordinate to another, when e,ercisin! the trust committed to
it. .he courts may declare le!islative enactments unconstitutional and void in some
cases, but not because the udicial power is superior in de!ree or di!nity to the
le!islative. Bein! re?uired to declare what the law is in the cases which come before
them, they must enforce the Constitution, as the paramount law, whenever a
le!islative enactment comes in conflict with it. But the courts sit, not to review or
revise the le!islative action, but to enforce the le!islative will, and it is only where
they find that the le!islature has failed to 'eep within its constitutional limits, that they
are at liberty to disre!ard its actionD and in doin! so, they only do what every private
citi*en may do in respect to the mandates of the courts when the ud!es assumed to
act and to render ud!ments or decrees without urisdiction. (/n e,ercisin! this hi!h
authority, the ud!es claim no udicial supremacyD they are only the administrators of
the public will. /f an act of the le!islature is held void, it is not because the ud!es
have any control over the le!islative power, but because the act is forbidden by the
Constitution, and because the will of the people, which is therein declared, is
paramount to that of their representatives e,pressed in any law.( A6indsay v.
Commissioners, K c., E Bay, C=, @%D People v. Ruc'er, > Col. >D Russ v. Com., E%J
Pa. "t. >##D @J Atl. %@), % 6.R.A. AN.".B #J), %J> Am. "t. Rep. =E>B Fpp. CCEHCC#G.
/ndeed, where the le!islature or the e,ecutive branch is actin! within the limits of its authority, the
udiciary cannot and ou!ht not to interfere with the former. But where the le!islature or the e,ecutive
acts beyond the scope of its constitutional powers, it becomes the duty of the udiciary to declare
what the other branches of the !overnment had assumed to do as void. .his is the essence of
udicial power conferred by the Constitution (in one "upreme Court and in such lower courts as may
be established by law( AArt. ;///, "ection % of the %)C> ConstitutionD Art. <, "ection % of the %)&C
Constitution and which was adopted as part of the 1reedom Constitution, and Art. ;///, "ection % of
the %)=& ConstitutionB and which power this Court has e,ercised in many instances. 1
Public respondents are bein! enoined from actin! under a provision of law which 7e have earlier
mentioned to be constitutionally infirm. .he !eneral principle relied upon cannot therefore accord
them the protection sou!ht as they are not actin! within their (sphere of responsibility( but without it.
.he nation has not recovered from the shoc', and worst, the economic destitution brou!ht about by
the plunderin! of the .reasury by the deposed dictator and his cohorts. A provision which allows
even the sli!htest possibility of a repetition of this sad e,perience cannot remain written in our
statute boo's.
72ERE10RE, the instant petition is !ranted. Para!raph % of "ection ## of Presidential $ecree No.
%%&& is hereby declared null and void for bein! unconstitutional.
"0 0R$ER RE$.
Teehan"ee, C.J., )a#, *arvasa, 'elencio+,errera, Alam#ay, -utierre., Jr., Cru., Paras, Feliciano,
-ancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Foo-&o-e*
% Petition, p. C, Rollo.
E pp. @H&, Rollo
C p. %@), Rollo.
# .he relevant portions read as follows-
.he Court developed, for its own !overnance in the case confessedly within its
urisdiction, a series of rules under which it has avoided passin! upon a lar!e part of
all the constitutional ?uestions pressed upon it for decision. .hey are-
%. .he Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of le!islation in a friendly, nonH
adversary proceedin!, declinin! because to decide such ?uestions (is le!itimate only
in the last resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real, earnest and vital
controversy between individuals. /t never was the thou!ht tht, by means of a friendly
suit, a party beaten in the le!islature could transfer to the courts an in?uiry as to the
constitutionality of the le!islative act.( Chica!o K 5rand .run' Ry. v. 7ellman, %#C
4.". CC), C#>.
E. .he Court will not (anticipate ?uestion of constitutional law in advance of the
necessity of decidin! it.( 6iverpool. N.8. K P.".". Co. v. Emi!ration Commissioners,
%%C 4.". CC, C) ... (/t is not the habit of the Court to decide ?uestions of a
constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case. 3Burton v.
4nited "tates. %)@ 4.". E=C, E)>.
C. .he Court will not formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is re?uired by
the precise facts to which it is to be applied.( 6iverpool, N.8. K P.".". Co. v.
Emi!ration Commissioners, supra.
#. .he Court will not pass upon a constitutional ?uestion althou!h properly presented
by the record, if there is also present some other !round upon which the case may
be disposed of. .his rule has found most varied application. .hus, if a case can be
decided on either of two !rounds, one involvin! a constitutional ?uestion, the other a
?uestion of statutory construction or !eneral law, the Court will decide only the latter.
"iler v. 6ouisville K Nashville R. Co., E%C 4.". %&>, %)%D 6i!ht v. 4nited "tates, EEJ
4.". >EC, >C=. Appeals from the hi!hest court of a state challen!in! its decision of a
?uestion under the 1ederal Constitution are fre?uently dismissed because the
ud!ment can be sustained on an independent state !round. Berea Colle!e v.
Lentuc'y, E%% 4.". #>, >C.
>. .he Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who
fails to show that he is inured by its operation. .yler v. .he :ud!es, %&) 4.". #J>D
2endric' v. Maryland, EC> 4.". @%J, @E%. Amon! the many applications of this rule,
none is more stri'in! than the denial of the ri!ht of challen!e to one who lac's a
personal or property ri!ht. .hus, the challen!e by a public official interested only in
the performance of his official duty will not be entertained..... /n 1airchild v. 2u!hes,
E>= 4.". %E@, the Court affirmed the dismissal of a suit brou!ht by a citi*enwho
sou!ht to have the Nineteenth Amendment declared unconstitutional. /n
Massachusetts v. Mellon, E@E 4.". ##&, the challen!e of the federal Maternity Act
was not entertained althou!h made by the Commonwealth on behalf of all its
citi*ens.
@. .he Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of one
who has availed himself of its benefits. 5reat 1alls Mf!. Co. v. Attorney 5eneral, %E#,
4.". >=% . . .
&. (7hen the validity of an act of the Con!ress is drawn in ?uestion, and even if a
serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will
first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the
?uestion may be avoided.3 Cromwell v. Benson, E=> 4.". EE, @E.( App. %&@H%&&,
RolloB.
> p. %#, Rollo.
M Casanovas vs. 2ord = Phil. %E>D Mc5irr vs. 2amilton, CJ Phil. >@CD Compania
5eneral de .abacos vs. Board of Public 4tility, C# Phil. %C@D Central Capi* vs.
Ramire*, #J Phil. ==CD Concepcion vs. Paredes, #E Phil. >))D 4" vs. An! .an! 2o #C
Phil. @D Mc$aniel vs. Apacible, ## Phil. E#=D People vs. Pomar, #@ Phil. ##JD A!caoili
vs. "u!uitan, #= Phil. @&@D 5overnment of P./. vs. "prin!er, >J Phil. E>)D Manila
Electric Co. vs. Pasay .ransp. Co., >& Phil. @JJ- People vs. 6insan!anD @E Phil. #@#D
People and 2on!'on! K "han!hai Ban'in! Corp. vs. :ose 0. ;era, @> Phil. >@D
People vs. Carlos, &= Phil. >C>D City of Ba!uio vs. Nawasa, %J@ Phil. %##D City of
Cebu vs. Nawasa, %J& Phil, %%%ED Rutter vs. Esteban )C Phil. @=.
.he 6awphil Proect H Arellano 6aw 1oundation