1

LEGAL MAXIMS AND CASE DIGESTS

2

Absoluta sententia expositore non indigent

Fagel Tabin Agricultural Corporation vs. Hon. Emilio Jacinto
G.R. No. L-55393; October 28, 1991

Facts:

After the issuance of Presidential Decree No. 27, respondents officials and employees of
the Ministry of Agrarian Reform conducted parcellary map sketching of portions of private
agricultural areas cultivated to rice and corn. Thus, placing the 165-hectare agricultural land of
petitioner Fagel Tabin Agricultural Corporation under the coverage of the Certificate Land
Transfer (CLT). A complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Certificates of Land Transfer was
filed by the petitioner contending that the 165-hectare parcel of land it owned was classified
primarily as a coconut and rubber land, and not devoted to rice and corn. While respondents
contended that the landholding in question is not totally primarily devoted to coconuts and
rubber, portions of it are tenanted and devoted to the production of corn. Furthermore, under the
provision of P.D. No. 946, the Court of Agrarian Relations has no jurisdiction in the case. The
complaint was dismissed by the said Court for lack of jurisdiction so was the motion for
reconsideration.

Issue:

Whether the Court of Agrarian Relations has jurisdiction over the present case.

Ruling:

Section 12 of P.D. No. 946 is clear and unambiguous. It provides, as an exception to the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Courts of Agrarian Relations, the subject matters
exclusively cognizable by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform among which are the classification
and identification of land-holdings, the parcellary mapping in question and the issuance, recall or
cancellation of CLTs. Thus, the said Court of Agrarian Relations had no jurisdiction over this
case. As a rule in statutory construction that when the words and phrases of a statute are clear
and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language employed and the statute
must be taken to mean exactly what it says. As expressed in absoluta sententia expositore non
indigent, where the language of the statute is clear, no explanation is required. It must be stated
that the first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law and construction and
interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or
inadequate without them. With the enactment of R.A. No. 6657 covering the landholding
in question, the case at bar has already become moot and academic. Thus, the case is dismissed.

3

Actus me invito factus non est meus actus

People of the Philippines vs. Juan Salvatierra
G. R. No. 111124; June 20, 1996

Facts:

Only three of the five accused were prosecuted for robbery in band with rape and double
homicide and attempted homicide for conspiring together in entering the house of Hichiro
Kubota and Elizabeth Hammond, and stealing an amount of P800,000 on the evening of 1988.
Once inside, the accused had carnal knowledge of Hazel Arjona, Hichiro Kubota's maid; stabbed
Kubota and Arjona resulting mortal wounds which directly caused their death; and attemptedly
stabbed the other maid Marilyn Juguilon. Since the other two accused eluded arrest, only three
were apprehended, Constantino and Salvatierra were found guilty but Trinidad was acquitted.
Hence, an appeal by respondent Eric Constatino, the driver of the deceased Hichiro Kubota, on
main defense of an exempting circumstance that he had acted under the impulse of
uncontrollable fear since he was allegedly coerced by his co-accused into committing the
criminal offense for which they were all charged.

Issue:

Whether the respondent is exempted from the crime on alleged employment of duress
upon him.

Ruling:

The Court affirmed the trial courts decision. Respondents account of the supposed
employment of duress upon him by his cohorts falls far short of the requirements under which
the same could have substantial value in evidence. The Court held that in order that duress may
be validly availed, it should actually be anchored on a real, imminent or reasonable fear for one's
own life or limb and should not be speculative, fanciful, or imagined. Based on the complete
absence of freedom as expressed in legal maxim actus me invito factus non est meus actus,
which translates to an act done by me against my will is not my act. The compulsion employed
upon the accused must have been of such character as to leave no opportunity for him to spring
an escape or to himself foist any act of defense for self-preservation. The acts performed by
respondent as narrated by the victims as witnesses clearly indicate that he was in concert and in
coordination with his other co-accused in the execution of their criminal design. Moreover, his
immediate flight to and his months of sojourn in Sorsogon after the incident are likewise
indicative of his guilt.
4

Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea

The United States vs. Ah Chong
G.R. No. L-5272; March 19, 1910

Facts:

The defendant Ah Chong worked as a cooked while the deceased Pascual Gilberto who
was a house boy. The two of them shared a room having a door with no permanent lock. As a
means of securing it, a chair was placed against the door. At around 10 in the evening, Ah Chong
who was sleeping was awakened by someone trying to forcefully open the door. He called twice
but there was no response. Fearing that the intruder might be a thief, Ah Chong took his knife
and struck the intruder when it entered the room. It turned out that the said intruder was his
roommate Pascual. Despite his plea of self-defense, said defendant was found guilty with
homicide by the Court of First Instance.

Issue:

Whether the defendant by reason of mistake of facts criminally liable.

Ruling:

The Court held that there is no criminal liability when one commits an offense or act due
to ignorance of facts provided that it was not due to negligence or bad faith. Such ignorance of
the fact is sufficient to negative the particular intent which under the law, is an essential element
to the crime of murder charged cancels the presumption of intent and works for an acquittal. In
the case, the defendant struck the fatal blow on the belief that the intruder was a robber, on which
his life and property was in danger. It is clear that e acted in good faith without negligence and
without any criminal intent in exercising his right to self-defense. There can be no crime, large or
small, without an evil mind. The author of the Penal Code deemed criminal intent or malice to be
an essential element of the various crimes and misdemeanors. It is a principle that the essence of
an offense is the wrongful intent, without which it cannot exist. In other words, punishment is the
sequence of wickedness, without which it cannot be. And neither in philosophical speculation
nor in religious or moral sentiment would any people in any age allow that a man should be
deemed guilty unless his mind was so. This doctrine confirmed by the maxim actus non facit
reum nisi mens sit rea in which the act itself does not make a man guilty unless his intention
were so. Thus, the Court held that the defendant should be acquitted.


5

Ad proximum antecedens fiat relatio nisi impediatur sentential

Jose Mapa vs. Hon. Joker Arroyo
G.R. No. 78585; July 5, 1989

Facts:

On 1975, four contracts of sale of subdivision lots were entered by petitioner Jose
Antonio Mapa and respondent Labrador Development Corporation (Labrador). After petitioners
failure to pay his unpaid installments, respondent sent a notarial cancellation of the four
contracts. Such certification was withheld in the demand of petitioner that respondent must
comply with his contractual obligation on Clause 20 to provide for lighting and water facilities to
subdivision lot buyers. Since the petitioner did not paid the agreed amount in full, respondent
refused to accept his payment. Then, petitioner filed a complaint that respondent neglected to
meet the minimum HSRC standard for water system, and electrical power supply, and to enjoin
respondent to cancel his contracts. The HSRC dismissed the complaint by default of the
petitioner on the lapse of 5 years. Under P.D. No. 957, petitioner contends respondent cannot
rescind the said contracts since he did not cause delay on his part, it is the latter failing to
perform their contractual obligations.

Issue:

Whether respondent is entitled to rescind the contracts of sale with the petitioner.

Ruling:

Under Section 20 of P.D. No. 957, every owner or developer shall construct and provide
the facilities, improvements, infrastructures and other forms of developmentwithin one year
from the date of the issuance of the license for the subdivisionfixed by the Authority. The
Court applied the rule ad proximum antecedens fiat relatio nisi impediatur sentencia. Relative
words refer to the nearest antecedent, unless it be prevented by the context. In the present case,
the employment of the word "and" between "facilities, improvements, infrastructures" and "other
forms of development," far from supporting petitioner's theory, enervates it instead since it is
basic in legal hermeneutics that "and" is not meant to separate words but is a conjunction used to
denote a joinder or union. Moreover, P.D. No. 957 cannot be applied since it was issued on July
12, 1976 long after the execution of the contracts involved. The Court found that the respondent
has the right to rescind the contracts, petitioners suspended payments on the ground of non-
development was improper since the period allowed for respondent's obligation to undertake
such development has not yet expired. Thus, the petition was dismissed.

6

Argumentum a contrario

Clemea vs. Bien
G.R. No. 155508; September 11, 2006

Facts:
This piece of land was one of three lots involved in two consolidated cases for recovery
of possession and ownership filed in the 1940s by respondents predecessor Irene Bien against
petitioners. Neither one of the original parties lived to see the end of the trial. Petitioners
succeeded the defendant Pedro Clemea y Zurbano who died in 1955.The trial lasted decades.
Eventually, the cases were re-raffled, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision declaring
petitioners to be the absolute owners of the land. Subsequently, the RTC modified portion of its
decision and ruled that the contending parties had failed to prove their respective claims of
ownership. Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). In a decision dated April 4,
2002, the CA reversed the ruling on the ownership of the land. It proceeded to award respondents
in damages as compensation for their having been deprived of possession and the owners share
in the harvest. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether petitioners should be made to pay respondents compensatory damages.
Ruling:
The appellate court committed no reversible error in relying on Gregorio Clemeas
testimony. The award of damages must stand. Petitioners predecessor Pedro Clemea alleged in
his answer that the land was in his exclusive possession. An admission, verbal or written, made
by a party in the course of proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission
may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such
admission was made. A judicial admission conclusively binds the party making it. He cannot
thereafter contradict it. Interest alone is not a ground for disregarding a partys testimony. To
these dicta we give our complete assent. Petitioners argumentum a contrario must be rejected.






7

Casus omissus pro omisso habendus est

SMCEUPTGWO vs. SMPPEUPDMP
G.R. No. 171153; September 12, 2007
Facts:
San Miguel Corporation Employees Union- Philippines Transport and General Workers
(SMCEU-PTGWO) filed with the DOLE-NCR a petition seeking the cancellation of San Miguel
Packaging Products Employees Union - Pambansang Diwa ng Manggagawang Pilipino
(SMPPEU-PDMP) registration and its dropping from the rolls of legitimate labor organizations.
DOLE-NCR Regional Director issued an Order dismissing the allegations. It was found that
respondent did not comply with the 20% membership requirement and, thus, ordered the
cancellation of its certificate of registration and removal from the rolls of legitimate labor
organizations. Respondent appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR).While the BLR
agreed with the findings of the DOLE Regional Director, it reversed the ruling that the 20%
membership is a requirement for respondent to attain legal personality as a labor organization.
The Court of Appeals, in a Decision dated 9 March 2005, dismissed the petition and affirmed the
decision of the BLR. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
Issue:
Whether the respondent is a legitimate labor organization.

Held:
When certain persons or things are specified in a law, contract, or will, an intention to
exclude all others from its operation may be inferred. Such is the case here. If its intent were
otherwise, the law could have so easily and conveniently included trade union centers in
identifying the labor organizations allowed to charter a chapter or local. The rule is restrictive in
the sense that it proceeds from the premise that the legislating body would not have made
specific enumerations in a statute if it had the intention not to restrict its meaning and confine its
terms to those expressly mentioned. Casus omissus pro omisso habendus est. A person, object
or thing omitted must have been omitted intentionally. Under the pertinent status and applicable
implementing rules, the power granted to labor organizations to directly create a chapter or local
through chartering is given to a federation or national union, then a trade union center is without
authority to charter directly. Although PDMP as a trade union center is a legitimate labor
organization, it has no power to directly create a local or chapter.



8

Cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex

Commendador vs. De Villa
G.R. No. 93177; August 2, 1991

Facts:
On September 27, 1972, President Marcos issued General Order No. 8, empowering the
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces to create military tribunals to try and decide cases of military
personnel and such other cases as may be referred to them. On November 7, 1972, he
promulgated P.D. No. 39. On June 11, 1978, the President promulgated P.D. No. 1498, or the
National Security Code, intended to meet the continuing threats to the existence, security and
stability of the State. The modified rule on challenges under P.D. No. 39 was embodied in this
decree. On January 17, 1981, the President issued Proc. No. 2045 proclaiming the termination of
the state of martial law throughout the Philippines. P.D. No. 39 was issued to implement General
Order No. 8 and the other general orders mentioned therein. With the termination of martial law
and the dissolution of the military tribunals created thereunder, the reason for the existence of
P.D. No. 39 ceased automatically.

Issue:
Whether P.D. No. 39 had been rendered inoperative by Proclamation 2045.

Ruling:
It is a basic canon of statutory construction that when the reason of the law ceases, the
law itself ceases. Cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex. This principle is also expressed in the
maxim ratio legis est anima: the reason of law is its soul. Applying these rules, the Court held
that the withdrawal of the right to peremptory challenge in P.D. No. 39 became ineffective when
the apparatus of martial law was dismantled with the issuance of Proclamation No. 2045, As a
result, the old rule embodied in Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 was automatically revived and
now again allows the right to peremptory challenge.





9

Contemporanea expositio est optima et fortissimo in lege

People vs. Puno
G.R. No. 97471; February 17, 1993

Facts:
Mrs. Maria Socorro Mutuc-Sarmiento owns a bakeshop. She has a driver of her own just
as her husband does. At around 5:00pm of January 13, 1988, the accused Isabelo Puno, who is
the personal driver of Mrs. Sarmiento's arrived at the bakeshop. He told Mrs. Socorro that her
own driver Fred had to go to Pampanga on an emergency, so Isabelo will temporary take his
place. On their way home, Isabelo stopped the car at Araneta Avenue where Enrique Amurao,
nephew of Isabelo, boarded. Amurao poked a gun at her. They took her bag. Isabelo asked Ma.
Socorro to issue a check for P100,000.00, Ma. Socorro complied. Enrique ordered her to
swallow a pill but she refused. Ma. Socorro jumped out of the car then reported the matter to
CAPCOM. Both accused were arrested, Enrique tried to encash the P40,000.00 check at PCI
Bank, Makati.

Issue:
Whether accused-appellants committed the felony of kidnapping for ransom; or a
violation of Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974; or the offense of simple
robbery.

Ruling:
The Court held that the offense committed by appellants is simple robbery defined in
Article 293 and punished under Paragraph 5 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code with
prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period. Appellants
have indisputably acted in conspiracy as shown by their concerted acts evidentiary of a unity of
thought and community of purpose. This conclusion is buttressed by the rule on
contemporaneous construction, since it is one drawn from the time when and the circumstances
under which the decree to be construed originated. Contemporaneous exposition or construction
is the best and strongest in the law, contemporanea expositio est optima et fortissimo in lege.



10

Distingue tempora et concordabis jura

U.S. vs. Alvir
G.R. No. L-3981; January 14, 1908

Facts:
Gaspar Alvir, appellant herein, was accused before the court of the justice of the peace of
Bulacan of the crime of seduction, and, having been found guilty, he was sentenced to three
months of arresto mayor, to pay an indemnity of P1,000 to the offended party, to acknowledge
the offspring, to make an allowance of P15 monthly subsistence until the child becomes of age,
and to pay the costs of the proceedings. He appealed to the Court of First Instance wherein he
was also found to be guilty and imposed the same penalty as that of the lower court. After having
undergone his term of imprisonment, he filed a motion asking the court to permit him to keep the
child in his own house and to be released from paying to the offended party the P15 monthly.
The accused based his claim on Article 149 of the Civil Code, the motion was overruled.

Issue:
Whether the appellant, in his keeping of his child, be released from the obligation of
paying allowance to the offended party.

Ruling:
It is a juridical maxim, distingue tempora et concordabis jura. The Penal Code was
promulgated as a law for the Philippines in 1884, and is interior to the Civil Code, which was not
enforced in the Philippines until the latter part of 1889. In a similar case, the Court held that the
option which article 149 grants the person obliged to furnish nourishment, between paying the
pension fixed or receiving and keeping in his own house the party who is entitled to the same, is
not so absolute as to prevent cases being considered wherein, either because this right would be
opposed to the exercise of a preferential right or because of the existence of some justifiable
cause morally opposed to the removal of the party enjoying the maintenance, the right of
selection must be understood as being thereby restricted.




11

Dura lex sed lex

Revaldo vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 170589; April 16, 2009
Facts:

Petitioner was charged with the offense of illegal possession of premium hardwood
lumber in violation of Section 68 of the Forestry Code. That on or about the 17th day of June
1992, Revaldo, with intent of gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
possess 96.14 board ft. of flat lumber with a total value of P1,730.52, Philippine Currency,
without any legal document as required under existing forest laws and regulations from proper
government authorities, to the damage and prejudice of the government. Upon arraignment,
petitioner, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued. The RTC rendered judgment on
1997 convicting petitioner of the offense charged, he appealed and the Court of Appeals ruled
that motive or intention is immaterial for the reason that mere possession of the lumber without
the legal documents gives rise to criminal liability. Hence, this petition for certiorari. Petitioner
contends that the warrantless search and seizure conducted by the police officers was illegal and
thus the items seized should not have been admitted in evidence against him. Petitioner argues
that the police officers were not armed with a search warrant when they went to his house to
verify the report that petitioner had in his possession lumber without the corresponding license
Issue:

Whether or not the evidence obtained without search warrant is admissible in court.

Ruling:

When the police officers arrived at the house of petitioner, the lumber were lying around
the vicinity of petitioners house. The lumber were in plain view. Under the plain view doctrine,
objects falling in "plain view" of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view
are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. When asked whether he had the
necessary permit to possess the lumber, petitioner failed to produce one. Petitioner merely
replied that the lumber in his possession was intended for the repair of his house and for his
furniture shop. There was thus probable cause for the police officers to confiscate the lumber.
There was, therefore, no necessity for a search warrant. Petitioner was in possession of the
lumber without the necessary documents when the police officers accosted him. In open court,
petitioner categorically admitted the possession and ownership of the confiscated lumber as well
as the fact that he did not have any legal documents therefore and that he merely intended to use
the lumber for the repair of his dilapidated house. Mere possession of forest products without the
proper documentation consummates the crime. Dura lex sed lex. The law may be harsh but that
is the law. Therefore, the appealed decision convicting petitioner for violation of Section 68
(now Section 77) of the Forestry Code is affirmed.
12

Ejusdem generis

Vera vs. Cuevas
G.R. No. L-33693-94; May 31, 1979

Facts:
Plaintiffs, in Civil Case No. 52276 private respondents herein, are engaged in the
manufacture sale and distribution of filled milk products throughout the Philippines. The Court
issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the Commissioner of Internal Revenue from
requiring plaintiffs private respondent to print on the labels of their rifled milk products the
words directed by Section 169 and from taking any action to enforce the above legal provision
against the plaintiffs private respondents in connection with their milk products, pending the
final determination of the case. The Office of the Solicitor General brought an appeal from the
said order by way of certiorari to the Supreme Court. Upon agreement of the parties, Civil Case
52276 and Special Civil action 52383 were heard jointly being intimately related with each
other. On April 16, 1971, the respondent court issued its decision.

Issue:
Whether the lower court erred in ruling that Section 169 of the Tax Code has been
repealed by implication.

Ruling:
The lower court did not err in ruling that section 169 of the Tax Code has been repealed
by implication. Section 169 was enacted in 1939, together with Section 141 and Section 177.
However, Section 141 was expressly repealed by Section 1 of Republic Act No. 344, and Section
177, by Section 1 of Republic Act No. 463. By the express repeal, Section 169 became merely
declaratory provision, without tax purpose, or a penal sanction. Moreover, it seems apparent that
Section 169 of the Tax Code does not apply to filled milk. The general clause is restricted by the
specific term "skimmed milk" under the familiar rule of ejusdem Generis that general and
unlimited terms are restrained and limited by the particular terms they follow in the statute.




13

Exceptio firmat regulam in casibus non exceptis

Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Seagate Technology
G.R. No. 153866; February 11, 2005

Facts:
Seagate Technology is a foreign corporation registered with the Philippine Export Zone
Authority (PEZA) and has been issued a PEZA Certificate pursuant to Presidential Decree No.
66, as amended, to engage in the manufacture of recording components primarily used in
computers for export. The administrative claim for refund by the respondent on October 4, 1999
was not acted upon by the petitioner prompting the respondent to elevate the case to the CTA on
July 21, 2000 by way of Petition for Review in order to toll the running of the two-year
prescriptive period. The Tax Court rendered a decision granting the claim for refund.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent is entitled to the refund.

Ruling:
R.A. No. 7916 states that no taxes, local and national, shall be imposed on business
establishments operating within the ecozone. Since this law does not exclude the VAT from the
prohibition, it is deemed included. Exceptio firmat regulam in casibus non exceptis. A thing not
being excepted must be regarded as coming within the purview of the general rule Business
companies registered in and operating from the Special Economic Zone in Naga, Cebu are
entities exempt from all internal revenue taxes and the implementing rules relevant thereto,
including the value-added taxes or VAT. Although export sales are not deemed exempt
transactions, they are zero-rated. Hence, the distinction between exempt entities and exempt
transactions has little significance, because the net result is that the taxpayer is not liable for the
VAT. Respondent, a VAT-registered enterprise, has complied with all requisites for claiming a
tax refund of or credit for the input VAT it paid on capital goods it purchased. The Court of Tax
Appeals and the Court of Appeals did not err in ruling that it is entitled to such refund or credit.




14

Ex dolo malo non oritur actio

Spouses Angel vs. Aledo
G.R. No. 145031; January 33, 2004

Facts:
The spouses Rufino and Emerita Angel, petitioners, engaged the services of respondent
Felixberto Modales to construct a two-storey building. In their contract, the parties made it
appear that the contractor was Modales father-in-law, his here-in co-respondent Simplicio
Aledo. Aledo filed a complaint for the collection of sum of money against the petitioners,
alleging that they failed to pay the balance of the contract and cost of materials. The spouses
claimed that Aledo has no cause of action as he is only a dummy. The spouses filed a Third Party
Complaint against Modales for failure to comply with his obligations. Modales alleged that he
had nothing to do with the contracts. The trial court held in favor of the defendants-third party
plaintiffs angels. Adelo and Modales appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set
aside the decision of the trial court.

Issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in taking jurisdiction over the case.

Ruling:
The Court dismissed the case. Since admittedly it was with respondent Modales that
petitioners contracted to construct their residential building but that his father-in-law co-
respondent Aledo, his mere dummy, was named in the Construction Agreements, the Court of
Appeals did not err in holding that said agreements were contrary to law and public policy,
hence, petitioners and respondents Aledo and Modales were in pari delicto, and in accordingly
pronouncing the dismissal of petitioners counterclaim and dismissing their third-party
complaint. Ex dolo malo non oritur actio. In pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis.






15

Expressio unius est exclusio alterius

Go-Tan vs. Tan
G.R. No. 168852. September 30, 2008

Facts:
Mari L. Go-Tan and Steven L. Tan were married and had two female children. Petitioner
filed a petition with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Protective Order (TPO) against
Steven and her parents-in-law, spouses Perfecto and Juanita Tan before the Regional Trial Court.
She alleged that Steven, in conspiracy with the respondents, were causing verbal, psychological
and economic abuses upon her in violation of Republic Act No. 9262. On Regional Trial Court
granted the TPO. The respondents filed a motion to dismiss with opposition to the issuance of
Permanent Protection Order contending that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over their persons as
parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were not covered by R.A. No. 9262. The RTC dismissed
the case as to respondents under the rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Petitioner filed
a motion for reconsideration contending that the doctrine should be applied in the broader. The
RTC denied the petitioners verified motion for reconsideration.

Issue:
Whether the respondents may be included in the petition for the issuance of a protective
order.

Ruling:
The express language of R.A. No. 9262 reflects the intent of the legislature for liberal
construction as will best ensure that attainment of the object of the law according to its true
intent, meaning and spirit- the protection and safety of violence against women and children.
Contrary to the RTCs pronouncement, the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius finds no
application here. It is not of universal application, neither is it conclusive. It should be applied
only as means of discovering legislative intent which is not otherwise manifest and should not be
permitted to defeat the plainly indicated purpose of the legislature.




16

Expressum facit cessare tacitum

Espiritu vs. Cipriano
G.R. No. L-32743; February 15, 1974

Facts:
The case originated as one for unlawful detainer by plaintiffs, now petitioners, in the
Municipal Court of Pasig, Rizal, against private respondent Ricardo Cipriano for the latter's
alleged failure to pay rentals. An adverse judgment having been rendered against said
respondent, he appealed to the Court of First Instance of Rizal. In the said Court private
respondent sought to amend his Answer, but was denied. The parties eventually submitted a
stipulation of facts. Judge Ruiz of the Court of First Instance of Rizal issued an order giving
private respondent herein seven days within which to file his motion to dismiss. Subsequently,
respondent moved to dismiss petitioner's complaint, invoking the prohibitory provision of
Republic Act 6126. Petitioners opposed the motion to dismiss but respondent Judge issued an
order. A motion for reconsideration of said order was likewise denied by respondent Judge.
Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether the provisions of Republic Act No. 6126 also known as the Rental Law applies
retroactively.

Ruling:
Republic Act No. 6126 is not applicable in the case at bar. As the language of the law is
clear and unambiguous, it must be held to mean what it plainly says. The claim of private
respondent that the act is remedial and may, therefore, be given retroactive effect is untenable. A
close study of the provisions discloses that far from being remedial, the statute affects
substantive rights and hence a strict and prospective construction thereof is in order. It is a well-
established rule of statutory construction that expressium facit cessare tacitum and, therefore, no
reasonable implication that the Legislature ever intended to give the law in question a retroactive
effect may be accorded to the same.



17

Ex necessitate legis

Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines Inc. vs. Office of the Secretary Department of Labor
G.R. No. 103300; August 10, 1999

Facts:
The Med-Arbiter Order and the Decision and Order of the Secretary of Labor and
Employment are assailed in this case. On June 6, 1991, Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines Inc.
(PEPSI) appealed the Order to the Secretary of Labor and Employment on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion, docketed as Case No. OS-A-232-91. The Secretary modified the appealed
decision and the order of the Med-Arbiter dated 23 May 1991 was modified to the effect that
MED ARB ROX Case No. R1000-9104-RU-012 and R1000-9102-RU-008 are referred to the
Office of the Regional Director. PEPSI presented a motion for reconsideration of the Order but
the same was denied. The Bureau of Labor Relations issued Registration Certificate No. 11492-
LC in favor of the Union, dissatisfied therewith, PEPSI brought the instant petition for certiorari
contending that public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion and private respondent is
prohibited from affiliating itself with a federation already affiliated with the rank and file union.

Issue:
Whether confidential employees can join the labor union of the rank and file.

Ruling:
A confidential employee is one entrusted with confidence on delicate matters, or with the
custody, handling, or care and protection of the employers property. While Article 245 of the
Labor Code singles out managerial employee as ineligible to join, assist or form any labor
organization, under the doctrine of necessary implication, confidential employees are similarly
disqualified. Every statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may be
necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or
jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be
fairly and logically inferred from its terms. Ex necessitate legis.




18

Falsa demonstratio non nocet, cum de corpora constat

Salaysay vs. Castro
98 Phil. 364; January 31, 1956.
Facts:
Engracio E. Santos is the duly elected Municipal Mayor of San Juan del Monte, Rizal,
and the Petitioner Nicanor G. Salaysay is the duly elected Vice-Mayor. In the month of
September, 1955 and for some time prior thereto, Santos was under suspension from his office
due to administrative charges filed against him and so Petitioner Salaysay acted as Mayor under
section 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code providing that in case of temporary disability
of the Mayor such as absence, etc., his duties shall be discharged by the Vice-Mayor. On
September 8, 1955, while acting as Mayor, Salaysay filed his certificate of candidacy for the
same office of Mayor. In Sept. 8, 1955, while acting as Mayor, Salaysay filed his certificate of
candidacy for the same office of Mayor. Interpreting said action of Salaysayin running for the
office of Mayor as an automatic resignation from his office of Vice Mayor, consequently,
forfeiting the office he was holding as acting Mayor. Salaysay refused to turn over the office of
Mayor and brought this action of prohibition with preliminary injunction against Executive
Secretary Castro, Governor Pascual and Sto.Domingo to declare invalid.
Issue:
Whether elected municipal official was considered resigned when he filed his certificate
of candidacy for an office other than the one he was elected or actually holding.
Ruling:
No, elected municipal official was considered resigned when he filed his certificate of
candidacy for an office other than the one he was elected or actually holding. It is urged that the
phrase actually holding, in section 27 of Republic Act No 180, was meant to refer only to
permanent incumbents and does not apply to those holding office in a temporary character.
The law is plain, simple and clear. The resignation therein provided is inapplicable to any
elective local official who runs for an office he actually holds. It does not qualify the nature of
said possession, as long as, it is actual. It is irrelevant, therefore, whether the office is held
temporarily or permanently. All this goes to show that we should not and cannot always be
bound by the phraseology or literal meaning of a law or statute but at times may interpret, nay,
even disregard loose or inaccurate wording in order to arrive at the real meaning and spirit of a
statute intended and breathed into it by the law-making body. Falsa demonstratio non nocet, cum
de corpora constat which means false description does not preclude construction: vitiate the
meaning of the statute. The intention of the amendment by the President Roxas was to give and
extend privilege to the appointees and elected official for continuity in their office. This was not
applicable for the official who assumed the office by succession because of incapacitated of his
predecessor.
19

Favores ampliandi sunt; odia restringenda

Clemente Laceste vs. PaulinoSantos, Director of Prisons
G.R. No. 36886; February 1, 1932

Facts:
Petitioner Clemente Laceste committed rape along with Nicolas Lachica. The crime took
effectbefore the effectivity of the RPC. Nicola Lachica married the victim, Magdalena de
Ocampo, and was accordingly relieved from the criminal prosecution by virtue of section 2, Act
No. 1773, and article 448 of the Penal Code then in force, which provided that such a marriage
extinguished penal liability, and hence, the penalty. But the petitioner herein continued serving
his sentence, which was not affected by the marriage of his co- accused and the offended party.
Petitioner, Clemente Laceste, prays the court to set him at liberty through the writ of habeas
corpus, pleading that there is no sufficient legal ground for continuing his imprisonment any
longer.
Issue:
Whether the last paragraph of Art. 344 of the RPC has retroactive effect.
Ruling:
Yes, the last paragraph has retroactive effect thus, the petition for habeas corpus was
granted. It may be clearly seen that as far back as the year 1884, when the Penal Code took effect
in these Islands until the 31st of December, 1931, the principle underlying our laws granting to
the accused in certain cases an exception to the general rule that laws shall not be retroactive
when the law in question favors the accused, has evidently been carried over into the Revised
Penal Code at present in force in the Philippines through article 22, quoted above. This is an
exception to the general rule that all laws are prospective, not retrospective, variously contained
in the following maxims: Lexprospicit, non respicit (the law looks forward, not backward); lex
de futuro, judez de praeterito (the law provides for the future, the judge for the past); and adopted
in a modified form with a prudent limitation in our Civil Code (Article 3). Conscience and good
law justify this exception, which is contained in the well-known aphorism: Favores ampliandi
sunt, odioa restringenda. As one distinguished author has put it, the exception was inspired by
sentiments of humanity, and accepted by science. Article 22 of the new Penal Code is applicable
to the petitioner, who comes within one of the cases especially provided for in Article 344 of the
Code: this is a point upon which there neither is, nor can be, any discussion between the parties
to this case.


20

Generale dictum generaliter est interpretandum

Cresencio Ruben Tolentino vs. Cesario Catoy
G.R. No. L-2503; December 10, 1948
Facts:
Petitioner Crecensio Ruben Tolentino was a Hukbalahap and was found by the Court of
First Instance of Batangas guilty of the crime of illegal assembly held in furtherance of the
Hukbalahap designs. The judgment was promulgated on May 11, 1948. On June 21, the
President issued Proclamation No. 76 granting amnesty under certain conditions to leaders and
members of the Hukbalahap and the PKM organizations. On July 16, within the 20-day period
for surrender imposed as a condition by the amnesty, the petitioner, already serving sentence,
sent the President a petition for his release under the provisions of the proclamation. Some
members of the Court question the applicability of Amnesty Proclamation No. 76 to Hukbalahap
already undergoing sentence upon the date of its promulgation.
Issue:
Whether the Amnesty Proclamation No. 76 covers all the leaders and members of the
Hukbalahap.
Ruling:
Yes, it covers all the leaders and members of the Hukbalahap. No compelling reason is
apparent for excluding Hukbalahaps of any class or condition from its object, which is "to
forgive, and forego the prosecution of the crimes of rebellion, sedition, etc.," as a "just and wise
measure of the Government." Where general words are used, their natural meaning is not to be
restricted by other words unless the intention to do so is clear and manifest."Generale dictum
generaliter est interpretandum. Fundamentally and in their utmost effect, pardon and amnesty
are synonymous. Mr. Justice Field in Knote vs. United States, said that "the distinction between
them is one rather of philological interest than of legal importance." It seems to be generally
conceded in the United States that the word "'pardon' includes amnesty. This being so, the rules
for interpreting pardon and amnesty ought not to vary. Now then, according to a well-recognized
doctrine, pardon is construed "most strictly against the state. At best, the contention that the
grace and beneficence of the amnesty are denied the Hukbalahaps who were in prison rests on
the idea that being restrained of liberty they cannot surrender. Our answer is that surrender is
required merely as a token of willingness to abide by the conditions of the grant. It is not
intended as, and cannot accomplish the purpose of, a security. Thus, the writ was granted and the
petitioner discharged from confinement immediately without costs. It is so ordered.