ARTICLE 1

PRESUMPTION OF MARRIAGE, Art.1, pp220

RULES OF COURT
________________
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 5(5) of Article VIII of the Constitution, the Supreme Court hereby adopts
and promulgates the following rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to
the underprivileged:
RULE 131
BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS

(aa) That a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage;
(bb) That property acquired by a man and woman who are capacitated to marry each other and who live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, has been
obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry.
cc) That in cases of cohabitation by a man and a woman who are not capacitated to marry each other and who
have acquired property through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry, such contributions and
their corresponding shares including joint deposits of money and evidences of credit are equal.


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 85140 May 17, 1990
TOMAS EUGENIO, SR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City,
DEPUTY SHERIFF JOHNSON TAN, JR., Deputy Sheriff of Branch 20, Regional Trial Court, Cagayan de Oro
City, and the Private Respondents, the petitioners in Sp. Proc. No. 88-55, for "Habeas Corpus", namely:
CRISANTA VARGAS-SANCHEZ, SANTOS and NARCISA VARGAS-BENTULAN, respondents.
G.R. No. 86470 May 17, 1990.
TOMAS EUGENIO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City,
CRISANTA VARGAS-SANCHEZ, FELIX VARGAS, ERNESTO VARGAS, NATIVIDAD VARGAS-CAGAPE, NENITA
VARGAS-CADENAS, LUDIVINA VARGAS-DE LOS SANTOS and NARCISA VARGAS-BENTULAN, respondents-
appellees.
Maximo G. Rodriguez for petitioner.
Erasmo B. Damasing and Oliver Asis Improso for respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
On 5 October 1988, petitioner came to this Court with a petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for
restraining order and/or injunction (docketed as G.R. No. 85140) seeking to enjoin respondent Judge from proceeding
with the Habeas Corpus case (Sp. Proc. No. 88- 55, RTC, Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City), * the respondent Sheriff
from enforcing and implementing the writ and orders of the respondent Judge dated 28, 29, and 30 September 1988,
and to declare said writ and orders as null and void. In a resolution issued on 11 October 1988, this Court required
comment from the respondents on the petition but denied the application for a temporary restraining order.
The records disclose the following:
Unaware of the death on 28 August 1988 of (Vitaliana Vargas Vitaliana for brevity), her full blood brothers and sisters,
herein private respondents (Vargases', for brevity) filed on 27 September 1988, a petition for habeas corpus before the
RTC of Misamis Oriental (Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City) alleging that Vitaliana was forcibly taken from her
residence sometime in 1987 and confined by herein petitioner in his palacial residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental.
Despite her desire to escape, Vitaliana was allegedly deprived of her liberty without any legal authority. At the time the
petition was filed, it was alleged that Vitaliana was 25 years of age, single, and living with petitioner Tomas Eugenio.
The respondent court in an order dated 28 September 1988 issued the writ of habeas corpus, but the writ was returned
unsatisfied. Petitioner refused to surrender the body of Vitaliana (who had died on 28 August 1988) to the respondent
sheriff, reasoning that a corpse cannot be the subject of habeas corpus proceedings; besides, according to petitioner,
he had already obtained a burial permit from the Undersecretary of the Department of Health, authorizing the burial at
the palace quadrangle of the Philippine Benevolent Christian Missionary, Inc. (PBCM), a registered religious sect, of
which he (petitioner) is the Supreme President and Founder.
Petitioner also alleged that Vitaliana died of heart failure due to toxemia of pregnancy in his residence on 28 August
1988. As her common law husband, petitioner claimed legal custody of her body. These reasons were incorporated in
an explanation filed before the respondent court. Two (2) orders dated 29 and 30 September 1988 were then issued by
respondent court, directing delivery of the deceased's body to a funeral parlor in Cagayan de Oro City and its autopsy.
Petitioner (as respondent in the habeas corpus proceedings) filed an urgent motion to dismiss the petition therein,
claiming lack of jurisdiction of the court over the nature of the action under sec. 1(b) of Rule 16 in relation to sec. 2,
Rule 72 of the Rules of Court.
1
A special proceeding for habeas corpus, petitioner argued, is not applicable to a dead
person but extends only to all cases of illegal confinement or detention of a live person.
Before resolving the motion to dismiss, private respondents (as petitioners below) were granted leave to amend their
petition.
2
Claiming to have knowledge of the death of Vitaliana only on 28 September 1988 (or after the filing of
the habeas corpus petition), private respondents (Vargases') alleged that petitioner Tomas Eugenia who is not in any
way related to Vitaliana was wrongfully interfering with their (Vargases') duty to bury her. Invoking Arts. 305 and 308 of
the Civil Code,
3
the Vargases contended that, as the next of kin in the Philippines, they are the legal custodians of the
dead body of their sister Vitaliana. An exchange of pleadings followed. The motion to dismiss was finally submitted for
resolution on 21 October 1988.
In the absence of a restraining order from this Court, proceedings continued before the respondent court; the body was
placed in a coffin, transferred to the Greenhills Memorial Homes in Cagayan de Oro City, viewed by the presiding
Judge of respondent court, and examined by a duly authorized government pathologist.
4

Denying the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner, the court a quo held in an order,
5
dated 17 November 1988, that:
It should be noted from the original petition, to the first amended petition, up to the second
amended petition that the ultimate facts show that if the person of Vitaliana Vargas turns out to be
dead then this Court is being prayed to declare the petitioners as the persons entitled to the
custody, interment and/or burial of the body of said deceased. The Court, considering the
circumstance that Vitaliana Vargas was already dead on August 28, 1988 but only revealed to the
Court on September 29, 1988 by respondent's counsel, did not lose jurisdiction over the nature and
subject matter of this case because it may entertain this case thru the allegations in the body of the
petition on the determination as to who is entitled to the custody of the dead body of the late
Vitaliana Vargas as well as the burial or interment thereof, for the reason that under the provisions
of Sec. 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, which reads as follows:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of
pecuniary estimation;
xxx xxx xxx
(5) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations;
(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person
or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions:
xxx xxx xxx
it so provides that the Regional Trial Court has exclusive original jurisdiction to try this case. The
authority to try the issue of custody and burial of a dead person is within the lawful jurisdiction of
this Court because of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 and because of the allegations of the pleadings in
this case, which are enumerated in Sec. 19, pars. 1, 5 and 6 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
Thereafter, the court a quo proceeded as in or civil cases and, in due course, rendered a decision on 17 January
1989,
6
resolving the main issue of whether or not said court acquired jurisdiction over the case by treating it as an
action for custody of a dead body, without the petitioners having to file a separate civil action for such relief, and
without the Court first dismissing the original petition for habeas corpus.
Citing Sections 19 and 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1981),
7
Sections 5 and 6
of Rule 135 of the Rules of Court
8
Articles 305 and 308 in relation to Article 294 of the Civil Code and Section 1104 of
the Revised Administrative Code,
9
the decision stated:
. . . . By a mere reading of the petition the court observed that the allegations in the original petition
as well as in the two amended petitions show that Vitaliana Vargas has been restrained of her
liberty and if she were dead then relief was prayed for the custody and burial of said dead person.
The amendments to the petition were but elaborations but the ultimate facts remained the same,
hence, this court strongly finds that this court has ample jurisdiction to entertain and sit on this case
as an action for custody and burial of the dead body because the body of the petition controls and
is binding and since this case was raffled to this court to the exclusion of all other courts, it is the
primary duty of this court to decide and dispose of this case. . . . .
10

Satisfied with its jurisdiction, the respondent court then proceeded to the matter of rightful custody over the dead body,
(for purposes of burial thereof). The order of preference to give support under Art. 294 was used as the basis of the
award. Since there was no surviving spouse, ascendants or descendants, the brothers and sisters were preferred over
petitioner who was merely a common law spouse, the latter being himself legally married to another woman.
11

On 23 January 1989, a new petition for review with application for a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary
injunction was filed with this Court (G.R. No. 86470). Raised therein were pure questions of law, basically Identical to
those raised in the earlier petition (G.R. No. 85140); hence, the consolidation of both cases.
12
On 7 February 1989,
petitioner filed an urgent motion for the issuance of an injunction to maintain status quo pending appeal, which this
Court denied in a resolution dated 23 February 1989 stating that "Tomas Eugenio has so far failed to sufficiently
establish a clear legal right to the custody of the dead body of Vitaliana Vargas, which now needs a decent burial." The
petitions were then submitted for decision without further pleadings.
Between the two (2) consolidated petitions, the following issues are raised:
1. propriety of a habeas corpus proceeding under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court to recover
custody of the dead body of a 25 year old female, single, whose nearest surviving claimants are full
blood brothers and sisters and a common law husband.
2. jurisdiction of the RTC over such proceedings and/or its authority to treat the action as one for
custody/possession/authority to bury the deceased/recovery of the dead.
3. interpretation of par. 1, Art. 294 of the Civil Code (Art. 199 of the new Family
Code) which states:
Art. 294. The claim for support, when proper and two or more persons are
obliged to give it, shall be made in the following order:
(1) From the spouse;
xxx xxx xxx
Section 19, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 provides for the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts over
civil cases. Under Sec. 2, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus may be granted by a Court of First
Instance (now Regional Trial Court). It is an elementary rule of procedure that what controls is not the caption of the
complaint or petition; but the allegations therein determine the nature of the action, and even without the prayer for a
specific remedy, proper relief may nevertheless be granted by the court if the facts alleged in the complaint and the
evidence introduced so warrant.
13

When the petition for habeas corpus was filed before the court a quo, it was not certain whether Vitaliana was dead or
alive. While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of course or as a mere perfimetory operation on
the filing of the petition. Judicial discretion is exercised in its issuance, and such facts must be made to appear to the
judge to whom the petition is presented as, in his judgment, prima facie entitle the petitioner to the writ.
14
While the
court may refuse to grant the writ if the petition is insufficient in form and substance, the writ should issue if the petition
complies with the legal requirements and its averments make a prima facie case for relief. However, a judge who is
asked to issue a writ of habeas corpus need not be very critical in looking into the petition for very clear grounds for the
exercise of this jurisdiction. The latter's power to make full inquiry into the cause of commitment or detention will enable
him to correct any errors or defects in the petition.
15

In Macazo and Nunez vs. Nunez, 16 the Court frowned upon the dismissal of a habeas corpus petition filed by a
brother to obtain custody of a minor sister, stating:
All these circumstances notwithstanding, we believe that the case should not have been dismissed.
The court below should not have overlooked that by dismissing the petition, it was virtually
sanctioning the continuance of an adulterous and scandalous relation between the minor and her
married employer, respondent Benildo Nunez against all principles of law and morality. It is no
excuse that the minor has expressed preference for remaining with said respondent, because the
minor may not chose to continue an illicit relation that morals and law repudiate.
xxx xxx xxx
The minor's welfare being the paramount consideration, the court below should not allow the
technicality, that Teofilo Macazo was not originally made a party, to stand in the way of its giving
the child full protection. Even in a habeas corpus proceeding the court had power to award
temporary custody to the petitioner herein, or some other suitable person, after summoning and
hearing all parties concerned. What matters is that the immoral situation disclosed by the records
be not allowed to continue.
17

After the fact of Vitaliana's death was made known to the petitioners in the habeas corpus proceedings,amendment of
the petition for habeas corpus, not dismissal, was proper to avoid multiplicity of suits. Amendments to pleadings are
generally favored and should be liberally allowed in furtherance of justice in order that every case may so far as
possible be determined on its real facts and in order to expedite the trial of cases or prevent circuity of action and
unnecessary expense, unless there are circumstances such as inexcusable delay or the taking of the adverse party by
surprise or the like, which justify a refusal of permission to amend.
18
As correctly alleged by respondents, the writ
of habeas corpus as a remedy became moot and academic due to the death of the person allegedly restrained of
liberty, but the issue of custody remained, which the court a quo had to resolve.
Petitioner claims he is the spouse contemplated under Art. 294 of the Civil Code, the term spouse used therein not
being preceded by any qualification; hence, in the absence of such qualification, he is the rightful custodian of
Vitaliana's body. Vitaliana's brothers and sisters contend otherwise. Indeed, Philippine Law does not recognize
common law marriages. A man and woman not legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who
represent themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the
community where they live may be considered legally mauled in common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines.
19

While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such relationships are present in our society, and that
they produce a community of properties and interests which is governed by law,
20
authority exists in case law to the
effect that such form of co-ownership requires that the man and woman living together must not in any way be
incapacitated to contract marriage.
21
In any case, herein petitioner has a subsisting marriage with another woman, a
legal impediment which disqualified him from even legally marrying Vitaliana. In Santero vs. CFI of Cavite,
22
,the
Court, thru Mr. Justice Paras, interpreting Art. 188 of the Civil Code (Support of Surviving Spouse and Children During
Liquidation of Inventoried Property) stated: "Be it noted however that with respect to 'spouse', the same must be the
legitimate 'spouse' (not common-law spouses)."
There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the term "spouse" embraces common law relation
for purposes of exemption from criminal liability in cases of theft, swindling and malicious mischief committed or
caused mutually by spouses. The Penal Code article, it is said, makes no distinction between a couple whose
cohabitation is sanctioned by a sacrament or legal tie and another who are husband and wife de facto.
23
But this view
cannot even apply to the facts of the case at bar. We hold that the provisions of the Civil Code, unless expressly
providing to the contrary as in Article 144, when referring to a "spouse" contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse.
Petitioner vis-a-vis Vitaliana was not a lawfully-wedded spouse to her; in fact, he was not legally capacitated to marry
her in her lifetime.
Custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to her surviving brothers and sisters (the Vargases).
Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:
Sec. 1103. Persons charged with duty of burial. The immediate duty of burying the body of a
deceased person, regardless of the ultimate liability for the expense thereof, shall devolve upon the
persons hereinbelow specified:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) If the deceased was an unmarried man or woman, or a child, and left any
kin, the duty of burial shall devolve upon the nearest of kin of the deceased, if
they be adults and within the Philippines and in possession of sufficient means
to defray the necessary expenses.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Both petitions are hereby DISMISSED. No Costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Medialdea
and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Gancayco and Grino-Aquino, JJ., are on leave.

Footnotes
* Hon. Alejandro Velez, presiding.
1 Rule 16 (Motion to Dismiss):
Sec. 1. Grounds. Within the time for pleading a motion to dismiss the action may be made on
any of the following grounds:
(a) . . .
(b) That the court has no jurisdiction over the nature of the action or suit;
Rule 72 (Subject Matter and Applicability of General Rules)
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of civil actions. In the absence of special provisions, the rules
provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings.
2 3 and 11 October 1988 orders, Record of Regional Trial Court Proceedings, pp. 74, 75 & 102.
3 Art. 305. The duty and the right to make arrangements for the funeral of a relative shall be in
accordance with the order established for support, under article 294. In case of descendants of the
same degree, or of brothers and sisters, the oldest shall be preferred. In case of ascendants, the
paternal shall have a better right.
Art. 308. No human remains shall be retained, interred disposed of or exhumed without the
consent of the persons mentioned in Articles 294 and 305.
4 Record of RTC Proceedings, pp. 296-297.
5 Ibid., p. 338.
6 Record of RTC Proceedings, p. 577.
7 Supra.
8 Sec. 5 Inherent power of courts; Sec. 6 means to carry jurisdiction into effect.
9 Sec. 1104. Right of custody to body Any person charged by law with the duty of burying the
body of a deceased person is entitled to the custody of such body for the purpose of burying it,
except when an inquest is required by law for the purpose of determining the cause of death; and,
in case of death due to or accompanied by a dangerous communicable disease, such body shall
until buried remain in the custody of the local board of health or local health officer, or if there be no
such, then in the custody of the municipal council.
10 G.R. No. 86470, Rollo at 34.
11 Annexes 7 & 8, Petition, G.R. No. 85140, Rollo at 85 and 86.
12 Resolution of 26 January 1989, G.R. No. 85140, Rollo at 114.
13 Ras v. Sua, G.R. No. L-23302, September 25, 1968, 25 SCRA 158-159; Nactor v. IAC, G.R.
No. 74122, March 15, 1988, 158 SCRA 635.
14 39 Am. Jur., 2d, Habeas corpus 129.
15 Ibid., 130.
16 G.R. No. L-12772, 24 January 1959, 105 Phil. 55.
17 Ibid.
18 PNB vs. CA, G.R. No. L-45770, 30 March 1988, 159 SCRA 933.
19 Fiel vs. Banawa, No. 56284-R, March 26, 1979, 76 OG 619.
20 Article 144 of the Civil Code provides:
When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their
marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their
work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
21 Aznar, et al. vs. Garcia, et al., G.R. Nos. L-11483-84, 14 February 1958, 102 Phil. 1055.
22 G.R. Nos. 61700-03, September 24, 1987, 153 SCRA 728.
23 People vs. Constantino, No. 01897-CR, September 6, 1963, 60 O.G. 3603.















TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE TO PROVE MARRIAGE - Art.1, pp.220
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 83598 March 7, 1997
LEONCIA BALOGBOG and GAUDIOSO BALOGBOG, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, RAMONITO BALOGBOG and GENEROSO BALOGBOG, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision
1
of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu City (Branch IX), declaring private respondents heirs of the deceased Basilio and Genoveva
Balogbog entitled to inherit from them.
The facts are as follows. Petitioners Leoncia and Gaudioso Balogbog are the children of Basilio Balogbog and
Genoveva Arzibal who died intestate in 1951 and 1961, respectively. They had an older brother, Gavino, but he
died in 1935, predeceasing their parents.
In 1968, private respondents Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog brought an action for partition and accounting
against petitioners, claiming that they were the legitimate children of Gavino by Catalina Ubas and that, as such,
they were entitled to the one-third share of Gavino in the estate of their grandparents.
In their answer, petitioners denied knowing private respondents. They alleged that their brother Gavino died
single and without issue in their parents' residence at Tag-amakan, Asturias, Cebu. In the beginning they claimed
that the properties of the estate had been sold to them by their mother when she was still alive, but they later
withdrew this allegation.
Private respondents presented Priscilo Y. Trazo,
2
then 81 years old, mayor of the municipality of Asturias from
1928 to 1934, who testified that he knew Gavino and Catalina to be husband and wife and Ramonito to be their
first child. On crossexamination, Trazo explained that he knew Gavino and Catalina because they performed at
his campaign rallies, Catalina as "balitaw" dancer and Gavino Balogbog as her guitarist. Trazo said he attended
the wedding of Gavino and Catalina sometime in 1929, in which Rev. Father Emiliano Jomao-as officiated and
Egmidio Manuel, then a municipal councilor, acted as one of the witnesses.
The second witness presented was Matias Pogoy,
3
a family friend of private respondents, who testified that
private respondents are the children of Gavino and Catalina. According to him, the wedding of Gavino and
Catalina was solemnized in the Catholic Church of Asturias, Cebu and that he knew this because he attended
their wedding and was in fact asked by Gavino to accompany Catalina and carry her wedding dress from her
residence in Camanaol to the poblacion of Asturias before the wedding day. He testified that Gavino died in 1935
in his residence at Obogon, Balamban, Cebu, in the presence of his wife. (This contradicts petitioners' claim
made in their answer that Gavino died in the ancestral house at Tag-amakan, Asturias.) Pogoy said he was a
carpenter and he was the one who had made the coffin of Gavino. He also made the coffin of the couple's son,
Petronilo, who died when he was six.
Catalina Ubas testified concerning her marriage to Gavino.
4
She testified that after the wedding, she was handed
a "receipt," presumably the marriage certificate, by Fr. Jomao-as, but it was burned during the war. She said that
she and Gavino lived together in Obogon and begot three children, namely, Ramonito, Petronilo, and Generoso.
Petronilo died after an illness at the age of six. On crossexamination, she stated that after the death of Gavino,
she lived in common law relation with a man for a year and then they separated.
Private respondents produced a certificate from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar (Exh. P) that the Register of
Marriages did not have a record of the marriage of Gavino and Catalina, another certificate from the Office of the
Treasurer (Exh. L) that there was no record of the birth of Ramonito in that office and, for this reason, the record
must be presumed to have been lost or destroyed during the war, and a certificate by the Parish Priest of
Asturias that there was likewise no record of birth of Ramonito in the church, the records of which were either lost
or destroyed during the war. (Exh. M)
On the other hand, as defendant below, petitioner Leoncia Balogbog testified
5
that Gavino died single at the
family residence in Asturias. She denied that her brother had any legitimate children and stated that she did not
know private respondents before this case was filed. She obtained a certificate (Exh. 10) from the Local Civil
Registrar of Asturias to the effect that that office did not have a record of the names of Gavino and Catalina. The
certificate was prepared by Assistant Municipal Treasurer Juan Maranga, who testified that there was no record
of the marriage of Gavino and Catalina in the Book of Marriages between 1925 to 1935.
6

Witness Jose Narvasa testified
7
that Gavino died single in 1935 and that Catalina lived with a certain Eleuterio
Keriado after the war, although he did not know whether they were legally married. He added, however, that
Catalina had children by a man she had married before the war, although he did not know the names of the
children. On crossexamination, Narvasa stated that Leoncia Balogbog, who requested him to testify, was also his
bondsman in a criminal case filed by a certain Mr. Cuyos.
Ramonito Balogbog was presented
8
to rebut Leoncia Balogbog's testimony.
On June 15, 1973, the Court of First Instance of Cebu City rendered judgment for private respondents (plaintiffs
below), ordering petitioners to render an accounting from 1960 until the finality of its judgment, to partition the
estate and deliver to private respondents one-third of the estate of Basilio and Genoveva, and to pay attorney's
fees and costs.
Petitioners filed a motion for new trial and/or reconsideration, contending that the trial court erred in not giving
weight to the certification of the Office of the Municipal Treasurer of Asturias (Exh. 10) to the effect that no
marriage of Gavino and Catalina was recorded in the Book of Marriages for the years 1925-1935. Their motion
was denied by the trial court, as was their second motion for new trial and/or reconsideration based on the church
records of the parish of Asturias which did not contain the record of the alleged marriage in that church.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that private respondents failed to overcome the legal
presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are in fact married, that a child
is presumed to be legitimate, and that things happen according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary
habits of life.
9
Hence, this petition.
We find no reversible error committed by the Court of Appeals.
First. Petitioners contend that the marriage of Gavino and Catalina should have been proven in accordance with
Arts. 53 and 54 of the Civil Code of 1889 because this was the law in force at the time the alleged marriage was
celebrated. Art. 53 provides that marriages celebrated under the Civil Code of 1889 should be proven only by a
certified copy of the memorandum in the Civil Registry, unless the books thereof have not been kept or have
been lost, or unless they are questioned in the courts, in which case any other proof, such as that of the
continuous possession by parents of the status of husband and wife, may be considered, provided that the
registration of the birth of their children as their legitimate children is also submitted in evidence.
This Court noted long ago, however, that Arts. 42 to 107 of the Civil Code of 1889 of Spain did not take effect,
having been suspended by the Governor General of the Philippines shortly after the extension of that code to this
country.
10
Consequently, Arts. 53 and 54 never came into force. Since this case was brought in the lower court in
1968, the existence of the marriage must be determined in accordance with the present Civil Code, which
repealed the provisions of the former Civil Code, except as they related to vested rights,
11
and the rules on
evidence. Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a woman conducting themselves as
husband and wife are legally married.
12
This presumption may be rebutted only by cogent proof to the
contrary.
13
In this case, petitioners' claim that the certification presented by private respondents (to the effect that
the record of the marriage had been lost or destroyed during the war) was belied by the production of the Book of
Marriages by the assistant municipal treasurer of Asturias. Petitioners argue that this book does not contain any
entry pertaining to the alleged marriage of private respondents' parents.
This contention has no merit. In Pugeda v. Trias,
14
the defendants, who questioned the marriage of the plaintiffs,
produced a photostatic copy of the record of marriages of the Municipality of Rosario, Cavite for the month of
January, 1916, to show that there was no record of the alleged marriage. Nonetheless, evidence consisting of the
testimonies of witnesses was held competent to prove the marriage. Indeed, although a marriage contract is
considered primary evidence of marriage,
15
the failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place. Other
evidence may be presented to prove
marriage.
16
Here, private respondents proved, through testimonial evidence, that Gavino and Catalina were
married in 1929; that they had three children, one of whom died in infancy; that their marriage subsisted until
1935 when Gavino died; and that their children, private respondents herein, were recognized by Gavino's family
and by the public as the legitimate children of Gavino.
Neither is there merit in the argument that the existence of the marriage cannot be presumed because there was
no evidence showing in particular that Gavino and Catalina, in the presence of two witnesses, declared that they
were taking each other as husband and wife.
17
An exchange of vows can be presumed to have been made from
the testimonies of the witnesses who state that a wedding took place, since the very purpose for having a
wedding is to exchange vows of marital commitment. It would indeed be unusual to have a wedding without an
exchange of vows and quite unnatural for people not to notice its absence.
The law favors the validity of marriage, because the State is interested in the preservation of the family and the
sanctity of the family is a matter of constitutional concern. As stated in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee:
18

The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not
only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply
interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling
together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to
the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not
what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law.
A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is "that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage." (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio Always presume marriage. (U.S. vs. Villafuerte and Rabano [1905], 4 Phil., 476; Son Cui vs.
Guepangco, supra; U.S. vs. Memoracion and Uri [1916], 34 Phil., 633; Teter vs. Teter [1884], 101 Ind., 129.)
Second. Petitioners contend that private respondents' reliance solely on testimonial evidence to support their
claim that private respondents had been in the continuous possession of the status of legitimate children is
contrary to Art. 265 of the Civil Code which provides that such status shall be proven by the record of birth in the
Civil Register, by an authentic document or by final judgment. But in accordance with Arts. 266 and 267, in the
absence of titles indicated in Art. 265, the filiation of children may be proven by continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child and by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court or special laws. Thus the Civil
Code provides:
Art. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated in the preceding article, the filiation shall be proved by the
continuous possession of status of a legitimate child.
Art. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final judgment or possession of status,
legitimate filiation may be proved by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Petitioners contend that there is no justification for presenting testimonies as to the possession by private
respondents of the status of legitimate children because the Book of Marriages for the years 1928-1929 is
available.
What is in issue, however, is not the marriage of Gavino and Catalina but the filiation of private respondents as
their children. The marriage of Gavino and Catalina has already been shown in the preceding discussion. The
treasurer of Asturias, Cebu certified that the records of birth of that municipality for the year 1930 could not be
found, presumably because they were lost or destroyed during the war (Exh. L). But Matias Pogoy testified that
Gavino and Catalina begot three children, one of whom, Petronilo, died at the age of six. Catalina testified that
private respondents Ramonito and Generoso are her children by Gavino Balogbog. That private respondents are
the children of Gavino and Catalina Balogbog cannot therefore be doubted.
Moreover, the evidence in the record shows that petitioner Gaudioso Balogbog admitted to the police of
Balamban, Cebu that Ramonito is his nephew. As the Court of Appeals found:
Ironically, it is appellant Gaudioso himself who supplies the clincher that tips the balance in favor of the
appellees. In an investigation before the Police Investigating Committee of Balamban, Cebu, held on March 8,
1968, conducted for the purpose of inquiring into a complaint filed by Ramonito against a patrolman of the
Balamban police force, Gaudioso testified that the complainant in that administrative case is his nephew.
Excerpts from the transcript of the proceedings conducted on that date (Exhs. "N", "N-1", "N-2", "N-3" and "N-4")
read:
Atty. Kiamco May it please this investigative body.
Q. Do you know the complainant in this Administrative Case No. 1?
A. Yes I know.
Q. Why do you know him?
A. I know because he is my nephew.
Q. Are you in good terms with your nephew, the complainant?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you mean to say that you are close to him?
A. Yes. We are close.
Q. Why do you say you are close?
A. We are close because aside from the fact that he is my nephew we were also leaving (sic) in the same house
in Butuan City, and I even barrow (sic) from him money in the amount of P300.00, when I return to Balamban,
Cebu.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Why is Ramonito Balogbog your nephew?
A. Because he is the son of my elder brother.
This admission of relationship is admissible against Gaudioso although made in another case. It is considered as
a reliable declaration against interest (Rule 130, Section 22). Significantly, Gaudioso did not try to offer any
explanation to blunt the effects of that declaration. He did not even testify during the trial. Such silence can only
mean that Ramonito is indeed the nephew of Gaudioso, the former being the son of Gavino.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Romero, Puno and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Per Justice Alfredo L. Benipayo, J., concurred in by Justices Ricardo J. Francisco and Jose C. Campos, Jr.
2 TSN, December 3, 1969, pp. 2-6.
3 TSN, July 9, 1970, pp. 3-28.
4 TSN, July 25, 1980, pp. 3-28.
5 TSN, Aug. 12, 1972, pp. 5-18.
6 TSN, Aug. 28, 1972, p. 13.
7 TSN, Sept. 16, 1972, pp. 4-20.
8 TSN, July 7, 1983, pp. 3-5.
9 1964 RULES OF COURT, Rule 131, 5 (z), (bb), and (cc).
10 Benedicto v. De la Rama, 3 Phil. 34 (1903).
11 CIVIL CODE, Art. 2270.
12 1964 RULES OF COURT, Rule 131, 5(bb).
13 Alavado v. City Government of Tacloban, 139 SCRA 230, 235 (1985); Perido v.Perido, 63 SCRA 97, 102-103
(1975).
14 SCRA 849 (1962). See Madridejo v. De Leon, 55 Phil. 1 (1930); Jones v.Hortiguela, 64 Phil. 179 (1937);
People v. Borromeo, 133 SCRA 106 (1984).
15 Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete, 66 SCRA 425 (1975).
16 Tolentino v. Paras, 122 SCRA 525 (1983); United States v. Memoracion, 34 Phil. 633 (1916); People v.
Borromeo, 133 SCRA 106 (1984).
17 CIVIL CODE, Art. 55.
18 43 Phil. 13, 56 (1922). Accord, Perido v. Perido, 63 SCRA 97 (1975)



HOW A MARRIAGE MAY BE PROVEN Art 1, pp 221
Marriage contract is the primary evidence of marriage, the failure to present is not a proof that no marriage
took place.
G.R No. 83598
March 7, 1997
CASE TITLE:
LEONCIA and GAUDIOSO BALOGBOG (Younger siblings of the deceased Gavino Balogbog. The two questioned the
validity of Gavinos marriage and thus contesting the inheritance claims posed by Gavinos sons on a third of their
parents Basilio and Genoveva Balogbogs estate) vs. COURT OF APPEALS, RAMONITO BALOGBOG AND
GENERESO BALOGBOG (legitimate children of Gavino by Catalina Ubas and are defending the validity of their
parents marriage and thus be entitled to inherit a third of the estate of their grandparents Basilio and Genoveva
Balogbog)

QUOTED:

However, in the case of Balogbog vs. Court of Appeals where it was contended that a particular marriage should have
been proven in accordance with Articles 53 and 54 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 because this was the law in force
at the time of the alleged marriage, the Supreme Court ruled that Articles 53 and 54 of the Spanish Civil Code never
took effect in the Philippines because they were suspended by the Spanish Governor General of the Philippines shortly
after the extension of the Spanish Civil Code to this country. In such a case the Supreme Court said that: since this
case was brought to the lower court in 1968, the existence of the marriage must be determined in accordance with the
present Civil Code, except as they related to vested rights and the rules of evidence. (page 108)

FACTS
Nature of the case:

Ramonito and Generoso filed action for partition and accounting against their aunt Leoncia and uncle Gaudioso for
partition and accounting of their grandparents estate at the Court of First Instance of Cebu City. This was granted.
Leoncia and Gaudioso appealed to the Court of Appeals but the latter affirmed the lower courts decision. Thus, they
are now at the Supreme Court for certiorari hopefully over turn the CA and lower courts decision in favoring their
nephews.
The facts: Leoncia and Gaudioso Balogbog contends are the children of Basilio Balogbog and Geneveva Arnibal who
died in 1951 and 1961 respectively. They had an older brother Gavino but he died in 1935 pre-deceasing their parents.
In 1968 however, Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog filed an action for partition and accounting against Leoncia and
Gaudioso claiming that they were the legitimate children of Gavino by Catalina Ubas and that, as such they were
entitled to the one-third share in the estate of their grandparents. But Leoncia and Gaudioso said they dont know
Ramonito and Generoso and proceeded to question the validity of the marriage between their brother Gavino and
Catalina. This despite how Gaudioso himself admitted during a police investigation proceeding that indeed Ramonito is
his nephew as the latter is the son of his elder brother Gavino. To prove the validity of their parents marriage,
Ramonito and Generoso presented Priscilo Trazo, 81 years old then mayor of Asturias from 1928 to 1934 and Matias
Pogoy who both testified that he knew Gavino and Catalina to be husband and wife and that they have three children.
Catalina herself testified that she was handed a receipt presumambly the marriage certificate by Fr. Jomao-as but it
was burned during the war. Leoncia for part claimed that her brother Gavino died single at the family residence in
Asturias. She obtained a certificate from the local Civil Registrar of Asturias to the effect that the office did not have a
record of the names of Gavino and Catalina. The certificate was prepared by Assistant Municipal Treasurer Juan
Maranga who testified that there was no record of marriage of Gavino and Catalina in the Book of Marriages between
1925 to 1935/ She and Gaudioso contended that the marriage of Gavino and Catalina should have been proven in
accordance with Arts. 53 and 54 of the Civil Code of 1889 because this was the law in force at the time of the alleged
marriage was celebrated. Art. 53 provides that marriages celebrated under the Civil Code of 1889 should be proven
only by a certified copy of the memorandum in the Civil Registry, unless the books thereof have not been kept or have
been lost, or unless they are questioned in the courts, in which case any other proof, such as that of the continuous
possession by parents of the status of husband and wife, may be considered, provided that the registration of the birth
of their children as their legitimate children is also submitted in evidence.

ISSUE: Whether or not Gavino and Catalinas marriage is valid.

RULING: The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the trial court and Court of Appeals in rendering Gavino and
Catalinas marriage as valid and thus entitle Ramonito and Generoso a third of their grandparents estate.

APPLICATION:
The Supreme Court held that Arts. 42 to 107 of the Civil Code of 889 of Spain did not take effect, having been
suspended by the Governor General of the Philippines shortly after the extension of that code of this country.
Consequently, Arts. 53 and 54 never came into force. Since this case was brought in the lower court in 1968, the
existence of the marriage must be determined in accordance with the present Civil Code, which repealed the
provisions of the former Civil Code, except as they related to vested rights, and the rules of evidence. Under the Rules
of Court, the presumption is that a man and a woman conducting themselves as husband and wife are legally married.
This presumption may be rebutted only by cogent proof to the contrary.
Although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, the failure to present it is not proof that no
marriage took place other evidence may be presented to prove marriage. In this case, Leoncia and Gaudioso claim
that the certification presented by Ramonito and Generoso (to the effect that the record of the marriage had been lost
or destroyed during the war) was belied by the production of the Book of Marriages by the assistant municipal treasurer
of Asturias. Leoncia and Gaudioso argue that this book does not contain any entry pertaining to the alleged marriage of
Gavino and Catalina. This contention has no merit. In Pugeda vs. Trias, the defendants, who questioned the marriage
of the plaintiffs produced a photostatic copy of the record of marriages of the Municipality of Rosario, Cavite for the
month of Jaunary 1916, to show that there was no record of the alleged marriage. Nonetheless, evidence consisting of
the testimonies of witnesses was held competent to prove the marriage. Indeed, although a marriage contract is
considered primary evidence of marriage, failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place. Other evidence
may be presented it to proof marriage. Here, Ramonito and Generoso proved through testimonial evidence, that
Gavino and Catalina were married in 1929, that they have three children, one of whom died in infancy, that their
marriage subsisted until 1935 when Gavino died, and that they are recognized by Gavinos family and by the public as
the legitimate children of Gavino.










Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

DECISION
August 1, 1916

G.R. No. L-11371
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CECILIA MEMORACION and DALMACIO URI, defendants-appellants.

Manly, Goddard and Lockwood, Rafael de la Sierra and D.R. Williams for appellants.
Attorney-General Avancea for appellee.

, J.:

These defendants were charged with the crime of adultery. On the 7th of June, 1915, a complaint was presented
against them in the court of the justice of the peace of the municipality of Albay. A preliminary examination was held, at
the close of which the justice of the peace found that there was probable cause for believing that the defendants were
guilty of the crime charged in the complaint, and held them for trial in the Court of First Instance.

On the 26th of June, 1915, the offended party presented a complaint against the said defendants. Later, on the 23d of
August, 1915, the said offended party presented an amended complaint, which alleged:

That the said accused, Cecilia Memoracion, on or about June 6, 1915, within the district of the municipality of Albay,
Province of Albay, P. I., being legally and lawfully married to the complainant, the offended party Eustaquio Abrigo, did,
willfully and criminally, unite, lie and have carnal intercourse with her co-accused, Dalmacio Uri; that the said accused,
Dalamcio Uri, then knowing that his co-accused, Cecilia Memoracion, was legally and lawfully married to the aggrieved
party, Eustaquio Abrigo, did, willfully and criminally, unite, lie and have carnal intercourse with his co-accused, Cecilia
Memoracion; acts committed with violation of law.

Upon said complaint the defendants were duly arraigned and each pleaded not guilty of the crime charged in the
complaint. The cause was brought on for trial and after hearing the evidence the Honorable J. C. Jenkins, judge, in a
carefully prepared opinion, found that the defendants were guilty of the crime charged in the complaint and sentenced
each of them to be imprisoned for a period of four years, nine months and eleven days of prision correccional with the
accessory penalties of article 61 of the Penal code and each to pay one-half the costs. From that sentence each of the
defendants appealed to this court. In this court the appellants make the following assignments of error:

(1) In not sustaining the objection filed by the defense during the trial of the case to the following questions,

Q. How are you related to the defendant woman?

Mr. SIERRA. Objected to as not best proof.

The COURT. I will allow the evidence.

A. She is my wife.

And, therefore, is allowing the taking of evidence with respect to the alleged marital relation between the complaint and
the co-accused Cecilia Memoracion. (2) In admitting as evidence the alleged marriage certificate issued by the parish
priest of Daraga; and, therefore, in overruling the objection filed by the attorney for the defense against the introduction
of Exhibit G, as evidence for the prosecution. (3) In the court himself personally addressing the following questions to
the witness Nicolas Briola:

Q. Did you know her (referring to the defendant) when she was married to Eustaquio?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Where you at the wedding?

A. I was there.

And in refusing to strike out of the record the testimony of the witness Nicolas Briola, overruling the motion so to do,
made by the defense. (4) In holding in the judgment that the alleged marriage of the complainant Eustaquio Abrigo with
the coaccused Cecilia Memoracion is a proven fact. (5) In holding that there is legal presumption of the existence of
the marriage between the complainant Abrigo and the coaccused Memoracion. (6) In holding as a proven fact that the
accused Dalmacio Uri knew, on the night of June 6, 1915, that Cecilia Memoracion and Eustaquio Abrigo were
husband and wife. (7) In holding that the accused are guilty of the crime of adultery, and in sentencing them to the
penalty of fours years nine months and eleven days of prision correccional, with the accessory penalties and costs.

With reference to said assignments of error, the first, third and fourth may be discussed together for the reason that
they present but one question. The question presented by the said assignments of error is whether or not oral
testimony is competent proof of a marriage in the case of the crime of adultery. The first assignment of error is based
upon the fact that the husband was asked the question whether or not he and the defendant Cecilia Memoracion were
married and whether or not they were husband and wife. The appellants contend that his declaration was not
competent evidence upon that fact. If a man and a woman are married, the declaration of either of them is competent
evidence to show the fact. No witness is more competent than they are. Whether the declaration of a husband alone is
sufficient to prove that fact must depend upon each particular case. There might, perchance, be a case where the
judge would not believe the declaration of the husband or wife upon the question of the marriage. In such a case
corroborative proof might become necessary. Corroboration of the fact is not absolutely necessary if the declaration of
either the husband or wife is sufficient to satisfy the conscience of the court. Certainly there are no witnesses more
competent than the husband and wife to testify as to whether they were married or not. Under the third assignment of
error, the same question is presented with reference to the oral declaration of Nicolas Briola. The appellant contends
that his oral declaration should not have been accepted upon the question whether the marriage existed or not. He
testified that Cecilia Memoracion and Eustaquio Abrigo had been married and that he was present to the wedding. A
witness who is present at the time a marriage takes place is certainly a competent witness to testify as to whether a
marriage took place or not. Whether or not his declaration should be accepted depends upon his credibility, but his
declaration is admissible for the purpose of showing that fact.

In reaching the foregoing conclusion we have not overlooked the decision of this court in the case of U.S. vs. Nebrida
and Saorda (32 Phil. Rep., 160.) In that case the court simply said that the substantially uncorroborated testimony of
the complaining witness in a case of adultery as to the fact of the marriage is not sufficient to establish the fact, beyond
a reasonable doubt, in a criminal action. In the present case the declaration of the husband as to the marriage was
corroborated by proof that he and his alleged wife had been living together for a period of twenty years. That fact alone
gave rise to the presumption that they were husband and wife. And not only that, but the declaration of the husband
was supported by the testimony of another witness who was present at the time the marriage took place. We are fully
convinced that Eustaquio Abrigo and Cecilia Memoracion were legally married and that they were husband and wife.

With reference to the second assignment of error, the appellant claims that the lower court committed an error in
admitting as proof Exhibit G. Exhibit G purports to be a marriage certificate issued by the parish priest, and purports to
certify that Eustaquio Abrigo and Cecilia Memoracion were married. While it is true that the lower court admitted Exhibit
G over the objection of the defendant, it will be noted, upon an examination of the decision of the lower court, that it
was rejected and was not considered as proof. The lower court said in the course of his decision:

It is true that certificate of marriage by the parish priest (Exhibit G) was, on the trial, improperly admitted, but it is now
excluded from the record and will not be considered by the court as evidence.

In view of that fact, therefore, we find no reason for sustaining the contention of the appellant. Exhibit G was not
considered as proof for the purpose of determining the existence of the marriage in question.

With reference to the fifth assignment of error, the lower court in the course of his opinion said:

They (the alleged husband and wife) deported themselves as husband and wife and, therefore there is the
presumption that they had entered into a lawful contract of marriage, independent of the positive testimony of an
eyewitness and the husband.

Subparagraph 28 of section 334 of Act No. 190 which relates to disputable presumptions provides:

That a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.

In discussing that provision of said Act No. 190, this court said in the case of United States vs. Villafuerte (4 Phil. Rep.,
559):

A man and woman who are living in marital relations under the same roof are presumed to be legitimate spouses,
united by virtue of a legal marriage contract, and this presumption can only be rebutted by sufficient contrary evidence.

In view of the above quoted provision of Act No. 190 and the decision of this court upon the same, it remains to be
seen whether or not the alleged spouses had "deported themselves as husband and wife." The record shows that they
had been living in the same house, under the same roof, and had been cohabiting together for a long period of time.
That fact is not denied, nor even questioned by anything found in the record.

With reference to the sixth assignment of error, the appellants contend that the defendant Dalmacio Uri, at the time the
alleged illicit relations took place, did not know that Cecilia Memoracion was a married woman. That the said Uri and
Memoracion had had illicit relations at the time and place described in the complaint is not denied. The proof shows
beyond a reasonable doubt, by eye-witnesses, that they had had the illicit relations charged in the complaint. The
husband of Cecilia declared that they had lived together as husband and wife in the community where the crime was
alleged to have been committed for a number of years; that the fact that they were husband and wife was well known
in that community. It is also shown that the defendant Dalmacio Uri has visited the house of Cecilia and her husband a
great number of times; that he had seen them together in the same house, and that he knew that they were living there
together. The defendant Uri had been in the community where the crime was committed for a number of months. It can
scarcely be believed, in view of the fact that he had visited the house of Eustaquio and Cecilia twenty or more times
before the commission of the crime, that he did not at least know that they were married and were husband and wife.
In view of the fact that he had frequently visited the house where Eustaquio and Cecilia were living and saw their
relations, one toward the other, we are convinced, in the absence of positive proof to the contrary, that he must have
known that they were at least living together as husband and wife 4kO8l.

With reference to the seventh assignment of error, it may be said, after a careful examination of the evidence, that we
are convinced, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendants were guilty of the crime charged and that the sentence
of the lower court is in accordance with the facts and the law. Therefore the sentence of the lower court is hereby
affirmed, with costs. So ordered.

Torres, Moreland, Trent, and Araullo, JJ., concur. .












HOW A MARRIAGE MAY BE PROVEN - Destruction of marriage contract, testimonial evidence is accepted,
pp221
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 118904. April 20, 1998]
ARTURIO TRINIDAD, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, FELIX TRINIDAD (deceased) and LOURDES
TRINIDAD, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In the absence of a marriage contract and a birth certificate, how may marriage and filiation be proven?
The Case
This is the main question raised in this petition for review on certiorari challenging the Court of
Appeals
[1]
Decision promulgated on December 1, 1994
[2]
and Resolution promulgated on February 8, 1995
[3]
in CA-GR
CV No. 23275, which reversed the decision of the trial court and dismissed petitioners action for partition and
damages.
On August 10, 1978, Petitioner Arturio Trinidad filed a complaint
[4]
for partition and damages against Private
Respondents Felix and Lourdes, both surnamed Trinidad, before the Court of First Instance of Aklan, Branch I.
[5]
On
October 28, 1982, Felix died without issue, so he was not substituted as a party.
[6]

On July 4, 1989, the trial court rendered a twenty-page decision
[7]
in favor of the petitioner, in which it ruled:
[8]

Considering therefore that this court is of the opinion that plaintiff is the legitimate son of Inocentes
Trinidad, plaintiff is entitled to inherit the property left by his deceased father which is 1/3 of the 4 parcels of
land subject matter of this case. Although the plaintiff had testified that he had been receiving [his] share
from said land before and the same was stopped, there was no evidence introduced as to what year he
stopped receiving his share and for how much. This court therefore cannot rule on that.
In its four-page Decision, Respondent Court reversed the trial court on the ground that petitioner failed to adduce
sufficient evidence to prove that his parents were legally married to each other and that acquisitive prescription against
him had set in. The assailed Decision disposed:
[9]

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES the appealed decision.
In lieu thereof, the Court hereby DISMISSES the [petitioners] complaint and the counterclaim thereto.
Without costs.
Respondent Court denied reconsideration in its impugned Resolution which reads:
[10]

The Court DENIES defendants-appellants motion for reconsideration, dated December 15, 1994, for lack of
merit. There are no new or substantial matters raised in the motion that merit the modification of the decision.
Hence, this petition.
[11]

The Facts
The assailed Decision recites the factual background of this case, as follows:
[12]

On August 10, 1978, plaintiff [herein petitioner] filed with the Court of First Instance of Aklan, Kalibo, Aklan,
an action for partition of four (4) parcels of land, described therein, claiming that he was the son of the late
Inocentes Trinidad, one of three (3) children of Patricio Trinidad, who was the original owner of the parcels
of land. Patricio Trinidad died in 1940, leaving the four (4) parcels of land to his three (3) children,
Inocentes, Lourdes and Felix. In 1970, plaintiff demanded from the defendants to partition the land into
three (3) equal shares and to give him the one-third (1/3) individual share of his late father, but the
defendants refused.
In their answer, filed on September 07, 1978, defendants denied that plaintiff was the son of the late
Inocentes Trinidad. Defendants contended that Inocentes was single when he died in 1941, before
plaintiffs birth. Defendants also denied that plaintiff had lived with them, and claimed that the parcels of
land described in the complaint had been in their possession since the death of their father in 1940 and that
they had not given plaintiff a share in the produce of the land.
Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia Briones were the parents of three (3) children, namely, Inocentes, Lourdes
and Felix. When Patricio died in 1940, survived by the above named children, he left four (4) parcels of
land, all situated at Barrio Tigayon, Kalibo Aklan.
Arturio Trinidad, born on July 21, 1943, claimed to be the legitimate son of the late Inocentes Trinidad.
Arturio got married in 1966 to Candelaria Gaspar, at the age of twenty three (23). Sometime after the
marriage, Arturio demanded from the defendants that the above-mentioned parcels of land be partitioned
into three (3) equal shares and that he be given the one-third (1/3) individual shares of his late father, but
defendants refused.
In order to appreciate more clearly the evidence adduced by both parties, this Court hereby reproduces pertinent
portions of the trial courts decision:
[13]

EVIDENCE FOR THE PLAINTIFF:
Plaintiff presented as his first witness, Jovita Gerardo, 77 years old, (at the time she testified in 1981) who is the
barangay captain of barrio Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan, since 1972. She testified that before being elected as barrio
captain she held the position of barrio council-woman for 4 years. Also she was [a member of the] board of
director[s] of the Parent-Teachers Association of Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan. That she knows the plaintiff because
they are neighbors and she knows him from the time of his birth. She knows the father of the plaintiff as
Inocentes Trinidad and his mother Felicidad Molato; both were already dead, Inocentes having died in 1944 and
his wife died very much later. Witness recalls plaintiff was born in 1943 in Barrio Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan, on July
21, 1943. At the time of the birth of the plaintiff, the house of the witness was about 30 meters away from
plaintiffs parents[] house and she used to go there 2 or 3 times a week. That she knows both the defendants as
they are also neighbors. That both Felix and Lourdes Trinidad are the uncle and aunt of Arturio because
Inocentes Trinidad who is the father of the plaintiff is the brother of the defendants, Felix and Lourdes
Trinidad. She testified she also knows that the father of Inocentes, Felix and Lourdes[,] all surnamed Trinidad[,]
was Patricio Trinidad who is already dead but left several parcels of land which are the 4 parcels subject of this
litigation. That she knows all these [parcels of] land because they are located in Barrio Tigayon.
When asked about the adjoining owners or boundaries of the 4 parcels of land, witness answered and mentioned the
respective adjoining owners. That she knew these 4 parcels belonged to Patricio Trinidad because said Patricio
Trinidad was a native also of Barrio Tigayon. Said Patricio died before the [war] and after his death the land went to
his 3 children, namely: Inocentes, Felix and Lourdes. Since then the land was never partitioned or divided among the
3 children of Patricio.
A picture, Exhibit A, was shown to the witness for identification and she identified a woman in the picture as the
defendant, Lourdes Trinidad. A man with a hat holding a baby was identified by her as Felix Trinidad, the
defendant. The other woman in the picture was pointed by the witness as the wife of the plaintiff, Arturio
Trinidad. When asked if Arturio Trinidad and Lourdes Trinidad and Felix Trinidad pointed to by her in the picture are
the same Arturio, Felix and Lourdes, who are the plaintiff and the defendants in this case, witness answered yes.
Another picture marked as Exhibit B was presented to the witness for identification. She testified the woman in this
picture as Lourdes Trinidad. In said picture, Lourdes Trinidad was holding a child which witness identified as the
child Arturio Trinidad. When asked by the court when xxx the picture [was] taken, counsel for the plaintiff answered, in
1966. When asked if Arturio Trinidad was baptized, witness answered yes, as she had gone to the house of his
parents. Witness then identified the certificate of baptism marked as Exhibit C. The name Arturio Trinidad was
marked as Exhibit C-1 and the name of Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato as father and mother respectively,
were marked as Exhibit C-2. The date of birth being July 21, 1943 was also marked. The signature of Monsignor
Iturralde was also identified.
On cross-examination, witness testified that she [knew] the land in question very well as she used to pass by it
always. It was located just near her house but she cannot exactly tell the area as she merely passes by it. When
asked if she [knew] the photographer who took the pictures presented as Exhibit A and B, witness answered she does
not know as she was not present during the picture taking. However, she can identify everybody in the picture as she
knows all of them.
At this stage of the trial, Felix Trinidad [died] without issue and he was survived by his only sister, Lourdes Trinidad,
who is his co-defendant in this case.
Next witness for the plaintiff was ISABEL MEREN who was 72 years old and a widow. She testified having known
Inocentes Trinidad as the father of Arturio Trinidad and that Inocentes, Felix and Lourdes are brothers and sister and
that their father was Patricio Trinidad who left them 4 parcels of land. That she knew Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad
Molato who are the parents of Arturio, the plaintiff, were married in New Washington, Aklan, by a protestant pastor by
the name of Lauriano Lajaylajay. That she knows Felicidad Molato and Lourdes Trinidad very well because as a
farmer she also owns a parcel of land [and] she used to invite Felicidad and Lourdes to help her during planting and
harvesting season. That she knows that during the lifetime of Inocentes the three of them, Inocentes, Felix and
Lourdes possessed and usufructed the 4 parcels they inherited from their father, Patricio. That upon the death of
Inocentes, Lourdes Trinidad was in possession of the property without giving the widow of Inocentes any share of the
produce. As Lourdes outlived her two brothers, namely: Felix and Inocentes, she was the one possessing and
usufructing the 4 parcels of land up to the present. The witness testified that upon the death of Inocentes, Lourdes
took Arturio and cared for him when he was still small, about 3 years old, until Arturio grew up and got married. That
while Arturio was growing up, he had also enjoyed the produce of the land while he was being taken care of by
Lourdes Trinidad. That a misunderstanding later on arose when Arturio Trinidad wanted to get his fathers share but
Lourdes Trinidad will not give it to him.
Plaintiff, ARTURIO TRINIDAD, himself, was presented as witness. He testified that defendants, Lourdes and Felix
Trinidad, are his aunt and uncle, they being the brother and sister of his father. That the parents of his father and the
defendants were Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia Briones. That both his father, Inocentes Trinidad, and mother,
Felicidad Molato, were already dead having died in Tigayon, his father having died in 1944 and his mother about 25
years ago.
As proof that he is the son of Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato, he showed a certificate of baptism which had
been previously marked as Exhibit C. That his birth certificate was burned during World War 2 but he has a certificate
of loss issued by the Civil Registrar of Kalibo, Aklan.
When he was 14 years old, the defendants invited him to live with them being their nephew as his mother was already
dead. Plaintiffs mother died when he was 13 years old. They treated him well and provided for all his needs. He lived
with defendants for 5 years. At the age of 19, he left the house of the defendants and lived on his own. He got married
at 23 to Candelaria Gaspar and then they were invited by the defendants to live with them. So he and his wife and
children lived with the defendants. As proof that he and his family lived with the defendants when the latter invited him
to live with them, he presented a picture previously marked as Exhibit B where there appears his aunt, Lourdes
Trinidad, carrying plaintiffs daughter, his uncle and his wife. In short, it is a family picture according to him. Another
family picture previously marked Exhibit A shows his uncle, defendant Felix Trinidad, carrying plaintiffs son. According
to him, these 2 pictures were taken when he and his wife and children were living with the defendants. That a few
years after having lived with them, the defendants made them vacate the house for he requested for partition of the
land to get his share. He moved out and looked for [a] lawyer to handle his case. He testified there are 4 parcels of
land in controversy of which parcel 1 is an upland.
Parcel 1 is 1,000 square meters, [has] 10 coconut trees and fruit bearing. The harvest is 100 coconuts every 4 months
and the cost of coconuts is P2.00 each. The boundaries are : East-Federico Inocencio; West-Teodulo Dionesio; North-
Teodulo Dionesio; and South-Bulalio Briones; located at Tigayon.
Parcel 2 is an upland with an area of 500 square meters; it has only 1 coconut tree and 1 bamboo groove; also located
in Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan. Adjoining owners are : East-Ambrosio Trinidad; North-Federico Inocencio; West-Patricio
Trinidad and South-Gregorio Briones.
Parcel 3 is about 12,000 square meters and 1/4 of that belongs to Patricio Trinidad, the deceased father of the
defendants and Inocentes, the father of the plaintiff.
Parcel 4 is a riceland with an area of 5,000 square meters. The harvest is 40 cavans two times a years [sic]. Adjoining
owners are: East-Gregorio Briones; West-Bulalio Briones; South-Federico Inocencio and North-Digna Carpio.
Parcel 1 is Lot No. 903.
Parcel 2 is Lot No. 864 of the cadastral survey of Kalibo and only Lot 864-A with an area of 540 square meters is the
subject of litigation.
Parcel 3 is Lot No. 979 of the cadastral survey of Kalibo covered by Tax Decl. No. 703310 with reference to one of the
owners of the land, Patricio Trinidad married to Anastacia Briones, one-half share.
Parcel 4 is covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 22502 RO-174 covering Lot No. 863 of the cadastral survey of
Kalibo. The title is in the name of Patricio Trinidad married to Anastacia Briones.
Parcel 1 is covered by Tax Decl. No. 11609 in the name of Patricio Trinidad while parcel 2 is covered by Tax Decl. No.
10626 in the name of Anastacia Briones and another Tax Declaration No. 11637 for Parcel 3 in the name of Ambrosio
Trinidad while Parcel 4 is covered by Tax Decl. No. 16378 in the name of Patricio Trinidad.
On cross-examination, plaintiff testified that during the lifetime of his mother they were getting the share in the produce
of the land like coconuts, palay and corn. Plaintiff further testified that his father is Inocentes Trinidad and his mother
was Felicidad Molato. They were married in New Washington, Aklan, by a certain Atty. Lajaylajay. When asked if this
Atty. Lajaylajay is a municipal judge of New Washington, Aklan, plaintiff answered he does not know because he was
not yet born at that time. That he does not have the death certificate of his father who died in 1944 because it was
wartime. That after the death of his father, he lived with his mother and when his mother died[,] he lived with his aunt
and uncle, the defendants in this case. That during the lifetime of his mother, it was his mother receiving the share of
the produce of the land. That both defendants, namely Lourdes and Felix Trinidad, are single and they have no other
nephews and nieces. That [petitioners] highest educational attainment is Grade 3.
EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENDANTS:
First witness for the defendants was PEDRO BRIONES, 68 years old, unemployed and a resident of
Nalook, Kalibo, Aklan. He testified having known the defendants, Felix and Lourdes Trinidad. They being
his first cousins because the mother of Lourdes and Felix by the name of Anastacia Briones and his father
are sister and brother. That he also knew Inocentes Trinidad being the brother of Felix and Lourdes and he
is already dead. According to the witness, Inocentes Trinidad [died] in 1940 and at the time of his death
Inocentes Trinidad was not married. That he knew this fact because at the time of the death of Inocentes
Trinidad he was then residing with his aunt, Nanay Taya, referring to Anastacia Briones who is mother of
the defendants, Felix and Lourdes Trinidad, as well as Inocentes Trinidad. That at the time of the death of
Inocentes Trinidad, according to this witness he stayed with his aunt, Anastacia Trinidad, and with his
children before 1940 for only 3 months. When asked if he knew Inocentes Trinidad cohabited with anybody
before his death, he answered, That I do not know, neither does he kn[o]w a person by the name of
Felicidad Molato. Furthermore, when asked if he can recall if during the lifetime of Inocentes Trinidad
witness knew of anybody with whom said Inocentes Trinidad had lived as husband and wife, witness, Pedro
Briones, answered that he could not recall because he was then in Manila working. That after the war, he
had gone back to the house of his aunt, Anastacia, at Tigayon, Kalibo, as he always visit[s] her every
Sunday, however, he does not know the plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad. When asked if after the death of
Inocentes Trinidad, he knew anybody who has stayed with the defendants who claimed to be a son of
Inocentes Trinidad, witness, Pedro Briones, answered: I do not know about that..
On cross examination, witness testified that although he was born in Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan, he started to
reside in Nalook, Kalibo, as the hereditary property of their father was located there. When asked if he was
aware of the 4 parcels of land which is the subject matter of this case before the court, witness answered
that he does not know. What he knew is that among the 3 children of Patricio Trinidad, Inocentes is the
eldest. And that at the time of the death of Inocentes in 1940, according to the witness when cross
examined, Inocentes Trinidad was around 65 years old. That according to him, his aunt, Anastacia Briones,
was already dead before the war. When asked on cross examination if he knew where Inocentes Trinidad
was buried when he died in 1940, witness answered that he was buried in their own land because the
Japanese forces were roaming around the place. When confronted with Exhibit A which is the alleged
family picture of the plaintiff and the defendants, witness was able to identify the lady in the picture, which
had been marked as Exhibit A-1, as Lourdes Trinidad, and the man wearing a hat on the said picture
marked as Exhibit 2-A is Felix Trinidad. However, when asked if he knew the plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad, he
said he does not know him.
Next witness for the defendants was the defendant herself, LOURDES TRINIDAD. She stated that she is
75 years old, single and jobless. She testified that Inocentes Trinidad was her brother and he is already
dead and he died in 1941 in Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan. That before the death of her brother, Inocentes
Trinidad, he had gone to Manila where he stayed for a long time and returned to Tigayon in
1941. According to her, upon arrival from Manila in 1941 his brother, Inocentes Trinidad, lived only for 15
days before he died. While his brother was in Manila, witness testified she was not aware that he had
married anybody. Likewise, when he arrived in Tigayon in 1941, he also did [not] get married. When asked
if she knew one by the name of Felicidad Molato, witness answered she knew her because Felicidad Molato
was staying in Tigayon. However, according to her[,] she does not kn[o]w if her brother, Inocentes Trinidad,
had lived with Felicidad Molato as husband and wife. When asked if she knew the plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad,
she said, Yes, but she denied that Arturio Trinidad had lived with them. According to the witness, Arturio
Trinidad did not live with the defendants but he stayed with his grandmother by the name of Maria
Concepcion, his mother, Felicidad Molato, having died already. When asked by the court if there had been
an instance when the plaintiff had lived with her even for days, witness answered, he did not. When further
asked if Arturio Trinidad went to visit her in her house, witness also said, He did not.
Upon cross examination by counsel for the plaintiff, Lourdes Trinidad testified that her parents, Anastacia
Briones and Patricio Trinidad, had 3 children, namely: Inocentes Trinidad, Felix Trinidad and herself. But
inasmuch as Felix and Inocentes are already dead, she is the only remaining daughter of the spouses
Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia Briones. Defendant, Lourdes Trinidad, testified that her brother, Felix
Trinidad, died without a wife and children, in the same manner that her brother, Inocentes Trinidad, died
without a wife and children. She herself testified that she does not have any family of her own for she has
[no] husband or children. According to her[,] when Inocentes Trinidad [died] in 1941, they buried him in
their private lot in Tigayon because nobody will carry his coffin as it was wartime and the municipality of
Kalibo was occupied by the Japanese forces. When further cross-examined that I[t] could not be true that
Inocentes Trinidad died in March 1941 because the war broke out in December 1941 and March 1941 was
still peace time, the witness could not answer the question. When she was presented with Exhibit A which
is the alleged family picture wherein she was holding was [sic] the child of Arturio Trinidad, she answered;
Yes. and the child that she is holding is Clarita Trinidad, child of Arturio Trinidad. According to her, she
was only requested to hold this child to be brought to the church because she will be baptized and that the
baptism took place in the parish church of Kalibo. When asked if there was a party, she answered; Maybe
there was. When confronted with Exhibit A-1 which is herself in the picture carrying the child, witness
identified herself and explained that she was requested to bring the child to the church and that the picture
taken together with her brother and Arturio Trinidad and the latters child was taken during the time when
she and Arturio Trinidad did not have a case in court yet. She likewise identified the man with a hat holding
a child marked as Exhibit A-2 as her brother, Felix. When asked if the child being carried by her brother,
Felix Trinidad, is another child of the plaintiff, witness answered she does not know because her eyes are
already blurred. Furthermore, when asked to identify the woman in the picture who was at the right of the
child held by her brother, Felix, and who was previously identified by plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad, as his wife,
witness answered that she cannot identify because she had a poor eyesight neither can she identify
plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad, holding another child in the picture for the same reason. When asked by counsel
for the plaintiff if she knows that the one who took this picture was the son of Ambrosio Trinidad by the
name of Julito Trinidad who was also their cousin, witness testified that she does not know.
Third witness for the defendants was BEATRIZ TRINIDAD SAYON who testified that she knew Arturio
Trinidad because he was her neighbor in Tigayon. In the same manner that she also knew the defendants,
Felix and Lourdes, and Inocentes all surnamed Trinidad because they were her cousins. She testified that
a few months after the war broke out Inocentes Trinidad died in their lolas house whose names was
Eugenia Rufo Trinidad. She further testified that Inocentes Trinidad had lived almost in his lifetime in Manila
and he went home only when his father fetched him in Manila because he was already sick. That according
to her, about 1 months after his arrival from Manila, Inocentes Trinidad died. She also testified that she
knew Felicidad Molato and that Felicidad Molato had never been married to Inocentes Trinidad. According
to her, it was in 1941 when Inocentes Trinidad died. According to her she was born in 1928, therefore, she
was 13 or 14 years old when the war broke out. When asked if she can remember that it was only in the
early months of the year 1943 when the Japanese occupied Kalibo, she said she [was] not sure. She
further testified that Inocentes Trinidad was buried in their private lot because Kalibo was then occupied by
the Japanese forces and nobody would carry his body to be buried in the Poblacion.
For rebuttal evidence, [petitioner] presented ISABEL MEREN, who was 76 years old and a resident of
Tigayon. Rebuttal witness testified that xxx she knew both the [petitioner] and the [private respondents] in
this case very well as her house is only around 200 meters from them. When asked if it is true that
according to Lourdes Trinidad, [Inocentes Trinidad] arrived from Manila in 1941 and he lived only for 15
days and died, witness testified that he did not die in that year because he died in the year 1944, and that
Inocentes Trinidad lived with his sister, Lourdes Trinidad, in a house which is only across the street from her
house. According to the said rebuttal witness, it is not true that Inocentes Trinidad died single because he
had a wife by the name of Felicidad Molato whom he married on May 5, 1942 in New Washington,
Aklan. That she knew this fact because she was personally present when couple was married by Lauriano
Lajaylajay, a protestant pastor.
On cross examination, rebuttal witness testified that when Inocentes Trinidad arrived from Manila he was in
good physical condition. That she knew both Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato to be Catholics but
that according to her, their marriage was solemnized by a Protestant minister and she was one of the
sponsors. That during the marriage of Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato, Lourdes Trinidad and Felix
Trinidad were also present.
When plaintiff, ARTURIO TRINIDAD, was presented as rebuttal witness, he was not able to present a
marriage contract of his parents but instead a certification dated September 5, 1978 issued by one
Remedios Eleserio of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of New Washington, Aklan, attesting to the
fact that records of births, deaths, and marriages in the municipality of New Washington were destroyed
during the Japanese time.
Respondent Courts Ruling
In finding that petitioner was not a child, legitimate or otherwise, of the late Inocentes Trinidad, Respondent Court
ruled:
[14]

We sustain the appeal on the ground that plaintiff has not adduced sufficient evidence to prove that he is
the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad. But the action to claim legitimacy has not prescribed.
Plaintiff has not established that he was recognized, as a legitimate son of the late Inocentes Trinidad, in
the record of birth or a final judgment, in a public document or a private handwritten instrument, or that he
was in continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child.
Two witnesses, Pedro Briones and Beatriz Trinidad Sayon, testified for the defendants that Inocentes
Trinidad never married. He died single in 1941. One witness, Isabel Maren, testified in rebuttal for the
plaintiff, that Inocentes Trinidad married Felicidad Molato in New Washington, Aklan, on May 5, 1942,
solemnized by a pastor of the protestant church and that she attended the wedding ceremony (t.s.n. Sept.
6, 1988, p. 4). Hence, there was no preponderant evidence of the marriage, nor of Inocentes
acknowledgment of plaintiff as his son, who was born on July 21, 1943.
The right to demand partition does not prescribe (de Castro vs. Echarri, 20 Phil. 23). Where one of the
interested parties openly and adversely occupies the property without recognizing the co-ownership
(Cordova vs. Cordova, L-9936, January 14, 1958) acquisitive prescription may set in (Florenz D. Regalado,
Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. I, Fifth Revised Edition, 1988, p. 497). Admittedly, the defendants have
been in possession of the parcels of land involved in the concept of owners since their father died in
1940. Even if possession be counted from 1964, when plaintiff attained the age of majority, still, defendants
possessed the land for more than ten (10) years, thus acquiring ownership of the same by acquisitive
prescription (Article 1134, Civil Code of the Philippines).
The Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for resolution:
[15]

1. Whether or not petitioner (plaintiff-appellee) has proven by preponderant evidence the marriage of his
parents.
2. Whether or not petitioner (plaintiff-appellee) has adduced sufficient evidence to prove that he is the
son of the late Inocentes Trinidad, brother of private respondents (defendants-appellants) Felix and Lourdes
Trinidad.
3. Whether or not the Family Code is applicable to the case at bar[,] the decision of the Regional Trial
Court having been promulgated on July 4, 1989, after the Family Code became effective on August 3, 1988.
4. Whether or not petitioners status as a legitimate child can be attacked collaterally by the private
respondents.
5. Whether or not private respondent (defendants-appellants) have acquired ownership of the properties
in question by acquisitive prescription.
Simply stated, the main issues raised in this petition are:
1. Did petitioner present sufficient evidence of his parents marriage and of his filiation?
2. Was petitioners status as a legitimate child subject to collateral attack in the action for partition?
3. Was his claim time-barred under the rules on acquisitive prescription?

The Courts Ruling

The merits of this petition are patent. The partition of the late Patricios real properties requires preponderant
proof that petitioner is a co-owner or co-heir of the decedents estate.
[16]
His right as a co-owner would, in turn, depend
on whether he was born during the existence of a valid and subsisting marriage between his mother (Felicidad) and his
putative father (Inocentes). This Court holds that such burden was successfully discharged by petitioner and, thus, the
reversal of the assailed Decision and Resolution is inevitable.

First and Second Issues: Evidence of and Collateral
Attack on Filiation

At the outset, we stress that an appellate courts assessment of the evidence presented by the parties will not, as
a rule, be disturbed because the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. But in the face of the contradictory conclusions
of the appellate and the trial courts, such rule does not apply here. So, we had to meticulously pore over the records
and the evidence adduced in this case.
[17]

Petitioners first burden is to prove that Inocentes and his mother (Felicidad) were validly married, and that he
was born during the subsistence of their marriage. This, according to Respondent Court, he failed to accomplish.
This Court disagrees. Pugeda vs. Trias
[18]
ruled that when the question of whether a marriage has been
contracted arises in litigation, said marriage may be proven by relevant evidence. To prove the fact of marriage,
the following would constitute competent evidence: the testimony of a witness to the matrimony, the couples public
and open cohabitation as husband and wife after the alleged wedlock, the birth and the baptismal certificates of
children born during such union, and the mention of such nuptial in subsequent documents.
[19]

In the case at bar, petitioner secured a certification
[20]
from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Aklan that all
records of births, deaths and marriages were either lost, burned or destroyed during the Japanese occupation of said
municipality. This fact, however, is not fatal to petitioners case. Although the marriage contract is considered the
primary evidence of the marital union, petitioners failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place, as other
forms of relevant evidence may take its place.
[21]

In place of a marriage contract, two witnesses were presented by petitioner: Isabel Meren, who
testified that she was present during the nuptial of Felicidad and Inocentes on May 5, 1942 in New Washington,
Aklan; and Jovita Gerardo, who testified that the couple deported themselves as husband and wife after the
marriage. Gerardo, the 77-year old barangay captain of Tigayon and former board member of the local parent-
teachers association, used to visit Inocentes and Felicidads house twice or thrice a week, as she lived only thirty
meters away.
[22]
On July 21, 1943, Gerardo dropped by Inocentes house when Felicidad gave birth to petitioner. She
also attended petitioners baptismal party held at the same house.
[23]
Her testimony constitutes evidence of common
reputation respecting marriage.
[24]
It further gives rise to the disputable presumption that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.
[25]
Petitioner also presented his
baptismal certificate (Exhibit C) in which Inocentes and Felicidad were named as the childs father and mother.
[26]

On the other hand, filiation may be proven by the following:
ART. 265. The filiation of legitimate children is proved by the record of birth appearing in the Civil
Register, or by an authentic document or a final judgment.
ART. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated in the preceding article, the filiation shall be proved by
the continuous possession of status of a legitimate child.
ART. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final judgment or possession of
status, legitimate filiation may be proved by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws.
[27]

Petitioner submitted in evidence a certification
[28]
that records relative to his birth were either destroyed during the
last world war or burned when the old town hall was razed to the ground on June 17, 1956. To prove his filiation, he
presented in evidence two family pictures, his baptismal certificate and Gerardos testimony.
The first family picture (Exhibit A) shows petitioner (Exhibit A-5) carrying his second daughter and his wife
(Exhibit A-4) together with the late Felix Trinidad (Exhibit A-2) carrying petitioners first daughter, and Lourdes Trinidad
(Exhibit A-1). Exhibit B is another picture showing Lourdes Trinidad (Exhibit B-1) carrying petitioners first child
(Exhibit B-2). These pictures were taken before the case was instituted. Although they do not directly prove
petitioners filiation to Inocentes, they show that petitioner was accepted by the private respondents as Inocentes
legitimate sonante litem motam.
Lourdes denials of these pictures are hollow and evasive. While she admitted that Exhibit B shows her holding
Clarita Trinidad, the petitioners daughter, she demurred that she did so only because she was requested to carry the
child before she was baptized.
[29]
When shown Exhibit A, she recognized her late brother -- but not petitioner, his wife
and the couples children -- slyly explaining that she could not clearly see because of an alleged eye defect.
[30]

Although a baptismal certificate is indeed not a conclusive proof of filiation, it is one of the other means allowed
under the Rules of Court and special laws to show pedigree, as this Court ruled in Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals:
[31]

What both the trial court and the respondent court did not take into account is that an illegitimate child is
allowed to establish his claimed filiation by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws, according to the Civil Code, or by evidence of proof in his favor that the defendant is her father,
according to the Family Code. Such evidence may consist of his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission,
a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission
by silence, the testimony of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court. [Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Phil. 1988 ed., p. 246]
Concededly, because Gerardo was not shown to be a member of the Trinidad family by either consanguinity or
affinity,
[32]
her testimony does not constitute family reputation regarding pedigree. Hence, it cannot, by itself, be used
to establish petitioners legitimacy.
Be that as it may, the totality of petitioners positive evidence clearly preponderates over private respondents
self-serving negations. In sum, private respondents thesis is that Inocentes died unwed and without issue in March
1941. Private respondents witness, Pedro Briones, testified that Inocentes died in 1940 and was buried in the estate of
the Trinidads, because nobody was willing to carry the coffin to the cemetery in Kalibo, which was then occupied by the
Japanese forces. His testimony, however, is far from credible because he stayed with the Trinidads for only three
months, and his answers on direct examination were noncommittal and evasive:
[33]

Q: At the time of his death, can you tell the Court if this Inocentes Trinidad was married or not?
A: Not married.
Q: In 1940 at the time of death of Inocentes Trinidad, where were you residing?
A: I was staying with them.
Q: When you said them, to whom are you referring to [sic]?
A: My aunt Nanay Taya, Anastacia.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Will you please tell the Court for how long did you stay with your aunt Anastacia Trinidad and his children
before 1940?
A: For only three months.
Q: Now, you said at the time of his death, Inocentes Trinidad was single. Do you know if he had cohabited with
anybody before his death?
A: [T]hat I do not know.
Q: You know a person by the name of Felicidad Molato?
A: No, sir.
Q: Can you recall if during the lifetime of Inocentes Trinidad if you have known of anybody with whom he has
lived as husband and wife?
A: I could not recall because I was then in Manila working.
Q: After the war, do you remember having gone back to the house of your aunt Anastacia at Tigayon, Kalibo,
Aklan?
A: Yes, sir,
Q: How often did you go to the house of your aunt?
A: Every Sunday.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: You know the plaintiff Arturio Trinidad?
A: I do not know him.
Q: After the death of Inocentes Trinidad, do you know if there was anybody who has stayed with the defendants
who claimed to be a son of Inocentes Trinidad?
A: I do not know about that.
Beatriz Sayon, the other witness of private respondent, testified that, when the Japanese occupied Kalibo in
1941, her father brought Inocentes from Manila to Tigayon because he was sick. Inocentes stayed with their
grandmother, Eugenia Roco Trinidad, and died single and without issue in March 1941, one and a half months after his
return to Tigayon. She knew Felicidad Molato, who was also a resident of Tigayon, but denied that Felicidad was ever
married to Inocentes.
[34]

Taking judicial notice that World War II did not start until December 7, 1941 with the bombing of Pearl Harbor in
Hawaii, the trial court was not convinced that Inocentes died in March 1941.
[35]
The Japanese forces occupied Manila
only on January 2, 1942;
[36]
thus, it stands to reason that Aklan was not occupied until then. It was only then that local
residents were unwilling to bury their dead in the cemetery in Kalibo, because of the Japanese soldiers who were
roaming around the area.
[37]

Furthermore, petitioner consistently used Inocentes surname (Trinidad) without objection from private
respondents -- a presumptive proof of his status as Inocentes legitimate child.
[38]

Preponderant evidence means that, as a whole, the evidence adduced by one side outweighs that of the adverse
party.
[39]
Compared to the detailed (even if awkwardly written) ruling of the trial court, Respondent Courts holding that
petitioner failed to prove his legitimate filiation to Inocentes is unconvincing. In determining where the preponderance
of evidence lies, a trial court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, including the witnesses manner
of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature
of the facts, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want thereof, and their personal
credibility.
[40]
Applying this rule, the trial court significantly and convincingly held that the weight of evidence was in
petitioners favor. It declared:
xxx [O]ne thing sure is the fact that plaintiff had lived with defendants enjoying the status of being their
nephew xxx before plaintiff [had] gotten married and had a family of his own where later on he started
demanding for the partition of the share of his father, Inocentes. The fact that plaintiff had so lived with the
defendants xxx is shown by the alleged family pictures, Exhibits A & B. These family pictures were taken at
a time when plaintiff had not broached the idea of getting his fathers share. xxxx His demand for the
partition of the share of his father provoked the ire of the defendants, thus, they disowned him as their
nephew. xxxx In this case, the plaintiff enjoyed the continuous possession of a status of the child of the
alleged father by the direct acts of the defendants themselves, which status was only broken when plaintiff
demanded for the partition xxx as he was already having a family of his own. xxxx.
However, the disowning by the defendant [private respondent herein], Lourdes Trinidad, of the plaintiff
[petitioner herein] being her nephew is offset by the preponderance of evidence, among them the testimony
of witness, Jovita Gerardo, who is the barrio captain. This witness was already 77 years old at the time she
testified. Said witness had no reason to favor the plaintiff. She had been a PTA officer and the court sized
her up as a civic minded person. She has nothing to gain in this case as compared to the witness for the
defendants who are either cousin or nephew of Lourdes Trinidad who stands to gain in the case for
defendant, Lourdes Trinidad, being already 75 years old, has no husband nor children.
[41]

Doctrinally, a collateral attack on filiation is not permitted.
[42]
Rather than rely on this axiom, petitioner chose to
present evidence of his filiation and of his parents marriage. Hence, there is no more need to rule on the application of
this doctrine to petitioners cause.



Third Issue: No Acquisitive Prescription

Respondent Court ruled that, because acquisitive prescription sets in when one of the interested parties openly
and adversely occupies the property without recognizing the co-ownership, and because private respondents had been
in possession -- in the concept of owners -- of the parcels of land in issue since Patricio died in 1940, they acquired
ownership of these parcels.
The Court disagrees. Private respondents have not acquired ownership of the property in question by acquisitive
prescription. In a co-ownership, the act of one benefits all the other co-owners, unless the former repudiates the co-
ownership.
[43]
Thus, no prescription runs in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his or her co-owners or co-heirs, so
long as he or she expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
In this particular case, it is undisputed that, prior to the action for partition, petitioner, in the concept of a co-
owner, was receiving from private respondents his share of the produce of the land in dispute. Until such time,
recognition of the co-ownership by private respondents was beyond question. There is no evidence, either, of their
repudiation, if any, of the co-ownership of petitioners father Inocentes over the land. Further, the titles of these pieces
of land were still in their fathers name. Although private respondents had possessed these parcels openly since 1940
and had not shared with petitioner the produce of the land during the pendency of this case, still, they manifested no
repudiation of the co-ownership. In Mariategui vs. Court of Appeals, the Court held:
[44]

x x x Corollarily, prescription does not run again private respondents with respect to the filing of the action
for partition so long as the heirs for whose benefit prescription is invoked, have not expressly or impliedly
repudiated the co-ownership. In the other words, prescription of an action for partition does not lie except
when the co-ownership is properly repudiated by the co-owner (Del Banco vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,
156 SCRA 55 [1987] citing Jardin vs. Hollasco, 117 SCRA 532 [1982]).
Otherwise stated, a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners absent a
clear repudiation of co-ownership duly communicated to the other co-owners (Mariano vs. De Vega, 148
SCRA 342 [1987]). Furthermore, an action to demand partition is imprescriptible and cannot be barred by
laches (Del Banco vs. IAC, 156 SCRA 55 (1987). On the other hand, an action for partition may be seen to
be at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determinate
portion of the property involved (Roque vs. IAC, 165 SCRA 118 [1988]).
Considering the foregoing, Respondent Court committed reversible error in holding that petitioners claim over
the land in dispute was time-barred.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The trial courts decision dated July 4, 1989 is REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., (Chairman), Bellosillo, Vitug, and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.


[1]
Fifteenth Division composed of J. Bernardo P. Pardo, ponente; and JJ. Justo P. Torres, Jr., (now a retired associate
justice of this Court) and Antonio P. Solano, concurring;
[2]
Rollo, pp 114-117.
[3]
Rollo, p 141.
[4]
Records, p. 1.
[5]
The case was later transferred to Branch VI, presided by Judge Jaime D. Discaya, and then to Branch VIII, presided
by Judge Emma C. Labayen.
[6]
Records, p. 68; TSN, July 17, 1984, p. 2.
[7]
Penned by Judge Labayen.
[8]
Rollo, p 90; Regional Trial Courts decision, p 20.
[9]
Rollo, p. 90.
[10]
Rollo, p. 141.
[11]
The case was deemed submitted for resolution upon receipt by this Court of the private respondents two-page
Memorandum on August 15, 1997.
[12]
Rollo, pp 114-115.
[13]
Rollo, pp. 74-85.
[14]
Rollo, pp. 115-116; Decision, pp 2-3.
[15]
The 51-page petition was signed by Attys. Al A. Castro, Florecita V. Bilbes and Teresita S. de Guzman of the Public
Attorneys Office; Rollo, pp 21-22.
[16]
De Mesa vs. Court of Appeals, 231 SCRA 773, 779-780, April 25, 1994, per Regalado, J.
[17]
Quebral vs. . Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 353, 364, January 25, 1996; Edra vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 179
SCRA 344, 350, November 13, 1989; and Pacmac, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 150 SCRA 555, 560, May
29, 1987.
[18]
4 SCRA 849, 855, March 31, 1962, per Labrador, J.
[19]
IbId.
[20]
Exh. I, Folder of Exhibits.
[21]
Balogbog vs. Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA 259, 266-267, March 7, 1997; Lim Tanhu vs. Ramolete, 66 SCRA 425,
469, August 29, 1975.
[22]
TSN, July 30, 1981, p. 6.
[23]
IbId., pp 1-17; TSN, October 30, 1981, pp 18-26; TSN, March 5, 1982, pp 27-36.
[24]
Section 41, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence.
[25]
Section 3(aa), Rule 131, Rules; and Vitug, Compendium of Civil Law and Jurisprudence, revised ed., 1993, p. 131,
citing Rivera vs. Intermediate Court of Appeals, 182 SCRA 322; De Labuca vs. Workmens Compensation
Commission, 77 SCRA 31; and Alvado vs. City Government of Tacloban, 139 SCRA 230.
[26]
Exhs. C-1 and C-2, Folder of Exhibits.
[27]
Now Arts. 170 & 171 of the Family Code; and Vitug, supra., pp.223-224.
[28]
Exh. D, Folder of Exhibits.
[29]
TSN, February 3, 1988, p. 6.
[30]
IbId., p. 8.
[31]
201 SCRA 675, 684, September 24, 1991, per Cruz, J.; and Uyguangco vs. Court of Appeals, 178 SCRA 684, 689,
October 26, 1989.
[32]
Sec. 40, Rule 130, Rules on Evidence.
[33]
TSN, August 29, 1986, pp. 4-6.
[34]
TSN, March 17, 1988, pp. 2-5.
[35]
RTC Decision, p. 16; Rollo, p. 86.
[36]
Zaide, Philippine Political and Cultural History, Vol. II, revised ed., 1957, p. 341.
[37]
Rollo, p. 86.
[38]
Mendoza vs. CA, supra, pp. 683-684.
[39]
Summa Insurance Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 175, 185, February 5, 1996; New Testament Church of
God vs. Court of Appeals, 246 SCRA 266, 269, July 14, 1995; Sapu-an vs. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 701, 706,
October 19, 1992; Republic vs. Court of Appeals, ibid.
[40]
IbId.; and Francisco, Basic Evidence, 1991 ed., p. 491.
[41]
Rollo, pp. 89-90.
[42]
Sayson vs. Court of Appeals, 205 SCRA 321, January 23, 1992; Rosales vs. Castillo Rosales, 132 SCRA 132,
141-142, September 28, 1984; and Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines,
Vol. I, 1990 ed., pp. 535-536.
[43]
Art. 494, Civil Code.
[44]
205 SCRA 337, 345-346, January 24, 1992, per Bidin, J.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 135216. August 19, 1999]
TOMASA VDA. DE JACOB, as Special Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Deceased Alfredo E.
Jacob, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO PILAPIL, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS for the Province of
Camarines Sur, and JUAN F. TRIVINO as publisher of "Balalong," respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The contents of a document may be proven by competent evidence other than the document itself, provided that the
offeror establishes its due execution and its subsequent loss or destruction. Accordingly, the fact of marriage may be
shown by extrinsic evidence other than the marriage contract.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision of the Court of
Appeals1 [Sixth Division composed of J. Jesus M. Elbinias (chairman), J. Omar U. Amin (ponente), and J. Hector L.
Hofilea.](CA) dated January 15, 1998, and its Resolution dated August 24, 1998, denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.
The dispositive part of the CA Decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from it being more consistent with the facts and the
applicable law, the challenged Decision dated 05 April 1994 of the RTC, Br. 30, Tigaon, Camarines Sur is AFFIRMED
in toto."2 [CA Decision, p. 10; rollo, p. 59.]
The decretal portion of the trial court Decision3 [Penned by Judge Angel S. Malaya. The case was heard by several
judges; namely, Judges Alfredo A. Cabral, Nilo A. Malanyaon, Ceferino P. Barcinas, Bonifacio C. Initia, and Augusto O.
Cledera.]is as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, decision is hereby rendered in favor of [herein Respondent] Pedro Pilapil, and
against [herein Petitioner] Tomasa Guison as follows:
a) Declaring Exh. B, the so called reconstructed marriage contract excluded under the best evidence rule, and
therefore declaring said Exh. B spurious and non-existent.
b) Declaring Exh. 3 Order dated July 18, 1961, and the signature of the issuing Judge JOSE L. MOYA (Exh. 34) to be
genuine.
c) Permanently setting aside and lifting the provisional writ of injunction earlier issued; and
d) To pay attorneys fees of P50,000.
And costs against [herein petitioner.]"

The Facts
The Court of Appeals narrates the facts thus:
"Plaintiff-appellant [petitioner herein] claimed to be the surviving spouse of deceased Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob and was
appointed Special Administratix for the various estates of the deceased by virtue of areconstructed Marriage Contract
between herself and the deceased.
"Defendant-appellee on the other hand, claimed to be the legally-adopted son of Alfredo. In support of his
claim, he presented an Order dated 18 July 1961 issued by then Presiding Judge Jose L. Moya, CFI, Camarines Sur,
granting the petition for adoption filed by deceased Alfredo in favor of Pedro Pilapil.
"During the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Alfredo in Case No. T-46 (entitled
"Tomasa vda. de Jacob v. Jose Centenera, et al) herein defendant-appellee Pedro sought to intervene therein claiming
his share of the deceaseds estate as Alfredos adopted son and as his sole surviving heir. Pedro questioned the
validity of the marriage between appellant Tomasa and his adoptive father Alfredo.
"Appellant Tomasa opposed the Motion for Intervention and filed a complaint for injunction with damages
(Civil Case No. T-83) questioning appellees claim as the legal heir of Alfredo.
"The following issues were raised in the court a quo:
a) Whether the marriage between the plaintiff-appellant and deceased Alfredo Jacob was valid;
b) Whether the defendant-appellee is the legally adopted son of deceased Jacob.
"On the first issue, appellant claims that the marriage between her and Alfredo was solemnized by one Msgr. Florencio
C. Yllana, CBCP, Intramuros, Manila sometime in 1975. She could not however present the original copy of the
Marriage Contract stating that the original document was lost when Msgr. Yllana allegedly gave it to Mr. Jose
Centenera for registration. In lieu of the original, Tomasa presented as secondary evidence a reconstructed Marriage
Contract issued in 1978.
"During the trial, the court a quo observed the following irregularities in the execution of the reconstructed Marriage
Contract, to wit:
1. No copy of the Marriage Contract was sent to the local civil registrar by the solemnizing officer thus giving the
implication that there was no copy of the marriage contract sent to, nor a record existing in the civil registry of Manila;
2. In signing the Marriage Contract, the late Alfredo Jacob merely placed his "thumbmark" on said contract purportedly
on 16 September 1975 (date of the marriage). However, on a Sworn Affidavit executed between appellant Tomasa and
Alfredo a day before the alleged date of marriage or on 15 September 1975 attesting that both of them lived together
as husband and wife for five (5) years, Alfredo [af]fixed his customary signature. Thus the trial court concluded that the
"thumbmark" was logically "not genuine". In other words, not of Alfredo Jacobs;
3. Contrary to appellants claim, in his Affidavit stating the circumstances of the loss of the Marriage Contract, the
affiant Msgr. Yllana never mentioned that he allegedly "gave the copies of the Marriage Contract to Mr. Jose
Centenera for registration". And as admitted by appellant at the trial, Jose Centenera (who allegedly acted as padrino)
was not present at the date of the marriage since he was then in Australia. In fact, on the face of the reconstructed
Marriage Contract, it was one "Benjamin Molina" who signed on top of the typewritten name of Jose Centenera. This
belies the claim that Msgr. Yllana allegedly gave the copies of the Marriage Contract to Mr. Jose Centenera;
4. Appellant admitted that there was no record of the purported marriage entered in the book of records in San Agustin
Church where the marriage was allegedly solemnized.
"Anent the second issue, appellee presented the Order dated 18 July 1961 in Special Proceedings No. 192 issued by
then Presiding Judge Moya granting the petition for adoption filed by deceased Alfredo which declared therein Pedro
Pilapil as the legally adopted son of Alfredo.
"Appellant Tomasa however questioned the authenticity of the signature of Judge Moya.
"In an effort to disprove the genuineness and authenticity of Judge Moyas signature in the Order granting the petition
for adoption, the deposition of Judge Moya was taken at his residence on 01 October 1990.
"In his deposition, Judge Moya attested that he could no longer remember the facts in judicial proceedings taken about
twenty-nine (29) years ago when he was then presiding judge since he was already 79 years old and was suffering
from "glaucoma".
"The trial court then consulted two (2) handwriting experts to test the authenticity and genuineness of Judge Moyas
signature.
"A handwriting examination was conducted by Binevenido C. Albacea, NBI Document Examiner. Examiner Albacea
used thirteen (13) specimen signatures of Judge Moya and compared it with the questioned signature. He pointed out
irregularities and "significant fundamental differences in handwriting characteristics/habits existing between the
questioned and the standard signature" and concluded that the questioned and the standard signatures "JOSE L.
MOYA" were NOT written by one and the same person.
"On the other hand, to prove the genuineness of Judge Moyas signature, appellee presented the comparative findings
of the handwriting examination made by a former NBI Chief Document Examiner Atty. Desiderio A. Pagui who
examined thirty-two (32) specimen signatures of Judge Moya inclusive of the thirteen (13) signatures examined by
Examiner Albacea. In his report, Atty. Pagui noted the existence of significant similarities of unconscious habitual
pattern within allowable variation of writing characteristics between the standard and the questioned signatures and
concluded that the signature of Judge Moya appearing in the Order dated 18 July 1961 granting the petition for
adoption was indeed genuine.
"Confronted with two (2) conflicting reports, the trial court sustained the findings of Atty. Pagui declaring the signature
of Judge Moya in the challenged Order as genuine and authentic.
"Based on the evidence presented, the trial court ruled for defendant-appellee sustaining his claim as the legally
adopted child and sole heir of deceased Alfredo and declaring the reconstructed Marriage Contract as spurious and
non-existent."4 [CA Decision, pp. 3-7; rollo, pp. 52-56.] (citations omitted, emphasis in the original)
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In affirming the Decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals ruled in this wise:
"Dealing with the issue of validity of the reconstructed Marriage Contract, Article 6, par. 1 of the Family Code provides
that the declaration of the contracting parties that they take each other as husband and wife shall be set forth in an
instrument signed by the parties as well as by their witnesses and the person solemnizing the marriage. Accordingly,
the primary evidence of a marriage must be an authentic copy of the marriage contract.
"And if the authentic copy could not be produced, Section 3 in relation to Section 5, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of
Court provides:
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document,
no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court without bad faith on the part of the
offeror;
x x x x x x x x x
Sec. 5. When the original document is unavailable. - When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or
cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability
without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy. Or by a recital of its contents in some authentic
document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.
"As required by the Rules, before the terms of a transaction in reality may be established by secondary evidence, it is
necessary that the due execution of the document and subsequent loss of the original instrument evidencing the
transaction be proved. For it is the due execution of the document and subsequent loss that would constitute the
foundation for the introduction of secondary evidence to prove the contents of such document.
"In the case at bench, proof of due execution besides the loss of the three (3) copies of the marriage contract has not
been shown for the introduction of secondary evidence of the contents of the reconstructedcontract. Also, appellant
failed to sufficiently establish the circumstances of the loss of the original document.
"With regard to the trial courts finding that the signature of then Judge Moya in the questioned Order granting the
petition for adoption in favor of Pedro Pilapil was genuine, suffice it to state that, in the absence of clear and convincing
proof to the contrary, the presumption applies that Judge Moya in issuing the order acted in the performance of his
regular duties.
"Furthermore, since the signature appearing in the challenged Order was subjected to a rigid examination of two (2)
handwriting experts, this negates the possibility of forgery of Judge Moyas signature. The value of the opinion of a
handwriting expert depends not upon his mere statement of whether a writing is genuine or false, but upon the
assistance he may afford in pointing out distinguishing marks, characteristics, and discrepancies in and between
genuine and false specimens of writing of which would ordinarily escape notice or dete[c]tion from an unpracticed
observer. And in the final analysis, the assessment of the credibility of such expert witnesses rests largely in the
discretion of the trial court, and the test of qualification is necessarily a relative one, depending upon the subject under
investigation and the fitness of the particular witness. Except in extraordinary cases, an appellate court will not reverse
on account of a mistake of judgment on the part of the trial court in determining qualifications of this case.
"Jurisprudence is settled that the trial courts findings of fact when ably supported by substantial evidence on record
are accorded with great weight and respect by the Court. Thus, upon review, We find that no material facts were
overlooked or ignored by the court below which if considered might vary the outcome of this case nor there exist
cogent reasons that would warrant reversal of the findings below. Factual findings of the trial court are entitled to great
weight and respect on appeal especially when established by unrebutted testimony and documentary evidence."5 [CA
Decision, pp. 7-9; rollo, pp. 56-58.](citations omitted, emphasis in the original)
Disagreeing with the above, petitioner lodged her Petition for Review before this Court.6 [This case was deemed
submitted for resolution on June 8, 1999, upon receipt by the Court of respondent's Memorandum.]
The Issues
In her Memorandum, petitioner presents the following issues for the resolution of this Court:
"a) Whether or not the marriage between the plaintiff Tomasa Vda. De Jacob and deceased Alfredo E. Jacob was
valid; and
b) Whether defendant Pedro Pilapil is the legally adopted son of Alfredo E. Jacob."7 [Memorandum for Petitioner, p.
11; rollo, p. 83.]
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is meritorious. Petitioners marriage is valid, but respondents adoption has not been sufficiently
established.
First Issue:
Validity of Marriage
Doctrinally, a void marriage may be subjected to collateral attack, while a voidable one may be assailed only in a direct
proceeding.8 [Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines: Commentaries and Jurisprudence, Vol. I, 1987 ed., p.
265.]Aware of this fundamental distinction, Respondent Pilapil contends that the marriage between Dr. Alfredo Jacob
and petitioner was void ab initio, because there was neither a marriage license nor a marriage
ceremony.9[Respondents Memorandum, p. 8; rollo, p. 120.] We cannot sustain this contention.
To start with, Respondent Pedro Pilapil argues that the marriage was void because the parties had no marriage
license. This argument is misplaced, because it has been established that Dr. Jacob and petitioner lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years.10 [See note 34, infra.] An affidavit to this effect was executed by Dr. Jacob
and petitioner.11 [See CA Decision, p. 5; rollo, p. 54.] Clearly then, the marriage was exceptional in character and did
not require a marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil Code.12 [Art. 76 of the Civil Code provides:
"No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have attained the age of majority and who,
being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each other. The
contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oath.
The official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to
ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the
marriage."] The Civil Code governs this case, because the questioned marriage and the assailed adoption took place
prior the effectivity of the Family Code.
When Is Secondary Evidence Allowed?
"It is settled that if the original writing has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court, upon proof of its
execution and loss or destruction, or unavailability, its contents may be proved by a copy or a recital of its contents in
some authentic document, or by recollection of witnesses."13 [De Guzman v. CA, 260 SCRA 389, 395, August 7,
1996, per Mendoza, J. See Rule 130, 5, Rules of Court.] Upon a showing that the document was duly executed and
subsequently lost, without any bad faith on the part of the offeror, secondary evidence may be adduced to prove its
contents.14 [See De Vera v. Aguilar, 218 SCRA 602, February 9, 1993.]
The trial court and the Court of Appeals committed reversible error when they (1) excluded the testimonies of
petitioner, Adela Pilapil and Msgr. Florencio Yllana and (2) disregarded the following: (a) photographs of the wedding
ceremony; (b) documentary evidence, such as the letter of Monsignor Yllana stating that he had solemnized the
marriage between Dr. Jacob and petitioner, informed the Archbishop of Manila that the wedding had not been recorded
in the Book of Marriages, and at the same time requested the list of parties to the marriage; (c) the subsequent
authorization issued by the Archbishop -- through his vicar general and chancellor, Msgr. Benjamin L. Marino --
ordaining that the union between Dr. Jacob and petitioner be reflected through a corresponding entry in the Book of
Marriages; and (d) the Affidavit of Monsignor Yllana stating the circumstances of the loss of the marriage
certificate.
It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both constituting the conditio sine
qua non for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by the very evidence they have
disregarded. They have thus confused the evidence to show due execution and loss as "secondary" evidence of the
marriage. In Hernaez v. Mcgrath,15 [91 Phil. 565, 573, July 9, 1952, per Tuason, J.] the Court clarified this
misconception thus:
"x x x [T]he court below was entirely mistaken in holding that parol evidence of the execution of the instrument was
barred. The court confounded the execution and the contents of the document. It is the contents, x x x which may not
be prove[n] by secondary evidence when the instrument itself is accessible. Proofs of the execution are not dependent
on the existence or non-existence of the document, and, as a matter of fact, such proofs precede proofs of the
contents: due execution, besides the loss, has to be shown as foundation for the introduction of secondary evidence of
the contents.
x x x x x x x x x
"Evidence of the execution of a document is, in the last analysis, necessarily collateral or primary. It
generally consists of parol testimony or extrinsic papers. Even when the document is actually
produced, its authenticity is not necessarily, if at all, determined from its face or recital of its
contents but by parol evidence. At the most, failure to produce the document, when available, to
establish its execution may affect the weight of the evidence presented but not the admissibility of
such evidence." (emphasis ours)
The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial court, tried to justify its stand on this issue by relying on Lim Tanhu v.
Ramolete.16 [66 SCRA 425, August 29, 1975.] But even there, we said that "marriage may be prove[n] by other
competent evidence."17 [Ibid., p. 469, per Barredo, J.]
Truly, the execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by the swearing officer, by witnesses
who saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by those to whom the parties have previously narrated
the execution thereof.18 [De Vera v. Aguilar, supra, pp. 606-607, citing Michael & Co v. Enriquez, 33 Phil. 87, 89-90,
December 24, 1915. See also De Guzman v. CA, supra.] The Court has also held that "[t]he loss may be shown by any
person who [knows] the fact of its loss, or by any one who ha[s] made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient
examination in the place or places where the document or papers of similar character are usually kept by the person in
whose custody the document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made any other investigation which
is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument [has] indeed [been] lost."19 [Ibid., p. 607, citing Michael &
Co v. Enriquez, supra. (emphasis ours)]
In the present case, due execution was established by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who was present during the
marriage ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a party to the event. The subsequent loss was shown by the testimony
and the affidavit of the officiating priest, Monsignor Yllana, as well as by petitioners own declaration in court. These are
relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract were
clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence -- testimonial and documentary -- may be admitted to
prove the fact of marriage.
The trial court pointed out that on the face of the reconstructed marriage contract were certain irregularities suggesting
that it had fraudulently been obtained.20 [CA Decision, pp. 4-5; rollo, pp. 53-54.] Even if we were to agree with the trial
court and to disregard the reconstructed marriage contract, we must emphasize that this certificate is not the only proof
of the union between Dr. Jacob and petitioner.
Proof of Marriage
As early as Pugeda v. Trias21 [4 SCRA 849, 855, March 31, 1962, per Labrador, J.], we have held that marriage may
be proven by any competent and relevant evidence. In that case, we said:
"Testimony by one of the parties to the marriage, or by one of the witnesses to the marriage, has
been held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage. The person who officiated at the
solemnization is also competent to testify as an eyewitness to the fact of marriage."22 [Ibid., citing
55 CJS, p. 900.] (emphasis supplied)
In Balogbog v. CA,23 [269 SCRA 259, 266, March 7, 1997; per Mendoza, J.] we similarly held:
"[A]lthough a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, the failure to present it
is not proof that no marriage took place. Other evidence may be presented to prove marriage."
(emphasis supplied, footnote omitted)
In both cases, we allowed testimonial evidence to prove the fact of marriage. We reiterated this principle in Trinidad v.
CA,24 [289 SCRA 188, April 20, 1998.] in which, because of the destruction of the marriage contract, we accepted
testimonial evidence in its place.25 [Ibid., p. 204, per Panganiban, J.]
Respondent Pedro Pilapil misplaces emphasis on the absence of an entry pertaining to 1975 in the Books of Marriage
of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila and in the National Census and Statistics Office (NCSO).26[Respondents
Memorandum, p. 8; rollo, p. 120.] He finds it quite "bizarre" for petitioner to have waited three years before registering
their marriage.27 [Respondents Memorandum, p. 10; rollo, p. 122.] On both counts, he proceeds from the wrong
premise. In the first place, failure to send a copy of a marriage certificate for record purposes does not invalidate the
marriage.28 [See Madridejo v. De Leon, 55 Phil. 1, 3, October 6, 1930; cited in Jones v. Hortigela, 64 Phil. 179,184,
March 6, 1937. Article 53 of the New Civil Code. Cf. Petition, p. 22; rollo, p. 29.] In the second place, it was not the
petitioners duty to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the civil registrar. Instead, this charge fell upon the
solemnizing officer.29 [Article 68, Civil Code.]
Presumption in Favor of Marriage
Likewise, we have held:
"The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is xxx of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a
civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested.
Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact
married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold
themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption
established by our Code of Civil Procedure is that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have
entered into a lawful contract of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio -- Always presume
marriage."30 [Perido v. Perido, 63 SCRA 97, 103, March 12, 1975, per Makalintal, CJ, citing Adong v. Cheong Seng
Gee, 43 Phil. 43, 56, March 3, 1922.] (emphasis supplied)
This jurisprudential attitude31 [See Trinidad v. CA, supra; Balogbog v. CA, supra; People v. Borromeo, 133 SCRA 110,
October 31, 1984; Perido v. Perido, 63 SCRA 97, March 12, 1975.] towards marriage is based on the prima
faciepresumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage.32 [Section 3 (aa), Rule 131, Rules of Court. Cf. Section 5 (bb), Rule 131, 1964 Rules of Court
and Article 220 of the Civil Code.] Given the undisputed, even accepted,33 [Respondents Memorandum, p. 12; rollo,
p. 124.] fact that Dr. Jacob and petitioner lived together as husband and wife,34 [This is evidenced by the "Affidavit of
Marriage Between a Man and Woman Who Have Lived for at Least Five Years," the authenticity of which was not
questioned by respondent.] we find that the presumption of marriage was not rebutted in this case.
Second Issue:
Validity of Adoption Order
In ruling that Respondent Pedro Pilapil was adopted by Dr. Jacob and that the signature of Judge Moya appearing on
the Adoption Order was valid, the Court of Appeals relied on the presumption that the judge had acted in the regular
performance of his duties. The appellate court also gave credence to the testimony of respondents handwriting expert,
for "the assessment of the credibility of such expert witness rests largely on the discretion of the trial court x x
x."35 [CA Decision, p. 9; rollo, p. 58.]
We disagree. As a rule, the factual findings of the trial court are accorded great weight and respect by appellate courts,
because it had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and to note telltale signs indicating the truth or
the falsity of a testimony. The rule, however, is not applicable to the present case, because it was Judge Augusto O.
Cledera, not the ponente, who heard the testimonies of the two expert witnesses. Thus, the Court examined the
records and found that the Court of Appeals and the trial court "failed to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly
considered, will justify a different conclusion."36 [Fuentes v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 703, February 26, 1997, per
Panganiban, J.] Hence, the present case is an exception to the general rule that only questions of law may be
reviewed in petitions under Rule 45.37 [Alcantara v. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 353, January 25, 1996;
Cayabyab v. IAC, 232 SCRA 1, April 18, 1994.]
Central to the present question is the authenticity of Judge Moyas signature on the questioned Order of Adoption. To
enlighten the trial court on this matter, two expert witnesses were presented, one for petitioner and one for Respondent
Pilapil. The trial court relied mainly on respondents expert and brushed aside the Deposition of Judge Moya
himself.38 [See RTC Decision, p. 11; Records, Vol. III, p. 1,506.] Respondent Pilapil justifies the trial judges action by
arguing that the Deposition was ambiguous. He contends that Judge Moya could not remember whether the signature
on the Order was his and cites the following portion as proof:39 [Respondents Memorandum, pp. 13-14; rollo, pp. 125-
126.]
"Q. What was you[r] response, sir?
A. I said I do not remember."
Respondent Pilapil's argument is misleading, because it took the judges testimony out of its context. Considered with
the rest of the Deposition, Judge Moyas statements contained no ambiguity. He was clear when he answered the
queries in the following manner:
"Atty. Benito P. Fabie
Q. What else did she tell you[?]
A. And she ask[ed] me if I remembered having issued the order.
Q. What was your response sir[?]
A. I said I do not remember."40 [Deposition of Judge Jose L. Moya, p. 2, October 1, 1990;
Records, Vol. 3, p. 1,128.]
The answer "I do not remember" did not suggest that Judge Moya was unsure of what he was declaring. In fact, he
was emphatic and categorical in the subsequent exchanges during the Deposition:
"Atty. Benito P. Fabie
Q. I am showing to you this Order, Exh. A deposition[;] will you please recall whether you issued
this Order and whether the facsimile of the signature appearing thereon is your signature.
A. As I said, I do not remember having issued such an order and the signature reading Jose[;] I
cant make out clearly what comes after the name[;] Jose Moya is not my signature."41 [Ibid.
(Emphasis supplied)]
Clearly, Judge Moya could not recall having ever issued the Order of Adoption. More importantly, when shown the
signature over his name, he positively declared that it was not his.
The fact that he had glaucoma when his Deposition was taken does not discredit his statements. At the time, he could
with medication still read the newspapers; upon the request of the defense counsel, he even read a document shown
to him.42 [Ibid., p. 4; Records, Vol. 3, p. 1,130.] Indeed, we find no reason and the respondent has not presented any
to disregard the Deposition of Judge Moya.
Judge Moyas declaration was supported by the expert testimony of NBI Document Examiner Bienvenido Albacea, who
declared:
"Atty. Paraiso
Q And were you able to determine [w]hat purpose you had in your examination of this document?
A Yes sir, [based on] my conclusion, [I] stated that the questioned and the standard signature Jose
L. Moya were not written by one and the same person. On the basis of my findings that I would
point out in detail, the difference in the writing characteristics [was] in the structural pattern of
letters which is very apparent as shown in the photograph as the capital letter J."43 [TSN, p. 9,
May 3, 1991; Records, p. 1,266, vol. 3.]
It is noteworthy that Mr. Albacea is a disinterested party, his services having been sought without any compensation.
Moreover, his competence was recognized even by Respondent Pilapils expert witness, Atty. Desiderio
Pagui.44 [TSN, p. 7, December 8, 1992; Records, Vol. 3, p. 1,422.]
Other considerations also cast doubt on the claim of respondent. The alleged Order was purportedly made in open
court. In his Deposition, however, Judge Moya declared that he did not dictate decisions in adoption cases. The only
decisions he made in open court were criminal cases, in which the accused pleaded guilty.45 [Deposition of Judge
Jose L. Moya, p. 4; Records, Vol. 3, p. 1,130.] Moreover, Judge Moya insisted that the branch where he was assigned
was always indicated in his decisions and orders; yet the questioned Order did not contain this information.
Furthermore, Pilapils conduct gave no indication that he recognized his own alleged adoption, as shown by the
documents that he signed and other acts that he performed thereafter.46 [Petitioners Memorandum, pp. 31-36; rollo,
pp. 103-108.] In the same vein, no proof was presented that Dr. Jacob had treated him as an adopted child. Likewise,
both the Bureau of Records Management47 [Records, Vol. I, p. 40.] in Manila and the Office of the Local Civil Registrar
of Tigaon, Camarines Sur,48 [Records, Vol. I, p. 41.] issued Certifications that there was no record that Pedro Pilapil
had been adopted by Dr. Jacob. Taken together, these circumstances inexorably negate the alleged adoption of
respondent.49 [Eusebio v. Valmores, 97 Phil. 163, May 31, 1955.]
The burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the person claiming such relationship.50 [Lazatin v. Campos, 92
SCRA 250, July 30, 1979.] This Respondent Pilapil failed to do. Moreover, the evidence presented by petitioner shows
that the alleged adoption is a sham.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The marriage between Petitioner Tomasa Vda. de Jacob and the deceased Alfredo E. Jacob is hereby
recognized and declared VALID and the claimed adoption of Respondent Pedro Pilapil is DECLARED NONEXISTENT.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur
Presumption of marriage. Art 1, pp221 and 36(Psychological Incapacity pp 312)
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 155800 March 10, 2006
LEONILO ANTONIO Petitioner,
vs.
MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
TINGA, J.:
Statistics never lie, but lovers often do, quipped a sage. This sad truth has unsettled many a love transformed into
matrimony. Any sort of deception between spouses, no matter the gravity, is always disquieting. Deceit to the depth
and breadth unveiled in the following pages, dark and irrational as in the modern noir tale, dims any trace of certitude
on the guilty spouses capability to fulfill the marital obligations even more.
The Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision
1
and Resolution
2
of the Court of Appeals dated 29 November
2001 and 24 October 2002. The Court of Appeals had reversed the judgment
3
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati declaring the marriage of Leonilo N. Antonio (petitioner) and Marie Ivonne F. Reyes (respondent), null and void.
After careful consideration, we reverse and affirm instead the trial court.
Antecedent Facts
Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years old and respondent was 36 years of age.
Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married before a minister of the Gospel
4
at the Manila City Hall, and
through a subsequent church wedding
5
at the Sta. Rosa de Lima Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig, Metro Manila on 6
December 1990.
6
Out of their union, a child was born on 19 April 1991, who sadly died five (5) months later.
On 8 March 1993,
7
petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent declared null and void. He anchored
his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage. He asserted that respondents incapacity existed at the time their
marriage was celebrated and still subsists up to the present.
8

As manifestations of respondents alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed that respondent persistently lied
about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or things,
9
to
wit:
(1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate son,
10
and instead introduced the boy to
petitioner as the adopted child of her family. She only confessed the truth about the boys parentage when petitioner
learned about it from other sources after their marriage.
11

(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted to rape and kill her when in fact, no such
incident occurred.
12

(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician, Dr. Consuelo Gardiner, and told some of her
friends that she graduated with a degree in psychology, when she was neither.
13

(4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated with Blackgold Recording Company (Blackgold);
yet, not a single member of her family ever witnessed her alleged singing activities with the group. In the same vein,
she postulated that a luncheon show was held at the Philippine Village Hotel in her honor and even presented an
invitation to that effect
14
but petitioner discovered per certification by the Director of Sales of said hotel that no such
occasion had taken place.
15

(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and under those names, sent lengthy letters to
petitioner claiming to be from Blackgold and touting her as the "number one moneymaker" in the commercial industry
worth P2 million.
16
Petitioner later found out that respondent herself was the one who wrote and sent the letters to him
when she admitted the truth in one of their quarrels.
17
He likewise realized that Babes Santos and Via Marquez were
only figments of her imagination when he discovered they were not known in or connected with Blackgold.
18

(6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she altered her payslip to make it appear that she
earned a higher income. She bought a sala set from a public market but told petitioner that she acquired it from a
famous furniture dealer.
19
She spent lavishly on unnecessary items and ended up borrowing money from other people
on false pretexts.
20

(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of calling up his officemates to monitor his
whereabouts. When he could no longer take her unusual behavior, he separated from her in August 1991. He tried to
attempt a reconciliation but since her behavior did not change, he finally left her for good in November 1991.
21

In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera Abcede (Dr. Abcede), a psychiatrist, and Dr. Arnulfo
V.
Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the tests they conducted, that petitioner was
essentially a normal, introspective, shy and conservative type of person. On the other hand, they observed that
respondents persistent and constant lying
to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It undermined the basic relationship that should be based on love, trust and
respect.
22
They further asserted that respondents extreme jealousy was also pathological. It reached the point of
paranoia since there was no actual basis for her to suspect that petitioner was having an affair with another woman.
They concluded based on the foregoing that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential
marital obligations.
23

In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she performed her marital obligations by attending to all the needs of
her husband. She asserted that there was no truth to the allegation that she fabricated stories, told lies and invented
personalities.
24
She presented her version, thus:
(1) She concealed her child by another man from petitioner because she was afraid of losing her husband.
25

(2) She told petitioner about Davids attempt to rape and kill her because she surmised such intent from Davids act of
touching her back and ogling her from head to foot.
26

(3) She was actually a BS Banking and Finance graduate and had been teaching psychology at the Pasig Catholic
School for two (2) years.
27

(4) She was a free-lance voice talent of Aris de las Alas, an executive producer of Channel 9 and she had done three
(3) commercials with McCann Erickson for the advertisement of Coca-cola, Johnson & Johnson, and Traders Royal
Bank. She told petitioner she was a Blackgold recording artist although she was not under contract with the company,
yet she reported to the Blackgold office after office hours. She claimed that a luncheon show was indeed held in her
honor at the Philippine Village Hotel on 8 December 1979.
28

(5) She vowed that the letters sent to petitioner were not written by her and the writers thereof were not fictitious. Bea
Marquez Recto of the Recto political clan was a resident of the United States while Babes Santos was employed with
Saniwares.
29

(6) She admitted that she called up an officemate of her husband but averred that she merely asked the latter in a
diplomatic matter if she was the one asking for chocolates from petitioner, and not to monitor her husbands
whereabouts.
30

(7) She belied the allegation that she spent lavishly as she supported almost ten people from her monthly budget
of P7,000.00.
31

In fine, respondent argued that apart from her non-disclosure of a child prior to their marriage, the other lies attributed
to her by petitioner were mostly hearsay and unconvincing. Her stance was that the totality of the evidence presented
is not sufficient for a finding of psychological incapacity on her part.
32

In addition, respondent presented Dr. Antonio Efren Reyes (Dr. Reyes), a psychiatrist, to refute the allegations anent
her psychological condition. Dr. Reyes testified that the series of tests conducted by his assistant,
33
together with the
screening procedures and the Comprehensive Psycho-Pathological Rating Scale (CPRS) he himself conducted, led
him to conclude that respondent was not psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations. He
postulated that regressive behavior, gross neuroticism, psychotic tendencies, and poor control of impulses, which are
signs that might point to the presence of disabling trends, were not elicited from respondent.
34

In rebuttal, Dr. Lopez asseverated that there were flaws in the evaluation conducted by Dr. Reyes as (i) he was not the
one who administered and interpreted respondents psychological evaluation, and (ii) he made use of only one
instrument called CPRS which was not reliable because a good liar can fake the results of such test.
35

After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioners evidence and held that respondents propensity to lying about
almost anythingher occupation, state of health, singing abilities and her income, among othershad been duly
established. According to the trial court, respondents fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities
enabled her to live in a world of make-believe. This made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her
incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage.
36
The trial court thus declared the marriage between
petitioner and respondent null and void.
Shortly before the trial court rendered its decision, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila annulled the
Catholic marriage of the parties, on the ground of lack of due discretion on the part of the parties.
37
During the
pendency of the appeal before the Court of Appeals, the Metropolitan Tribunals ruling was affirmed with modification
by both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, which held instead that only respondent was impaired by a lack of
due discretion.
38
Subsequently, the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal was upheld by the Roman
Rota of the Vatican.
39

Petitioner duly alerted the Court of Appeals of these rulings by the Catholic tribunals. Still, the appellate court reversed
the RTCs judgment. While conceding that respondent may not have been completely honest with petitioner, the Court
of Appeals nevertheless held that the totality of the evidence presented was insufficient to establish respondents
psychological incapacity. It declared that the requirements in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals
40
governing the
application and interpretation of psychological incapacity had not been satisfied.
Taking exception to the appellate courts pronouncement, petitioner elevated the case to this Court. He contends
herein that the evidence conclusively establish respondents psychological incapacity.
In considering the merit of this petition, the Court is heavily influenced by the credence accorded by the RTC to the
factual allegations of petitioner.
41
It is a settled principle of civil procedure that the conclusions of the trial court
regarding the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect from the appellate courts because the trial court had
an opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony which may indicate their candor or lack
thereof.
42
The Court is likewise guided by the fact that the Court of Appeals did not dispute the veracity of the evidence
presented by petitioner. Instead, the appellate court concluded that such evidence was not sufficient to establish the
psychological incapacity of respondent.
43

Thus, the Court is impelled to accept the factual version of petitioner as the operative facts. Still, the crucial question
remains as to whether the state of facts as presented by petitioner sufficiently meets the standards set for the
declaration of nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. These standards were definitively laid down in
the Courts 1997 ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals
44
(also known as the Molina case
45
), and indeed the Court of
Appeals cited the Molina guidelines in reversing the RTC in the case at bar.
46
Since Molinawas decided in 1997, the
Supreme Court has yet to squarely affirm the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
47
In
fact, even before Molina was handed down, there was only one case, Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,
48
wherein the
Court definitively concluded that a spouse was psychologically incapacitated under Article 36.
This state of jurisprudential affairs may have led to the misperception that the remedy afforded by Article 36 of the
Family Code is hollow, insofar as the Supreme Court is concerned.
49
Yet what Molina and the succeeding cases did
ordain was a set of guidelines which, while undoubtedly onerous on the petitioner seeking the declaration of nullity, still
leave room for a decree of nullity under the proper circumstances. Molina did not foreclose the grant of a decree of
nullity under Article 36, even as it raised the bar for its allowance.
Legal Guides to Understanding Article 36
Article 36 of the Family Code states that "[a] marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."
50
The concept of psychological incapacity as a ground
for nullity of marriage is novel in our body of laws, although mental incapacity has long been recognized as a ground
for the dissolution of a marriage.
The Spanish Civil Code of 1889 prohibited from contracting marriage persons "who are not in the full enjoyment of their
reason at the time of contracting marriage."
51
Marriages with such persons were ordained as void,
52
in the same class
as marriages with underage parties and persons already married, among others. A partys mental capacity was not a
ground for divorce under the Divorce Law of 1917,
53
but a marriage where "either party was of unsound mind" at the
time of its celebration was cited as an "annullable marriage" under the Marriage Law of 1929.
54
Divorce on the ground
of a spouses incurable insanity was permitted under the divorce law enacted during the Japanese occupation.
55
Upon
the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950, a marriage contracted by a party of "unsound mind" was classified under
Article 85 of the Civil Code as a voidable marriage.
56
The mental capacity, or lack thereof, of the marrying spouse was
not among the grounds for declaring a marriage void ab initio.
57
Similarly, among the marriages classified as voidable
under Article 45 (2) of the Family Code is one contracted by a party of unsound mind.
58

Such cause for the annulment of marriage is recognized as a vice of consent, just like insanity impinges on consent
freely given which is one of the essential requisites of a contract.
59
The initial common consensus on psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code was that it did not constitute a specie of vice of consent. Justices
Sempio-Diy and Caguioa, both members of the Family Code revision committee that drafted the Code, have opined
that psychological incapacity is not a vice of consent, and conceded that the spouse may have given free and voluntary
consent to a marriage but was nonetheless incapable of fulfilling such rights and obligations.
60
Dr. Tolentino likewise
stated in the 1990 edition of his commentaries on the Family Code that this "psychological incapacity to comply with
the essential marital obligations does not affect the consent to the marriage."
61

There were initial criticisms of this original understanding of Article 36 as phrased by the Family Code committee.
Tolentino opined that "psychologically incapacity to comply would not be
juridically different from physical incapacity of consummating the marriage, which makes the marriage only voidable
under Article 45 (5) of the Civil Code x x x [and thus] should have been a cause for annulment of the marriage
only."
62
At the same time, Tolentino noted "[it] would be different if it were psychological incapacity to understand the
essential marital obligations, because then this would amount to lack of consent to the marriage."
63
These concerns
though were answered, beginning with Santos v. Court of Appeals,
64
wherein the Court, through Justice Vitug,
acknowledged that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes
a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage."
65

The notion that psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of marriage, as opposed
to a mere inability to comply with them, was further affirmed in the Molina
66
case. Therein, the Court, through then
Justice (now Chief Justice) Panganiban observed that "[t]he evidence [to establish psychological incapacity] must
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such extent that the person could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereto."
67
Jurisprudence since then has recognized that psychological incapacity "is a malady so grave and
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to
assume."
68

It might seem that this present understanding of psychological incapacity deviates from the literal wording of Article 36,
with its central phase reading "psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage."
69
At the same time, it has been consistently recognized by this Court
that the intent of the Family Code committee was to design the law as to allow some resiliency in its application, by
avoiding specific examples that would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle ofejusdem
generis. Rather, the preference of the revision committee was for "the judge to interpret the provision ona case-to-
case basis, guided by experience, in the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and
by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on
the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law."
70

We likewise observed in Republic v. Dagdag:
71

Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially,
more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori
assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a
ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must
take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own
judgment for that of the trial court.
72

The Court thus acknowledges that the definition of psychological incapacity, as intended by the revision committee,
was not cast in intractable specifics. Judicial understanding of psychological incapacity may be informed by evolving
standards, taking into account the particulars of each case, current trends in psychological and even canonical thought,
and experience. It is under the auspices of the deliberate ambiguity of the framers that the Court has developed
the Molina rules, which have been consistently applied since 1997. Molina has proven indubitably useful in providing a
unitary framework that guides courts in adjudicating petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the same
time, the Molina guidelines are not set in stone, the clear legislative intent mandating a case-to-case perception of
each situation, and Molina itself arising from this evolutionary understanding of Article 36. There is no cause to
disavow Molina at present, and indeed the disposition of this case shall rely primarily on that precedent. There is need
though to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of
nullity under Article 36.
Of particular notice has been the citation of the Court, first in Santos then in Molina, of the considered opinion of canon
law experts in the interpretation of psychological incapacity. This is but unavoidable, considering that the Family Code
committee had bluntly acknowledged that the concept of psychological incapacity was derived from canon law,
73
and
as one member admitted, enacted as a solution to the problem of marriages already annulled by the Catholic Church
but still existent under civil law.
74
It would be disingenuous to disregard the influence of Catholic Church doctrine in the
formulation and subsequent understanding of Article 36, and the Court has expressly acknowledged that
interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the local Church, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
75
Still, it must be emphasized that the Catholic Church is hardly
the sole source of influence in the interpretation of Article 36. Even though the concept may have been derived from
canon law, its incorporation into the Family Code and subsequent judicial interpretation occurred in wholly secular
progression. Indeed, while Church thought on psychological incapacity is merely persuasive on the trial courts, judicial
decisions of this Court interpreting psychological incapacity are binding on lower courts.
76

Now is also opportune time to comment on another common legal guide utilized in the adjudication of petitions for
declaration of nullity under Article 36. All too frequently, this Court and lower courts, in denying petitions of the kind,
have favorably cited Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the Constitution, which respectively state that "[t]he State
recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively
promote its total developmen[t]," and that "[m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family
and shall be protected by the State." These provisions highlight the importance of the family and the constitutional
protection accorded to the institution of marriage.
But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state protection to marriage as a social institution and
the foundation of the family. It remains the province of the legislature to define all legal aspects of marriage and
prescribe the strategy and the modalities to protect it, based on whatever socio-political influences it deems proper,
and subject of course to the qualification that such legislative enactment itself adheres to the Constitution and the Bill
of Rights. This being the case, it also falls on the legislature to put into operation the constitutional provisions that
protect marriage and the family. This has been accomplished at present through the enactment of the Family Code,
which defines marriage and the family, spells out the corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations that affect
married and family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for declaration of nullity and those for legal separation. While
it may appear that the judicial denial of a petition for declaration of nullity is reflective of the constitutional mandate to
protect marriage, such action in fact merely enforces a statutory definition of marriage, not a constitutionally ordained
decree of what marriage is. Indeed, if circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV need not be the only
constitutional considerations to be taken into account in resolving a petition for declaration of nullity.
Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a psychologically incapacitated person as
a nullity, should be deemed as an implement of this constitutional protection of marriage. Given the avowed State
interest in promoting marriage as the foundation of the family, which in turn serves as the foundation of the nation,
there is a corresponding interest for the State to defend against marriages ill-equipped to promote family life. Void ab
initio marriages under Article 36 do not further the initiatives of the State concerning marriage and family, as they
promote wedlock among persons who, for reasons independent of their will, are not capacitated to understand or
comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
These are the legal premises that inform us as we decide the present petition.
Molina Guidelines As Applied in This Case
As stated earlier, Molina established the guidelines presently recognized in the judicial disposition of petitions for nullity
under Article 36. The Court has consistently applied Molina since its promulgation in 1997, and the guidelines therein
operate as the general rules. They warrant citation in full:
1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This
is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the
family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the
nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in
the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychologicalnot physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them,
was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle ofejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence
must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I dos." The manifestation of the
illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or
prior thereto.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability
may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment
in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine
to cure them but not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents
and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that
Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon
Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of
marriage due to causes of psychological nature."
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith
of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to
decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideallysubject to our law on evidencewhat is decreed as canonically invalid
should also be decreed civilly void.
77

Molina had provided for an additional requirement that the Solicitor General issue a certification stating his reasons for
his agreement or opposition to the petition.
78
This requirement however was dispensed with following the
implementation of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages.
79
Still, Article 48 of the Family Code mandates that the appearance of the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned be on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties
and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Obviously, collusion is not an issue in this case,
considering the consistent vigorous opposition of respondent to the petition for declaration of nullity. In any event, the
fiscals participation in the hearings before the trial court is extant from the records of this case.
As earlier noted, the factual findings of the RTC are now deemed binding on this Court, owing to the great weight
accorded to the opinion of the primary trier of facts, and the refusal of the Court of Appeals to dispute the veracity of
these facts. As such, it must be considered that respondent had consistently lied about many material aspects as to
her character and personality. The question remains whether her pattern of fabrication sufficiently establishes her
psychological incapacity, consistent with Article 36 and generally, the Molina guidelines.
We find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines in Molina.
First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological incapacity of his spouse. Apart from
his own testimony, he presented witnesses who corroborated his allegations on his wifes behavior, and certifications
from Blackgold Records and the Philippine Village Hotel Pavillon which disputed respondents claims pertinent to her
alleged singing career. He also presented two (2) expert witnesses from the field of psychology who testified that the
aberrant behavior of respondent was tantamount to psychological incapacity. In any event, both courts below
considered petitioners evidence as credible enough. Even the appellate court acknowledged that respondent was not
totally honest with petitioner.
80

As in all civil matters, the petitioner in an action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 must be able to establish the
cause of action with a preponderance of evidence. However, since the action cannot be considered as a non-public
matter between private parties, but is impressed with State interest, the Family Code likewise requires the participation
of the State, through the prosecuting attorney, fiscal, or Solicitor General, to take steps to prevent collusion between
the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Thus, even if the petitioner is able establish
the psychological incapacity of respondent with preponderant evidence, any finding of collusion among the parties
would necessarily negate such proofs.
Second. The root cause of respondents psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically identified, alleged in
the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the trial courts decision. The initiatory complaint
alleged that respondent, from the start, had exhibited unusual and abnormal behavior "of peren[n]ially telling lies,
fabricating ridiculous stories, and inventing personalities and situations," of writing letters to petitioner using fictitious
names, and of lying about her actual occupation, income, educational attainment, and family background, among
others.
81

These allegations, initially characterized in generalities, were further linked to medical or clinical causes by expert
witnesses from the field of psychology. Petitioner presented two (2) such witnesses in particular. Dr. Abcede, a
psychiatrist who had headed the department of psychiatry of at least two (2) major hospitals,
82
testified as follows:
WITNESS:
Given that as a fact, which is only based on the affidavit provided to me, I can say that there are a couple of things that
[are] terribly wrong with the standards. There are a couple of things that seems (sic) to be repeated over and over
again in the affidavit. One of which is the persistent, constant and repeated lying of the "respondent"; which, I think,
based on assessment of normal behavior of an individual, is abnormal or pathological. x x x
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that because of these actuations of the respondent she is then incapable of
performing the basic obligations of her marriage?
A- Well, persistent lying violates the respect that one owes towards another. The lack of concern, the lack of love
towards the person, and it is also something that endangers human relationship. You see, relationship is based on
communication between individuals and what we generally communicate are our thoughts and feelings. But then when
one talks and expresse[s] their feelings, [you] are expected to tell the truth. And therefore, if you constantly lie, what do
you think is going to happen as far as this relationship is concerned. Therefore, it undermines that basic relationship
that should be based on love, trust and respect.
Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that due to the behavior of the respondent in constantly lying and fabricating
stories, she is then incapable of performing the basic obligations of the marriage?
x x x
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q- Mr. witness, based on the testimony of Mr. Levy Mendoza, who is the third witness for the petitioner, testified that
the respondent has been calling up the petitioners officemates and ask him (sic) on the activities of the petitioner and
ask him on the behavior of the petitioner. And this is specifically stated on page six (6) of the transcript of stenographic
notes, what can you say about this, Mr. witness?
A- If an individual is jealous enough to the point that he is paranoid, which means that there is no actual basis on her
suspect (sic) that her husband is having an affair with a woman, if carried on to the extreme, then that is pathological.
That is not abnormal. We all feel jealous, in the same way as we also lie every now and then; but everything that is
carried out in extreme is abnormal or pathological. If there is no basis in reality to the fact that the husband is having an
affair with another woman and if she persistently believes that the husband is having an affair with different women,
then that is pathological and we call that paranoid jealousy.
Q- Now, if a person is in paranoid jealousy, would she be considered psychologically incapacitated to perform the
basic obligations of the marriage?
A- Yes, Maam.
83

The other witness, Dr. Lopez, was presented to establish not only the psychological incapacity of respondent, but also
the psychological capacity of petitioner. He concluded that respondent "is [a] pathological liar, that [she continues] to lie
[and] she loves to fabricate about herself."
84

These two witnesses based their conclusions of psychological incapacity on the case record, particularly the trial
transcripts of respondents testimony, as well as the supporting affidavits of petitioner. While these witnesses did not
personally examine respondent, the Court had already held in Marcos v. Marcos
85
that personal examination of the
subject by the physician is not required for the spouse to be declared psychologically incapacitated.
86
We deem the
methodology utilized by petitioners witnesses as sufficient basis for their medical conclusions. Admittedly, Drs. Abcede
and Lopezs common conclusion of respondents psychological incapacity hinged heavily on their own acceptance of
petitioners version as the true set of facts. However, since the trial court itself accepted the veracity of petitioners
factual premises, there is no cause to dispute the conclusion of psychological incapacity drawn therefrom by
petitioners expert witnesses.
Also, with the totality of the evidence presented as basis, the trial court explicated its finding of psychological incapacity
in its decision in this wise:
To the mind of the Court, all of the above are indications that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform
the essential obligations of marriage. It has been shown clearly from her actuations that respondent has that propensity
for telling lies about almost anything, be it her occupation, her state of health, her singing abilities, her income, etc. She
has this fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities. She practically lived in a world of make
believe making her therefore not in a position to give meaning and significance to her marriage to petitioner. In
persistently and constantly lying to petitioner, respondent undermined the basic tenets of relationship between spouses
that is based on love, trust and respect. As concluded by the psychiatrist presented by petitioner, such repeated lying
is abnormal and pathological and amounts to psychological incapacity.
87

Third. Respondents psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the time of and even before
the celebration of marriage. She fabricated friends and made up letters from fictitious characters well before she
married petitioner. Likewise, she kept petitioner in the dark about her natural childs real parentage as she only
confessed when the latter had found out the truth after their marriage.
Fourth. The gravity of respondents psychological incapacity is sufficient to prove her disability to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. It is immediately discernible that the parties had shared only a little over a year of cohabitation
before the exasperated petitioner left his wife. Whatever such circumstance speaks of the degree of tolerance of
petitioner, it likewise supports the belief that respondents psychological incapacity, as borne by the record, was so
grave in extent that any prolonged marital life was dubitable.
It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not adopted as false pretenses in order to induce
petitioner into marriage. More disturbingly, they indicate a failure on the part of respondent to distinguish truth from
fiction, or at least abide by the truth. Petitioners witnesses and the trial court were emphatic on respondents inveterate
proclivity to telling lies and the pathologic nature of her mistruths, which according to them, were revelatory of
respondents inability to understand and perform the essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, a person unable to
distinguish between fantasy and reality would similarly be unable to comprehend the legal nature of the marital bond,
much less its psychic meaning, and the corresponding obligations attached to marriage, including parenting. One
unable to adhere to reality cannot be expected to adhere as well to any legal or emotional commitments.
The Court of Appeals somehow concluded that since respondent allegedly tried her best to effect a reconciliation, she
had amply exhibited her ability to perform her marital obligations. We are not convinced. Given the nature of her
psychological condition, her willingness to remain in the marriage hardly banishes nay extenuates her lack of capacity
to fulfill the essential marital obligations. Respondents ability to even comprehend what the essential marital
obligations are is impaired at best. Considering that the evidence convincingly disputes respondents ability to adhere
to the truth, her avowals as to her commitment to the marriage cannot be accorded much credence.
At this point, it is worth considering Article 45(3) of the Family Code which states that a marriage may be annulled if the
consent of either party was obtained by fraud, and Article 46 which enumerates the circumstances constituting fraud
under the previous article, clarifies that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or
chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage." It would be improper
to draw linkages between misrepresentations made by respondent and the misrepresentations under Articles 45 (3)
and 46. The fraud under Article 45(3) vitiates the consent of the spouse who is lied to, and does not allude to vitiated
consent of the lying spouse. In this case, the misrepresentations of respondent point to her own inadequacy to cope
with her marital obligations, kindred to psychological incapacity under Article 36.
Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations as embraced by Articles 68 to 71
of the Family Code. Article 68, in particular, enjoins the spouses to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity, and render mutual help and support. As noted by the trial court, it is difficult to see how an inveterate
pathological liar would be able to commit to the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and
respect.
Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact that the marriage of the
parties was annulled by the Catholic Church. The appellate court apparently deemed this detail totally inconsequential
as no reference was made to it anywhere in the assailed decision despite petitioners efforts to bring the matter to its
attention.
88
Such deliberate ignorance is in contravention of Molina, which held that interpretations given by the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts.
As noted earlier, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila decreed the invalidity of the marriage in
question in a Conclusion
89
dated 30 March 1995, citing the "lack of due discretion" on the part of respondent.
90
Such
decree of nullity was affirmed by both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal,
91
and the Roman Rota of the
Vatican.
92
In fact, respondents psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive clause
93
was
appended to the sentence of nullity prohibiting respondent from contracting another marriage without the Tribunals
consent.
In its Decision dated 4 June 1995, the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal pronounced:
The JURISRPRUDENCE in the Case maintains that matrimonial consent is considered ontologically defective and
wherefore judicially ineffective when elicited by a Part Contractant in possession and employ of a discretionary
judgment faculty with a perceptive vigor markedly inadequate for the practical understanding of the conjugal Covenant
or serious impaired from the correct appreciation of the integral significance and implications of the marriage vows.
The FACTS in the Case sufficiently prove with the certitude required by law that based on the depositions of the Partes
in Causa and premised on the testimonies of the Common and Expert Witnesse[s], the Respondent made the
marriage option in tenure of adverse personality constracts that were markedly antithetical to the substantive
content and implications of the Marriage Covenant, and that seriously undermined the integrality of her
matrimonial consent in terms of its deliberative component. In other words, afflicted with a discretionary
faculty impaired in its practico-concrete judgment formation on account of an adverse action and reaction
pattern, the Respondent was impaired from eliciting a judicially binding matrimonial consent. There is no
sufficient evidence in the Case however to prove as well the fact of grave lack of due discretion on the part of the
Petitioner.
94

Evidently, the conclusion of psychological incapacity was arrived at not only by the trial court, but also by canonical
bodies. Yet, we must clarify the proper import of the Church rulings annulling the marriage in this case. They hold sway
since they are drawn from a similar recognition, as the trial court, of the veracity of petitioners allegations. Had the trial
court instead appreciated respondents version as correct, and the appellate court affirmed such conclusion, the rulings
of the Catholic Church on this matter would have diminished persuasive value. After all, it is the factual findings of the
judicial trier of facts, and not that of the canonical courts, that are accorded significant recognition by this Court.
Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement in Molina that such psychological incapacity be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It was on this score that the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of
the trial court, the appellate court noting that it did not appear certain that respondents condition was incurable and
that Dr. Abcede did not testify to such effect.
95

Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife initially separated, he returned to her, desiring to make their
marriage work. However, respondents aberrant behavior remained unchanged, as she continued to lie, fabricate
stories, and maintained her excessive jealousy. From this fact, he draws the conclusion that respondents condition is
incurable.
From the totality of the evidence, can it be definitively concluded that respondents condition is incurable? It would
seem, at least, that respondents psychosis is quite grave, and a cure thereof a remarkable feat. Certainly, it would
have been easier had petitioners expert witnesses characterized respondents condition as incurable. Instead, they
remained silent on whether the psychological incapacity was curable or incurable.
But on careful examination, there was good reason for the experts taciturnity on this point.
The petitioners expert witnesses testified in 1994 and 1995, and the trial court rendered its decision on 10 August
1995. These events transpired well before Molina was promulgated in 1997 and made explicit the requirement that the
psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such requirement was not
expressly stated in Article 36 or any other provision of the Family Code.
On the other hand, the Court in Santos, which was decided in January 1995, began its discussion by first citing the
deliberations of the Family Code committee,
96
then the opinion of canonical scholars,
97
before arriving at its formulation
of the doctrinal definition of psychological incapacity.
98
Santos did refer to Justice Caguioas opinion expressed during
the deliberations that "psychological incapacity is incurable,"
99
and the view of a former presiding judge of the
Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila that psychological incapacity must be characterized "by
(a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."
100
However, in formulating the doctrinal rule on psychological
incapacity, the Court in Santos omitted any reference to incurability as a characteristic of psychological incapacity.
101

This disquisition is material as Santos was decided months before the trial court came out with its own ruling that
remained silent on whether respondents psychological incapacity was incurable. Certainly, Santos did not clearly
mandate that the incurability of the psychological incapacity be established in an action for declaration of nullity. At
least, there was no jurisprudential clarity at the time of the trial of this case and the subsequent promulgation of the trial
courts decision that required a medical finding of incurability. Such requisite arose only with Molina in 1997, at a time
when this case was on appellate review, or after the reception of evidence.
We are aware that in Pesca v. Pesca,
102
the Court countered an argument that Molina and Santos should not apply
retroactively
with the observation that the interpretation or construction placed by the courts of a law constitutes a part of that law as
of the date the statute in enacted.
103
Yet we approach this present case from utterly practical considerations. The
requirement that psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable is one
that necessarily cannot be divined without expert opinion. Clearly in this case, there was no categorical averment from
the expert witnesses that respondents psychological incapacity was curable or incurable simply because there was no
legal necessity yet to elicit such a declaration and the appropriate question was not accordingly propounded to him. If
we apply Pesca without deep reflection, there would be undue prejudice to those cases tried before Molina or Santos,
especially those presently on appellate review, where presumably the respective petitioners and their expert witnesses
would not have seen the need to adduce a diagnosis of incurability. It may hold in those cases, as in this case, that the
psychological incapacity of a spouse is actually incurable, even if not pronounced as such at the trial court level.
We stated earlier that Molina is not set in stone, and that the interpretation of Article 36 relies heavily on a case-to-case
perception. It would be insensate to reason to mandate in this case an expert medical or clinical diagnosis of
incurability, since the parties would have had no impelling cause to present evidence to that effect at the time this case
was tried by the RTC more than ten (10) years ago. From the totality of the evidence, we are sufficiently convinced that
the incurability of respondents psychological incapacity has been established by the petitioner. Any lingering doubts
are further dispelled by the fact that the Catholic Church tribunals, which indubitably consider incurability as an integral
requisite of psychological incapacity, were sufficiently convinced that respondent was so incapacitated to contract
marriage to the degree that annulment was warranted.
All told, we conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the
Family Code. The RTC correctly ruled, and the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court.
There is little relish in deciding this present petition, pronouncing as it does the marital bond as having been inexistent
in the first place. It is possible that respondent, despite her psychological state, remains in love with petitioner, as
exhibited by her persistent challenge to the petition for nullity. In fact, the appellate court placed undue emphasis on
respondents avowed commitment to remain in the marriage. Yet the Court decides these cases on legal reasons and
not vapid sentimentality. Marriage, in legal contemplation, is more than the legitimatization of a desire of people in love
to live together.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the RTC dated 10 August 1995, declaring the marriage
between petitioner and respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the Family Code, is REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairman
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Asscociate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairman, Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Attestation by the Divisions Chairman, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

Footnotes
1
Penned by Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes, concurred in by Associate Justices Renato C. Dacudao and
Mariano C. Del Castillo; See rollo, pp. 67-84.
2
Rollo, p. 86.
3
Penned by Judge (now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals) Josefina Guevara-Salonga.
4
Solemnized by Rev. Victor M. Navarro, Minister of the PCCC, Las Pias, Metro Manila.
5
Solemnized by the Parish Priest, Rev. Fr. Rodolfo Aguirre Gallardo.
6
Rollo, pp. 69, 91.
7
Records, pp. 1-5.
8
Id. at 1-2.
9
Id. at 2-3. See also rollo, pp. 69, 91.
10
Named Tito F. Reyes II, born on 21 January 1982.
11
Supra note 8.
12
Rollo, pp. 69, 92.
13
Id. at 70, 92.
14
Id. at 95.
15
Supra note 13.
16
Id. at 70, 92.
17
TSN, 8 September 1993, p. 12.
18
Id. at 12-13. See also records, p. 91.
19
Rollo, pp. 71, 92.
20
Id.; records, p. 3.
21
Rollo, pp. 71, 92.
22
Id. at 71-72, 92-93.
23
Id.
24
Id. at 93.
25
Id. at 74, 94.
26
Id.
27
Id. at 73, 93.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id. at 74, 94.
31
Id. at 73, 94.
32
Id. at 77-78.
33
Miss Francianina Sanches.
34
Rollo, p. 94.
35
Id. at 72, 93; TSN, 23 March 1995, pp. 15-17.
36
Rollo, pp. 95-96.
37
Id. at 97-98.
38
Id. at pp. 99-100.
39
Id. at 101-103.
40
335 Phil. 664 (1997).
41
Rollo, p. 95.
42
Limketkai Sons Milling, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 321 Phil. 105, 126 (1995), citing Serrano v. Court of
Appeals, 196 SCRA 107 (1991).
43
Rollo, p. 82.
44
Supra note 40.
45
The petitioning spouse and co-respondent in the case being Roridel O. Molina. Id.
46
Rollo, p. 78.
47
There were two cases since 1997 wherein the Court did let stand a lower court order declaring as a nullity
a marriage on the basis of Article 36. These cases are Sy v. Court of Appeals, 386 Phil. 760 (2000), and
Buenaventura v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 127358 & 127449, 31 March 2005, 454 SCRA 261. However,
in Sy, the Court found that the marriage was void ab initio due to the lack of a marriage license at the time
the marriage was solemnized, and thus declined to pass upon the question of psychological incapacity.
In Buenaventura, since the parties chose not to challenge the trial courts conclusion of psychological
incapacity and instead raised questions on the award of damages and support, the Court did not review the
finding of psychological incapacity.
48
334 Phil. 294 (1997).
49
It does not escape this Courts attention that many lower courts do grant petitions for declaration of nullity
under Article 36, and that these decisions are not elevated for review to the Supreme Court.
50
See Family Code, Art. 36.
51
Translated from the original Spanish by Justice F.C. Fisher. See F.C. Fisher, The Civil Code of Spain with
Philippine Notes and References 45 (Fifth Ed., 1947). The original text of Article 83 (2) of the Spanish Civil
Code reads: "No pueden contraer matrimonio: x x x (2) Los que no estuvieren en el pleno ejercicio du su
razon al tiempo de contraer matrimonio."
52
See Spanish Civil Code. (1889) Art. 101.
53
Act No. 2710 (1917).
54
See Act No. 3613 (1929), Sec. 30 (c)
55
See Executive Order No. 141 (1943), Sec. 2 (5).
56
Unless the party of unsound mind, after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband or
wife. See Civil Code, Art. 85 (3).
57
See Civil Code, Art. 80.
58
Subject to the same qualifications under Article 85 (3) of the Civil Code. See note 56.
59
See Civil Code, Art. 1327 (2) in relation to Art. 1318 (1).
60
See Santos v. Court of Appeals, 310 Phil. 21, 32-33 (1995). See also A. Sempio Diy, Handbook on the
Family Code of the Philippines 37 (1988). A contrary view though was expressed by Justice Ricardo Puno,
also a member of the Family Code commission. See Santos v. Court of Appeals, ibid.
61
I A. Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines: Commentaries and Jurisprudence 274-275 (1990 ed.).
62
Id.
63
Id. at 274.
64
Supra note 60.
65
Id. at 40, emphasis supplied. The Court further added, "[t]here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of
the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to marriage." Id.
66
Supra note 40.
67
Id. at 677.
68
Marcos v. Marcos, 397 Phil. 840, 851 (2000).
69
It may be noted that a previous incarnation of Article 36, subsequently rejected by the Family Code
Commission, stated that among those void ab initio marriages are those "contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential
nature of marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital
obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration." See Santos v. Court of
Appeals, supra note 60, at 30.
70
Salita v. Magtolis, G.R. No. 106429, 13 June 1994, 233 SCRA 100, 107-108; citing A. Sempio-Diy, supra
note 60, at 37, emphasis supplied. See also Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra note 60, at 36; Republic v.
Court of Appeals, supra note 40, at 677.
71
G.R. No. 109975, 9 February 2001, 351 SCRA 425.
72
Id. at 431; citing Republic v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 198, 214 (1997), Padilla, J., Separate Statement.
73
See Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra note 60, at 32-39.
74
See Sempio-Diy, supra note 60, at 36.
75
Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra note 40, at 678.
76
Thus, Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, supra note 48, wherein the psychological incapacity of the
petitioner was recognized by the Court from the fact that he did not engage in sexual relations with his wife
during their ten (10) month marital cohabitation, remains a binding precedent, even though it was decided
shortly before the Molina case.
77
Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra note 40, at 676-680.
78
Id. at 680.
79
See Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco, G.R. No. 158896, 27 October 2004, 441 SCRA 422, 435.
80
Rollo, p. 82.
81
Records, pp. 2-3.
82
University of Santo Tomas Hospital and UERM Memorial Medical Center. Dr. Abcede likewise was the
past president of the Philippine Psychiatrist Association. TSN, February 23, 1994, p. 6.
83
TSN, 23 February 1994, pp. 7-9, 11-12.
84
TSN, 23 March 1995, p. 12.
85
397 Phil. 840 (2000).
86
Id. at 850.
87
Rollo, pp. 95-96.
88
As shown by the Motion(s) for Early Resolution of the Case filed by petitioner with the canonical
declarations attached as annexes.
89
Id. at 97-98.
90
The Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila based the decree of invalidity on the ground of lack
of due discretion on the part of both parties. On appeal, however, the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
modified the judgment by holding that lack of due discretion applied to respondent but there was no sufficient
evidence to prove lack of due discretion on the part of petitioner. See also note 38.
91
Rollo, pp. 99-100.
92
Id. at 101-103.
93
"A restrictive clause is herewith attached to this sentence of nullity to the effect that the respondent may
not enter into another marriage without the express consent of this Tribunal, in deference to the sanctity and
dignity of the sacrament of matrimony, as well as for the protection of the intended spouse."; rollo, p. 97.
94
Rollo, p. 99. Emphasis supplied, citations omitted.
95
Rollo, p. 82.
96
Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra note 60, at 30-36.
97
Id. at 37-39.
98
Id. at 39-40.
99
Id. at 33.
100
Id. at 39.
101
"It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the
deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase "psychological
incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of
psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity,
and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's "Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and
their Parallels in Canon Law," quoting from the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the
American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's "Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases"). Article 36 of
the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of but must stand in conjunction with, existing
precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by
Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This
psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision,
upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is
implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial
declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."
"The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party
being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or
lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If
drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the
marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code.
These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various
circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of
psychological incapacity.
"Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance that may
have some bearing on the degree, extent, and other conditions of that incapacity must, in every
case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is
peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons
with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable." Santos v. Court of
Appeals, id. at 39-41.
102
G.R. No. 136921, 17 April 2001, 356 SCRA 588.
103
Id. at 593.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation


Characteristics of Marriage, pp222
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995
LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS, respondents.

VITUG, J.:
Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most likely, controversial provision introduced by the Family Code is Article 36
(as amended by E.O. No. 227 dated 17 July 1987), which declares:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
The present petition for review on certiorari, at the instance of Leouel Santos ("Leouel"), brings into fore the
above provision which is now invoked by him. Undaunted by the decisions of the court a quo
1
and the Court
of Appeal,
2
Leouel persists in beseeching its application in his attempt to have his marriage with herein
private respondent, Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos ("Julia"), declared a nullity.
It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank of First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, first met Julia. The
meeting later proved to be an eventful day for Leouel and Julia. On 20 September 1986, the two exchanged vows
before Municipal Trial Court Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed, shortly thereafter, by a church wedding.
Leouel and Julia lived with the latter's parents at the J. Bedia Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July 1987, Julia
gave birth to a baby boy, and he was christened Leouel Santos, Jr. The ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was
bound to happen, Leouel averred, because of the frequent interference by Julia's parents into the young spouses
family affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start a "quarrel" over a number of other things, like when and where
the couple should start living independently from Julia's parents or whenever Julia would express resentment on
Leouel's spending a few days with his own parents.
On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to work as a nurse despite Leouel's pleas to so
dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, or on 01 January 1989, Julia called up Leouel for the first time by long
distance telephone. She promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never did.
When Leouel got a chance to visit the United States, where he underwent a training program under the auspices of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines from 01 April up to 25 August 1990, he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get
in touch with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.
Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed with the regional trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch
30, a complaint for "Voiding of marriage Under Article 36 of the Family Code" (docketed, Civil Case No. 9814).
Summons was served by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in Negros Oriental.
On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer (through counsel), opposed the complaint and denied its allegations,
claiming, in main, that it was the petitioner who had, in fact, been irresponsible and incompetent.
A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of nullity of their marriage was ruled out by the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor (in its report to the court).
On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had repeatedly been set, albeit unsuccessfully, by the court, Julia
ultimately filed a manifestation, stating that she would neither appear nor submit evidence.
On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.
3

Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeal. The latter affirmed the decision of the trial court.
4

The petition should be denied not only because of its non-compliance with Circular 28-91, which requires a certification
of non-shopping, but also for its lack of merit.
Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate with him, for more than five
years are circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life. In his own
words, Leouel asserts:
. . . (T)here is no leave, there is no affection for (him) because respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-
Santos failed all these years to communicate with the petitioner. A wife who does not care to inform
her husband about her whereabouts for a period of five years, more or less, is psychologically
incapacitated.
The family Code did not define the term "psychological incapacity." The deliberations during the sessions of the Family
Code Revision Committee, which has drafted the Code, can, however, provide an insight on the import of the
provision.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 36. . . .
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the
sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if
such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.
On subparagraph (7), which as lifted from the Canon Law, Justice (Jose B.L.) Reyes suggested
that they say "wanting in sufficient use," but Justice (Eduardo) Caguioa preferred to say "wanting in
the sufficient use." On the other hand, Justice Reyes proposed that they say "wanting in sufficient
reason." Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that the idea is that one is not lacking in judgment
but that he is lacking in the exercise of judgment. He added that lack of judgment would make the
marriage voidable. Judge (Alicia Sempio-) Diy remarked that lack of judgment is more serious than
insufficient use of judgment and yet the latter would make the marriage null and void and the
former only voidable. Justice Caguioa suggested that subparagraph (7) be modified to read:
"That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations,
even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration."
Justice Caguioa explained that the phrase "was wanting in sufficient use of reason of judgment to
understand the essential nature of marriage" refers to defects in the mental faculties vitiating
consent, which is not the idea in subparagraph (7), but lack of appreciation of one's marital
obligations.
Judge Diy raised the question: Since "insanity" is also a psychological or mental incapacity, why is
"insanity" only a ground for annulment and not for declaration or nullity? In reply, Justice Caguioa
explained that in insanity, there is the appearance of consent, which is the reason why it is a
ground for voidable marriages, while subparagraph (7) does not refer to consent but to the very
essence of marital obligations.
Prof. (Araceli) Baviera suggested that, in subparagraph (7), the word "mentally" be deleted, with
which Justice Caguioa concurred. Judge Diy, however, prefers to retain the word "mentally."
Justice Caguioa remarked that subparagraph (7) refers to psychological impotence. Justice
(Ricardo) Puno stated that sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent with one but not
with another. Justice (Leonor Ines-) Luciano said that it is called selective impotency.
Dean (Fortunato) Gupit stated that the confusion lies in the fact that in inserting the Canon Law
annulment in the Family Code, the Committee used a language which describes a ground for
voidable marriages under the Civil Code. Justice Caguioa added that in Canon Law, there are
voidable marriages under the Canon Law, there are no voidable marriages Dean Gupit said that
this is precisely the reason why they should make a distinction.
Justice Puno remarked that in Canon Law, the defects in marriage cannot be cured.
Justice Reyes pointed out that the problem is: Why is "insanity" a ground for void ab
initio marriages? In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that insanity is curable and there are lucid
intervals, while psychological incapacity is not.
On another point, Justice Puno suggested that the phrase "even if such lack or incapacity is made
manifest" be modified to read "even if such lack or incapacity becomes manifest."
Justice Reyes remarked that in insanity, at the time of the marriage, it is not apparent.
Justice Caguioa stated that there are two interpretations of the phrase "psychological or mentally
incapacitated" in the first one, there is vitiation of consent because one does not know all the
consequences of the marriages, and if he had known these completely, he might not have
consented to the marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
Prof. Bautista stated that he is in favor of making psychological incapacity a ground for voidable
marriages since otherwise it will encourage one who really understood the consequences of
marriage to claim that he did not and to make excuses for invalidating the marriage by acting as if
he did not understand the obligations of marriage. Dean Gupit added that it is a loose way of
providing for divorce.
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Caguioa explained that his point is that in the case of incapacity by reason of defects in the
mental faculties, which is less than insanity, there is a defect in consent and, therefore, it is clear
that it should be a ground for voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it
is capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there are cases
when the insanity is curable. He emphasized that psychological incapacity does not refer to mental
faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
On psychological incapacity, Prof. (Flerida Ruth P.) Romero inquired if they do not consider it as
going to the very essence of consent. She asked if they are really removing it from consent. In
reply, Justice Caguioa explained that, ultimately, consent in general is effected but he stressed that
his point is that it is not principally a vitiation of consent since there is a valid consent. He objected
to the lumping together of the validity of the marriage celebration and the obligations attendant to
marriage, which are completely different from each other, because they require a different capacity,
which is eighteen years of age, for marriage but in contract, it is different. Justice Puno, however,
felt that psychological incapacity is still a kind of vice of consent and that it should not be classified
as a voidable marriage which is incapable of convalidation; it should be convalidated but there
should be no prescription. In other words, as long as the defect has not been cured, there is always
a right to annul the marriage and if the defect has been really cured, it should be a defense in the
action for annulment so that when the action for annulment is instituted, the issue can be raised
that actually, although one might have been psychologically incapacitated, at the time the action is
brought, it is no longer true that he has no concept of the consequence of marriage.
Prof. (Esteban) Bautista raised the question: Will not cohabitation be a defense? In response,
Justice Puno stated that even the bearing of children and cohabitation should not be a sign that
psychological incapacity has been cured.
Prof. Romero opined that psychological incapacity is still insanity of a lesser degree. Justice
Luciano suggested that they invite a psychiatrist, who is the expert on this matter. Justice Caguioa,
however, reiterated that psychological incapacity is not a defect in the mind but in the
understanding of the consequences of marriage, and therefore, a psychiatrist will not be a help.
Prof. Bautista stated that, in the same manner that there is a lucid interval in insanity, there are
also momentary periods when there is an understanding of the consequences of marriage. Justice
Reyes and Dean Gupit remarked that the ground of psychological incapacity will not apply if the
marriage was contracted at the time when there is understanding of the consequences of
marriage.
5

xxx xxx xxx
Judge Diy proposed that they include physical incapacity to copulate among the grounds for void
marriages. Justice Reyes commented that in some instances the impotence that in some instances
the impotence is only temporary and only with respect to a particular person. Judge Diy stated that
they can specify that it is incurable. Justice Caguioa remarked that the term "incurable" has a
different meaning in law and in medicine. Judge Diy stated that "psychological incapacity" can also
be cured. Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that "psychological incapacity" is incurable.
Justice Puno observed that under the present draft provision, it is enough to show that at the time
of the celebration of the marriage, one was psychologically incapacitated so that later on if already
he can comply with the essential marital obligations, the marriage is still void ab initio. Justice
Caguioa explained that since in divorce, the psychological incapacity may occur after the marriage,
in void marriages, it has to be at the time of the celebration of marriage. He, however, stressed that
the idea in the provision is that at the time of the celebration of the marriage, one is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations, which incapacity continues and later
becomes manifest.
Justice Puno and Judge Diy, however, pointed out that it is possible that after the marriage, one's
psychological incapacity become manifest but later on he is cured. Justice Reyes and Justice
Caguioa opined that the remedy in this case is to allow him to remarry.
6

xxx xxx xxx
Justice Puno formulated the next Article as follows:
Art. 37. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated, to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage shall likewise be void from the beginning even if such incapacity
becomes manifest after its solemnization.
Justice Caguioa suggested that "even if" be substituted with "although." On the other hand, Prof.
Bautista proposed that the clause "although such incapacity becomes manifest after its
solemnization" be deleted since it may encourage one to create the manifestation of psychological
incapacity. Justice Caguioa pointed out that, as in other provisions, they cannot argue on the basis
of abuse.
Judge Diy suggested that they also include mental and physical incapacities, which are lesser in
degree than psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa explained that mental and physical
incapacities are vices of consent while psychological incapacity is not a species of vice or consent.
Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said on the matter in the minutes of their February 9, 1984
meeting:
"On the third ground, Bishop Cruz indicated that the phrase "psychological or
mental impotence" is an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but
not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase. He said that the
Code of Canon Law would rather express it as "psychological or mental
incapacity to discharge . . ."
Justice Caguioa remarked that they deleted the word "mental" precisely to distinguish it from vice
of consent. He explained that "psychological incapacity" refers to lack of understanding of the
essential obligations of marriage.
Justice Puno reminded the members that, at the last meeting, they have decided not to go into the
classification of "psychological incapacity" because there was a lot of debate on it and that this is
precisely the reason why they classified it as a special case.
At this point, Justice Puno, remarked that, since there having been annulments of marriages
arising from psychological incapacity, Civil Law should not reconcile with Canon Law because it is
a new ground even under Canon Law.
Prof. Romero raised the question: With this common provision in Civil Law and in Canon Law, are
they going to have a provision in the Family Code to the effect that marriages annulled or declared
void by the church on the ground of psychological incapacity is automatically annulled in Civil Law?
The other members replied negatively.
Justice Puno and Prof. Romero inquired if Article 37 should be retroactive or prospective in
application.
Justice Diy opined that she was for its retroactivity because it is their answer to the problem of
church annulments of marriages, which are still valid under the Civil Law. On the other hand,
Justice Reyes and Justice Puno were concerned about the avalanche of cases.
Dean Gupit suggested that they put the issue to a vote, which the Committee approved.
The members voted as follows:
(1) Justice Reyes, Justice Puno and Prof. Romero were for prospectivity.
(2) Justice Caguioa, Judge Diy, Dean Gupit, Prof. Bautista and Director Eufemio were for
retroactivity.
(3) Prof. Baviera abstained.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they put in the prescriptive period of ten years within which the
action for declaration of nullity of the marriage should be filed in court. The Committee approved
the suggestion.
7

It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision Committee in ultimately deciding to adopt the provision with less
specificity than expected, has in fact, so designed the law as to allow some resiliency in its application. Mme. Justice
Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a member of the Code Committee, has been quoted by Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo in Salita
vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429, 13 June 1994); thus:
8

The Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that the giving of
examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis.
Rather, the Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis,
guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given
persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law.
A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law,
9
which reads:
Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning essentila matrimonial rights
and duties, to be given and accepted mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. (Emphasis supplied.)
Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all that persuasive for having no juridical or secular effect, the
jurisprudence under Canon Law prevailing at the time of the code's enactment, nevertheless, cannot be dismissed as
impertinent for its value as an aid, at least, to the interpretation or construction of the codal provision.
One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his treaties,
10
giving an account on how the third paragraph of Canon 1095 has
been framed, states:
The history of the drafting of this canon does not leave any doubt that the legislator intended,
indeed, to broaden the rule. A strict and narrow norm was proposed first:
Those who cannot assume the essential obligations of marriage because of a
grave psycho-sexual anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam psychosexualem) are
unable to contract marriage (cf. SCH/1975, canon 297, a new canon, novus);
then a broader one followed:
. . . because of a grave psychological anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam psychicam) . . .
(cf. SCH/1980, canon 1049);
then the same wording was retained in the text submitted to the pope (cf. SCH/1982, canon 1095,
3);
finally, a new version was promulgated:
because of causes of a psychological nature (ob causas naturae psychiae).
So the progress was from psycho-sexual to psychological anomaly, then the term anomaly was
altogether eliminated. it would be, however, incorrect to draw the conclusion that the cause of the
incapacity need not be some kind of psychological disorder; after all, normal and healthy person
should be able to assume the ordinary obligations of marriage.
Fr. Orsy concedes that the term "psychological incapacity" defies any precise definition since psychological causes can
be of an infinite variety.
In a book, entitled "Canons and Commentaries on Marriage," written by Ignatius Gramunt, Javier Hervada and LeRoy
Wauck, the following explanation appears:
This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of
marriage. Some psychosexual disorders and other disorders of personality can be the psychic
cause of this defect, which is here described in legal terms. This particular type of incapacity
consists of a real inability to render what is due by the contract. This could be compared to the
incapacity of a farmer to enter a binding contract to deliver the crops which he cannot possibly
reap; (b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the
conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and
education of offspring; (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. The
mere difficulty of assuming these obligations, which could be overcome by normal effort, obviously
does not constitute incapacity. The canon contemplates a true psychological disorder which
incapacitates a person from giving what is due (cf. John Paul II, Address to R. Rota, Feb. 5, 1987).
However, if the marriage is to be declared invalid under this incapacity, it must be proved not only
that the person is afflicted by a psychological defect, but that the defect did in fact deprive the
person, at the moment of giving consent, of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage
and consequently of the possibility of being bound by these duties.
Justice Sempio-Diy
11
cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan
Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch 1), who opines that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious
such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the
history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage;
and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the deliberations of the
Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the
Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some
ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's
"Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law," quoting from the Diagnostic
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's "Handbook II for
Marriage Nullity Cases"). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must
stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity" should
refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed
by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
intensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This pschologic condition must exist at the
time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to
have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers
children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind or
concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage
contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcholism, lesbianism or
homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55
of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various
circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological
incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance that may have some bearing
on the degree, extent, and other conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and evaluated
so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists,
psychologists, and persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.
Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We should continue to be reminded that innate in our society,
then enshrined in our Civil Code, and even now still indelible in Article 1 of the Family Code, is that
Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the
family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed
by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property
relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code. (Emphasis supplied.)
Our Constitution is no less emphatic:
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall
strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State. (Article XV, 1987 Constitution).
The above provisions express so well and so distinctly the basic nucleus of our laws on marriage and the family, and
they are doubt the tenets we still hold on to.
The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close to the standards required to decree a
nullity of marriage. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation.
Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers to every individual problem.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ.,
concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.


Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., dissenting:
It is difficult to dissent from a well-written and studied opinion as Mr. Justice Vitug's ponencia. But, after an extended
reflection on the facts of this case, I cannot see my way clear into holding, as the majority do, that there is no ground
for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner and private respondent.
To my mind, it is clear that private respondent has been shown to be psychologically incapacitated to comply with at
least one essential marital obligation, i.e. that of living and cohabiting with her husband, herein petitioner. On the other
hand, it has not been shown that petitioner does not deserve to live and cohabit with his wife, herein private
respondent.
There appears to be no disagreement that the term "psychological incapacity" defies precision in definition. But, as
used in Article 36 of the Family Code as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage, the intent of the framers of
the Code is evidently to expand and liberalize the grounds for nullifying a marriage, as well pointed out by Madam
Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero in her separate opinion in this case.
While it is true that the board term "psychological incapacity" can open the doors to abuse by couples who may wish to
have an easy way out of their marriage, there are, however, enough safeguards against this contingency, among
which, is the intervention by the State, through the public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the parties
and/or fabrication of evidence.
In their case at bench, it has been abundantly established that private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos exhibits
specific behavior which, to my mind, shows that she is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her essential marital
obligations, to writ:
a. It took her seven (7) months after she left for the United States to call up her husband.
b. Julia promised to return home after her job contract expired in July 1989, but she never did and
neither is there any showing that she informed her husband (herein petitioner) of her whereabouts
in the U.S.A.
c. When petitioner went to the United States on a mission for the Philippine Army, he exerted
efforts to "touch base" with Julia; there were no similar efforts on the part of Julia; there were no
similar efforts on the part of Julia to do the same.
d. When petitioner filed this suit, more than five (5) years had elapsed, without Julia indicating her
plans to rejoin the petitioner or her whereabouts.
e. When petitioner filed this case in the trial court, Julia, in her answer, claimed that it is the former
who has been irresponsible and incompetent.
f. During the trial, Julia waived her right to appear and submit evidence.
A spouse's obligation to live and cohabit with his/her partner in marriage is a basic ground rule in marriage, unless
there are overpowering compelling reasons such as, for instance, an incurable contagious disease on the part of a
spouse or cruelty of one partner, bordering on insanity. There may also be instances when, for economic and practical
reasons, husband and wife have to live separately, but the marital bond between the spouses always remains. Mutual
love and respect for each other would, in such cases, compel the absent spouse to at least have regular contracts with
the other to inform the latter of his/her condition and whereabouts.
In the present case, it is apparent that private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos has no intention of cohabiting
with petitioner, her husband, or maintaining contact with him. In fact, her acts eloquently show that she does not want
her husband to know of her whereabouts and neither has she any intention of living and cohabiting with him.
To me there appears to be, on the part of private respondent, an unmistakeable indication of psychological incapacity
to comply with her essential marital obligations, although these indications were made manifest after the celebration of
the marriage.
It would be a great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this Court to give a much too restrictive interpretation of the law
and compel the petitioner to continue to be married to a wife who for purposes of fulfilling her marital duties has, for all
practical purposes, ceased to exist.
Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in the ruling the Court makes today. Is it not, in effect directly
or indirectly, facilitating the transformation of petitioner into a "habitual tryster" or one forced to maintain illicit relations
with another woman or women with emerging problems of illegitimate children, simply because he is denied by private
respondent, his wife, the companionship and conjugal love which he has sought from her and to which he is legally
entitled?
I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family Code is a sanction for absolute divorce but I submit that we
should not constrict it to non-recognition of its evident purpose and thus deny to one like petitioner, an opportunity to
turn a new leaf in his life by declaring his marriage a nullity by reason of his wife's psychological incapacity to perform
an essential marital obligation.
I therefore vote to GRANT the petition and to DECLARE the marriage between petitioner Leouel Santos and private
respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos VOID on the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code.
ROMERO, J., concurring:
I agree under the circumstances of the case, petitioner is not entitled to have his marriage declared a nullity on the
ground of psychological incapacity of private respondent.
However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
Civil Code Revision Committee of the UP Law Center, I wish to add some observations. The letter
1
dated April 15,
1985 of then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in behalf of the Family Law and Civil Code Revision Committee to then
Assemblywoman Mercedes Cojuangco-Teodoro traced the background of the inclusion of the present Article 36 in the
Family Code.
During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had thought of including a chapter on
absolute divorce in the draft of a new Family Code (Book I of the Civil Code) that it had been
tasked by the IBP and the UP Law Center to prepare. In fact, some members of the Committee
were in favor of a no-fault divorce between the spouses after a number of years of separation, legal
or de-facto. Justice J.B.L. Reyes was then requested to prepare a proposal for an action for
dissolution of marriage and the effects thereof based on two grounds: (a) five continuous years of
separation between the spouses, with or without a judicial decree of legal separation, and (b)
whenever a married person would have obtained a decree of absolute divorce in another country.
Actually, such a proposal is one for absolute divorce but called by another name. Later, even the
Civil Code Revision Committee took time to discuss the proposal of Justice Reyes on this matter.
Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision Committee and Family Law Committee
started holding joint meetings on the preparation of the draft of the New Family Code, they agreed
and formulated the definition of marriage as
"a special contract of permanent partnership between a man and a woman
entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and
family life. It is an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and
incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that
marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within
the limits provided by law."
With the above definition, and considering the Christian traditional concept of marriage of the
Filipino people as a permanent, inviolable, indissoluble social institution upon which the family and
society are founded, and also realizing the strong opposition that any provision on absolute divorce
would encounter from the Catholic Church and the Catholic sector of our citizenry to whom the
great majority of our people belong, the two Committees in their joint meetings did not pursue the
idea of absolute divorce and instead opted for an action for judicial declaration of invalidity of
marriage based on grounds available in the Canon Law. It was thought that such an action would
not only be an acceptable alternative to divorce but would also solve the nagging problem of
church annulments of marriages on grounds not recognized by the civil law of the State. Justice
Reyes was thus requested to again prepare a draft of provisions on such action for celebration of
invalidity of marriage. Still later, to avoid the overlapping of provisions on void marriages as found
in the present Civil Code and those proposed by Justice Reyes on judicial declaration of invalidity
of marriage on grounds similar to the Canon Law, the two Committees now working as a Joint
Committee in the preparation of a New Family Code decided to consolidate the present provisions
on void marriages with the proposals of Justice Reyes. The result was the inclusion of an additional
kind of void marriage in the enumeration of void marriages in the present Civil Code, to wit:
"(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to
understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or mentally
incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack of
incapacity is made manifest after the celebration."
as well as the following implementing provisions:
"Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked or pleaded only on
the basis of a final judgment declaring the marriage void, without prejudice to
the provision of Article 34."
"Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration of the absolute nullity of a
marriage shall not prescribe."
xxx xxx xxx
It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our country today may already dissolved or
annulled on the grounds proposed by the Joint Committee on declaration of nullity as well as
annulment of marriages, thus rendering an absolute divorce law unnecessary. In fact, during a
conference with Father Gerald Healy of the Ateneo University as well as another meeting with
Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint Committee was informed that
since Vatican II, the Catholic Church has been declaring marriages null and void on the ground of
"lack of due discretion" for causes that, in other jurisdictions, would be clear grounds for divorce,
like teen-age or premature marriages; marriage to a man who, because of some personality
disorder or disturbance, cannot support a family; the foolish or ridiculous choice of a spouse by an
otherwise perfectly normal person; marriage to a woman who refuses to cohabit with her husband
or who refuses to have children. Bishop Cruz also informed the Committee that they have found
out in tribunal work that a lot of machismo among husbands are manifestations of their sociopathic
personality anomaly, like inflicting physical violence upon their wives, constitutional indolence or
laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychological anomaly. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, by incorporating what is now Article 36 into the Family Code, the Revision Committee referred to above
intended to add another ground to those already listed in the Civil Code as grounds for nullifying a marriage, thus
expanding or liberalizing the same. Inherent in the inclusion of the provision on psychological incapacity was the
understanding that every petition for declaration of nullity based on it should be treated on a case-to-case basis; hence,
the absence of a definition and an enumeration of what constitutes psychological incapacity. Moreover, the Committee
feared that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle ofejusdem generis.
But the law requires that the same be existing at the time of marriage although it be manifested later.
Admittedly, the provision on psychological incapacity, just like any other provision of law, is open to abuse. To prevent
this, "the court shall take order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take
steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed."
2
Moreover, the judge, in interpreting the provision on a case-to-case basis, must be guided by
"experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals
which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provisions was taken from
Canon Law."
3

The constitutional and statutory provisions on the family
4
will remain the lodestar which our society will hope to achieve
ultimately. Therefore, the inclusion of Article 36 is not to be taken as an abandonment of the ideal which we all cherish.
If at all, it is a recognition of the reality that some marriages, by reason of the incapacity of one of the contracting
parties, fall short of this ideal; thus, the parties are constrained to find a way of putting an end to their union through
some legally-accepted means.
Any criticism directed at the way that judges have interpreted the provision since its enactment as to render it easier for
unhappily-married couples to separate is addressed, not to the wisdom of the lawmakers but to the manner by which
some members of the Bench have implemented the provision. These are not interchangeable, each being separate
and distinct from the other.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
It is difficult to dissent from a well-written and studied opinion as Mr. Justice Vitug's ponencia. But, after an extended
reflection on the facts of this case, I cannot see my way clear into holding, as the majority do, that there is no ground
for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner and private respondent.
To my mind, it is clear that private respondent has been shown to be psychologically incapacitated to comply with at
least one essential marital obligation, i.e. that of living and cohabiting with her husband, herein petitioner. On the other
hand, it has not been shown that petitioner does not deserve to live and cohabit with his wife, herein private
respondent.
There appears to be no disagreement that the term "psychological incapacity" defies precision in definition. But, as
used in Article 36 of the Family Code as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage, the intent of the framers of
the Code is evidently to expand and liberalize the grounds for nullifying a marriage, as well pointed out by Madam
Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero in her separate opinion in this case.
While it is true that the board term "psychological incapacity" can open the doors to abuse by couples who may wish to
have an easy way out of their marriage, there are, however, enough safeguards against this contingency, among
which, is the intervention by the State, through the public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the parties
and/or fabrication of evidence.
In their case at bench, it has been abundantly established that private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos exhibits
specific behavior which, to my mind, shows that she is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her essential marital
obligations, to writ:
a. It took her seven (7) months after she left for the United States to call up her husband.
b. Julia promised to return home after her job contract expired in July 1989, but she never did and
neither is there any showing that she informed her husband (herein petitioner) of her whereabouts
in the U.S.A.
c. When petitioner went to the United States on a mission for the Philippine Army, he exerted
efforts to "touch base" with Julia; there were no similar efforts on the part of Julia; there were no
similar efforts on the part of Julia to do the same.
d. When petitioner filed this suit, more than five (5) years had elapsed, without Julia indicating her
plans to rejoin the petitioner or her whereabouts.
e. When petitioner filed this case in the trial court, Julia, in her answer, claimed that it is the former
who has been irresponsible and incompetent.
f. During the trial, Julia waived her right to appear and submit evidence.
A spouse's obligation to live and cohabit with his/her partner in marriage is a basic ground rule in marriage, unless
there are overpowering compelling reasons such as, for instance, an incurable contagious disease on the part of a
spouse or cruelty of one partner, bordering on insanity. There may also be instances when, for economic and practical
reasons, husband and wife have to live separately, but the marital bond between the spouses always remains. Mutual
love and respect for each other would, in such cases, compel the absent spouse to at least have regular contracts with
the other to inform the latter of his/her condition and whereabouts.
In the present case, it is apparent that private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos has no intention of cohabiting
with petitioner, her husband, or maintaining contact with him. In fact, her acts eloquently show that she does not want
her husband to know of her whereabouts and neither has she any intention of living and cohabiting with him.
To me there appears to be, on the part of private respondent, an unmistakeable indication of psychological incapacity
to comply with her essential marital obligations, although these indications were made manifest after the celebration of
the marriage.
It would be a great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this Court to give a much too restrictive interpretation of the law
and compel the petitioner to continue to be married to a wife who for purposes of fulfilling her marital duties has, for all
practical purposes, ceased to exist.
Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in the ruling the Court makes today. Is it not, in effect directly
or indirectly, facilitating the transformation of petitioner into a "habitual tryster" or one forced to maintain illicit relations
with another woman or women with emerging problems of illegitimate children, simply because he is denied by private
respondent, his wife, the companionship and conjugal love which he has sought from her and to which he is legally
entitled?
I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family Code is a sanction for absolute divorce but I submit that we
should not constrict it to non-recognition of its evident purpose and thus deny to one like petitioner, an opportunity to
turn a new leaf in his life by declaring his marriage a nullity by reason of his wife's psychological incapacity to perform
an essential marital obligation.
I therefore vote to GRANT the petition and to DECLARE the marriage between petitioner Leouel Santos and private
respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos VOID on the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code.
ROMERO, J., concurring:
I agree under the circumstances of the case, petitioner is not entitled to have his marriage declared a nullity on the
ground of psychological incapacity of private respondent.
However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
Civil Code Revision Committee of the UP Law Center, I wish to add some observations. The letter
1
dated April 15,
1985 of then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in behalf of the Family Law and Civil Code Revision Committee to then
Assemblywoman Mercedes Cojuangco-Teodoro traced the background of the inclusion of the present Article 36 in the
Family Code.
During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had thought of including a chapter on
absolute divorce in the draft of a new Family Code (Book I of the Civil Code) that it had been
tasked by the IBP and the UP Law Center to prepare. In fact, some members of the Committee
were in favor of a no-fault divorce between the spouses after a number of years of separation, legal
or de-facto. Justice J.B.L. Reyes was then requested to prepare a proposal for an action for
dissolution of marriage and the effects thereof based on two grounds: (a) five continuous years of
separation between the spouses, with or without a judicial decree of legal separation, and (b)
whenever a married person would have obtained a decree of absolute divorce in another country.
Actually, such a proposal is one for absolute divorce but called by another name. Later, even the
Civil Code Revision Committee took time to discuss the proposal of Justice Reyes on this matter.
Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision Committee and Family Law Committee
started holding joint meetings on the preparation of the draft of the New Family Code, they agreed
and formulated the definition of marriage as
"a special contract of permanent partnership between a man and a woman
entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and
family life. It is an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and
incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that
marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within
the limits provided by law."
With the above definition, and considering the Christian traditional concept of marriage of the
Filipino people as a permanent, inviolable, indissoluble social institution upon which the family and
society are founded, and also realizing the strong opposition that any provision on absolute divorce
would encounter from the Catholic Church and the Catholic sector of our citizenry to whom the
great majority of our people belong, the two Committees in their joint meetings did not pursue the
idea of absolute divorce and instead opted for an action for judicial declaration of invalidity of
marriage based on grounds available in the Canon Law. It was thought that such an action would
not only be an acceptable alternative to divorce but would also solve the nagging problem of
church annulments of marriages on grounds not recognized by the civil law of the State. Justice
Reyes was thus requested to again prepare a draft of provisions on such action for celebration of
invalidity of marriage. Still later, to avoid the overlapping of provisions on void marriages as found
in the present Civil Code and those proposed by Justice Reyes on judicial declaration of invalidity
of marriage on grounds similar to the Canon Law, the two Committees now working as a Joint
Committee in the preparation of a New Family Code decided to consolidate the present provisions
on void marriages with the proposals of Justice Reyes. The result was the inclusion of an additional
kind of void marriage in the enumeration of void marriages in the present Civil Code, to wit:
"(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to
understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or mentally
incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack of
incapacity is made manifest after the celebration."
as well as the following implementing provisions:
"Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked or pleaded only on
the basis of a final judgment declaring the marriage void, without prejudice to
the provision of Article 34."
"Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration of the absolute nullity of a
marriage shall not prescribe."
xxx xxx xxx
It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our country today may already dissolved or
annulled on the grounds proposed by the Joint Committee on declaration of nullity as well as
annulment of marriages, thus rendering an absolute divorce law unnecessary. In fact, during a
conference with Father Gerald Healy of the Ateneo University as well as another meeting with
Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint Committee was informed that
since Vatican II, the Catholic Church has been declaring marriages null and void on the ground of
"lack of due discretion" for causes that, in other jurisdictions, would be clear grounds for divorce,
like teen-age or premature marriages; marriage to a man who, because of some personality
disorder or disturbance, cannot support a family; the foolish or ridiculous choice of a spouse by an
otherwise perfectly normal person; marriage to a woman who refuses to cohabit with her husband
or who refuses to have children. Bishop Cruz also informed the Committee that they have found
out in tribunal work that a lot of machismo among husbands are manifestations of their sociopathic
personality anomaly, like inflicting physical violence upon their wives, constitutional indolence or
laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychological anomaly. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, by incorporating what is now Article 36 into the Family Code, the Revision Committee referred to above
intended to add another ground to those already listed in the Civil Code as grounds for nullifying a marriage, thus
expanding or liberalizing the same. Inherent in the inclusion of the provision on psychological incapacity was the
understanding that every petition for declaration of nullity based on it should be treated on a case-to-case basis; hence,
the absence of a definition and an enumeration of what constitutes psychological incapacity. Moreover, the Committee
feared that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle ofejusdem generis.
But the law requires that the same be existing at the time of marriage although it be manifested later.
Admittedly, the provision on psychological incapacity, just like any other provision of law, is open to abuse. To prevent
this, "the court shall take order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take
steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed."
2
Moreover, the judge, in interpreting the provision on a case-to-case basis, must be guided by
"experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals
which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provisions was taken from
Canon Law."
3

The constitutional and statutory provisions on the family
4
will remain the lodestar which our society will hope to achieve
ultimately. Therefore, the inclusion of Article 36 is not to be taken as an abandonment of the ideal which we all cherish.
If at all, it is a recognition of the reality that some marriages, by reason of the incapacity of one of the contracting
parties, fall short of this ideal; thus, the parties are constrained to find a way of putting an end to their union through
some legally-accepted means.
Any criticism directed at the way that judges have interpreted the provision since its enactment as to render it easier for
unhappily-married couples to separate is addressed, not to the wisdom of the lawmakers but to the manner by which
some members of the Bench have implemented the provision. These are not interchangeable, each being separate
and distinct from the other.
Footnotes
1 Per Judge Enrique Garovillo.
2 Penned by Justice Jainal Rasul, concurred in by Justice Pedro Ramirez and Ramon Mabutas, Jr.
3 Rollo, 37-42.
4 Rollo, 13-18.
5 Deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee, July 26, 1986.
6 Deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee, August 2, 1986.
7 Deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee, August 9, 1986.
8 In her "Handbook on the Family Code."
9 Marriage in Canon Law, Delaware: Michael Glazier, Inc., 1986, 129-130.
C 1095 Sunt incapaces matrimonii contrahendi:
1. qui sufficiente rationis usu carent;
2. qui laborant gravi defectu discretionis iudicii circa iura et official matrimonialia essentialia mutuo
tradenda et acceptanda;
3. qui ob causas naturae psychicae obligationes matrimonii essentiales assumere non valent.
10 Ibid., 131-132.
11 Handbook on the Family Code, First Edition, 1988.
ROMERO, J., concurring:
1 Written pursuant to the request of Assemblywoman Mercedes Cojuangco-Teodoro during the
March 23, 1985 joint meeting of the Family Law and Civil Code Revision Committee at the UP Law
Center for comments on P.B. 3149 (Pacificador Bill) on Divorce, P.B. No. 1986 (Monfort and
Collantes Bill) on Recognition of Church Annulments of Marriages, P.B. No. 2347 (Sitoy Bill) on
Additional Grounds for Annulment of Marriage and Legal Separation and P.B. 1350 (Kalaw Bill) on
Equal Rights of Filipino Women which were pending before her Sub-Committee.
2 FAMILY CODE, Art. 48.
3 J.A. v. SEMPIO-DIY, HANDBOOK OF THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, 37 (1988).
4 As quoted in the majority opinion.

Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals and Santos

GR No. 112019 / 58 SCAD 17

Januray 4, 1995

FACTS:

Lt. Leouel Santos married private respondent Julia Bedia on Sept. 20, 1986 in Illoilo MTC and later by church
wedding. They lived with the latters parents and eventually gave birth to Leouel Santos, Jr. on July 18, 1987. The
relationship turned sour when they began quarelling over frequent interferrence of Julias parents and the issue of
liveing independently from the in-laws.

On May 18, 1988, Julia left for the United States (US) to work as nurse despite Leouels protestations. Seven months
thereafter or on January 1, 1989, she called up from the US with the promise of returning home soon, but she never
did. Given the chance, Leouel went to the US for a training program sponsored by the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) from April to August 1990. He desperately tried to locate her there but failed.

He then filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for the nullification of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code, on the ground of psychological incapacity. Summons was served by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation in Negros Oriental. In her answer, Julia claimed that it was Leouel who was irresponsible and incompetent.
The RTC in November 1991 dismissed the case for lack of merit. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the
RTC decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage may be declared a nullity prusuant to Artcile 36 of the Family Code.

HELD:

Article 36 cannot be taken and construed independently, but must stand in conjunction with existing precepts of laws
on marriage. Thus correlated, psychological incapacity should refer no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt
that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases
of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not
evidently envision an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under
Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void
marriage to be legitimate.

The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists and persons with expertise in psychological disciplines
might be helpful or even desirable in establishing the parameters of psychological incapacity.

Marriage is not just and adventure but a lifetime commitment. We should continue to be reminded that innate in our
society, then enshrined in the Civil Code, and even now still indelible in Section 1 of the Family Codethe Constitution
is no less emphatic.


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 94053 March 17, 1993
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
GREGORIO NOLASCO, respondent.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Warloo G. Cardenal for respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N

FELICIANO, J.:
On 5 August 1988, respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed before the Regional Trial Court of Antique, Branch 10, a petition
for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica Parker, invoking Article 41 of the Family Code. The
petition prayed that respondent's wife be declared presumptively dead or, in the alternative, that the marriage be
declared null and void.
1

The Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition through the Provincial Prosecutor of Antique who had been
deputized to assist the Solicitor-General in the instant case. The Republic argued, first, that Nolasco did not possess a
"well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead,"
2
and second, Nolasco's attempt to have his marriage
annulled in the same proceeding was a "cunning attempt" to circumvent the law on marriage.
3

During trial, respondent Nolasco testified that he was a seaman and that he had first met Janet Monica Parker, a
British subject, in a bar in England during one of his ship's port calls. From that chance meeting onwards, Janet Monica
Parker lived with respondent Nolasco on his ship for six (6) months until they returned to respondent's hometown of
San Jose, Antique on 19 November 1980 after his seaman's contract expired. On 15 January 1982, respondent
married Janet Monica Parker in San Jose, Antique, in Catholic rites officiated by Fr. Henry van Tilborg in the Cathedral
of San Jose.
Respondent Nolasco further testified that after the marriage celebration, he obtained another employment contract as a
seaman and left his wife with his parents in San Jose, Antique. Sometime in January 1983, while working overseas,
respondent received a letter from his mother informing him that Janet Monica had given birth to his son. The same
letter informed him that Janet Monica had left Antique. Respondent claimed he then immediately asked permission to
leave his ship to return home. He arrived in Antique in November 1983.
Respondent further testified that his efforts to look for her himself whenever his ship docked in England proved
fruitless. He also stated that all the letters he had sent to his missing spouse at No. 38 Ravena Road, Allerton,
Liverpool, England, the address of the bar where he and Janet Monica first met, were all returned to him. He also
claimed that he inquired from among friends but they too had no news of Janet Monica.
On cross-examination, respondent stated that he had lived with and later married Janet Monica Parker despite his lack
of knowledge as to her family background. He insisted that his wife continued to refuse to give him such information
even after they were married. He also testified that he did not report the matter of Janet Monica's disappearance to the
Philippine government authorities.
Respondent Nolasco presented his mother, Alicia Nolasco, as his witness. She testified that her daughter-in-law Janet
Monica had expressed a desire to return to England even before she had given birth to Gerry Nolasco on 7 December
1982. When asked why her daughter-in-law might have wished to leave Antique, respondent's mother replied that
Janet Monica never got used to the rural way of life in San Jose, Antique. Alicia Nolasco also said that she had tried to
dissuade Janet Monica from leaving as she had given birth to her son just fifteen days before, but when she (Alicia)
failed to do so, she gave Janet Monica P22,000.00 for her expenses before she left on 22 December 1982 for England.
She further claimed that she had no information as to the missing person's present whereabouts.
The trial court granted Nolasco's petition in a Judgment dated 12 October 1988 the dispositive portion of which reads:
Wherefore, under Article 41, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Executive Order
No. 209, July 6, 1987, as amended by Executive Order No. 227, July 17, 1987) this Court hereby
declares as presumptively dead Janet Monica Parker Nolasco, without prejudice to her
reappearance.
4

The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that the trial court erred in declaring Janet Monica Parker
presumptively dead because respondent Nolasco had failed to show that there existed a well founded belief for such
declaration.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that respondent had sufficiently established a basis to
form a belief that his absent spouse had already died.
The Republic, through the Solicitor-General, is now before this Court on a Petition for Review where the following
allegations are made:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's finding that there existed a well-founded
belief on the part of Nolasco that Janet Monica Parker was already dead; and
2. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial Court's declaration that the petition was a proper
case of the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41, Family Code.
5

The issue before this Court, as formulated by petitioner is "[w]hether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his
wife is already dead."
6

The present case was filed before the trial court pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code which provides that:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall
be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had
been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under
the circumstances set forth in the provision of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two
years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the
spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse. (Emphasis supplied).
When Article 41 is compared with the old provision of the Civil Code, which it superseded,
7
the following crucial
differences emerge. Under Article 41, the time required for the presumption to arise has been shortened to four (4)
years; however, there is need for a judicial declaration of presumptive death to enable the spouse present to
remarry.
8
Also, Article 41 of the Family Code imposes a stricter standard than the Civil Code: Article 83 of the Civil
Code merely requires either that there be no news that such absentee is still alive; or the absentee is generally
considered to be dead and believed to be so by the spouse present, or is presumed dead under Article 390 and 391 of
the Civil Code.
9
The Family Code, upon the other hand, prescribes as "well founded belief" that the absentee
is already dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted.
As pointed out by the Solicitor-General, there are four (4) requisites for the declaration of presumptive death under
Article 41 of the Family Code:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if
the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in
Article 391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of
the absentee.
10

Respondent naturally asserts that he had complied with all these requirements.
11

Petitioner's argument, upon the other hand, boils down to this: that respondent failed to prove that he had complied
with the third requirement, i.e., the existence of a "well-founded belief" that the absent spouse is already dead.
The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to conduct a search for his missing wife with such diligence as to
give rise to a "well-founded belief" that she is dead.
United States v. Biasbas,
12
is instructive as to degree of diligence required in searching for a missing spouse. In that
case, defendant Macario Biasbas was charged with the crime of bigamy. He set-up the defense of a good faith belief
that his first wife had already died. The Court held that defendant had not exercised due diligence to ascertain the
whereabouts of his first wife, noting that:
While the defendant testified that he had made inquiries concerning the whereabouts of his wife,
he fails to state of whom he made such inquiries. He did not even write to the parents of his first
wife, who lived in the Province of Pampanga, for the purpose of securing information concerning
her whereabouts. He admits that he had a suspicion only that his first wife was dead. He admits
that the only basis of his suspicion was the fact that she had been absent. . . .
13

In the case at bar, the Court considers that the investigation allegedly conducted by respondent in his attempt to
ascertain Janet Monica Parker's whereabouts is too sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable or well-founded belief
that she was already dead. When he arrived in San Jose, Antique after learning of Janet Monica's departure, instead of
seeking the help of local authorities or of the British Embassy,
14
he secured another seaman's contract and went to
London, a vast city of many millions of inhabitants, to look for her there.
Q After arriving here in San Jose, Antique, did you exert efforts to inquire the
whereabouts of your wife?
A Yes, Sir.
Court:
How did you do that?
A I secured another contract with the ship and we had a trip to London and I
went to London to look for her I could not find her (sic).
15
(Emphasis supplied)
Respondent's testimony, however, showed that he confused London for Liverpool and this casts doubt on his
supposed efforts to locate his wife in England. The Court of Appeal's justification of the mistake, to wit:
. . . Well, while the cognoscente (sic) would readily know the geographical difference between
London and Liverpool, for a humble seaman like Gregorio the two places could mean one place
in England, the port where his ship docked and where he found Janet. Our own provincial folks,
every time they leave home to visit relatives in Pasay City, Kalookan City, or Paraaque, would
announce to friends and relatives, "We're going to Manila." This apparent error in naming of places
of destination does not appear to be fatal.
16

is not well taken. There is no analogy between Manila and its neighboring cities, on one hand, and London and
Liverpool, on the other, which, as pointed out by the Solicitor-General, are around three hundred fifty (350) kilometers
apart. We do not consider that walking into a major city like Liverpool or London with a simple hope of somehow
bumping into one particular person there which is in effect what Nolasco says he did can be regarded as a
reasonably diligent search.
The Court also views respondent's claim that Janet Monica declined to give any information as to her personal
background even after she had married respondent
17
too convenient an excuse to justify his failure to locate her. The
same can be said of the loss of the alleged letters respondent had sent to his wife which respondent claims were all
returned to him. Respondent said he had lost these returned letters, under unspecified circumstances.
Neither can this Court give much credence to respondent's bare assertion that he had inquired from their friends of her
whereabouts, considering that respondent did not identify those friends in his testimony. The Court of Appeals ruled
that since the prosecutor failed to rebut this evidence during trial, it is good evidence. But this kind of evidence cannot,
by its nature, be rebutted. In any case, admissibility is not synonymous with credibility.
18
As noted before, there are
serious doubts to respondent's credibility. Moreover, even if admitted as evidence, said testimony merely tended to
show that the missing spouse had chosen not to communicate with their common acquaintances, and not that she was
dead.
Respondent testified that immediately after receiving his mother's letter sometime in January 1983, he cut short his
employment contract to return to San Jose, Antique. However, he did not explain the delay of nine (9) months from
January 1983, when he allegedly asked leave from his captain, to November 1983 when be finally reached San Jose.
Respondent, moreover, claimed he married Janet Monica Parker without inquiring about her parents and their place of
residence.
19
Also, respondent failed to explain why he did not even try to get the help of the police or other authorities
in London and Liverpool in his effort to find his wife. The circumstances of Janet Monica's departure and respondent's
subsequent behavior make it very difficult to regard the claimed belief that Janet Monica was dead a well-founded one.
In Goitia v. Campos-Rueda,
20
the Court stressed that:
. . . Marriage is an institution, the maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply
interested. It is a relationship for life and the parties cannot terminate it at any shorter period by
virtue of any contract they make. . . . .
21
(Emphasis supplied)
By the same token, the spouses should not be allowed, by the simple expedient of agreeing that one of them leave the
conjugal abode and never to return again, to circumvent the policy of the laws on marriage. The Court notes that
respondent even tried to have his marriage annulled before the trial court in the same proceeding.
In In Re Szatraw,
22
the Court warned against such collusion between the parties when they find it impossible to
dissolve the marital bonds through existing legal means.
While the Court understands the need of respondent's young son, Gerry Nolasco, for maternal care, still the
requirements of the law must prevail. Since respondent failed to satisfy the clear requirements of the law, his petition
for a judicial declaration of presumptive death must be denied. The law does not view marriage like an ordinary
contract. Article 1 of the Family Code emphasizes that.
. . . Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the
familyand an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed
by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property
relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code. (Emphasis supplied)
In Arroyo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,
23
the Court stressed strongly the need to protect.
. . . the basic social institutions of marriage and the family in the preservation of which the State
bas the strongest interest; the public policy here involved is of the most fundamental kind. In Article
II, Section 12 of the Constitution there is set forth the following basic state policy:
The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen
the family as a basic autonomous social institution. . . .
The same sentiment bas been expressed in the Family Code of the Philippines in Article 149:
The family, being the foundation of the nation, is a basic social institution which
public policy cherishes and protects. Consequently, family relations are
governed by law and no custom, practice or agreement destructive of the
family shall be recognized or given effect.
24

In fine, respondent failed to establish that he had the well-founded belief required by law that his absent wife was
already dead that would sustain the issuance of a court order declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 February 1990, affirming the trial court's decision
declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead is hereby REVERSED and both Decisions are hereby NULLIFIED
and SET ASIDE. Costs against respondent.
Bidin, Davide, Jr., Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr. J., is on leave.

# Footnotes
1 Petition, p. 2; Record, p. 7.
2 Records, p. 13.
3 Records, p. 14.
4 Trial Court Decision, p. 4; Records, p. 39.
5 Petition, p. 9; Rollo, p. 13.
6 Id.
7 Pertinent portions of Article 83 of the Civil Code reads:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse
of such person with any other person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its
performance, unless:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second
marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee,
though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and
believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of the contracting such subsequent marriage,
or if the absentee is presumed dead according to articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted
shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a competent court.
8 See A. V. Sempio Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines (1988),
p. 48.
9 See generally Jones v. Hortiguela, 64 Phil. 179 (1937).
10 Petition, p. 11; Rollo; p. 15.
11 Memorandum for Respondent, p. 4.
12 25 Phil. 71 (1913).
13 25 Phil. at 73.
14 TSN, 28 September 1988, p. 16.
15 Id., p. 8.
16 Court of Appeal's Decision, p. 6.
17 TSN, 28 September 1988, p. 14.
18 See generally Ramos v. Sandiganbayan, 191 SCRA 671 (1990).
19 TSN, 28 September 1988, p. 10.
20 35 Phil. 252 (1919).
21 35 Phil. at 254.
22 81 Phil. 461 (1948).
23 203 SCRA 750 (1991).
24 203 SCRA at 761.


Article 2
No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential requisites are be present:
1.) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female;
2.) Consent given freely in the presence of the solemnizing officer
Article 3
Formal requisites of marriage:
1.) Authority of the Solemnizing Officer
2.) A valid marriage license except in the case provided in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
3.) A marriage ceremony which take place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the
solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife
in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age
Article 4
The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites will render the marriage ab initio except stated in Art.
35;
A defect in any of the essential requisites will render the marriage voidable as provided in Art. 45

An irregularity of the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of marriage but the party or parties
responsible for the irregularity will be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.

VOID MARRIAGES AS LEGAL IMPEDIMENT TO MARRY
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-53642 April 15, 1988
LEONILO C. DONATO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ARTEMON D. LUNA, PRESIDING JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANIIA, BRANCH XXXII HON.
JOSE FLAMINIANO, CITY FISCAL OF MANILA; PAZ B. ABAYAN, respondents.
Leopoldo P. Dela Rosa for petitioner.
Emiterio C. Manibog for private respondent.
City Fiscal of Manila for public respondent.
GANCAYCO, J.:
In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, the question for the resolution of the Court is
whether or not a criminal case for bigamy pending before the Court of First Itance of Manila should be suspended in
view of a civil case for annulment of marriage pending before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court on the ground
that the latter constitutes a prejudicial question. The respondent judge ruled in the negative. We sustain him.
The pertinent facts as set forth in the records follow. On January 23, 1979, the City Fiscal of Manila acting thru
Assistant City Fiscal Amado N. Cantor filed an information for bigamy against herein petitioner, Leonilo C. Donato with
the Court of First Instance of Manila, docketed as Criminal Case No. 43554 and assigned to Branch XXXII of said
court. The information was filed based on the complaint of private respondent Paz B. Abayan.
On September 28, 1979, before the petitioner's arraignment, private respondent filed with the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Manila a civil action for declaration of nullity of her marriage with petitioner contracted on September
26, 1978, which action was docketed as Civil Case No. E-02627. Said civil case was based on the ground that private
respondent consented to entering into the marriage, which was petitioner Donato's second one, since she had no
previous knowledge that petitioner was already married to a certain Rosalinda R. Maluping on June 30, 1978.
Petitioner Donato's answer in the civil case for nullity interposed the defense that his second marriage was void since it
was solemnized without a marriage license and that force, violence, intimidation and undue influence were employed
by private respondent to obtain petitioner's consent to the marriage. Prior to the solemnization of the subsequent or
second marriage, petitioner and private respondent had lived together and deported themselves as husband and wife
without the benefit of wedlock for a period of at least five years as evidenced by a joint affidavit executed by them on
September 26, 1978, for which reason, the requisite marriage license was dispensed with pursuant to Article 76 of the
New Civil Code pertaining to marriages of exceptional character.
Prior to the date set for the trial on the merits of Criminal Case No. 43554, petitioner filed a motion to suspend the
proceedings of said case contending that Civil Case No. E-02627 seeking the annulment of his second marriage filed
by private respondent raises a prejudicial question which must first be determined or decided before the criminal case
can proceed.
In an order dated April 7, 1980. Hon. Artemon D. Luna denied the motion to suspend the proceedings in Criminal Case
No. 43554 for bigamy. Respondent judge's basis for denial is the ruling laid down in the case of Landicho vs.
Relova.
1
The order further directed that the proceedings in the criminal case can proceed as scheduled.
A motion for reconsideration was flied by herein petitioner thru counsel citing as one of his grounds for suspension of
proceedings the ruling laid down by this Court in the case of De la Cruz vs. Ejercito
2
which was a much later case than
that cited by respondent judge in his order of denial.
The motion for reconsideration of the said order was likewise denied in an order dated April 14, 1980, for lack of merit.
Hence, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction.
A prejudicial question has been defined to be one which arises in a case, the resolution of which question is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved in said case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal.
3
It is one
based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or
innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves
facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of
the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.
4
A
prejudicial question usually comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action may proceed,
because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or
innocence of the accused in a criminal case.
5

The requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain in the case at bar. It must be noted that the issue before the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court touching upon the nullity of the second marriage is not determinative of
petitioner Donato's guilt or innocence in the crime of bigamy. Furthermore, it was petitioner's second wife, the herein
private respondent Paz B. Abayan who filed the complaint for annulment of the second marriage on the ground that her
consent was obtained through deceit.
Petitioner Donato raised the argument that the second marriage should have been declared null and void on the
ground of force, threats and intimidation allegedly employed against him by private respondent only sometime later
when he was required to answer the civil action for anulment of the second marriage. The doctrine elucidated upon by
the case of Landicho vs. Relova
6
may be applied to the present case. Said case states that:
The mere fact that there are actions to annul the marriages entered into by the accused in a
bigamy case does not mean that "prejudicial questions" are automatically raised in civil actions as
to warrant the suspension of the case. In order that the case of annulment of marriage be
considered a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused, it must be shown that
the petitioner's consent to such marriage must be the one that was obtained by means of duress,
force and intimidation to show that his act in the second marriage must be involuntary and cannot
be the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy. The situation in the present case is markedly
different. At the time the petitioner was indicted for bigamy on February 27, 1963, the fact that two
marriage ceremonies had been contracted appeared to be indisputable. And it was the second
spouse, not the petitioner who filed the action for nullity on the ground of force, threats and
intimidation. And it was only on June 15, 1963, that petitioner, as defendant in the civil action, filed
a third-party complaint against the first spouse alleging that his marriage with her should be
declared null and void on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. Assuming that the first
marriage was null and void on the ground alleged by petitioner, the fact would not be material to
the outcome of the case. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves
its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only when
the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such
declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second
marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy. The lower court therefore, has not abused much less gravely abused, its
discretion in failing to suspend the hearing as sought by petitioner.
In the case at bar, petitioner has not even sufficiently shown that his consent to the second marriage has been
obtained by the use of threats, force and intimidation.
Petitioner calls the attention of this Court to the fact that the case of De la Cruz vs. Ejercito is a later case and as such
it should be the one applied to the case at bar. We cannot agree. The situation in the case at bar is markedly different.
In the aforecited case it was accused Milagros dela Cruz who was charged with bigamy for having contracted a second
marriage while a previous one existed. Likewise, Milagros dela Cruz was also the one who filed an action for
annulment on the ground of duress, as contra-distinguished from the present case wherein it was private respondent
Paz B. Abayan, petitioner's second wife, who filed a complaint for annulment of the second marriage on the ground
that her consent was obtained through deceit since she was not aware that petitioner's marriage was still subsisting.
Moreover, in De la Cruz, a judgment was already rendered in the civil case that the second marriage of De la Cruz was
null and void, thus determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. In the present case,
there is as yet no such judgment in the civil case.
Pursuant to the doctrine discussed in Landicho vs. Relova, petitioner Donato cannot apply the rule on prejudicial
questions since a case for annulment of marriage can be considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy case
against the accused only if it is proved that the petitioner's consent to such marriage was obtained by means of duress,
violence and intimidation in order to establish that his act in the subsequent marriage was an involuntary one and as
such the same cannot be the basis for conviction. The preceding elements do not exist in the case at bar.
Obviously, petitioner merely raised the issue of prejudicial question to evade the prosecution of the criminal case. The
records reveal that prior to petitioner's second marriage on September 26, 1978, he had been living with private
respondent Paz B. Abayan as husband and wife for more than five years without the benefit of marriage. Thus,
petitioner's averments that his consent was obtained by private respondent through force, violence, intimidation and
undue influence in entering a subsequent marriage is belled by the fact that both petitioner and private respondent
executed an affidavit which stated that they had lived together as husband and wife without benefit of marriage for five
years, one month and one day until their marital union was formally ratified by the second marriage and that it was
private respondent who eventually filed the civil action for nullity.
Another event which militates against petitioner's contentions is the fact hat it was only when Civil Case No. E-02627
was filed on September 28, 1979, or more than the lapse of one year from the solemnization of the second marriage
that petitioner came up with the story that his consent to the marriage was secured through the use of force, violence,
intimidation and undue influence. Petitioner also continued to live with private respondent until November 1978, when
the latter left their abode upon learning that Leonilo Donato was already previously married.
In the light of the preceding factual circumstances, it can be seen that the respondent Judge did not err in his earlier
order. There is no pivotal issue that must be pre-emptively resolved in Civil Case No. E-02627 before proceedings in
the criminal action for bigamy can be undertaken.
Accordingly, there being no prejudicial question shown to exit the order of denial issued by the respondent judge dated
April 14, 1980 should be sustained.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. We make no
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Cruz and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 22 SCRA 731.
2 68 SCRA 1.
3 People va. Aragon, 94 Phil. 357; Isip vs. Gonzales, 39 SCRA 255; Rojas vs. People, 57 SCRA
243.
4 Libra va. Coscolluela, Jr., 116 SCRA 303.
5 Ibid.
6 22 SCRA 73.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-53703 August 19, 1986
LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY (as presiding judge of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Caloocan City) and KARL HEINZ WIEGEL, respondents.
Dapucanta, Dulay & Associates for petitioner.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo and Ongsiako Law Office for private respondent.
PARAS, J.:
In an action (Family Case No. 483) filed before the erstwhile Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City,
herein respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel (plaintiff therein) asked for the declaration of Nullity of his marriage (celebrated on
July, 1978 at the Holy Catholic Apostolic Christian Church Branch in Makati, Metro Manila) with herein petitioner Lilia
Oliva Wiegel (Lilia, for short, and defendant therein) on the ground of Lilia's previous existing marriage to one Eduardo
A. Maxion, the ceremony having been performed on June 25, 1972 at our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City.
Lilia, while admitting the existence of said prior subsisting marriage claimed that said marriage was null and void, she
and the first husband Eduardo A. Maxion having been allegedly forced to enter said marital union. In the pre-trial that
ensued, the issue agreed upon by both parties was the status of the first marriage (assuming the presence of force
exerted against both parties): was said prior marriage void or was it merely voidable? Contesting the validity of the pre-
trial order, Lilia asked the respondent court for an opportunity to present evidence-
(1) that the first marriage was vitiated by force exercised upon both her and the first husband; and
(2) that the first husband was at the time of the marriage in 1972 already married to someone else.
Respondent judge ruled against the presentation of evidence because the existence of force exerted on both parties of
the first marriage had already been agreed upon. Hence, the present petition for certiorari assailing the following
Orders of therespondent Judge-
(1) the Order dated March 17, 1980 in which the parties were compelled to submit the case for resolution based on
"agreed facts;" and
(2) the Order dated April 14, 1980, denying petitioner's motion to allow her to present evidence in her favor.
We find the petition devoid of merit.
There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force committed against both parties
because assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be void but merely viodable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and therefore
valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married respondent she was still
validly married to her first husband, consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID (Art. 80, Civil Code).
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time they
married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration
1
of
such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she
contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel); accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent
would be regarded VOID under the law.
WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, for lack of merit, and the Orders complained of are hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Feria (Chairman), Fernan Alampay and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Vda. de Consuegra vs. GSIS, 37 SCRA 315.











Also in Art. 1(Nature of Marriage)
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. MTJ-92-706 March 29, 1995
LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR., Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 28, Manila, respondent.
QUIASON, J.:
This is a complaint by Lupo A. Atienza for Gross Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety against Judge Francisco
Brillantes, Jr., Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 20, Manila.
Complainant alleges that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro, who are living together at No. 34 Galaxy Street,
Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati, Metro Manila. He stays in said house, which he purchased in 1987, whenever he is in
Manila.
In December 1991, upon opening the door to his bedroom, he saw respondent sleeping on his (complainant's) bed.
Upon inquiry, he was told by the houseboy that respondent had been cohabiting with De Castro. Complainant did not
bother to wake up respondent and instead left the house after giving instructions to his houseboy to take care of his
children.
Thereafter, respondent prevented him from visiting his children and even alienated the affection of his children for him.
Complainant claims that respondent is married to one Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has five children, as appearing
in his 1986 and 1991 sworn statements of assets and liabilities. Furthermore, he alleges that respondent caused his
arrest on January 13, 1992, after he had a heated argument with De Castro inside the latter's office.
For his part, respondent alleges that complainant was not married to De Castro and that the filing of the administrative
action was related to complainant's claim on the Bel-Air residence, which was disputed by De Castro.
Respondent denies that he caused complainant's arrest and claims that he was even a witness to the withdrawal of the
complaint for Grave Slander filed by De Castro against complainant. According to him, it was the sister of De Castro
who called the police to arrest complainant.
Respondent also denies having been married to Ongkiko, although he admits having five children with her. He alleges
that while he and Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremony before a Nueva Ecija town mayor on April 25, 1965, the
same was not a valid marriage for lack of a marriage license. Upon the request of the parents of Ongkiko, respondent
went through another marriage ceremony with her in Manila on June 5, 1965. Again, neither party applied for a
marriage license. Ongkiko abandoned respondent 17 years ago, leaving their children to his care and custody as a
single parent.
Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles, California on December 4, 1991, he
believed, in all good faith and for all legal intents and purposes, that he was single because his first marriage was
solemnized without a license.
Under the Family Code, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage before a party thereto
can enter into a second marriage. Article 40 of said Code provides:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for the purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
Respondent argues that the provision of Article 40 of the Family Code does not apply to him considering that his first
marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of the Philippines; while the second marriage took
place in 1991 and governed by the Family Code.
Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless
of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is given "retroactive effect
insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws."
This is particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right that
was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case.
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive application
to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel
that he is adversely affected (Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 229 [1968]). The reason is that as a general rule
no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws (Billones v. Court of Industrial Relations, 14 SCRA 674
[1965]).
Respondent is the last person allowed to invoke good faith. He made a mockery of the institution of marriage and
employed deceit to be able to cohabit with a woman, who beget him five children.
Respondent passed the Bar examinations in 1962 and was admitted to the practice of law in 1963. At the time he went
through the two marriage ceremonies with Ongkiko, he was already a lawyer. Yet, he never secured any marriage
license. Any law student would know that a marriage license is necessary before one can get married. Respondent
was given an opportunity to correct the flaw in his first marriage when he and Ongkiko were married for the second
time. His failure to secure a marriage license on these two occasions betrays his sinister motives and bad faith.
It is evident that respondent failed to meet the standard of moral fitness for membership in the legal profession.
While the deceit employed by respondent existed prior to his appointment as a Metropolitan Trial Judge, his immoral
and illegal act of cohabiting with De Castro began and continued when he was already in the judiciary.
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety, not only with
respect to his performance of his judicial duties but also as to his behavior as a private individual. There is no duality of
morality. A public figure is also judged by his private life. A judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity
and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times, in the performance of his judicial duties and in
his everyday life. These are judicial guideposts too self-evident to be overlooked. No position exacts a greater demand
on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the judiciary (Imbing v. Tiongzon, 229 SCRA
690 [1994]).
WHEREFORE, respondent is DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all leave and retirement benefits and with
prejudice to reappointment in any branch, instrumentality, or agency of the government, including government-owned
and controlled corporations. This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.


If a person gets married while the petition for declaration of nullity of his first
marriage is ongoing, can he be charged with bigamy?
Related issues:
[1] What if the first marriage is declared null and void? Will this make the
second marriage valid?
[2] What if the second marriage was declared null and void on the ground of
psychological incapacity? Will this be a defense against a charge of bigamy?

What is bigamy?

Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code states that bigamy is committed when a person contracts a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has
been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings. The penalty
for bigamy is prision mayor (minimum of six years and one day to a maximum of twelve years). Bigamy is a
public crime which means that anyone who knows of the bigamous marriage can file the criminal complaint.

People in a void marriage cannot take the law into their own hands and by themselves declare that their marriage is
void

Please take note that under Article 40 of the Family Code, people in a void marriage cannot take the law into
their own hands and by themselves declare that their marriage is void. Article 40 states that the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Simply stated, if the marriage is void, either or both
spouses must file a petition asking the court to declare the marriage void.

If the court declares the marriage null and void, can there be a subsequent marriage immediately?

Some people got married immediately after they received the copy of the courts decision granting the petition for
declaration of nullity of their first marriage. This is wrong. At what point in time can a subsequent marriage take place?
Please take note ofSections 21 to 23 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages. Only when these sections have been complied with can a subsequent marriage take place.
Sec. 21. Liquidation, partition and distribution, custody, support of common children and delivery of their
presumptive legitimes. - Upon entry of the judgment granting the petition, or, in case of appeal, upon receipt of the
entry of judgment of the appellate court granting the petition, the Family Court, on motion of either party, shall proceed
with the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, including custody, support of common
children and delivery of their presumptive legitimes pursuant to Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code unless such
matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.

Sec. 22. Issuance of Decree of Declaration of Absolute Nullity or Annulment of Marriage.-

(a) The court shall issue the Decree after:

(1) Registration of the entry of judgment granting the petition for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage in the
Civil Registry where the marriage was celebrated and in the Civil Registry of the place where the Family Court is
located;

(2) Registration of the approved partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, in the proper Register of
Deeds where the real properties are located; and

(3) The delivery of the children's presumptive legitimes in cash, property, or sound securities.

(b) The court shall quote in the Decree the dispositive portion of the judgment entered and attach to the Decree the
approved deed of partition.

Except in the case of children under Articles 36 and 53 of the Family Code, the court shall order the Local Civil
Registrar to issue an amended birth certificate indicating the new civil status of the children affected.

Sec. 23. Registration and publication of the decree; decree as best evidence.

(a) The prevailing party shall cause the registration of the Decree in the Civil Registry where the marriage was
registered, the Civil Registry of the place where the Family Court is situated, and in the National Census and Statistics
Office. He shall report to the court compliance with this requirement within thirty days from receipt of the copy of the
Decree.

(b) In case service of summons was made by publication, the parties shall cause the publication of the Decree once in
a newspaper of general circulation.

(c) The registered Decree shall be the best evidence to prove the declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of
marriage and shall serve as notice to third persons concerning the properties of petitioner and respondent as well as
the properties or presumptive legitimes delivered to their common children.

The Supreme Court ruled in Mercado vs. Tan, Tenebro vs. CA, and in Abunado vs. People, respectively, that:
[1] The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity does not
retroact to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the Philippines penal laws are concerned. As such, an
individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is
criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that the second marriage is void ab
initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.

[2] A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be legally
contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is
guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statute as void.

[3] The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the
declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover, petitioners assertion would only delay
the prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous
marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow
that.

Mercado vs. Tan (G.R. No. 137110, 1 August 2000)
In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although there was yet no judicial declaration of nullity of
his first marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to have the first marriage declared void only after complainant had
filed a letter-complaint charging him with bigamy. By contracting a second marriage while the first was still subsisting,
he committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.

That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial. To repeat, the
crime had already been consummated by then. Moreover, his view effectively encourages delay in the prosecution of
bigamy cases; an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of
that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.

Tenebro vs. CA, G.R. No. 150758, February 18, 2004
We are called on to decide the novel issue concerning the effect of the judicial declaration of the nullity of a second or
subsequent marriage, on the ground of psychological incapacity, on an individuals criminal liability for bigamy. We hold
that the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity does not
retroact to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the Philippines penal laws are concerned. As such, an
individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally liable
for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that the second marriage is void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity.

Petitioner in this case, Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10,
1990. The two were wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City. Tenebro and Ancajas
lived together continuously and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that
he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a
photocopy of a marriage contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left
the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes.

On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda Villegas, before Judge
German Lee, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 15. When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she
verified from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married to petitioner. In a handwritten letter, Villareyes confirmed
that petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her husband.

The second tier of petitioners defense hinges on the effects of the subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the
second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.

Petitioner argues that this subsequent judicial declaration retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage to
Ancajas. As such, he argues that, since his marriage to Ancajas was subsequently declared void ab initio, the crime of
bigamy was not committed.

This argument is not impressed with merit. Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the nullity of the second
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, invoking Article 36 of the Family Code. What petitioner fails to
realize is that a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of
absolutely no moment insofar as the States penal laws are concerned.

As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioners valid marriage to Villareyes,
petitioners marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioners psychological
capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the
nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently,
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage
before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively
dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings. A plain reading of the law, therefore, would indicate
that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a
valid marriage.

Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990, during the subsistence of the valid
first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated. To our mind, there is no cogent reason for
distinguishing between a subsequent marriage that is null and void purely because it is a second or subsequent
marriage, and a subsequent marriage that is null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity, at least insofar as
criminal liability for bigamy is concerned. The States penal laws protecting the institution of marriage are in recognition
of the sacrosanct character of this special contract between spouses, and punish an individuals deliberate disregard of
the permanent character of the special bond between spouses, which petitioner has undoubtedly done.

Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is not an
indicator that petitioners marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity. The requisites for the validity of
a marriage are classified by the Family Code into essential (legal capacity of the contracting parties and their consent
freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer) and formal (authority of the solemnizing officer, marriage
license, and marriage ceremony wherein the parties personally declare their agreement to marry before the
solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two witnesses). Under Article 5 of the Family Code, any male or female
of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38 may
contract marriage.

In this case, all the essential and formal requisites for the validity of marriage were satisfied by petitioner and Ancajas.
Both were over eighteen years of age, and they voluntarily contracted the second marriage with the required license
before Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, in the presence of at least two witnesses.

Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the
date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, it is significant to
note that said marriage is not without legal effects. Among these effects is that children conceived or born before the
judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be considered legitimate. There is therefore a recognition written into
the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal
consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the States penal laws on
bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some
manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless
women with the promise of futurity and commitment.

As a final point, we note that based on the evidence on record, petitioner contracted marriage a third time, while his
marriages to Villareyes and Ancajas were both still subsisting. Although this is irrelevant in the determination of the
accuseds guilt for purposes of this particular case, the act of the accused displays a deliberate disregard for the
sanctity of marriage, and the State does not look kindly on such activities.Marriage is a special contract, the key
characteristic of which is its permanence. When an individual manifests a deliberate pattern of flouting the foundation
of the States basic social institution, the States criminal laws on bigamy step in.
Abunado vs. People, G.R. No. 159218, March 30, 2004
Petitioner claims that his petition for annulment/declaration of nullity of marriage was a prejudicial question, hence, the
proceedings in the bigamy case should have been suspended during the pendency of the annulment case. Petitioner,
in fact, eventually obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Narcisa on October 29, 1999.

A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately
connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it
must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution
would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the
accused would necessarily be determined. The rationale behind the principle of suspending a criminal case in view of a
prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.

The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of
nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover, petitioners assertion would only delay the prosecution of
bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke
the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.

The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioners marriage to Narcisa had no bearing upon the determination
of petitioners innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to
prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.

Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in
a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void
ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.



THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 137110. August 1, 2000]
VINCENT PAUL G. MERCADO a.k.a. VINCENT G. MERCADO, petitioner, vs. CONSUELO TAN, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be legally
contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of
bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statute as void.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the July 14, 1998 Decision of the Court of Appeals
(CA)
[1]
in CA-GR CR No. 19830 and its January 4, 1999 Resolution denying reconsideration. The assailed Decision
affirmed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City in Criminal Case No. 13848, which convicted
herein petitioner of bigamy as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of accused Dr. Vincent Paul G. Mercado a.k.a. Dr. Vincent G. Mercado of the crime of
Bigamy punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code to have been proven beyond reasonable doubt, [the
court hereby renders] judgment imposing upon him a prison term of three (3) years, four (4) months and fifteen (15)
days of prision correccional, as minimum of his indeterminate sentence, to eight (8) years and twenty-one (21) days of
prision mayor, as maximum, plus accessory penalties provided by law.
Costs against accused.
[2]

The Facts
The facts are quoted by Court of Appeals (CA) from the trial courts judgment, as follows: From the evidence
adduced by the parties, there is no dispute that accused Dr. Vincent Mercado and complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan got
married on June 27, 1991 before MTCC-Bacolod City Br. 7 Judge Gorgonio J. Ibaez [by reason of] which a Marriage
Contract was duly executed and signed by the parties. As entered in said document, the status of accused was
single. There is no dispute either that at the time of the celebration of the wedding with complainant, accused was
actually a married man, having been in lawful wedlock with Ma. Thelma Oliva in a marriage ceremony solemnized on
April 10, 1976 by Judge Leonardo B. Caares, CFI-Br. XIV, Cebu City per Marriage Certificate issued in connection
therewith, which matrimony was further blessed by Rev. Father Arthur Baur on October 10, 1976 in religious rites at
the Sacred Heart Church, Cebu City. In the same manner, the civil marriage between accused and complainant was
confirmed in a church ceremony on June 29, 1991 officiated by Msgr. Victorino A. Rivas, Judicial Vicar, Diocese of
Bacolod City. Both marriages were consummated when out of the first consortium, Ma. Thelma Oliva bore accused
two children, while a child, Vincent Paul, Jr. was sired by accused with complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan.
On October 5, 1992, a letter-complaint for bigamy was filed by complainant through counsel with the City Prosecutor
of Bacolod City, which eventually resulted [in] the institution of the present case before this Court against said accused,
Dr. Vincent G. Mercado, on March 1, 1993 in an Information dated January 22, 1993.
On November 13, 1992, or more than a month after the bigamy case was lodged in the Prosecutors Office, accused
filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Ma. Thelma V. Oliva in RTC-Br. 22, Cebu City, and in a
Decision dated May 6, 1993 the marriage between Vincent G. Mercado and Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was declared null
and void.
Accused is charged [with] bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code for having contracted a second
marriage with herein complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan on June 27, 1991 when at that time he was previously united in
lawful marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva on April 10, 1976 at Cebu City, without said first marriage having been legally
dissolved. As shown by the evidence and admitted by accused, all the essential elements of the crime are present,
namely: (a) that the offender has been previously legally married; (2) that the first marriage has not been legally
dissolved or in case the spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil
Code; (3) that he contract[ed] a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage ha[d]
all the essential requisites for validity. x x x
While acknowledging the existence of the two marriage[s], accused posited the defense that his previous marriage
ha[d] been judicially declared null and void and that the private complainant had knowledge of the first marriage of
accused.
It is an admitted fact that when the second marriage was entered into with Ma. Consuelo Tan on June 27, 1991,
accuseds prior marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was subsisting, no judicial action having yet been initiated or any
judicial declaration obtained as to the nullity of such prior marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva. Since no declaration of
the nullity of his first marriage ha[d] yet been made at the time of his second marriage, it is clear that accused was a
married man when he contracted such second marriage with complainant on June 27, 1991. He was still at the time
validly married to his first wife.
[3]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Agreeing with the lower court, the Court of Appeals stated:
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. But here, the final judgment
declaring null and void accuseds previous marriage came not before the celebration of the second marriage, but after,
when the case for bigamy against accused was already tried in court. And what constitutes the crime of bigamy is the
act of any person who shall contract a second subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved.
[4]

Hence, this Petition.
[5]


The Issues
In his Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues:
A
Whether or not the element of previous legal marriage is present in order to convict petitioner.
B
Whether or not a liberal interpretation in favor of petitioner of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code punishing bigamy,
in relation to Articles 36 and 40 of the Family Code, negates the guilt of petitioner.
C
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to an acquittal on the basis of reasonable doubt.
[6]


The Courts Ruling
The Petition is not meritorious.

Main Issue:Effect of Nullity of Previous Marriage
Petitioner was convicted of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:
The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage
before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively
dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
The elements of this crime are as follows:
1. That the offender has been legally married;
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could
not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage;
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
[7]

When the Information was filed on January 22, 1993, all the elements of bigamy were present. It is undisputed
that petitioner married Thelma G. Oliva on April 10, 1976 in Cebu City. While that marriage was still subsisting, he
contracted a second marriage, this time with Respondent Ma. Consuelo Tan who subsequently filed the Complaint for
bigamy.
Petitioner contends, however, that he obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage under Article 36
of the Family Code, thereby rendering it void ab initio. Unlike voidable marriages which are considered valid until set
aside by a competent court, he argues that a void marriage is deemed never to have taken place at all.
[8]
Thus, he
concludes that there is no first marriage to speak of. Petitioner also quotes the commentaries
[9]
of former Justice Luis
Reyes that it is now settled that if the first marriage is void from the beginning, it is a defense in a bigamy charge. But
if the first marriage is voidable, it is not a defense.
Respondent, on the other hand, admits that the first marriage was declared null and void under Article 36 of the
Family Code, but she points out that that declaration came only after the Information had been filed. Hence, by then,
the crime had already been consummated. She argues that a judicial declaration of nullity of a void previous marriage
must be obtained before a person can marry for a subsequent time.
We agree with the respondent.
To be sure, jurisprudence regarding the need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage has
been characterized as conflicting.
[10]
In People v. Mendoza,
[11]
a bigamy case involving an accused who married three
times, the Court ruled that there was no need for such declaration. In that case, the accused contracted a second
marriage during the subsistence of the first. When the first wife died, he married for the third time. The second wife
then charged him with bigamy. Acquitting him, the Court held that the second marriage was void ab initio because it
had been contracted while the first marriage was still in effect. Since the second marriage was obviously void and
illegal, the Court ruled that there was no need for a judicial declaration of its nullity. Hence, the accused did not commit
bigamy when he married for the third time. This ruling was affirmed by the Court in People v. Aragon,
[12]
which
involved substantially the same facts.
But in subsequent cases, the Court impressed the need for a judicial declaration of nullity. In Vda de Consuegra
v. GSIS,
[13]
Jose Consuegra married for the second time while the first marriage was still subsisting. Upon his death,
the Court awarded one half of the proceeds of his retirement benefits to the first wife and the other half to the second
wife and her children, notwithstanding the manifest nullity of the second marriage. It held: And with respect to the
right of the second wife, this Court observes that although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as
it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity.
In Tolentino v. Paras,
[14]
however, the Court again held that judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage was
not necessary. In that case, a man married twice. In his Death Certificate, his second wife was named as his surviving
spouse. The first wife then filed a Petition to correct the said entry in the Death Certificate. The Court ruled in favor of
the first wife, holding that the second marriage that he contracted with private respondent during the lifetime of the first
spouse is null and void from the beginning and of no force and effect. No judicial decree is necessary to establish the
invalidity of a void marriage.
In Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy,
[15]
the Court stressed the need for such declaration. In that case, Karl Heinz Wiegel
filed an action for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lilia Olivia Wiegel on the ground that the latter had a prior
existing marriage. After pretrial, Lilia asked that she be allowed to present evidence to prove, among others, that her
first husband had previously been married to another woman. In holding that there was no need for such evidence, the
Court ruled: x x x There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first
husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs, according to this Court,
a judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman
at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel; x x x.
Subsequently, in Yap v. CA,
[16]
the Court reverted to the ruling in People v. Mendoza, holding that there was no
need for such declaration of nullity.
In Domingo v. CA,
[17]
the issue raised was whether a judicial declaration of nullity was still necessary for the
recovery and the separation of properties of erstwhile spouses. Ruling in the affirmative, the Court declared: The
Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the absolute
nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense; in fact, the
requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the spouse who, believing
that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her first
marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy.
[18]

Unlike Mendoza and Aragon, Domingo as well as the other cases herein cited was not a criminal prosecution for
bigamy. Nonetheless, Domingo underscored the need for a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage on the
basis of a new provision of the Family Code, which came into effect several years after the promulgation
of Mendoza and Aragon.
In Mendoza and Aragon, the Court relied on Section 29 of Act No. 3613 (Marriage Law), which provided:
Illegal marriages. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse shall
be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
(a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;
(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage
without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or the absentee being generally
considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such
subsequent marriage, the marriage as contracted being valid in either case until declared null and void
by a competent court."
The Court held in those two cases that the said provision plainly makes a subsequent marriage contracted by
any person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void from its performance, and no judicial decree is
necessary to establish its invalidity, as distinguished from mere annulable marriages.
[19]

The provision appeared in substantially the same form under Article 83 of the 1950 Civil Code and Article 41 of
the Family Code. However, Article 40 of the Family Code, a new provision, expressly requires a judicial declaration of
nullity of the previous marriage, as follows:
ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely
of a final judgment declaring such marriage void.
In view of this provision, Domingo stressed that a final judgment declaring such marriage void was
necessary. Verily, the Family Code and Domingo affirm the earlier ruling in Wiegel. Thus, a Civil Law authority and
member of the Civil Code Revision Commitee has observed:
[Article 40] is also in line with the recent decisions of the Supreme Court that the marriage of a person may be null
and void but there is need of a judicial declaration of such fact before that person can marry again; otherwise, the
second marriage will also be void (Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, Aug. 19/86, 143 SCRA 499, Vda. De Consuegra v. GSIS, 37
SCRA 315). This provision changes the old rule that where a marriage is illegal and void from its performance, no
judicial decree is necessary to establish its validity (People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 843; People v. Aragon, 100 Phil.
1033).
[20]

In this light, the statutory mooring of the ruling in Mendoza and Aragon that there is no need for a judicial
declaration of nullity of a void marriage -- has been cast aside by Article 40 of the Family Code. Such declaration is
now necessary before one can contract a second marriage. Absent that declaration, we hold that one may be charged
with and convicted of bigamy.
The present ruling is consistent with our pronouncement in Terre v. Terre,
[21]
which involved an administrative
Complaint against a lawyer for marrying twice. In rejecting the lawyers argument that he was free to enter into a
second marriage because the first one was void ab initio, the Court ruled: for purposes of determining whether a
person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab
initio is essential. The Court further noted that the said rule was cast into statutory form by Article 40 of the Family
Code. Significantly, it observed that the second marriage, contracted without a judicial declaration that the first
marriage was void, was bigamous and criminal in character.
Moreover, Justice Reyes, an authority in Criminal Law whose earlier work was cited by petitioner, changed his
view on the subject in view of Article 40 of the Family Code and wrote in 1993 that a person must first obtain a judicial
declaration of the nullity of a void marriage before contracting a subsequent marriage:
[22]

It is now settled that the fact that the first marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense in a bigamy charge. As
with a voidable marriage, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage before contracting the
second marriage. Article 40 of the Family Code states that x x x. The Code Commission believes that the parties to
a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void, even if such is the fact, but must first secure a
judicial declaration of nullity of their marriage before they should be allowed to marry again. x x x.
In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although there was yet no judicial declaration of
nullity of his first marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to have the first marriage declared void only after
complainant had filed a letter-complaint charging him with bigamy. By contracting a second marriage while the first
was still subsisting, he committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial. To repeat,
the crime had already been consummated by then. Moreover, his view effectively encourages delay in the prosecution
of bigamy cases; an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency
of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.
Under the circumstances of the present case, he is guilty of the charge against him.
Damages
In her Memorandum, respondent prays that the Court set aside the ruling of the Court of Appeals insofar as it
denied her claim of damages and attorneys fees.
[23]

Her prayer has no merit. She did not appeal the ruling of the CA against her; hence, she cannot obtain
affirmative relief from this Court.
[24]
In any event, we find no reason to reverse or set aside the pertinent ruling of the CA
on this point, which we quote hereunder:
We are convinced from the totality of the evidence presented in this case that Consuelo Tan is not the innocent victim
that she claims to be; she was well aware of the existence of the previous marriage when she contracted matrimony
with Dr. Mercado. The testimonies of the defense witnesses prove this, and we find no reason to doubt said
testimonies.
x x x x x x x x x
Indeed, the claim of Consuelo Tan that she was not aware of his previous marriage does not inspire belief, especially
as she had seen that Dr. Mercado had two (2) children with him. We are convinced that she took the plunge anyway,
relying on the fact that the first wife would no longer return to Dr. Mercado, she being by then already living with
another man.
Consuelo Tan can therefore not claim damages in this case where she was fully conscious of the consequences of
her act. She should have known that she would suffer humiliation in the event the truth [would] come out, as it did in
this case, ironically because of her personal instigation. If there are indeed damages caused to her reputation, they
are of her own willful making.
[25]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., see concurring and dissenting opinion.

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
VITUG, J.:
At the pith of the controversy is the defense of the absolute nullity of a previous marriage in an indictment for
bigamy. The majority opinion, penned by my esteemed brother, Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, enunciates that it
is only a judicially decreed prior void marriage which can constitute a defense against the criminal charge.
The civil law rule stated in Article 40 of the Family Code is a given but I have strong reservations on its
application beyond what appears to be its expressed context. The subject of the instant petition is a criminal
prosecution, not a civil case, and the ponencia affirms the conviction of petitioner Vincent Paul G. Mercado for bigamy.
Article 40 of the Family code reads:
ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely
of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
The phrase for purposes of remarriage is not at all insignificant. Void marriages, like void contracts, are
inexistent from the very beginning. It is only by way of exception that the Family code requires a judicial declaration of
nullity of the previous marriage before a subsequent marriage is contracted; without such declaration, the validity and
the full legal consequence of the subsequent marriage would itself be in similar jeopardy under Article 53, in relation to
Article 52, of the Family Code. Parenthetically, I would daresay that the necessity of a judicial declaration of nullity of a
void marriage for the purpose of remarriage should be held to refer merely to cases where it can be said that a
marriage, at least ostensibly, had taken place. No such judicial declaration of nullity, in my view, should still be
deemed essential when the marriage, for instance, is between persons of the same sex or when either or both parties
had not at all given consent to the marriage. Indeed, it is likely that Article 40 of the Family Code has been meant
and intended to refer only to marriages declared void under the provisions of Articles 35, 36, 37, 38 and 53 thereof.
In fine, the Family Code, I respectfully submit, did not have the effect of overturning the rule in criminal law and
related jurisprudence. The Revised Penal Code expresses:
Art. 349. Bigamy.---The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has
been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
Surely, the foregoing provision contemplated an existing, not void, prior marriage. Covered by article 349 would thus
be, for instance, a voidable marriage, it obviously being valid and subsisting until set aside by a competent court. As
early as People vs. Aragon,
1
this Court has underscored:
xxx Our Revised Penal Code is of recent enactment and had the rule enunciated in Spain and in America
requiring judicial declaration of nullity of ab initio void marriages been within the contemplation of the
legislature, an express provision to that effect would or should have been inserted in the law. In its absence,
we are bound by said rule of strict interpretation.
Unlike a voidable marriage which legally exists until judicially annulled (and therefore not a defense in bigamy if
the second marriage were contracted prior to the decree of annulment), the complete nullity, however, of a previously
contracted marriage, being a total nullity and inexistent, should be capable of being independently raised by way of a
defense in a criminal case for bigamy. I see no incongruence between this rule in criminal law and that of the Family
Code, and each may be applied within the respective spheres of governance.
Accordingly, I vote to grant the petition.



1


100 Phil. 1033.



[1]
Penned by J. Salome A. Montoya, Division chairman; with the concurrence of JJ Conchita Carpio Morales and
Bernardo P. Abesamis, members.
[2]
RTC Decision, pp. 16-17; rollo, pp. 136-137. This was written by Judge Edgar G. Garvilles.
[3]
CA Decision, pp. 2-4; rollo, pp. 45-47.
[4]
Ibid., p. 6; rollo, p. 13.
[5]
The case was deemed submitted for resolution on May 26, 2000, upon receipt by this Court of the OSG
Memorandum signed by Sol. Gen. Ricardo P. Galvez, Asst. Sol. Gen. Mariano M Martinez and Sol. Jesus P. Castelo.
Respondents Memorandum, which was signed by Atty. Julius C. Baldado, was received on November 11, 1999; while
petitioners Memorandum, signed by Attys. Bernard B. Lopez and Maritoni Z. Liwanag, had been filed earlier on
September 30, 1999.
[6]
Petitioners Memorandum, p. 5; rollo, p. 215.
[7]
Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Book Two, 13th ed. (1993), p. 828.
[8]
Citing Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines: Commentaries and Jurisprudence, Vol. I, p. 265.
[9]
Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Book Two, 12th ed. (1981), p. 907.9
[10]
Domingo v. CA, 226 SCRA 572, September 17, 1993, per Romero, J.
[11]
95 Phil. 845, September 28, 1954.
[12]
100 Phil. 1033, February 28, 1957.
[13]
37 SCRA 315, 326, January 30, 1971, per Zaldivar, J. Emphasis supplied. See also Gomez v. Lipana, 33 SCRA
615, June 30, 1970.
[14]
122 SCRA 525,529, May 30, 1983; per Melencio-Herrera, J. Emphasis supplied.
[15]
143 SCRA 499, August 19, 1986, per Paras, J. Emphasis supplied.
[16]
145 SCRA 229, October 28, 1986.
[17]
226 SCRA 572, September 17, 1993, per Romero, J, citing Sempio-Diy, Handbook of the Family Code of the
Philippines, 1988, p. 46.
[18]
Supra, p. 579.
[19]
People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845, 847, September 28, 1954, per Paras, CJ. See also People v. Aragon, 100 Phil.
1033, 1034-1035, February 28, 1957, per Labrador, J.
[20]
Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, 1995 ed., p. 56.
[21]
211 SCRA 6, 11, July 3, 1992, per curiam.
[22]
Reyes, Revised Penal Code, Book Two, 13th ed. (1993), p. 829. Emphasis supplied. Petitioner had cited the
statement of Justice Reyes that if the first marriage is void from the beginning, it is a defense in a bigamy
charge. This statement, however, appeared in the 1981 edition of Reyes book, before the enactment of the Family
Code.
[23]
Respondents Memorandum, p. 16; rollo, p. 259.
[24]
Lagandaon v. Court of Appeals, 290 SCRA 330, May 21, 1998; Dio v. Concepcion, 296 SCRA 579, September 25,
1998.
[25]
CA Decision, pp. 7-9; rollo, pp. 50-52.


AUTHORITY OF SOLEMNIZING OFFICER
FIRST DIVISION

[A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390. April 11, 2002]
MERCEDITA MATA ARAES, petitioner, vs. JUDGE SALVADOR M. OCCIANO, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

PUNO, J.:
Petitioner Mercedita Mata Araes charges respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law via a sworn Letter-
Complaint dated 23 May 2001. Respondent is the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines
Sur. Petitioner alleges that on 17 February 2000, respondent judge solemnized her marriage to her late groom
Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his
territorial jurisdiction.
They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of this marriage until her husband passed away.
However, since the marriage was a nullity, petitioners right to inherit the vast properties left by Orobia was not
recognized. She was likewise deprived of receiving the pensions of Orobia, a retired Commodore of the Philippine
Navy.
Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent judge for his illegal acts and unethical
misrepresentations which allegedly caused her so much hardships, embarrassment and sufferings.
On 28 May 2001, the case was referred by the Office of the Chief Justice to then Acting Court Administrator
Zenaida N. Elepao for appropriate action. On 8 June 2001, the Office of the Court Administrator required respondent
judge to comment.
In his Comment dated 5 July 2001, respondent judge averred that he was requested by a certain Juan Arroyo on
15 February 2000 to solemnize the marriage of the parties on 17 February 2000. Having been assured that all the
documents to the marriage were complete, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in his sala at the Municipal Trial Court
of Balatan, Camarines Sur. However, on 17 February 2000, Arroyo informed him that Orobia had a difficulty walking
and could not stand the rigors of travelling to Balatan which is located almost 25 kilometers from his residence in
Nabua. Arroyo then requested if respondent judge could solemnize the marriage in Nabua, to which request he
acceded.
Respondent judge further avers that before he started the ceremony, he carefully examined the documents
submitted to him by petitioner. When he discovered that the parties did not possess the requisite marriage license, he
refused to solemnize the marriage and suggested its resetting to another date. However, due to the earnest pleas of
the parties, the influx of visitors, and the delivery of provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the
marriage out of human compassion. He also feared that if he reset the wedding, it might aggravate the physical
condition of Orobia who just suffered from a stroke. After the solemnization, he reiterated the necessity for the
marriage license and admonished the parties that their failure to give it would render the marriage void. Petitioner and
Orobia assured respondent judge that they would give the license to him in the afternoon of that same day. When they
failed to comply, respondent judge followed it up with Arroyo but the latter only gave him the same reassurance that
the marriage license would be delivered to his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur.
Respondent judge vigorously denies that he told the contracting parties that their marriage is valid despite the
absence of a marriage license. He attributes the hardships and embarrassment suffered by the petitioner as due to her
own fault and negligence.
On 12 September 2001, petitioner filed her Affidavit of Desistance dated 28 August 2001 with the Office of the
Court Administrator. She attested that respondent judge initially refused to solemnize her marriage due to the want of a
duly issued marriage license and that it was because of her prodding and reassurances that he eventually solemnized
the same. She confessed that she filed this administrative case out of rage. However, after reading the Comment filed
by respondent judge, she realized her own shortcomings and is now bothered by her conscience.
Reviewing the records of the case, it appears that petitioner and Orobia filed their Application for Marriage
License on 5 January 2000. It was stamped in this Application that the marriage license shall be issued on 17 January
2000. However, neither petitioner nor Orobia claimed it.
It also appears that the Office of the Civil Registrar General issued a Certification that it has no record of such
marriage that allegedly took place on 17 February 2000. Likewise, the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua,
Camarines Sur issued another Certification dated 7 May 2001 that it cannot issue a true copy of the Marriage Contract
of the parties since it has no record of their marriage.
On 8 May 2001, petitioner sought the assistance of respondent judge so the latter could communicate with the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur for the issuance of her marriage license. Respondent judge
wrote the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur. In a letter dated 9 May 2001, a Clerk of said office, Grace T.
Escobal, informed respondent judge that their office cannot issue the marriage license due to the failure of Orobia to
submit the Death Certificate of his previous spouse.
The Office of the Court Administrator, in its Report and Recommendation dated 15 November 2000, found the
respondent judge guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a duly issued marriage license and for doing so outside his
territorial jurisdiction. A fine of P5,000.00 was recommended to be imposed on respondent judge.
We agree.
Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P.129, the authority of the regional trial court judges and
judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their territorial jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme
Court.
The case at bar is not without precedent. In Navarro vs. Domagtoy,
[1]
respondent judge held office and had
jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. However, he solemnized a
wedding at his residence in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte which did not fall within the jurisdictional area
of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos. We held that:
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinance to marry the faithful is authorized to do so only within
the area or diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction
over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are
complied with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only
within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his courts jurisdiction, there
is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity
of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.
[2]
(Emphasis supplied.)
In said case, we suspended respondent judge for six (6) months on the ground that his act of solemnizing a
marriage outside his jurisdiction constitutes gross ignorance of the law. We further held that:
The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in the law they are sworn to
apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and competent in understanding and applying the law. It
is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles like the ones involved in the instant case. x x x While
magistrates may at times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge exhibited
ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of married persons.
[3]

In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the municipality of Balatan,
Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is
contrary to law and subjects him to administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he
allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the
law on marriage.
Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage license.
In People vs. Lara,
[4]
we held that a marriage which preceded the issuance of the marriage license is void, and that
the subsequent issuance of such license cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in
cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a
marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this
respect, respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of the law.
Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit of Desistance filed by petitioner. This Court has
consistently held in a catena of cases that the withdrawal of the complaint does not necessarily have the legal effect of
exonerating respondent from disciplinary action. Otherwise, the prompt and fair administration of justice, as well as the
discipline of court personnel, would be undermined.
[5]
Disciplinary actions of this nature do not involve purely private or
personal matters. They can not be made to depend upon the will of every complainant who may, for one reason or
another, condone a detestable act. We cannot be bound by the unilateral act of a complainant in a matter which
involves the Courts constitutional power to discipline judges. Otherwise, that power may be put to naught, undermine
the trust character of a public office and impair the integrity and dignity of this Court as a disciplining authority.
[6]

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan,
Camarines Sur, is fined P5,000.00 pesos with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense in
the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.



[1]
259 SCRA 129 (1996).
[2]
Id., pp. 135-136.
[3]
Id., p. 136.
[4]
C.A. O.G. 4079.
[5]
Farrales vs. Camarista, 327 SCRA 84 (2000).
[6]
Sandoval vs. Manalo, 260 SCRA 611 (1996


SECOND DIVISION

[A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088. July 19, 1996]
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant, vs. JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTOY, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

ROMERO, J.:
The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G.
Navarro. He has submitted evidence in relation to two specific acts committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial
Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and
ignorance of the law.
First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding between Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn
F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first wife.
Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G.
del Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Respondent judge holds office and has jurisdiction in
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. The wedding was solemnized at the
respondent judge's residence in the municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within his jurisdictional area of the
municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, located some 40 to 45 kilometers away from the municipality of Dapa,
Surigao del Norte.
In his letter-comment to the Office of the Court Administrator, respondent judge avers that the office and name of
the Municipal Mayor of Dapa have been used by someone else, who, as the mayor's "lackey," is overly concerned with
his actuations both as judge and as a private person. The same person had earlier filed Administrative Matter No. 94-
980-MTC, which was dismissed for lack of merit on September 15, 1994, and Administrative Matter No. OCA-IPI-95-
16, "Antonio Adapon v. Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy," which is still pending.
In relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks exculpation from his act of having solemnized the
marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated from his wife, and Arlyn F. Borga by stating that he
merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that Mr.
Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other for almost seven years.
[1]
With respect to the second charge, he
maintains that in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph 1
of the Family Code which states that: "Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary
within the court's jurisdiction; and that Article 8 thereof applies to the case in question.
The complaint was not referred, as is usual, for investigation, since the pleadings submitted were considered
sufficient for a resolution of the case.
[2]

Since the countercharges of sinister motives and fraud on the part of complainant have not been sufficiently
proven, they will not be dwelt upon. The acts complained of and respondent judge's answer thereto will suffice and
can be objectively assessed by themselves to prove the latter's malfeasance.
The certified true copy of the marriage contract between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga states that Tagadan's
civil status is "separated." Despite this declaration, the wedding ceremony was solemnized by respondent judge. He
presented in evidence a joint affidavit by Maurecio A. Labado, Sr. and Eugenio Bullecer, subscribed and sworn to
before Judge Demosthenes C. Duquilla, Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar.
[3]
The affidavit was not issued by the
latter judge, as claimed by respondent judge, but merely acknowledged before him. In their affidavit, the affiants stated
that they knew Gaspar Tagadan to have been civilly married to Ida D. Pearanda in September 1983; that after
thirteen years of cohabitation and having borne five children, Ida Pearanda left the conjugal dwelling in Valencia,
Bukidnon and that she has not returned nor been heard of for almost seven years, thereby giving rise to the
presumption that she is already dead.
In effect, Judge Domagtoy maintains that the aforementioned joint affidavit is sufficient proof of Ida Pearanda's
presumptive death, and ample reason for him to proceed with the marriage ceremony. We do not agree.
Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides:
"A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless
before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and
the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance
where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Articles 391 of the Civil Code, an
absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must
institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse." (Emphasis added.)
There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this provision. In fact, the law is clear and simple. Even
if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding for
the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage, a mandatory
requirement which has been precisely incorporated into the Family Code to discourage subsequent marriages where it
is not proven that the previous marriage has been dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or presumptively dead, in
accordance with pertinent provisions of law.
In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of his first wife's
presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida Pearanda. Whether wittingly, or
unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of respondent judge to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the
groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage. Under Article
35 of the Family Code, "The following marriage shall be void from the beginning: (4) Those bigamous x x x marriages
not falling under Article 41."
The second issue involves the solemnization of a marriage ceremony outside the court's jurisdiction, covered by
Articles 7 and 8 of the Family Code, thus:
"Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;
x x x x x x xxx (Emphasis supplied.)
Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open court, in the church, chapel or
temple, or in the office of the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in
cases of marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this
Code, or where both parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be
solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect."
Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justifications for his having solemnized the
marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside of his court's jurisdiction. As the aforequoted
provision states, a marriage can be held outside of the judge's chambers or courtroom only in the following
instances: (1) at the point of death, (2) in remote places in accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon request of both
parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect. There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the
point of death or in a remote place. Moreover, the written request presented addressed to the respondent judge was
made by only one party, Gemma del Rosario.
[4]

More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority of the solemnizing
judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the "authority of the solemnizing officer." Under
Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, "any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's
jurisdiction." Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not
alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith
will not invalidate the marriage.
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to marry the faithful, is authorized to do so only
within the area of the diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has
jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the
law are complied with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only
within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a
resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the
marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.
[5]

Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, he was not
clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. By citing Article 8 and
the exceptions therein as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced authority, respondent judge again demonstrated a
lack of understanding of the basic principles of civil law.
Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law. The legal principles
applicable in the cases brought to our attention are elementary and uncomplicated, prompting us to conclude that
respondent's failure to apply them is due to a lack of comprehension of the law.
The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in the law they are sworn
to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and competent in understanding and applying the
law. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles like the ones involved in instant case.
[6]
It is not
too much to expect them to know and apply the law intelligently.
[7]
Otherwise, the system of justice rests on a shaky
foundation indeed, compounded by the errors committed by those not learned in the law. While magistrates may at
times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge exhibited ignorance of
elementary provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of married persons.
The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered bigamous and void, there being a
subsisting marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Ida Pearanda.
The Office of the Court Administrator recommends, in its Memorandum to the Court, a six-month suspension and
a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Considering that one of
the marriages in question resulted in a bigamous union and therefore void, and the other lacked the necessary
authority of respondent judge, the Court adopts said recommendation. Respondent is advised to be more circumspect
in applying the law and to cultivate a deeper understanding of the law.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy is hereby SUSPENDED for a period
of six (6) months and given a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado (Chairman), Puno, Mendoza, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.



[1]
Rollo, pp. 7-8.
[2]
Uy v. Dizon-Capulong, A.M. No. RTJ-91-766, April 7, 1993; Montemayor v. Collado, A.M. No. 2519-MTJ, September
10, 1981; Ubongon v. Mayo, A.M. No. 1255-CTJ, August 6, 1980, 99 SCRA 30.
[3]
Rollo, p. 12.
[4]
Rollo, pp. 10-11.
[5]
Article 4, Family Code.
[6]
Lim v. Domogas, A.M. No. RTJ-92-899, October 15, 1993, 227 SCRA 258, 263 citing Ubongan v. Mayo, 99 SCRA
30 and Ajeno v. Inserto, 71 SCRA 166.
[7]
Galan Realty Co. v. Arranz, A.M. No. MTJ-93-978, October 27, 1994, 237 SCRA 771.


MARRIAGE LICENSE SHOULD BE EXISTING AT THE TIME OF THE MARRIAGE:
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

A.M. No. MTJ-92-721 September 30, 1994
JUVY N. COSCA, EDMUNDO B. PERALTA, RAMON C. SAMBO, and APOLLO A. VILLAMORA, complainants,
vs.
HON. LUCIO P. PALAYPAYON, JR., Presiding Judge, and NELIA B. ESMERALDA-BAROY, Clerk of Court II,
both of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, respondents.
Esteban R. Abonal for complainants.
Haide B. Vista-Gumba for respondents.

PER CURIAM, J.:
Complainants Juvy N. Cosca, Edmundo B. Peralta, Ramon C. Sambo, and Apollo Villamora, are Stenographer I,
Interpreter I, Clerk II, and Process Server, respectively, of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur.
Respondents Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon, Jr. and Nelia B. Esmeralda-Baroy are respectively the Presiding Judge and
Clerk of Court II of the same court.
In an administrative complaint filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on October 5, 1992, herein respondents
were charged with the following offenses, to wit: (1) illegal solemnization of marriage; (2) falsification of the monthly
reports of cases; (3) bribery in consideration of an appointment in the court; (4) non-issuance of receipt for cash bond
received; (5) infidelity in the custody of detained prisoners; and (6) requiring payment of filing fees from exempted
entities.
1

Pursuant to a resolution issued by this Court respondents filed their respective Comments.
2
A Reply to Answers of
Respondents was filed by complainants.
3
The case was thereafter referred to Executive Judge David C. Naval of the
Regional Trial Court, Naga City, for investigation report and recommendation. The case was however transferred to
First Assistant Executive Judge Antonio N. Gerona when Judge Naval inhibited himself for the reason that his wife is a
cousin of respondent Judge Palaypayon, Jr.
4

The contending versions of the parties regarding the factual antecedents of this administrative matter, as culled from
the records thereof, are set out under each particular charge against respondents.
1. Illegal solemnization of marriage
Complainants allege that respondent judge solemnized marriages even without the requisite marriage license. Thus,
the following couples were able to get married by the simple expedient of paying the marriage fees to respondent
Baroy, despite the absence of a marriage license, viz.: Alano P. Abellano and Nelly Edralin, Francisco Selpo and
Julieta Carrido, Eddie Terrobias and Maria Gacer, Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga, Arsenio Sabater and Margarita
Nacario, and Sammy Bocaya and Gina Bismonte. As a consequence, their marriage contracts (Exhibits B, C, D, F, G,
and A, respectively) did not reflect any marriage license number. In addition, respondent judge did not sign their
marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of solemnization, the reason being that he allegedly had to wait for the
marriage license to be submitted by the parties which was usually several days after the ceremony. Indubitably, the
marriage contracts were not filed with the local civil registrar. Complainant Ramon Sambo, who prepares the marriage
contracts, called the attention of respondents to the lack of marriage licenses and its effect on the marriages involved,
but the latter opted to proceed with the celebration of said marriages.
Respondent Nelia Baroy claims that when she was appointed Clerk of Court II, the employees of the court were
already hostile to her, especially complainant Ramon Sambo who told her that he was filing a protest against her
appointment. She avers that it was only lately when she discovered that the court had a marriage Register which is in
the custody of Sambo; that it was Sambo who failed to furnish the parties copies of the marriage contract and to
register these with the local civil registrar; and that apparently Sambo kept these marriage contracts in preparation for
this administrative case. Complainant Sambo, however, claims that all file copies of the marriage contracts were kept
by respondent Baroy, but the latter insists that she had instructed Sambo to follow up the submission by the
contracting parties of their marriage licenses as part of his duties but he failed to do so.
Respondent Judge Palaypayon, Jr. contends that the marriage between Alano P. Abellano and Nelly Edralin falls
under Article 34 of the Civil Code, hence it is exempt from the marriage license requirement; that he gave strict
instructions to complainant Sambo to furnish the couple a copy of the marriage contract and to file the same with the
civil registrar, but the latter failed to do so; that in order to solve the problem, the spouses subsequently formalized their
marriage by securing a marriage license and executing their marriage contract, a copy of which was filed with the civil
registrar; that the other five marriages alluded to in the administrative complaint were not illegally solemnized because
the marriage contracts were not signed by him and they did not contain the date and place of marriage; that copies of
these marriage contracts are in the custody of complainant Sambo; that the alleged marriage of Francisco Selpo and
Julieta Carrido, Eddie Terrobias and Maria Emma Gaor, Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga, and of Arsenio Sabater
and Margarita Nacario were not celebrated by him since he refused to solemnize them in the absence of a marriage
license; that the marriage of Samy Bocaya and Gina Bismonte was celebrated even without the requisite license due to
the insistence of the parties in order to avoid embarrassment to their guests but that, at any rate, he did not sign their
marriage contract which remains unsigned up to the present.
2. Falsification of monthly report for July, 1991 regarding the number of marriages solemnized and
the number of documents notarized.
It is alleged that respondent judge made it appear that he solemnized seven (7) marriages in the month of July, 1992,
when in truth he did not do so or at most those marriages were null and void; that respondents likewise made it appear
that they have notarized only six (6) documents for July, 1992, but the Notarial Register will show that there were one
hundred thirteen (113) documents which were notarized during that month; and that respondents reported a notarial
fee of only P18.50 for each document, although in fact they collected P20.00 therefor and failed to account for the
difference.
Respondent Baroy contends, however, that the marriage registry where all marriages celebrated by respondent judge
are entered is under the exclusive control and custody of complainant Ramon Sambo, hence he is the only one who
should be held responsible for the entries made therein; that the reported marriages are merely based on the
payments made as solemnization fees which are in the custody of respondent Baroy. She further avers that it is
Sambo who is likewise the custodian of the Notarial Register; that she cannot be held accountable for whatever
alleged difference there is in the notarial fees because she is liable only for those payments tendered to her by Sambo
himself; that the notarial fees she collects are duly covered by receipts; that of the P20.00 charged, P18.50 is remitted
directly to the Supreme Court as part of the Judiciary Development Fund and P150 goes to the general fund of the
Supreme Court which is paid to the Municipal Treasurer of Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Respondent theorizes that the
discrepancies in the monthly report were manipulated by complainant Sambo considering that he is the one in charge
of the preparation of the monthly report.
Respondent Judge Palaypayon avers that the erroneous number of marriages celebrated was intentionally placed by
complainant Sambo; that the number of marriages solemnized should not be based on solemnization fees paid for that
month since not all the marriages paid for are solemnized in the same month. He claims that there were actually only
six (6) documents notarized in the month of July, 1992 which tallied with the official receipts issued by the clerk of
court; that it is Sambo who should be held accountable for any unreceipted payment for notarial fees because he is the
one in charge of the Notarial Register; and that this case filed by complainant Sambo is merely in retaliation for his
failure to be appointed as the clerk of court. Furthermore, respondent judge contends that he is not the one supervising
or preparing the monthly report, and that he merely has the ministerial duty to sign the same.
3. Bribery in consideration of an appointment in the court
Complainants allege that because of the retirement of the clerk of court, respondent judge forwarded to the Supreme
Court the applications of Rodel Abogado, Ramon Sambo, and Jessell Abiog. However, they were surprised when
respondent Baroy reported for duty as clerk of court on October 21, 1991. They later found out that respondent Baroy
was the one appointed because she gave a brand-new air-conditioning unit to respondent judge.
Respondent Baroy claims that when she was still in Naga City she purchased an air-conditioning unit but when she
was appointed clerk of court she had to transfer to Tinambac and, since she no longer needed the air conditioner, she
decided to sell the same to respondent judge. The installation and use thereof by the latter in his office was with the
consent of the Mayor of Tinambac.
Respondent judge contends that he endorsed all the applications for the position of clerk of court to the Supreme Court
which has the sole authority over such appointments and that he had no hand in the appointment of respondent Baroy.
He contends that the air-conditioning unit was bought from his
co-respondent on installment basis on May 29, 1992, eight (8) months after Baroy had been appointed clerk of court.
He claims that he would not be that naive to exhibit to the public as item which could not be defended as a matter of
honor and prestige.
4. Cash bond issued without a receipt
It is alleged that in Criminal Case No. 5438, entitled "People vs. Mendeza, et al., "bondswoman Januaria Dacara was
allowed by respondent judge to change her property bond to cash bond; that she paid the amount of P1,000.00 but
was never issued a receipt therefor nor was it made to appear in the records that the bond has been paid; that despite
the lapse of two years, the money was never returned to the bondswoman; and that it has not been shown that the
money was turned over to the Municipal Treasurer of Tinambac.
Respondent Baroy counters that the cash bond was deposited with the former clerk of court, then turned over to the
acting clerk of court and, later, given to her under a corresponding receipt; that the cash bond is deposited with the
bank; and that should the bondswoman desire to withdraw the same, she should follow the proper procedure therefor.
Respondent judge contends that Criminal Case No. 5438 was archieved for failure of the bondsman to deliver the body
of the accused in court despite notice; and that he has nothing to do with the payment of the cash bond as this is the
duty of the clerk of court.
5. Infidelity in the custody of prisoners
Complainants contend that respondent judge usually got detention prisoners to work in his house, one of whom was
Alex Alano, who is accused in Criminal Case No. 5647 for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act; that while Alano was
in the custody of respondent judge, the former escaped and was never recaptured; that in order to conceal this fact,
the case was archived pursuant to an order issued by respondent judge dated April 6, 1992.
Respondent judge denied the accusation and claims that he never employed detention prisoners and that he has
adequate household help; and that he had to order the case archived because it had been pending for more than six
(6) months and the accused therein remained at large.
6. Unlawful collection of docket fees
Finally, respondents are charged with collecting docket fees from the Rural Bank of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, Inc.
although such entity is exempt by law from the payment of said fees, and that while the corresponding receipt was
issued, respondent Baroy failed to remit the amount to the Supreme Court and, instead, she deposited the same in her
personal account.
Respondents Baroy contends that it was Judge-Designate Felimon Montenegro (because respondent judge was on
sick leave) who instructed her to demand payment of docket fees from said rural bank; that the bank issued a check for
P800.00; that she was not allowed by the Philippine National Bank to encash the check and, instead, was instructed to
deposit the same in any bank account for clearing; that respondent deposited the same in her account; and that after
the check was cleared, she remitted P400.00 to the Supreme Court and the other P400.00 was paid to the Municipal
Treasurer of Tinambac.
On the basis of the foregoing contentions, First Vice-Executive Judge Antonio N. Gerona prepared and submitted to us
his Report and Recommendations dated May 20, 1994, together with the administrative matter. We have
perspicaciously reviewed the same and we are favorably impressed by the thorough and exhaustive presentation and
analysis of the facts and evidence in said report. We commend the investigating judge for his industry and perspicacity
reflected by his findings in said report which, being amply substantiated by the evidence and supported by logical
illations, we hereby approve and hereunder reproduce at length the material portions thereof.
xxx xxx xxx
The first charge against the respondents is illegal solemnization of marriage. Judge Palaypayon is
charged with having solemnized without a marriage license the marriage of Sammy Bocaya and
Gina Besmonte (Exh. A). Alano Abellano and Nelly Edralin (Exh. B), Francisco Selpo and Julieta
Carrido (Exh. C), Eddie Terrobias and Maria Emma Gaor (Exh. D), Renato Gamay and Maricris
Belga (Exh. F) and Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario (Exh. G).
In all these aforementioned marriages, the blank space in the marriage contracts to show the
number of the marriage was solemnized as required by Article 22 of the Family Code were not
filled up. While the contracting parties and their witnesses signed their marriage contracts, Judge
Palaypayon did not affix his signature in the marriage contracts, except that of Abellano and
Edralin when Judge Palaypayon signed their marriage certificate as he claims that he solemnized
this marriage under Article 34 of the Family Code of the Philippines. In said marriages the
contracting parties were not furnished a copy of their marriage contract and the Local Civil
Registrar was not sent either a copy of the marriage certificate as required by Article 23 of the
Family Code.
The marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte is shown to have been solemnized by Judge Palaypayon
without a marriage license. The testimonies of Bocay himself and Pompeo Ariola, one of the
witnesses of the marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte, and the photographs taken when Judge
Palaypayon solemnized their marriage (Exhs. K-3 to K-9) sufficiently show that Judge Palaypayon
really solemnized their marriage. Bocaya declared that they were advised by Judge Palaypayon to
return after ten (10) days after their marriage was solemnized and bring with them their marriage
license. In the meantime, they already started living together as husband and wife believing that
the formal requisites of marriage were complied with.
Judge Palaypayon denied that he solemnized the marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte because the
parties allegedly did not have a marriage license. He declared that in fact he did not sign the
marriage certificate, there was no date stated on it and both the parties and the Local Civil
Registrar did not have a copy of the marriage certificate.
With respect to the photographs which show that he solemnized the marriage of Bocaya and
Besmonte, Judge Palaypayon explains that they merely show as if he was solemnizing the
marriage. It was actually a simulated solemnization of marriage and not a real one. This happened
because of the pleading of the mother of one of the contracting parties that he consent to be
photographed to show that as if he was solemnizing the marriage as he was told that the food for
the wedding reception was already prepared, visitors were already invited and the place of the
parties where the reception would be held was more than twenty (20) kilometers away from the
poblacion of Tinambac.
The denial made by Judge Palaypayon is difficult to believe. The fact alone that he did not sign the
marriage certificate or contract, the same did not bear a date and the parties and the Local Civil
Registrar were not furnished a copy of the marriage certificate, do not by themselves show that he
did not solemnize the marriage. His uncorroborated testimony cannot prevail over the testimony of
Bocaya and Ariola who also declared, among others, that Bocaya and his bride were advised by
Judge Palaypayon to return after ten (10) days with their marriage license and whose credibility
had not been impeached.
The pictures taken also from the start of the wedding ceremony up to the signing of the marriage
certificate in front of Judge Palaypayon and on his table (Exhs. K-3, K-3-a, K-3-b, K-3-c, K-4, K-4-a,
K-4-b, K-4-c,
K-4-d, K-5, K-5-a, K-5-b, K-6, K-7, K-8, K-8-a and K-9), cannot possibly be just to show a simulated
solemnization of marriage. One or two pictures may convince a person of the explanation of Judge
Palaypayon, but not all those pictures.
Besides, as a judge it is very difficult to believe that Judge Palaypayon would allows himself to be
photographed as if he was solemnizing a marriage on a mere pleading of a person whom he did
not even know for the alleged reasons given. It would be highly improper and unbecoming of him to
allow himself to be used as an instrument of deceit by making it appear that Bocaya and Besmonte
were married by him when in truth and in fact he did not solemnize their marriage.
With respect to the marriage of Abellano and Edralin (Exh. B), Judge Palaypayon admitted that he
solemnized their marriage, but he claims that it was under Article 34 of the Family Code, so a
marriage license was not required. The contracting parties here executed a joint affidavit that they
have been living together as husband and wife for almost six (6) years already (Exh. 12; Exh. AA).
In their marriage contract which did not bear any date either when it was solemnized, it was stated
that Abellano was only eighteen (18) years, two (2) months and seven (7) days old. If he and
Edralin had been living together as husband and wife for almost six (6) years already before they
got married as they stated in their joint affidavit, Abellano must ha(ve) been less than thirteen (13)
years old when he started living with Edralin as his wife and this is hard to believe. Judge
Palaypayon should ha(ve) been aware of this when he solemnized their marriage as it was his duty
to ascertain the qualification of the contracting parties who might ha(ve) executed a false joint
affidavit in order to have an instant marriage by avoiding the marriage license requirement.
On May 23, 1992, however, after this case was already filed, Judge Palaypayon married again
Abellano and Edralin, this time with a marriage license (Exh. BB). The explanation given by Judge
Palaypayon why he solemnized the marriage of the same couple for the second time is that he did
not consider the first marriage he solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code as (a) marriage
at all because complainant Ramon Sambo did not follow his instruction that the date should be
placed in the marriage certificate to show when he solemnized the marriage and that the
contracting parties were not furnished a copy of their marriage certificate.
This act of Judge Palaypayon of solemnizing the marriage of Abellano and Edralin for the second
time with a marriage license already only gave rise to the suspicion that the first time he
solemnized the marriage it was only made to appear that it was solemnized under exceptional
character as there was not marriage license and Judge Palaypayon had already signed the
marriage certificate. If it was true that he solemnized the first marriage under exceptional character
where a marriage license was not required, why did he already require the parties to have a
marriage license when he solemnized their marriage for the second time?
The explanation of Judge Palaypayon that the first marriage of Abellano and Edralin was not a
marriage at all as the marriage certificate did not state the date when the marriage was solemnized
and that the contracting parties were not furnished a copy of their marriage certificate, is not well
taken as they are not any of those grounds under Article(s) 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the Family Code
which declare a marriage void from the beginning. Even if no one, however, received a copy of the
marriage certificate, the marriage is still valid (Jones vs. H(o)rtiguela, 64 Phil. 179). Judge
Palaypayon cannot just absolve himself from responsibility by blaming his personnel. They are not
the guardian(s) of his official function and under Article 23 of the Family Code it is his duty to
furnish the contracting parties (a) copy of their marriage contract.
With respect to the marriage of Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido (Exh. C), and Arsenio Sabater
and Margarita Nacario (Exh. G), Selpo and Carrido and Sabater and Nacarcio executed joint
affidavits that Judge Palaypayon did not solemnize their marriage (Exh. 13-A and Exh. 1). Both
Carrido and Nacario testified for the respondents that actually Judge Palaypayon did not solemnize
their marriage as they did not have a marriage license. On cross-examination, however, both
admitted that they did not know who prepared their affidavits. They were just told, Carrido by a
certain Charito Palaypayon, and Nacario by a certain Kagawad Encinas, to just go to the Municipal
building and sign their joint affidavits there which were already prepared before the Municipal
Mayor of Tinambac, Camarines Sur.
With respect to the marriage of Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga (Exh. f), their marriage contract
was signed by them and by their two (2) witnesses, Atty. Elmer Brioso and respondent Baroy
(Exhs. F-1 and F-2). Like the other aforementioned marriages, the solemnization fee was also paid
as shown by a receipt dated June 7, 1992 and signed by respondent Baroy (Exh. F-4).
Judge Palaypayon also denied having solemnized the marriage of Gamay and Belga allegedly
because there was no marriage license. On her part, respondent Baroy at first denied that the
marriage was solemnized. When she was asked, however, why did she sign the marriage contract
as a witness she answered that she thought the marriage was already solemnized (TSN, p. 14; 10-
28-93).
Respondent Baroy was, and is, the clerk of court of Judge Palaypayon. She signed the marriage
contract of Gamay and Belga as one of the two principal sponsors. Yet, she wanted to give the
impression that she did not even know that the marriage was solemnized by Judge Palaypayon.
This is found very difficult to believe.
Judge Palaypayon made the same denial of having solemnized also the marriage of Terrobias and
Gaor (Exh. D). The contracting parties and their witnesses also signed the marriage contract and
paid the solemnization fee, but Judge Palaypayon allegedly did not solemnize their marriage due to
lack of marriage license. Judge Palaypayon submitted the affidavit of William Medina, Vice-Mayor
of Tinambac, to corroborate his testimony (Exh. 14). Medina, however, did not testify in this case
and so his affidavit has no probative value.
Judge Palaypayon testified that his procedure and practice have been that before the contracting
parties and their witnesses enter his chamber in order to get married, he already required
complainant Ramon Sambo to whom he assigned the task of preparing the marriage contract, to
already let the parties and their witnesses sign their marriage contracts, as what happened to
Gamay and Belga, and Terrobias and Gaor, among others. His purpose was to save his precious
time as he has been solemnizing marriages at the rate of three (3) to four (4) times everyday (TSN,
p. 12;
2-1-94).
This alleged practice and procedure, if true, is highly improper and irregular, if not illegal, because
the contracting parties are supposed to be first asked by the solemnizing officer and declare that
they take each other as husband and wife before the solemnizing officer in the presence of at least
two (2) witnesses before they are supposed to sign their marriage contracts (Art. 6, Family Code).
The uncorroborated testimony, however, of Judge Palaypayon as to his alleged practice and
procedure before solemnizing a marriage, is not true as shown by the picture taken during the
wedding of Bocaya and Besmonte (Exhs. K-3 to K-9) and by the testimony of respondent Baroy
herself who declared that the practice of Judge Palaypayon ha(s) been to let the contracting parties
and their witnesses sign the marriage contract only after Judge Palaypayon has solemnized their
marriage (TSN, p. 53;
10-28-93).
Judge Palaypayon did not present any evidence to show also that he was really solemnizing three
(3) to four (4) marriages everyday. On the contrary his monthly report of cases for July, 1992
shows that his court had only twenty-seven (27) pending cases and he solemnized only seven (7)
marriages for the whole month (Exh. E). His monthly report of cases for September, 1992 shows
also that he solemnized only four (4) marriages during the whole month (Exh. 7).
In this first charge of having illegally solemnized marriages, respondent Judge Palaypayon has
presented and marked in evidence several marriage contracts of other persons, affidavits of
persons and certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar (Exhs. 12-B to 12-H). These persons
who executed affidavits, however, did not testify in this case. Besides, the marriage contracts and
certification mentioned are immaterial as Judge Palaypayon is not charged of having solemnized
these marriages illegally also. He is not charged that the marriages he solemnized were all illegal.
The second charge against herein respondents, that of having falsified the monthly report of cases
submitted to the Supreme Court and not stating in the monthly report the actual number of
documents notarized and issuing the corresponding receipts of the notarial fees, have been
sufficiently proven by the complainants insofar as the monthly report of cases for July and
September, 1992 are concerned.
The monthly report of cases of the MTC of Tinambac, Camarines Sur for July, 1992 both signed by
the respondents, show that for said month there were six (6) documents notarized by Judge
Palaypayon in his capacity as Ex-Officio Notary Public (Exhs. H to H-1-b). The notarial register of
the MTC of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, however, shows that there were actually one hundred
thirteen (113) documents notarized by Judge Palaypayon for the said month (Exhs. Q to Q-45).
Judge Palaypayon claims that there was no falsification of the monthly report of cases for July,
1992 because there were only six (6) notarized documents that were paid (for) as shown by official
receipts. He did not, however, present evidence of the alleged official receipts showing that the
notarial fee for the six (6) documetns were paid. Besides, the monthly report of cases with respect
to the number of documents notarized should not be based on how many notarized documents
were paid of the notarial fees, but the number of documents placed or recorded in the notarial
register.
Judge Palaypayon admitted that he was not personally verifying and checking anymore the
correctness of the monthly reports because he relies on his co-respondent who is the Clerk of
Court and whom he has assumed to have checked and verified the records. He merely signs the
monthly report when it is already signed by respondent Baroy.
The explanation of Judge Palaypayon is not well taken because he is required to have close
supervision in the preparation of the monthly report of cases of which he certifies as to their
correctness. As a judge he is personally responsible for the proper discharge of his functions (The
Phil. Trial Lawyer's Asso. Inc. vs. Agana, Sr., 102 SCRA 517). In Nidera vs. Lazaro, 174 SCRA
581, it was held that "A judge cannot take refuge behind the inefficiency or mismanagement of his
court personnel."
On the part of respondent Baroy, she puts the blame of the falsification of the monthly report of
cases on complainant Sambo whom she allegedly assigned to prepare not only the monthly report
of cases, but the preparation and custody of marriage contracts, notarized documents and the
notarial register. By her own admission she has assigned to complainant Sambo duties she was
supposed to perform, yet according to her she never bother(ed) to check the notarial register of the
court to find out the number of documents notarized in a month (TSN, p. 30; 11-23-93).
Assuming that respondent Baroy assigned the preparation of the monthly report of cases to
Sambo, which was denied by the latter as he claims that he only typed the monthly report based on
the data given to him by her, still it is her duty to verify and check whether the report is correct.
The explanation of respondent Baroy that Sambo was the one in custody of marriage contracts,
notarized documents and notarial register, among other things, is not acceptable not only because
as clerk of court she was supposed to be in custody, control and supervision of all court records
including documents and other properties of the court (p. 32, Manual for Clerks of Court), but she
herself admitted that from January, 1992 she was already in full control of all the records of the
court including receipts (TSN, p. 11; 11-23-93).
The evidence adduced in this cases in connection with the charge of falsification, however, also
shows that respondent Baroy did not account for what happened to the notarial fees received for
those documents notarized during the month of July and September, 1992. The evidence adduced
in this case also sufficiently show that she received cash bond deposits and she did not deposit
them to a bank or to the Municipal Treasurer; and that she only issued temporary receipts for said
cash bond deposits.
For July, 1992 there were only six (6) documents reported to have been notarized by Judge
Palaypayon although the documents notarized for said month were actually one hundred thirteen
(113) as recorded in the notarial register. For September, 1992, there were only five (5) documents
reported as notarized for that month, though the notarial register show(s) that there were fifty-six
(56) documents actually notarized. The fee for each document notarized as appearing in the
notarial register was P18.50. Respondent Baroy and Sambo declared that what was actually being
charged was P20.00. Respondent Baroy declared that P18.50 went to the Supreme Court and
P1.50 was being turned over to the Municipal Treasurer.
Baroy, however, did not present any evidence to show that she really sent to the Supreme Court
the notarial fees of P18.50 for each document notarized and to the Municipal Treasurer the
additional notarial fee of P1.50. This should be fully accounted for considering that Baroy herself
declared that some notarial fees were allowed by her at her own discretion to be paid later.
Similarly, the solemnization fees have not been accounted for by Baroy considering that she
admitted that even (i)n those instances where the marriages were not solemnized due to lack of
marriage license the solemnization fees were not returned anymore, unless the contracting parties
made a demand for their return. Judge Palaypayon declared that he did not know of any instance
when solemnization fee was returned when the marriage was not solemnized due to lack of
marriage license.
Respondent Baroy also claims that Ramon Sambo did not turn over to her some of the notarial
fees. This is difficult to believe. It was not only because Sambo vehemently denied it, but the
minutes of the conference of the personnel of the MTC of Tinambac dated January 20, 1992 shows
that on that date Baroy informed the personnel of the court that she was taking over the functions
she assigned to Sambo, particularly the collection of legal fees (Exh. 7). The notarial fees she
claims that Sambo did not turn over to her were for those documents notarized (i)n July and
September, 1992 already. Besides there never was any demand she made for Sambo to turn over
some notarial fees supposedly in his possession. Neither was there any memorandum she issued
on this matter, in spite of the fact that she has been holding meetings and issuing memoranda to
the personnel of the court (Exhs. V, W, FF, FF-1, FF-2, FF-3; Exhs. 4-A (supplement(s), 5-8, 6-S,
7-S and 8-S).
It is admitted by respondent Baroy that on October 29, 1991 a cash bond deposit of a certain
Dacara in the amount of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos was turned over to her after she
assumed office and for this cash bond she issued only a temporary receipt (Exh. Y). She did not
deposit this cash bond in any bank or to the Municipal Treasurer. She just kept it in her own cash
box on the alleged ground that the parties in that case where the cash bond was deposited
informed her that they would settle the case amicably.
Respondent Baroy declared that she finally deposited the aforementioned cash bond of One
Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos with the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) in February, 1993, after
this administrative case was already filed (TSN, pp. 27-28; 12-22-93). The Pass Book, however,
shows that actually Baroy opened an account with the LBP, Naga Branch, only on March 26, 1993
when she deposited an amount of Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos (Exhs. 8 to 8-1-a). She
claims that One Thousand (P1,000.000) Pesos of the initial deposit was the cash bond of Dacara.
If it were true, it was only after keeping to herself the cash bond of One Thousand (P1,000.00)
Pesos for around one year and five months when she finally deposited it because of the filing of
this case.
On April 29, 1993, or only one month and two days after she finally deposited the One Thousand
(P1,000.00) Pesos cash bond of Dacara, she withdrew it from the bank without any authority or
order from the court. It was only on July 23, 1993, or after almost three (3) months after she
withdrew it, when she redeposited said cash bond (TSN, p. 6; 1-4-94).
The evidence presented in this case also show that on February 28, 1993 respondent Baroy
received also a cash bond of Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos from a certain Alfredo Seprones
in Crim. Case No. 5180. For this cash bond deposit, respondent Baroy issued only an annumbered
temporary receipt (Exh. X and X-1). Again Baroy just kept this Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos
cash bond to herself. She did not deposit it either (in) a bank or (with) the Municipal Treasurer. Her
explanation was that the parties in Crim. Case No. 5180 informed her that they would settle the
case amicably. It was on April 26, 1993, or almost two months later when Judge Palaypayon
issued an order for the release of said cash bond (Exh. 7).
Respondent Baroy also admitted that since she assumed office on October 21, 1991 she used to
issue temporary receipt only for cash bond deposits and other payments and collections she
received. She further admitted that some of these temporary receipts she issued she failed to place
the number of the receipts such as that receipt marked Exhibit X (TSN, p. 35; 11-23-93). Baroy
claims that she did not know that she had to use the official receipts of the Supreme Court. It was
only from February, 1993, after this case was already filed, when she only started issuing official
receipts.
The next charge against the respondents is that in order to be appointed Clerk of Court, Baroy
gave Judge Palaypayon an air conditioner as a gift. The evidence adduced with respect to this
charge, show that on August 24, 1991 Baroy bought an air conditioner for the sum of Seventeen
Thousand Six Hundred (P17,600.00) Pesos (Exhs. I and I-1). The same was paid partly in cash
and in check (Exhs. I-2 and I-3). When the air conditioner was brought to court in order to be
installed in the chamber of Judge Palaypayon, it was still placed in the same box when it was
bought and was not used yet.
The respondents claim that Baroy sold it to Judge Palaypayon for Twenty Thousand (P20,00.00)
Pesos on installment basis with a down payment of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos and as
proof thereof the respondents presented a typewritten receipt dated May 29, 1993 (Exh. 22). The
receipt was signed by both respondents and by the Municipal Mayor of Tinambac, Camarines Sur
and another person as witness.
The alleged sale between respondents is not beyond suspicion. It was bought by Baroy at a time
when she was applying for the vacant position of Clerk of Court (to) which she was eventually
appointed in October, 1991. From the time she bought the air conditioner on August 24, 1991 until
it was installed in the office of Judge Palaypayon it was not used yet. The sale to Judge
Palaypayon was only evidenced by a mere typewritten receipt dated May 29, 1992 when this case
was already filed. The receipt could have been easily prepared. The Municipal Mayor of Tinambac
who signed in the receipt as a witness did not testify in this case. The sale is between the Clerk of
Court and the Judge of the same court. All these circumstances give rise to suspicion of at least
impropriety. Judges should avoid such action as would subject (them) to suspicion and (their)
conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety (Jaagueta vs. Boncasos, 60 SCRA 27).
With respect to the charge that Judge Palaypayon received a cash bond deposit of One Thousand
(P1,000.00) Pesos from Januaria Dacara without issuing a receipt, Dacara executed an affidavit
regarding this charge that Judge Palaypayon did not give her a receipt for the P1,000.00 cash
bond she deposited (Exh. N). Her affidavit, however, has no probative value as she did not show
that this cash bond of P1,000.00 found its way into the hands of respondent Baroy who issued only
a temporary receipt for it and this has been discussed earlier.
Another charge against Judge Palaypayon is the getting of detention prisoners to work in his house
and one of them escaped while in his custody and was never found again. To hide this fact, the
case against said accused was ordered archived by Judge Palaypayon. The evidence adduced
with respect to this particular charge, show that in Crim. Case No. 5647 entitled People vs.
Stephen Kalaw, Alex Alano and Allan Adupe, accused Alex Alano and Allan Adupe were arrested
on April 12, 1991 and placed in the municipal jail of Tinambac, Camarines Sur (Exhs. 0, 0-1, 0-2
and 0-3; Exh. 25). The evidence presented that Alex Alano was taken by Judge Palaypayon from
the municipal jail where said accused was confined and that he escaped while in custody of Judge
Palaypayon is solely testimonial, particularly that of David Ortiz, a former utility worker of the MTC
of Tinambac.
Herein investigator finds said evidence not sufficient. The complainants should have presented
records from the police of Tinambac to show that Judge Palaypayon took out from the municipal
jail Alex Alano where he was under detention and said accused escaped while in the custody of
Judge Palaypayon.
The order, however, of Judge Palaypayon dated April 6, 1992 in Crim. Case No. 5047 archiving
said case appears to be without basis. The order states: "this case was filed on April 12, 1991 and
the records show that the warrant of arrest (was) issued against the accused, but up to this
moment there is no return of service for the warrant of arrest issued against said accused" (Exh. 0-
4). The records of said case, however, show that in fact there was a return of the service of the
warrant of arrest dated April 12, 1991 showing that Alano and Adupe were arrested (Exh. 0-3).
Judge Palaypayon explained that his order dated April 6, 1992 archiving Crim. Case No. 5047
referred only to one of the accused who remained at large. The explanation cannot be accepted
because the two other accused, Alano and Adupe, were arrested. Judge Palaypayon should have
issued an order for the arrest of Adupe who allegedly jumped bail, but Alano was supposed to be
confined in the municipal jail if his claim is true that he did not take custody of Alano.
The explanation also of Judge Palaypayon why he ordered the case archived was because he
heard from the police that Alano escaped. This explanation is not acceptable either. He should
ha(ve) set the case and if the police failed to bring to court Alano, the former should have been
required to explain in writing why Alano was not brought to court. If the explanation was that Alano
escaped from jail, he should have issued an order for his arrest. It is only later on when he could
not be arrested when the case should have been ordered archived. The order archiving this case
for the reason that he only heard that Alano escaped is another circumstance which gave rise to a
suspicion that Alano might have really escaped while in his custody only that the complainants
could not present records or other documentary evidence to prove the same.
The last charge against the respondents is that they collected filing fees on collection cases filed by
the Rural Bank of Tinambac, Camarines Sur which was supposed to be exempted in paying filing
fees under existing laws and that the filing fees received was deposited by respondent Baroy in her
personal account in the bank. The evidence presented show that on February 4, 1992 the Rural
Bank of Tinambac filed ten (10) civil cases for collection against farmers and it paid the total
amount of Four Hundred (P400.00) Pesos representing filing fees. The complainants cited Section
14 of Republic Act 720, as amended, which exempts Rural Banks (from) the payment of filing fees
on collection of sums of money cases filed against farmers on loans they obtained.
Judge Palaypayon, however, had nothing to do with the payment of the filing fees of the Rural
Bank of Tinambac as it was respondent Baroy who received them and besides, on February 4,
1992, he was on sick leave. On her part Baroy claims that the bank paid voluntarily the filing fees.
The records, however, shows that respondent Baroy sent a letter to the manager of the bank dated
January 28, 1992 to the effect that if the bank would not pay she would submit all Rural Bank
cases for dismissal (Annex 6, comment by respondent Baroy).
Respondent Baroy should have checked whether the Rural Bank of Tinambac was really exempt
from the payment of filing fees pursuant to Republic Act 720, as amended, instead of threatening
the bank to have its cases be submitted to the court in order to have them dismissed. Here the
payment of the filing fees was made on February 4, 1992, but the Four Hundred (P400.00) Pesos
was only turned over to the Municipal Treasurer on March 12, 1992. Here, there is an undue delay
again in complying with her obligation as accountable officer.
In view of the foregoing findings that the evidence presented by the complainants sufficiently show
that respondent Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon, Jr. had solemnized marriages, particularly that of
Sammy Bocaya and Gina Besmonte, without a marriage license, and that it having been shown
that he did not comply with his duty in closely supervising his clerk of court in the preparation of the
monthly report of cases being submitted to the Supreme Court, particularly for the months of July
and September, 1992 where it has been proven that the reports for said two (2) months were
falsified with respect to the number of documents notarized, it is respectfully recommended that he
be imposed a fine of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS with a warning that the same or
similar offenses will be more severely dealt with.
The fact that Judge Palaypayon did not sign the marriage contracts or certificates of those
marriages he solemnized without a marriage license, there were no dates placed in the marriage
contracts to show when they were solemnized, the contracting parties were not furnished their
marriage contracts and the Local Civil Registrar was not being sent any copy of the marriage
contract, will not absolve him from liability. By solemnizing alone a marriage without a marriage
license he as the solemnizing officer is the one responsible for the irregularity in not complying
(with) the formal requ(i)sites of marriage and under Article 4(3) of the Family Code of the
Philippines, he shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
Judge Palaypayon is likewise liable for his negligence or failure to comply with his duty of closely
supervising his clerk of court in the performance of the latter's duties and functions, particularly the
preparation of the monthly report of cases (Bendesula vs. Laya, 58 SCRA 16). His explanation that
he only signed the monthly report of cases only when his clerk of court already signed the same,
cannot be accepted. It is his duty to closely supervise her, to check and verify the records if the
monthly reports prepared by his clerk of court do not contain false statements. It was held that "A
judge cannot take refuge behind the inefficiency or incompetence of court personnel (Nidua vs.
Lazaro, 174 SCRA 158).
In view also of the foregoing finding that respondent Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy, the clerk of court of
the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, has been found to have falsified the
monthly report of cases for the months of July and September, 1992 with respect to the number of
documents notarized, for having failed to account (for) the notarial fees she received for said two
(2) months period; for having failed to account (for) the solemnization fees of those marriages
allegedly not solemnized, but the solemnization fees were not returned; for unauthorized issuance
of temporary receipts, some of which were issued unnumbered; for receiving the cash bond of
Dacara on October 29, 1991 in the amount of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos for which she
issued only a temporary receipt (Exh. Y) and for depositing it with the Land Bank of the Philippines
only on March 26, 1993, or after one year and five months in her possession and after this case
was already filed; for withdrawing said cash bond of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos on April 29,
1993 without any court order or authority and redepositing it only on July 23, 1993; for receiving a
cash bond of Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos from Alfredo Seprones in Crim. Case No. 5180,
MTC, Tinambac, Camarines Sur, for which she issued only an unnumbered temporary receipt
(Exhs. X and X-1) and for not depositing it with a bank or with the Municipal Treasurer until it was
ordered released; and for requiring the Rural Bank of Tinambac, Camarines Sur to pay filing fees
on February 4, 1992 for collection cases filed against farmers in the amount of Four Hundred
(P400.00) Pesos, but turning over said amount to the Municipal Treasurer only on March 12, 1992,
it is respectfully recommended that said respondent clerk of court Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy be
dismissed from the service.
It is provided that "Withdrawal of court deposits shall be by the clerk of court who shall issue official
receipt to the provincial, city or municipal treasurer for the amount withdrawn. Court deposits
cannot be withdrawn except by order of the court, . . . ." (Revised Manual of Instructions for
Treasurers, Sec. 183, 184 and 626; p. 127, Manual for Clerks of Court). A circular also provides
that the Clerks of Court shall immediately issue an official receipt upon receipt of deposits from
party litigants and thereafter deposit intact the collection with the municipal, city or provincial
treasurer and their deposits, can only be withdrawn upon proper receipt and order of the Court
(DOJ Circular No. 52, 26 April 1968; p. 136, Manual for Clerks of Court). Supreme Court
Memorandum Circular No. 5, 25 November 1982, also provides that "all collections of funds of
fiduciary character including rental deposits, shall be deposited immediately by the clerk of court
concerned upon receipt thereof with City, Municipal or Provincial Treasurer where his court is
located" and that "no withdrawal of any of such deposits shall be made except upon lawful order of
the court exercising jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Respondent Baroy had either failed to comply with the foregoing circulars, or deliberately
disregarded, or even intentionally violated them. By her conduct, she demonstrated her callous
unconcern for the obligations and responsibility of her duties and functions as a clerk of court and
accountable officer. The gross neglect of her duties shown by her constitute(s) a serious
misconduct which warrant(s) her removal from office. In the case of Belen P. Ferriola vs. Norma
Hiam, Clerk of Court, MTCC, Branch I, Batangas City; A.M. No. P-90-414; August 9, 1993, it was
held that "The clerk of court is not authorized to keep funds in his/her custody; monies received by
him/her shall be deposited immediately upon receipt thereof with the City, Municipal or Provincial
Treasurer. Supreme Court Circular Nos. 5 dated November 25, 1982 and 5-A dated December 3,
1982. Respondent Hiam's failure to remit the cash bail bonds and fine she collected constitutes
serious misconduct and her misappropriation of said funds constitutes dishonesty. "Respondent
Norma Hiam was found guilty of dishonesty and serious misconduct prejudicial to the best interest
of the service and (the Court) ordered her immediate dismissal (from) the service.
xxx xxx xxx
We here emphasize once again our adjuration that the conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office
charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, should be circumscribed with the
heavy burden of responsibility. His conduct, at all times, must not only be characterized by propriety and decorum but,
above all else, must be beyond suspicion. Every employee should be an example of integrity, uprightness and
honesty.
5
Integrity in a judicial office is more than a virtue, it is a necessity.
6
It applies, without qualification as to rank
or position, from the judge to the least of its personnel, they being standard-bearers of the exacting norms of ethics and
morality imposed upon a Court of justice.
On the charge regarding illegal marriages the Family Code pertinently provides that the formal requisites of marriage
are, inter alia, a valid marriage license except in the cases provided for therein.
7
Complementarily, it declares that the
absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall generally render the marriage void ab initio and that, while an
irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage, the party or parties responsible for the
irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
8

The civil aspect is addressed to the contracting parties and those affected by the illegal marriages, and what we are
providing for herein pertains to the administrative liability of respondents, all without prejudice to their criminal
responsibility. The Revised Penal Code provides that "(p)riests or ministers of any religious denomination or sect, or
civil authorities who shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony shall be punished in accordance with the
provisions of the Marriage Law."
9
This is of course, within the province of the prosecutorial agencies of the
Government.
The recommendation with respect to the administrative sanction to be imposed on respondent judge should, therefore,
be modified. For one, with respect to the charge of illegal solemnization of marriages, it does appear that he had not
taken to heart, but actually trifled with, the law's concern for the institution of marriage and the legal effects flowing from
civil status. This, and his undeniable participation in the other offenses charged as hereinbefore narrated in detail,
approximate such serious degree of misconduct and of gross negligence in the performance of judicial duties as to
ineludibly require a higher penalty.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby imposes a FINE of P20,000.00 on respondent Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon. Jr., with a
stern warning that any repetition of the same or similar offenses in the future will definitely be severely dealt with.
Respondent Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy is hereby DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits
and with prejudice to employment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of the Government, including government-
owned or controlled corporations.
Let copies of this decision be spread on their records and furnished to the Office of the Ombudsman for appropriate
action.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Cruz, J., took no part.
Bidin, J., is on leave.
#Footnotes
1 Original Record, 1.
2 Ibid., 9 and 23.
3 Ibid., 86.
4 Ibid., 134.
5 Annong vs. Vda. de Blas, A.M. No. P-91-602, October 15, 1991, 202 SCRA 635.
6 Capuno, et al. vs. Jaramillo, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-93-944, July 20, 1994.
7 Article 3(2), Executive Order No. 209, as amended.
8 Article 4, id.
9 Article 352, Revised Penal Code, in relation to Section 39, Act No. 3613.



MARRIAGE WITHOUT LICENSE:
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 103047 September 2, 1994
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND ANGELINA M. CASTRO, respondents.
Parungao, Abesamis, Eleazar & Pulgar Law Offices for private respondent.
PUNO, J.:
The case at bench originated from a petition filed by private respondent Angelina M. Castro in the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage to Edwin F. Cardenas.
1
As ground therefor,
Castro claims that no marriage license was ever issued to them prior to the solemnization of their marriage.
Despite notice, defendant Edwin F. Cardenas failed to file his answer. Consequently, he was declared in default. Trial
proceeded in his absence.
The controlling facts are undisputed:
On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony performed by Judge
Pablo M. Malvar, City Court Judge of Pasay City. The marriage was celebrated without the knowledge of Castro's
parents. Defendant Cardenas personally attended to the processing of the documents required for the celebration of
the marriage, including the procurement of the marriage, license. In fact, the marriage contract itself states that
marriage license no. 3196182 was issued in the name of the contracting parties on June 24, 1970 in Pasig, Metro
Manila.
The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife since the marriage was unknown to Castro's
parents. Thus, it was only in March 1971, when Castro discovered she was pregnant, that the couple decided to live
together. However, their cohabitation lasted only for four (4) months. Thereafter, the couple parted ways. On October
19, 1971, Castro gave birth. The baby was adopted by Castro's brother, with the consent of Cardenas.
The baby is now in the United States. Desiring to follow her daughter, Castro wanted to put in order her marital status
before leaving for the States. She thus consulted a lawyer, Atty. Frumencio E. Pulgar, regarding the possible
annulment of her marriage. Through her lawyer's efforts, they discovered that there was no marriage license issued to
Cardenas prior to the celebration of their marriage.












As proof, Angelina Castro offered in evidence a certification from the Civil Register of Pasig, Metro Manila. It reads:

February 20, 1987

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to certify that the names EDWIN F. CARDENAS and ANGELINA M. CASTRO who were
allegedly married in the Pasay City Court on June 21, 1970 under an alleged (s)upportive marriage
license no. 3196182 allegedly issued in the municipality on June 20, 1970 cannot be located as
said license no. 3196182 does not appear from our records.

Issued upon request of Mr. Ed Atanacio.
(Sgd) CENONA D. QUINTOS
Senior Civil Registry Officer
Castro testified that she did not go to the civil registrar of Pasig on or before June 24, 1970 in order to apply for a
license. Neither did she sign any application therefor. She affixed her signature only on the marriage contract on June
24, 1970 in Pasay City.
The trial court denied the petition.
2
It held that the above certification was inadequate to establish the alleged non-
issuance of a marriage license prior to the celebration of the marriage between the parties. It ruled that the "inability of
the certifying official to locate the marriage license is not conclusive to show that there was no marriage license
issued."
Unsatisfied with the decision, Castro appealed to respondent appellate court. She insisted that the certification from the
local civil registrar sufficiently established the absence of a marriage license.
As stated earlier, respondent appellate court reversed the Decision of the trial court.
3
It declared the marriage between
the contracting parties null and void and directed the Civil Registrar of Pasig to cancel the subject marriage contract.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines urges that respondent appellate court erred when it ruled that the certification
issued by the civil registrar that marriage license no. 3196182 was not in their record adequately proved that no such
license was ever issued. Petitioner also faults the respondent court for relying on the self-serving and uncorroborated
testimony of private respondent Castro that she had no part in the procurement of the subject marriage license.
Petitioner thus insists that the certification and the uncorroborated testimony of private respondent are insufficient to
overthrow the legal presumption regarding the validity of a marriage.
Petitioner also points that in declaring the marriage between the parties as null and void, respondent appellate court
disregarded the presumption that the solemnizing officer, Judge Pablo M. Malvar, regularly performed his duties when
he attested in the marriage contract that marriage license no. 3196182 was duly presented to him before the
solemnization of the subject marriage.
The issues, being interrelated, shall be discussed jointly.
The core issue presented by the case at bench is whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence presented
by private respondent are sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig
prior to the celebration of the marriage of private respondent to Edwin F. Cardenas.
We affirm the impugned Decision.
At the time the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law governing marital relations was the New
Civil Code. The law
4
provides that no marriage shall be solemnized without a marriage license first issued by a local
civil registrar. Being one of the essential requisites of a valid marriage, absence of a license would render the marriage
void ab initio.
5

Petitioner posits that the certification of the local civil registrar of due search and inability to find a record or entry to the
effect that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued to the parties is not adequate to prove its non-issuance.
We hold otherwise. The presentation of such certification in court is sanctioned by Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court,viz.:
Sec. 29. Proof of lack of record. A written statement signed by an officer having custody of an
official record or by his deputy, that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is
found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is
admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such record or entry.
The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite diligent search, a particular document
does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As custodians
of public documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book
where they are required to enter all applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date
the marriage license was issued and such other relevant data.
6

The certification of "due search and inability to find" issued by the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys probative value, he
being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a
certificate of "due search and inability to find" sufficiently proved that his office did not issue marriage license no.
3196182 to the contracting parties.
The fact that private respondent Castro offered only her testimony in support of her petition is, in itself, not a ground to
deny her petition. The failure to offer any other witness to corroborate her testimony is mainly due to the peculiar
circumstances of the case. It will be remembered that the subject marriage was a civil ceremony performed by a judge
of a city court. The subject marriage is one of those commonly known as a "secret marriage" a legally non-existent
phrase but ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage celebrated without the knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of
either or both of the contracting parties. The records show that the marriage between Castro and Cardenas was initially
unknown to the parents of the former.
Surely, the fact that only private respondent Castro testified during the trial cannot be held against her. Her husband,
Edwin F. Cardenas, was duly served with notice of the proceedings and a copy of the petition. Despite receipt thereof,
he chose to ignore the same. For failure to answer, he was properly declared in default. Private respondent cannot be
faulted for her husband's lack of interest to participate in the proceedings. There was absolutely no evidence on record
to show that there was collusion between private respondent and her husband Cardenas.
It is noteworthy to mention that the finding of the appellate court that the marriage between the contracting parties is
null and void for lack of a marriage license does not discount the fact that indeed, a spurious marriage license,
purporting to be issued by the civil registrar of Pasig, may have been presented by Cardenas to the solemnizing officer.
In fine, we hold that, under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by
private respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of the subject marriage license.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED there being no showing of any reversible error committed by respondent
appellate court.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
#
Footnotes
1 Filed on February 19, 1987 and docketed as Civil Case No. Q-50117.
2 Decision dated June 30, 1987, issued by Presiding Judge Antonio P. Solano, Quezon City RTC,
Branch LXXXVI; Rollo, pp. 46-48.
3 Sixteenth Division, penned by Mr. Justice Justo P. Torres, with Mr. Justices Ricardo J. Francisco
and Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, concurring; Decision dated November 27, 1991, Rollo, pp. 38-42.
4 Articles 53 (4) and 58, New Civil Code.
5 Article 80 (3), New Civil Code.
6 Article 70, New Civil Code.
ISSUANCE OF MARRIAGE LICENSE AN ACT OF STATES INTERVENTION:
FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000]
ENGRACE NIAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIAL, INGRID NIAL,
ARCHIE NIAL & PEPITO NIAL, JR., petitioners, vs. NORMA BAYADOG, respondent. Ncmmis

D E C I S I O N
YNARES_SANTIAGO, J.:
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death?
Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born herein
petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or
on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu
thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19,
1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their fathers death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the
marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed
under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioners successional rights.
Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the
persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissed the petition after
finding that the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure, insufficient" to resolve the following issues:
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for the declaration
of the nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Nial, with her specially so when at the
time of the filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Nial is already dead;
(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs deceased father with defendant is null and
void ab initio;
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the second marriage after it
was dissolved due to their fathers death.
[1]

Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null and void their fathers marriage
to respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family Code which enumerates the time and the
persons who could initiate an action for annulment of marriage.
[2]
Hence, this petition for review with this Court
grounded on a pure question of law. Scnc m
This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, and because "the verification failed to state the basis of petitioners averment that the allegations in the
petition are true and correct." It was thus treated as an unsigned pleading which produces no legal effect under
Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules.
[3]
However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court reconsidered the dismissal and
reinstated the petition for review.
[4]

The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the
applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of their
celebration.
[5]
A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code,
[6]
the absence of
which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3)
[7]
in relation to Article 58.
[8]
The requirement and
issuance of marriage license is the States demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the
maintenance of which the general public is interested.
[9]
This interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate that the
State recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording protection to the family as a basic "autonomous social
institution."
[10]
Specifically, the Constitution considers marriage as an "inviolable social institution," and is the foundation
of family life which shall be protected by the State.
[11]
This is why the Family Code considers marriage as "a special
contract of permanent union"
[12]
and case law considers it "not just an adventure but a lifetime commitment."
[13]

However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one
of which is that provided in Article 76,
[14]
referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and
exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the
marriage. The rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame
and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the
publication of every applicants name for a marriage license. The publicity attending the marriage license may
discourage such persons from legitimizing their status.
[15]
To preserve peace in the family, avoid the peeping and
suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source of gossip arising from the publication of their names, the law
deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and exempt them from that requirement. Sdaa miso
There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners father to respondent Norma was celebrated without any marriage
license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that "they have attained the age of majority, and, being
unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, and that we now desire to marry each
other."
[16]
The only issue that needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article
76 of the Civil Code to warrant the counting of the five year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing
a marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to marry each other during the
entire five-year continuous period or should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties have lived together and
exclusively with each other as husband and wife during the entire five-year continuous period regardless of whether
there is a legal impediment to their being lawfully married, which impediment may have either disappeared or
intervened sometime during the cohabitation period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for five years without the
benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife"
where the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year
common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of
legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before
the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party
was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year
cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during
the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law
relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a
special relationship must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a
man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements of
the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use the
same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from
securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted
that a license is required in order to notify the public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and that
anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil
registrar.
[17]
The Civil Code provides:
Article 63: "x x x. This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the
marriage to advice the local civil registrar thereof. x x x."
Article 64: "Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the marriage, the local civil registrar
shall forthwith make an investigation, examining persons under oath. x x x" Sdaad
This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
Article 17 provides in part: "x x x. This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any
impediment to the marriage to advise the local civil registrar thereof. x x x."
Article 18 reads in part: "x x x. In case of any impediment known to the local civil registrar or
brought to his attention, he shall note down the particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the
application for a marriage license. x x x."
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited the concurrence of multiple marriages
by the same person during the same period. Thus, any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first
spouse shall be illegal and void,
[18]
subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was
dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law in that the contracting of two or more
marriages and the having of extramarital affairs are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and
adultery.
[19]
The law sanctions monogamy.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondents marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as
husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepitos first marriage was dissolved
to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his
first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has
already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation
contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect
only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting
with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from
his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship
between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband
and wife". Scs daad
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to the requirement of
a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a petition to declare their fathers marriage
void after his death?
Contrary to respondent judges ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code
[20]
cannot be applied even by analogy to petitions
for declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground for annulment of marriage relied upon by the trial court, which
allows "the sane spouse" to file an annulment suit "at any time before the death of either party" is inapplicable. Article
47 pertains to the grounds, periods and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of
marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void
marriages are not identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a
marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having never to have taken place
[21]
and cannot be the source of rights.
The first can be generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be ratified.
A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage can be attacked
collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable
marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties
and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.
[22]
That is why the action or defense for nullity
is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can
assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects except those
declared by law concerning the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual
joint contribution,
[23]
and its effect on the children born to such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to
Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime governing
voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership and the children conceived before its annulment are
legitimate. Sup rema
Contrary to the trial courts ruling, the death of petitioners father extinguished the alleged marital bond between him
and respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a wrong premise that there was a marriage bond that
was dissolved between the two. It should be noted that their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never existed
at all and the death of either extinguished nothing.
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a
marriage.
[24]
"A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to make
the marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order
of society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be
ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction."
[25]
"Under ordinary circumstances, the
effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage
had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any
proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any
parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof
of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not like a
voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the
parties so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio.
[26]
But Article 40
of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage,
though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage
[27]
and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final
judgment to that effect.
[28]
For the same reason, the law makes either the action or defense for the declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible.
[29]
Corollarily, if the death of either party would extinguish the cause of
action or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be considered imprescriptible. Juris
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute
nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child,
settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the
validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a
final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the
basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such
final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch
59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said case is ordered REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., (Chairman), Puno, and Kapunan, JJ., concur. Sc juris
Pardo, J., on official business abroad.
[1]
The dispositive portion of the Order dated March 27, 1998 issued by Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of Regional Trial
Court (RTC) - Branch 59, Toledo City, reads: "WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendants motion to dismiss is
hereby granted and this instant case is hereby ordered dismissed without costs." (p. 6; Rollo, p. 21).
[2]
Order, p. 4; Rollo, p. 19.
[3]
Minute Resolution dated July 13, 1998; Rollo, p. 39.
[4]
Minute Resolution dated October 7, 1998; Rollo, p. 50.
[5]
Tamano v. Ortiz, 291 SCRA 584 (1998).
[6]
Now Article 3, Family Code. Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all the requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties; their consent, freely given;
(2) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(3) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.
[7]
Now Article 4, Family Code. Art. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
x x x x x x x x x
(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character.
x x x x x x x x x
[8]
Art. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in Chapter 2 of this Title, but not those under article
75, no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality
where either contracting party habitually resides.
[9]
Perido v. Perido, 63 SCRA 97 (1975).
[10]
Section 12, Article II, 1987 Constitution; Hernandez v. CA, G. R. No. 126010, December 8, 1999; See also Tuason
v. CA, 256 SCRA 158 (1996).
[11]
Section 2, Article XV (The Family), 1987 Constitution.
[12]
Article 1, Family Code provides: "Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman
entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal or family life. x x x.
[13]
Santos v. CA, 58 SCAD 17 (1995); 310 Phil. 21, 41 (1995).
[14]
Now Article 34, Family Code. Art. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have
attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years,
desire to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an
affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no
legal impediment to the marriage.
[15]
Report of the Code Commission, p. 80.
[16]
Rollo, p. 29.
[17]
Articles 63 and 64, Civil Code; Article 17 and 18, Family Code.
[18]
Article 83, Civil Code provides "Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first
spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance,
unless:
(1) the first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) the first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years."
Article 41 of the Family Code reads: "A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years"
[19]
Arts. 333 and 334, Revised Penal Code.
[20]
Art. 47. The action for annulment of marriage must be filed by the following persons and within the periods indicated
herein:
(1) For causes mentioned in number 1 of Article 45 by the party whose parent or guardian did not give
his or her consent, within five years after attaining the age of twenty-one; or by the parent or guardian or
person having legal charge of the minor, at any time before such party has reached the age of twenty-one;
(2) For causes mentioned in number 2 of Article 45, by the sane spouse, who had no knowledge of the
others insanity; or by any relative or guardian or person having legal charge of the insane, at any time before
the death of either party, or by the insane spouse during a lucid interval or after regaining sanity;
(3) For causes mentioned in number 3 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years after the
discovery of the fraud;
(4) For causes mentioned in number 4 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years from the time
the force, intimidation or undue influence disappeared or ceased;
For causes mentioned in numbers 5 and 6 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years after the marriage.
[21]
Suntay v. Cojuanco-Suntay, 300 SCRA 760 (1998); People v. Retirement Board, 272 Ill. App. 59 cited in I Tolentino,
Civil Code, 1990 ed. p. 271.
[22]
In re Conzas Estate, 176 Ill. 192; Miller v. Miller, 175 Cal. 797, 167 Pac. 394 cited in I Tolentino, Civil Code, 1990
ed., p. 271.
[23]
Article 148-149, Family Code; Article 144, Civil Code.
[24]
Odayat v. Amante, 77 SCRA 338 (1977); Weigel v. Sempio-Dy, 143 SCRA 499 (1986); People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil.
845 (1954); 50 O.G. (10) 4767 cited in People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033 (1957); 53 O.G. 3749.
[25]
35 Am. Jur. 219-220.
[26]
18 RCL 446-7; 35 Am Jur. 221.
[27]
Apiag v. Cantero, 335 Phil. 511 (1997); 268 SCRA 47 (1997); Atienza v. Judge Brillantes, Jr., 60 SCAD 119; 312
Phil. 939 (1995).
[28]
Domingo v. CA, 226 SCRA 572 (1993).
[29]
Article 39, Family Code as amended by E.O. 209 and 227 s. 1987 and further amended by R.A. No. 8533 dated
February 23, 1998.







Art. 36 A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
compl time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. (As amended by
EO No. 227, dated July 17, 1987)
Example Case, page 293 of textbook: PHYSICAL VIOLENCE, MORAL PRESSURE, CIVIL INTERDICTION, DRUG
ADDICTION, HABITUAL ALCOHOLISM, ABANDONMENT not just grounds for legal separation-Art. 55
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 136490. October 19, 2000]
BRENDA B. MARCOS, petitioner, vs. WILSON G. MARCOS, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be established by the totality of
evidence presented. There is no requirement, however, that the respondent should be examined by a physician or a
psychologist as a conditio sine qua non for such declaration.
The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the July 24, 1998
Decision
[1]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 55588, which disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the contested decision is set aside and the marriage between the parties is hereby declared valid."
[2]

Also challenged by petitioner is the December 3, 1998 CA Resolution denying her Motion for Reconsideration.
Earlier, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had ruled thus:
"WHEREFORE, the marriage between petitioner Brenda B. Marcos and respondent Wilson G. Marcos, solemnized on
September 6, 1982 in Pasig City is declared null and void ab initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. The conjugal
properties, if any, is dissolved [sic] in accordance with Articles 126 and 129 of the same Code in relation to Articles 50,
51 and 52 relative to the delivery of the legitime of [the] parties' children. In the best interest and welfare of the minor
children, their custody is granted to petitioner subject to the visitation rights of respondent.
"Upon finality of this Decision, furnish copy each to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City where the marriage
was solemnized, the National Census and Statistics Office, Manila and the Register of Deeds of Mandaluyong City for
their appropriate action consistent with this Decision.
"SO ORDERED."
The Facts

The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
"It was established during the trial that the parties were married twice: (1) on September 6, 1982 which was solemnized
by Judge Eriberto H. Espiritu at the Municipal Court of Pasig (Exh. A); and (2) on May 8, 1983 which was solemnized
by Rev. Eduardo L. Eleazar, Command Chaplain, at the Presidential Security Command Chapel in Malacaang Park,
Manila (Exh. A-1). Out of their marriage, five (5) children were born (Exhs. B, C, D, E and F).
"Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the Armed Forces of the Philippines in 1973. Later on, he was transferred to the
Presidential Security Command in Malacaang during the Marcos Regime. Appellee Brenda B. Marcos, on the other
hand, joined the Women's Auxilliary Corps under the Philippine Air Force in 1978. After the Edsa Revolution, both of
them sought a discharge from the military service.
"They first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were assigned at the Malacaang Palace, she as an escort of
Imee Marcos and he as a Presidential Guard of President Ferdinand Marcos. Through telephone conversations, they
became acquainted and eventually became sweethearts.
"After their marriage on September 6, 1982, they resided at No. 1702 Daisy Street, Hulo Bliss, Mandaluyong, a
housing unit which she acquired from the Bliss Development Corporation when she was still single.
"After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the military service in 1987 and then engaged in different business
ventures that did not however prosper. As a wife, she always urged him to look for work so that their children would
see him, instead of her, as the head of the family and a good provider. Due to his failure to engage in any gainful
employment, they would often quarrel and as a consequence, he would hit and beat her. He would even force her to
have sex with him despite her weariness. He would also inflict physical harm on their children for a slight mistake and
was so severe in the way he chastised them. Thus, for several times during their cohabitation, he would leave their
house. In 1992, they were already living separately.
"All the while, she was engrossed in the business of selling "magic uling" and chickens. While she was still in the
military, she would first make deliveries early in the morning before going to Malacaang. When she was discharged
from the military service, she concentrated on her business. Then, she became a supplier in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines until she was able to put up a trading and construction company, NS Ness Trading and Construction
Development Corporation.
"The 'straw that broke the camel's back' took place on October 16, 1994, when they had a bitter quarrel. As they were
already living separately, she did not want him to stay in their house anymore. On that day, when she saw him in their
house, she was so angry that she lambasted him. He then turned violent, inflicting physical harm on her and even on
her mother who came to her aid. The following day, October 17, 1994, she and their children left the house and sought
refuge in her sister's house.
"On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself [to] medical examination at the Mandaluyong Medical Center where her
injuries were diagnosed as contusions (Exh. G, Records, 153).
"Sometime in August 1995, she together with her two sisters and driver, went to him at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong to
look for their missing child, Niko. Upon seeing them, he got mad. After knowing the reason for their unexpected
presence, he ran after them with a samurai and even [beat] her driver.
"At the time of the filing of this case, she and their children were renting a house in Camella, Paraaque, while the
appellant was residing at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong.
"In the case study conducted by Social Worker Sonia C. Millan, the children described their father as cruel and
physically abusive to them (Exh. UU, Records, pp. 85-100).
"The appellee submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A. Dayan, Ph.D., for psychological evaluation (Exh. YY,
Records, pp. 207-216), while the appellant on the other hand, did not.
"The court a quo found the appellant to be psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations mainly
because of his failure to find work to support his family and his violent attitude towards appellee and their children, x x
x."
[3]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Reversing the RTC, the CA held that psychological incapacity had not been established by the totality of the
evidence presented. It ratiocinated in this wise:
"Essential in a petition for annulment is the allegation of the root cause of the spouse's psychological incapacity which
should also be medically or clinically identified, sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision. The
incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage and shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. It must also be grave enough to bring about the disability of the parties to assume the
essential obligations of marriage as set forth in Articles 68 to 71 and Articles 220 to 225 of the Family Code and such
non-complied marital obligations must similarly be alleged in the petition, established by evidence and explained in the
decision.
"In the case before us, the appellant was not subjected to any psychological or psychiatric evaluation. The
psychological findings about the appellant by psychiatrist Natividad Dayan were based only on the interviews
conducted with the appellee. Expert evidence by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists is essential if only to
prove that the parties were or any one of them was mentally or psychically ill to be truly incognitive of the marital
obligations he or she was assuming, or as would make him or her x x x unable to assume them. In fact, he offered
testimonial evidence to show that he [was] not psychologically incapacitated. The root cause of his supposed
incapacity was not alleged in the petition, nor medically or clinically identified as a psychological illness or sufficiently
proven by an expert. Similarly, there is no evidence at all that would show that the appellant was suffering from an
incapacity which [was] psychological or mental - not physical to the extent that he could not have known the obligations
he was assuming: that the incapacity [was] grave, ha[d] preceded the marriage and [was] incurable."
[4]

Hence, this Petition.
[5]

Issues

In her Memorandum,
[6]
petitioner presents for this Court's consideration the following issues:
"I. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals could set aside the findings by the Regional Trial Court
of psychological incapacity of a respondent in a Petition for declaration of nullity of marriage simply
because the respondent did not subject himself to psychological evaluation.
II. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented and the demeanor of all the witnesses should be the
basis of the determination of the merits of the Petition."
[7]


The Court's Ruling

We agree with petitioner that the personal medical or psychological examination of respondent is not a
requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity. Nevertheless, the totality of the evidence she presented does
not show such incapacity.

Preliminary Issue: Need for Personal Medical Examination
Petitioner contends that the testimonies and the results of various tests that were submitted to determine
respondent's psychological incapacity to perform the obligations of marriage should not have been brushed aside by
the Court of Appeals, simply because respondent had not taken those tests himself. Petitioner adds that the CA should
have realized that under the circumstances, she had no choice but to rely on other sources of information in order to
determine the psychological capacity of respondent, who had refused to submit himself to such tests.
In Republic v. CA and Molina,
[8]
the guidelines governing the application and the interpretation of psychological
incapacity referred to in Article 36 of the Family Code
[9]
were laid down by this Court as follows:
"1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage
and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it 'as
the foundation of the nation.' It decrees marriage as legally 'inviolable,' thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be 'protected' by the state.
x x x x x x x x x
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged
in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.Article 36 of
the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the
parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of
the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified
as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given
by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the time of the celebration' of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their 'I do's.' The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise
of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses
of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but not be psychologically capacitated to procreate,
bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, 'mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a
natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality
structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to
parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition,
proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
x x x x x x x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or
opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095."
[10]

The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of
Appeals:
[11]
"psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability." The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is important is the
presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the
person concerned need not be resorted to.
Main Issue: Totality of Evidence Presented

The main question, then, is whether the totality of the evidence presented in the present case -- including the
testimonies of petitioner, the common children, petitioner's sister and the social worker -- was enough to sustain a
finding that respondent was psychologically incapacitated.
We rule in the negative. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to provide material
support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead
to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already
present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.
Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and was not gainfully
employed for a period of more than six years. It was during this period that he became intermittently drunk, failed to
give material and moral support, and even left the family home.
Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the inception of the
marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence showing that his condition is incurable, especially now that he is
gainfully employed as a taxi driver.
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the
time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before
the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties
and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital obligations are those provided
under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code.
Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in
psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction,
habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like.
[12]
At best, the evidence presented by petitioner refers
only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.
Because Article 36 has been abused as a convenient divorce law, this Court laid down the procedural
requirements for its invocation in Molina. Petitioner, however, has not faithfully observed them.
In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of petitioner to show that the alleged
psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability; and for her failure to
observe the guidelines outlined in Molina.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and assailed Decision AFFIRMED, except that portion requiring personal
medical examination as a conditio sine qua non to a finding of psychological incapacity. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.



[1]
Penned by Justice Bernardo LL Salas with the concurrence of Justices Fermin A. Martin Jr. (Division chairman) and
Candido V. Rivera (member).
[2]
CA Decision, pp. 12-13; rollo, pp. 38-39.
[3]
CA Decision, pp. 5-7; rollo, pp. 31-33.
[4]
CA Decision, pp. 10-11; rollo, pp. 36-37.
[5]
This case was deemed submitted for resolution on February 24, 2000, upon receipt by this Court of respondent's
Memorandum, which was signed by Atty. Virgilio V. Macaraig. Petitioner's Memorandum, signed by Atty. Rita Linda V.
Jimeno, had been filed earlier on November 5, 1999.
[6]
Rollo, p. 70; original in upper case.
[7]
Memorandum for petitioner, p. 6; rollo, p. 70.
[8]
268 SCRA 198, February 13, 1997, per Panganiban, J.
[9]
"Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
"The action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under this Article shall prescribe in ten years after its celebration."
[10]
Supra, pp. 209-213.
[11]
240 SCRA 20, 34, January 4, 1995, per Vitug, J.
[12]
"Article 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds:
(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common child, or a child of
the petitioner;
(2) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or political affiliation;
(3) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner, to engage in
prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement;
(4) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six years, even if pardoned;
(5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;
(6) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent;
(7) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in the Philippines or abroad;
(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;
(9) Attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner; or
(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one year.
For purposes of this Article, the term 'child' shall include a child by nature or by adoption."

ARTICLE 41 PRESSUMTIVE DEATH
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 165545 March 24, 2006
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, Petitioner,
vs.
TERESITA JARQUE VDA. DE BAILON, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES,J.:

The Court of Appeals Decision
1
dated June 23, 2004
2
and Resolution dated September 28,
2004
3
reversing the Resolution dated April 2, 2003
4
and Order dated June 4, 2003
5
of the Social
Security Commission (SSC) in SSC Case No. 4-15149-01 are challenged in the present petition for
review on certiorari.
On April 25, 1955, Clemente G. Bailon (Bailon) and Alice P. Diaz (Alice) contracted marriage in
Barcelona, Sorsogon.
6

More than 15 years later or on October 9, 1970, Bailon filed before the then Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Sorsogon a petition
7
to declare Alice presumptively dead.
By Order of December 10, 1970,
8
the CFI granted the petition, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, there being no opposition filed against the petition notwithstanding the publication
of the Notice of Hearing in a newspaper of general circulation in the country, Alice Diaz is hereby
declared to [sic] all legal intents and purposes, except for those of succession, presumptively
dead.
SO ORDERED.
9
(Underscoring supplied)
Close to 13 years after his wife Alice was declared presumptively dead or on August 8, 1983,
Bailon contracted marriage with Teresita Jarque (respondent) in Casiguran, Sorsogon.
10

On January 30, 1998, Bailon, who was a member of the Social Security System (SSS) since 1960
and a retiree pensioner thereof effective July 1994, died.
11

Respondent thereupon filed a claim for funeral benefits, and was granted P12,000
12
by the SSS.
Respondent filed on March 11, 1998 an additional claim for death benefits
13
which was also
granted by the SSS on April 6, 1998.
14

Cecilia Bailon-Yap (Cecilia), who claimed to be a daughter of Bailon and one Elisa Jayona (Elisa)
contested before the SSS the release to respondent of the death and funeral benefits. She claimed
that Bailon contracted three marriages in his lifetime, the first with Alice, the second with her
mother Elisa, and the third with respondent, all of whom are still alive; she, together with her
siblings, paid for Bailons medical and funeral expenses; and all the documents submitted by
respondent to the SSS in support of her claims are spurious.
In support of her claim, Cecilia and her sister Norma Bailon Chavez (Norma) submitted an Affidavit
dated February 13, 1999
15
averring that they are two of nine children of Bailon and Elisa who
cohabited as husband and wife as early as 1958; and they were reserving their right to file the
necessary court action to contest the marriage between Bailon and respondent as they personally
know that Alice is still very much alive.
16

In the meantime, on April 5, 1999, a certain Hermes P. Diaz, claiming to be the brother and
guardian of Aliz P. Diaz, filed before the SSS a claim for death benefits accruing from Bailons
death,
17
he further attesting in a sworn statement
18
that it was Norma who defrayed Bailons
funeral expenses.
Elisa and seven of her children
19
subsequently filed claims for death benefits as Bailons
beneficiaries before the SSS.
20

Atty. Marites C. de la Torre of the Legal Unit of the SSS Bicol Cluster, Naga City recommended the
cancellation of payment of death pension benefits to respondent and the issuance of an order for
the refund of the amount paid to her from February 1998 to May 1999 representing such benefits;
the denial of the claim of Alice on the ground that she was not dependent upon Bailon for support
during his lifetime; and the payment of the balance of the five-year guaranteed pension to
Bailons beneficiaries according to the order of preference provided under the law, after the
amount erroneously paid to respondent has been collected. The pertinent portions of the
Memorandum read:
1. Aliz [sic] Diaz never disappeared. The court must have been misled by misrepresentation in
declaring the first wife, Aliz [sic] Diaz, as presumptively dead.
x x x x
x x x the Order of the court in the Petition to Declare Alice Diaz Presumptively Dead,did not
become final. The presence of Aliz [sic] Diaz, is contrary proof that rendered it invalid.
x x x x
3. It was the deceased member who abandoned his wife, Aliz [sic] Diaz. He, being in bad faith, and
is the deserting spouse, his remarriage is void, being bigamous.
x x x x
In this case, it is the deceased member who was the deserting spouse and who remarried, thus his
marriage to Teresita Jarque, for the second time was void as it was bigamous. To require affidavit
of reappearance to terminate the second marriage is not necessary as there is no disappearance of
Aliz [sic] Diaz, the first wife, and a voidable marriage [sic], to speak of.
21
(Underscoring supplied)
In the meantime, the SSS Sorsogon Branch, by letter of August 16, 2000,
22
advised respondent
that as Cecilia and Norma were the ones who defrayed Bailons funeral expenses, she should
return the P12,000 paid to her.
In a separate letter dated September 7, 1999,
23
the SSS advised respondent of the cancellation of
her monthly pension for death benefits in view of the opinion rendered by its legal department
that her marriage with Bailon was void as it was contracted while the latters marriage with Alice
was still subsisting; and the December 10, 1970 CFI Order declaring Alice presumptively dead did
not become final, her presence being contrary proof against the validity of the order. It thus
requested respondent to return the amount of P24,000 representing the total amount of monthly
pension she had received from the SSS from February 1998 to May 1999.
Respondent protested the cancellation of her monthly pension for death benefits by letter to the
SSS dated October 12, 1999.
24
In a subsequent letter dated November 27, 1999
25
to the SSC, she
reiterated her request for the release of her monthly pension, asserting that her marriage with
Bailon was not declared before any court of justice as bigamous or unlawful, hence, it remained
valid and subsisting for all legal intents and purposes as in fact Bailon designated her as his
beneficiary.
The SSS, however, by letter to respondent dated January 21, 2000,
26
maintained the denial of her
claim for and the discontinuance of payment of monthly pension. It advised her, however, that she
was not deprived of her right to file a petition with the SSC.
Respondent thus filed a petition
27
against the SSS before the SSC for the restoration to her of her
entitlement to monthly pension.
In the meantime, respondent informed the SSS that she was returning, under protest, the amount
of P12,000 representing the funeral benefits she received, she alleging that Norma and her
siblings forcibly and coercively prevented her from spending any amount during Bailons wake.
28

After the SSS filed its Answer
29
to respondents petition, and the parties filed their respective
Position Papers, one Alicia P. Diaz filed an Affidavit
30
dated August 14, 2002 with the SSS Naga
Branch attesting that she is the widow of Bailon; she had only recently come to know of the
petition filed by Bailon to declare her presumptively dead; it is not true that she disappeared as
Bailon could have easily located her, she having stayed at her parents residence in Barcelona,
Sorsogon after she found out that Bailon was having an extramarital affair; and Bailon used to visit
her even after their separation.
By Resolution of April 2, 2003, the SSC found that the marriage of respondent to Bailon was void
and, therefore, she was just a common-law-wife. Accordingly it disposed as follows,
quoted verbatim:
WHEREFORE, this Commission finds, and so holds, that petitioner Teresita Jarque-Bailon is not the
legitimate spouse and primary beneficiary of SSS member Clemente Bailon.
Accordingly, the petitioner is hereby ordered to refund to the SSS the amount ofP24,000.00
representing the death benefit she received therefrom for the period February 1998 until May
1999 as well as P12,000.00 representing the funeral benefit.
The SSS is hereby ordered to pay Alice (a.k.a. Aliz) Diaz-Bailon the appropriate death benefit
arising from the demise of SSS member Clemente Bailon in accordance with Section 8(e) and (k) as
well as Section 13 of the SS Law, as amended, and its prevailing rules and regulations and to
inform this Commission of its compliance herewith.
SO ORDERED.
31
(Underscoring supplied)
In so ruling against respondent, the SSC ratiocinated.
After a thorough examination of the evidence at hand, this Commission comes to the inevitable
conclusion that the petitioner is not the legitimate wife of the deceased member.
x x x x
There is x x x ample evidence pointing to the fact that, contrary to the declaration of the then CFI
of Sorsogon (10th Judicial District), the first wife never disappeared as the deceased member
represented in bad faith. This Commission accords credence to the findings of the SSS contained
in its Memorandum dated August 9, 1999,
32
revealing that Alice (a.k.a. Aliz) Diaz never left
Barcelona, Sorsogon, after her separation from Clemente Bailon x x x.
As the declaration of presumptive death was extracted by the deceased member using artifice and
by exerting fraud upon the unsuspecting court of law, x x x it never had the effect of giving the
deceased member the right to marry anew. x x x [I]t is clear that the marriage to the petitioner is
void, considering that the first marriage on April 25, 1955 to Alice Diaz was not previously
annulled, invalidated or otherwise dissolved during the lifetime of the parties thereto. x x x as
determined through the investigation conducted by the SSS, Clemente Bailon was the abandoning
spouse, not Alice Diaz Bailon.
x x x x
It having been established, by substantial evidence, that the petitioner was just a common-law
wife of the deceased member, it necessarily follows that she is not entitled as a primary
beneficiary, to the latters death benefit. x x x
x x x x
It having been determined that Teresita Jarque was not the legitimate surviving spouse and
primary beneficiary of Clemente Bailon, it behooves her to refund the total amount of death
benefit she received from the SSS for the period from February 1998 until May 1999 pursuant to
the principle of solutio indebiti x x x
Likewise, it appearing that she was not the one who actually defrayed the cost of the wake and
burial of Clemente Bailon, she must return the amount of P12,000.00 which was earlier given to
her by the SSS as funeral benefit.
33
(Underscoring supplied)
Respondents Motion for Reconsideration
34
having been denied by Order of June 4, 2003, she filed
a petition for review
35
before the Court of Appeals (CA).
By Decision of June 23, 2004, the CA reversed and set aside the April 2, 2003 Resolution and June
4, 2003 Order of the SSC and thus ordered the SSS to pay respondent all the pension benefits due
her. Held the CA:
x x x [T]he paramount concern in this case transcends the issue of whether or not the decision of
the then CFI, now RTC, declaring Alice Diaz presumptively dead has attained finality but, more
importantly, whether or not the respondents SSS and Commission can validly re-evaluate the
findings of the RTC, and on its own, declare the latters decision to be bereft of any basis. On
similar import, can respondents SSS and Commission validly declare the first marriage subsisting
and the second marriage null and void?
x x x x
x x x while it is true that a judgment declaring a person presumptively dead never attains finality
as the finding that the person is unheard of in seven years is merely a presumption juris tantum,
the second marriage contracted by a person with an absent spouse endures until annulled. It is
only the competent court that can nullify the second marriage pursuant to Article 87 of the Civil
Code and upon the reappearance of the missing spouse, which action for annulment may be
filed. Nowhere does the law contemplates [sic] the possibility that respondent SSS may validly
declare the second marriage null and void on the basis alone of its own investigation and declare
that the decision of the RTC declaring one to be presumptively dead is without basis.
Respondent SSS cannot arrogate upon itself the authority to review the decision of the regular
courts under the pretext of determining the actual and lawful beneficiaries of its members.
Notwithstanding its opinion as to the soundness of the findings of the RTC, it should extend due
credence to the decision of the RTC absent of [sic] any judicial pronouncement to the contrary. x x
x
x x x [A]ssuming arguendo that respondent SSS actually possesses the authority to declare the
decision of the RTC to be without basis, the procedure it followed was offensive to the principle of
fair play and thus its findings are of doubtful quality considering that petitioner Teresita was not
given ample opportunity to present evidence for and her behalf.
x x x x
Respondent SSS is correct in stating that the filing of an Affidavit of Reappearance with the Civil
Registry is no longer practical under the premises. Indeed, there is no more first marriage to
restore as the marital bond between Alice Diaz and Clemente Bailon was already terminated upon
the latters death. Neither is there a second marriage to terminate because the second marriage
was likewise dissolved by the death of Clemente Bailon.
However, it is not correct to conclude that simply because the filing of the Affidavit of
Reappearance with the Civil Registry where parties to the subsequent marriage reside is already
inutile, the respondent SSS has now the authority to review the decision of the RTC and
consequently declare the second marriage null and void.
36
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The SSC and the SSS separately filed their Motions for Reconsideration
37
which were both denied
for lack of merit.
Hence, the SSS present petition for review on certiorari
38
anchored on the following grounds:
I
THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IS CONTRARY TO LAW.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION.
39

The SSS faults the CA for failing to give due consideration to the findings of facts of the SSC on
the prior and subsisting marriage between Bailon and Alice; in disregarding the authority of the
SSC to determine to whom, between Alice and respondent, the death benefits should be awarded
pursuant to Section 5
40
of the Social Security Law; and in declaring that the SSS did not give
respondent due process or ample opportunity to present evidence in her behalf.
The SSS submits that the observations and findings relative to the CFI proceedings are of no
moment to the present controversy, as the same may be considered only as obiter dicta in view of
the SSCs finding of the existence of a prior and subsisting marriage between Bailon and Alice by
virtue of which Alice has a better right to the death benefits.
41

The petition fails.
That the SSC is empowered to settle any dispute with respect to SSS coverage, benefits and
contributions, there is no doubt. In so exercising such power, however, it cannot review, much
less reverse, decisions rendered by courts of law as it did in the case at bar when it declared that
the December 10, 1970 CFI Order was obtained through fraud and subsequently disregarded the
same, making its own findings with respect to the validity of Bailon and Alices marriage on the
one hand and the invalidity of Bailon and respondents marriage on the other.
In interfering with and passing upon the CFI Order, the SSC virtually acted as an appellate court.
The law does not give the SSC unfettered discretion to trifle with orders of regular courts in the
exercise of its authority to determine the beneficiaries of the SSS.
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity on August 3,
1988 of the Family Code, the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was
the law in effect at the time of their celebration.
42

Article 83 of the Civil Code
43
provides:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first
spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from
its performance, unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second
marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee,
though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed
to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the
absentee is presumed dead according to Articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall
be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a competent court. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Under the foregoing provision of the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage contracted during the
lifetime of the first spouse is illegal and void ab initio unless the prior marriage is first annulled or
dissolved or contracted under any of the three exceptional circumstances. It bears noting that the
marriage under any of these exceptional cases is deemed valid until declared null and void by a
competent court. It follows that the onus probandi in these cases rests on the party assailing the
second marriage.
44

In the case at bar, as found by the CFI, Alice had been absent for 15 consecutive years
45
when
Bailon sought the declaration of her presumptive death, which judicial declaration was not even a
requirement then for purposes of remarriage.
46

Eminent jurist Arturo M. Tolentino (now deceased) commented:
Where a person has entered into two successive marriages, a presumption arises in favor of the
validity of the second marriage, and the burden is on the party attacking the validity of the second
marriage to prove that the first marriage had not been dissolved; it is not enough to prove the
first marriage, for it must also be shown that it had not ended when the second marriage was
contracted. The presumption in favor of the innocence of the defendant from crime or wrong
and of the legality of his second marriage, will prevail over the presumption of the continuance of
life of the first spouse or of the continuance of the marital relation with such first
spouse.
47
(Underscoring supplied)
Under the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage being voidable,
48
it is terminated by final judgment
of annulment in a case instituted by the absent spouse who reappears or by either of the spouses
in the subsequent marriage.
Under the Family Code, no judicial proceeding to annul a subsequent marriage is necessary. Thus
Article 42 thereof provides:
Art. 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall beautomatically
terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is
a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio.
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil
registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any
interested person, with due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage and without
prejudice to the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is disputed.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The termination of the subsequent marriage by affidavit provided by the above-quoted provision
of the Family Code does not preclude the filing of an action in court to prove the reappearance of
the absentee and obtain a declaration of dissolution or termination of the subsequent marriage.
49

If the absentee reappears, but no step is taken to terminate the subsequent marriage, either by
affidavit or by court action, such absentees mere reappearance, even if made known to the
spouses in the subsequent marriage, will not terminate such marriage.
50
Since the second marriage
has been contracted because of a presumption that the former spouse is dead, such presumption
continues inspite of the spouses physical reappearance, and by fiction of law, he or she must still
be regarded as legally an absentee until the subsequent marriage is terminated as provided by
law.
51

If the subsequent marriage is not terminated by registration of an affidavit of reappearance or by
judicial declaration but by death of either spouse as in the case at bar, Tolentino submits:
x x x [G]enerally if a subsequent marriage is dissolved by the death of either spouse, the effects of
dissolution of valid marriages shall arise. The good or bad faith of either spouse can no longer be
raised, because, as in annullable or voidable marriages, the marriage cannot be questioned except
in a direct action for annulment.
52
(Underscoring supplied)
Similarly, Lapuz v. Eufemio
53
instructs:
In fact, even if the bigamous marriage had not been void ab initio but only voidable under Article
83, paragraph 2, of the Civil Code, because the second marriage had been contracted with the
first wife having been an absentee for seven consecutive years, or when she had been generally
believed dead, still the action for annulment became extinguished as soon as one of the three
persons involved had died, as provided in Article 87, paragraph 2, of the Code, requiring that the
action for annulment should be brought during the lifetime of any one of the parties involved.
And furthermore, the liquidation of any conjugal partnership that might have resulted from such
voidable marriage must be carried out in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased
spouse, as expressly provided in Section 2 of the Revised Rule 73, and not in the annulment
proceeding.
54
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It bears reiterating that a voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct
proceeding. Consequently, such marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties
and not after the death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the
marriage had been perfectly valid.
55
Upon the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached,
and is made good ab initio.
56

In the case at bar, as no step was taken to nullify, in accordance with law, Bailons and
respondents marriage prior to the formers death in 1998, respondent is rightfully the dependent
spouse-beneficiary of Bailon.
In light of the foregoing discussions, consideration of the other issues raised has been rendered
unnecessary.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
(ON OFFICIAL LEAVE)
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Acting Chairpersons
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Footnotes
*
On Official Leave.
1
Penned by Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and concurred in by Justices Mariano C. del
Castillo and Edgardo F. Sundiam.
2
CA rollo, pp. 147-157.
3
Id. at 195.
4
Id. at 47-55.
5
Id. at 56.
6
SSC records, p. 112.
7
Id. at 65-67.
8
CA rollo, pp. 6-9.
9
Id. at 8-9.
10
SSC records, p. 127.
11
CA rollo, p. 11.
12
SSC records, p. 48.
13
Ibid.
14
Id. at 96-97.
15
Id. at 55.
16
Ibid.
17
Id. at 109.
18
Id. at 110.
19
Herminia Bailon-Argente, Cecilia Bailon-Yap, Norma Bailon-Chavez, Roselyn Bailon-Ladesma,
Susan J. Bailon, Charito Bailon-Soriano, and Clemente J. Bailon, Jr.
20
SSC records, pp. 113-120.
21
Id. at 135-136.
22
Id. at 137.
23
Id. at 124.
24
Id. at 125.
25
Id. at 129-130.
26
Id. at 134.
27
CA rollo, pp. 12-14.
28
SSC records, p. 149.
29
CA rollo, pp. 15-19.
30
Id. at 144.
31
Rollo, pp. 56-57.
32
Pertinent portions of the Memorandum provide:
x x x x
1. Based on the interview conducted by our Account Officer, Mr. Rolando G. Gomez to [sic] the
relatives of Alice (not Aliz) Diaz namely: Rogelio Del Prado and Emelita Diaz at Poblacion Sur,
Barcelona, Sorsogon they alleged that subject deceased member and Alice live [sic] as husband
and wife for only a year. Alice never left Barcelona, Sorsogon since their separation and is not
dependent for support nor received support from the deceased member. x x x
33
Rollo, pp. 53-56.
34
SSC records, pp. 172-174.
35
CA rollo, pp. 2-5.
36
Rollo, pp. 41-44.
37
CA rollo, pp. 161-170.
38
Rollo, pp. 10-34.
39
Id. at 22.
40
SEC. 5. Settlement of Disputes. (a) Any dispute arising under this Act with respect to coverage,
benefits, contributions and penalties thereon or any other matter related thereto, shall be
cognizable by the Commission, and any case filed with respect thereto shall be heard by the
Commission, or any of its members, or by hearing officers duly authorized by the Commission
and decided within the mandatory period of twenty (20) days after the submission of the evidence.
The filing, determination and settlement of disputes shall be governed by the rules and
regulations promulgated by the Commission.
x x x x
41
Rollo, p. 28.
42
Article 256 of the Family Code itself limited its retroactive governance only to cases where it
thereby would not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code
or other laws.
43
Article 41 of the Family Code now provides:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall
be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had
been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under
the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only
two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the
spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration
of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the
absent spouse.
44
Armas v. Calisterio, 386 Phil. 402, 409 (2000).
45
CA rollo, p. 8.
46
Jones v. Hortiguela, 64 Phil. 179, 183 (1937).
47
I A. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines 282 (1999
ed.). (Citations omitted)
48
Art. 85. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the
marriage:
x x x x
(2) In a subsequent marriage under Article 83, Number 2, that the former husband or wife
believed to be dead was in fact living and the marriage with such former husband or wife was then
in force;
x x x x (Underscoring supplied)
Art. 87. The action for annulment of marriage must be commenced by the parties and within the
periods as follows:
x x x x
(2) For causes mentioned in number 2 of Article 85, by the spouse who has been absent, during
his or her lifetime; or by either spouse of the subsequent marriage during the lifetime of the
other;
x x x x
49
Supra note 47, at 284.
50
Ibid.
51
Id. at 285-286.
52
Supra note 47, at 287.
53
150 Phil. 204 (1972).
54
Id. at 213.
55
Nial v. Bayadog, 384 Phil. 661, 673 (2000). (Citations omitted)
56
Id. at 674.

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