XII.

The Judicial Department

Montesclaros v. Commission on Elections, 384 SCRA 269
Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014
Dumlao v. Commission on Elections, 955 SCRA 392
Senate v. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1
Pimentel v. Aguirre, G.R. No. 132988, July 19, 2000
Hacienta Luisita Incorporated v. Luisita Industrial park, G.R. No. 171101, July 5, 2011
Javier v. Commission on Elections, 144 SCRA 194
Funa v. The Chairman on Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 192791, April 24, 2012
Antolin v. Domondon, G.R. No. 165036, July 5, 2010
Francisco v. Toll Regulatory Board, 633 SCRA 470
Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain,
568 SCRA 402
Joya vs. Presidential Commission on Good Governance, 225 SCRA 568
Mamba v. Lara, G.R. No. 165109, December 14, 2009
Francisco v. Fernando, G.R. No. 166501, November 16, 2006
Chavez v. JBC, G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012
Planters Products Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation, G.R. No. 166006, March 14, 2008
League of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176951, August 24, 2010
Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, 297 SCRA 754
Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 152 SCRA 284
Bengzon v. Drilon, 208 SCRA 133
Fortrich v. Corona, 312 SCRA 751
Caoibes v. Ombudsman, 413 Phil. 717










EN BANC
[G.R. No. 152295. July 9, 2002]

ANTONIETTE V.C. MONTESCLAROS, MARICEL CARANZO, JOSEPHINE ATANGAN, RONALD ATANGAN
and CLARIZA DECENA, and OTHER YOUTH OF THE LAND SIMILARLY SITUATED, petitioners, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, DEPARTMENT
OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY of the OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATOR
FRANKLIN DRILON in his capacity as Senate President and SENATOR AQUILINO PIMENTEL in his capacity as
Minority Leader of the Senate of the Philippines, CONGRESSMAN JOSE DE VENECIA in his capacity as Speaker,
CONGRESSMAN AGUSTO L. SYJOCO in his capacity as Chairman of the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral
Reforms, and CONGRESSMAN EMILIO C. MACIAS II in his capacity as Chairman of the Committee on Local
Government of the House of Representatives, THE PRESIDENT OF THE PAMBANSANG KATIPUNAN NG MGA
SANGGUNIANG KABATAAN, AND ALL THEIR AGENTS AND REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before us is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for a temporary restraining order or
preliminary injunction. The petition seeks to prevent the postponement of the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK for brevity)
elections originally scheduled last May 6, 2002. The petition also seeks to prevent the reduction of the age requirement
for membership in the SK.

Petitioners, who are all 20 years old, filed this petition as a taxpayers and class suit, on their own behalf and on behalf of
other youths similarly situated. Petitioners claim that they are in danger of being disqualified to vote and be voted for in
the SK elections should the SK elections on May 6, 2002 be postponed to a later date. Under the Local Government Code
of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), membership in the SK is limited to youths at least 15 but not more than 21 years old.

Petitioners allege that public respondents connived, confederated and conspired to postpone the May 6, 2002 SK
elections and to lower the membership age in the SK to at least 15 but less than 18 years of age. Petitioners assail the
alleged conspiracy because youths at least 18 but not more than 21 years old will be summarily and unduly
dismembered, unfairly discriminated, unnecessarily disenfranchised, unjustly disassociated and obnoxiously disqualified
from the SK organization.[1]

Thus, petitioners pray for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction -

a) To prevent, annul or declare unconstitutional any law, decree, Comelec resolution/directive and other respondents
issuances, orders and actions and the like in postponing the May 6, 2002 SK elections.

b) To command the respondents to continue the May 6, 2002 SK elections set by the present law and in accordance with
Comelec Resolutions No. 4713 and 4714 and to expedite the funding of the SK elections.

c) In the alternative, if the SK elections will be postponed for whatever reason, there must be a definite date for said
elections, for example, July 15, 2002, and the present SK membership, except those incumbent SK officers who were
elected on May 6, 1996, shall be allowed to run for any SK elective position even if they are more than 21 years old.

d) To direct the incumbent SK officers who are presently representing the SK in every sanggunian and the NYC to vacate
their post after the barangay elections.[2]

The Facts

The SK is a youth organization originally established by Presidential Decree No. 684 as the Kabataang Barangay (KB
for brevity). The KB was composed of all barangay residents who were less than 18 years old, without specifying the
minimum age. The KB was organized to provide its members with the opportunity to express their views and opinions on
issues of transcendental importance.[3]

The Local Government Code of 1991 renamed the KB to SK and limited SK membership to those youths at least 15 but
not more than 21 years of age.[4] The SK remains as a youth organization in every barangay tasked to initiate programs
to enhance the social, political, economic, cultural, intellectual, moral, spiritual, and physical development of the
youth.[5] The SK in every barangay is composed of a chairperson and seven members, all elected by the Katipunan ng
Kabataan. The Katipunan ng Kabataan in every barangay is composed of all citizens actually residing in the barangay for
at least six months and who meet the membership age requirement.

The first SK elections took place on December 4, 1992. RA No. 7808 reset the SK elections to the first Monday of May
of 1996 and every three years thereafter. RA No. 7808 mandated the Comelec to supervise the conduct of the SK
elections under rules the Comelec shall promulgate. Accordingly, the Comelec on December 4, 2001 issued Resolution
Nos. 4713[6] and 4714[7] to govern the SK elections on May 6, 2002.

On February 18, 2002, petitioner Antoniette V.C. Montesclaros (Montesclaros for brevity) sent a letter[8] to the
Comelec, demanding that the SK elections be held as scheduled on May 6, 2002. Montesclaros also urged the Comelec to
respond to her letter within 10 days upon receipt of the letter, otherwise, she will seek judicial relief.

On February 20, 2002, Alfredo L. Benipayo (Chairman Benipayo for brevity), then Comelec Chairman, wrote identical
letters to the Speaker of the House[9] and the Senate President[10] about the status of pending bills on the SK and
Barangay elections. In his letters, the Comelec Chairman intimated that it was operationally very difficult to hold both
elections simultaneously in May 2002. Instead, the Comelec Chairman expressed support for the bill of Senator Franklin
Drilon that proposed to hold the Barangay elections in May 2002 and postpone the SK elections to November 2002.

Ten days lapsed without the Comelec responding to the letter of Montesclaros. Subsequently, petitioners received a copy
of Comelec En Banc Resolution No. 4763[11] dated February 5, 2002 recommending to Congress the postponement of
the SK elections to November 2002 but holding the Barangay elections in May 2002 as scheduled.[12]

On March 6, 2002, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed their respective bills postponing the SK elections.
On March 11, 2002, the Bicameral Conference Committee (Bicameral Committee for brevity) of the Senate and the
House came out with a Report[13] recommending approval of the reconciled bill consolidating Senate Bill No. 2050[14]
and House Bill No. 4456.[15] The Bicameral Committees consolidated bill reset the SK and Barangay elections to July
15, 2002 and lowered the membership age in the SK to at least 15 but not more than 18 years of age.

On March 11, 2002, petitioners filed the instant petition.

On March 11, 2002, the Senate approved the Bicameral Committees consolidated bill and on March 13, 2002, the House
of Representatives approved the same. The President signed the approved bill into law on March 19, 2002.

The Issues

Petitioners[16] raise the following grounds in support of their petition:

I.

RESPONDENTS ACTED WHIMSICALLY, ILLEGALLY AND UNCONSTITUTIONALLY THUS CONSTITUTED
(SIC) WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN
THEY INTENDED TO POSTPONE THE SK ELECTIONS.

II.

RESPONDENTS ACTED WHIMSICALLY, ILLEGALLY AND UNCONSTITUTIONALLY THUS CONSTITUTED
(SIC) WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN
THEY INTENDED TO DISCRIMINATE, DISENFRANCHISE, SINGLE OUT AND DISMEMBER THE SK
MEMBERS WHO ARE 18 BUT NOT LESS[17] (SIC) THAN 21 YEARS OLD COMPOSED OF ABOUT 7 MILLION
YOUTH.

III.

RESPONDENTS ACTED WHIMSICALLY, ILLEGALLY AND UNCONSTITUTIONALLY THUS CONSTITUTED
(SIC) WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN
THEY WILLFULLY FAILED TO FUND THE SK ELECTION PURPORTEDLY TO POSTPONE THE SAME IN
ORDER TO IMPLEMENT THEIR ILLEGAL SCHEME AND MACHINATION IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT
THERE ARE AVAILABLE FUNDS FOR THE PURPOSE.

IV.

THE INCUMBENT SK OFFICERS WANTED TO PERPETUALLY SIT ON THEIR RESPECTIVE OFFICES
CONTRARY TO THE ENVISION (SIC) OF THE CREATION OF THE SK ORGANIZATION, HENCE, IN
VIOLATION OF LAW AND CONSTITUTION.[18]

The Courts Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

At the outset, the Court takes judicial notice of the following events that have transpired since petitioners filed this
petition:

1. The May 6, 2002 SK elections and May 13, 2002 Barangay elections were not held as scheduled.

2. Congress enacted RA No. 9164[19] which provides that voters and candidates for the SK elections must be at least 15
but less than 18 years of age on the day of the election.[20] RA No. 9164 also provides that there shall be a synchronized
SK and Barangay elections on July 15, 2002.

3. The Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 4846, the rules and regulations for the conduct of the July 15, 2002
synchronized SK and Barangay elections.

Petitioners, who all claim to be 20 years old, argue that the postponement of the May 6, 2002 SK elections disenfranchises
them, preventing them from voting and being voted for in the SK elections. Petitioners theory is that if the SK elections
were postponed to a date later than May 6, 2002, the postponement would disqualify from SK membership youths who
will turn 21 years old between May 6, 2002 and the date of the new SK elections. Petitioners claim that a reduction in the
SK membership age to 15 but less than 18 years of age from the then membership age of 15 but not more than 21 years of
age would disqualify about seven million youths. The public respondents failure to hold the elections on May 6, 2002
would prejudice petitioners and other youths similarly situated.

Thus, petitioners instituted this petition to: (1) compel public respondents to hold the SK elections on May 6, 2002 and
should it be postponed, the SK elections should be held not later than July 15, 2002; (2) prevent public respondents from
passing laws and issuing resolutions and orders that would lower the membership age in the SK; and (3) compel public
respondents to allow petitioners and those who have turned more than 21 years old on May 6, 2002 to participate in any
re-scheduled SK elections.

The Courts power of judicial review may be exercised in constitutional cases only if all the following requisites are
complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case or controversy; (2) a personal and substantial
interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.[21]

In the instant case, there is no actual controversy requiring the exercise of the power of judicial review. While seeking to
prevent a postponement of the May 6, 2002 SK elections, petitioners are nevertheless amenable to a resetting of the SK
elections to any date not later than July 15, 2002. RA No. 9164 has reset the SK elections to July 15, 2002, a date
acceptable to petitioners. With respect to the date of the SK elections, there is therefore no actual controversy requiring
judicial intervention.

Petitioners prayer to prevent Congress from enacting into law a proposed bill lowering the membership age in the SK
does not present an actual justiciable controversy. A proposed bill is not subject to judicial review because it is not a
law. A proposed bill creates no right and imposes no duty legally enforceable by the Court. A proposed bill, having no
legal effect, violates no constitutional right or duty. The Court has no power to declare a proposed bill constitutional or
unconstitutional because that would be in the nature of rendering an advisory opinion on a proposed act of Congress. The
power of judicial review cannot be exercised in vacuo.[22] The second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution states

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, there can be no justiciable controversy involving the constitutionality of a proposed bill. The Court can exercise its
power of judicial review only after a law is enacted, not before.

Under the separation of powers, the Court cannot restrain Congress from passing any law, or from setting into motion the
legislative mill according to its internal rules. Thus, the following acts of Congress in the exercise of its legislative
powers are not subject to judicial restraint: the filing of bills by members of Congress, the approval of bills by each
chamber of Congress, the reconciliation by the Bicameral Committee of approved bills, and the eventual approval into law
of the reconciled bills by each chamber of Congress. Absent a clear violation of specific constitutional limitations or of
constitutional rights of private parties, the Court cannot exercise its power of judicial review over the internal processes or
procedures of Congress.[23]

The Court has also no power to dictate to Congress the object or subject of bills that Congress should enact into law. The
judicial power to review the constitutionality of laws does not include the power to prescribe to Congress what laws to
enact. The Court has no power to compel Congress by mandamus to enact a law allowing petitioners, regardless of their
age, to vote and be voted for in the July 15, 2002 SK elections. To do so would destroy the delicate system of checks and
balances finely crafted by the Constitution for the three co-equal, coordinate and independent branches of government.

Under RA No. 9164, Congress merely restored the age requirement in PD No. 684, the original charter of the SK, which
fixed the maximum age for membership in the SK to youths less than 18 years old. Petitioners do not have a vested right
to the permanence of the age requirement under Section 424 of the Local Government Code of 1991. Every law passed
by Congress is always subject to amendment or repeal by Congress. The Court cannot restrain Congress from amending
or repealing laws, for the power to make laws includes the power to change the laws.[24]

The Court cannot also direct the Comelec to allow over-aged voters to vote or be voted for in an election that is limited
under RA No. 9164 to youths at least 15 but less than 18 years old. A law is needed to allow all those who have turned
more than 21 years old on or after May 6, 2002 to participate in the July 15, 2002 SK elections. Youths from 18 to 21
years old as of May 6, 2002 are also no longer SK members, and cannot participate in the July 15, 2002 SK elections.
Congress will have to decide whether to enact an amendatory law. Petitioners remedy is legislation, not judicial
intervention.

Petitioners have no personal and substantial interest in maintaining this suit. A party must show that he has been, or is
about to be denied some personal right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled.[25] A party must also show that he
has a real interest in the suit. By real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere
expectancy or future, contingent, subordinate, or inconsequential interest.[26]

In the instant case, petitioners seek to enforce a right originally conferred by law on those who were at least 15 but not
more than 21 years old. Now, with the passage of RA No. 9164, this right is limited to those who on the date of the SK
elections are at least 15 but less than 18 years old. The new law restricts membership in the SK to this specific age group.
Not falling within this classification, petitioners have ceased to be members of the SK and are no longer qualified to
participate in the July 15, 2002 SK elections. Plainly, petitioners no longer have a personal and substantial interest in the
SK elections.

This petition does not raise any constitutional issue. At the time petitioners filed this petition, RA No. 9164, which reset
the SK elections and reduced the age requirement for SK membership, was not yet enacted into law. After the passage of
RA No. 9164, petitioners failed to assail any provision in RA No. 9164 that could be unconstitutional. To grant
petitioners prayer to be allowed to vote and be voted for in the July 15, 2002 SK elections necessitates assailing the
constitutionality of RA No. 9164. This, petitioners have not done. The Court will not strike down a law unless its
constitutionality is properly raised in an appropriate action and adequately argued.[27]

The only semblance of a constitutional issue, albeit erroneous, that petitioners raise is their claim that SK membership is a
property right within the meaning of the Constitution.[28] Since certain public offices are reserved for SK officers,
petitioners also claim a constitutionally protected opportunity to occupy these public offices. In petitioners own words,
they and others similarly situated stand to lose their opportunity to work in the government positions reserved for SK
members or officers.[29] Under the Local Government Code of 1991, the president of the federation of SK organizations
in a municipality, city or province is an ex-officio member of the municipal council, city council or provincial board,
respectively.[30] The chairperson of the SK in the barangay is an ex-officio member of the Sangguniang Barangay.[31]
The president of the national federation of SK organizations is an ex-officio member of the National Youth Commission,
with rank of a Department Assistant Secretary.[32]

Congress exercises the power to prescribe the qualifications for SK membership. One who is no longer qualified because
of an amendment in the law cannot complain of being deprived of a proprietary right to SK membership. Only those who
qualify as SK members can contest, based on a statutory right, any act disqualifying them from SK membership or from
voting in the SK elections. SK membership is not a property right protected by the Constitution because it is a mere
statutory right conferred by law. Congress may amend at any time the law to change or even withdraw the statutory right.

A public office is not a property right. As the Constitution expressly states, a [P]ublic office is a public trust.[33] No
one has a vested right to any public office, much less a vested right to an expectancy of holding a public office. In
Cornejo v. Gabriel,[34] decided in 1920, the Court already ruled:

Again, for this petition to come under the due process of law prohibition, it would be necessary to consider an office a
property. It is, however, well settled x x x that a public office is not property within the sense of the constitutional
guaranties of due process of law, but is a public trust or agency. x x x The basic idea of the government x x x is that of a
popular representative government, the officers being mere agents and not rulers of the people, one where no one man or
set of men has a proprietary or contractual right to an office, but where every officer accepts office pursuant to the
provisions of the law and holds the office as a trust for the people he represents. (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioners, who apparently desire to hold public office, should realize from the very start that no one has a proprietary
right to public office. While the law makes an SK officer an ex-officio member of a local government legislative council,
the law does not confer on petitioners a proprietary right or even a proprietary expectancy to sit in local legislative
councils. The constitutional principle of a public office as a public trust precludes any proprietary claim to public office.
Even the State policy directing equal access to opportunities for public service[35] cannot bestow on petitioners a
proprietary right to SK membership or a proprietary expectancy to ex-officio public offices.

Moreover, while the State policy is to encourage the youths involvement in public affairs,[36] this policy refers to those
who belong to the class of people defined as the youth. Congress has the power to define who are the youth qualified to
join the SK, which itself is a creation of Congress. Those who do not qualify because they are past the age group defined
as the youth cannot insist on being part of the youth. In government service, once an employee reaches mandatory
retirement age, he cannot invoke any property right to cling to his office. In the same manner, since petitioners are now
past the maximum age for membership in the SK, they cannot invoke any property right to cling to their SK membership.

The petition must also fail because no grave abuse of discretion attended the postponement of the SK elections. RA No.
9164 is now the law that prescribes the qualifications of candidates and voters for the SK elections. This law also fixes
the date of the SK elections. Petitioners are not even assailing the constitutionality of RA No. 9164. RA No. 9164 enjoys
the presumption of constitutionality and will apply to the July 15, 2002 SK elections.

Petitioners have not shown that the Comelec acted illegally or with grave abuse of discretion in recommending to
Congress the postponement of the SK elections. The very evidence relied upon by petitioners contradict their allegation
of illegality. The evidence consist of the following: (1) Comelec en banc Resolution No. 4763 dated February 5, 2002 that
recommended the postponement of the SK elections to 2003; (2) the letter of then Comelec Chairman Benipayo addressed
to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate; and (3) the Conference Committee Report
consolidating Senate Bill No. 2050 and House Bill No. 4456.

The Comelec exercised its power and duty to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of
an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall[37] and to recommend to Congress effective measures to
minimize election spending.[38] The Comelecs acts enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duties.[39] These acts cannot constitute proof, as claimed by petitioners, that there exists a connivance and conspiracy
(among) respondents in contravention of the present law. As the Court held in Pangkat Laguna v. Comelec,[40] the
Comelec, as the government agency tasked with the enforcement and administration of elections laws, is entitled to the
presumption of regularity of official acts with respect to the elections.

The 1987 Constitution imposes upon the Comelec the duty of enforcing and administering all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of elections. Petitioners failed to prove that the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in
recommending to Congress the postponement of the May 6, 2002 SK elections. The evidence cited by petitioners even
establish that the Comelec has demonstrated an earnest effort to address the practical problems in holding the SK elections
on May 6, 2002. The presumption remains that the decision of the Comelec to recommend to Congress the postponement
of the elections was made in good faith in the regular course of its official duties.

Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is patent and gross as to amount to
an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.[41] Public respondents having acted
strictly pursuant to their constitutional powers and duties, we find no grave abuse of discretion in their assailed acts.

Petitioners contend that the postponement of the SK elections would allow the incumbent SK officers to perpetuate
themselves in power, depriving other youths of the opportunity to serve in elective SK positions. This argument deserves
scant consideration. While RA No. 9164 contains a hold-over provision, incumbent SK officials can remain in office only
until their successors have been elected or qualified. On July 15, 2002, when the SK elections are held, the hold-over
period expires and all incumbent SK officials automatically cease to hold their SK offices and their ex-officio public
offices.

In sum, petitioners have no personal and substantial interest in maintaining this suit. This petition presents no actual
justiciable controversy. Petitioners do not cite any provision of law that is alleged to be unconstitutional. Lastly, we find
no grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondents.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-
Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, and Corona, JJ., concur.

[1] Rollo, pp. 4-5.

[2] Ibid., pp. 14-15.

[3] Second Whereas Clause of PD No. 684; See also Mercado vs. Board of Election Supervisors of Ibaan, Batangas, 243
SCRA 422 (1995).

[4] This was the same membership qualification in Section 116 of the Local Government Code of 1983. Earlier, PD No.
1102, issued on February 28, 1977, had increased the age requirement to twenty-one years of age or less.

[5] Section 426 of the Local Government Code enumerates the powers and functions of the Sangguniag Kabataan as
follows: Section 426.Powers and Functions of the Sangguniang Kabataan. The Sangguniang Kabataan shall: (a)
Promulgate resolutions necessary to carry out the objectives of the youth in the barangay in accordance with the
applicable provisions of this Code; (b) Initiate programs designed to enhance the social, political, economic, cultural,
intellectual, moral, spiritual, and physical development of the members; (c) Hold fund-raising activities, the proceeds of
which shall be tax-exempt and shall accrue to the general fund of the sangguniang kabataan: Provided, however, That in
the appropriation thereof, the specific purpose for which such activity has been held shall be first satisfied; (d) Create such
bodies or committees as it may deem necessary to effectively carry out its programs and activities; (e) Submit annual and
end-of-term reports to the sangguniang barangay on their projects and activities for the survival and development of the
youth in the barangay; (f) Consult and coordinate with all youth organizations in the barangay for policy formulation and
program implementation; (g) Coordinate with the appropriate national agency for the implementation of youth
development projects and programs at the national level; (h) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties
and functions as the sangguniang barangay may determine or delegate; and (i) Exercise such other powers and perform
such other duties and functions as may be prescribed by law or ordinance.

[6] Rollo, pp. 47-55. Resolution No. 4713 is entitled Rules and Regulation on the Registration of Members of the
Katipunan ng Kabataan in Connection with the May 6, 2002 Election of Members of the Sangguniang Kabataan.

[7] Ibid., pp. 56-61. Resolution No. 4714 is entitled Calendar of Activities and Periods of Certain Prohibited Acts in
Connection with the May 6, 2002 Election of Members of the Sangguniang Kabataan.

[8] Ibid., pp. 62-63.

[9] Ibid., p. 64.

[10] Ibid., p. 65.

[11] Entitled In Re: Position of the Commission on Elections on the Postponement or Synchronization of the Barangay
and Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) Elections within the year 2002.

[12] Ibid., pp. 66-68.

[13] Ibid., pp. 69-71.

[14] An Act amending Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the `Local Government Code of 1991, as amended,
resetting the elections of the Sangguniang Kabataan officials to the first Monday of November, 2002, and for other
purposes.

[15] An Act providing for a synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan elections on the second Monday of
November 2002, repealing Republic Act No. 8524, and for other purposes.

[16] Represented by Atty. Abraham A. Mantilla.

[17] This should read more.

[18] Rollo, pp. 25-26.

[19] An Act Providing for Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections, Amending Republic Act No.
7160, As Amended, Otherwise Known As `The Local Government Code of 1991, And For Other Purposes.

[20] Sections 6 and 7 of RA No. 9164.

[21] Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81 (2000).

[22] Allied Broadcasting Center, Inc. v. Republic, 190 SCRA 782 (1990).

[23] Santiago v. Guingona, 298 SCRA 756 (1998); See also Arroyo v. De Venecia, 277 SCRA 268 (1997); Tolentino v.
Secretary of Finance, 249 SCRA 628 (1995).

[24] Isagani A. Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1998 Ed., p. 152.

[25] Bayan (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan) v. Zamora, 342 SCRA 449 (2000).

[26] Caruncho III v. Commission on Elections, 315 SCRA 693 (1999).

[27] See Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 320 SCRA 486 (1999).

[28] Petition dated March 11, 2002, p. 3; Rollo, p. 8.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Section 438, Local Government Code of 1991.

[31] Section 390, Local Government Code of 1991.

[32] Section 5, RA No. 8044.

[33] Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution.

[34] 41 Phil. 188 (1920).

[35] Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution.

[36] Section 13, Article II of the 1987 Constitution.

[37] Section 2, paragraph (1), Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution.

[38] Section 2, paragraph (7), Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution.

[39] Salcedo vs. Comelec, 312 SCRA 447 (1999).

[40] G.R. No. 148075, February 4, 2002.

[41] Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, see note 21.


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City

EN BANC

G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014

JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in behalf of their minor children, LUCIA
CARLOS IMBONG and BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER,
INC., Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of
Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,
Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of
Interior and Local Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 204934

ALLIANCE FOR THE FAMILY FOUNDATION PHILIPPINES, INC. [ALFI], represented by its President, Maria
Concepcion S. Noche, Spouses Reynaldo S. Luistro & Rosie B . Luistro, Jose S. Sandejas & Elenita S.A. Sandejas, Arturo
M. Gorrez & Marietta C. Gorrez, Salvador S. Mante, Jr. & Hazeleen L. Mante, Rolando M. Bautista & Maria Felisa S.
Bautista, Desiderio Racho & Traquilina Racho, F emand Antonio A. Tansingco & Carol Anne C. Tansingco for
themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Therese Antonette C. Tansingco, Lorenzo Jose C. Tansingco, Miguel F
emando C. Tangsingco, Carlo Josemaria C. Tansingco & Juan Paolo C. Tansingco, Spouses Mariano V. Araneta & Eileen
Z. Araneta for themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Ramon Carlos Z. Araneta & Maya Angelica Z. Araneta,
Spouses Renato C. Castor & Mildred C. Castor for themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Renz Jeffrey C.
Castor, Joseph Ramil C. Castor, John Paul C. Castor & Raphael C. Castor, Spouses Alexander R. Racho & Zara Z. Racho
for themselves and on behalf of their minor children Margarita Racho, Mikaela Racho, Martin Racho, Mari Racho &
Manolo Racho, Spouses Alfred R. Racho & Francine V. Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor children
Michael Racho, Mariana Racho, Rafael Racho, Maxi Racho, Chessie Racho & Laura Racho, Spouses David R. Racho &
Armilyn A. Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor child Gabriel Racho, Mindy M. Juatas and on behalf of her
minor children Elijah Gerald Juatas and Elian Gabriel Juatas, Salvacion M. Monteiro, Emily R. Laws, Joseph R . Laws &
Katrina R. Laws, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health,
HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports, HON. CORAZON SOLIMAN,
Secretary, Department of Social Welfare and Development, HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of
Interior and Local Government, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management,
HON. ARSENIO M. BALISACAN, Socio-Economic Planning Secretary and NEDA Director-General, THE
PHILIPPINE COMMISSION ON WOMEN, represented by its Chairperson, Remedios lgnacio-Rikken, THE
PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE CORPORATION, represented by its President Eduardo Banzon, THE LEAGUE
OF PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Alfonso Umali, THE LEAGUE OF CITIES OF
THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Oscar Rodriguez, and THE LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Donato Marcos, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 204957

TASK FORCE FOR FAMILY AND LIFE VISAYAS, INC. and VALERIANO S. AVILA, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of
Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Education; and HON. MANUELA.
ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 204988

SERVE LIFE CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, INC., represented by Dr. Nestor B. Lumicao, M. D., as President and in his
personal capacity, ROSEVALE FOUNDATION INC., represented by Dr. Rodrigo M. Alenton, M.D., as member of the
school board and in his personal capacity, ROSEMARIE R. ALENTON, IMELDA G. IBARRA, CPA, LOVENIAP.
NACES, Phd., ANTHONY G. NAGAC, EARL ANTHONY C. GAMBE and MARLON I. YAP, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON.
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health; HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary,
Department of Education and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government,
Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205003

EXPEDITO A. BUGARIN, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. SENATE PRESIDENT, HON.
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES and HON. SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205043

EDUARDO B. OLAGUER and THE CATHOLIC XYBRSPACE APOSTOLATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,
vs.
DOH SECRETARY ENRIQUE T. ONA, FDA DIRECTOR SUZETTE H. LAZO, DBM SECRETARY FLORENCIO B.
ABAD, DILG SECRETARY MANUELA. ROXAS II, DECS SECRETARY ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205138

PHILIPPINE ALLIANCE OF XSEMINARIANS, INC. (PAX), herein represented by its National President, Atty.
Ricardo M . Ribo, and in his own behalf, Atty. Lino E.A. Dumas, Romeo B. Almonte, Osmundo C. Orlanes, Arsenio Z.
Menor, Samuel J. Yap, Jaime F. Mateo, Rolly Siguan, Dante E. Magdangal, Michael Eugenio O. Plana, Bienvenido C.
Miguel, Jr., Landrito M. Diokno and Baldomero Falcone, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of
Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,
Secretary, Department of Education, HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, HON. CORAZON J. SOLIMAN, Secretary, Department of Social Welfare and Development, HON.
ARSENIO BALISACAN, Director-General, National Economic and Development Authority, HON. SUZETTE H.
LAZO, Director-General, Food and Drugs Administration, THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, Philippine Health Insurance
Corporation, and THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, Philippine Commission on Women, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205478

REYNALDO J. ECHAVEZ, M.D., JACQUELINE H. KING, M.D., CYNTHIA T. DOMINGO, M.D., AND JOSEPHINE
MILLADO-LUMITAO, M.D., collectively known as Doctors For Life, and ANTHONY PEREZ, MICHAEL ANTHONY
G. MAPA, CARLOS ANTONIO PALAD, WILFREDO JOSE, CLAIRE NAVARRO, ANNA COSIO, and GABRIEL
DY LIACCO collectively known as Filipinos For Life, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary of the Department of
Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of the Department of Health; HON. ARMIN A.
LUISTRO, Secretary of the Department of Education; and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary of the Department of
Interior and Local Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205491

SPOUSES FRANCISCO S. TATAD AND MARIA FENNY C. TATAD & ALA F. PAGUIA, for themselves, their
Posterity, and the rest of Filipino posterity, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT of the Republic of the Philippines, Respondent.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205720

PRO-LIFE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, Inc., represented by Loma Melegrito, as Executive Director, and in her
personal capacity, JOSELYN B. BASILIO, ROBERT Z. CORTES, ARIEL A. CRISOSTOMO, JEREMY I. GATDULA,
CRISTINA A. MONTES, RAUL ANTONIO A. NIDOY, WINSTON CONRAD B. PADOJINOG, RUFINO L.
POLICARPIO III, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON.
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary,
Department of Education and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government,
Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 206355

MILLENNIUM SAINT FOUNDATION, INC., ATTY. RAMON PEDROSA, ATTY. CITA BORROMEO-GARCIA,
STELLAACEDERA, ATTY. BERTENI CATALUNA CAUSING, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 207111

JOHN WALTER B. JUAT, MARY M. IMBONG, ANTHONY VICTORIO B. LUMICAO, JOSEPH MARTIN Q.
VERDEJO, ANTONIA EMMA R. ROXAS and LOTA LAT-GUERRERO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget
and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary,
Department of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and
Local Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 207172

COUPLES FOR CHRIST FOUNDATION, INC., SPOUSES JUAN CARLOS ARTADI SARMIENTO AND
FRANCESCA ISABELLE BESINGA-SARMIENTO, AND SPOUSES LUIS FRANCIS A. RODRIGO, JR. and
DEBORAH MARIE VERONICA N. RODRIGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of
Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,
Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of
Interior and Local Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 207563

ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH and ABDULHUSSEIN M. KASHIM, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of the Department of
Health, and HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

MENDOZA, J.:

Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this Court has consistently
affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to
allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs , and to live as he believes he ought to live,
consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good."1

To this day, poverty is still a major stumbling block to the nation's emergence as a developed country, leaving our people
beleaguered in a state of hunger, illiteracy and unemployment. While governmental policies have been geared towards the
revitalization of the economy, the bludgeoning dearth in social services remains to be a problem that concerns not only the
poor, but every member of society. The government continues to tread on a trying path to the realization of its very
purpose, that is, the general welfare of the Filipino people and the development of the country as a whole. The legislative
branch, as the main facet of a representative government, endeavors to enact laws and policies that aim to remedy looming
societal woes, while the executive is closed set to fully implement these measures and bring concrete and substantial
solutions within the reach of Juan dela Cruz. Seemingly distant is the judicial branch, oftentimes regarded as an inert
governmental body that merely casts its watchful eyes on clashing stakeholders until it is called upon to adjudicate.
Passive, yet reflexive when called into action, the Judiciary then willingly embarks on its solemn duty to interpret
legislation vis-a-vis the most vital and enduring principle that holds Philippine society together - the supremacy of the
Philippine Constitution.

Nothing has polarized the nation more in recent years than the issues of population growth control, abortion and
contraception. As in every democratic society, diametrically opposed views on the subjects and their perceived
consequences freely circulate in various media. From television debates2 to sticker campaigns,3 from rallies by socio-
political activists to mass gatherings organized by members of the clergy4 - the clash between the seemingly antithetical
ideologies of the religious conservatives and progressive liberals has caused a deep division in every level of the society.
Despite calls to withhold support thereto, however, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible
Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.

Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers from various sectors of society came
knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience. Aware
of the profound and lasting impact that its decision may produce, the Court now faces the iuris controversy, as presented
in fourteen (14) petitions and two (2) petitions- in-intervention, to wit:

(1) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,5 filed by spouses Attys. James M. Imbong and Lovely Ann C. Imbong, in their
personal capacities as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers and on behalf of their minor children; and the Magnificat Child
Leaming Center, Inc., a domestic, privately-owned educational institution (Jmbong);

(2) Petition for Prohibition,6 filed by the Alliance for the Family Foundation Philippines, Inc., through its president, Atty.
Maria Concepcion S. Noche7 and several others8 in their personal capacities as citizens and on behalf of the generations
unborn (ALFI);

(3) Petition for Certiorari,9 filed by the Task Force for Family and Life Visayas, Inc., and Valeriano S. Avila, in their
capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Task Force Family);

(4) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,10 filed by Serve Life Cagayan De Oro City, Inc.,11 Rosevale Foundation,
Inc.,12 a domestic, privately-owned educational institution, and several others,13 in their capacities as citizens (Serve
Life);

(5) Petition,14 filed by Expedito A. Bugarin, Jr. in his capacity as a citizen (Bugarin);

(6) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,15 filed by Eduardo Olaguer and the Catholic Xybrspace Apostolate of the
Philippines,16 in their capacities as a citizens and taxpayers (Olaguer);

(7) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,17 filed by the Philippine Alliance of Xseminarians Inc.,18 and several others19
in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (PAX);

(8) Petition,20 filed by Reynaldo J. Echavez, M.D. and several others,21 in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers
(Echavez);

(9) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,22 filed by spouses Francisco and Maria Fenny C. Tatad and Atty. Alan F.
Paguia, in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers and on behalf of those yet unborn. Atty. Alan F. Paguia is also proceeding
in his capacity as a member of the Bar (Tatad);

(10) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,23 filed by Pro-Life Philippines Foundation Inc.24 and several others,25 in
their capacities as citizens and taxpayers and on behalf of its associates who are members of the Bar (Pro-Life);

(11) Petition for Prohibition,26 filed by Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc.,27 Attys. Ramon Pedrosa, Cita Borromeo-
Garcia, Stella Acedera, and Berteni Catalufia Causing, in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers and members of the Bar
(MSF);

(12) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,28 filed by John Walter B. Juat and several others,29 in their capacities as
citizens (Juat) ;

(13) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,30 filed by Couples for Christ Foundation, Inc. and several others,31 in their
capacities as citizens (CFC);

(14) Petition for Prohibition32 filed by Almarim Centi Tillah and Abdulhussein M. Kashim in their capacities as citizens
and taxpayers (Tillah); and

(15) Petition-In-Intervention,33 filed by Atty. Samson S. Alcantara in his capacity as a citizen and a taxpayer (Alcantara);
and

(16) Petition-In-Intervention,34 filed by Buhay Hayaang Yumabong (B UHAY) , an accredited political party.

A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the
following GROUNDS:

The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. According to the petitioners, notwithstanding its declared policy
against abortion, the implementation of the RH Law would authorize the purchase of hormonal contraceptives, intra-
uterine devices and injectables which are abortives, in violation of Section 12, Article II of the Constitution which
guarantees protection of both the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.35

The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products. The petitioners posit that
the RH Law provides universal access to contraceptives which are hazardous to one's health, as it causes cancer and other
health problems.36

The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom. The petitioners contend that the RH Law violates the constitutional
guarantee respecting religion as it authorizes the use of public funds for the procurement of contraceptives. For the
petitioners, the use of public funds for purposes that are believed to be contrary to their beliefs is included in the
constitutional mandate ensuring religious freedom.37

It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other
forms of punishment, as it compels medical practitioners 1] to refer patients who seek advice on reproductive health
programs to other doctors; and 2] to provide full and correct information on reproductive health programs and service,
although it is against their religious beliefs and convictions.38

In this connection, Section 5 .23 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the RH Law (RH-IRR),39 provides that
skilled health professionals who are public officers such as, but not limited to, Provincial, City, or Municipal Health
Officers, medical officers, medical specialists, rural health physicians, hospital staff nurses, public health nurses, or rural
health midwives, who are specifically charged with the duty to implement these Rules, cannot be considered as
conscientious objectors.40

It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of mandatory sex education in schools should not be
allowed as it is an affront to their religious beliefs.41

While the petit10ners recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom is not absolute, they argue that the RH Law fails
to satisfy the "clear and present danger test" and the "compelling state interest test" to justify the regulation of the right to
free exercise of religion and the right to free speech.42

The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude. According to the petitioners, the RH Law
subjects medical practitioners to involuntary servitude because, to be accredited under the PhilHealth program, they are
compelled to provide forty-eight (48) hours of pro bona services for indigent women, under threat of criminal prosecution,
imprisonment and other forms of punishment.43

The petitioners explain that since a majority of patients are covered by PhilHealth, a medical practitioner would
effectively be forced to render reproductive health services since the lack of PhilHealth accreditation would mean that the
majority of the public would no longer be able to avail of the practitioners services.44

The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law. It is claimed that the RH Law discriminates against the
poor as it makes them the primary target of the government program that promotes contraceptive use. The petitioners
argue that, rather than promoting reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law seeks to introduce contraceptives that
would effectively reduce the number of the poor.45

The RH Law is "void-for-vagueness" in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution. In imposing the penalty
of imprisonment and/or fine for "any violation," it is vague because it does not define the type of conduct to be treated as
"violation" of the RH Law.46

In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH Law violates the right to due process by removing from them
(the people) the right to manage their own affairs and to decide what kind of health facility they shall be and what kind of
services they shall offer."47 It ignores the management prerogative inherent in corporations for employers to conduct their
affairs in accordance with their own discretion and judgment.

The RH Law violates the right to free speech. To compel a person to explain a full range of family planning methods is
plainly to curtail his right to expound only his own preferred way of family planning. The petitioners note that although
exemption is granted to institutions owned and operated by religious groups, they are still forced to refer their patients to
another healthcare facility willing to perform the service or procedure.48

The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one's family protected by the Constitution. It is contended that the RH
Law providing for mandatory reproductive health education intrudes upon their constitutional right to raise their children
in accordance with their beliefs.49

It is claimed that, by giving absolute authority to the person who will undergo reproductive health procedure, the RH Law
forsakes any real dialogue between the spouses and impedes the right of spouses to mutually decide on matters pertaining
to the overall well-being of their family. In the same breath, it is also claimed that the parents of a child who has suffered
a miscarriage are deprived of parental authority to determine whether their child should use contraceptives.50

The RH Law violates the constitutional principle of non-delegation of legislative authority. The petitioners question the
delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether a product is non-abortifacient and to be included in
the Emergency Drugs List (EDL).51

The RH Law violates the one subject/one bill rule provision under Section 26( 1 ), Article VI of the Constitution.52

The RH Law violates Natural Law.53

The RH Law violates the principle of Autonomy of Local Government Units (LGUs) and the Autonomous Region of
Muslim Mindanao {ARMM). It is contended that the RH Law, providing for reproductive health measures at the local
government level and the ARMM, infringes upon the powers devolved to LGUs and the ARMM under the Local
Government Code and R.A . No. 9054.54

Various parties also sought and were granted leave to file their respective comments-in-intervention in defense of the
constitutionality of the RH Law. Aside from the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which commented on the petitions
in behalf of the respondents,55 Congressman Edcel C. Lagman,56 former officials of the Department of Health Dr.
Esperanza I. Cabral, Jamie Galvez-Tan, and Dr. Alberto G. Romualdez,57 the Filipino Catholic Voices for Reproductive
Health (C4RH),58 Ana Theresa "Risa" Hontiveros,59 and Atty. Joan De Venecia60 also filed their respective Comments-
in-Intervention in conjunction with several others. On June 4, 2013, Senator Pia Juliana S. Cayetano was also granted
leave to intervene.61

The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the petitioners, pray for the dismissal of the petitions
for the principal reasons that 1] there is no actual case or controversy and, therefore, the issues are not yet ripe for judicial
determination.; 2] some petitioners lack standing to question the RH Law; and 3] the petitions are essentially petitions for
declaratory relief over which the Court has no original jurisdiction.

Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the assailed legislation took effect.

On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments raised, the Court issued the Status Quo Ante Order
(SQAO), enjoining the effects and implementation of the assailed legislation for a period of one hundred and twenty (120)
days, or until July 17, 2013.62

On May 30, 2013, the Court held a preliminary conference with the counsels of the parties to determine and/or identify
the pertinent issues raised by the parties and the sequence by which these issues were to be discussed in the oral
arguments. On July 9 and 23, 2013, and on August 6, 13, and 27, 2013, the cases were heard on oral argument. On July
16, 2013, the SQAO was ordered extended until further orders of the Court.63

Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda within sixty (60) days and, at the same
time posed several questions for their clarification on some contentions of the parties.64

The Status Quo Ante

(Population, Contraceptive and Reproductive Health Laws

Prior to the RH Law

Long before the incipience of the RH Law, the country has allowed the sale, dispensation and distribution of contraceptive
drugs and devices. As far back as June 18, 1966, the country enacted R.A. No. 4729 entitled "An Act to Regu,late the
Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices." Although contraceptive drugs and devices
were allowed, they could not be sold, dispensed or distributed "unless such sale, dispensation and distribution is by a duly
licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and with the prescription of a qualified medical practitioner."65

In addition, R.A. No. 5921,66 approved on June 21, 1969, contained provisions relative to "dispensing of abortifacients or
anti-conceptional substances and devices." Under Section 37 thereof, it was provided that "no drug or chemical product or
device capable of provoking abortion or preventing conception as classified by the Food and Drug Administration shall be
delivered or sold to any person without a proper prescription by a duly licensed physician."

On December 11, 1967, the Philippines, adhering to the UN Declaration on Population, which recognized that the
population problem should be considered as the principal element for long-term economic development, enacted measures
that promoted male vasectomy and tubal ligation to mitigate population growth.67 Among these measures included R.A.
No. 6365, approved on August 16, 1971, entitled "An Act Establishing a National Policy on Population, Creating the
Commission on Population and for Other Purposes. " The law envisioned that "family planning will be made part of a
broad educational program; safe and effective means will be provided to couples desiring to space or limit family size;
mortality and morbidity rates will be further reduced."

To further strengthen R.A. No. 6365, then President Ferdinand E . Marcos issued Presidential Decree. (P.D.) No. 79,68
dated December 8, 1972, which, among others, made "family planning a part of a broad educational program," provided
"family planning services as a part of over-all health care," and made "available all acceptable methods of contraception,
except abortion, to all Filipino citizens desirous of spacing, limiting or preventing pregnancies."

Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods evolved from being a component of
demographic management, to one centered on the promotion of public health, particularly, reproductive health.69 Under
that policy, the country gave priority to one's right to freely choose the method of family planning to be adopted, in
conformity with its adherence to the commitments made in the International Conference on Population and
Development.70 Thus, on August 14, 2009, the country enacted R.A. No. 9710 or "The Magna Carta for Women, "
which, among others, mandated the State to provide for comprehensive health services and programs for women,
including family planning and sex education.71

The RH Law

Despite the foregoing legislative measures, the population of the country kept on galloping at an uncontrollable pace.
From a paltry number of just over 27 million Filipinos in 1960, the population of the country reached over 76 million in
the year 2000 and over 92 million in 2010.72 The executive and the legislative, thus, felt that the measures were still not
adequate. To rein in the problem, the RH Law was enacted to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized,
access and information to the full range of modem family planning methods, and to ensure that its objective to provide for
the peoples' right to reproductive health be achieved. To make it more effective, the RH Law made it mandatory for health
providers to provide information on the full range of modem family planning methods, supplies and services, and for
schools to provide reproductive health education. To put teeth to it, the RH Law criminalizes certain acts of refusals to
carry out its mandates.

Stated differently, the RH Law is an enhancement measure to fortify and make effective the current laws on
contraception, women's health and population control.

Prayer of the Petitioners - Maintain the Status Quo

The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional. Petitioner ALFI, in particular,
argues that the government sponsored contraception program, the very essence of the RH Law, violates the right to health
of women and the sanctity of life, which the State is mandated to protect and promote. Thus, ALFI prays that "the status
quo ante - the situation prior to the passage of the RH Law - must be maintained."73 It explains:

x x x. The instant Petition does not question contraception and contraceptives per se. As provided under Republic Act No.
5921 and Republic Act No. 4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives are prohibited unless dispensed by a
prescription duly licensed by a physician. What the Petitioners find deplorable and repugnant under the RH Law is the
role that the State and its agencies - the entire bureaucracy, from the cabinet secretaries down to the barangay officials in
the remotest areas of the country - is made to play in the implementation of the contraception program to the fullest extent
possible using taxpayers' money. The State then will be the funder and provider of all forms of family planning methods
and the implementer of the program by ensuring the widespread dissemination of, and universal access to, a full range of
family planning methods, devices and supplies.74

ISSUES

After a scrutiny of the various arguments and contentions of the parties, the Court has synthesized and refined them to the
following principal issues:

I. PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.

1] Power of Judicial Review

2] Actual Case or Controversy

3] Facial Challenge

4] Locus Standi

5] Declaratory Relief

6] One Subject/One Title Rule

II. SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is unconstitutional:

1] Right to Life

2] Right to Health

3] Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech

4] The Family

5] Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom

6] Due Process

7] Equal Protection

8] Involuntary Servitude

9] Delegation of Authority to the FDA

10] Autonomy of Local Govemments/ARMM

DISCUSSION

Before delving into the constitutionality of the RH Law and its implementing rules, it behooves the Court to resolve some
procedural impediments.

I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE: Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.

The Power of Judicial Review

In its attempt to persuade the Court to stay its judicial hand, the OSG asserts that it should submit to the legislative and
political wisdom of Congress and respect the compromises made in the crafting of the RH Law, it being "a product of a
majoritarian democratic process"75 and "characterized by an inordinate amount of transparency."76 The OSG posits that
the authority of the Court to review social legislation like the RH Law by certiorari is "weak," since the Constitution vests
the discretion to implement the constitutional policies and positive norms with the political departments, in particular,
with Congress.77 It further asserts that in view of the Court's ruling in Southern Hemisphere v. Anti-Terrorism Council,78
the remedies of certiorari and prohibition utilized by the petitioners are improper to assail the validity of the acts of the
legislature.79

Moreover, the OSG submits that as an "as applied challenge," it cannot prosper considering that the assailed law has yet to
be enforced and applied to the petitioners, and that the government has yet to distribute reproductive health devices that
are abortive. It claims that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech-regulating measure.80

In many cases involving the determination of the constitutionality of the actions of the Executive and the Legislature, it is
often sought that the Court temper its exercise of judicial power and accord due respect to the wisdom of its co-equal
branch on the basis of the principle of separation of powers. To be clear, the separation of powers is a fundamental
principle in our system of government, which obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our
Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is
supreme within its own sphere.81

Thus, the 1987 Constitution provides that: (a) the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines;82
(b) the executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines;83 and (c) the judicial power shall be vested in
one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.84 The Constitution has truly blocked out with
deft strokes and in bold lines, the allotment of powers among the three branches of government.85

In its relationship with its co-equals, the Judiciary recognizes the doctrine of separation of powers which imposes upon the
courts proper restraint, born of the nature of their functions and of their respect for the other branches of government, in
striking down the acts of the Executive or the Legislature as unconstitutional. Verily, the policy is a harmonious blend of
courtesy and caution.86

It has also long been observed, however, that in times of social disquietude or political instability, the great landmarks of
the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated.87 In order to address this, the Constitution
impresses upon the Court to respect the acts performed by a co-equal branch done within its sphere of competence and
authority, but at the same time, allows it to cross the line of separation - but only at a very limited and specific point - to
determine whether the acts of the executive and the legislative branches are null because they were undertaken with grave
abuse of discretion.88 Thus, while the Court may not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of the RH
Law, it may do so where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results.89 The Court must
demonstrate its unflinching commitment to protect those cherished rights and principles embodied in the Constitution.

In this connection, it bears adding that while the scope of judicial power of review may be limited, the Constitution makes
no distinction as to the kind of legislation that may be subject to judicial scrutiny, be it in the form of social legislation or
otherwise. The reason is simple and goes back to the earlier point. The Court may pass upon the constitutionality of acts
of the legislative and the executive branches, since its duty is not to review their collective wisdom but, rather, to make
sure that they have acted in consonance with their respective authorities and rights as mandated of them by the
Constitution. If after said review, the Court finds no constitutional violations of any sort, then, it has no more authority of
proscribing the actions under review.90 This is in line with Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution which expressly
provides:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by
law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. [Emphases supplied]

As far back as Tanada v. Angara,91 the Court has unequivocally declared that certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are
appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative
and executive officials, as there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. This ruling
was later on applied in Macalintal v. COMELEC,92 Aldaba v. COMELEC,93 Magallona v. Ermita,94 and countless
others. In Tanada, the Court wrote:

In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no
doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. "The question thus
posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is
upheld. " Once a "controversy as to the application or interpretation of constitutional provision is raised before this Court
(as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide. [Emphasis
supplied]

In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, "judicial review is essential for the
maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of powers among the three great departments
of government through the definition and maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control between them. To him,
judicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of participation - or instrument of intervention - of the judiciary in
that balancing operation.95

Lest it be misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the Court does not have the unbridled authority to rule on just any and
every claim of constitutional violation. Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited by
four exacting requisites, viz : (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi;
(c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be
the lis mota of the case.96

Actual Case or Controversy

Proponents of the RH Law submit that the subj ect petitions do not present any actual case or controversy because the RH
Law has yet to be implemented.97 They claim that the questions raised by the petitions are not yet concrete and ripe for
adjudication since no one has been charged with violating any of its provisions and that there is no showing that any of the
petitioners' rights has been adversely affected by its operation.98 In short, it is contended that judicial review of the RH
Law is premature.

An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not
conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion.99 The rule is that courts do
not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging. The
controversy must be justiciable-definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal
interests. In other words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a
denial thereof, on the other; that is, it must concern a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There
ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as
distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.100

Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness.101 A question is ripe for
adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to
be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or performed by either
branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or
threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in
danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of102

In The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines,103 where the constitutionality
of an unimplemented Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) was put in question, it was
argued that the Court has no authority to pass upon the issues raised as there was yet no concrete act performed that could
possibly violate the petitioners' and the intervenors' rights. Citing precedents, the Court ruled that the fact of the law or act
in question being not yet effective does not negate ripeness. Concrete acts under a law are not necessary to render the
controversy ripe. Even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.

In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe for judicial
determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect and that budgetary
measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable
controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.104

Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or medical providers are in danger
of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof, particularly public health officers who are
threatened to be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be heard
on the matter NOW.

Facial Challenge

The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by the subject petitions, contending that the RH Law
cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech regulating measure.105

The Court is not persuaded.

In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that is
launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First
Amendment.106 These include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.107 After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom,
freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to one's freedom of expression, as they
are modes which one's thoughts are externalized.

In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally maintained, albeit with some
modifications. While this Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly penal statues,108 it has
expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and other
fundamental rights.109 The underlying reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this
Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.110 Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to
maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.

Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional human rights to life,
speech and religion and other fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated by the assailed legislation, the
Court has authority to take cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass
constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that there exist no actual case or controversy,
would diminish this Court as a reactive branch of government, acting only when the Fundamental Law has been
transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people.

Locus Standi

The OSG also attacks the legal personality of the petitioners to file their respective petitions. It contends that the "as
applied challenge" lodged by the petitioners cannot prosper as the assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied against
them,111 and the government has yet to distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive.112

The petitioners, for their part, invariably invoke the "transcendental importance" doctrine and their status as citizens and
taxpayers in establishing the requisite locus standi.

Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or
will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental act.113 It requires a personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so
largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.114

In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge" embodies the rule that one can challenge the constitutionality of a
statute only if he asserts a violation of his own rights. The rule prohibits one from challenging the constitutionality of the
statute grounded on a violation of the rights of third persons not before the court. This rule is also known as the
prohibition against third-party standing.115

Transcendental Importance

Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed
for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as
when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public
interest."116

In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres,117 the Court held that in cases of paramount importance where
serious constitutional questions are involved, the standing requirement may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to
prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review. In the first Emergency
Powers Cases,118 ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive
orders although they had only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public.

With these said, even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an "as-applied challenge, still, the
Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus s tandi requirement. It has accorded certain individuals standing to
sue, not otherwise directly injured or with material interest affected by a Government act, provided a constitutional issue
of transcendental importance is invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural technicality which the Court
has, on more than one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens,
taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have been directly injured by the
operation of a law or any other government act. As held in Jaworski v. PAGCOR:119

Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental
importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that we set aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction
over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social
and moral well being of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an imperative need.
This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder
or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result
in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. (Emphasis
supplied)

In view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents, not only to the public, but also to the bench and bar, the
issues raised must be resolved for the guidance of all. After all, the RH Law drastically affects the constitutional
provisions on the right to life and health, the freedom of religion and expression and other constitutional rights. Mindful of
all these and the fact that the issues of contraception and reproductive health have already caused deep division among a
broad spectrum of society, the Court entertains no doubt that the petitions raise issues of transcendental importance
warranting immediate court adjudication. More importantly, considering that it is the right to life of the mother and the
unborn which is primarily at issue, the Court need not wait for a life to be taken away before taking action.

The Court cannot, and should not, exercise judicial restraint at this time when rights enshrined in the Constitution are
being imperilled to be violated. To do so, when the life of either the mother or her child is at stake, would lead to
irreparable consequences.

Declaratory Relief

The respondents also assail the petitions because they are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court
has no original jurisdiction.120 Suffice it to state that most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the
Court would just consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original jurisdiction. Where
the case has far-reaching implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for
prohibition under Rule 65.121

One Subject-One Title

The petitioners also question the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it violates Section 26(1 ), Article VI of the
Constitution,122 prescribing the one subject-one title rule. According to them, being one for reproductive health with
responsible parenthood, the assailed legislation violates the constitutional standards of due process by concealing its true
intent - to act as a population control measure.123

To belittle the challenge, the respondents insist that the RH Law is not a birth or population control measure,124 and that
the concepts of "responsible parenthood" and "reproductive health" are both interrelated as they are inseparable.125

Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the Court sees it as principally a population control
measure. The corpus of the RH Law is geared towards the reduction of the country's population. While it claims to save
lives and keep our women and children healthy, it also promotes pregnancy-preventing products. As stated earlier, the RH
Law emphasizes the need to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, with access to information on the
full range of modem family planning products and methods. These family planning methods, natural or modem, however,
are clearly geared towards the prevention of pregnancy.

For said reason, the manifest underlying objective of the RH Law is to reduce the number of births in the country.

It cannot be denied that the measure also seeks to provide pre-natal and post-natal care as well. A large portion of the law,
however, covers the dissemination of information and provisions on access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective,
legal, affordable, and quality reproductive health care services, methods, devices, and supplies, which are all intended to
prevent pregnancy.

The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners' contention that the whole idea of contraception pervades the entire RH Law.
It is, in fact, the central idea of the RH Law.126 Indeed, remove the provisions that refer to contraception or are related to
it and the RH Law loses its very foundation.127 As earlier explained, "the other positive provisions such as skilled birth
attendance, maternal care including pre-and post-natal services, prevention and management of reproductive tract
infections including HIV/AIDS are already provided for in the Magna Carta for Women."128

Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In Benjamin E. Cawaling, Jr. v. The
Commission on Elections and Rep. Francis Joseph G Escudero, it was written:

It is well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the enactment
language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. The rule is
sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to
effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law
and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule "so as
not to cripple or impede legislation." [Emphases supplied]

In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both "reproductive health" and "responsible
parenthood" are interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control the population growth. As expressed in the
first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their right
to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to health which
includes reproductive health, the right to education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for
themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible
parenthood.

The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be "so uncertain that the average
person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is
misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or
in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act."129

Considering the close intimacy between "reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" which bears to the attainment
of the goal of achieving "sustainable human development" as stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to believe
that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed legislation.

II - SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:

1-The Right to Life
Position of the Petitioners

The petitioners assail the RH Law because it violates the right to life and health of the unborn child under Section 12,
Article II of the Constitution. The assailed legislation allowing access to abortifacients/abortives effectively sanctions
abortion.130

According to the petitioners, despite its express terms prohibiting abortion, Section 4(a) of the RH Law considers
contraceptives that prevent the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb as an abortifacient; thus,
sanctioning contraceptives that take effect after fertilization and prior to implantation, contrary to the intent of the Framers
of the Constitution to afford protection to the fertilized ovum which already has life.

They argue that even if Section 9 of the RH Law allows only "non-abortifacient" hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine
devices, injectables and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies, medical
research shows that contraceptives use results in abortion as they operate to kill the fertilized ovum which already has
life.131

As it opposes the initiation of life, which is a fundamental human good, the petitioners assert that the State sanction of
contraceptive use contravenes natural law and is an affront to the dignity of man.132

Finally, it is contended that since Section 9 of the RH Law requires the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to certify
that the product or supply is not to be used as an abortifacient, the assailed legislation effectively confirms that
abortifacients are not prohibited. Also considering that the FDA is not the agency that will actually supervise or
administer the use of these products and supplies to prospective patients, there is no way it can truthfully make a
certification that it shall not be used for abortifacient purposes.133

Position of the Respondents

For their part, the defenders of the RH Law point out that the intent of the Framers of the Constitution was simply the
prohibition of abortion. They contend that the RH Law does not violate the Constitution since the said law emphasizes
that only "non-abortifacient" reproductive health care services, methods, devices products and supplies shall be made
accessible to the public.134

According to the OSG, Congress has made a legislative determination that contraceptives are not abortifacients by
enacting the RH Law. As the RH Law was enacted with due consideration to various studies and consultations with the
World Health Organization (WHO) and other experts in the medical field, it is asserted that the Court afford deference
and respect to such a determination and pass judgment only when a particular drug or device is later on determined as an
abortive.135

For his part, respondent Lagman argues that the constitutional protection of one's right to life is not violated considering
that various studies of the WHO show that life begins from the implantation of the fertilized ovum. Consequently, he
argues that the RH Law is constitutional since the law specifically provides that only contraceptives that do not prevent
the implantation of the fertilized ovum are allowed.136

The Court's Position

It is a universally accepted principle that every human being enjoys the right to life.137

Even if not formally established, the right to life, being grounded on natural law, is inherent and, therefore, not a creation
of, or dependent upon a particular law, custom, or belief. It precedes and transcends any authority or the laws of men.

In this jurisdiction, the right to life is given more than ample protection. Section 1, Article III of the Constitution provides:

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws.

As expounded earlier, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods in the Philippines is not of recent vintage.
From the enactment of R.A. No. 4729, entitled "An Act To Regulate The Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of
Contraceptive Drugs and Devices "on June 18, 1966, prescribing rules on contraceptive drugs and devices which prevent
fertilization,138 to the promotion of male vasectomy and tubal ligation,139 and the ratification of numerous international
agreements, the country has long recognized the need to promote population control through the use of contraceptives in
order to achieve long-term economic development. Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and other
family planning methods evolved from being a component of demographic management, to one centered on the
promotion of public health, particularly, reproductive health.140

This has resulted in the enactment of various measures promoting women's rights and health and the overall promotion of
the family's well-being. Thus, aside from R.A. No. 4729, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the Philippines" and
R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as the "The Magna Carta of Women" were legislated. Notwithstanding this paradigm
shift, the Philippine national population program has always been grounded two cornerstone principles: "principle of no-
abortion" and the "principle of non-coercion."141 As will be discussed later, these principles are not merely grounded on
administrative policy, but rather, originates from the constitutional protection expressly provided to afford protection to
life and guarantee religious freedom.

When Life Begins*

Majority of the Members of the Court are of the position that the question of when life begins is a scientific and medical
issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence. During the deliberation, however, it
was agreed upon that the individual members of the Court could express their own views on this matter.

In this regard, the ponente, is of the strong view that life begins at fertilization.

In answering the question of when life begins, focus should be made on the particular phrase of Section 12 which reads:

Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.
The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of
moral character shall receive the support of the Government.

Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn from conception. This is undisputable because before
conception, there is no unborn to speak of. For said reason, it is no surprise that the Constitution is mute as to any
proscription prior to conception or when life begins. The problem has arisen because, amazingly, there are quarters who
have conveniently disregarded the scientific fact that conception is reckoned from fertilization. They are waving the view
that life begins at implantation. Hence, the issue of when life begins.

In a nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend that conception is synonymous with "fertilization" of the female ovum
by the male sperm.142 On the other side of the spectrum are those who assert that conception refers to the "implantation"
of the fertilized ovum in the uterus.143

Plain and Legal Meaning

It is a canon in statutory construction that the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in their plain and ordinary
meaning. As held in the recent case of Chavez v. Judicial Bar Council:144

One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free
from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled
principle of constitutional construction that the language employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed. As much as possible, the words of the Constitution should be
understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed
compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people
mean what they say. Verba legis non est recedendum - from the words of a statute there should be no departure.

The raison d' etre for the rule is essentially two-fold: First, because it is assumed that the words in which constitutional
provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained; and second, because the Constitution is not primarily a
lawyer's document but essentially that of the people, in whose consciousness it should ever be present as an important
condition for the rule of law to prevail.

In conformity with the above principle, the traditional meaning of the word "conception" which, as described and defined
by all reliable and reputable sources, means that life begins at fertilization.

Webster's Third New International Dictionary describes it as the act of becoming pregnant, formation of a viable zygote;
the fertilization that results in a new entity capable of developing into a being like its parents.145

Black's Law Dictionary gives legal meaning to the term "conception" as the fecundation of the female ovum by the male
spermatozoon resulting in human life capable of survival and maturation under normal conditions.146

Even in jurisprudence, an unborn child has already a legal personality. In Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation v.
Hon. Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Allan S. Montano,147 it was written:

Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a
child inside the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception,
that the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof
even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death. [Emphases in the original]

In Gonzales v. Carhart,148 Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the US Supreme Court, said that the State "has respect
for human life at all stages in the pregnancy" and "a legitimate and substantial interest in preserving and promoting fetal
life." Invariably, in the decision, the fetus was referred to, or cited, as a baby or a child.149

Intent of the Framers

Records of the Constitutional Convention also shed light on the intention of the Framers regarding the term "conception"
used in Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. From their deliberations, it clearly refers to the moment of
"fertilization. " The records reflect the following:

Rev. Rigos: In Section 9, page 3, there is a sentence which reads:

"The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of conception."

When is the moment of conception?

xxx

Mr. Villegas: As I explained in the sponsorship speech, it is when the ovum is fertilized by the sperm that there is human
life. x x x.150

xxx

As to why conception is reckoned from fertilization and, as such, the beginning of human life, it was explained:

Mr. Villegas: I propose to review this issue in a biological manner. The first question that needs to be answered is: Is the
fertilized ovum alive? Biologically categorically says yes, the fertilized ovum is alive. First of all, like all living
organisms, it takes in nutrients which it processes by itself. It begins doing this upon fertilization. Secondly, as it takes in
these nutrients, it grows from within. Thirdly, it multiplies itself at a geometric rate in the continuous process of cell
division. All these processes are vital signs of life. Therefore, there is no question that biologically the fertilized ovum has
life.

The second question: Is it human? Genetics gives an equally categorical "yes." At the moment of conception, the nuclei of
the ovum and the sperm rupture. As this happens 23 chromosomes from the ovum combine with 23 chromosomes of the
sperm to form a total of 46 chromosomes. A chromosome count of 46 is found only - and I repeat, only in human cells.
Therefore, the fertilized ovum is human.

Since these questions have been answered affirmatively, we must conclude that if the fertilized ovum is both alive and
human, then, as night follows day, it must be human life. Its nature is human.151

Why the Constitution used the phrase "from the moment of conception" and not "from the moment of fertilization" was
not because of doubt when human life begins, but rather, because:

Mr. Tingson: x x x x the phrase from the moment of conception" was described by us here before with the scientific
phrase "fertilized ovum" may be beyond the comprehension of some people; we want to use the simpler phrase "from the
moment of conception."152

Thus, in order to ensure that the fertilized ovum is given ample protection under the Constitution, it was discussed:

Rev. Rigos: Yes, we think that the word "unborn" is sufficient for the purpose of writing a Constitution, without
specifying "from the moment of conception."

Mr. Davide: I would not subscribe to that particular view because according to the Commissioner's own admission, he
would leave it to Congress to define when life begins. So, Congress can define life to begin from six months after
fertilization; and that would really be very, very, dangerous. It is now determined by science that life begins from the
moment of conception. There can be no doubt about it. So we should not give any doubt to Congress, too.153

Upon further inquiry, it was asked:

Mr. Gascon: Mr. Presiding Officer, I would like to ask a question on that point. Actually, that is one of the questions I was
going to raise during the period of interpellations but it has been expressed already. The provision, as proposed right now
states:

The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of conception.

When it speaks of "from the moment of conception," does this mean when the egg meets the sperm?

Mr. Villegas: Yes, the ovum is fertilized by the sperm.

Mr. Gascon: Therefore that does not leave to Congress the right to determine whether certain contraceptives that we know
today are abortifacient or not because it is a fact that some of the so-called contraceptives deter the rooting of the ovum in
the uterus. If fertilization has already occurred, the next process is for the fertilized ovum to travel towards the uterus and
to take root. What happens with some contraceptives is that they stop the opportunity for the fertilized ovum to reach the
uterus. Therefore, if we take the provision as it is proposed, these so called contraceptives should be banned.

Mr. Villegas: Yes, if that physical fact is established, then that is what is called abortifacient and, therefore, would be
unconstitutional and should be banned under this provision.

Mr. Gascon: Yes. So my point is that I do not think it is up to Congress to state whether or not these certain contraceptives
are abortifacient. Scientifically and based on the provision as it is now proposed, they are already considered
abortifacient.154

From the deliberations above-quoted, it is apparent that the Framers of the Constitution emphasized that the State shall
provide equal protection to both the mother and the unborn child from the earliest opportunity of life, that is, upon
fertilization or upon the union of the male sperm and the female ovum. It is also apparent is that the Framers of the
Constitution intended that to prohibit Congress from enacting measures that would allow it determine when life begins.

Equally apparent, however, is that the Framers of the Constitution did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being
unconstitutional. In fact, Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, spearheading the need to have a constitutional provision on
the right to life, recognized that the determination of whether a contraceptive device is an abortifacient is a question of
fact which should be left to the courts to decide on based on established evidence.155

From the discussions above, contraceptives that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum should be deemed an abortive and thus
prohibited. Conversely, contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and the female ovum, and those
that similarly take action prior to fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus, constitutionally permissible.

As emphasized by the Framers of the Constitution:

x x x x x x x x x

Mr. Gascon: xx xx. As I mentioned in my speech on the US bases, I am pro-life, to the point that I would like not only to
protect the life of the unborn, but also the lives of the millions of people in the world by fighting for a nuclear-free world.
I would just like to be assured of the legal and pragmatic implications of the term "protection of the life of the unborn
from the moment of conception." I raised some of these implications this afternoon when I interjected in the interpellation
of Commissioner Regalado. I would like to ask that question again for a categorical answer.

I mentioned that if we institutionalize the term "the life of the unborn from the moment of conception" we are also
actually saying "no," not "maybe," to certain contraceptives which are already being encouraged at this point in time. Is
that the sense of the committee or does it disagree with me?

Mr. Azcuna: No, Mr. Presiding Officer, because contraceptives would be preventive. There is no unborn yet. That is yet
unshaped.

Mr. Gascon: Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer, but I was speaking more about some contraceptives, such as the intra-uterine
device which actually stops the egg which has already been fertilized from taking route to the uterus. So if we say "from
the moment of conception," what really occurs is that some of these contraceptives will have to be unconstitutionalized.

Mr. Azcuna: Yes, to the extent that it is after the fertilization.

Mr. Gascon: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.156

The fact that not all contraceptives are prohibited by the 1987 Constitution is even admitted by petitioners during the oral
arguments. There it was conceded that tubal ligation, vasectomy, even condoms are not classified as abortifacients.157

Atty. Noche:

Before the union of the eggs, egg and the sperm, there is no life yet.

Justice Bersamin:

There is no life.

Atty. Noche:

So, there is no life to be protected.

Justice Bersamin:

To be protected.

Atty. Noche:

Under Section 12, yes.

Justice Bersamin:

So you have no objection to condoms?

Atty. Noche:

Not under Section 12, Article II.

Justice Bersamin:

Even if there is already information that condoms sometimes have porosity?

Atty. Noche:

Well, yes, Your Honor, there are scientific findings to that effect, Your Honor, but I am discussing here Section 12,
Article II, Your Honor, yes.

Justice Bersamin:

Alright.

Atty. Noche:

And it's not, I have to admit it's not an abortifacient, Your Honor.158

Medical Meaning

That conception begins at fertilization is not bereft of medical foundation. Mosby s Medical, Nursing, and Allied Health
Dictionary defines conception as "the beginning of pregnancy usually taken to be the instant a spermatozoon enters an
ovum and forms a viable zygote."159

It describes fertilization as "the union of male and female gametes to form a zygote from which the embryo develops."160

The Textbook of Obstetrics (Physiological & Pathological Obstetrics),161 used by medical schools in the Philippines, also
concludes that human life (human person) begins at the moment of fertilization with the union of the egg and the sperm
resulting in the formation of a new individual, with a unique genetic composition that dictates all developmental stages
that ensue.

Similarly, recent medical research on the matter also reveals that: "Human development begins after the union of male and
female gametes or germ cells during a process known as fertilization (conception). Fertilization is a sequence of events
that begins with the contact of a sperm (spermatozoon) with a secondary oocyte (ovum) and ends with the fusion of their
pronuclei (the haploid nuclei of the sperm and ovum) and the mingling of their chromosomes to form a new cell. This
fertilized ovum, known as a zygote, is a large diploid cell that is the beginning, or primordium, of a human being."162

The authors of Human Embryology & Teratology163 mirror the same position. They wrote: "Although life is a
continuous process, fertilization is a critical landmark because, under ordinary circumstances, a new, genetically distinct
human organism is thereby formed.... The combination of 23 chromosomes present in each pronucleus results in 46
chromosomes in the zygote. Thus the diploid number is restored and the embryonic genome is formed. The embryo now
exists as a genetic unity."

In support of the RH Bill, The Philippine Medical Association came out with a "Paper on the Reproductive Health Bill
(Responsible Parenthood Bill)" and therein concluded that:

CONCLUSION

The PMA throws its full weight in supporting the RH Bill at the same time that PMA maintains its strong position that
fertilization is sacred because it is at this stage that conception, and thus human life, begins. Human lives are sacred from
the moment of conception, and that destroying those new lives is never licit, no matter what the purported good outcome
would be. In terms of biology and human embryology, a human being begins immediately at fertilization and after that,
there is no point along the continuous line of human embryogenesis where only a "potential" human being can be posited.
Any philosophical, legal, or political conclusion cannot escape this objective scientific fact.

The scientific evidence supports the conclusion that a zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new human being
commences at a scientifically well defined "moment of conception." This conclusion is objective, consistent with the
factual evidence, and independent of any specific ethical, moral, political, or religious view of human life or of human
embryos.164

Conclusion: The Moment of Conception is Reckoned from
Fertilization

In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood under medical parlance, and more importantly, following
the intention of the Framers of the Constitution, the undeniable conclusion is that a zygote is a human organism and that
the life of a new human being commences at a scientifically well-defined moment of conception, that is, upon
fertilization.

For the above reasons, the Court cannot subscribe to the theory advocated by Hon. Lagman that life begins at
implantation.165 According to him, "fertilization and conception are two distinct and successive stages in the reproductive
process. They are not identical and synonymous."166 Citing a letter of the WHO, he wrote that "medical authorities
confirm that the implantation of the fertilized ovum is the commencement of conception and it is only after implantation
that pregnancy can be medically detected."167

This theory of implantation as the beginning of life is devoid of any legal or scientific mooring. It does not pertain to the
beginning of life but to the viability of the fetus. The fertilized ovum/zygote is not an inanimate object - it is a living
human being complete with DNA and 46 chromosomes.168 Implantation has been conceptualized only for convenience
by those who had population control in mind. To adopt it would constitute textual infidelity not only to the RH Law but
also to the Constitution.

Not surprisingly, even the OSG does not support this position.

If such theory would be accepted, it would unnervingly legitimize the utilization of any drug or device that would prevent
the implantation of the fetus at the uterine wall. It would be provocative and further aggravate religious-based
divisiveness.

It would legally permit what the Constitution proscribes - abortion and abortifacients.

The RH Law and Abortion

The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution in protecting the life of the unborn from
conception was to prevent the Legislature from enacting a measure legalizing abortion. It was so clear that even the Court
cannot interpret it otherwise. This intent of the Framers was captured in the record of the proceedings of the 1986
Constitutional Commission. Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, the principal proponent of the protection of the unborn
from conception, explained:

The intention .. .is to make sure that there would be no pro-abortion laws ever passed by Congress or any pro-abortion
decision passed by the Supreme Court.169

A reading of the RH Law would show that it is in line with this intent and actually proscribes abortion. While the Court
has opted not to make any determination, at this stage, when life begins, it finds that the RH Law itself clearly mandates
that protection be afforded from the moment of fertilization. As pointed out by Justice Carpio, the RH Law is replete with
provisions that embody the policy of the law to protect to the fertilized ovum and that it should be afforded safe travel to
the uterus for implantation.170

Moreover, the RH Law recognizes that abortion is a crime under Article 256 of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes
the destruction or expulsion of the fertilized ovum. Thus:

1] xx x.

Section 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as follows:

xxx.

(q) Reproductive health care refers to the access to a full range of methods, facilities, services and supplies that contribute
to reproductive health and well-being by addressing reproductive health-related problems. It also includes sexual health,
the purpose of which is the enhancement of life and personal relations. The elements of reproductive health care include
the following:

xxx.

(3) Proscription of abortion and management of abortion complications;

xxx.

2] xx x.

Section 4. x x x.

(s) Reproductive health rights refers to the rights of individuals and couples, to decide freely and responsibly whether or
not to have children; the number, spacing and timing of their children; to make other decisions concerning reproduction,
free of discrimination, coercion and violence; to have the information and means to do so; and to attain the highest
standard of sexual health and reproductive health: Provided, however, That reproductive health rights do not include
abortion, and access to abortifacients.

3] xx x.

SEC. 29. Repealing Clause. - Except for prevailing laws against abortion, any law, presidential decree or issuance,
executive order, letter of instruction, administrative order, rule or regulation contrary to or is inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act including Republic Act No. 7392, otherwise known as the Midwifery Act, is hereby repealed,
modified or amended accordingly.

The RH Law and Abortifacients

In carrying out its declared policy, the RH Law is consistent in prohibiting abortifacients. To be clear, Section 4(a) of the
RH Law defines an abortifacient as:

Section 4. Definition of Terms - x x x x

(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb
or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the FDA.

As stated above, the RH Law mandates that protection must be afforded from the moment of fertilization. By using the
word " or," the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation, but also those that induce abortion
and those that induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb. Thus, an abortifacient is any drug or device that
either:

(a) Induces abortion; or

(b) Induces the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb; or

(c) Prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, upon determination of the FDA.

Contrary to the assertions made by the petitioners, the Court finds that the RH Law, consistent with the Constitution,
recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounden duty to protect it. The conclusion
becomes clear because the RH Law, first, prohibits any drug or device that induces abortion (first kind), which, as
discussed exhaustively above, refers to that which induces the killing or the destruction of the fertilized ovum, and,
second, prohibits any drug or device the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb (third kind).

By expressly declaring that any drug or device that prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's
womb is an abortifacient (third kind), the RH Law does not intend to mean at all that life only begins only at implantation,
as Hon. Lagman suggests. It also does not declare either that protection will only be given upon implantation, as the
petitioners likewise suggest. Rather, it recognizes that: one, there is a need to protect the fertilized ovum which already
has life, and two, the fertilized ovum must be protected the moment it becomes existent - all the way until it reaches and
implants in the mother's womb. After all, if life is only recognized and afforded protection from the moment the fertilized
ovum implants - there is nothing to prevent any drug or device from killing or destroying the fertilized ovum prior to
implantation.

From the foregoing, the Court finds that inasmuch as it affords protection to the fertilized ovum, the RH Law does not
sanction abortion. To repeat, it is the Court's position that life begins at fertilization, not at implantation. When a fertilized
ovum is implanted in the uterine wall , its viability is sustained but that instance of implantation is not the point of
beginning of life. It started earlier. And as defined by the RH Law, any drug or device that induces abortion, that is, which
kills or destroys the fertilized ovum or prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, is an
abortifacient.

Proviso Under Section 9 of the RH Law

This notwithstanding, the Court finds that the proviso under Section 9 of the law that "any product or supply included or
to be included in the EDL must have a certification from the FDA that said product and supply is made available on the
condition that it is not to be used as an abortifacient" as empty as it is absurd. The FDA, with all its expertise, cannot fully
attest that a drug or device will not all be used as an abortifacient, since the agency cannot be present in every instance
when the contraceptive product or supply will be used.171

Pursuant to its declared policy of providing access only to safe, legal and non-abortifacient contraceptives, however, the
Court finds that the proviso of Section 9, as worded, should bend to the legislative intent and mean that "any product or
supply included or to be included in the EDL must have a certification from the FDA that said product and supply is made
available on the condition that it cannot be used as abortifacient." Such a construction is consistent with the proviso under
the second paragraph of the same section that provides:

Provided, further, That the foregoing offices shall not purchase or acquire by any means emergency contraceptive pills,
postcoital pills, abortifacients that will be used for such purpose and their other forms or equivalent.

Abortifacients under the RH-IRR

At this juncture, the Court agrees with ALFI that the authors of the RH-IRR gravely abused their office when they
redefined the meaning of abortifacient. The RH Law defines "abortifacient" as follows:

SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as follows:

(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb
or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the FDA.

Section 3.0l (a) of the IRR, however, redefines "abortifacient" as:

Section 3.01 For purposes of these Rules, the terms shall be defined as follows:

a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that primarily induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the
mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon
determination of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). [Emphasis supplied]

Again in Section 3.0lG) of the RH-IRR, "contraceptive," is redefined, viz:

j) Contraceptive refers to any safe, legal, effective and scientifically proven modern family planning method, device, or
health product, whether natural or artificial, that prevents pregnancy but does not primarily destroy a fertilized ovum or
prevent a fertilized ovum from being implanted in the mother's womb in doses of its approved indication as determined by
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).

The above-mentioned section of the RH-IRR allows "contraceptives" and recognizes as "abortifacient" only those that
primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to
reach and be implanted in the mother's womb.172

This cannot be done.

In this regard, the observations of Justice Brion and Justice Del Castillo are well taken. As they pointed out, with the
insertion of the word "primarily," Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR173 must be struck down for being ultra vires.

Evidently, with the addition of the word "primarily," in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR is indeed ultra vires. It
contravenes Section 4(a) of the RH Law and should, therefore, be declared invalid. There is danger that the insertion of
the qualifier "primarily" will pave the way for the approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the
unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution. With such qualification in
the RH-IRR, it appears to insinuate that a contraceptive will only be considered as an "abortifacient" if its sole known
effect is abortion or, as pertinent here, the prevention of the implantation of the fertilized ovum.

For the same reason, this definition of "contraceptive" would permit the approval of contraceptives which are actually
abortifacients because of their fail-safe mechanism.174

Also, as discussed earlier, Section 9 calls for the certification by the FDA that these contraceptives cannot act as abortive.
With this, together with the definition of an abortifacient under Section 4 (a) of the RH Law and its declared policy
against abortion, the undeniable conclusion is that contraceptives to be included in the PNDFS and the EDL will not only
be those contraceptives that do not have the primary action of causing abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the
mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, but also those
that do not have the secondary action of acting the same way.

Indeed, consistent with the constitutional policy prohibiting abortion, and in line with the principle that laws should be
construed in a manner that its constitutionality is sustained, the RH Law and its implementing rules must be consistent
with each other in prohibiting abortion. Thus, the word " primarily" in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR should be
declared void. To uphold the validity of Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR and prohibit only those contraceptives that
have the primary effect of being an abortive would effectively "open the floodgates to the approval of contraceptives
which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12 of the
Constitution."175

To repeat and emphasize, in all cases, the "principle of no abortion" embodied in the constitutional protection of life must
be upheld.

2-The Right to Health

The petitioners claim that the RH Law violates the right to health because it requires the inclusion of hormonal
contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and family products and supplies in the National Drug Formulary and the
inclusion of the same in the regular purchase of essential medicines and supplies of all national hospitals.176 Citing
various studies on the matter, the petitioners posit that the risk of developing breast and cervical cancer is greatly
increased in women who use oral contraceptives as compared to women who never use them. They point out that the risk
is decreased when the use of contraceptives is discontinued. Further, it is contended that the use of combined oral
contraceptive pills is associated with a threefold increased risk of venous thromboembolism, a twofold increased risk of
ischematic stroke, and an indeterminate effect on risk of myocardial infarction.177 Given the definition of "reproductive
health" and "sexual health" under Sections 4(p)178 and (w)179 of the RH Law, the petitioners assert that the assailed
legislation only seeks to ensure that women have pleasurable and satisfying sex lives.180

The OSG, however, points out that Section 15, Article II of the Constitution is not self-executory, it being a mere
statement of the administration's principle and policy. Even if it were self-executory, the OSG posits that medical
authorities refute the claim that contraceptive pose a danger to the health of women.181

The Court's Position

A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this regard, the Constitution is replete with
provisions protecting and promoting the right to health. Section 15, Article II of the Constitution provides:

Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among
them.

A portion of Article XIII also specifically provides for the States' duty to provide for the health of the people, viz:

HEALTH

Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor
to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be
priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavor to
provide free medical care to paupers.

Section 12. The State shall establish and maintain an effective food and drug regulatory system and undertake appropriate
health, manpower development, and research, responsive to the country's health needs and problems.

Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency for disabled person for their rehabilitation, self-development, and
self-reliance, and their integration into the mainstream of society.

Finally, Section 9, Article XVI provides:

Section 9. The State shall protect consumers from trade malpractices and from substandard or hazardous products.

Contrary to the respondent's notion, however, these provisions are self-executing. Unless the provisions clearly express
the contrary, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executory. There is no need for legislation to
implement these self-executing provisions.182 In Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS,183 it was stated:

x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the
presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as
requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the
mandate of the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that

... in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing. . . . Unless the
contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule
would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be
subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass
the needed implementing statute. (Emphases supplied)

This notwithstanding, it bears mentioning that the petitioners, particularly ALFI, do not question contraception and
contraceptives per se.184 In fact, ALFI prays that the status quo - under R.A. No. 5921 and R.A. No. 4729, the sale and
distribution of contraceptives are not prohibited when they are dispensed by a prescription of a duly licensed by a
physician - be maintained.185

The legislative intent in the enactment of the RH Law in this regard is to leave intact the provisions of R.A. No. 4729.
There is no intention at all to do away with it. It is still a good law and its requirements are still in to be complied with.
Thus, the Court agrees with the observation of respondent Lagman that the effectivity of the RH Law will not lead to the
unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives since the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices
will still require the prescription of a licensed physician. With R.A. No. 4729 in place, there exists adequate safeguards to
ensure the public that only contraceptives that are safe are made available to the public. As aptly explained by respondent
Lagman:

D. Contraceptives cannot be
dispensed and used without
prescription

108. As an added protection to voluntary users of contraceptives, the same cannot be dispensed and used without
prescription.

109. Republic Act No. 4729 or "An Act to Regulate the Sale, Dispensation, and/ or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs
and Devices" and Republic Act No. 5921 or "An Act Regulating the Practice of Pharmacy and Setting Standards of
Pharmaceutical Education in the Philippines and for Other Purposes" are not repealed by the RH Law and the provisions
of said Acts are not inconsistent with the RH Law.

110. Consequently, the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices are particularly governed by
RA No. 4729 which provides in full:

"Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, or corporation, to sell, dispense or otherwise distribute
whether for or without consideration, any contraceptive drug or device, unless such sale, dispensation or distribution is by
a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and with the prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.

"Sec. 2 . For the purpose of this Act:

"(a) "Contraceptive drug" is any medicine, drug, chemical, or portion which is used exclusively for the purpose of
preventing fertilization of the female ovum: and

"(b) "Contraceptive device" is any instrument, device, material, or agent introduced into the female reproductive system
for the primary purpose of preventing conception.

"Sec. 3 Any person, partnership, or corporation, violating the provisions of this Act shall be punished with a fine of not
more than five hundred pesos or an imprisonment of not less than six months or more than one year or both in the
discretion of the Court.

"This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

"Approved: June 18, 1966"

111. Of the same import, but in a general manner, Section 25 of RA No. 5921 provides:

"Section 25. Sale of medicine, pharmaceuticals, drugs and devices. No medicine, pharmaceutical, or drug of whatever
nature and kind or device shall be compounded, dispensed, sold or resold, or otherwise be made available to the
consuming public except through a prescription drugstore or hospital pharmacy, duly established in accordance with the
provisions of this Act.

112. With all of the foregoing safeguards, as provided for in the RH Law and other relevant statutes, the pretension of the
petitioners that the RH Law will lead to the unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives, whether harmful or not, is
completely unwarranted and baseless.186 [Emphases in the Original. Underlining supplied.]

In Re: Section 10 of the RH Law:

The foregoing safeguards should be read in connection with Section 10 of the RH Law which provides:

SEC. 10. Procurement and Distribution of Family Planning Supplies. - The DOH shall procure, distribute to LGUs and
monitor the usage of family planning supplies for the whole country. The DOH shall coordinate with all appropriate local
government bodies to plan and implement this procurement and distribution program. The supply and budget allotments
shall be based on, among others, the current levels and projections of the following:

(a) Number of women of reproductive age and couples who want to space or limit their children;

(b) Contraceptive prevalence rate, by type of method used; and

(c) Cost of family planning supplies.

Provided, That LGUs may implement its own procurement, distribution and monitoring program consistent with the
overall provisions of this Act and the guidelines of the DOH.

Thus, in the distribution by the DOH of contraceptive drugs and devices, it must consider the provisions of R.A. No.
4729, which is still in effect, and ensure that the contraceptives that it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store
or pharmaceutical company and that the actual dispensation of these contraceptive drugs and devices will done following
a prescription of a qualified medical practitioner. The distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices must not be
indiscriminately done. The public health must be protected by all possible means. As pointed out by Justice De Castro, a
heavy responsibility and burden are assumed by the government in supplying contraceptive drugs and devices, for it may
be held accountable for any injury, illness or loss of life resulting from or incidental to their use.187

At any rate, it bears pointing out that not a single contraceptive has yet been submitted to the FDA pursuant to the RH
Law. It behooves the Court to await its determination which drugs or devices are declared by the FDA as safe, it being the
agency tasked to ensure that food and medicines available to the public are safe for public consumption. Consequently,
the Court finds that, at this point, the attack on the RH Law on this ground is premature. Indeed, the various kinds of
contraceptives must first be measured up to the constitutional yardstick as expounded herein, to be determined as the case
presents itself.

At this point, the Court is of the strong view that Congress cannot legislate that hormonal contraceptives and intra-uterine
devices are safe and non-abortifacient. The first sentence of Section 9 that ordains their inclusion by the National Drug
Formulary in the EDL by using the mandatory "shall" is to be construed as operative only after they have been tested,
evaluated, and approved by the FDA. The FDA, not Congress, has the expertise to determine whether a particular
hormonal contraceptive or intrauterine device is safe and non-abortifacient. The provision of the third sentence concerning
the requirements for the inclusion or removal of a particular family planning supply from the EDL supports this
construction.

Stated differently, the provision in Section 9 covering the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices,
injectables, and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies by the National
Drug Formulary in the EDL is not mandatory. There must first be a determination by the FDA that they are in fact safe,
legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies. There can be no predetermination by
Congress that the gamut of contraceptives are "safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective" without the proper scientific
examination.

3 -Freedom of Religion
and the Right to Free Speech

Position of the Petitioners:

1. On Contraception

While contraceptives and procedures like vasectomy and tubal ligation are not covered by the constitutional proscription,
there are those who, because of their religious education and background, sincerely believe that contraceptives, whether
abortifacient or not, are evil. Some of these are medical practitioners who essentially claim that their beliefs prohibit not
only the use of contraceptives but also the willing participation and cooperation in all things dealing with contraceptive
use. Petitioner PAX explained that "contraception is gravely opposed to marital chastity, it is contrary to the good of the
transmission of life, and to the reciprocal self-giving of the spouses; it harms true love and denies the sovereign rule of
God in the transmission of Human life."188

The petitioners question the State-sponsored procurement of contraceptives, arguing that the expenditure of their taxes on
contraceptives violates the guarantee of religious freedom since contraceptives contravene their religious beliefs.189

2. On Religious Accommodation and
The Duty to Refer

Petitioners Imbong and Luat note that while the RH Law attempts to address religious sentiments by making provisions
for a conscientious objector, the constitutional guarantee is nonetheless violated because the law also imposes upon the
conscientious objector the duty to refer the patient seeking reproductive health services to another medical practitioner
who would be able to provide for the patient's needs. For the petitioners, this amounts to requiring the conscientious
objector to cooperate with the very thing he refuses to do without violating his/her religious beliefs.190

They further argue that even if the conscientious objector's duty to refer is recognized, the recognition is unduly limited,
because although it allows a conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(3) the option to refer a patient seeking reproductive
health services and information - no escape is afforded the conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(l) and (2), i.e. against a
patient seeking reproductive health procedures. They claim that the right of other individuals to conscientiously object,
such as: a) those working in public health facilities referred to in Section 7; b) public officers involved in the
implementation of the law referred to in Section 23(b ); and c) teachers in public schools referred to in Section 14 of the
RH Law, are also not recognize.191

Petitioner Echavez and the other medical practitioners meanwhile, contend that the requirement to refer the matter to
another health care service provider is still considered a compulsion on those objecting healthcare service providers. They
add that compelling them to do the act against their will violates the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality. Sections 9, 14 and
1 7 of the law are too secular that they tend to disregard the religion of Filipinos. Authorizing the use of contraceptives
with abortive effects, mandatory sex education, mandatory pro-bono reproductive health services to indigents encroach
upon the religious freedom of those upon whom they are required.192

Petitioner CFC also argues that the requirement for a conscientious objector to refer the person seeking reproductive
health care services to another provider infringes on one's freedom of religion as it forces the objector to become an
unwilling participant in the commission of a serious sin under Catholic teachings. While the right to act on one's belief
may be regulated by the State, the acts prohibited by the RH Law are passive acts which produce neither harm nor injury
to the public.193

Petitioner CFC adds that the RH Law does not show compelling state interest to justify regulation of religious freedom
because it mentions no emergency, risk or threat that endangers state interests. It does not explain how the rights of the
people (to equality, non-discrimination of rights, sustainable human development, health, education, information, choice
and to make decisions according to religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs and the demands of responsible
parenthood) are being threatened or are not being met as to justify the impairment of religious freedom.194

Finally, the petitioners also question Section 15 of the RH Law requiring would-be couples to attend family planning and
responsible parenthood seminars and to obtain a certificate of compliance. They claim that the provision forces
individuals to participate in the implementation of the RH Law even if it contravenes their religious beliefs.195 As the
assailed law dangles the threat of penalty of fine and/or imprisonment in case of non-compliance with its provisions, the
petitioners claim that the RH Law forcing them to provide, support and facilitate access and information to contraception
against their beliefs must be struck down as it runs afoul to the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.

The Respondents' Positions

The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the RH Law does not provide that a specific mode or type of
contraceptives be used, be it natural or artificial. It neither imposes nor sanctions any religion or belief.196 They point out
that the RH Law only seeks to serve the public interest by providing accessible, effective and quality reproductive health
services to ensure maternal and child health, in line with the State's duty to bring to reality the social justice health
guarantees of the Constitution,197 and that what the law only prohibits are those acts or practices, which deprive others of
their right to reproductive health.198 They assert that the assailed law only seeks to guarantee informed choice, which is
an assurance that no one will be compelled to violate his religion against his free will.199

The respondents add that by asserting that only natural family planning should be allowed, the petitioners are effectively
going against the constitutional right to religious freedom, the same right they invoked to assail the constitutionality of the
RH Law.200 In other words, by seeking the declaration that the RH Law is unconstitutional, the petitioners are asking that
the Court recognize only the Catholic Church's sanctioned natural family planning methods and impose this on the entire
citizenry.201

With respect to the duty to refer, the respondents insist that the same does not violate the constitutional guarantee of
religious freedom, it being a carefully balanced compromise between the interests of the religious objector, on one hand,
who is allowed to keep silent but is required to refer -and that of the citizen who needs access to information and who has
the right to expect that the health care professional in front of her will act professionally. For the respondents, the
concession given by the State under Section 7 and 23(a)(3) is sufficient accommodation to the right to freely exercise
one's religion without unnecessarily infringing on the rights of others.202

Whatever burden is placed on the petitioner's religious freedom is minimal as the duty to refer is limited in duration,
location and impact.203

Regarding mandatory family planning seminars under Section 15 , the respondents claim that it is a reasonable regulation
providing an opportunity for would-be couples to have access to information regarding parenthood, family planning,
breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It is argued that those who object to any information received on account of their
attendance in the required seminars are not compelled to accept information given to them. They are completely free to
reject any information they do not agree with and retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life without
intervention of the State.204

For their part, respondents De Venecia et al., dispute the notion that natural family planning is the only method acceptable
to Catholics and the Catholic hierarchy. Citing various studies and surveys on the matter, they highlight the changing
stand of the Catholic Church on contraception throughout the years and note the general acceptance of the benefits of
contraceptives by its followers in planning their families.

The Church and The State

At the outset, it cannot be denied that we all live in a heterogeneous society. It is made up of people of diverse ethnic,
cultural and religious beliefs and backgrounds. History has shown us that our government, in law and in practice, has
allowed these various religious, cultural, social and racial groups to thrive in a single society together. It has embraced
minority groups and is tolerant towards all - the religious people of different sects and the non-believers. The undisputed
fact is that our people generally believe in a deity, whatever they conceived Him to be, and to whom they call for
guidance and enlightenment in crafting our fundamental law. Thus, the preamble of the present Constitution reads:

We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane society, and
establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and develop
our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity, the blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of
law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.

The Filipino people in "imploring the aid of Almighty God " manifested their spirituality innate in our nature and
consciousness as a people, shaped by tradition and historical experience. As this is embodied in the preamble, it means
that the State recognizes with respect the influence of religion in so far as it instills into the mind the purest principles of
morality.205 Moreover, in recognition of the contributions of religion to society, the 1935, 1973 and 1987 constitutions
contain benevolent and accommodating provisions towards religions such as tax exemption of church property, salary of
religious officers in government institutions, and optional religious instructions in public schools.

The Framers, however, felt the need to put up a strong barrier so that the State would not encroach into the affairs of the
church, and vice-versa. The principle of separation of Church and State was, thus, enshrined in Article II, Section 6 of the
1987 Constitution, viz:

Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.

Verily, the principle of separation of Church and State is based on mutual respect.1wphi1 Generally, the State cannot
meddle in the internal affairs of the church, much less question its faith and dogmas or dictate upon it. It cannot favor one
religion and discriminate against another. On the other hand, the church cannot impose its beliefs and convictions on the
State and the rest of the citizenry. It cannot demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it sincerely believes that they
are good for the country.

Consistent with the principle that not any one religion should ever be preferred over another, the Constitution in the
above-cited provision utilizes the term "church" in its generic sense, which refers to a temple, a mosque, an iglesia, or any
other house of God which metaphorically symbolizes a religious organization. Thus, the "Church" means the religious
congregations collectively.

Balancing the benefits that religion affords and the need to provide an ample barrier to protect the State from the pursuit
of its secular objectives, the Constitution lays down the following mandate in Article III, Section 5 and Article VI, Section
29 (2), of the 1987 Constitution:

Section. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be
allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.

Section 29.

xxx.

No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit,
or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher,
minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned
to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.

In short, the constitutional assurance of religious freedom provides two guarantees: the Establishment Clause and the Free
Exercise Clause.

The establishment clause "principally prohibits the State from sponsoring any religion or favoring any religion as against
other religions. It mandates a strict neutrality in affairs among religious groups."206 Essentially, it prohibits the
establishment of a state religion and the use of public resources for the support or prohibition of a religion.

On the other hand, the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human conscience.207
Under this part of religious freedom guarantee, the State is prohibited from unduly interfering with the outside
manifestations of one's belief and faith.208 Explaining the concept of religious freedom, the Court, in Victoriano v.
Elizalde Rope Workers Union209 wrote:

The constitutional provisions not only prohibits legislation for the support of any religious tenets or the modes of worship
of any sect, thus forestalling compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship
(U.S. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 88 L. ed. 1148, 1153), but also assures the free exercise of one's chosen form of religion
within limits of utmost amplitude. It has been said that the religion clauses of the Constitution are all designed to protect
the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs,
and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good. Any legislation
whose effect or purpose is to impede the observance of one or all religions, or to discriminate invidiously between the
religions, is invalid, even though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect. (Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398, 10 L.ed.2d 965, 83 S. Ct. 1970) But if the state regulates conduct by enacting, within its power, a general law which
has for its purpose and effect to advance the state's secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious
observance, unless the state can accomplish its purpose without imposing such burden. (Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S.
599, 6 Led. 2d. 563, 81 S. Ct. 144; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 444-5 and 449).

As expounded in Escritor,

The establishment and free exercise clauses were not designed to serve contradictory purposes. They have a single goal-to
promote freedom of individual religious beliefs and practices. In simplest terms, the free exercise clause prohibits
government from inhibiting religious beliefs with penalties for religious beliefs and practice, while the establishment
clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious belief with rewards for religious beliefs and practices. In other
words, the two religion clauses were intended to deny government the power to use either the carrot or the stick to
influence individual religious beliefs and practices.210

Corollary to the guarantee of free exercise of one's religion is the principle that the guarantee of religious freedom is
comprised of two parts: the freedom to believe, and the freedom to act on one's belief. The first part is absolute. As
explained in Gerona v. Secretary of Education:211

The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by one's imagination and thought. So is the freedom of
belief, including religious belief, limitless and without bounds. One may believe in most anything, however strange,
bizarre and unreasonable the same may appear to others, even heretical when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or
doctrinal standards. But between the freedom of belief and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a stretch of road to
travel.212

The second part however, is limited and subject to the awesome power of the State and can be enjoyed only with proper
regard to the rights of others. It is "subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the
public welfare."213

Legislative Acts and the

Free Exercise Clause

Thus, in case of conflict between the free exercise clause and the State, the Court adheres to the doctrine of benevolent
neutrality. This has been clearly decided by the Court in Estrada v. Escritor, (Escritor)214 where it was stated "that
benevolent neutrality-accommodation, whether mandatory or permissive, is the spirit, intent and framework underlying
the Philippine Constitution."215 In the same case, it was further explained that"

The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these governmental actions, accommodation of religion may
be allowed, not to promote the government's favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their
religion without hindrance. "The purpose of accommodation is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a
person's or institution's religion."216 "What is sought under the theory of accommodation is not a declaration of
unconstitutionality of a facially neutral law, but an exemption from its application or its 'burdensome effect,' whether by
the legislature or the courts."217

In ascertaining the limits of the exercise of religious freedom, the compelling state interest test is proper.218 Underlying
the compelling state interest test is the notion that free exercise is a fundamental right and that laws burdening it should be
subject to strict scrutiny.219 In Escritor, it was written:

Philippine jurisprudence articulates several tests to determine these limits. Beginning with the first case on the Free
Exercise Clause, American Bible Society, the Court mentioned the "clear and present danger" test but did not employ it.
Nevertheless, this test continued to be cited in subsequent cases on religious liberty. The Gerona case then pronounced
that the test of permissibility of religious freedom is whether it violates the established institutions of society and law. The
Victoriano case mentioned the "immediate and grave danger" test as well as the doctrine that a law of general applicability
may burden religious exercise provided the law is the least restrictive means to accomplish the goal of the law. The case
also used, albeit inappropriately, the "compelling state interest" test. After Victoriano , German went back to the Gerona
rule. Ebralinag then employed the "grave and immediate danger" test and overruled the Gerona test. The fairly recent case
of Iglesia ni Cristo went back to the " clear and present danger" test in the maiden case of A merican Bible Society. Not
surprisingly, all the cases which employed the "clear and present danger" or "grave and immediate danger" test involved,
in one form or another, religious speech as this test is often used in cases on freedom of expression. On the other hand, the
Gerona and German cases set the rule that religious freedom will not prevail over established institutions of society and
law. Gerona, however, which was the authority cited by German has been overruled by Ebralinag which employed the
"grave and immediate danger" test . Victoriano was the only case that employed the "compelling state interest" test, but as
explained previously, the use of the test was inappropriate to the facts of the case.

The case at bar does not involve speech as in A merican Bible Society, Ebralinag and Iglesia ni Cristo where the "clear
and present danger" and "grave and immediate danger" tests were appropriate as speech has easily discernible or
immediate effects. The Gerona and German doctrine, aside from having been overruled, is not congruent with the
benevolent neutrality approach, thus not appropriate in this jurisdiction. Similar to Victoriano, the present case involves
purely conduct arising from religious belief. The "compelling state interest" test is proper where conduct is involved for
the whole gamut of human conduct has different effects on the state's interests: some effects may be immediate and short-
term while others delayed and far-reaching. A test that would protect the interests of the state in preventing a substantive
evil, whether immediate or delayed, is therefore necessary. However, not any interest of the state would suffice to prevail
over the right to religious freedom as this is a fundamental right that enjoys a preferred position in the hierarchy of rights -
"the most inalienable and sacred of all human rights", in the words of Jefferson. This right is sacred for an invocation of
the Free Exercise Clause is an appeal to a higher sovereignty. The entire constitutional order of limited government is
premised upon an acknowledgment of such higher sovereignty, thus the Filipinos implore the "aid of Almighty God in
order to build a just and humane society and establish a government." As held in Sherbert, only the gravest abuses,
endangering paramount interests can limit this fundamental right. A mere balancing of interests which balances a right
with just a colorable state interest is therefore not appropriate. Instead, only a compelling interest of the state can prevail
over the fundamental right to religious liberty. The test requires the state to carry a heavy burden, a compelling one, for to
do otherwise would allow the state to batter religion, especially the less powerful ones until they are destroyed. In
determining which shall prevail between the state's interest and religious liberty, reasonableness shall be the guide. The
"compelling state interest" serves the purpose of revering religious liberty while at the same time affording protection to
the paramount interests of the state. This was the test used in Sherbert which involved conduct, i.e. refusal to work on
Saturdays. In the end, the "compelling state interest" test, by upholding the paramount interests of the state, seeks to
protect the very state, without which, religious liberty will not be preserved. [Emphases in the original. Underlining
supplied.]

The Court's Position

In the case at bench, it is not within the province of the Court to determine whether the use of contraceptives or one's
participation in the support of modem reproductive health measures is moral from a religious standpoint or whether the
same is right or wrong according to one's dogma or belief. For the Court has declared that matters dealing with "faith,
practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church ... are unquestionably ecclesiastical
matters which are outside the province of the civil courts."220 The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and
secular morality. Whatever pronouncement the Court makes in the case at bench should be understood only in this realm
where it has authority. Stated otherwise, while the Court stands without authority to rule on ecclesiastical matters, as
vanguard of the Constitution, it does have authority to determine whether the RH Law contravenes the guarantee of
religious freedom.

At first blush, it appears that the RH Law recognizes and respects religion and religious beliefs and convictions. It is
replete with assurances the no one can be compelled to violate the tenets of his religion or defy his religious convictions
against his free will. Provisions in the RH Law respecting religious freedom are the following:

1. The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their right to equality and
nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to health which includes
reproductive health, the right to education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves in
accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood. [Section
2, Declaration of Policy]

2 . The State recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family which in turn is the
foundation of the nation. Pursuant thereto, the State shall defend:

(a) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible
parenthood." [Section 2, Declaration of Policy]

3. The State shall promote and provide information and access, without bias, to all methods of family planning, including
effective natural and modern methods which have been proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in
accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical research standards such as those registered and approved by the
FDA for the poor and marginalized as identified through the NHTS-PR and other government measures of identifying
marginalization: Provided, That the State shall also provide funding support to promote modern natural methods of family
planning, especially the Billings Ovulation Method, consistent with the needs of acceptors and their religious convictions.
[Section 3(e), Declaration of Policy]

4. The State shall promote programs that: (1) enable individuals and couples to have the number of children they desire
with due consideration to the health, particularly of women, and the resources available and affordable to them and in
accordance with existing laws, public morals and their religious convictions. [Section 3CDJ

5. The State shall respect individuals' preferences and choice of family planning methods that are in accordance with their
religious convictions and cultural beliefs, taking into consideration the State's obligations under various human rights
instruments. [Section 3(h)]

6. Active participation by nongovernment organizations (NGOs) , women's and people's organizations, civil society, faith-
based organizations, the religious sector and communities is crucial to ensure that reproductive health and population and
development policies, plans, and programs will address the priority needs of women, the poor, and the marginalized.
[Section 3(i)]

7. Responsible parenthood refers to the will and ability of a parent to respond to the needs and aspirations of the family
and children. It is likewise a shared responsibility between parents to determine and achieve the desired number of
children, spacing and timing of their children according to their own family life aspirations, taking into account
psychological preparedness, health status, sociocultural and economic concerns consistent with their religious convictions.
[Section 4(v)] (Emphases supplied)

While the Constitution prohibits abortion, laws were enacted allowing the use of contraceptives. To some medical
practitioners, however, the whole idea of using contraceptives is an anathema. Consistent with the principle of benevolent
neutrality, their beliefs should be respected.

The Establishment Clause

and Contraceptives

In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with religion, it also limits what
religious sects can or cannot do with the government. They can neither cause the government to adopt their particular
doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they not cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms,
would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus, establishing a state religion.

Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their supposition that the State cannot enhance its population control
program through the RH Law simply because the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to their religious beliefs.
Indeed, the State is not precluded to pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon by the policies of
any one religion. One cannot refuse to pay his taxes simply because it will cloud his conscience. The demarcation line
between Church and State demands that one render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God the things that
are God's.221

The Free Exercise Clause and the Duty to Refer

While the RH Law, in espousing state policy to promote reproductive health manifestly respects diverse religious beliefs
in line with the Non-Establishment Clause, the same conclusion cannot be reached with respect to Sections 7, 23 and 24
thereof. The said provisions commonly mandate that a hospital or a medical practitioner to immediately refer a person
seeking health care and services under the law to another accessible healthcare provider despite their conscientious
objections based on religious or ethical beliefs.

In a situation where the free exercise of religion is allegedly burdened by government legislation or practice, the
compelling state interest test in line with the Court's espousal of the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality in Escritor, finds
application. In this case, the conscientious objector's claim to religious freedom would warrant an exemption from
obligations under the RH Law, unless the government succeeds in demonstrating a more compelling state interest in the
accomplishment of an important secular objective. Necessarily so, the plea of conscientious objectors for exemption from
the RH Law deserves no less than strict scrutiny.

In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether a conscientious objector's right to religious freedom has been burdened. As
in Escritor, there is no doubt that an intense tug-of-war plagues a conscientious objector. One side coaxes him into
obedience to the law and the abandonment of his religious beliefs, while the other entices him to a clean conscience yet
under the pain of penalty. The scenario is an illustration of the predicament of medical practitioners whose religious
beliefs are incongruent with what the RH Law promotes.

The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law violates the religious belief and conviction of
a conscientious objector. Once the medical practitioner, against his will, refers a patient seeking information on modem
reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods, his conscience is immediately burdened as he has been
compelled to perform an act against his beliefs. As Commissioner Joaquin A. Bernas (Commissioner Bernas) has written,
"at the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human conscience.222

Though it has been said that the act of referral is an opt-out clause, it is, however, a false compromise because it makes
pro-life health providers complicit in the performance of an act that they find morally repugnant or offensive. They
cannot, in conscience, do indirectly what they cannot do directly. One may not be the principal, but he is equally guilty if
he abets the offensive act by indirect participation.

Moreover, the guarantee of religious freedom is necessarily intertwined with the right to free speech, it being an
externalization of one's thought and conscience. This in turn includes the right to be silent. With the constitutional
guarantee of religious freedom follows the protection that should be afforded to individuals in communicating their beliefs
to others as well as the protection for simply being silent. The Bill of Rights guarantees the liberty of the individual to
utter what is in his mind and the liberty not to utter what is not in his mind.223 While the RH Law seeks to provide
freedom of choice through informed consent, freedom of choice guarantees the liberty of the religious conscience and
prohibits any degree of compulsion or burden, whether direct or indirect, in the practice of one's religion.224

In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and moral convictions of individuals, on one hand, and the interest of the
State, on the other, to provide access and information on reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods
to enable the people to determine the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children, the Court is of the strong
view that the religious freedom of health providers, whether public or private, should be accorded primacy. Accordingly, a
conscientious objector should be exempt from compliance with the mandates of the RH Law. If he would be compelled to
act contrary to his religious belief and conviction, it would be violative of "the principle of non-coercion" enshrined in the
constitutional right to free exercise of religion.

Interestingly, on April 24, 2013, Scotland's Inner House of the Court of Session, found in the case of Doogan and Wood v.
NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde Health Board,225 that the midwives claiming to be conscientious objectors under the
provisions of Scotland's Abortion Act of 1967, could not be required to delegate, supervise or support staff on their labor
ward who were involved in abortions.226 The Inner House stated "that if 'participation' were defined according to whether
the person was taking part 'directly' or ' indirectly' this would actually mean more complexity and uncertainty."227

While the said case did not cover the act of referral, the applicable principle was the same - they could not be forced to
assist abortions if it would be against their conscience or will.

Institutional Health Providers

The same holds true with respect to non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious
group and health care service providers. Considering that Section 24 of the RH Law penalizes such institutions should
they fail or refuse to comply with their duty to refer under Section 7 and Section 23(a)(3), the Court deems that it must be
struck down for being violative of the freedom of religion. The same applies to Section 23(a)(l) and (a)(2) in relation to
Section 24, considering that in the dissemination of information regarding programs and services and in the performance
of reproductive health procedures, the religious freedom of health care service providers should be respected.

In the case of Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. v. Office of the Executive Secretary228 it was stressed:

Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this Court has consistently
affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to
allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live,
consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good."10

The Court is not oblivious to the view that penalties provided by law endeavour to ensure compliance. Without set
consequences for either an active violation or mere inaction, a law tends to be toothless and ineffectual. Nonetheless,
when what is bartered for an effective implementation of a law is a constitutionally-protected right the Court firmly
chooses to stamp its disapproval. The punishment of a healthcare service provider, who fails and/or refuses to refer a
patient to another, or who declines to perform reproductive health procedure on a patient because incompatible religious
beliefs, is a clear inhibition of a constitutional guarantee which the Court cannot allow.

The Implementing Rules and Regulation (RH-IRR)

The last paragraph of Section 5.24 of the RH-IRR reads:

Provided, That skilled health professional such as provincial, city or municipal health officers, chiefs of hospital, head
nurses, supervising midwives, among others, who by virtue of their office are specifically charged with the duty to
implement the provisions of the RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors.

This is discriminatory and violative of the equal protection clause. The conscientious objection clause should be equally
protective of the religious belief of public health officers. There is no perceptible distinction why they should not be
considered exempt from the mandates of the law. The protection accorded to other conscientious objectors should equally
apply to all medical practitioners without distinction whether they belong to the public or private sector. After all, the
freedom to believe is intrinsic in every individual and the protective robe that guarantees its free exercise is not taken off
even if one acquires employment in the government.

It should be stressed that intellectual liberty occupies a place inferior to none in the hierarchy of human values. The mind
must be free to think what it wills, whether in the secular or religious sphere, to give expression to its beliefs by oral
discourse or through the media and, thus, seek other candid views in occasions or gatherings or in more permanent
aggrupation. Embraced in such concept then are freedom of religion, freedom of speech, of the press, assembly and
petition, and freedom of association.229

The discriminatory provision is void not only because no such exception is stated in the RH Law itself but also because it
is violative of the equal protection clause in the Constitution. Quoting respondent Lagman, if there is any conflict between
the RH-IRR and the RH Law, the law must prevail.

Justice Mendoza:

I'll go to another point. The RH law .. .in your Comment- in-Intervention on page 52, you mentioned RH Law is replete
with provisions in upholding the freedom of religion and respecting religious convictions. Earlier, you affirmed this with
qualifications. Now, you have read, I presumed you have read the IRR-Implementing Rules and Regulations of the RH
Bill?

Congressman Lagman:

Yes, Your Honor, I have read but I have to admit, it's a long IRR and I have not thoroughly dissected the nuances of the
provisions.

Justice Mendoza:

I will read to you one provision. It's Section 5.24. This I cannot find in the RH Law. But in the IRR it says: " .... skilled
health professionals such as provincial, city or municipal health officers, chief of hospitals, head nurses, supervising
midwives, among others, who by virtue of their office are specifically charged with the duty to implement the provisions
of the RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors." Do you agree with this?

Congressman Lagman:

I will have to go over again the provisions, Your Honor.

Justice Mendoza:

In other words, public health officers in contrast to the private practitioners who can be conscientious objectors, skilled
health professionals cannot be considered conscientious objectors. Do you agree with this? Is this not against the
constitutional right to the religious belief?

Congressman Lagman:

Your Honor, if there is any conflict between the IRR and the law, the law must prevail.230

Compelling State Interest

The foregoing discussion then begets the question on whether the respondents, in defense of the subject provisions, were
able to: 1] demonstrate a more compelling state interest to restrain conscientious objectors in their choice of services to
render; and 2] discharge the burden of proof that the obligatory character of the law is the least intrusive means to achieve
the objectives of the law.

Unfortunately, a deep scrutiny of the respondents' submissions proved to be in vain. The OSG was curiously silent in the
establishment of a more compelling state interest that would rationalize the curbing of a conscientious objector's right not
to adhere to an action contrary to his religious convictions. During the oral arguments, the OSG maintained the same
silence and evasion. The Transcripts of the Stenographic Notes disclose the following:

Justice De Castro:

Let's go back to the duty of the conscientious objector to refer. ..

Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:

Yes, Justice.

Justice De Castro:

... which you are discussing awhile ago with Justice Abad. What is the compelling State interest in imposing this duty to
refer to a conscientious objector which refuses to do so because of his religious belief?

Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:

Ahh, Your Honor, ..

Justice De Castro:

What is the compelling State interest to impose this burden?

Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:

In the first place, Your Honor, I don't believe that the standard is a compelling State interest, this is an ordinary health
legislation involving professionals. This is not a free speech matter or a pure free exercise matter. This is a regulation by
the State of the relationship between medical doctors and their patients.231

Resultantly, the Court finds no compelling state interest which would limit the free exercise clause of the conscientious
objectors, however few in number. Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of
the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to show the seriousness and
immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable.232

Freedom of religion means more than just the freedom to believe. It also means the freedom to act or not to act according
to what one believes. And this freedom is violated when one is compelled to act against one's belief or is prevented from
acting according to one's belief.233

Apparently, in these cases, there is no immediate danger to the life or health of an individual in the perceived scenario of
the subject provisions. After all, a couple who plans the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children refers to
a future event that is contingent on whether or not the mother decides to adopt or use the information, product, method or
supply given to her or whether she even decides to become pregnant at all. On the other hand, the burden placed upon
those who object to contraceptive use is immediate and occurs the moment a patient seeks consultation on reproductive
health matters.

Moreover, granting that a compelling interest exists to justify the infringement of the conscientious objector's religious
freedom, the respondents have failed to demonstrate "the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests" which could
limit or override a person's fundamental right to religious freedom. Also, the respondents have not presented any
government effort exerted to show that the means it takes to achieve its legitimate state objective is the least intrusive
means.234 Other than the assertion that the act of referring would only be momentary, considering that the act of referral
by a conscientious objector is the very action being contested as violative of religious freedom, it behooves the
respondents to demonstrate that no other means can be undertaken by the State to achieve its objective without violating
the rights of the conscientious objector. The health concerns of women may still be addressed by other practitioners who
may perform reproductive health-related procedures with open willingness and motivation. Suffice it to say, a person who
is forced to perform an act in utter reluctance deserves the protection of the Court as the last vanguard of constitutional
freedoms.

At any rate, there are other secular steps already taken by the Legislature to ensure that the right to health is protected.
Considering other legislations as they stand now, R.A . No. 4 729 or the Contraceptive Act, R.A. No. 6365 or "The
Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as "The Magna Carta of Women," amply cater to
the needs of women in relation to health services and programs. The pertinent provision of Magna Carta on
comprehensive health services and programs for women, in fact, reads:

Section 17. Women's Right to Health. - (a) Comprehensive Health Services. - The State shall, at all times, provide for a
comprehensive, culture-sensitive, and gender-responsive health services and programs covering all stages of a woman's
life cycle and which addresses the major causes of women's mortality and morbidity: Provided, That in the provision for
comprehensive health services, due respect shall be accorded to women's religious convictions, the rights of the spouses to
found a family in accordance with their religious convictions, and the demands of responsible parenthood, and the right of
women to protection from hazardous drugs, devices, interventions, and substances.

Access to the following services shall be ensured:

(1) Maternal care to include pre- and post-natal services to address pregnancy and infant health and nutrition;

(2) Promotion of breastfeeding;

(3) Responsible, ethical, legal, safe, and effective methods of family planning;

(4) Family and State collaboration in youth sexuality education and health services without prejudice to the primary right
and duty of parents to educate their children;

(5) Prevention and management of reproductive tract infections, including sexually transmitted diseases, HIV, and AIDS;

(6) Prevention and management of reproductive tract cancers like breast and cervical cancers, and other gynecological
conditions and disorders;

(7) Prevention of abortion and management of pregnancy-related complications;

(8) In cases of violence against women and children, women and children victims and survivors shall be provided with
comprehensive health services that include psychosocial, therapeutic, medical, and legal interventions and assistance
towards healing, recovery, and empowerment;

(9) Prevention and management of infertility and sexual dysfunction pursuant to ethical norms and medical standards;

(10) Care of the elderly women beyond their child-bearing years; and

(11) Management, treatment, and intervention of mental health problems of women and girls. In addition, healthy lifestyle
activities are encouraged and promoted through programs and projects as strategies in the prevention of diseases.

(b) Comprehensive Health Information and Education. - The State shall provide women in all sectors with appropriate,
timely, complete, and accurate information and education on all the above-stated aspects of women's health in government
education and training programs, with due regard to the following:

(1) The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth and the development of moral character
and the right of children to be brought up in an atmosphere of morality and rectitude for the enrichment and strengthening
of character;

(2) The formation of a person's sexuality that affirms human dignity; and

(3) Ethical, legal, safe, and effective family planning methods including fertility awareness.

As an afterthought, Asst. Solicitor General Hilbay eventually replied that the compelling state interest was "Fifteen
maternal deaths per day, hundreds of thousands of unintended pregnancies, lives changed, x x x."235 He, however, failed
to substantiate this point by concrete facts and figures from reputable sources.

The undisputed fact, however, is that the World Health Organization reported that the Filipino maternal mortality rate
dropped to 48 percent from 1990 to 2008, 236 although there was still no RH Law at that time. Despite such revelation,
the proponents still insist that such number of maternal deaths constitute a compelling state interest.

Granting that there are still deficiencies and flaws in the delivery of social healthcare programs for Filipino women, they
could not be solved by a measure that puts an unwarrantable stranglehold on religious beliefs in exchange for blind
conformity.

Exception: Life Threatening Cases

All this notwithstanding, the Court properly recognizes a valid exception set forth in the law. While generally healthcare
service providers cannot be forced to render reproductive health care procedures if doing it would contravene their
religious beliefs, an exception must be made in life-threatening cases that require the performance of emergency
procedures. In these situations, the right to life of the mother should be given preference, considering that a referral by a
medical practitioner would amount to a denial of service, resulting to unnecessarily placing the life of a mother in grave
danger. Thus, during the oral arguments, Atty. Liban, representing CFC, manifested: "the forced referral clause that we
are objecting on grounds of violation of freedom of religion does not contemplate an emergency."237

In a conflict situation between the life of the mother and the life of a child, the doctor is morally obliged always to try to
save both lives. If, however, it is impossible, the resulting death to one should not be deliberate. Atty. Noche explained:

Principle of Double-Effect. - May we please remind the principal author of the RH Bill in the House of Representatives of
the principle of double-effect wherein intentional harm on the life of either the mother of the child is never justified to
bring about a "good" effect. In a conflict situation between the life of the child and the life of the mother, the doctor is
morally obliged always to try to save both lives. However, he can act in favor of one (not necessarily the mother) when it
is medically impossible to save both, provided that no direct harm is intended to the other. If the above principles are
observed, the loss of the child's life or the mother's life is not intentional and, therefore, unavoidable. Hence, the doctor
would not be guilty of abortion or murder. The mother is never pitted against the child because both their lives are equally
valuable.238

Accordingly, if it is necessary to save the life of a mother, procedures endangering the life of the child may be resorted to
even if is against the religious sentiments of the medical practitioner. As quoted above, whatever burden imposed upon a
medical practitioner in this case would have been more than justified considering the life he would be able to save.

Family Planning Seminars

Anent the requirement imposed under Section 15239 as a condition for the issuance of a marriage license, the Court finds
the same to be a reasonable exercise of police power by the government. A cursory reading of the assailed provision bares
that the religious freedom of the petitioners is not at all violated. All the law requires is for would-be spouses to attend a
seminar on parenthood, family planning breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It does not even mandate the type of family
planning methods to be included in the seminar, whether they be natural or artificial. As correctly noted by the OSG, those
who receive any information during their attendance in the required seminars are not compelled to accept the information
given to them, are completely free to reject the information they find unacceptable, and retain the freedom to decide on
matters of family life without the intervention of the State.

4-The Family and the Right to Privacy

Petitioner CFC assails the RH Law because Section 23(a) (2) (i) thereof violates the provisions of the Constitution by
intruding into marital privacy and autonomy. It argues that it cultivates disunity and fosters animosity in the family rather
than promote its solidarity and total development.240

The Court cannot but agree.

The 1987 Constitution is replete with provisions strengthening the family as it is the basic social institution. In fact, one
article, Article XV, is devoted entirely to the family.

ARTICLE XV
THE FAMILY

Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its
solidarity and actively promote its total development.

Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.

Section 3. The State shall defend:

The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible
parenthood;

The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect,
abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development;

The right of the family to a family living wage and income; and

The right of families or family assoc1at1ons to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs
that affect them.

In this case, the RH Law, in its not-so-hidden desire to control population growth, contains provisions which tend to
wreck the family as a solid social institution. It bars the husband and/or the father from participating in the decision
making process regarding their common future progeny. It likewise deprives the parents of their authority over their minor
daughter simply because she is already a parent or had suffered a miscarriage.

The Family and Spousal Consent

Section 23(a) (2) (i) of the RH Law states:

The following acts are prohibited:

(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall: ...

(2) refuse to perform legal and medically-safe reproductive health procedures on any person of legal age on the ground of
lack of consent or authorization of the following persons in the following instances:

(i) Spousal consent in case of married persons: provided, That in case of disagreement, the decision of the one undergoing
the procedures shall prevail. [Emphasis supplied]

The above provision refers to reproductive health procedures like tubal litigation and vasectomy which, by their very
nature, should require mutual consent and decision between the husband and the wife as they affect issues intimately
related to the founding of a family. Section 3, Art. XV of the Constitution espouses that the State shall defend the "right of
the spouses to found a family." One person cannot found a family. The right, therefore, is shared by both spouses. In the
same Section 3, their right "to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect them "
is equally recognized.

The RH Law cannot be allowed to infringe upon this mutual decision-making. By giving absolute authority to the spouse
who would undergo a procedure, and barring the other spouse from participating in the decision would drive a wedge
between the husband and wife, possibly result in bitter animosity, and endanger the marriage and the family, all for the
sake of reducing the population. This would be a marked departure from the policy of the State to protect marriage as an
inviolable social institution.241

Decision-making involving a reproductive health procedure is a private matter which belongs to the couple, not just one of
them. Any decision they would reach would affect their future as a family because the size of the family or the number of
their children significantly matters. The decision whether or not to undergo the procedure belongs exclusively to, and
shared by, both spouses as one cohesive unit as they chart their own destiny. It is a constitutionally guaranteed private
right. Unless it prejudices the State, which has not shown any compelling interest, the State should see to it that they chart
their destiny together as one family.

As highlighted by Justice Leonardo-De Castro, Section 19( c) of R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as the "Magna Carta for
Women," provides that women shall have equal rights in all matters relating to marriage and family relations, including
the joint decision on the number and spacing of their children. Indeed, responsible parenthood, as Section 3(v) of the RH
Law states, is a shared responsibility between parents. Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law should not be allowed to betray
the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family by giving to only one spouse the absolute authority to
decide whether to undergo reproductive health procedure.242

The right to chart their own destiny together falls within the protected zone of marital privacy and such state intervention
would encroach into the zones of spousal privacy guaranteed by the Constitution. In our jurisdiction, the right to privacy
was first recognized in Marje v. Mutuc,243 where the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Fernando, held that "the right
to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of
constitutional protection."244 Marje adopted the ruling of the US Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut,245 where
Justice William O. Douglas wrote:

We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights -older than our political parties, older than our school system.
Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is
an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not
commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.

Ironically, Griswold invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of contraceptives a criminal offense on the
ground of its amounting to an unconstitutional invasion of the right to privacy of married persons. Nevertheless, it
recognized the zone of privacy rightfully enjoyed by couples. Justice Douglas in Grisworld wrote that "specific guarantees
in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance.
Various guarantees create zones of privacy."246

At any rate, in case of conflict between the couple, the courts will decide.

The Family and Parental Consent

Equally deplorable is the debarment of parental consent in cases where the minor, who will be undergoing a procedure, is
already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Section 7 of the RH law provides:

SEC. 7. Access to Family Planning. x x x.

No person shall be denied information and access to family planning services, whether natural or artificial: Provided, That
minors will not be allowed access to modern methods of family planning without written consent from their parents or
guardian/s except when the minor is already a parent or has had a miscarriage.

There can be no other interpretation of this provision except that when a minor is already a parent or has had a
miscarriage, the parents are excluded from the decision making process of the minor with regard to family planning. Even
if she is not yet emancipated, the parental authority is already cut off just because there is a need to tame population
growth.

It is precisely in such situations when a minor parent needs the comfort, care, advice, and guidance of her own parents.
The State cannot replace her natural mother and father when it comes to providing her needs and comfort. To say that
their consent is no longer relevant is clearly anti-family. It does not promote unity in the family. It is an affront to the
constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family as an inviolable social institution.

More alarmingly, it disregards and disobeys the constitutional mandate that "the natural and primary right and duty of
parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of
the Government."247 In this regard, Commissioner Bernas wrote:

The 1987 provision has added the adjective "primary" to modify the right of parents. It imports the assertion that the right
of parents is superior to that of the State.248 [Emphases supplied]

To insist on a rule that interferes with the right of parents to exercise parental control over their minor-child or the right of
the spouses to mutually decide on matters which very well affect the very purpose of marriage, that is, the establishment
of conjugal and family life, would result in the violation of one's privacy with respect to his family. It would be dismissive
of the unique and strongly-held Filipino tradition of maintaining close family ties and violative of the recognition that the
State affords couples entering into the special contract of marriage to as one unit in forming the foundation of the family
and society.

The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over the role of parents in the care and custody of a minor child,
whether or not the latter is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Only a compelling state interest can justify a state
substitution of their parental authority.

First Exception: Access to Information

Whether with respect to the minor referred to under the exception provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 or with
respect to the consenting spouse under Section 23(a)(2)(i), a distinction must be made. There must be a differentiation
between access to information about family planning services, on one hand, and access to the reproductive health
procedures and modern family planning methods themselves, on the other. Insofar as access to information is concerned,
the Court finds no constitutional objection to the acquisition of information by the minor referred to under the exception in
the second paragraph of Section 7 that would enable her to take proper care of her own body and that of her unborn child.
After all, Section 12, Article II of the Constitution mandates the State to protect both the life of the mother as that of the
unborn child. Considering that information to enable a person to make informed decisions is essential in the protection
and maintenance of ones' health, access to such information with respect to reproductive health must be allowed. In this
situation, the fear that parents might be deprived of their parental control is unfounded because they are not prohibited to
exercise parental guidance and control over their minor child and assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the
information received.

Second Exception: Life Threatening Cases

As in the case of the conscientious objector, an exception must be made in life-threatening cases that require the
performance of emergency procedures. In such cases, the life of the minor who has already suffered a miscarriage and that
of the spouse should not be put at grave risk simply for lack of consent. It should be emphasized that no person should be
denied the appropriate medical care urgently needed to preserve the primordial right, that is, the right to life.

In this connection, the second sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii)249 should be struck down. By effectively limiting the
requirement of parental consent to "only in elective surgical procedures," it denies the parents their right of parental
authority in cases where what is involved are "non-surgical procedures." Save for the two exceptions discussed above, and
in the case of an abused child as provided in the first sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii), the parents should not be deprived
of their constitutional right of parental authority. To deny them of this right would be an affront to the constitutional
mandate to protect and strengthen the family.

5 - Academic Freedom

It is asserted that Section 14 of the RH Law, in relation to Section 24 thereof, mandating the teaching of Age-and
Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education under threat of fine and/or imprisonment violates the principle
of academic freedom . According to the petitioners, these provisions effectively force educational institutions to teach
reproductive health education even if they believe that the same is not suitable to be taught to their students.250 Citing
various studies conducted in the United States and statistical data gathered in the country, the petitioners aver that the
prevalence of contraceptives has led to an increase of out-of-wedlock births; divorce and breakdown of families; the
acceptance of abortion and euthanasia; the "feminization of poverty"; the aging of society; and promotion of promiscuity
among the youth.251

At this point, suffice it to state that any attack on the validity of Section 14 of the RH Law is premature because the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports has yet to formulate a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health
education. One can only speculate on the content, manner and medium of instruction that will be used to educate the
adolescents and whether they will contradict the religious beliefs of the petitioners and validate their apprehensions. Thus,
considering the premature nature of this particular issue, the Court declines to rule on its constitutionality or validity.

At any rate, Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the natural and primary right and duty of parents
in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government. Like the 1973 Constitution and the 1935 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution affirms the State recognition of
the invaluable role of parents in preparing the youth to become productive members of society. Notably, it places more
importance on the role of parents in the development of their children by recognizing that said role shall be "primary," that
is, that the right of parents in upbringing the youth is superior to that of the State.252

It is also the inherent right of the State to act as parens patriae to aid parents in the moral development of the youth.
Indeed, the Constitution makes mention of the importance of developing the youth and their important role in nation
building.253 Considering that Section 14 provides not only for the age-appropriate-reproductive health education, but also
for values formation; the development of knowledge and skills in self-protection against discrimination; sexual abuse and
violence against women and children and other forms of gender based violence and teen pregnancy; physical, social and
emotional changes in adolescents; women's rights and children's rights; responsible teenage behavior; gender and
development; and responsible parenthood, and that Rule 10, Section 11.01 of the RH-IRR and Section 4(t) of the RH Law
itself provides for the teaching of responsible teenage behavior, gender sensitivity and physical and emotional changes
among adolescents - the Court finds that the legal mandate provided under the assailed provision supplements, rather than
supplants, the rights and duties of the parents in the moral development of their children.

Furthermore, as Section 14 also mandates that the mandatory reproductive health education program shall be developed in
conjunction with parent-teacher-community associations, school officials and other interest groups, it could very well be
said that it will be in line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners. By imposing such a condition, it becomes apparent
that the petitioners' contention that Section 14 violates Article XV, Section 3(1) of the Constitution is without merit.254

While the Court notes the possibility that educators might raise their objection to their participation in the reproductive
health education program provided under Section 14 of the RH Law on the ground that the same violates their religious
beliefs, the Court reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed before it.

6 - Due Process

The petitioners contend that the RH Law suffers from vagueness and, thus violates the due process clause of the
Constitution. According to them, Section 23 (a)(l) mentions a "private health service provider" among those who may be
held punishable but does not define who is a "private health care service provider." They argue that confusion further
results since Section 7 only makes reference to a "private health care institution."

The petitioners also point out that Section 7 of the assailed legislation exempts hospitals operated by religious groups
from rendering reproductive health service and modern family planning methods. It is unclear, however, if these
institutions are also exempt from giving reproductive health information under Section 23(a)(l), or from rendering
reproductive health procedures under Section 23(a)(2).

Finally, it is averred that the RH Law punishes the withholding, restricting and providing of incorrect information, but at
the same time fails to define "incorrect information."

The arguments fail to persuade.

A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two
respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the
conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.255 Moreover, in determining whether the words used in a statute are vague,
words must not only be taken in accordance with their plain meaning alone, but also in relation to other parts of the
statute. It is a rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, that is, every part of it
must be construed together with the other parts and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.256

As correctly noted by the OSG, in determining the definition of "private health care service provider," reference must be
made to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a "public health service provider," viz:

(n) Public health care service provider refers to: (1) public health care institution, which is duly licensed and accredited
and devoted primarily to the maintenance and operation of facilities for health promotion, disease prevention, diagnosis,
treatment and care of individuals suffering from illness, disease, injury, disability or deformity, or in need of obstetrical or
other medical and nursing care; (2) public health care professional, who is a doctor of medicine, a nurse or a midvvife; (3)
public health worker engaged in the delivery of health care services; or (4) barangay health worker who has undergone
training programs under any accredited government and NGO and who voluntarily renders primarily health care services
in the community after having been accredited to function as such by the local health board in accordance with the
guidelines promulgated by the Department of Health (DOH) .

Further, the use of the term "private health care institution" in Section 7 of the law, instead of "private health care service
provider," should not be a cause of confusion for the obvious reason that they are used synonymously.

The Court need not belabor the issue of whether the right to be exempt from being obligated to render reproductive health
service and modem family planning methods, includes exemption from being obligated to give reproductive health
information and to render reproductive health procedures. Clearly, subject to the qualifications and exemptions earlier
discussed, the right to be exempt from being obligated to render reproductive health service and modem family planning
methods, necessarily includes exemption from being obligated to give reproductive health information and to render
reproductive health procedures. The terms "service" and "methods" are broad enough to include the providing of
information and the rendering of medical procedures.

The same can be said with respect to the contention that the RH Law punishes health care service providers who
intentionally withhold, restrict and provide incorrect information regarding reproductive health programs and services. For
ready reference, the assailed provision is hereby quoted as follows:

SEC. 23. Prohibited Acts. - The following acts are prohibited:

(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall:

(1) Knowingly withhold information or restrict the dissemination thereof, and/ or intentionally provide incorrect
information regarding programs and services on reproductive health including the right to informed choice and access to a
full range of legal, medically-safe, non-abortifacient and effective family planning methods;

From its plain meaning, the word "incorrect" here denotes failing to agree with a copy or model or with established rules;
inaccurate, faulty; failing to agree with the requirements of duty, morality or propriety; and failing to coincide with the
truth. 257 On the other hand, the word "knowingly" means with awareness or deliberateness that is intentional.258 Used
together in relation to Section 23(a)(l), they connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public
as to the nature and effect of programs and services on reproductive health. Public health and safety demand that health
care service providers give their honest and correct medical information in accordance with what is acceptable in medical
practice. While health care service providers are not barred from expressing their own personal opinions regarding the
programs and services on reproductive health, their right must be tempered with the need to provide public health and
safety. The public deserves no less.

7-Egual Protection

The petitioners also claim that the RH Law violates the equal protection clause under the Constitution as it discriminates
against the poor because it makes them the primary target of the government program that promotes contraceptive use .
They argue that, rather than promoting reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law introduces contraceptives that
would effectively reduce the number of the poor. Their bases are the various provisions in the RH Law dealing with the
poor, especially those mentioned in the guiding principles259 and definition of terms260 of the law.

They add that the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory reproductive health education program
imposed by the RH Law renders it unconstitutional.

In Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission,261 the Court had the occasion to expound on the concept of equal protection.
Thus:

One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the equality of right which is embodied in
Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process,
as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has been embodied in a separate clause,
however, to provide for a more specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government.
Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed
partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.

"According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should
be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed." It "requires public bodies and inst itutions to
treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner." "The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every
person within a state's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express
terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the state's duly constituted authorities." "In other words, the concept
of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between
individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective."

The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover all
the departments of the government including the political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a state
denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.

It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it
simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection
clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has
four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is
not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. "Superficial differences
do not make for a valid classification."

For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who naturally
belong to the class. "The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated,
both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is not necessary that the classification be made with absolute
symmetry, in the sense that the members of the class should possess the same characteristics in equal degree. Substantial
similarity will suffice; and as long as this is achieved, all those covered by the classification are to be treated equally. The
mere fact that an individual belonging to a class differs from the other members, as long as that class is substantially
distinguishable from all others, does not justify the non-application of the law to him."

The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude addition to the
number included in the class. It must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar
circumstances and conditions. It must not leave out or "underinclude" those that should otherwise fall into a certain
classification. [Emphases supplied; citations excluded]

To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government's reproductive health care program is not a violation of
the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution which recognizes the
distinct necessity to address the needs of the underprivileged by providing that they be given priority in addressing the
health development of the people. Thus:

Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor
to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be
priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavor to
provide free medical care to paupers.

It should be noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility
issues and desire to have children. There is, therefore, no merit to the contention that the RH Law only seeks to target the
poor to reduce their number. While the RH Law admits the use of contraceptives, it does not, as elucidated above,
sanction abortion. As Section 3(1) explains, the "promotion and/or stabilization of the population growth rate is incidental
to the advancement of reproductive health."

Moreover, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does not impose conditions upon
couples who intend to have children. While the petitioners surmise that the assailed law seeks to charge couples with the
duty to have children only if they would raise them in a truly humane way, a deeper look into its provisions shows that
what the law seeks to do is to simply provide priority to the poor in the implementation of government programs to
promote basic reproductive health care.

With respect to the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory reproductive health education
program under Section 14, suffice it to state that the mere fact that the children of those who are less fortunate attend
public educational institutions does not amount to substantial distinction sufficient to annul the assailed provision. On the
other hand, substantial distinction rests between public educational institutions and private educational institutions,
particularly because there is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private educational institutions especially with
respect to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health education.

8-Involuntary Servitude

The petitioners also aver that the RH Law is constitutionally infirm as it violates the constitutional prohibition against
involuntary servitude. They posit that Section 17 of the assailed legislation requiring private and non-government health
care service providers to render forty-eight (48) hours of pro bono reproductive health services, actually amounts to
involuntary servitude because it requires medical practitioners to perform acts against their will.262

The OSG counters that the rendition of pro bono services envisioned in Section 17 can hardly be considered as forced
labor analogous to slavery, as reproductive health care service providers have the discretion as to the manner and time of
giving pro bono services. Moreover, the OSG points out that the imposition is within the powers of the government, the
accreditation of medical practitioners with PhilHealth being a privilege and not a right.

The point of the OSG is well-taken.

It should first be mentioned that the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both a power
and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Like the legal
profession, the practice of medicine is not a right but a privileged burdened with conditions as it directly involves the very
lives of the people. A fortiori, this power includes the power of Congress263 to prescribe the qualifications for the
practice of professions or trades which affect the public welfare, the public health, the public morals, and the public
safety; and to regulate or control such professions or trades, even to the point of revoking such right altogether.264

Moreover, as some petitioners put it, the notion of involuntary servitude connotes the presence of force, threats,
intimidation or other similar means of coercion and compulsion.265 A reading of the assailed provision, however, reveals
that it only encourages private and non- government reproductive healthcare service providers to render pro bono service.
Other than non-accreditation with PhilHealth, no penalty is imposed should they choose to do otherwise. Private and non-
government reproductive healthcare service providers also enjoy the liberty to choose which kind of health service they
wish to provide, when, where and how to provide it or whether to provide it all. Clearly, therefore, no compulsion, force
or threat is made upon them to render pro bono service against their will. While the rendering of such service was made a
prerequisite to accreditation with PhilHealth, the Court does not consider the same to be an unreasonable burden, but
rather, a necessary incentive imposed by Congress in the furtherance of a perceived legitimate state interest.

Consistent with what the Court had earlier discussed, however, it should be emphasized that conscientious objectors are
exempt from this provision as long as their religious beliefs and convictions do not allow them to render reproductive
health service, pro bona or otherwise.

9-Delegation of Authority to the FDA

The petitioners likewise question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether or not a
supply or product is to be included in the Essential Drugs List (EDL).266

The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation. The FDA does not only have the power but also the competency to
evaluate, register and cover health services and methods. It is the only government entity empowered to render such
services and highly proficient to do so. It should be understood that health services and methods fall under the gamut of
terms that are associated with what is ordinarily understood as "health products."

In this connection, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3 720, as amended by R.A. No. 9711 reads:

SEC. 4. To carry out the provisions of this Act, there is hereby created an office to be called the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) in the Department of Health (DOH). Said Administration shall be under the Office of the Secretary
and shall have the following functions, powers and duties:

"(a) To administer the effective implementation of this Act and of the rules and regulations issued pursuant to the same;

"(b) To assume primary jurisdiction in the collection of samples of health products;

"(c) To analyze and inspect health products in connection with the implementation of this Act;

"(d) To establish analytical data to serve as basis for the preparation of health products standards, and to recommend
standards of identity, purity, safety, efficacy, quality and fill of container;

"(e) To issue certificates of compliance with technical requirements to serve as basis for the issuance of appropriate
authorization and spot-check for compliance with regulations regarding operation of manufacturers, importers, exporters,
distributors, wholesalers, drug outlets, and other establishments and facilities of health products, as determined by the
FDA;

"x x x

"(h) To conduct appropriate tests on all applicable health products prior to the issuance of appropriate authorizations to
ensure safety, efficacy, purity, and quality;

"(i) To require all manufacturers, traders, distributors, importers, exporters, wholesalers, retailers, consumers, and non-
consumer users of health products to report to the FDA any incident that reasonably indicates that said product has caused
or contributed to the death, serious illness or serious injury to a consumer, a patient, or any person;

"(j) To issue cease and desist orders motu propio or upon verified complaint for health products, whether or not registered
with the FDA Provided, That for registered health products, the cease and desist order is valid for thirty (30) days and may
be extended for sixty ( 60) days only after due process has been observed;

"(k) After due process, to order the ban, recall, and/or withdrawal of any health product found to have caused death,
serious illness or serious injury to a consumer or patient, or is found to be imminently injurious, unsafe, dangerous, or
grossly deceptive, and to require all concerned to implement the risk management plan which is a requirement for the
issuance of the appropriate authorization;

x x x.

As can be gleaned from the above, the functions, powers and duties of the FDA are specific to enable the agency to carry
out the mandates of the law. Being the country's premiere and sole agency that ensures the safety of food and medicines
available to the public, the FDA was equipped with the necessary powers and functions to make it effective. Pursuant to
the principle of necessary implication, the mandate by Congress to the FDA to ensure public health and safety by
permitting only food and medicines that are safe includes "service" and "methods." From the declared policy of the RH
Law, it is clear that Congress intended that the public be given only those medicines that are proven medically safe, legal,
non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical research standards. The
philosophy behind the permitted delegation was explained in Echagaray v. Secretary of Justice,267 as follows:

The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of the government and the growing inability of the legislature to cope
directly with the many problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created
peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even
in legislation has become necessary. To many of the problems attendant upon present day undertakings, the legislature
may not have the competence, let alone the interest and the time, to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say
specific solutions.

10- Autonomy of Local Governments and the Autonomous Region

of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)

As for the autonomy of local governments, the petitioners claim that the RH Law infringes upon the powers devolved to
local government units (LGUs) under Section 17 of the Local Government Code. Said Section 17 vested upon the LGUs
the duties and functions pertaining to the delivery of basic services and facilities, as follows:

SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities.

(a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue exercising the powers and discharging the
duties and functions currently vested upon them. They shall also discharge the functions and responsibilities of national
agencies and offices devolved to them pursuant to this Code. Local government units shall likewise exercise such other
powers and discharge such other functions and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and
effective provision of the basic services and facilities enumerated herein.

(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, x x x.

While the aforementioned provision charges the LGUs to take on the functions and responsibilities that have already been
devolved upon them from the national agencies on the aspect of providing for basic services and facilities in their
respective jurisdictions, paragraph (c) of the same provision provides a categorical exception of cases involving
nationally-funded projects, facilities, programs and services.268 Thus:

(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, public works and infrastructure projects and other facilities,
programs and services funded by the National Government under the annual General Appropriations Act, other special
laws, pertinent executive orders, and those wholly or partially funded from foreign sources, are not covered under this
Section, except in those cases where the local government unit concerned is duly designated as the implementing agency
for such projects, facilities, programs and services. [Emphases supplied]

The essence of this express reservation of power by the national government is that, unless an LGU is particularly
designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which funding has been provided by the
national government under the annual general appropriations act, even if the program involves the delivery of basic
services within the jurisdiction of the LGU.269 A complete relinquishment of central government powers on the matter of
providing basic facilities and services cannot be implied as the Local Government Code itself weighs against it.270

In this case, a reading of the RH Law clearly shows that whether it pertains to the establishment of health care
facilities,271 the hiring of skilled health professionals,272 or the training of barangay health workers,273 it will be the
national government that will provide for the funding of its implementation. Local autonomy is not absolute. The national
government still has the say when it comes to national priority programs which the local government is called upon to
implement like the RH Law.

Moreover, from the use of the word "endeavor," the LG Us are merely encouraged to provide these services. There is
nothing in the wording of the law which can be construed as making the availability of these services mandatory for the
LGUs. For said reason, it cannot be said that the RH Law amounts to an undue encroachment by the national government
upon the autonomy enjoyed by the local governments.

The ARMM

The fact that the RH Law does not intrude in the autonomy of local governments can be equally applied to the ARMM.
The RH Law does not infringe upon its autonomy. Moreover, Article III, Sections 6, 10 and 11 of R.A. No. 9054, or the
organic act of the ARMM, alluded to by petitioner Tillah to justify the exemption of the operation of the RH Law in the
autonomous region, refer to the policy statements for the guidance of the regional government. These provisions relied
upon by the petitioners simply delineate the powers that may be exercised by the regional government, which can, in no
manner, be characterized as an abdication by the State of its power to enact legislation that would benefit the general
welfare. After all, despite the veritable autonomy granted the ARMM, the Constitution and the supporting jurisprudence,
as they now stand, reject the notion of imperium et imperio in the relationship between the national and the regional
governments.274 Except for the express and implied limitations imposed on it by the Constitution, Congress cannot be
restricted to exercise its inherent and plenary power to legislate on all subjects which extends to all matters of general
concern or common interest.275

11 - Natural Law

With respect to the argument that the RH Law violates natural law,276 suffice it to say that the Court does not duly
recognize it as a legal basis for upholding or invalidating a law. Our only guidepost is the Constitution. While every law
enacted by man emanated from what is perceived as natural law, the Court is not obliged to see if a statute, executive
issuance or ordinance is in conformity to it. To begin with, it is not enacted by an acceptable legitimate body. Moreover,
natural laws are mere thoughts and notions on inherent rights espoused by theorists, philosophers and theologists. The
jurists of the philosophical school are interested in the law as an abstraction, rather than in the actual law of the past or
present.277 Unless, a natural right has been transformed into a written law, it cannot serve as a basis to strike down a law.
In Republic v. Sandiganbayan,278 the very case cited by the petitioners, it was explained that the Court is not duty-bound
to examine every law or action and whether it conforms with both the Constitution and natural law. Rather, natural law is
to be used sparingly only in the most peculiar of circumstances involving rights inherent to man where no law is
applicable.279

At any rate, as earlier expounded, the RH Law does not sanction the taking away of life. It does not allow abortion in any
shape or form. It only seeks to enhance the population control program of the government by providing information and
making non-abortifacient contraceptives more readily available to the public, especially to the poor.

Facts and Fallacies

and the Wisdom of the Law

In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as unconstitutional insofar as it seeks to provide access to medically-safe,
non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive healthcare services, methods, devices, and
supplies. As earlier pointed out, however, the religious freedom of some sectors of society cannot be trampled upon in
pursuit of what the law hopes to achieve. After all, the Constitutional safeguard to religious freedom is a recognition that
man stands accountable to an authority higher than the State.

In conformity with the principle of separation of Church and State, one religious group cannot be allowed to impose its
beliefs on the rest of the society. Philippine modem society leaves enough room for diversity and pluralism. As such,
everyone should be tolerant and open-minded so that peace and harmony may continue to reign as we exist alongside each
other.

As healthful as the intention of the RH Law may be, the idea does not escape the Court that what it seeks to address is the
problem of rising poverty and unemployment in the country. Let it be said that the cause of these perennial issues is not
the large population but the unequal distribution of wealth. Even if population growth is controlled, poverty will remain as
long as the country's wealth remains in the hands of the very few.

At any rate, population control may not be beneficial for the country in the long run. The European and Asian countries,
which embarked on such a program generations ago , are now burdened with ageing populations. The number of their
young workers is dwindling with adverse effects on their economy. These young workers represent a significant human
capital which could have helped them invigorate, innovate and fuel their economy. These countries are now trying to
reverse their programs, but they are still struggling. For one, Singapore, even with incentives, is failing.

And in this country, the economy is being propped up by remittances from our Overseas Filipino Workers. This is because
we have an ample supply of young able-bodied workers. What would happen if the country would be weighed down by an
ageing population and the fewer younger generation would not be able to support them? This would be the situation when
our total fertility rate would go down below the replacement level of two (2) children per woman.280

Indeed, at the present, the country has a population problem, but the State should not use coercive measures (like the penal
provisions of the RH Law against conscientious objectors) to solve it. Nonetheless, the policy of the Court is non-
interference in the wisdom of a law.

x x x. But this Court cannot go beyond what the legislature has laid down. Its duty is to say what the law is as enacted by
the lawmaking body. That is not the same as saying what the law should be or what is the correct rule in a given set of
circumstances. It is not the province of the judiciary to look into the wisdom of the law nor to question the policies
adopted by the legislative branch. Nor is it the business of this Tribunal to remedy every unjust situation that may arise
from the application of a particular law. It is for the legislature to enact remedial legislation if that would be necessary in
the premises. But as always, with apt judicial caution and cold neutrality, the Court must carry out the delicate function of
interpreting the law, guided by the Constitution and existing legislation and mindful of settled jurisprudence. The Court's
function is therefore limited, and accordingly, must confine itself to the judicial task of saying what the law is, as enacted
by the lawmaking body.281

Be that as it may, it bears reiterating that the RH Law is a mere compilation and enhancement of the prior existing
contraceptive and reproductive health laws, but with coercive measures. Even if the Court decrees the RH Law as entirely
unconstitutional, there will still be the Population Act (R.A. No. 6365), the Contraceptive Act (R.A. No. 4729) and the
reproductive health for women or The Magna Carta of Women (R.A. No. 9710), sans the coercive provisions of the
assailed legislation. All the same, the principle of "no-abortion" and "non-coercion" in the adoption of any family
planning method should be maintained.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private health facilities and non-
maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency
or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is conveniently
accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of family
planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s;

2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they
punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate information regarding programs and
services on reproductive health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.

3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married individual, not in an
emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures
without the consent of the spouse;

4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the requirement of parental
consent only to elective surgical procedures.

5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they
punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or life-threatening
case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service provider within the same facility or one
which is conveniently accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish
any public officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall do any act that hinders the full
implementation of a reproductive health program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bona reproductive health
service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation; and

8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier "primarily" in defining abortifacients and
contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and
violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.

The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March 19, 2013 as extended by its Order, dated July 16, 2013 , is
hereby LIFTED, insofar as the provisions of R.A. No. 10354 which have been herein declared as constitutional.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

Tingnan ang aking opinyong
Sumasang-ayon at Sumasalungat
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

See Concurring Opinion
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
With Separate concurring opinion
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice See: Separate Concurring Opinion
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
See Concurring and dissenting
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice See Concurring Opinion
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
See concurring and dissenting
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice See Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
See Separate dissent
MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I hereby certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice


Footnotes

1 Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. v. Office of the Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 153888, July 9, 2003;
405 SCRA 497, 504.

2 See <http://wn.com/pro-rh_ bill_vs_anti-rh_ bi ll>, last visited on November 5, 20 13; See also <http://www.abs-
cbnnews.com/nation/04/ 19/ I O/h ontiveros-tatad-debate-rh-bill>, last vi sited on November 5, 201 3.

3 See <http ://news info .inqu irer.net/inquirerheadlines/nation/view/ 20110321-326743/Stickers-spread-anti-RH-bill-
message>, last visited on November 5, 2 01 3; See also <http ://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/
218169/news/nation/carlos-celdran-distributes-pro-rh-stickers-in-quiapo>, last visited on November 5, 201 3.

4 See <http ://newsinfo. inquirer.net/241 737/massive-church-rally-set-against-rh-bill>, last visited November 5, 201 3;
See also <http://www.splendorofthechurch.eom.ph/201 3/04/29/fi lipino-catholics-flex-muscles-in-poll-clout/>, last
visited November 5, 2013.

5 With Prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order/ Writ of Preliminary Injunction; docketed as G.R. No.
2048 19; rollo (G.R. No. 204819), pp. 3-32.

6 With Prayer for the Urgent Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction; docketed
as G.R. No. 204934; rollo (G.R. No. 204934), pp. 3-76.

7 Also proceeding in her personal capacity a citizen and as a member of the Bar.

8 Spouses Reynaldo S. Luistro & Rosie B. Luistro, Jose S. Sandejas & Elenita S.A. Sandejas, Arturo M. Gorrez &
Marietta C . Gorrez, Salvador S. Mante, Jr. & Hazeleen L. Mante, Rolando M. Bautista & Maria Felisa S. Bautista,
Desiderio Racho & Traquilina Racho, Femand Antonio A. Tansingco & Carol Anne C. Tansingco for themselves and on
behalf of their minor children, Therese Antonette C. Tansingco, Lorenzo Jose C. Tansingco, Miguel Fernando C .
Tangsingco, Carlo Josemaria C. Tansingco & Juan Paolo C. Tansingco, Spouses Mariano V. Araneta & Eileen Z. Araneta
for themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Ramon Carlos Z. Araneta & Maya Angelica Z. Araneta, Spouses
Renato C. Castor & Mildred C. Castor for themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Renz Jeffrey C. Castor,
Joseph Ramil C. Castor, John Paul C. Castor & Raphae l C. Castor, Spouses Alexander R. Racho & Zara Z. Racho for
themselves a nd on behalf of their minor chi ldren Margarita Racho, Mikaela Racho, Martin Racho, Mari Racho &
Manolo Racho, Spouses Alfred R. Racho & Franc ine Y. Racho for themse lves and on behalf of their minor children
Michael Racho, Mariana Racho, Rafael Racho, Maxi Racho, C hessie Racho & Laura Racho, Spouses David R. Racho &
Armilyn A. Racho for themselves and on behalf of the ir minor child Gabrie l Racho, Mindy M. Juatas and on behalf of
her minor children Elijah General Juatas and Elian Gabriel Juatas, Salvacion M. Monteiro, Emily R. Laws, Joseph R.
Laws & Katrina R. Laws

9 With Prayer for Injunction; docketed a s G.R. No. 204957.

10 With Prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order/ Writ of Preliminary Injunction; docketed as G.R. No.
204988; rollo (G.R. No. 204988), pp. 5-3 5.

11 Through and together with its president Nestor B. Lumicao, M.D.

12 Through and together with its representative/ member of the school board Dr. Rodrigo M. Alenton, M.D.

13 Rosemarie R. Alenton, Imelda G. Ibarra, Cpa, Lovenia P. Naces, Phd. , Anthony G. Nagac, Earl Anthony C. Gambe
And, Marlon I. Yap.

14 Docketed as G.R. No. 205003; Petition is entitled "Petition (To Declare As Unconstitutional Republic Act No.
10354)." The petition fails to provide any description as to nature of the suit under the Rules of Court; rollo (G.R. No.
205003), pp. 3-40.

15 With prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order; docketed as G.R. No. 205043 ; rollo (G.R. No.
205043), pp. 3-16.

16 Through its vice president and co-founder, Eduardo B.Olaguer.

17 With Prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order/ Writ of Prel iminary Injunction; docketed as G.R. No.
205 138; rollo (G.R. No. 205138), pp. 3-50.

18 Through and together with its president Atty. Ricardo M. Ribo.

19 Atty. Lino E.A. Dumas, Romeo B. Almonte, Osmundo C. Orlanes, Arsenio Z. Menor, Samuel J. Yap, Jaime F. Mateo,
Rolly Siguan, Dante E. Magdangal, Michael Eugenio 0. Plana, Bienvenido C. Miguel, Jr., Landrito M. Diokno And
Baldomero Falcone.

20 With Prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order/ Writ of Pre lim inary Injunction; The petition fails to
provide any description as to nature of the suit under the Rules of Court; docketed as G.R. No. 205478; rollo (G.R. No.
205478), pp. 3-26.

21 Jacqueline H. King, M.D., Cynthia T. Domingo, M.D., Josephine Millado-Lumitao, M.D., Anthony Perez, Michael
Anthony G. Mapa, Carlos Antonio Palad, Wilfredo Jose, Claire Navarro, Anna Cosio, Gabrie l Dy Liacco

22 With Prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order/ Writ of Prelim inary Injunction; docketed as G.R. No.
20549 1; rollo (G.R. No. 20549 1), pp. 3-13.

23 With Prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order/ Writ of Preliminary Injunction; docketed as G.R. No.
205720; rollo (G.R. No. 205720), pp. 3-90.

24 Through and together with its executive director, Loma Melegrito.

25 Joselyn B. Basilio, Robert z. Cortes, Ariel A. Crisostomo, Jeremy I. Gatdula, Cri stina A. Montes, Raul Antonio A. N
idoy, Winston Conrad B. Padojinog, Rufino L. Policarpio III.

26 Docketed as G.R. No. 206355, rollo (G.R. No. 206355), pp. 3-32.

27 Through and together with its co-petitioners, Attys. Ramon Pedrosa, Cita Borromeo-Garcia, Stella Acedera, and
Berteni Cataluna Causing .

28 With prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction; docketed as G.R. No. 207 111 ; rollo (G.R. No. 207111 ), pp. 3-51.

29 Mary M. lmbong, Anthony Victorio B. Lumicao, Joseph Martin Q. Verdejo, Antonio Emma R. Roxas and Lota Lat-
Guerrero.

30 With prayer for a Writ of Pre liminary Injunction; docketed as G.R. No. 207 172; rollo (G.R. No. 207 172), pp. 3-56.

31 Spouses Juan Carlos Artadi Sarmiento and Francesca Isabelle Besinga-Sarmiento, and Spouses Luis Francis A.
Rodrigo, Jr. and Deborah Marie Veronica N. Rodrigo.

32 Docketed as G.R. No. 2 07563; rollo (G.R. No. 2 07563), pp. 3-1 5.

33 Rollo (G.R. No. 204934), pp. 138-1 55.

34 Rollo (G.R. No. 204819), pp. 124 8-1 260.

35 Petition, lmbong v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 20481 9), pp. 8-1 O; Petit ion, Alliance for the Family Foundation, Inc.
(ALFI) v. Ochoa, rol!o (G.R. No. 20493 4), pp. 15-25; Petition, Serve Life Cagayan De Oro City, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo,
(G.R. No. 204988), pp. 13-1 5; Petition, Olaguer v. Ona, rollo (G.R. No. 205043), pp. 10-11 ; Petition, Philippine Alliance
of XSeminarians (PAX) v. Ochoa, rol!o (G.R. No. 205138), pp. 8-36; Petition, Echavez v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. N o.
205478), pp. 10-1 3; Petition, Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc. v. Office of the President, rollo (G.R. No . 20635 5), pp .
11-15 ; Petition, Juat v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 207111 ), pp. 17- 18; Petition, Buhay Party-list (BUHAY) v. Ochoa, rollo
(G.R. No. 204819), pp. 1255- 1256.

36 Petition, Alliance for the Family Foundation, Inc. (ALFI) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204934), pp. 26-28; Petition, Serve
Life Cagayan De Oro City, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo, (G. R. No. 204988), pp. 15-1 6; Petition, Echavez v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. N
o. 205478), pp. 13- 14; Petition, Pro-Life Philippines Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205720), pp. 30-35.

37 Petition, Task Force for the Family and Life Visayas, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204957), pp. 26-27; Petition,
Philippine Alliance of XSeminarians (PAX) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205138), pp. 39-44; Petition, Tatad v. Office of the
President, rol/o (G. R. No. 205491), pp. 8-9; Petition, Pro-Life Philippines Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No.
205720), pp . 59-67; Petition, Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc. v. Office of the President, rollo (G.R. No. 2 06355), pp.
25-26.

38 Petition, lmbong v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 2048 I 9), pp. 20-22; Petition, Alliance for the Family Foundation, inc.
(ALFI) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204934), pp. 34-38; Petition, Task Force for the Family and Life Visayas, Inc. v. Ochoa,
rollo (G.R. No. 204957), pp. 26-27; Petition, Echavez v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205478), pp. 6-7; Petition, Pro-Life
Philippines Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205720), pp. 56-75; Petition, Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc. v.
Office of the President, rollo (G.R. No. 206355), pp. 16-22; Petition, Juat v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 207 111), pp.28-33 ;
Petition, Couples for Christ Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, ro/lo (G.R. No. 207 172), pp. 12- 16.

39 Section 5.23 Skilled Health Professional as a Conscientious Objector. ln order to be considered a conscientious
objector, a skilled health professional shall comply with the following requirements:

a) Submission to the DOH of an affidavit stating the modem family planning methods that he or she refuses to provide
and his or her reasons for objection;

b) Posting of a notice at the entrance of the clinic or place of practice, in a prominent location and using a clear/legible
font, enumerating the reproductive health services he or she refuses to provide; and c) Other requirements as determined
by the DOH. xxx.

Provided, That skilled health professionals who are pub lic officers such as, but not limited to, Provincial, City, or
Municipal Health Officers, medical officers, medical specialists, rural health physicians, hospital staff nurses, public
health nurses, or rural health midwives, who are specifically charged with the duty to implement these Rules cannot be
considered as conscientious objectors. xx x (Emphases Ours)

40 Joint Memorandum, lmbong v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204819), pp. 26 17-26 19.

41 Petition, Alliance for the Family Foundation, Inc. (ALFI) v. Ochoa, ro/lo (G.R. No. 204934), p. 40; Petition, Echavez
v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205478), pp.6-7; Petition, Pro-Life Philippines Foundation, In c. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No.
205720), p. 81.

42 Petition, Pro-l ife Philippines Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G. R. No. 205720), pp. 63-64; Petition, Couples for
Christ Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 207172), pp. 20-23.

43 Petition, Serve Life Cagayan De Oro City, In c. v. Ochoa, rollo, (G.R. No . 204988), pp. 16-48 ; Petition , Echavez v.
Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 2 05478), pp. 7-9.

44 Petition, Serve Life Cagayan De Oro City, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo, (G.R. No. 204988), pp. 16-48; Petition, Echavez v.
Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205478), pp. 7-9.

45 Petition, Task Force for the Family and Life Visayas, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204957), pp. 30-3 1;
Memorandum, Echavez v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205478), pp. 1247- 1250; Petition, Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc.
v. Office of the President, rollo (G.R. No. 2063 55), pp. 25; Petition, Couples for Christ Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo
(G.R. No. 207 172 ), pp. 43-45.

46 Joint Memorandum, Im bong v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 2048 19), pp. 2626-2637; Petition, Alcantara, pp. 9-1 3; rollo,
(G.R. No. 204934), pp. 146- 150; Petition, Pro-l ife Philippines Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205720), pp.
78-81.

47 Petition, Couples for Christ Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, ro//o (G.R. No. 207172), pp. 32-34.

48 Petition, l mbong v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 2048 19), pp. 2623-2626; Petition, Alcantara, pp.5-9; rollo, (G.R. No.
204934), pp. 142- 148; Petition, Serve life Cagayan De Oro City, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo, (G.R. No. 204988), pp. 20-21;
Petition, Bugarin v. Office of the President, rollo (G. R. No. 205003), pp. 14- 16; Petit ion, Millennium Saint Foundation,
Inc. v. Office of the President, rollo (G. R. No. 206355), p. 16; Petition, Couples for Christ Foundation, In c. v. Ochoa,
ro//o (G. R. No. 207 172), pp. 16-20.

49 Petition, Imbong v. Ochoa, rollo (G. R. No. 2 0481 9), pp. 14- 19; Petition, Alliance for the Family Foundation, Inc.
(ALFI) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204934), pp. 42-44; Petition, Task Force for the Family and Life Visayas, Inc. v. Ochoa,
rollo (G.R. No. 204957), pp. 21-25; Petition, Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc. v. Office of the President, rollo (G.R. No.
206355), pp. 23-25; Petition, Couples for Christ Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 207172), pp. 23 -28.

50 Jo int Memorandum, Jmbong v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No . 204819), pp. 257 1-2574; Petition, Olaguer v. Ona, rollo (G.R.
No. 205043), pp. 11-1 2; Petition, Tatad v. Office of the President, rollo (G. R. No. 205491), pp. 7-8; Petition, Couples for
Christ Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G. R. No. 207172), pp. 28-32.

51 Petition, Alliance for the Family Foundation, Inc. (ALFI) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204934), pp. 28-33; Petition,
Philippine Alliance of XSeminarians (PAX) v. Ochoa, rollo (G. R. No. 205138), pp. 37-38.

52 Section 26. ( I) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof; Task Force for the Family and l ife Visayas, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204957), pp. 6-1 O; Echavez v.
Ochoa, rollo (G. R. No. 205478), pp. 9-10.

53 Petition, Pro-Life Philippines Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205720), pp. 14-30.

54 Memorandum, Echavez v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205478), pp. 894-900; Petition, Couples for Christ Foundation, Inc.
v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 207172), pp. 45-48; Petition, Tillah v. Executive Secretary, rollo (G.R. No. 207563) pp. 6-12.

55 Rollo (G .. R. No. 204819), pp. 362-480.

56 Rollo (G .. R. No. 204819), pp. 195-353.

57 Rollo (G .. R. No. 204819), pp. 487-528.

58 Rollo (G.R. No. 204934), pp. 871-1007.

59 Rollo (G.R. No. 204819), pp.1 306-1334; rollo, (G.R. No. 204934), pp. 98-132.

60 Rollo (G.R. No. 204819), pp. 736-780.

61 In her Motion for Leave to Intervene, Senator Pilar Ju liana S. Cayetano manifested that she was adopting as her own
the arguments raised by respondents Dr. Esperanza I. Cabral, Jamie Galvez-Tan, and Dr. Alberto G. Romualdez in their
Petition for Intervention; See rollo (G..R. No. 20481 9), pp. 173 1-1 783. After being directed by the Court to file their
respective memoranda, intervenors Dr. Esperanza I. Cabral, Jamie Galvez-Tan, and Dr. Alberto G. Romualdez manjfested
on November 18, 201 3, that they were adopting the arguments raised by Congressman Lagman in his Joint
Memorandum; See rollo (G..R. No. 20481 9), pp. 3061-3070. On November 26, 201 3, Senator Pilar Juliana S. Cayetano
file d her separate Memorandum ; see, rollo (G. .R. No. 204819), pp. 3032-3059.

62 Resolution dated March 15, 201 3.

63 Resolution, dated July 16, 201 3.

64 In its Resolution, dated August 27, 201 3, the Court required the parties to also include the following in their respective
memoranda:

1. What is the relation of the first portion of Section 7 on Access to Family Planning to the theory that R.A. No. I 0354 is
an anti-poor program that seeks to reduce the population of the poor?

2. How is the second paragraph of the same section related to the proposition that R.A. No. 10354 encourages sex among
minors?

3. In relation to Section 23 on Prohibited Acts, where in the law can you find the definition of the term ' health care
service provider' ? Is the definition of a ' public health care service provider ' found in Section 4, paragraph (n) of the law
sufficient for the Court to understand the meaning of a 'private health care service provider' or should the Court refer to
the Implementing Rules and Regulations which refer to 'health care providers'?

4. With respect to ' health care providers' under the Implementing Rules and Regulations, does it make a difference that
they are called ' health care providers' and not ' health care service providers'? Does the fact that there is a missing word
indicate that there is a difference or that the tautology being proposed actually refers to different objects? If in the
affirmative, is there enough basis to say that the law is a criminal statute that has sufficient definitions for purposes of
punitive action?

5. In relation to Section 23(a)(l), how will the State be able to locate the programs and services on which the health care
service provider has the duty to give information? If the terminology of ' health care service provider ' includes ' private
health care service provider', which includes private hospitals and private doctors, is the State duty-bound to consequently
provide these providers with information on the programs and services that these providers should give information on?

6. As regards programs, is there a duty on the part of the State to provide a way by which private health care service
providers can have access to information on reproductive health care programs as defined in Section 4, paragraph (r)?
What is the implication of the fact that the law requires even private parties with the duty to provide information on
government programs on the criminal liability of private health care service providers?

7. As regards services, what is the distinction between 'information' and 'services' considering that 'services' in different
portions of the statute include providing of information?

8. What are the specific elements of every sub-group of crime in Section 23 and what are the legal bases for the
determination of each element?

9. Are there existing provisions in other statutes relevant to the legal definitions found in R.A. No. 10354?

10. Why is there an exemption for the religious or conscientious objector in paragraph (3) of Section 23 and not in
paragraphs ( 1) and (2)? What is the distinction between paragraph (3) and paragraphs ( 1) and (2)?

11 . Section 23(a)(3) penalizes refusal to extend quality health care services and information 'on account of the person's
marital status, gender, age, religious convictions, personal circumstances, or nature of work.' What if the refusal is not on
account of one's marital status, gender, age, religious convictions, personal circumstances, or nature of work, or what if
the refuser simply does not state the reason for the refusal? Will there still be a criminal liability under Section 23(a)(3)?

12. Still on Section (23 )(a)(3) on referring a person to another facility or provider, is this the same or analogous to referral
of a person to seek second opinion? What is the medical standard for the provision of a second opinion? In referring to
another professional or service provider for a second opinion, is it the patient who is not comfortable with the opinion
given by the first doctor that triggers the duty or option to refer? How is it different with the situation in Section 23(a)(3)
when it is the doctor who is not comfortable about giving an opinion? Is the difference legally material?

13. How does Section 23, paragraph (c) relate to Article 134 the Labor Code which requires employers to provide family
planning services?

14. Section 24 provides that in case the offender is a juridical person, the penalties in the statute shall be imposed on the
president or any responsible officer. For each offense in Section 23, how will the corporate officer be made responsible if
there is no actual participation by the hospital board directors or officers of such action? Does Section 24 in relation to
Section 23 require corporate action? What is the situation being contemplated in the second paragraph of Section 24
before there can be accountability for criminal violations?

15. Section 7 provides that access of minors to information and family planning services must be with the written consent
of parents or guardians. Is the re a penalty in the law for those who will make these information and services (e.g. ,
contraceptives) available to minors without the parent's consent? How does this relate to Section 14 which requires the
Department of Education to formulate a curriculum which 'shall be used by public schools' and ' may be adopted by
private schools'? Is there a penalty for teaching sex education without the parents' or guardians' written consent?
Correlatively, is there a penalty for private schools which do not teach sex education as formulated by the DepEd
considering the use of the word ' may'?

65 Section I , R.A. No. 4729

66 Entitled "An Act Regulating the Practice of Pharmacy and Setting Standards of Pharmaceutical Education in the
Philippines."

67 See http://www.pop.org/content/coercive-population-ploys-in-ph ilippines-1428, last visited October 17, 2013.

68 Entitled "Revising the Population Act of Nineteen Hundred And Seventy-One."

69 <http://www.senate.gov.ph/publications/PB%202009-03%20-%20Promoting%20Reproductive%20Health.pdf->, last
visited October 17, 2013.

70 Held in Cairo, Egypt from September 5- 13, 1994.

71 Section 17, R.A. 97 10.

72 See <www. nscb.gov.ph/secstat/d)pop.asp>; last accessed February 2 0, 2014.

73 Alliance /or the Family Foundation, Inc. (A LFI) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204934), p. 1408.

74 Id.

75 Consolidated Comment, OSG, rollo (G. R. No. 204819), p. 376.

76 Consolidated Comment, OSG, rollo (G. R. No. 20481 9), p. 377.

77 Consolidated Comment, OSG, rollo (G. R. No. 20481 9), p. 378.

78 G.R. No. 178552, October 5, 20 10, 632 SCRA 146, 166.

79 Consolidated Comment, OSG, rollo (G. R. No. 20481 9), p. 385, 387-388.

80 Consolidated Comment, OSG, rollo (G.R. No. 2048 19), pp .3 81-384.

81 Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 158 ( 1936).

82 Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. I.

83 Constitution, Art. Vll , Sec. I.

84 Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 1.

85 Supra note 81.

86 See Association of Small Landowners in the Phil., Inc., et al. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 256 Phil. 777, 799
(1989).

87 Francisco, Jr. v. Th e House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261 , November I 0, 2003, citing Angara v. Electoral
Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 158 (1936).

88 Garcia v. Executive Secretary, 602 Phil. 64, 77-78 (2009).

89 Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, G. R. No. 19627 I, October 18, 20 I I, 659 SCRA 270, 326-327.

90 Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission, G. R. No. I 92935 & G.R. No. 193036, December 7, 2010, 637 SCRA 7
8, I 77.

91 Taada v. Angara, 338 Phil. 546, 575 (I997).

92 453 Phil. 586 (2003).

93 G.R. No. 188078, 25 January 2010, 611 SCRA137.

94 G.R No. 187 167, July 16, 2011 , 655 SCRA 476.

95 Francisco v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 83 0, 882-883 (2003), citing Florentino P. Feliciano, The Application
of Law: Some Recurring Aspects Of The Process Of Judicial Review And Decision Making, 37 A MJJUR 17, 24 (1 992).

96 Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission, G. R. No . 192935, December 7, 20 10, 637 SCRA 78, 148 ; Southern
Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, G.R. No. 178552, October 5, 20 10, 632 SCRA 146,
166-1 67; Senate of the Philippines v. Ermita, 522 Phil. I, 27 (2006); Francisco v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 83
0, 892 (2003).

97 Consolidated Comment, OSG, rollo, (G.R. No. 2 04819), pp. 375-376.

98 Comment-In-Intervention, Hontiveros, et al., rollo, (G.R. No. 204934), pp. 106- 109; Comment-In-Intervention, Cabral
et al., rollo, (G.R. No. 204819), pp. 500-501.

99 Republic Telecommunications Holding, Inc. v. Santiago, 556 Phil. 83, 9 1-92 (2007).

100 Jriformation Technology Foundation of the Philipp ines v. Commission on Elections , 499 Phil. 281, 304-305 (2005).

101 Lawyers Against Monopoly And Poverty (LAMP) v. Th e Secretary of Budget and Management, G. R. No. 164987,
April 24, 201 2, 670 SCRA 373 , 383.

102 The Province Of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines, 589 Phil. 387, 481 (2008).

103 Id. at 483 .

104 Taada v. Angara, 338 Phil. 546, 574 ( 1997).

105 Consolidated Comment, OSG, rollo (G. R. No. 204819), p. 381.

106 See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 ( 1987).

107 The First Amendment of the US Constitution reads: Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.

108 Romualdez v. Commission on Elections, 576 Phi l. 357 (2008); Romualdez v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, 479 Phil. 265
(2004 ); Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 421 Phi I. 290 (200 I).

109 Resolution, Romualdez v. Commission on Elect ions, 594 Phil. 305, 3 16 (2008).

110 Constitution, Article VIII , Section 1.

111 Consolidated Comment, OSG, rollo (G. R. No. 2048 19), pp. 375-376.

112 Consolidated Comment, OSG, rollo (G. R. No. 2048 19), p. 384.

113 Anak Mindanao Party-list Group v. Th e Executive Secretary, 558 Phil. 338, 350 (2007).

114 Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 392 Phil. 618, 633 (2000), citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 ( 1962).

115 Dissenting Opinion, J. Carpio; Romualdez v. Commission on Elections, 576 Phil. 357, 406 (2008).

116 Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, 591 Phil. 393, 404
(2008); Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy, 346 Phil. 321 (1997); De Guia v. COMELEC, G .R . No. 104 71
2, May 6, I 992, 208 SCRA 420, 422.

117 503 Phil. 42, 53 (2005).

118 84 Phil. 368, 373 (1949).

119 464 Phil. 375, 385 (2004).

120 Consolidated Comment, OSG, rollo (G.R. No. 204819), pp. 388-389.

121 The Province Of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines, supra note 102; Ortega v.
Quezon City Government, 506 Phil. 373, 380 (2005); and Gonzales v. Comelec, 137 Phil. 471 (1969).

122 Section 26. (I) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof.

123 Petition, Task Force for the Family and life Visayas, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204957), pp. 6-10; Petition,
Echavez v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205478), pp. 9-10.

124 Joint Memorandum, Lagman, rollo, (G.R. No. 204819) pp. 212-214.

125 Consolidated Comment, OSG, rollo (G.R. No. 204819, pp.389-393.

126 ALFI Memorandum, rollo (G. .R. N o. 204934), p. 1396.

127 ALFI Memorandum, rollo (G. .R. No. 204934), p. 1396.

128 ALFI Memorandum, rollo (G. .R. No. 204934), p. 1396.

129 Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 2002 Edition, pp. 15 7-1 58; citing 82 CJS 365.

130 Petition, lmbong v. Ochoa, rol/o (G. R. No. 2048 19), pp. 8-10; Petition, Alliance for the Family Foundation, Inc.
(ALFI) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204934), pp. 15-25; Petition, Serve Life Cagayan De Oro City, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo,
(G.R. No. 204988), pp. 13-1 5; Petition, Olaguer v. Ona, ro/lo (G. R. No. 205043), pp. 10-11 ; Petition, Philippine
Alliance of XSeminarians (PAX) v. Ochoa, ro/lo (G.R. No . 2051 38), pp. 8-36; Petition, Echavez v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R.
No. 2 05478), pp. 10-13; Petition, Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc. v. Office of the President, rollo (G. R. No. 206355),
pp. 11-15; Petition, Juat v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 207111 ), pp. 17-18; Petition, Buhay Partylist (BU HAY) v. Ochoa,
rollo (G. R. No. 2048 19), pp. 1255 -1256.

131 Petition, Alliance for the Family Foundation, inc. (ALFI) v. Ochoa, rollo (G. R. No. 204934), pp. 15-25; Petition,
Serve Life Cagayan De Oro City, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo, (G.R. No. 204988), pp. 13-1 5; Petition, Olaguer v. Ona, rollo
(G.R. No. 205043), pp. 10-11; Petition, Philippine Alliance of XSeminarians (PAX) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205138),
pp. 8-36; Petition, Echavez v. Ochoa, rollo (G. R. No . 205478), pp. 10-13; Petition, Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc. v.
Office of the President, rollo (G.R. No. 206355), pp. 11-1 5; Petition, Juat v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 207111), pp. 17-18;
Petition, Buhay Partylist (BUHAY) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204819), pp. 1255-1256.

132 Petition, Pro-Life Philippines Foundation, inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205720), pp. 14-30.

133 Memorandum, Alcantara, rollo (G.R. No. 204819), p. 2133; Reply, Olaguer v. Ona, rollo (G.R. No. 205043), pp. 339-
340.

134 Consolidated Comment, OSG, rollo, (G.R. No. 204819), pp. 393-396; Comment-In-Intervention, Lagman, rollo,
(G.R. No. 204819), pp. 230-233; Comment-In-Intervention, C4RH, rollo (G.R. No. 2048 19), pp. 1091-11 92; Hontiveros,
rollo (G.R. No. 204934), pp. 111-1 16; Memorandum, Cayetano,, rollo (G.R. No. 204819), pp. 3038-3041.

135 Consolidated Comment, OSG, rollo, (G.R. No. 204819), pp. 396-410.

136 Comment-In-Intervention, Lagman, rollo, (G.R. No. 204819), pp. 225-342.

137 Article 3, Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

138 See Republic Act No. 4729, dated June 18, 1966.

139 See http://www.pop.org/content/coerci ve-population-ploys- in-philippines- 1428 , last visited October 17, 2013.

140 <http://www.senate.gov.ph/publications/PB%202009-03%20-%20Promoting%20Reproductive%20 Health.pdt>, last
visited October 17, 2013.

141 <http://www.pop.org/content/ coercive-population-p loys-in-ph ii ippines-1428>

During the deliberation, it was agreed that the individual members of the Court ca n express their own views on this
matter.

142 Petition, Alliance/or the Family Foundation, Inc. (AL FI) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204934), pp . 15-25; Petition,
Serve Life Cagayan De Oro City, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo, (G.R. No. 2 04988), pp. 13- 15; Petition, Olaguer v. Ona, rollo
(G.R. No. 205043), pp. 10-11 ; Petition, Philippine Alliance of XSeminarians (PAX) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205 138),
pp. 8-36 ; Petition, Echavez v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205478), pp. 10-13 ; Petition, Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc. v.
Office of the President, rollo (G.R. No. 206355), pp. 11-15; Petition, Juat v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 207 111), pp. 17-18;
Petition, Buhay Party/isl (BUHAY) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 2048 19), pp. 1255-1256.

143 Comment-ln-lntervention, Lag man, rollo, (G. R. No. 204819), pp. 225-342.

144 G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 201 2, 676 SCRA 579.

145 Webster's Third International Dictionary, 1993 Edition, p. 469.

146 Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, p. 262.

147 G.R. No. 182836, October 13, 2009, 618 Phil. 634 (2009).

148 Gonzales v. Carhart (Nos. 05-380 and 05-1382), No. 05- 380, 413 F. 3d 791 ; 05- 1382, 435 F. 3d 1163,

149 http: //www.law.comell.edu/supct/html/05-380.ZO.html, last visited February 15, 2014.

150 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Volume 4, September 16, 1986, p. 668.

151 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Volume 4, September 12, 1986, p. 596.

152 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Volume 4, September 12, 1986, p. 669.

153 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Volume 4, September 19, 1986, p. 800.

154 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Volume 4, September 17, 1986, p. 711 .

155 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Volume 4, September 17, 1986, p. 711.

156 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Volume 4 , September 17, 1986, p. 745 .

157 TSN, July 9, 2013 , pp. 23-24.

158 Id.

159 4th Edition, p. 375

160 Id, p. 609

161 Sumpaico, Gutierrez, Luna, Pareja, Ramos and Baja-Panlilio, 2"d Edition, (2002), pp. 76-77.

162 Moore, Persaud, Torchia, The Developing Human: Clinically Oriented Embryo logy, International Edition, 9th
Edition (2013), pp. 1-5, 13.

163 O'Rahilly, Ronan and Muller, Fabiola, Huma n Embryo logy & Teratology. 2nd edition. New York: Wiley-Liss,
1996, pp. 8, 29, cited at: http://www.princeton.edu/-prolife/articles/embryoguotes2.html, last visited February 15, 2014.

164 From https://www.philippinemedicalassociation .org/downloads/circular-forms/ Position-Paper-on-the-Republic-
Health-Bill-%28Responsible-Parenthood-Bill%29.pdf. last visited March 26, 2014.

165 Comment-In-Intervention, Lagman, rol/o, (G.R. No. 204819), pp. 225-342.

166 Id.

167 Id.

168 See <http://americanpregnancy.org/duringpregnancy/ fetaldevelopment I .htm>, last visited April 7, 2014.

169 Joint Memorandum of the House of Representatives and Respondent- Intervenor Rep. Edee I C. Lagman), Section 40,
Rollo, G.R. No. 2048 19, p. 2343.

170 Concurring Opinion (Justice Carpio), p. 3.

171 See TSN, July 9, 2013, p. 100.

172 Separate Opinion (Justice Del Castillo), pp. 17-19; Separate Opinion (Justice Brion), p. 25.

173 Section 3.01 For purposes ofthese Rules, the terms shall be defin ed as fo llows:

a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that primarily induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the
mother's womb or the prevention of the fertil ized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon
determination of the Food and Drug Admini stration (F DA) .

x x x x

j) Contraceptive refers to any safe, legal, effective and scientifically proven modern fam ily planning method, device, or
health product, whether natural or artificial, that prevents pregnancy but does not primarily destroy a fertilized ovum or
prevent a fertilized ovum from being implanted in the mother's womb in doses of its approved indication as determined by
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) .

174 Separate Opinion (Justice Del Castillo), pp. 17-19; Separate Opinion (Justice Brion), p. 25 .

175 Separate Opinion (Justice Del Castillo), p. 19 .

176 Petition, Alliance for the Family Foundation, Inc. (A LFI} v. Ochoa, rollo (G. R. No. 204934), pp. 26-28; Petition,
Serve l ife Cagayan De Oro City, Inc. v. Ochoa, rolfo, (G. R. No . 204988), pp. 15-16; Petition, Echavez v. Ochoa, rollo
(G.R. No. 205478), pp. 13- 14; Petition, Pro-life Philippines Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, rolfo (G.R. No. 205 720), pp. 30-
35.

177 Memorandum, Alliance for the Family Foundation, rollo, (G.R. No . 204934), pp. 1419-1445.

178 Section 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as follows:

x x x x

(p) Reproductive Health (RH) refers to the state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the
absence of disease or infirmity, in all matters relating to the reproductive system and to its functions and processes. This
implies that people are able to have a responsible, safe, consensual and satisfying sex life, that they have the capability to
reproduce and the freedom to decide if, when , and how often to do so. This further implies that women and men attain
equal relationships in matters related to sexual relations and reproduction.

179 Section 4. Definition of Terms . - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as follows:

x x x x

(w) Sexual health refers to a state of physical, mental and social well-being in relation to sexuality. It requires a positive
and respectful approach to sexuality and sexual relationships, as well as the possibility of having pleasurable and safe
sexual experiences, free from coercion, discrimination and violence.

180 Me morandum, Alcantara, rollo, (G.R. No. 204934)p. 2136; Memorandum , PAX, rollo (G.R. No. 205 138), pp.
2154-2155.

181 Consolidated Comment, OSG, rollo (G.R. No. 204819), pp. 415-416.

182 Gamboa v. Finance Secretary, G.R. No. 176579, June 28, 2011 , 6 52 SCRA 690, 738-739.

183 335 Phil. 82 ( 1997).

184 Memorandum , Alliance for the Family Foundation, In c. (ALFI) v. Ochoa, rol/o (G.R. No. 204934), p. 1408.

185 Id.

186 Memorandum, Lagman, rollo (G.R. No. 204819), pp. 2359-2361.

187 Separate Opinion (Justice Leonardo-De Castro) p. 54.

188 Petition, Philippine Alliance of XSeminarians (PAX) v. Ochoa, rollo (G. R. No. 205138), pp. 40-41.

189 Petition, Task Force/or the Family and Life Visayas, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204957), pp. 26-27; Petition,
Philippine Alliance of XSem inarians (PAX) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205138), pp. 39-44; Petition, Tatadv. Office of the
President, rollo (G.R. No. 205491), pp. 8-9; Petition, Pro-Life Philippines Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No.
205720), pp . 59-67; Petition, Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc. v. Office of the President, rollo (G.R. No. 2063 55), pp.
25-26.

190 Joint Memorandum, lmbong/Luat, rollo (G.R. No. 204819), p. 2615.

191 Joint Memorandum, Imbong/Luat, rollo (G.R. No. 204819), pp . 2616-2621.

192 Petition, Echavez v. Ochoa, rollo (GR. No. 205478), pp. 6-7.

193 Petition, Couples for Christ Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 207172), pp. 20-23.

194 Petition, Coup les for Christ Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 207 I 72), pp. 20-23.

195 Petition, Alliance for the Family Foundation, Inc. (A LFI) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204934), pp. 35-37.; Petition,
Millennium Saint Foundation, In c. v. Office of the President, rollo (G.R. No. 206355), pp. 17- 18.

196 Memorandum, Cayetano, rollo (G.R. No. 204819), p. 3050; Comment-in-Lntervention, Cabral, rollo (G.R. No. 2
04819), p. 5 11.

197 Memorandum, OSG, rollo (G. R. No. 204819), p. 2677.

198 Memorandum, Cayetano, rollo (G.R. No. 2048 19), p. 3050.

199 Joint Memorandum Lagman, rol!o (G.R. No. 2048 19), p. 2361.

200 Memorandum . C4RH, rollo (G.R. No. 204819), p. 2189; Memorandum, Cayetano, rollo (G.R. No. 204819), p. 3050-
305 1.

201 Memorandum, Cayetano, rollo (G.R. No. 204 819), p. 3050 .

202 Memorandum, OSG, rollo (G.R. No. 204819), p. 2677.

203 Memorandum, OSG, rollo (G.R. No. 204819), p . 2679.

204 Memorandum, OSG, rollo (G.R. No. 204819), p. 2679.

205 Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 2000 ed ., p. 179, citing Justice Laurel in Engel v. Vitale, 370 US 421.

206 Gorospe, Constitutional Law, Vol. I, p. I 007

207 Bernas, The 1987 Constitution, 2009 Ed. , p. 330

208 Gorospe, Constitutional Law, Vol. I, p. I 066

209 59 SC RA 54 (1974).

210 Escritor v. Estrada, A.M. No. P-02-1651 , June 22, 2006, 525 Phil. 110, 140- 141 (2006).

211 106 Phil. 2 (1959).

212 Gerona v. Secretary of Education, 106 Phil. 2, 9- 10 ( 1959).

213 Ebralinag v. Division Superintendent of Schools, 219 SCRA 25 6 ( 1993 ), March 1, 1993.

214 525 Phil. 110 (2006).

215 Id. at 137.

216 Id. at 148.

217 Id . at 149.

218 Id. at 175.

219 Id. at 168- 169.

220 Estrada v. Escritor, 455 Phil. 4 11 , 560 (2003).

221 Cruz, Constitutional Law, 2000 edition, pp. 178-1 79.

222 Bernas, The 1987 Constitution, 2009 Ed. , p. 330.

223 Separate Opinion, Cruz, Ebralinag v. Division Superintendent of Schools, 219 SCRA 25 6 ( 1993 ), March 1, 1993.

224 Estrada v. Escritor, supra note 220, at 537.

225 20 130 CSIH 36.

226 http://www. skepticink.com/tippling/201 3/05/0 5/conscientious-objection-to-abortion -cathoIic-midwives-win-
appeal/; last visited February 22, 2014

227 http://ukhumanrightsblog.com/20 13/05/03/conscientious-objection-to-abortion-catholic-midwives-win-appeal; last
visited February 22 , 2014

228 453 Phil. 440 (2003).

229 Fernando on the Philippine Constitution, 1974 ed. , p. 565; See Dissenting Opinion Makasiar, Garcia v. The Faculty
Admission Committee G. R. No. L-40779, November 28, 1975.

230 TSN , August 13, 201 3, pp. 52-54.

231 TSN, August27, 201 3, pp. 71-72

232 Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines v. Office of the Executive Secretary of the Office of the President of the
Philippines, supra note 228 at 450.

233 http://fatherbemasblogs. blogspot.com/2011 _02_0 !_archive.html ; last vi sited February 15, 2014.

234 Estrada v. Escritor, supra note 210.

235 TSN , Aug ust 27 , 201 3, p. 130.

236 http ://www. lifenews.com/2011 /09/01 /philippines-sees-matemal-mortalitv-decline-without-abortion; last visited
March 9, 2014 [Researchers from the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation of the University of Washington in
Seattle examined maternal mortality rates in 181 countries and found the rate (the number of women's deaths per 100,000)
dropped by 81 percent in the Philippines between .1980 and 2008. The decrease comes as the largely Catholic nation has
resister efforts to legalize abortions, even though the United Nations and pro-abortion groups claim women will
supposedly die in illegal abortions and increase the maternal mortality rate if abortion is prohibited.

The 2010 study, published in Lancet, shows the Philippines outpaced first-world nations like Germany, Russia and Israel -
where abortions are legal - in cutting maternal mortality rates.

Meanwhile, the National Statistical Coordination Board in the Philippines, according to Spero Forum, has shown the same
results. From 1990-2010, the daily maternal mortality rate dropped 21 percent, its figures indicated. The World Health
Organization also found that the Filipino maternal mortality rate dropped 48 percent from 1990 to 2008.

237 TSN, July 23, 2013 , p. 23.

238 Memorandum, Alliance for the Family Foundation, Inc. {ALFI) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204934), p. 1407.

239 SEC. 15. Certificate of Compliance. - No marriage license shall be issued by the Local Civil Registrar unless the
applicants present a Certificate of Compliance issued for free by the local Family Planning Office certifying that they had
duly received adequate instructions and information on responsible parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant
nutrition.

240 Petition, Couples for Christ Foundation, In c. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 207 172), p. 29.

241 80 CONST. Art XV, 2 .

242 Separate Opinion (Justice Leonardo-De Castro), p. 42-43.

243 130 Phil. 415 (1968).

244 Id . at 436.

245 81 Griswold v. Connecticut,3 81U.S. 479, June7, 1965.

246 Id.

247 Section 12, Article II , 1987 Constitution.

248 Bernas, The 1987 Constitution, 2009 Ed., p . 85.

249 (ii) Parental consent or that of the person exercising parental authority in the case of abused minors, where the parent
or the person exercising parental authority is the respondent, accused or convicted perpetrator as certified by the proper
prosecutorial office of the court. In the case of minors, the written consent of parents or legal guardian or, in their absence,
persons exercising parental authority or next-of-kin shall be required only in elective surgical procedures and in no case
shall consent be required in emergency or serious cases as defined in Republic Act No. 8344.

250 Petition, Echavez v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205478), pp. 15- 16.

251 Memorandum, Alliance for the Family Foundation, Inc. (ALFI) v. Ochoa, rollo (G. R. No. 204934), pp. 1453- 1496.

252 Records, 1986 Constitutional Convention, Volume IV, pp. 401-402 .

253 Article II , Section 13, 1987 Constitution.

254 Petition, Task Force for the Family and life Visayas, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G. R. No. 204957), pp. 24-25.

255 Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, G.R. No. 178552, October 5, 2010;
People v. Nazario, No. L-44 143, August 3 1, 1988, 165 SCRA 186, 195.

256 Philippine International Trading Corporation v. COA, G.R. No. 1835 17, June 22, 2010, 621 SC RA 461, 469.

257 Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 1993 Edition, p. 1145 .

258 Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 1993 Edition, p. 1252.

259 SEC. 3. Guiding Principles for Implementation. - Th is Act declares the following as guiding principles:

x x x x

(d) The provision of ethical and medically safe, legal, accessible, affordable, non-abortifacient, effective and quality
reproductive health care services and supplies is essential in the promotion of people's right to health, especially those of
women, the poor, and the marginalized, and shall be incorporated as a component of basic health care;

(e) The State shall promote and provide information and access, without bias, to all methods of family planning, including
effective natural and modem methods which have been proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in
accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical research standards such as those registered and approved by the
FDA for the poor and marginalized as identified through the NHTS-PR and other government measures of identifying
marginalization: Provided, That the State shall also provide fun ding support to promote modern natural methods of
family planning, especially the Billings Ovulation Method, consistent with the needs of acceptors and the irreligious
convictions;

(f) The State shall promote programs that: (I) enable individuals and couples to have the number of children they desire
with due consideration to the health, particularly of women, and the resources available and affordable to them and in
accordance with existing laws, public morals and their religious convictions: Provided, That no one shall be deprived, for
economic reasons, of the rights to have children; (2) achieve equitable allocation and utilization of resources; (3) ensure
effective partnership among national government, local government units (LGUs) and the private sector in the design,
implementation, coordination, integration, monitoring and evaluation of people-centered programs to enhance the quality
of life and environmental protection; (4) conduct studies to analyze demographic trends including demographic dividends
from sound population policies towards sustainable human development in keeping with the principles of gender equality,
protection of mothers and children, born and unborn and the promotion and protection of women's reproductive rights and
health ; and (5) conduct scientific studies to determine the safety and efficacy of alternative medicines and methods for
reproductive health care development;

x x x x

(g) The provision of reproductive health care, information and supplies giving priority to poor beneficiaries as identified
through the NHTS-PR and other government measures of identifying marginalization must be the primary responsibility
of the national government consistent with its obligation to respect, protect and promote the right to health and the right to
life;

x x x x

(i) Active participation by nongovernment organizations (NGOs), women's and people's organizations, civil society, faith-
based organizations, the religious sector and communities is crucial to ensure that reproductive health and population and
development policies, plans, and programs will address the priority needs of women, the poor, and the marginalized;

x x x x

(l) There shall be no demographic or population targets and the mitigation, promotion and/or stabilization of the
population growth rate is incidental to the advancement of reproductive health ;

x x x x

(n) The resources of the country must be made to serve the entire population, espec ially the poor, and allocations thereof
must be adequate and effective: Provided, That the life of the unborn is protected;

(o) Development is a multi-faceted process that calls for the harmonization and integration of policies, plans, programs
and projects that seek to uplift the quality of life of the people, more particularly the poor, the needy and the marginalized;

260 SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as follows:

x x x x

(r) Reproductive health care program refers to the systematic and integrated provision of reproductive health care to all
citizens prioritizing women, the poor, marginalized and those invulnerable or crisis situations.

x x x x

(aa) Sustainable human development refers to bringing people, particularly the poor and vulnerable, to the center of
development process, the central purpose of which is the creation of an enabling environment in which all can enjoy long,
healthy and productive lives, done in the manner that promotes their rights and protects the life opportunities of future
generation s and the natural ecosystem on which all life depends.

261 Biraogo v. Th e Philippine Truth Commission, supra note 90.

262 Petition, Serve Life Cagayan De Oro City, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo, (G. R. No. 204988), pp. 16-48; Petition, Echavez v.
Ochoa, rollo (G. R. No. 205478), pp. 7-9.

263 Except the practice of law which is under the supervision of the Supreme Court.

264 United States v. Jesus, 3 1 Phil. 218, 230 (1915).

265 Petition , Echavez v. Ochoa, rollo (G. R. N o. 205478), p. 8.

266 With reference to Section 2 , 3(E), 4(L), 9 and I 9(C) of the RH La w; Petition, ALFI, rollo (G.R. No. 204934), pp.
28-33; Petition, Philippine Alliance of XSeminarians (PAX) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205138), pp. 37-38.

267 358 Phil. 410 (1998) .

268 Pimentel, Jr. v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 195770, July 17, 201 2, 676 SCRA 551, 559.

269 Id . at 559-560.

270 Id. at 561.

271 See Section 6, R.A. No. 10354.

272 See Section 5, R.A . No. 10354.

273 See Section 16, R.A . No. 1354.

274 Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 196271, October 18, 2011, 659 SCRA 270, 306.

275 Id. at 305.

276 Petition, Pro-life Philippines Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (GR. N o. 205 720), pp. 14-30.

277 Gettel , Political Science, Revised Edition, p. 180.

278 454 Phil. 504 (2003).

279 Separate Opinion, Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 454 Phi l. 504 (2003).

280 https://www.cia.gov/ library/ publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2127rank.html ; last visited March 21, 2014

281 St. Josephs College v. St. Josephs College Workers' Association (Samahan), 489 Phil. 559, 572-573 (2005) ; and
Cebu Institute of Technology v. Opie, G.R. No. L-58870, 18 December 1987, 156 SCRA 629.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-52245 January 22, 1980

PATRICIO DUMLAO, ROMEO B. IGOT, and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, JR., petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

Raul M. Gonzales for petitioners

Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.



MELENCIO-HERRERA, J:

This is a Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order filed by petitioners, in their own
behalf and all others allegedly similarly situated, seeking to enjoin respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
from implementing certain provisions of Batas Pambansa Big. 51, 52, and 53 for being unconstitutional.

The Petition alleges that petitioner, Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed his certificate
of candidacy for said position of Governor in the forthcoming elections of January 30, 1980. Petitioner, Romeo B. Igot, is
a taxpayer, a qualified voter and a member of the Bar who, as such, has taken his oath to support the Constitution and
obey the laws of the land. Petitioner, Alfredo Salapantan, Jr., is also a taxpayer, a qualified voter, and a resident of San
Miguel, Iloilo.

Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory
and contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. Said Section 4 provides:

Sec. 4. Special Disqualification in addition to violation of section 10 of Art. XI I-C of the Constitution and
disqualification mentioned in existing laws, which are hereby declared as disqualification for any of the elective officials
enumerated in section 1 hereof.

Any retired elective provincial city or municipal official who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he
is entitled under the law, and who shall have been 6,5 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he
seeks to be elected shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired (Emphasis
supplied)

Petitioner Dumlao alleges that the aforecited provision is directed insidiously against him, and that the classification
provided therein is based on "purely arbitrary grounds and, therefore, class legislation."

For their part, petitioners igot and Salapantan, Jr. assail the validity of the following statutory provisions:

Sec 7. Terms of Office Unless sooner removed for cause, all local elective officials hereinabove mentioned shall hold
office for a term of six (6) years, which shall commence on the first Monday of March 1980.

.... (Batas Pambansa Blg. 51) Sec. 4.

Sec. 4. ...

Any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State, including acts amounting to subversion, insurrection,
rebellion or other similar crimes, shall not be qualified to be a candidate for any of the offices covered by this Act, or to
participate in any partisan political activity therein:

provided that a judgment of conviction for any of the aforementioned crimes shall be conclusive evidence of such fact and

the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary
investigation shall be prima fascie evidence of such fact.

... (Batas Pambansa Big. 52) (Paragraphing and Emphasis supplied).

Section 1. Election of certain Local Officials ... The election shall be held on January 30, 1980. (Batas Pambansa,
Blg. 52)

Section 6. Election and Campaign Period The election period shall be fixed by the Commission on Elections in
accordance with Section 6, Art. XII-C of the Constitution. The period of campaign shall commence on December 29,
1979 and terminate on January 28, 1980. (ibid.)

In addition to the above-cited provisions, petitioners Igot and Salapantan, Jr. also question the accreditation of some
political parties by respondent COMELEC, as authorized by Batas Pambansa Blg. 53, on the ground that it is contrary to
section 9(1)Art. XIIC of the Constitution, which provides that a "bona fide candidate for any public office shall be it. from
any form of harassment and discrimination. "The question of accreditation will not be taken up in this case but in that of
Bacalso, et als. vs. COMELEC et als. No. L-52232) where the issue has been squarely raised,

Petitioners then pray that the statutory provisions they have challenged be declared null and void for being violative of the
Constitution.

I . The procedural Aspect

At the outset, it should be stated that this Petition suffers from basic procedural infirmities, hence, traditionally
unacceptable for judicial resolution. For one, there is a misjoinder of parties and actions. Petitioner Dumlao' s interest is
alien to that of petitioners Igot and Salapantan Petitioner Dumlao does not join petitioners Igot and Salapantan in the
burden of their complaint, nor do the latter join Dumlao in his. The respectively contest completely different statutory
provisions. Petitioner Dumlao has joined this suit in his individual capacity as a candidate. The action of petitioners Igot
and Salapantan is more in the nature of a taxpayer's suit. Although petitioners plead nine constraints as the reason of their
joint Petition, it would have required only a modicum more of effort tor petitioner Dumlao, on one hand said petitioners
lgot and Salapantan, on the other, to have filed separate suits, in the interest of orderly procedure.

For another, there are standards that have to be followed inthe exercise of the function of judicial review, namely (1) the
existence of an appropriate case:, (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question:
(3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity and (4) the necessity that the constiutional question be
passed upon in order to decide the case (People vs. Vera 65 Phil. 56 [1937]).

It may be conceded that the third requisite has been complied with, which is, that the parties have raised the issue of
constitutionality early enough in their pleadings.

This Petition, however, has fallen far short of the other three criteria.

A. Actual case and controversy.

It is basic that the power of judicial review is limited to the determination of actual cases and controversies.

Petitioner Dumlao assails the constitutionality of the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52, quoted
earlier, as being contrary to the equal protection clause guaranteed by the Constitution, and seeks to prohibit respondent
COMELEC from implementing said provision. Yet, Dumlao has not been adversely affected by the application of that
provision. No petition seeking Dumlao's disqualification has been filed before the COMELEC. There is no ruling of that
constitutional body on the matter, which this Court is being asked to review on Certiorari. His is a question posed in the
abstract, a hypothetical issue, and in effect, a petition for an advisory opinion from this Court to be rendered without the
benefit of a detailed factual record Petitioner Dumlao's case is clearly within the primary jurisdiction (see concurring
Opinion of now Chief Justice Fernando in Peralta vs. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30, 96 [1978]) of respondent COMELEC as
provided for in section 2, Art. XII-C, for the Constitution the pertinent portion of which reads:

"Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall have the following power and functions:

1) xxx

2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all members of the National
Assembly and elective provincial and city officials. (Emphasis supplied)

The aforequoted provision must also be related to section 11 of Art. XII-C, which provides:

Section 11. Any decision, order, or ruling of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party within thirty days from his receipt of a copy thereof.

B. Proper party.

The long-standing rule has been that "the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement"
(People vs. Vera, supra).

In the case of petitioners Igot and Salapantan, it was only during the hearing, not in their Petition, that Igot is said to be a
candidate for Councilor. Even then, it cannot be denied that neither one has been convicted nor charged with acts of
disloyalty to the State, nor disqualified from being candidates for local elective positions. Neither one of them has been
calle ed to have been adversely affected by the operation of the statutory provisions they assail as unconstitutional Theirs
is a generated grievance. They have no personal nor substantial interest at stake. In the absence of any litigate interest,
they can claim no locus standi in seeking judicial redress.

It is true that petitioners Igot and Salapantan have instituted this case as a taxpayer's suit, and that the rule enunciated in
People vs. Vera, above stated, has been relaxed in Pascual vs. The Secretary of Public Works (110 Phil. 331 [1960], thus:

... it is well settled that the validity of a statute may be contested only by one who will sustain a direct injury in
consequence of its enforcement. Yet, there are many decisions nullifying at the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for
the disbursement of public funds, upon the theory that "the expenditure of public funds, by an officer of the State for the
purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds," which may be enjoined at the
request of a taxpayer.

In the same vein, it has been held:

In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite standing to attack the constitutionality of a
statute, the general rule is that not only persons individually affected, but also taxpayers have sufficient interest in
preventing the illegal expenditure of moneys raised by taxation and they may, therefore, question the constitutionality of
statutes requiring expenditure of public moneys. (Philippine Constitution Association, Inc., et als., vs. Gimenez, et als., 15
SCRA 479 [1965]).

However, the statutory provisions questioned in this case, namely, sec. 7, BP Blg. 51, and sections 4, 1, and 6 BP Blg. 52,
do not directly involve the disbursement of public funds. While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the
expenditure of public moneys, nowhere in their Petition do said petitioners allege that their tax money is "being extracted
and spent in violation of specific constitutional protections against abuses of legislative power" (Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S.,
83 [1960]), or that there is a misapplication of such funds by respondent COMELEC (see Pascual vs. Secretary of Public
Works, 110 Phil. 331 [1960]), or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose. Neither do petitioners
seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.
(Philippine Constitution Association vs. Mathay, 18 SCRA 300 [1966]), citing Philippine Constitution Association vs.
Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479 [1965]). Besides, the institution of a taxpayer's suit, per se is no assurance of judicial review. As
held by this Court in Tan vs. Macapagal (43 SCRA 677 [1972]), speaking through our present Chief Justice, this Court is
vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be entertained.

C. Unavoidability of constitutional question.

Again upon the authority of People vs. Vera, "it is a wellsettled rule that the constitutionality of an act of the legislature
will not be determined by the courts unless that question is properly raised and presented in appropriate cases and is
necessary to a determination of the case; i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented."

We have already stated that, by the standards set forth in People vs. Vera, the present is not an "appropriate case" for
either petitioner Dumlao or for petitioners Igot and Salapantan. They are actually without cause of action. It follows that
the necessity for resolving the issue of constitutionality is absent, and procedural regularity would require that this suit be
dismissed.

II. The substantive viewpoint.

We have resolved, however, to rule squarely on two of the challenged provisions, the Courts not being entirely without
discretion in the matter. Thus, adherence to the strict procedural standard was relaxed in Tinio vs. Mina (26 SCRA 512
[1968]); Edu vs. Ericta (35 SCRA 481 [1970]); and in Gonzalez vs. Comelec (27 SCRA 835 [1969]), the Opinion in the
Tinio and Gonzalez cases having been penned by our present Chief Justice. The reasons which have impelled us are the
paramount public interest involved and the proximity of the elections which will be held only a few days hence.

Petitioner Dumlao's contention that section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is discriminatory against him personally is belied by the fact
that several petitions for the disqualification of other candidates for local positions based on the challenged provision have
already been filed with the COMELEC (as listed in p. 15, respondent's Comment). This tellingly overthrows Dumlao's
contention of intentional or purposeful discrimination.

The assertion that Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is contrary to the safer guard of equal protection is neither well taken. The
constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. If the groupings are based on
reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently from another class. For purposes of
public service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees
attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable.

In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that candidates should not be more than 65
years of age at the time they assume office, if applicable to everyone, might or might not be a reasonable classification
although, as the Solicitor General has intimated, a good policy of the law would be to promote the emergence of younger
blood in our political elective echelons. On the other hand, it might be that persons more than 65 years old may also be
good elective local officials.

Coming now to the case of retirees. Retirement from government service may or may not be a reasonable disqualification
for elective local officials. For one thing, there can also be retirees from government service at ages, say below 65. It may
neither be reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65 year old retiree could be a good local official just like one,
aged 65, who is not a retiree.

But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official, who has retired from a provincial, city or municipal office, there is
reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged
provision. The need for new blood assumes relevance. The tiredness of the retiree for government work is present, and
what is emphatically significant is that the retired employee has already declared himself tired and unavailable for the
same government work, but, which, by virtue of a change of mind, he would like to assume again. It is for this very reason
that inequality will neither result from the application of the challenged provision. Just as that provision does not deny
equal protection neither does it permit of such denial (see People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1933]). Persons similarly situated
are sinlilarly treated.

In fine, it bears reiteration that the equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classification. What is proscribes is a
classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. That constitutional guarantee is not violated by a reasonable
classification based upon substantial distinctions, where the classification is germane to the purpose of the law and applies
to all Chose belonging to the same class (Peralta vs. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30 [1978] citing Felwa vs. Salas, 18 SCRA 606
[1966]; Rafael v. Embroidery and Apparel Control and Inspection Board, 21 SCRA 336 [1967]; Inchong etc., et al. vs.
Hernandez 101 Phil. 1155 [1957]). The purpose of the law is to allow the emergence of younger blood in local
governments. The classification in question being pursuant to that purpose, it cannot be considered invalid "even it at
times, it may be susceptible to the objection that it is marred by theoretical inconsistencies" (Chief Justice Fernando, The
Constitution of the Philippines, 1977 ed., p. 547).

There is an additional consideration. Absent herein is a showing of the clear invalidity of the questioned provision. Well
accepted is the rule that to justify the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal breach. Courts are practically unanimous in the pronouncement that laws shall
not be declared invalid unless the conflict with the Constitution is clear beyond reasonable doubt (Peralta vs. COMELEC,
82 SCRA 55 [1978], citing Cooper vs. Telfair 4 Dall 14; Dodd, Cases on Constitutional Law, 3rd ed. 1942, 56). Lastly, it
is within the compentence of the legislature to prescribe qualifications for one who desires to become a candidate for
office provided they are reasonable, as in this case.

In so far as the petition of Igot and Salapantan are concerned, the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
52, quoted in full earlier, and which they challenge, may be divided in two parts. The first provides:

a. judgment of conviction jor any of the aforementioned crimes shall be conclusive evidence of such fact ...

The supremacy of the Constitution stands out as the cardinal principle. We are aware of the presumption of validity that
attaches to a challenged statute, of the well-settled principle that "all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of
constitutionality," and that Courts will not set aside a statute as constitutionally defective "except in a clear case." (People
vs. Vera, supra). We are constrained to hold that this is one such clear case.

Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel (Article IV, section 19, 1973
Constitution). An accusation, according to the fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso
contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from running for public office on
the ground alone that charges have been filed against him before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns before one is
fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the degree of proof, no distinction is made between a person convicted of acts
of dislotalty and one against whom charges have been filed for such acts, as both of them would be ineligible to run for
public office. A person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that charges have been filed against him is
virtually placed in the same category as a person already convicted of a crime with the penalty of arresto, which carries
with it the accessory penalty of suspension of the right to hold office during the term of the sentence (Art. 44, Revised
Penal Code).

And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence, and therefore, may be rebutted, yet. there is
"clear and present danger" that because of the proximity of the elections, time constraints will prevent one charged with
acts of disloyalty from offering contrary proof to overcome the prima facie evidence against him.

Additionally, it is best that evidence pro and con of acts of disloyalty be aired before the Courts rather than before an
administrative body such as the COMELEC. A highly possible conflict of findings between two government bodies, to the
extreme detriment of a person charged, will thereby be avoided. Furthermore, a legislative/administrative determination of
guilt should not be allowed to be substituted for a judicial determination.

Being infected with constitutional infirmity, a partial declaration of nullity of only that objectionable portion is mandated.
It is separable from the first portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Big. 52 which can stand by
itself.

WHEREFORE, 1) the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared valid. Said paragraph
reads:

SEC. 4. Special disqualification. In addition to violation of Section 10 of Article XII(C) of the Constitution and
disqualifications mentioned in existing laws which are hereby declared as disqualification for any of the elective officials
enumerated in Section 1 hereof, any retired elective provincial, city or municipal official, who has received payment of
the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law and who shall have been 65 years of age at the
commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected, shall not be qualified to run for the same elective
local office from which he has retired.

2) That portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 providing that "... the filing of
charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be
prima facie evidence of such fact", is hereby declared null and void, for being violative of the constitutional presumption
of innocence guaranteed to an accused.

SO ORDERED.

Makasiar, Antonio, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.

Fernando, C.J., concurs and submits a brief separate opinion.

De Castro, J., abstain as far as petitioner Dumlao is concerned.





Separate Opinions



BARREDO, J., concurring:

But as regards the matter of equal protection, I reiterate my view for Peralta that Sec. 9(1) Art. XI I is more expensive
than the equal protection clause.

AQUINO, J, concurring:

concur in the result as to paragraph I of the dispositive part of the decision. I dissent as to paragraph 2. In my opinion,
paragraph 2, section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 is valid, being similar to certain presumptions in Articles 217 and 315
of the Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4885. See U.S. v. Luling, 34 Phil. 725 and People v. Mingoa, 92 Phil.
856.

ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:

concur but wish to add that a judgment of conviction as provided in Sec. 4, par. 2 of Batas Pambansa Big. 52 should be
one which is final and unappealable.

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring.

It is particularly gratifying that the reiteration in the ably-written and scholarly opinion of the Court, penned by Justice
Melencio-Herrera, of the standard that must be met before the power of judicial review may be availed of, set forth with
such lucidity and force by Justice Laurel in the two leading cases of Angara v. Electoral Commission 1 and People v.
Vera, 2 did not constitute an obstacle to this Court ruling on the crucial constitutional issues raised. It was a cause for
concern, for me at least, that counsel of private parties in not a few cases in the recent past had shown less than full
awareness of the doctrines, procedural in character, that call for application whenever the exercise of this awesome and
delicate responsibility of adjudging the validity of a statute or presidential decree is invoked. 3 While this Court cannot be
accused of being bound by the letters of judicial timidity, it remains true that no cavalier disregard of tried and tested
concepts should be given encouragement. A petitioner who bases his claim for relief on asserted constitutional
deficiencies deserves to be heard. That goes without saying. For the judiciary must ever endeavor to vindicate rights
safeguarded by the fundamental law. In that sense, this Tribunal is not susceptible to the reproach that it has imprisoned
itself in its allegiance to the philosophy of judicial self-restraint. There are, however, limits to judicial activism. It cannot
be too strongly stressed that a petition of this character must ever remain an orderly proceeding that cannot be oblivious of
the requisites to be complied with to justify a pronouncement on constitutional issues. Where there is exuberance in the
exercise of judicial power, the forms of litigation are but slight retaining walls. It is right and proper that the voice of the
Solicitor General should be heard in protest against such neglect of rudimentary precepts. Necessarily then, whenever
objections based on refusal to abide by the procedural principles are presented, this Court must rule. It would suffice if
thereby the petition is dismissed for non-observance of the controlling doctrines. There are times, however, when the
controversy is of such a character that to resolve doubts, erase uncertainty, and assure respect for constitutional
limitations, this Tribunal must pass on the merits. This is one such case. I therefore concur with the opinion of the Court.

It may be a task of superfluity then to write a concurring opinion. Nonetheless, a few words may not be amiss on what for
me is the proper approach to take as to the lack of power of this Court to pass on the motives of the legislative body, on
the lack of persuasiveness of petitioner's argument based on the equal protection guarantee, and on the fundamental
concept of fairness of which the due process clause is an embodiment, thus calling for the nullification of the
disqualification of a candidate upon the mere filing of charges against him.

1. The challenge to the provision in question is predicated on what was referred to as "a known fact in the province
of Nueva Vizcaya that the aforesaid provision was concocted and designed precisely to frustrate any bid of herein
petitioner to make a political come back [sic] as governor of Nueva Vizcaya. The wordings [sic] of the law is so
peculiarly attuned to discriminate against herein petitioner because every condition imposed as disqualification grounds
are known to be possessed by him because he was a former elective provincial official who has received his retirement
benefits, he desires to run for the same elective office and at the commencement of the term of office to which he now
seeks to be elected, he shall have reached 65 years of age. 4 Clearly then, the plea for invalidating such provision is the
motive attributed to the Interim Batasang Pambansa. For petitioner, it amounted to a constitutional infirmity fatal in
character. The weakness of the petition is thus apparent. No decision of this Tribunal can be cited in support of such a
proposition. It would be to extend unduly the concept of judicial review if a court can roam far and wide and range at will
over the variety and diversity of the reasons, the promptings that may lead a legislator to cast his vote for or against a
proposed legislation. It is not what inspired the introduction of a bill but the effect thereof if duly enacted that is decisive.
That would be the test for its validity or lack of it. There is this relevant excerpt from McCray v. United States: 5 "The
decisions of this Court [Supreme Court of the United States] from the beginning lend no support whatever to the
assumption that the judiciary may restrain the exercise of lawful power on the assumption that a wrongful purpose of
motive has caused the power to be exerted. 6 The late Chief Justice Warren, who penned the opinion in United States v. O'
Brien 7 put the matter thus: "Inquiries into congressional motives or purposes are a hazardous matter. When the issue is
simply the interpretation of legislation, the Court will look to statements by legislators for guidance as to the purpose of
the legislature, because the benefit to sound decision-making in this circumstance is thought sufficient to risk the
possibility of misreading Congress' purpose. It is entirely a different matter when we are asked to void a statute that is,
under well-settled criteria, constitutional on its face, on the basis of what fewer than a handful of Congressmen said about
it. What motivates one legislator to make a speech about a statute is not necessarily what motivates scores of others to
enact it, and the stakes are sufficiently high for us to eschew guesswork. We decline to void essentially on the ground that
it is unwise legislation which Congress had the undoubted power to enact and which could be reenacted in its exact form
if the same or another legislator made a 'wiser' speech about it." 8

2. If, however, the provision in question is susceptible to the reproach that it amounts to a denial of equal protection,
then his plea for nullification should be accorded a sympathetic response. As the opinion of the Court makes clear, such
imputation is not deserving of credence. The classification cannot be stigmatized as lacking in rationality. It is germane to
the subject. Age, as well as the fact of retirement and the receipt of retirement benefits are factors that can enter into any
legislative determination of what disqualifications to impose. As was pointed out in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. Land
Tenure Administration: 9 "It suffices then that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar
circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the
privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is
that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances, which if not Identical, are
analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same
fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest. 10 It cannot be denied that others
similarly fall under the same ban. It was not directed at petitioner solely. The most that can be said is that he falls within
the-proscribed class. The point was likewise raised as to why should national officials be excluded in the above provision.
The answer is simple. There is nothing to prevent the legislative body from following a system of priorities. This it did
under the challenged legislative provision. In its opinion, what called for such a measure is the propensity of the local
officials having reached the retirement age and having received retirement benefits once again running for public office.
Accordingly, the provision in question was enacted. A portion of the opinion in the aforesaid J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc.
finds relevance: "It was confronted with a situation that caned for correction, and the legislation that was the result of its
deliberation sought to apply the necessary palliative. That it stopped short of possibly attaining the cure of other analogous
ills certainly does not stigmatize its effort as a denial of equal protection. We have given our sanction to the principle
underlying the exercise of police power and taxation, but certainly not excluding eminent domain, that 'the legislature is
not required by the Constitution to adhere to the policy of all "or none." ' Thus, to reiterate, the invocation by petitioner of
the equal protection clause is futile and unavailing ." 11

3. That brings us to the assailed provision as to the sufficiency of the filing of charges for the commission of such
crimes as subversion, insurrection, rebellion or others of similar nature before a civil court or military tribunal after
preliminary investigation, being a prima facie evidence of such fact and therefore justifying the disqualification of a
candidate. The opinion of the Court invoked the constitutional presumption of innocence as a basis for its being annulled.
That conclusion is well-founded. Such being the case, I am in full agreement. I would add that such a provision is
moreover tainted with arbitrariness and therefore is violative of the due process clause. Such a constitutional right, to
quote from Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. Beson, 12 is "not a mere formality that may be dispensed with at will. Its disregard
is a matter of serious concern. It is a constitutional safeguard of the highest order. It is a response to man's innate sense of
justice." 13 As rightfully stressed in the opinion of the Court, the time element may invariably preclude a full hearing on
the charge against him and thus effectively negate the opportunity of an individual to present himself as a candidate. If, as
has been invariably the case, a prosecutor, whether in a civil court or in a military tribunal saddled as he is with so many
complaints filed on his desk would give in to the all-too-human propensity to take the easy way out and to file charges,
then a candidate Would be hard put to destroy the presumption. A sense of realism for me compels a declaration of nullity
of a provision which on its face is patently offensive to the Constitution.

Hence my concurrence.

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

Files a separate opinion dissenting from the adverse ruling on Dumlaos candidacy and declining to rule on the invalidity
of the first part of Section 4 of the questioned Law; and concurs with the pronouncement that the mere filing of charges
shall be prima facie cause for disqualification is void.

I. I dissent from the majority's dismissal of the petition insofar as it upholds the discriminatory and arbitrary provision of
Sec. 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 which would impose a special disqualification on petitioner Patricio Dumlao from
running for the elective local office of governor of his home province of Nueva Vizcaya and would in effect bar the
electors of his province from electing him to said office in the January 30 elections, simply because he is a retired
provincial governor of said province "who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under
the law and who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be
elected."

To specially and peculiarly ban a 65-year old previously retired elective local official from running for the same elective
office (of governor, in this case) previously held by him and from which he has retired is arbitrary, oppressive and
unreasonable. Persons similarly situated are not similarly treated, e.g. a retired vice-governor, mayor or councilor of 65 is
entitled to run for governor (because the disqualification is for the retiree of 65 to run for the same elective office from
which he retired) but petitioner is barred from doing so (although he may run for any other lesser office). Both are 65 and
are retirees, yet one is barred from running for the office of governor. What is the valid distinction? Is this not an arbitrary
discrimination against petitioner who has cause to that "the aforesaid provision was concocted and designed precisely to
frustrate any bid of petition to make a political comeback as governor of Nueva Vizcaya 1 (since no other case by a
former governor similarly barred by virtue of said provision can never be cited 2 ). Is there not here, therefore a gross
denial of the cardinal constitutional guarantee that equal protection and security shall be given under the law to every
person, under analogous if not Identical circumstances?

Respondent's claim, as accepted by the majority, is that the purpose of the special disqualification is "to infuse new blood
in local governments but the classification (that would bar 65-year old retirees from running for the same elective local
office) is not rational nor reasonable. It is not germane nor relevant to the alleged purpose of "infusing new blood"
because such "old blood" retirees may continue in local governments since they are not disqualified at all to run for any
other local elective office such as from provincial governor, vice-governor, city, municipal or district mayor and vice-
mayor to member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan Sangguniang Panglunsod and Sangguniang Bayan, other than the
local elective office from which they retired.

Furthermore, other 65-year olds who have likewise retired from the judiciary and other branches of government are not in
any manner disqualified to run for any local elective office, as in the case of retired Court of First Instance Judge (former
Congressman) Alberto S. Ubay who retired with full substantial retirement benefits as such judge in 1978 at age 70 and
now at past 71 years of age, is running as the official KBL candidate for governor of his province. And even in the case of
65-year old local elective officials, they are disqualified only when they have received payment of the retirement benefits
to which they are entitled under the law (which amount to very little, compared to retirement benefits of other executive
officials and members of the judiciary). If they have not received such retirement benefits, they are not disqualified.
Certainly, their disqualification or non-disqualification and consequent classification as "old blood" or "new blood"
cannot hinge on such an irrelevant question of whether or not they have received their retirement benefits.

The classification is patently arbitrary and unreasonable and is not based on substantial distinctions which make for real
differences that would justify the special disqualification of petitioner, which, it is claimed, "is based on a presumption
that elective local officials who have retired and are of advanced age cannot discharge the functions of the office they seek
as those who are differently situated." 3 Such presumption is sheer conjecture. The mere fact that a candidate is less than
65 or has "young or new blood" does not mean that he would be more efficient, effective and competent than a mature
65year old like petition er who has had experience on the job and who was observed at the hearing to appear to be most
physically fit. Sufice it to city the outstanding case of the incumbent ebullient Minister of Foreign Affairs, General Carlos
P. Romulo, who was elected a 80 as a member of the Interim Batasan Pambansa and who has just this month completed
81 years of age and has been hailed by the President himself as "the best foreign minister the Republic has ever had

Age has simply just never been a yardstick for qualification or disqualification. Al. the most, a minimum age to hold
public office has been required as a qualification to insure a modicum of maturity 'now reduced to 21 years in the present
batas), but no maximum age has ever been imposed as a disqualification for elect public office since the right and win of
the people to elect the candidate of their choice for any elective office, no matter his age has always been recognized as
supreme.

The disqualification in question therefore is grossly violative of the equal protection clause which mandates that all
persons subjected to legislation shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions, both in the privileges
conferred and in the liabilities imposed. The guarantee is meant to proscribe undue favor and individual or class privilege
on the one hand and hostile discrimination and the oppression of in quality on the other. The questioned provision should
therefore at the least be declared invalid in its application insofar as it would disqualify petitioner from running for the
office of governor of his province.

As aptly restated by the Chief Justice, "Persons similarly situated should be similarly treated. Where no valid distinction
could be made as to the relevant conditions that call for consideration, there should be none as to the privileges conferred
and the liabilities imposed. There can be no undue favoritism or partiality on the one hand or hostility on the other.
Arbitrary selection and discrimination against persons in thus ruled out. For the principle is that equal protection and
security shall be given to every person under circumstances, which if not Identical are analogous. If law be looked upon in
terms of burden or charges, those that full within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast
on some in the group equally binding on the rest." 4

Finally, this arbitrary disqualification is likewise grossly violative of Article XII, sub-article C, section 9(1) of the 1973
Constitution that Bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination.

II. I concur with the majority's declaration of invalidity of the portion of the second paragraph of Section 4 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 52 which would make the mere filing of charges of subversion, insurrection, rebellion or other similar
crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation prima facie evidence of the fact of
commission of an act of disloyalty to the State on the part of the candidate and disqualify him from his candidacy. Such a
provision could be the most insidious weapon to disqualify bona fide candidates who seem to be headed for election and
places in the hands of the military and civil prosecutors a dangerous and devastating weapon of cutting off any candidate
who may not be to their filing through the filing of last-hour charges against him.

I also concur with the pronouncement made in the majority decision that in order that a judgment of conviction may be
deemed "as conclusive evidence" of the candidate's disloyalty to the State and of his disqualification from office, such
judgment of conviction must be final and unappealable. This is so specifically provided in Section 22 of the 1978 Election
Code. 5 Otherwise, the questioned provision would deny the bona fide candidate substantive due process and would be
grossly violative of his constitutional right of presumption of innocence and of the above-quoted provision of the 1973
Constitution protecting candidates for public office from any form of harassment and discrimination.

ADDENDUM

When the case was voted upon a second time last January 21st, there appeared to be a majority in favor of the declarations
and pronouncements above referred to in the two preceding paragraphs, in view of the urgency of the matter and the evil
sought to be avoided. However, as of this writing, January 23, 1980 in the afternoon, such majority seems to have been
dissipated by the view that the action to nullify such second paragraph of section 4 of the Batas in question is premature
and has not been properly submitted for ajudication under the strict procedural require . If this be the case, my above
views, termed as concurrences, should be taken as dissents against the majority action.







Separate Opinions



BARREDO, J., concurring:

But as regards the matter of equal protection, I reiterate my view for Peralta that Sec. 9(1) Art. XI I is more expensive
than the equal protection clause.

AQUINO, J, concurring:

concur in the result as to paragraph I of the dispositive part of the decision. I dissent as to paragraph 2. In my opinion,
paragraph 2, section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 is valid, being similar to certain presumptions in Articles 217 and 315
of the Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4885. See U.S. v. Luling, 34 Phil. 725 and People v. Mingoa, 92 Phil.
856.

ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:

concur but wish to add that a judgment of conviction as provided in Sec. 4, par. 2 of Batas Pambansa Big. 52 should be
one which is final and unappealable.

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring.

It is particularly gratifying that the reiteration in the ably-written and scholarly opinion of the Court, penned by Justice
Melencio-Herrera, of the standard that must be met before the power of judicial review may be availed of, set forth with
such lucidity and force by Justice Laurel in the two leading cases of Angara v. Electoral Commission 1 and People v.
Vera, 2 did not constitute an obstacle to this Court ruling on the crucial constitutional issues raised. It was a cause for
concern, for me at least, that counsel of private parties in not a few cases in the recent past had shown less than full
awareness of the doctrines, procedural in character, that call for application whenever the exercise of this awesome and
delicate responsibility of adjudging the validity of a statute or presidential decree is invoked. 3 While this Court cannot be
accused of being bound by the letters of judicial timidity, it remains true that no cavalier disregard of tried and tested
concepts should be given encouragement. A petitioner who bases his claim for relief on asserted constitutional
deficiencies deserves to be heard. That goes without saying. For the judiciary must ever endeavor to vindicate rights
safeguarded by the fundamental law. In that sense, this Tribunal is not susceptible to the reproach that it has imprisoned
itself in its allegiance to the philosophy of judicial self-restraint. There are, however, limits to judicial activism. It cannot
be too strongly stressed that a petition of this character must ever remain an orderly proceeding that cannot be oblivious of
the requisites to be complied with to justify a pronouncement on constitutional issues. Where there is exuberance in the
exercise of judicial power, the forms of litigation are but slight retaining walls. It is right and proper that the voice of the
Solicitor General should be heard in protest against such neglect of rudimentary precepts. Necessarily then, whenever
objections based on refusal to abide by the procedural principles are presented, this Court must rule. It would suffice if
thereby the petition is dismissed for non-observance of the controlling doctrines. There are times, however, when the
controversy is of such a character that to resolve doubts, erase uncertainty, and assure respect for constitutional
limitations, this Tribunal must pass on the merits. This is one such case. I therefore concur with the opinion of the Court.

It may be a task of superfluity then to write a concurring opinion. Nonetheless, a few words may not be amiss on what for
me is the proper approach to take as to the lack of power of this Court to pass on the motives of the legislative body, on
the lack of persuasiveness of petitioner's argument based on the equal protection guarantee, and on the fundamental
concept of fairness of which the due process clause is an embodiment, thus calling for the nullification of the
disqualification of a candidate upon the mere filing of charges against him.

1. The challenge to the provision in question is predicated on what was referred to as "a known fact in the province
of Nueva Vizcaya that the aforesaid provision was concocted and designed precisely to frustrate any bid of herein
petitioner to make a political come back [sic] as governor of Nueva Vizcaya. The wordings [sic] of the law is so
peculiarly attuned to discriminate against herein petitioner because every condition imposed as disqualification grounds
are known to be possessed by him because he was a former elective provincial official who has received his retirement
benefits, he desires to run for the same elective office and at the commencement of the term of office to which he now
seeks to be elected, he shall have reached 65 years of age. 4 Clearly then, the plea for invalidating such provision is the
motive attributed to the Interim Batasang Pambansa. For petitioner, it amounted to a constitutional infirmity fatal in
character. The weakness of the petition is thus apparent. No decision of this Tribunal can be cited in support of such a
proposition. It would be to extend unduly the concept of judicial review if a court can roam far and wide and range at will
over the variety and diversity of the reasons, the promptings that may lead a legislator to cast his vote for or against a
proposed legislation. It is not what inspired the introduction of a bill but the effect thereof if duly enacted that is decisive.
That would be the test for its validity or lack of it. There is this relevant excerpt from McCray v. United States: 5 "The
decisions of this Court [Supreme Court of the United States] from the beginning lend no support whatever to the
assumption that the judiciary may restrain the exercise of lawful power on the assumption that a wrongful purpose of
motive has caused the power to be exerted. 6 The late Chief Justice Warren, who penned the opinion in United States v. O'
Brien 7 put the matter thus: "Inquiries into congressional motives or purposes are a hazardous matter. When the issue is
simply the interpretation of legislation, the Court will look to statements by legislators for guidance as to the purpose of
the legislature, because the benefit to sound decision-making in this circumstance is thought sufficient to risk the
possibility of misreading Congress' purpose. It is entirely a different matter when we are asked to void a statute that is,
under well-settled criteria, constitutional on its face, on the basis of what fewer than a handful of Congressmen said about
it. What motivates one legislator to make a speech about a statute is not necessarily what motivates scores of others to
enact it, and the stakes are sufficiently high for us to eschew guesswork. We decline to void essentially on the ground that
it is unwise legislation which Congress had the undoubted power to enact and which could be reenacted in its exact form
if the same or another legislator made a 'wiser' speech about it." 8

2. If, however, the provision in question is susceptible to the reproach that it amounts to a denial of equal protection,
then his plea for nullification should be accorded a sympathetic response. As the opinion of the Court makes clear, such
imputation is not deserving of credence. The classification cannot be stigmatized as lacking in rationality. It is germane to
the subject. Age, as well as the fact of retirement and the receipt of retirement benefits are factors that can enter into any
legislative determination of what disqualifications to impose. As was pointed out in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. Land
Tenure Administration: 9 "It suffices then that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar
circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the
privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is
that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances, which if not Identical, are
analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same
fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest. 10 It cannot be denied that others
similarly fall under the same ban. It was not directed at petitioner solely. The most that can be said is that he falls within
the-proscribed class. The point was likewise raised as to why should national officials be excluded in the above provision.
The answer is simple. There is nothing to prevent the legislative body from following a system of priorities. This it did
under the challenged legislative provision. In its opinion, what called for such a measure is the propensity of the local
officials having reached the retirement age and having received retirement benefits once again running for public office.
Accordingly, the provision in question was enacted. A portion of the opinion in the aforesaid J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc.
finds relevance: "It was confronted with a situation that caned for correction, and the legislation that was the result of its
deliberation sought to apply the necessary palliative. That it stopped short of possibly attaining the cure of other analogous
ills certainly does not stigmatize its effort as a denial of equal protection. We have given our sanction to the principle
underlying the exercise of police power and taxation, but certainly not excluding eminent domain, that 'the legislature is
not required by the Constitution to adhere to the policy of all "or none." ' Thus, to reiterate, the invocation by petitioner of
the equal protection clause is futile and unavailing ." 11

3. That brings us to the assailed provision as to the sufficiency of the filing of charges for the commission of such
crimes as subversion, insurrection, rebellion or others of similar nature before a civil court or military tribunal after
preliminary investigation, being a prima facie evidence of such fact and therefore justifying the disqualification of a
candidate. The opinion of the Court invoked the constitutional presumption of innocence as a basis for its being annulled.
That conclusion is well-founded. Such being the case, I am in full agreement. I would add that such a provision is
moreover tainted with arbitrariness and therefore is violative of the due process clause. Such a constitutional right, to
quote from Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. Beson, 12 is "not a mere formality that may be dispensed with at will. Its disregard
is a matter of serious concern. It is a constitutional safeguard of the highest order. It is a response to man's innate sense of
justice." 13 As rightfully stressed in the opinion of the Court, the time element may invariably preclude a full hearing on
the charge against him and thus effectively negate the opportunity of an individual to present himself as a candidate. If, as
has been invariably the case, a prosecutor, whether in a civil court or in a military tribunal saddled as he is with so many
complaints filed on his desk would give in to the all-too-human propensity to take the easy way out and to file charges,
then a candidate Would be hard put to destroy the presumption. A sense of realism for me compels a declaration of nullity
of a provision which on its face is patently offensive to the Constitution.

Hence my concurrence.

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

Files a separate opinion dissenting from the adverse ruling on Dumlaos candidacy and declining to rule on the invalidity
of the first part of Section 4 of the questioned Law; and concurs with the pronouncement that the mere filing of charges
shall be prima facie cause for disqualification is void.

I. I dissent from the majority's dismissal of the petition insofar as it upholds the discriminatory and arbitrary provision of
Sec. 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 which would impose a special disqualification on petitioner Patricio Dumlao from
running for the elective local office of governor of his home province of Nueva Vizcaya and would in effect bar the
electors of his province from electing him to said office in the January 30 elections, simply because he is a retired
provincial governor of said province "who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under
the law and who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be
elected."

To specially and peculiarly ban a 65-year old previously retired elective local official from running for the same elective
office (of governor, in this case) previously held by him and from which he has retired is arbitrary, oppressive and
unreasonable. Persons similarly situated are not similarly treated, e.g. a retired vice-governor, mayor or councilor of 65 is
entitled to run for governor (because the disqualification is for the retiree of 65 to run for the same elective office from
which he retired) but petitioner is barred from doing so (although he may run for any other lesser office). Both are 65 and
are retirees, yet one is barred from running for the office of governor. What is the valid distinction? Is this not an arbitrary
discrimination against petitioner who has cause to that "the aforesaid provision was concocted and designed precisely to
frustrate any bid of petition to make a political comeback as governor of Nueva Vizcaya 1 (since no other case by a
former governor similarly barred by virtue of said provision can never be cited 2 ). Is there not here, therefore a gross
denial of the cardinal constitutional guarantee that equal protection and security shall be given under the law to every
person, under analogous if not Identical circumstances?

Respondent's claim, as accepted by the majority, is that the purpose of the special disqualification is "to infuse new blood
in local governments but the classification (that would bar 65-year old retirees from running for the same elective local
office) is not rational nor reasonable. It is not germane nor relevant to the alleged purpose of "infusing new blood"
because such "old blood" retirees may continue in local governments since they are not disqualified at all to run for any
other local elective office such as from provincial governor, vice-governor, city, municipal or district mayor and vice-
mayor to member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan Sangguniang Panglunsod and Sangguniang Bayan, other than the
local elective office from which they retired.

Furthermore, other 65-year olds who have likewise retired from the judiciary and other branches of government are not in
any manner disqualified to run for any local elective office, as in the case of retired Court of First Instance Judge (former
Congressman) Alberto S. Ubay who retired with full substantial retirement benefits as such judge in 1978 at age 70 and
now at past 71 years of age, is running as the official KBL candidate for governor of his province. And even in the case of
65-year old local elective officials, they are disqualified only when they have received payment of the retirement benefits
to which they are entitled under the law (which amount to very little, compared to retirement benefits of other executive
officials and members of the judiciary). If they have not received such retirement benefits, they are not disqualified.
Certainly, their disqualification or non-disqualification and consequent classification as "old blood" or "new blood"
cannot hinge on such an irrelevant question of whether or not they have received their retirement benefits.

The classification is patently arbitrary and unreasonable and is not based on substantial distinctions which make for real
differences that would justify the special disqualification of petitioner, which, it is claimed, "is based on a presumption
that elective local officials who have retired and are of advanced age cannot discharge the functions of the office they seek
as those who are differently situated." 3 Such presumption is sheer conjecture. The mere fact that a candidate is less than
65 or has "young or new blood" does not mean that he would be more efficient, effective and competent than a mature
65year old like petition er who has had experience on the job and who was observed at the hearing to appear to be most
physically fit. Sufice it to city the outstanding case of the incumbent ebullient Minister of Foreign Affairs, General Carlos
P. Romulo, who was elected a 80 as a member of the Interim Batasan Pambansa and who has just this month completed
81 years of age and has been hailed by the President himself as "the best foreign minister the Republic has ever had

Age has simply just never been a yardstick for qualification or disqualification. Al. the most, a minimum age to hold
public office has been required as a qualification to insure a modicum of maturity 'now reduced to 21 years in the present
batas), but no maximum age has ever been imposed as a disqualification for elect public office since the right and win of
the people to elect the candidate of their choice for any elective office, no matter his age has always been recognized as
supreme.

The disqualification in question therefore is grossly violative of the equal protection clause which mandates that all
persons subjected to legislation shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions, both in the privileges
conferred and in the liabilities imposed. The guarantee is meant to proscribe undue favor and individual or class privilege
on the one hand and hostile discrimination and the oppression of in quality on the other. The questioned provision should
therefore at the least be declared invalid in its application insofar as it would disqualify petitioner from running for the
office of governor of his province.

As aptly restated by the Chief Justice, "Persons similarly situated should be similarly treated. Where no valid distinction
could be made as to the relevant conditions that call for consideration, there should be none as to the privileges conferred
and the liabilities imposed. There can be no undue favoritism or partiality on the one hand or hostility on the other.
Arbitrary selection and discrimination against persons in thus ruled out. For the principle is that equal protection and
security shall be given to every person under circumstances, which if not Identical are analogous. If law be looked upon in
terms of burden or charges, those that full within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast
on some in the group equally binding on the rest." 4

Finally, this arbitrary disqualification is likewise grossly violative of Article XII, sub-article C, section 9(1) of the 1973
Constitution that Bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination.

II. I concur with the majority's declaration of invalidity of the portion of the second paragraph of Section 4 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 52 which would make the mere filing of charges of subversion, insurrection, rebellion or other similar
crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation prima facie evidence of the fact of
commission of an act of disloyalty to the State on the part of the candidate and disqualify him from his candidacy. Such a
provision could be the most insidious weapon to disqualify bona fide candidates who seem to be headed for election and
places in the hands of the military and civil prosecutors a dangerous and devastating weapon of cutting off any candidate
who may not be to their filing through the filing of last-hour charges against him.

I also concur with the pronouncement made in the majority decision that in order that a judgment of conviction may be
deemed "as conclusive evidence" of the candidate's disloyalty to the State and of his disqualification from office, such
judgment of conviction must be final and unappealable. This is so specifically provided in Section 22 of the 1978 Election
Code. 5 Otherwise, the questioned provision would deny the bona fide candidate substantive due process and would be
grossly violative of his constitutional right of presumption of innocence and of the above-quoted provision of the 1973
Constitution protecting candidates for public office from any form of harassment and discrimination.

ADDENDUM

When the case was voted upon a second time last January 21st, there appeared to be a majority in favor of the declarations
and pronouncements above referred to in the two preceding paragraphs, in view of the urgency of the matter and the evil
sought to be avoided. However, as of this writing, January 23, 1980 in the afternoon, such majority seems to have been
dissipated by the view that the action to nullify such second paragraph of section 4 of the Batas in question is premature
and has not been properly submitted for ajudication under the strict procedural require . If this be the case, my above
views, termed as concurrences, should be taken as dissents against the majority action.



Separate Opinions

BARREDO, J., concurring:

But as regards the matter of equal protection, I reiterate my view for Peralta that Sec. 9(1) Art. XI I is more expensive
than the equal protection clause.

AQUINO, J, concurring:

concur in the result as to paragraph I of the dispositive part of the decision. I dissent as to paragraph 2. In my opinion,
paragraph 2, section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 is valid, being similar to certain presumptions in Articles 217 and 315
of the Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4885. See U.S. v. Luling, 34 Phil. 725 and People v. Mingoa, 92 Phil.
856.

ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:

concur but wish to add that a judgment of conviction as provided in Sec. 4, par. 2 of Batas Pambansa Big. 52 should be
one which is final and unappealable.

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring.

It is particularly gratifying that the reiteration in the ably-written and scholarly opinion of the Court, penned by Justice
Melencio-Herrera, of the standard that must be met before the power of judicial review may be availed of, set forth with
such lucidity and force by Justice Laurel in the two leading cases of Angara v. Electoral Commission 1 and People v.
Vera, 2 did not constitute an obstacle to this Court ruling on the crucial constitutional issues raised. It was a cause for
concern, for me at least, that counsel of private parties in not a few cases in the recent past had shown less than full
awareness of the doctrines, procedural in character, that call for application whenever the exercise of this awesome and
delicate responsibility of adjudging the validity of a statute or presidential decree is invoked. 3 While this Court cannot be
accused of being bound by the letters of judicial timidity, it remains true that no cavalier disregard of tried and tested
concepts should be given encouragement. A petitioner who bases his claim for relief on asserted constitutional
deficiencies deserves to be heard. That goes without saying. For the judiciary must ever endeavor to vindicate rights
safeguarded by the fundamental law. In that sense, this Tribunal is not susceptible to the reproach that it has imprisoned
itself in its allegiance to the philosophy of judicial self-restraint. There are, however, limits to judicial activism. It cannot
be too strongly stressed that a petition of this character must ever remain an orderly proceeding that cannot be oblivious of
the requisites to be complied with to justify a pronouncement on constitutional issues. Where there is exuberance in the
exercise of judicial power, the forms of litigation are but slight retaining walls. It is right and proper that the voice of the
Solicitor General should be heard in protest against such neglect of rudimentary precepts. Necessarily then, whenever
objections based on refusal to abide by the procedural principles are presented, this Court must rule. It would suffice if
thereby the petition is dismissed for non-observance of the controlling doctrines. There are times, however, when the
controversy is of such a character that to resolve doubts, erase uncertainty, and assure respect for constitutional
limitations, this Tribunal must pass on the merits. This is one such case. I therefore concur with the opinion of the Court.

It may be a task of superfluity then to write a concurring opinion. Nonetheless, a few words may not be amiss on what for
me is the proper approach to take as to the lack of power of this Court to pass on the motives of the legislative body, on
the lack of persuasiveness of petitioner's argument based on the equal protection guarantee, and on the fundamental
concept of fairness of which the due process clause is an embodiment, thus calling for the nullification of the
disqualification of a candidate upon the mere filing of charges against him.

1. The challenge to the provision in question is predicated on what was referred to as "a known fact in the province
of Nueva Vizcaya that the aforesaid provision was concocted and designed precisely to frustrate any bid of herein
petitioner to make a political come back [sic] as governor of Nueva Vizcaya. The wordings [sic] of the law is so
peculiarly attuned to discriminate against herein petitioner because every condition imposed as disqualification grounds
are known to be possessed by him because he was a former elective provincial official who has received his retirement
benefits, he desires to run for the same elective office and at the commencement of the term of office to which he now
seeks to be elected, he shall have reached 65 years of age. 4 Clearly then, the plea for invalidating such provision is the
motive attributed to the Interim Batasang Pambansa. For petitioner, it amounted to a constitutional infirmity fatal in
character. The weakness of the petition is thus apparent. No decision of this Tribunal can be cited in support of such a
proposition. It would be to extend unduly the concept of judicial review if a court can roam far and wide and range at will
over the variety and diversity of the reasons, the promptings that may lead a legislator to cast his vote for or against a
proposed legislation. It is not what inspired the introduction of a bill but the effect thereof if duly enacted that is decisive.
That would be the test for its validity or lack of it. There is this relevant excerpt from McCray v. United States: 5 "The
decisions of this Court [Supreme Court of the United States] from the beginning lend no support whatever to the
assumption that the judiciary may restrain the exercise of lawful power on the assumption that a wrongful purpose of
motive has caused the power to be exerted. 6 The late Chief Justice Warren, who penned the opinion in United States v. O'
Brien 7 put the matter thus: "Inquiries into congressional motives or purposes are a hazardous matter. When the issue is
simply the interpretation of legislation, the Court will look to statements by legislators for guidance as to the purpose of
the legislature, because the benefit to sound decision-making in this circumstance is thought sufficient to risk the
possibility of misreading Congress' purpose. It is entirely a different matter when we are asked to void a statute that is,
under well-settled criteria, constitutional on its face, on the basis of what fewer than a handful of Congressmen said about
it. What motivates one legislator to make a speech about a statute is not necessarily what motivates scores of others to
enact it, and the stakes are sufficiently high for us to eschew guesswork. We decline to void essentially on the ground that
it is unwise legislation which Congress had the undoubted power to enact and which could be reenacted in its exact form
if the same or another legislator made a 'wiser' speech about it." 8

2. If, however, the provision in question is susceptible to the reproach that it amounts to a denial of equal protection,
then his plea for nullification should be accorded a sympathetic response. As the opinion of the Court makes clear, such
imputation is not deserving of credence. The classification cannot be stigmatized as lacking in rationality. It is germane to
the subject. Age, as well as the fact of retirement and the receipt of retirement benefits are factors that can enter into any
legislative determination of what disqualifications to impose. As was pointed out in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. Land
Tenure Administration: 9 "It suffices then that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar
circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the
privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is
that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances, which if not Identical, are
analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same
fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest. 10 It cannot be denied that others
similarly fall under the same ban. It was not directed at petitioner solely. The most that can be said is that he falls within
the-proscribed class. The point was likewise raised as to why should national officials be excluded in the above provision.
The answer is simple. There is nothing to prevent the legislative body from following a system of priorities. This it did
under the challenged legislative provision. In its opinion, what called for such a measure is the propensity of the local
officials having reached the retirement age and having received retirement benefits once again running for public office.
Accordingly, the provision in question was enacted. A portion of the opinion in the aforesaid J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc.
finds relevance: "It was confronted with a situation that caned for correction, and the legislation that was the result of its
deliberation sought to apply the necessary palliative. That it stopped short of possibly attaining the cure of other analogous
ills certainly does not stigmatize its effort as a denial of equal protection. We have given our sanction to the principle
underlying the exercise of police power and taxation, but certainly not excluding eminent domain, that 'the legislature is
not required by the Constitution to adhere to the policy of all "or none." ' Thus, to reiterate, the invocation by petitioner of
the equal protection clause is futile and unavailing ." 11

3. That brings us to the assailed provision as to the sufficiency of the filing of charges for the commission of such
crimes as subversion, insurrection, rebellion or others of similar nature before a civil court or military tribunal after
preliminary investigation, being a prima facie evidence of such fact and therefore justifying the disqualification of a
candidate. The opinion of the Court invoked the constitutional presumption of innocence as a basis for its being annulled.
That conclusion is well-founded. Such being the case, I am in full agreement. I would add that such a provision is
moreover tainted with arbitrariness and therefore is violative of the due process clause. Such a constitutional right, to
quote from Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. Beson, 12 is "not a mere formality that may be dispensed with at will. Its disregard
is a matter of serious concern. It is a constitutional safeguard of the highest order. It is a response to man's innate sense of
justice." 13 As rightfully stressed in the opinion of the Court, the time element may invariably preclude a full hearing on
the charge against him and thus effectively negate the opportunity of an individual to present himself as a candidate. If, as
has been invariably the case, a prosecutor, whether in a civil court or in a military tribunal saddled as he is with so many
complaints filed on his desk would give in to the all-too-human propensity to take the easy way out and to file charges,
then a candidate Would be hard put to destroy the presumption. A sense of realism for me compels a declaration of nullity
of a provision which on its face is patently offensive to the Constitution.

Hence my concurrence.

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

Files a separate opinion dissenting from the adverse ruling on Dumlaos candidacy and declining to rule on the invalidity
of the first part of Section 4 of the questioned Law; and concurs with the pronouncement that the mere filing of charges
shall be prima facie cause for disqualification is void.

I. I dissent from the majority's dismissal of the petition insofar as it upholds the discriminatory and arbitrary provision of
Sec. 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 which would impose a special disqualification on petitioner Patricio Dumlao from
running for the elective local office of governor of his home province of Nueva Vizcaya and would in effect bar the
electors of his province from electing him to said office in the January 30 elections, simply because he is a retired
provincial governor of said province "who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under
the law and who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be
elected.

To specially and peculiarly ban a 65-year old previously retired elective local official from running for the same elective
office (of governor, in this case) previously held by him and from which he has retired is arbitrary, oppressive and
unreasonable. Persons similarly situated are not similarly treated, e.g. a retired vice-governor, mayor or councilor of 65 is
entitled to run for governor (because the disqualification is for the retiree of 65 to run for the same elective office from
which he retired) but petitioner is barred from doing so (although he may run for any other lesser office). Both are 65 and
are retirees, yet one is barred from running for the office of governor. What is the valid distinction? Is this not an arbitrary
discrimination against petitioner who has cause to that "the aforesaid provision was concocted and designed precisely to
frustrate any bid of petition to make a political comeback as governor of Nueva Vizcaya 1 (since no other case by a
former governor similarly barred by virtue of said provision can never be cited 2 ). Is there not here, therefore a gross
denial of the cardinal constitutional guarantee that equal protection and security shall be given under the law to every
person, under analogous if not Identical circumstances?

Respondent's claim, as accepted by the majority, is that the purpose of the special disqualification is "to infuse new blood
in local governments but the classification (that would bar 65-year old retirees from running for the same elective local
office) is not rational nor reasonable. It is not germane nor relevant to the alleged purpose of "infusing new blood"
because such "old blood" retirees may continue in local governments since they are not disqualified at all to run for any
other local elective office such as from provincial governor, vice-governor, city, municipal or district mayor and vice-
mayor to member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan Sangguniang Panglunsod and Sangguniang Bayan, other than the
local elective office from which they retired.

Furthermore, other 65-year olds who have likewise retired from the judiciary and other branches of government are not in
any manner disqualified to run for any local elective office, as in the case of retired Court of First Instance Judge (former
Congressman) Alberto S. Ubay who retired with full substantial retirement benefits as such judge in 1978 at age 70 and
now at past 71 years of age, is running as the official KBL candidate for governor of his province. And even in the case of
65-year old local elective officials, they are disqualified only when they have received payment of the retirement benefits
to which they are entitled under the law (which amount to very little, compared to retirement benefits of other executive
officials and members of the judiciary). If they have not received such retirement benefits, they are not disqualified.
Certainly, their disqualification or non-disqualification and consequent classification as "old blood" or "new blood"
cannot hinge on such an irrelevant question of whether or not they have received their retirement benefits.

The classification is patently arbitrary and unreasonable and is not based on substantial distinctions which make for real
differences that would justify the special disqualification of petitioner, which, it is claimed, "is based on a presumption
that elective local officials who have retired and are of advanced age cannot discharge the functions of the office they seek
as those who are differently situated." 3 Such presumption is sheer conjecture. The mere fact that a candidate is less than
65 or has "young or new blood" does not mean that he would be more efficient, effective and competent than a mature
65year old like petition er who has had experience on the job and who was observed at the hearing to appear to be most
physically fit. Sufice it to city the outstanding case of the incumbent ebullient Minister of Foreign Affairs, General Carlos
P. Romulo, who was elected a 80 as a member of the Interim Batasan Pambansa and who has just this month completed
81 years of age and has been hailed by the President himself as "the best foreign minister the Republic has ever had

Age has simply just never been a yardstick for qualification or disqualification. Al. the most, a minimum age to hold
public office has been required as a qualification to insure a modicum of maturity 'now reduced to 21 years in the present
batas), but no maximum age has ever been imposed as a disqualification for elect public office since the right and win of
the people to elect the candidate of their choice for any elective office, no matter his age has always been recognized as
supreme.

The disqualification in question therefore is grossly violative of the equal protection clause which mandates that all
persons subjected to legislation shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions, both in the privileges
conferred and in the liabilities imposed. The guarantee is meant to proscribe undue favor and individual or class privilege
on the one hand and hostile discrimination and the oppression of in quality on the other. The questioned provision should
therefore at the least be declared invalid in its application insofar as it would disqualify petitioner from running for the
office of governor of his province.

As aptly restated by the Chief Justice, "Persons similarly situated should be similarly treated. Where no valid distinction
could be made as to the relevant conditions that call for consideration, there should be none as to the privileges conferred
and the liabilities imposed. There can be no undue favoritism or partiality on the one hand or hostility on the other.
Arbitrary selection and discrimination against persons in thus ruled out. For the principle is that equal protection and
security shall be given to every person under circumstances, which if not Identical are analogous. If law be looked upon in
terms of burden or charges, those that full within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast
on some in the group equally binding on the rest." 4

Finally, this arbitrary disqualification is likewise grossly violative of Article XII, sub-article C, section 9(1) of the 1973
Constitution that Bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination.

II. I concur with the majority's declaration of invalidity of the portion of the second paragraph of Section 4 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 52 which would make the mere filing of charges of subversion, insurrection, rebellion or other similar
crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation prima facie evidence of the fact of
commission of an act of disloyalty to the State on the part of the candidate and disqualify him from his candidacy. Such a
provision could be the most insidious weapon to disqualify bona fide candidates who seem to be headed for election and
places in the hands of the military and civil prosecutors a dangerous and devastating weapon of cutting off any candidate
who may not be to their filing through the filing of last-hour charges against him.

I also concur with the pronouncement made in the majority decision that in order that a judgment of conviction may be
deemed "as conclusive evidence" of the candidate's disloyalty to the State and of his disqualification from office, such
judgment of conviction must be final and unappealable. This is so specifically provided in Section 22 of the 1978 Election
Code. 5 Otherwise, the questioned provision would deny the bona fide candidate substantive due process and would be
grossly violative of his constitutional right of presumption of innocence and of the above-quoted provision of the 1973
Constitution protecting candidates for public office from any form of harassment and discrimination.

ADDENDUM

When the case was voted upon a second time last January 21st, there appeared to be a majority in favor of the declarations
and pronouncements above referred to in the two preceding paragraphs, in view of the urgency of the matter and the evil
sought to be avoided. However, as of this writing, January 23, 1980 in the afternoon, such majority seems to have been
dissipated by the view that the action to nullify such second paragraph of section 4 of the Batas in question is premature
and has not been properly submitted for ajudication under the strict procedural require . If this be the case, my above
views, termed as concurrences, should be taken as dissents against the majority action.

Footnotes

Fernando, CJ.:

1 63 Phil. 139 (1936).

2 65 Phil. 56 (1937).

3 Cf. Sanidad, Commision on Election L-44640, October 12, 1976, 73 SCRA 333; De la T Llana v. Election. L-
47245, December 9, 1917, 80 SCRA 525; Hidalgo v. Marcos L-17329, December 9, 1977, 80 SCRA 538; Peralta v.
Commission on Elections, L-47771, March 11, 1978, 82 SCRA 30),

4 Petition, 3-4.

5 195 US 27 (1904).

6 Ibid, 56.

7 391 US 367 (1968).

8 lbid, 383-384.

9 L-21064, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413.

10 lbid, 435.

11 Ibid, 439.

12 L-26865-66, January 30, 1970, 31 SCRA 313.

13 Ibid, 318.

Teehankee, K.:

1 Petition at page 4.

2 Respondents cites in its comment (at page 15) a handful of pending cases for disqualification of mayoral
candidates.

3 Respondent's Comment, at pages 12-13.

4 E. M. Fernando: The Bill of Rights, 2nd Ed., p. 100, cit. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Land Tenure Administration,
31 SCRA 413 (1970).

5 SEC. 22. Ineligibility of person found disloyal to the Government. Any person found guilty in a final judgment
or order of a competent court or tribunal of any crime involving disloyalty to the duly constituted Government such as
rebellion, sedition, violations of the anti-subversion and firearms laws, and crimes against the national security shall not,
unless restored to his full civil and political rights in accordance with law, be eligible and his certificate of candidancy
shall not be given due course not shall the votes cast in his favor be counted. In the event his final conviction comes after
his election, he shall automatically cease in office. (P.D. 1296, decreed February 7, 1978).

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 132988. July 19, 2000]

AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL JR., petitioner, vs. Hon. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE in his capacity as Executive Secretary,
Hon. EMILIA BONCODIN in her capacity as Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, respondents.
ROBERTO PAGDANGANAN, intervenor.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J.:

The Constitution vests the President with the power of supervision, not control, over local government units (LGUs).
Such power enables him to see to it that LGUs and their officials execute their tasks in accordance with law. While he
may issue advisories and seek their cooperation in solving economic difficulties, he cannot prevent them from performing
their tasks and using available resources to achieve their goals. He may not withhold or alter any authority or power given
them by the law. Thus, the withholding of a portion of internal revenue allotments legally due them cannot be directed by
administrative fiat.

The Case

Before us is an original Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeking (1) to annul Section 1 of Administrative Order
(AO) No. 372, insofar as it requires local government units to reduce their expenditures by 25 percent of their authorized
regular appropriations for non-personal services; and (2) to enjoin respondents from implementing Section 4 of the Order,
which withholds a portion of their internal revenue allotments.

On November 17, 1998, Roberto Pagdanganan, through Counsel Alberto C. Agra, filed a Motion for Intervention/Motion
to Admit Petition for Intervention,[1] attaching thereto his Petition in Intervention[2] joining petitioner in the reliefs
sought. At the time, intervenor was the provincial governor of Bulacan, national president of the League of Provinces of
the Philippines and chairman of the League of Leagues of Local Governments. In a Resolution dated December 15, 1998,
the Court noted said Motion and Petition.

The Facts and the Arguments

On December 27, 1997, the President of the Philippines issued AO 372. Its full text, with emphasis on the assailed
provisions, is as follows:

"ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 372

ADOPTION OF ECONOMY MEASURES IN GOVERNMENT FOR FY 1998

WHEREAS, the current economic difficulties brought about by the peso depreciation requires continued prudence in
government fiscal management to maintain economic stability and sustain the country's growth momentum;

WHEREAS, it is imperative that all government agencies adopt cash management measures to match expenditures with
available resources;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested
in me by the Constitution, do hereby order and direct:

SECTION 1. All government departments and agencies, including state universities and colleges, government-owned and
controlled corporations and local governments units will identify and implement measures in FY 1998 that will reduce
total expenditures for the year by at least 25% of authorized regular appropriations for non-personal services items, along
the following suggested areas:

1. Continued implementation of the streamlining policy on organization and staffing by deferring action on the following:

a. Operationalization of new agencies;

b. Expansion of organizational units and/or creation of positions;

c. Filling of positions; and

d. Hiring of additional/new consultants, contractual and casual personnel, regardless of funding source.

2. Suspension of the following activities:

a. Implementation of new capital/infrastructure projects, except those which have already been contracted out;

b. Acquisition of new equipment and motor vehicles;

c. All foreign travels of government personnel, except those associated with scholarships and trainings funded by
grants;

d. Attendance in conferences abroad where the cost is charged to the government except those clearly essential to
Philippine commitments in the international field as may be determined by the Cabinet;

e. Conduct of trainings/workshops/seminars, except those conducted by government training institutions and agencies
in the performance of their regular functions and those that are funded by grants;

f. Conduct of cultural and social celebrations and sports activities, except those associated with the Philippine
Centennial celebration and those involving regular competitions/events;

g. Grant of honoraria, except in cases where it constitutes the only source of compensation from government received
by the person concerned;

h. Publications, media advertisements and related items, except those required by law or those already being
undertaken on a regular basis;

i. Grant of new/additional benefits to employees, except those expressly and specifically authorized by law; and

j. Donations, contributions, grants and gifts, except those given by institutions to victims of calamities.

3. Suspension of all tax expenditure subsidies to all GOCCs and LGUs

4. Reduction in the volume of consumption of fuel, water, office supplies, electricity and other utilities

5. Deferment of projects that are encountering significant implementation problems

6. Suspension of all realignment of funds and the use of savings and reserves

SECTION 2. Agencies are given the flexibility to identify the specific sources of cost-savings, provided the 25%
minimum savings under Section 1 is complied with.

SECTION 3. A report on the estimated savings generated from these measures shall be submitted to the Office of the
President, through the Department of Budget and Management, on a quarterly basis using the attached format.

SECTION 4. Pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development Budget Coordinating Committee of the
emerging fiscal situation, the amount equivalent to 10% of the internal revenue allotment to local government units shall
be withheld.

SECTION 5. The Development Budget Coordination Committee shall conduct a monthly review of the fiscal position of
the National Government and if necessary, shall recommend to the President the imposition of additional reserves or the
lifting of previously imposed reserves.

SECTION 6. This Administrative Order shall take effect January 1, 1998 and shall remain valid for the entire year unless
otherwise lifted.

DONE in the City of Manila, this 27th day of December, in the year of our Lord, nineteen hundred and ninety-seven."

Subsequently, on December 10, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada issued AO 43, amending Section 4 of AO 372, by
reducing to five percent (5%) the amount of internal revenue allotment (IRA) to be withheld from the LGUs.

Petitioner contends that the President, in issuing AO 372, was in effect exercising the power of control over LGUs. The
Constitution vests in the President, however, only the power of general supervision over LGUs, consistent with the
principle of local autonomy. Petitioner further argues that the directive to withhold ten percent (10%) of their IRA is in
contravention of Section 286 of the Local Government Code and of Section 6, Article X of the Constitution, providing for
the automatic release to each of these units its share in the national internal revenue.

The solicitor general, on behalf of the respondents, claims on the other hand that AO 372 was issued to alleviate the
"economic difficulties brought about by the peso devaluation" and constituted merely an exercise of the President's power
of supervision over LGUs. It allegedly does not violate local fiscal autonomy, because it merely directs local
governments to identify measures that will reduce their total expenditures for non-personal services by at least 25 percent.
Likewise, the withholding of 10 percent of the LGUs IRA does not violate the statutory prohibition on the imposition of
any lien or holdback on their revenue shares, because such withholding is "temporary in nature pending the assessment
and evaluation by the Development Coordination Committee of the emerging fiscal situation."

The Issues

The Petition[3] submits the following issues for the Court's resolution:

"A. Whether or not the president committed grave abuse of discretion [in] ordering all LGUS to adopt a 25% cost
reduction program in violation of the LGU[']S fiscal autonomy

"B. Whether or not the president committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the withholding of 10% of the
LGU[']S IRA"

In sum, the main issue is whether (a) Section 1 of AO 372, insofar as it "directs" LGUs to reduce their expenditures by 25
percent; and (b) Section 4 of the same issuance, which withholds 10 percent of their internal revenue allotments, are valid
exercises of the President's power of general supervision over local governments.

Additionally, the Court deliberated on the question whether petitioner had the locus standi to bring this suit, despite
respondents' failure to raise the issue.[4] However, the intervention of Roberto Pagdanganan has rendered academic any
further discussion on this matter.

The Court's Ruling

The Petition is partly meritorious.

Main Issue:
Validity of AO 372
Insofar as LGUs Are Concerned
Before resolving the main issue, we deem it important and appropriate to define certain crucial concepts: (1) the scope of
the President's power of general supervision over local governments and (2) the extent of the local governments'
autonomy.

Scope of President's Power of Supervision Over LGUs

Section 4 of Article X of the Constitution confines the President's power over local governments to one of general
supervision. It reads as follows:

"Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. x x x"

This provision has been interpreted to exclude the power of control. In Mondano v. Silvosa,[5] the Court contrasted the
President's power of supervision over local government officials with that of his power of control over executive officials
of the national government. It was emphasized that the two terms -- supervision and control -- differed in meaning and
extent. The Court distinguished them as follows:

"x x x In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate
officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former may take such action or step as
prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or
modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer ha[s] done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for that of the latter."[6]

In Taule v. Santos,[7] we further stated that the Chief Executive wielded no more authority than that of checking whether
local governments or their officials were performing their duties as provided by the fundamental law and by statutes. He
cannot interfere with local governments, so long as they act within the scope of their authority. "Supervisory power, when
contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior body; it does not include any restraining authority
over such body,"[8] we said.

In a more recent case, Drilon v. Lim,[9] the difference between control and supervision was further delineated. Officers
in control lay down the rules in the performance or accomplishment of an act. If these rules are not followed, they may, in
their discretion, order the act undone or redone by their subordinates or even decide to do it themselves. On the other
hand, supervision does not cover such authority. Supervising officials merely see to it that the rules are followed, but they
themselves do not lay down such rules, nor do they have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not
observed, they may order the work done or redone, but only to conform to such rules. They may not prescribe their own
manner of execution of the act. They have no discretion on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed.

Under our present system of government, executive power is vested in the President.[10] The members of the Cabinet and
other executive officials are merely alter egos. As such, they are subject to the power of control of the President, at whose
will and behest they can be removed from office; or their actions and decisions changed, suspended or reversed.[11] In
contrast, the heads of political subdivisions are elected by the people. Their sovereign powers emanate from the
electorate, to whom they are directly accountable. By constitutional fiat, they are subject to the Presidents supervision
only, not control, so long as their acts are exercised within the sphere of their legitimate powers. By the same token, the
President may not withhold or alter any authority or power given them by the Constitution and the law.

Extent of Local Autonomy

Hand in hand with the constitutional restraint on the President's power over local governments is the state policy of
ensuring local autonomy.[12]

In Ganzon v. Court of Appeals,[13] we said that local autonomy signified "a more responsive and accountable local
government structure instituted through a system of decentralization." The grant of autonomy is intended to "break up the
monopoly of the national government over the affairs of local governments, x x x not x x x to end the relation of
partnership and interdependence between the central administration and local government units x x x." Paradoxically,
local governments are still subject to regulation, however limited, for the purpose of enhancing self-government.[14]

Decentralization simply means the devolution of national administration, not power, to local governments. Local officials
remain accountable to the central government as the law may provide.[15] The difference between decentralization of
administration and that of power was explained in detail in Limbona v. Mangelin[16] as follows:

"Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of
administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden
the base of government power and in the process to make local governments 'more responsive and accountable,'[17] and
'ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of
national development and social progress.'[18] At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of
managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises 'general
supervision'[19] over them, but only to 'ensure that local affairs are administered according to law.'[20] He has no control
over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.[21]

Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local government
units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its
future with minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of
power amounts to 'self-immolation,' since in that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the
central authorities but to its constituency."[22]

Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national government has not completely relinquished all its powers
over local governments, including autonomous regions. Only administrative powers over local affairs are delegated to
political subdivisions. The purpose of the delegation is to make governance more directly responsive and effective at the
local levels. In turn, economic, political and social development at the smaller political units are expected to propel social
and economic growth and development. But to enable the country to develop as a whole, the programs and policies
effected locally must be integrated and coordinated towards a common national goal. Thus, policy-setting for the entire
country still lies in the President and Congress. As we stated in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc., municipal
governments are still agents of the national government.[23]

The Nature of AO 372

Consistent with the foregoing jurisprudential precepts, let us now look into the nature of AO 372. As its preambular
clauses declare, the Order was a "cash management measure" adopted by the government "to match expenditures with
available resources," which were presumably depleted at the time due to "economic difficulties brought about by the peso
depreciation." Because of a looming financial crisis, the President deemed it necessary to "direct all government agencies,
state universities and colleges, government-owned and controlled corporations as well as local governments to reduce
their total expenditures by at least 25 percent along suggested areas mentioned in AO 372.

Under existing law, local government units, in addition to having administrative autonomy in the exercise of their
functions, enjoy fiscal autonomy as well. Fiscal autonomy means that local governments have the power to create their
own sources of revenue in addition to their equitable share in the national taxes released by the national government, as
well as the power to allocate their resources in accordance with their own priorities. It extends to the preparation of their
budgets, and local officials in turn have to work within the constraints thereof. They are not formulated at the national
level and imposed on local governments, whether they are relevant to local needs and resources or not. Hence, the
necessity of a balancing of viewpoints and the harmonization of proposals from both local and national officials,[24] who
in any case are partners in the attainment of national goals.

Local fiscal autonomy does not however rule out any manner of national government intervention by way of supervision,
in order to ensure that local programs, fiscal and otherwise, are consistent with national goals. Significantly, the
President, by constitutional fiat, is the head of the economic and planning agency of the government,[25] primarily
responsible for formulating and implementing continuing, coordinated and integrated social and economic policies, plans
and programs[26] for the entire country. However, under the Constitution, the formulation and the implementation of
such policies and programs are subject to "consultations with the appropriate public agencies, various private sectors, and
local government units." The President cannot do so unilaterally.

Consequently, the Local Government Code provides:[27]

"x x x [I]n the event the national government incurs an unmanaged public sector deficit, the President of the Philippines is
hereby authorized, upon the recommendation of [the] Secretary of Finance, Secretary of the Interior and Local
Government and Secretary of Budget and Management, and subject to consultation with the presiding officers of both
Houses of Congress and the presidents of the liga, to make the necessary adjustments in the internal revenue allotment of
local government units but in no case shall the allotment be less than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of national
internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current fiscal year x x x."

There are therefore several requisites before the President may interfere in local fiscal matters: (1) an unmanaged public
sector deficit of the national government; (2) consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate and the House of
Representatives and the presidents of the various local leagues; and (3) the corresponding recommendation of the
secretaries of the Department of Finance, Interior and Local Government, and Budget and Management. Furthermore,
any adjustment in the allotment shall in no case be less than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of national internal
revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current one.

Petitioner points out that respondents failed to comply with these requisites before the issuance and the implementation of
AO 372. At the very least, they did not even try to show that the national government was suffering from an
unmanageable public sector deficit. Neither did they claim having conducted consultations with the different leagues of
local governments. Without these requisites, the President has no authority to adjust, much less to reduce, unilaterally the
LGU's internal revenue allotment.

The solicitor general insists, however, that AO 372 is merely directory and has been issued by the President consistent
with his power of supervision over local governments. It is intended only to advise all government agencies and
instrumentalities to undertake cost-reduction measures that will help maintain economic stability in the country, which is
facing economic difficulties. Besides, it does not contain any sanction in case of noncompliance. Being merely an
advisory, therefore, Section 1 of AO 372 is well within the powers of the President. Since it is not a mandatory
imposition, the directive cannot be characterized as an exercise of the power of control.

While the wordings of Section 1 of AO 372 have a rather commanding tone, and while we agree with petitioner that the
requirements of Section 284 of the Local Government Code have not been satisfied, we are prepared to accept the
solicitor general's assurance that the directive to "identify and implement measures x x x that will reduce total
expenditures x x x by at least 25% of authorized regular appropriation" is merely advisory in character, and does not
constitute a mandatory or binding order that interferes with local autonomy. The language used, while authoritative, does
not amount to a command that emanates from a boss to a subaltern.

Rather, the provision is merely an advisory to prevail upon local executives to recognize the need for fiscal restraint in a
period of economic difficulty. Indeed, all concerned would do well to heed the President's call to unity, solidarity and
teamwork to help alleviate the crisis. It is understood, however, that no legal sanction may be imposed upon LGUs and
their officials who do not follow such advice. It is in this light that we sustain the solicitor general's contention in regard
to Section 1.

Withholding a Part of LGUs' IRA

Section 4 of AO 372 cannot, however, be upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of the
shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. This is mandated by no less than the Constitution.[28] The Local
Government Code[29] specifies further that the release shall be made directly to the LGU concerned within five (5) days
after every quarter of the year and "shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national
government for whatever purpose."[30] As a rule, the term "shall" is a word of command that must be given a compulsory
meaning.[31] The provision is, therefore, imperative.

Section 4 of AO 372, however, orders the withholding, effective January 1, 1998, of 10 percent of the LGUs' IRA
"pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development Budget Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal
situation" in the country. Such withholding clearly contravenes the Constitution and the law. Although temporary, it is
equivalent to a holdback, which means "something held back or withheld, often temporarily."[32] Hence, the "temporary"
nature of the retention by the national government does not matter. Any retention is prohibited.

In sum, while Section 1 of AO 372 may be upheld as an advisory effected in times of national crisis, Section 4 thereof has
no color of validity at all. The latter provision effectively encroaches on the fiscal autonomy of local governments.
Concededly, the President was well-intentioned in issuing his Order to withhold the LGUs IRA, but the rule of law
requires that even the best intentions must be carried out within the parameters of the Constitution and the law. Verily,
laudable purposes must be carried out by legal methods.

Refutation of Justice Kapunan's Dissent

Mr. Justice Santiago M. Kapunan dissents from our Decision on the grounds that, allegedly, (1) the Petition is premature;
(2) AO 372 falls within the powers of the President as chief fiscal officer; and (3) the withholding of the LGUs IRA is
implied in the President's authority to adjust it in case of an unmanageable public sector deficit.

First, on prematurity. According to the Dissent, when "the conduct has not yet occurred and the challenged construction
has not yet been adopted by the agency charged with administering the administrative order, the determination of the
scope and constitutionality of the executive action in advance of its immediate adverse effect involves too remote and
abstract an inquiry for the proper exercise of judicial function."

This is a rather novel theory -- that people should await the implementing evil to befall on them before they can question
acts that are illegal or unconstitutional. Be it remembered that the real issue here is whether the Constitution and the law
are contravened by Section 4 of AO 372, not whether they are violated by the acts implementing it. In the unanimous en
banc case Taada v. Angara,[33] this Court held that when an act of the legislative department is seriously alleged to have
infringed the Constitution, settling the controversy becomes the duty of this Court. By the mere enactment of the
questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even
without any other overt act. Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken
judicial duty. Said the Court:

"In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no
doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. 'The question thus
posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is
upheld.'[34] Once a 'controversy as to the application or interpretation of a constitutional provision is raised before this
Court x x x , it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide.'[35]

x x x x x x x x x

"As this Court has repeatedly and firmly emphasized in many cases,[36] it will not shirk, digress from or abandon its
sacred duty and authority to uphold the Constitution in matters that involve grave abuse of discretion brought before it in
appropriate cases, committed by any officer, agency, instrumentality or department of the government."

In the same vein, the Court also held in Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy:[37]

"x x x Judicial power includes not only the duty of the courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, but also the duty to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. The
courts, as guardians of the Constitution, have the inherent authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the
legislature transcends the limit imposed by the fundamental law. Where the statute violates the Constitution, it is not only
the right but the duty of the judiciary to declare such act unconstitutional and void."

By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is a coequal of Congress, is seriously
alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the laws, as in the present case, settling the dispute becomes the duty and
the responsibility of the courts.

Besides, the issue that the Petition is premature has not been raised by the parties; hence it is deemed waived.
Considerations of due process really prevents its use against a party that has not been given sufficient notice of its
presentation, and thus has not been given the opportunity to refute it.[38]

Second, on the President's power as chief fiscal officer of the country. Justice Kapunan posits that Section 4 of AO 372
conforms with the President's role as chief fiscal officer, who allegedly "is clothed by law with certain powers to ensure
the observance of safeguards and auditing requirements, as well as the legal prerequisites in the release and use of IRAs,
taking into account the constitutional and statutory mandates."[39] He cites instances when the President may lawfully
intervene in the fiscal affairs of LGUs.

Precisely, such powers referred to in the Dissent have specifically been authorized by law and have not been challenged as
violative of the Constitution. On the other hand, Section 4 of AO 372, as explained earlier, contravenes explicit
provisions of the Local Government Code (LGC) and the Constitution. In other words, the acts alluded to in the Dissent
are indeed authorized by law; but, quite the opposite, Section 4 of AO 372 is bereft of any legal or constitutional basis.

Third, on the President's authority to adjust the IRA of LGUs in case of an unmanageable public sector deficit. It must be
emphasized that in striking down Section 4 of AO 372, this Court is not ruling out any form of reduction in the IRAs of
LGUs. Indeed, as the President may make necessary adjustments in case of an unmanageable public sector deficit, as
stated in the main part of this Decision, and in line with Section 284 of the LGC, which Justice Kapunan cites. He,
however, merely glances over a specific requirement in the same provision -- that such reduction is subject to consultation
with the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress and, more importantly, with the presidents of the leagues of local
governments.

Notably, Justice Kapunan recognizes the need for "interaction between the national government and the LGUs at the
planning level," in order to ensure that "local development plans x x x hew to national policies and standards." The
problem is that no such interaction or consultation was ever held prior to the issuance of AO 372. This is why the
petitioner and the intervenor (who was a provincial governor and at the same time president of the League of Provinces of
the Philippines and chairman of the League of Leagues of Local Governments) have protested and instituted this action.
Significantly, respondents do not deny the lack of consultation.

In addition, Justice Kapunan cites Section 287[40] of the LGC as impliedly authorizing the President to withhold the IRA
of an LGU, pending its compliance with certain requirements. Even a cursory reading of the provision reveals that it is
totally inapplicable to the issue at bar. It directs LGUs to appropriate in their annual budgets 20 percent of their respective
IRAs for development projects. It speaks of no positive power granted the President to priorly withhold any amount. Not
at all.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. Respondents and their successors are hereby permanently PROHIBITED
from implementing Administrative Order Nos. 372 and 43, respectively dated December 27, 1997 and December 10,
1998, insofar as local government units are concerned.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
Kapunan, J., see dissenting opinion.
Purisima, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., join J. Kapunan in his dissenting opinion.
DISSENTING OPINION

KAPUNAN, J.:

In striking down as unconstitutional and illegal Section 4 of Administrative Order No. 372 ("AO No. 372"), the majority
opinion posits that the President exercised power of control over the local government units ("LGU), which he does not
have, and violated the provisions of Section 6, Article X of the Constitution, which states:

SEC. 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be
automatically released to them.

and Section 286(a) of the Local Government Code, which provides:

SEC. 286. Automatic Release of Shares. - (a) The share of each local government unit shall be released, without need of
any further action, directly to the provincial, city, municipal or barangay treasurer, as the case may be, on a quarterly basis
within five (5) days after the end of each quarter, and which shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be
imposed by the national government for whatever purpose.

The share of the LGUs in the national internal revenue taxes is defined in Section 284 of the same Local Government
Code, to wit:

SEC. 284. Allotment of Internal Revenue Taxes. - Local government units shall have a share in the national internal
revenue taxes based on the collection of the third fiscal year preceding the current fiscal year as follows:

(a) On the first year of the effectivity of this Code, thirty percent (30%);

(b) On the second year, thirty-five (35%) percent; and

(c) On the third year and thereafter, forty percent (40%).

Provided, That in the event that the national government incurs an unmanageable public sector deficit, the President of the
Philippines is hereby authorized, upon the recommendation of Secretary of Finance, Secretary of Interior and Local
Government and Secretary of Budget and Management, and subject to consultation with the presiding officers of both
Houses of Congress and the presidents of the liga, to make the necessary adjustments in the internal revenue allotment
of local government units but in no case shall the allotment be less than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of national
internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current fiscal year: Provided, further, That in the first year of
the effectivity of this Code, the local government units shall, in addition to the thirty percent (30%) internal revenue
allotment which shall include the cost of devolved functions for essential public services, be entitled to receive the amount
equivalent to the cost of devolved personal services.

x x x

The majority opinion takes the view that the withholding of ten percent (10%) of the internal revenue allotment ("IRA") to
the LGUs pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development Budget Coordinating Committee of the emerging
fiscal situation as called for in Section 4 of AO No. 372 transgresses against the above-quoted provisions which mandate
the "automatic" release of the shares of the LGUs in the national internal revenue in consonance with local fiscal
autonomy. The pertinent portions of AO No. 372 are reproduced hereunder:

ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 372

ADOPTION OF ECONOMY MEASURES IN GOVERNMENT FOR FY 1998

WHEREAS, the current economic difficulties brought about by the peso depreciation requires continued prudence in
government fiscal management to maintain economic stability and sustain the countrys growth momentum;

WHEREAS, it is imperative that all government agencies adopt cash management measures to match expenditures with
available resources; NOW THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of
the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby order and direct:

SECTION 1. All government departments and agencies, including x x x local government units will identify and
implement measures in FY 1998 that will reduce total appropriations for non-personal services items, along the following
suggested areas:

x x x

SECTION 4. Pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development Budget Coordinating Committee of the
emerging fiscal situation the amount equivalent to 10% of the internal revenue allotment to local government units shall
be withheld.

x x x

Subsequently, on December 10, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada issued Administrative Order No. 43 (AO No. 43),
amending Section 4 of AO No. 372, by reducing to five percent (5%) the IRA to be withheld from the LGUs, thus:

ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 43

AMENDING ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 372 DATED 27 DECEMBER 1997 ENTITLED "ADOPTION OF
ECONOMY MEASURES IN GOVERNMENT FOR FY 1998"

WHEREAS, Administrative Order No. 372 dated 27 December 1997 entitled "Adoption of Economy Measures in
Government for FY 1998" was issued to address the economic difficulties brought about by the peso devaluation in 1997;

WHEREAS, Section 4 of Administrative Order No. 372 provided that the amount equivalent to 10% of the internal
revenue allotment to local government units shall be withheld; and,

WHEREAS, there is a need to release additional funds to local government units for vital projects and expenditures.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the
powers vested in me by law, do hereby order the reduction of the withheld Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) of local
government units from ten percent to five percent.

The five percent reduction in the IRA withheld for 1998 shall be released before 25 December 1998.

DONE in the City of Manila, this 10th day of December, in the year of our Lord, nineteen hundred and ninety eight.

With all due respect, I beg to disagree with the majority opinion.

Section 4 of AO No. 372 does not present a case ripe for adjudication. The language of Section 4 does not conclusively
show that, on its face, the constitutional provision on the automatic release of the IRA shares of the LGUs has been
violated. Section 4, as worded, expresses the idea that the withholding is merely temporary which fact alone would not
merit an outright conclusion of its unconstitutionality, especially in light of the reasonable presumption that administrative
agencies act in conformity with the law and the Constitution. Where the conduct has not yet occurred and the challenged
construction has not yet been adopted by the agency charged with administering the administrative order, the
determination of the scope and constitutionality of the executive action in advance of its immediate adverse effect
involves too remote and abstract an inquiry for the proper exercise of judicial function. Petitioners have not shown that the
alleged 5% IRA share of LGUs that was temporarily withheld has not yet been released, or that the Department of Budget
and Management (DBM) has refused and continues to refuse its release. In view thereof, the Court should not decide as
this case suggests an abstract proposition on constitutional issues.

The President is the chief fiscal officer of the country. He is ultimately responsible for the collection and distribution of
public money:

SECTION 3. Powers and Functions. - The Department of Budget and Management shall assist the President in the
preparation of a national resources and expenditures budget, preparation, execution and control of the National Budget,
preparation and maintenance of accounting systems essential to the budgetary process, achievement of more economy and
efficiency in the management of government operations, administration of compensation and position classification
systems, assessment of organizational effectiveness and review and evaluation of legislative proposals having budgetary
or organizational implications.1

In a larger context, his role as chief fiscal officer is directed towards "the nation's efforts at economic and social
upliftment"2 for which more specific economic powers are delegated. Within statutory limits, the President can, thus, fix
"tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of
the national development program of the government,3 as he is also responsible for enlisting the country in international
economic agreements.4 More than this, to achieve "economy and efficiency in the management of government
operations," the President is empowered to create appropriation reserves,5 suspend expenditure appropriations,6 and
institute cost reduction schemes.7

As chief fiscal officer of the country, the President supervises fiscal development in the local government units and
ensures that laws are faithfully executed.8 For this reason, he can set aside tax ordinances if he finds them contrary to the
Local Government Code.9 Ordinances cannot contravene statutes and public policy as declared by the national
govemment.10 The goal of local economy is not to "end the relation of partnership and inter-dependence between the
central administration and local government units,"11 but to make local governments "more responsive and accountable"
[to] "ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of
national development and social progress."12

The interaction between the national government and the local government units is mandatory at the planning level. Local
development plans must thus hew to "national policies and standards13 as these are integrated into the regional
development plans for submission to the National Economic Development Authority. "14 Local budget plans and goals
must also be harmonized, as far as practicable, with "national development goals and strategies in order to optimize the
utilization of resources and to avoid duplication in the use of fiscal and physical resources."15

Section 4 of AO No. 372 was issued in the exercise by the President not only of his power of general supervision, but also
in conformity with his role as chief fiscal officer of the country in the discharge of which he is clothed by law with certain
powers to ensure the observance of safeguards and auditing requirements, as well as the legal prerequisites in the release
and use of IRAs, taking into account the constitutional16 and statutory17 mandates.

However, the phrase "automatic release" of the LGUs' shares does not mean that the release of the funds is mechanical,
spontaneous, self-operating or reflex. IRAs must first be determined, and the money for their payment collected.18 In this
regard, administrative documentations are also undertaken to ascertain their availability, limits and extent. The phrase,
thus, should be used in the context of the whole budgetary process and in relation to pertinent laws relating to audit and
accounting requirements. In the workings of the budget for the fiscal year, appropriations for expenditures are supported
by existing funds in the national coffers and by proposals for revenue raising. The money, therefore, available for IRA
release may not be existing but merely inchoate, or a mere expectation. It is not infrequent that the Executive
Department's proposals for raising revenue in the form of proposed legislation may not be passed by the legislature. As
such, the release of IRA should not mean release of absolute amounts based merely on mathematical computations. There
must be a prior determination of what exact amount the local government units are actually entitled in light of the
economic factors which affect the fiscal situation in the country. Foremost of these is where, due to an unmanageable
public sector deficit, the President may make the necessary adjustments in the IRA of LGUs. Thus, as expressly provided
in Article 284 of the Local Government Code:

x x x (I)n the event that the national government incurs an unmanageable public sector deficit, the President of the
Philippines is hereby authorized, upon the recommendation of Secretary of Finance, Secretary of Interior and Local
Government and Secretary of Budget and Management and subject to consultation with the presiding officers of both
Houses of Congress and the presidents of the "liga," to make the necessary adjustments in the internal revenue allotment
of local government units but in no case shall the allotment be less than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of national
internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current fiscal year. x x x.

Under the aforecited provision, if facts reveal that the economy has sustained or will likely sustain such "unmanageable
public sector deficit," then the LGUs cannot assert absolute right of entitlement to the full amount of forty percent (40%)
share in the IRA, because the President is authorized to make an adjustment and to reduce the amount to not less than
thirty percent (30%). It is, therefore, impractical to immediately release the full amount of the IRAs and subsequently
require the local government units to return at most ten percent (10%) once the President has ascertained that there exists
an unmanageable public sector deficit.

By necessary implication, the power to make necessary adjustments (including reduction) in the IRA in case of an
unmanageable public sector deficit, includes the discretion to withhold the IRAs temporarily until such time that the
determination of the actual fiscal situation is made. The test in determining whether one power is necessarily included in a
stated authority is: "The exercise of a more absolute power necessarily includes the lesser power especially where it is
needed to make the first power effective."19 If the discretion to suspend temporarily the release of the IRA pending such
examination is withheld from the President, his authority to make the necessary IRA adjustments brought about by the
unmanageable public sector deficit would be emasculated in the midst of serious economic crisis. In the situation conjured
by the majority opinion, the money would already have been gone even before it is determined that fiscal crisis is indeed
happening.

The majority opinion overstates the requirement in Section 286 of the Local Government Code that the IRAs "shall not be
subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national government for whatever purpose" as proof that no
withholding of the release of the IRAs is allowed albeit temporary in nature.

It is worthy to note that this provision does not appear in the Constitution. Section 6, Art X of the Constitution merely
directs that LGUs "shall have a just share" in the national taxes "as determined by law" and which share shall be
automatically released to them. This means that before the LGUs share is released, there should be first a
determination, which requires a process, of what is the correct amount as dictated by existing laws. For one, the
Implementing Rules of the Local Government Code allows deductions from the IRAs, to wit:

Article 384. Automatic Release of IRA Shares of LGUs:

x x x

(c) The IRA share of LGUs shall not be subject to any lien or hold back that may be imposed by the National
Government for whatever purpose unless otherwise provided in the Code or other applicable laws and loan contract on
project agreements arising from foreign loans and international commitments, such as premium contributions of LGUs to
the Government Service Insurance System and loans contracted by LGUs under foreign-assisted projects.

Apart from the above, other mandatory deductions are made from the IRAs prior to their release, such as: (1) total actual
cost of devolution and the cost of city-funded hospitals;20 and (2) compulsory contributions21 and other remittances.22 It
follows, therefore, that the President can withhold portions of IRAs in order to set-off or compensate legitimately incurred
obligations and remittances of LGUs.

Significantly, Section 286 of the Local Government Code does not make mention of the exact amount that should be
automatically released to the LGUs. The provision does not mandate that the entire 40% share mentioned in Section 284
shall be released. It merely provides that the "share" of each LGU shall be released and which "shall not be subject to any
lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national government for whatever purpose." The provision on automatic
release of IRA share should, thus, be read together with Section 284, including the proviso on adjustment or reduction of
IRAs, as well as other relevant laws. It may happen that the share of the LGUs may amount to the full forty percent (40%)
or the reduced amount of thirty percent (30%) as adjusted without any law being violated. In other words, all that Section
286 requires is the automatic release of the amount that the LGUs are rightfully and legally entitled to, which, as the same
section provides, should not be less than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of the national revenue taxes. So that even
if five percent (5%) or ten percent (10%) is either temporarily or permanently withheld, but the minimum of thirty percent
(30%) allotment for the LGUs is released pursuant to the President's authority to make the necessary adjustment in the
LGUS' share, there is still full compliance with the requirements of the automatic release of the LGUs' share.

Finally, the majority insists that the withholding of ten percent (10%) or five percent (5%) of the IRAs could not have
been done pursuant to the power of the President to adjust or reduce such shares under Section 284 of the Local
Government Code because there was no showing of an unmanageable public sector deficit by the national government,
nor was there evidence that consultations with the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress and the presidents of the
various leagues had taken place and the corresponding recommendations of the Secretary of Finance, Secretary of Interior
and Local Government and the Budget Secretary were made.

I beg to differ. The power to determine whether there is an unmanageable public sector deficit is lodged in the President.
The President's determination, as fiscal manager of the country, of the existence of economic difficulties which could
amount to "unmanageable public sector deficit" should be accorded respect. In fact, the withholding of the ten percent
(10%) of the LGUs' share was further justified by the current economic difficulties brought about by the peso depreciation
as shown by one of the "WHEREASES" of AO No. 372.23 In the absence of any showing to the contrary, it is presumed
that the President had made prior consultations with the officials thus mentioned and had acted upon the recommendations
of the Secretaries of Finance, Interior and Local Government and Budget.24

Therefore, even assuming hypothetically that there was effectively a deduction of five percent (5%) of the LGUs' share,
which was in accordance with the President's prerogative in view of the pronouncement of the existence of an
unmanageable public sector deficit, the deduction would still be valid in the absence of any proof that the LGUs' allotment
was less than the thirty percent (30%) limit provided for in Section 284 of the Local Government Code.

In resume, the withholding of the amount equivalent to five percent (5%) of the IRA to the LGUs was temporary pending
determination by the Executive of the actual share which the LGUs are rightfully entitled to on the basis of the applicable
laws, particularly Section 284 of the Local Government Code, authorizing the President to make the necessary
adjustments in the IRA of LGUs in the event of an unmanageable public sector deficit. And assuming that the said five
percent (5%) of the IRA pertaining to the 1998 Fiscal Year has been permanently withheld, there is no showing that the
amount actually released to the LGUs that same year was less than thirty percent (30%) of the national internal revenue
taxes collected, without even considering the proper deductions allowed by law.

WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the petition.


1 Executive Order No. 292, Book IV, Title XVII, Chapter 1.
2 Garcia v. Corona, G.R. No. 132451, December 17, 1999.
3 1987 CONSTITUTION, Article VI, Section 28 (2).
4 Taada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18 (1997).
5 Executive Order No. 292, Book VI, Chapter 5, Section 37.
6 Id., at Section 38.
7 Id., at Section 48.
8 San Juan v. CSC, 196 SCRA 69 (1991).
9 Drilon v. Lim, 235 SCRA 135 (1994).
10 Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc. and PAGCOR, 234 SCRA 255 (1994).
11 Ganzon v. CA, 200 SCRA 271, 286 (1991).
12 Id., at 287.
13 Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government code of 1991, Rule XXIII, Article 182 (1) (3).
14 Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, Rule XXIII, Article 182 (j) (1) (2).
15 Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, Rule XXXIV, Article 405 (b).

16 1987 CONSTITUTION, Art. X, Section 6.
17 Republic Act No. 7160, Title III, Section 286.
18 Hector De Leon, PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND CASES, p. 505 (1991).
19 Separate Opinion of J. Esguerra in Aquino v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183 (1974).
20 Republic Act No. 8760 (General Appropriations ACT for FY 2000).
21 See Eexecutive Order No. 190 (1999), Directing The Department of Budget And Management To Remit directly The
Contributions And Other Remittances Of Local Government Units To the Concerned National Government Agencies
(NGA), Government Financial Institutions (GFI), And Government Owned And/Or Controlled Corporations (GOCC).
22 Republic Act No. 8760 (General Appropriations Act for FY 2000). Includes debt write-offs under Sec. 531 of the
Local Government Code: Debt Relief for Local Government Units.-- xxx

(e) Recovery schemes for the national government.---xxx

The national government is hereby authorized to deduct from the quarterly share of each local government unit in the
internal revenue collections an amount to be determined on the basis of the amortization schedule of the local unit
concerned: Provided, That such amount shall not exceed five percent (5%) of the monthly internal revenue allotment of
the local government unit concerned.
23 WHEREAS, the current economic difficulties brought about by the peso depreciation requires continued prudence in
government fiscal management to maintain economic stability and sustain the countrys growth momentum.
24 Section 3, Rule 131 of the RULES OF COURT provides:

SEC. 3 Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be
contradicted and overcome by other evidence:

xxx

(m) That official duty has been regularly performed;

xxx.

[1] Rollo, pp. 48-55.

[2] Ibid., pp. 56-75.

[3] This case was deemed submitted for decision on September 27, 1999, upon receipt by this Court of respondents' 10-
page Memorandum, which was signed by Asst. Sol. Gen. Mariano M. Martinez and Sol. Ofelia B. Cajigal. Petitioner's
Memorandum was filed earlier, on September 21, 1999. Intervenor failed, despite due notice, to submit a memorandum
within the alloted time; thus, he is deemed to have waived the filing of one.

[4] Issues of mootness and locus standi were not raised by the respondents. However, the intervention of Roberto
Pagdanganan, as explained in the main text, has stopped any further discussion of petitioner's standing. On the other
hand, by the failure of respondents to raise mootness as an issue, the Court thus understands that the main issue is still
justiciable. In any case, respondents are deemed to have waived this defense or, at the very least, to have submitted the
Petition for resolution on the merits, for the future guidance of the government, the bench and the bar.

[5] 97 Phil. 143, May 30, 1955; per Padilla, J.

[6] Ibid., pp. 147-148. Reiterated in Ganzon v. Kayanan, 104 Phil. 484 (1985); Ganzon v. Court of Appeals, 200 SCRA
271, August 5, 1991; Taule v. Santos, 200 SCRA 512, August 12, 1991.

[7] Ibid.; citing Pelaez v. Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569, December 24, 1965; Hebron v. Reyes, 104 Phil. 175 (1958);
and Mondano v. Silvosa, supra.

[8] Ibid., p. 522; citing Hebron v. Reyes, ibid., per Concepcion, J.

[9] 235 SCRA 135, 142, August 4, 1994.

[10] 1, Art. VII of the Constitution.

[11] Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 ed., p. 739.

[12] The Constitution provides:

"Sec. 25[, Art. II]. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments."

"Sec. 2[, Art. X]. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy."

[13] 200 SCRA 271, 286, August 5, 1991, per Sarmiento, J.; citing 3, Art. X of the Constitution.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Ibid.

[16] 170 SCRA 786, 794-795, February 28, 1989, per Sarmiento, J.

[17] Citing 3, Art. X, 1987 Const.

[18] Citing 2, BP 337.

[19] Citing 4, Art. X, 1987 Const.

[20] Citing BP 337; and Hebron v. Reyes, supra.

[21] Citing Hebron v. Reyes, supra.

[22] Citing Bernas, "Brewing storm over autonomy," The Manila Chronicle, pp. 4-5.

[23] 234 SCRA 255, 272, July 20,1994.

[24] San Juan v. Civil Service Commission, 196 SCRA 69, 79, April 19, 1991.

[25] 9, Art. XII of the Constitution.

[26] 3, Chapter 1, Subtitle C, Title II, Book V, EO 292 (Administrative Code of 1987).

[27] 284. See also Art. 379 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991.

[28] 6 of Art. X of the Constitution reads:

"Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically
released to them."

[29] 286 (a) provides:

"Automatic Release of Shares. -- (a) The share of each local government unit shall be released, without need of any
further action, directly to the provincial, city, municipal or barangay treasurer, as the case may be, on a quarterly basis
within (5) days after the end of each quarter, and which shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed
by the national government for whatever purpose."

[30] Emphasis supplied.

[31] Ruben E. Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1990 ed., p. 239.

[32] Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 1993 ed.

[33] 272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997, per Panganiban, J.

[34] Citing Aquino Jr. v. Ponce Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 196, September 17, 1974.

[35] Citing Guingona Jr. v. Gonzales, 219 SCRA 326, 337, March 1, 1993.

[36] Cf. Daza v. Singson, 180 SCRA 496, December 21, 1989.

[37] 281 SCRA 330, 347-48, November 5, 1997, per Puno, J.

[38] See Philippine National Bank v. Sayo, Jr., 292 SCRA 202, July 9, 1998; Vinta Maritime Co., Inc. v. NLRC, 284
SCRA 656, January 23, 1998.

[39] Footnotes omitted.

[40] "Sec. 287. Local Development Projects. -- Each local government unit shall appropriate in its annual budget no less
than twenty percent (20%) of its annual internal revenue allotment for development projects. Copies of the development
plans of local government units shall be furnished the Department of Interior and Local Government."


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

HACIENDA LUISITA, INCORPORATED,
Petitioner,

LUISITA INDUSTRIAL PARK CORPORATION and RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION,
Petitioners-in-Intervention,

- versus -

PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL; SECRETARY NASSER PANGANDAMAN OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM; ALYANSA NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG BUKID NG HACIENDA
LUISITA, RENE GALANG, NOEL MALLARI, and JULIO SUNIGA[1] and his SUPERVISORY GROUP OF THE
HACIENDA LUISITA, INC. and WINDSOR ANDAYA,
Respondents.

G.R. No. 171101

Present:

CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA, and
SERENO,
REYES,
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.




Promulgated:

November 22, 2011
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

R E S O L U T I O N

VELASCO, JR., J.:


For resolution are the (1) Motion for Clarification and Partial Reconsideration dated July 21, 2011 filed by petitioner
Hacienda Luisita, Inc. (HLI); (2) Motion for Partial Reconsideration dated July 20, 2011 filed by public respondents
Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) and Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR); (3) Motion for
Reconsideration dated July 19, 2011 filed by private respondent Alyansa ng mga Manggagawang Bukid sa Hacienda
Luisita (AMBALA); (4) Motion for Reconsideration dated July 21, 2011 filed by respondent-intervenor Farmworkers
Agrarian Reform Movement, Inc. (FARM); (5) Motion for Reconsideration dated July 21, 2011 filed by private
respondents Noel Mallari, Julio Suniga, Supervisory Group of Hacienda Luisita, Inc. (Supervisory Group) and Windsor
Andaya (collectively referred to as Mallari, et al.); and (6) Motion for Reconsideration dated July 22, 2011 filed by
private respondents Rene Galang and AMBALA.[2]

On July 5, 2011, this Court promulgated a Decision[3] in the above-captioned case, denying the petition filed by HLI and
affirming Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) Resolution No. 2005-32-01 dated December 22, 2005 and
PARC Resolution No. 2006-34-01 dated May 3, 2006 with the modification that the original 6,296 qualified farmworker-
beneficiaries of Hacienda Luisita (FWBs) shall have the option to remain as stockholders of HLI.

In its Motion for Clarification and Partial Reconsideration dated July 21, 2011, HLI raises the following issues for Our
consideration:

A

IT IS NOT PROPER, EITHER IN LAW OR IN EQUITY, TO DISTRIBUTE TO THE ORIGINAL FWBs OF 6,296 THE
UNSPENT OR UNUSED BALANCE OF THE PROCEEDS OF THE SALE OF THE 500 HECTARES AND 80.51
HECTARES OF THE HLI LAND, BECAUSE:

(1) THE PROCEEDS OF THE SALE BELONG TO THE CORPORATION, HLI, AS CORPORATE CAPITAL AND
ASSETS IN SUBSTITUTION FOR THE PORTIONS OF ITS LAND ASSET WHICH WERE SOLD TO THIRD
PARTY;

(2) TO DISTRIBUTE THE CASH SALES PROCEEDS OF THE PORTIONS OF THE LAND ASSET TO THE FWBs,
WHO ARE STOCKHOLDERS OF HLI, IS TO DISSOLVE THE CORPORATION AND DISTRIBUTE THE
PROCEEDS AS LIQUIDATING DIVIDENDS WITHOUT EVEN PAYING THE CREDITORS OF THE
CORPORATION;

(3) THE DOING OF SAID ACTS WOULD VIOLATE THE STRINGENT PROVISIONS OF THE CORPORATION
CODE AND CORPORATE PRACTICE.

B

IT IS NOT PROPER, EITHER IN LAW OR IN EQUITY, TO RECKON THE PAYMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION
FROM NOVEMBER 21, 1989 WHEN THE PARC, THEN UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF DAR SECRETARY
MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, APPROVED THE STOCK DISTRIBUTION PLAN (SDP) PROPOSED BY
TADECO/HLI, BECAUSE:

(1) THAT PARC RESOLUTION NO. 89-12-2 DATED NOVEMBER 21, 1989 WAS NOT THE ACTUAL TAKING
OF THE TADECOs/HLIs AGRICULTURAL LAND;

(2) THE RECALL OR REVOCATION UNDER RESOLUTION NO. 2005-32-01 OF THAT SDP BY THE NEW PARC
UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF DAR SECRETARY NASSER PANGANDAMAN ON DECEMBER 22, 2005 OR
16 YEARS EARLIER WHEN THE SDP WAS APPROVED DID NOT RESULT IN ACTUAL TAKING ON
NOVEMBER 21, 1989;

(3) TO PAY THE JUST COMPENSATION AS OF NOVEMBER 21, 1989 OR 22 YEARS BACK WOULD BE
ARBITRARY, UNJUST, AND OPPRESSIVE, CONSIDERING THE IMPROVEMENTS, EXPENSES IN THE
MAINTENANCE AND PRESERVATION OF THE LAND, AND RISE IN LAND PRICES OR VALUE OF THE
PROPERTY.

On the other hand, PARC and DAR, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), raise the following issues in their
Motion for Partial Reconsideration dated July 20, 2011:

THE DOCTRINE OF OPERATIVE FACT DOES NOT APPLY TO THIS CASE FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

I

THERE IS NO LAW OR RULE WHICH HAS BEEN INVALIDATED ON THE GROUND OF
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY; AND

II

THIS DOCTRINE IS A RULE OF EQUITY WHICH MAY BE APPLIED ONLY IN THE ABSENCE OF A LAW. IN
THIS CASE, THERE IS A POSITIVE LAW WHICH MANDATES THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE LAND AS A
RESULT OF THE REVOCATION OF THE STOCK DISTRIBUTION PLAN (SDP).

For its part, AMBALA poses the following issues in its Motion for Reconsideration dated July 19, 2011:

I

THE MAJORITY OF THE MEMBERS OF THE HONORABLE COURT, WITH DUE RESPECT, ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT SECTION 31 OF REPUBLIC ACT 6657 (RA 6657) IS CONSTITUTIONAL.

II

THE MAJORITY OF THE MEMBERS OF THE HONORABLE COURT, WITH DUE RESPECT, ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT ONLY THE [PARCS] APPROVAL OF HLIs PROPOSAL FOR STOCK DISTRIBUTION UNDER
CARP AND THE [SDP] WERE REVOKED AND NOT THE STOCK DISTRIBUTION OPTION AGREEMENT
(SDOA).

III

THE MAJORITY OF THE MEMBERS OF THE HONORABLE COURT, WITH DUE RESPECT, ERRED IN
APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF OPERATIVE FACTS AND IN MAKING THE [FWBs] CHOOSE TO OPT FOR
ACTUAL LAND DISTRIBUTION OR TO REMAIN AS STOCKHOLDERS OF [HLI].

IV

THE MAJORITY OF THE MEMBERS OF THE HONORABLE COURT, WITH DUE RESPECT, ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT IMPROVING THE ECONOMIC STATUS OF FWBs IS NOT AMONG THE LEGAL
OBLIGATIONS OF HLI UNDER THE SDP AND AN IMPERATIVE IMPOSITION BY [RA 6657] AND
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 10 (DAO 10).

V

THE HONORABLE COURT, WITH DUE RESPECT, ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CONVERSION OF THE
AGRICULTURAL LANDS DID NOT VIOLATE THE CONDITIONS OF RA 6657 AND DAO 10.

VI

THE HONORABLE COURT, WITH DUE RESPECT, ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO
PAYMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION. SHOULD THE HONORABLE COURT AFFIRM THE ENTITLEMENT OF
THE PETITIONER TO JUST COMPENSATION, THE SAME SHOULD BE PEGGED TO FORTY THOUSAND
PESOS (PhP 40,000.00) PER HECTARE.

VII

THE HONORABLE COURT, WITH DUE RESPECT, ERRED IN HOLDING THAT LUISITA INDUSTRIAL PARK
CORP. (LIPCO) AND RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION (RCBC) ARE INNOCENT
PURCHASERS FOR VALUE.

In its Motion for Reconsideration dated July 21, 2011, FARM similarly puts forth the following issues:

I

THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE STRUCK DOWN SECTION 31 OF [RA 6657] FOR BEING
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY ISSUE THAT WAS RAISED BY THE RESPONDENTS-
INTERVENORS IS THE LIS MOTA OF THE CASE.

II

THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE APPLIED THE DOCTRINE OF OPERATIVE
FACT TO THE CASE. THE OPTION GIVEN TO THE FARMERS TO REMAIN AS STOCKHOLDERS OF
HACIENDA LUISITA IS EQUIVALENT TO AN OPTION FOR HACIENDA LUISITA TO RETAIN LAND IN
DIRECT VIOLATION OF THE COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM LAW. THE DECEPTIVE STOCK
DISTRIBUTION OPTION / STOCK DISTRIBUTION PLAN CANNOT JUSTIFY SUCH RESULT, ESPECIALLY
AFTER THE SUPREME COURT HAS AFFIRMED ITS REVOCATION.

III

THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE CONSIDERED [LIPCO] AND [RCBC] AS
INNOCENT PURCHASERS FOR VALUE IN THE INSTANT CASE.

Mallari, et al., on the other hand, advance the following grounds in support of their Motion for Reconsideration dated July
21, 2011:

(1) THE HOMELOTS REQUIRED TO BE DISTRIBUTED HAVE ALL BEEN DISTRIBUTED PURSUANT TO THE
MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT. WHAT REMAINS MERELY IS THE RELEASE OF TITLE FROM THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS.

(2) THERE HAS BEEN NO DILUTION OF SHARES. CORPORATE RECORDS WOULD SHOW THAT IF EVER
NOT ALL OF THE 18,804.32 SHARES WERE GIVEN TO THE ACTUAL ORIGINAL FARMWORKER
BENEFICIARY, THE RECIPIENT OF THE DIFFERENCE IS THE NEXT OF KIN OR CHILDREN OF SAID
ORIGINAL [FWBs]. HENCE, WE RESPECTFULLY SUBMIT THAT SINCE THE SHARES WERE GIVEN TO THE
SAME FAMILY BENEFICIARY, THIS SHOULD BE DEEMED AS SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE
PROVISIONS OF SECTION 4 OF DAO 10.

(3) THERE HAS BEEN NO VIOLATION OF THE 3-MONTH PERIOD TO IMPLEMENT THE [SDP] AS PROVIDED
FOR BY SECTION 11 OF DAO 10 AS THIS PROVISION MUST BE READ IN LIGHT OF SECTION 10 OF
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 229, THE PERTINENT PORTION OF WHICH READS, THE APPROVAL BY THE
PARC OF A PLAN FOR SUCH STOCK DISTRIBUTION, AND ITS INITIAL IMPLEMENTATION, SHALL BE
DEEMED COMPLIANCE WITH THE LAND DISTRIBUTION REQUIREMENT OF THE CARP.

(4) THE VALUATION OF THE LAND CANNOT BE BASED AS OF NOVEMBER 21, 1989, THE DATE OF
APPROVAL OF THE STOCK DISTRIBUTION OPTION. INSTEAD, WE RESPECTFULLY SUBMIT THAT THE
TIME OF TAKING FOR VALUATION PURPOSES IS A FACTUAL ISSUE BEST LEFT FOR THE TRIAL
COURTS TO DECIDE.

(5) TO THOSE WHO WILL CHOOSE LAND, THEY MUST RETURN WHAT WAS GIVEN TO THEM UNDER THE
SDP. IT WOULD BE UNFAIR IF THEY ARE ALLOWED TO GET THE LAND AND AT THE SAME TIME HOLD
ON TO THE BENEFITS THEY RECEIVED PURSUANT TO THE SDP IN THE SAME WAY AS THOSE WHO
WILL CHOOSE TO STAY WITH THE SDO.

Lastly, Rene Galang and AMBALA, through the Public Interest Law Center (PILC), submit the following grounds in
support of their Motion for Reconsideration dated July 22, 2011:

I

THE HONORABLE COURT, WITH DUE RESPECT, GRAVELY ERRED IN ORDERING THE HOLDING OF A
VOTING OPTION INSTEAD OF TOTALLY REDISTRIBUTING THE SUBJECT LANDS TO [FWBs] in [HLI].

A. THE HOLDING OF A VOTING OPTION HAS NO LEGAL BASIS. THE REVOCATION OF THE [SDP]
CARRIES WITH IT THE REVOCATION OF THE [SDOA].

B. GIVING THE [FWBs] THE OPTION TO REMAIN AS STOCKHOLDERS OF HLI WITHOUT MAKING THE
NECESSARY CHANGES IN THE CORPORATE STRUCTURE WOULD ONLY SUBJECT THEM TO FURTHER
MANIPULATION AND HARDSHIP.

C. OTHER VIOLATIONS COMMITTED BY HLI UNDER THE [SDOA] AND PERTINENT LAWS JUSTIFY TOTAL
LAND REDISTRIBUTION OF HACIENDA LUISITA.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT, WITH DUE RESPECT, GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE [RCBC] AND
[LIPCO] ARE INNOCENT PURCHASERS FOR VALUE OF THE 300-HECTARE PROPERTY IN HACIENDA
LUISITA THAT WAS SOLD TO THEM PRIOR TO THE INCEPTION OF THE PRESENT CONTROVERSY.

Ultimately, the issues for Our consideration are the following: (1) applicability of the operative fact doctrine; (2)
constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988; (3) coverage of compulsory
acquisition; (4) just compensation; (5) sale to third parties; (6) the violations of HLI; and (7) control over agricultural
lands.

We shall discuss these issues accordingly.

I. Applicability of the Operative Fact Doctrine

In their motion for partial reconsideration, DAR and PARC argue that the doctrine of operative fact does not apply to the
instant case since: (1) there is no law or rule which has been invalidated on the ground of unconstitutionality;[4] (2) the
doctrine of operative fact is a rule of equity which may be applied only in the absence of a law, and in this case, they
maintain that there is a positive law which mandates the distribution of the land as a result of the revocation of the stock
distribution plan (SDP).[5]

Echoing the stance of DAR and PARC, AMBALA submits that the operative fact doctrine should only be made to apply
in the extreme case in which equity demands it, which allegedly is not in the instant case.[6] It further argues that there
would be no undue harshness or injury to HLI in case lands are actually distributed to the farmworkers, and that the
decision which orders the farmworkers to choose whether to remain as stockholders of HLI or to opt for land distribution
would result in inequity and prejudice to the farmworkers.[7] The foregoing views are also similarly shared by Rene
Galang and AMBALA, through the PILC.[8] In addition, FARM posits that the option given to the FWBs is equivalent to
an option for HLI to retain land in direct violation of RA 6657.[9]

(a) Operative Fact Doctrine Not Limited to
Invalid or Unconstitutional Laws


Contrary to the stance of respondents, the operative fact doctrine does not only apply to laws subsequently declared
unconstitutional or unlawful, as it also applies to executive acts subsequently declared as invalid. As We have discussed in
Our July 5, 2011 Decision:

That the operative fact doctrine squarely applies to executive actsin this case, the approval by PARC of the HLI
proposal for stock distributionis well-settled in our jurisprudence. In Chavez v. National Housing Authority, We held:

Petitioner postulates that the operative fact doctrine is inapplicable to the present case because it is an equitable doctrine
which could not be used to countenance an inequitable result that is contrary to its proper office.

On the other hand, the petitioner Solicitor General argues that the existence of the various agreements implementing the
SMDRP is an operative fact that can no longer be disturbed or simply ignored, citing Rieta v. People of the Philippines.

The argument of the Solicitor General is meritorious.

The operative fact doctrine is embodied in De Agbayani v. Court of Appeals, wherein it is stated that a legislative or
executive act, prior to its being declared as unconstitutional by the courts, is valid and must be complied with, thus:

xxx xxx xxx

This doctrine was reiterated in the more recent case of City of Makati v. Civil Service Commission, wherein we ruled
that:

Moreover, we certainly cannot nullify the City Government's order of suspension, as we have no reason to do so, much
less retroactively apply such nullification to deprive private respondent of a compelling and valid reason for not filing the
leave application. For as we have held, a void act though in law a mere scrap of paper nonetheless confers legitimacy
upon past acts or omissions done in reliance thereof. Consequently, the existence of a statute or executive order prior to its
being adjudged void is an operative fact to which legal consequences are attached. It would indeed be ghastly unfair to
prevent private respondent from relying upon the order of suspension in lieu of a formal leave application.

The applicability of the operative fact doctrine to executive acts was further explicated by this Court in Rieta v. People,
thus:

Petitioner contends that his arrest by virtue of Arrest Search and Seizure Order (ASSO) No. 4754 was invalid, as the law
upon which it was predicated General Order No. 60, issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos was
subsequently declared by the Court, in Taada v. Tuvera, 33 to have no force and effect. Thus, he asserts, any evidence
obtained pursuant thereto is inadmissible in evidence.

We do not agree. In Taada, the Court addressed the possible effects of its declaration of the invalidity of various
presidential issuances. Discussing therein how such a declaration might affect acts done on a presumption of their validity,
the Court said:

. . .. In similar situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County
Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank to wit:

The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to be unconstitutional, was
not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the
challenged decree. . . . It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of
unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to [the determination of its
invalidity], is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be
erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in
various aspects with respect to particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become
vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light
of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand examination. These questions are among the most
difficult of those which have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal, and it is manifest from numerous decisions
that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.

xxx xxx xxx

Similarly, the implementation/ enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is an
operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new
judicial declaration . . . that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.

The Chicot doctrine cited in Taada advocates that, prior to the nullification of a statute, there is an imperative necessity
of taking into account its actual existence as an operative fact negating the acceptance of a principle of absolute
retroactive invalidity. Whatever was done while the legislative or the executive act was in operation should be duly
recognized and presumed to be valid in all respects. The ASSO that was issued in 1979 under General Order No. 60
long before our Decision in Taada and the arrest of petitioner is an operative fact that can no longer be disturbed or
simply ignored. (Citations omitted; emphasis in the original.)



Bearing in mind that PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2[10]an executive actwas declared invalid in the instant case, the
operative fact doctrine is clearly applicable.

Nonetheless, the minority is of the persistent view that the applicability of the operative fact doctrine should be limited to
statutes and rules and regulations issued by the executive department that are accorded the same status as that of a statute
or those which are quasi-legislative in nature. Thus, the minority concludes that the phrase executive act used in the
case of De Agbayani v. Philippine National Bank[11] refers only to acts, orders, and rules and regulations that have the
force and effect of law. The minority also made mention of the Concurring Opinion of Justice Enrique Fernando in
Municipality of Malabang v. Benito,[12] where it was supposedly made explicit that the operative fact doctrine applies to
executive acts, which are ultimately quasi-legislative in nature.

We disagree. For one, neither the De Agbayani case nor the Municipality of Malabang case elaborates what executive
act mean. Moreover, while orders, rules and regulations issued by the President or the executive branch have fixed
definitions and meaning in the Administrative Code and jurisprudence, the phrase executive act does not have such
specific definition under existing laws. It should be noted that in the cases cited by the minority, nowhere can it be found
that the term executive act is confined to the foregoing. Contrarily, the term executive act is broad enough to
encompass decisions of administrative bodies and agencies under the executive department which are subsequently
revoked by the agency in question or nullified by the Court.

A case in point is the concurrent appointment of Magdangal B. Elma (Elma) as Chairman of the Presidential Commission
on Good Government (PCGG) and as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel (CPLC) which was declared unconstitutional by
this Court in Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma.[13] In said case, this Court ruled that the concurrent appointment of
Elma to these offices is in violation of Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, since these are
incompatible offices. Notably, the appointment of Elma as Chairman of the PCGG and as CPLC is, without a question, an
executive act. Prior to the declaration of unconstitutionality of the said executive act, certain acts or transactions were
made in good faith and in reliance of the appointment of Elma which cannot just be set aside or invalidated by its
subsequent invalidation.

In Tan v. Barrios,[14] this Court, in applying the operative fact doctrine, held that despite the invalidity of the jurisdiction
of the military courts over civilians, certain operative facts must be acknowledged to have existed so as not to trample
upon the rights of the accused therein. Relevant thereto, in Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34,[15] it was ruled that
military tribunals pertain to the Executive Department of the Government and are simply instrumentalities of the
executive power, provided by the legislature for the President as Commander-in-Chief to aid him in properly commanding
the army and navy and enforcing discipline therein, and utilized under his orders or those of his authorized military
representatives.[16]

Evidently, the operative fact doctrine is not confined to statutes and rules and regulations issued by the executive
department that are accorded the same status as that of a statute or those which are quasi-legislative in nature.

Even assuming that De Agbayani initially applied the operative fact doctrine only to executive issuances like orders and
rules and regulations, said principle can nonetheless be applied, by analogy, to decisions made by the President or the
agencies under the executive department. This doctrine, in the interest of justice and equity, can be applied liberally and in
a broad sense to encompass said decisions of the executive branch. In keeping with the demands of equity, the Court can
apply the operative fact doctrine to acts and consequences that resulted from the reliance not only on a law or executive
act which is quasi-legislative in nature but also on decisions or orders of the executive branch which were later nullified.
This Court is not unmindful that such acts and consequences must be recognized in the higher interest of justice, equity
and fairness.

Significantly, a decision made by the President or the administrative agencies has to be complied with because it has the
force and effect of law, springing from the powers of the President under the Constitution and existing laws. Prior to the
nullification or recall of said decision, it may have produced acts and consequences in conformity to and in reliance of
said decision, which must be respected. It is on this score that the operative fact doctrine should be applied to acts and
consequences that resulted from the implementation of the PARC Resolution approving the SDP of HLI.

More importantly, respondents, and even the minority, failed to clearly explain how the option to remain in HLI granted
to individual farmers would result in inequity and prejudice. We can only surmise that respondents misinterpreted the
option as a referendum where all the FWBs will be bound by a majority vote favoring the retention of all the 6,296 FWBs
as HLI stockholders. Respondents are definitely mistaken. The fallo of Our July 5, 2011 Decision is unequivocal that
only those FWBs who signified their desire to remain as HLI stockholders are entitled to 18,804.32 shares each, while
those who opted not to remain as HLI stockholders will be given land by DAR. Thus, referendum was not required but
only individual options were granted to each FWB whether or not they will remain in HLI.

The application of the operative fact doctrine to the FWBs is not iniquitous and prejudicial to their interests but is actually
beneficial and fair to them. First, they are granted the right to remain in HLI as stockholders and they acquired said shares
without paying their value to the corporation. On the other hand, the qualified FWBs are required to pay the value of the
land to the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) if land is awarded to them by DAR pursuant to RA 6657. If the qualified
FWBs really want agricultural land, then they can simply say no to the option. And second, if the operative fact doctrine
is not applied to them, then the FWBs will be required to return to HLI the 3% production share, the 3% share in the
proceeds of the sale of the 500-hectare converted land, and the 80.51-hectare Subic-Clark-Tarlac Expressway (SCTEX)
lot, the homelots and other benefits received by the FWBs from HLI. With the application of the operative fact doctrine,
said benefits, homelots and the 3% production share and 3% share from the sale of the 500-hectare and SCTEX lots shall
be respected with no obligation to refund or return them. The receipt of these things is an operative fact that can no
longer be disturbed or simply ignored.

(b) The Operative Fact Doctrine as Recourse in Equity

As mentioned above, respondents contend that the operative fact doctrine is a rule of equity which may be applied only in
the absence of a law, and that in the instant case, there is a positive law which mandates the distribution of the land as a
result of the revocation of the SDP.

Undeniably, the operative fact doctrine is a rule of equity.[17] As a complement of legal jurisdiction, equity seeks to
reach and complete justice where courts of law, through the inflexibility of their rules and want of power to adapt their
judgments to the special circumstances of cases, are incompetent to do so. Equity regards the spirit and not the letter, the
intent and not the form, the substance rather than the circumstance, as it is variously expressed by different courts.[18]
Remarkably, it is applied only in the absence of statutory law and never in contravention of said law.[19]

In the instant case, respondents argue that the operative fact doctrine should not be applied since there is a positive law,
particularly, Sec. 31 of RA 6657, which directs the distribution of the land as a result of the revocation of the SDP.
Pertinently, the last paragraph of Sec. 31 of RA 6657 states:

If within two (2) years from the approval of this Act, the land or stock transfer envisioned above is not made or realized or
the plan for such stock distribution approved by the PARC within the same period, the agricultural land of the corporate
owners or corporation shall be subject to the compulsory coverage of this Act. (Emphasis supplied.)

Markedly, the use of the word or under the last paragraph of Sec. 31 of RA 6657 connotes that the law gives the
corporate landowner an option to avail of the stock distribution option or to have the SDP approved within two (2) years
from the approval of RA 6657. This interpretation is consistent with the well-established principle in statutory
construction that [t]he word or is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence of one thing from the
other things enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive
word.[20] In PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. v. Giraffe-X Creative Imaging, Inc.,[21] this Court held:

Evidently, the letter did not make a demand for the payment of the P8,248,657.47 AND the return of the equipment; only
either one of the two was required. The demand letter was prepared and signed by Atty. Florecita R. Gonzales,
presumably petitioners counsel. As such, the use of or instead of and in the letter could hardly be treated as a simple
typographical error, bearing in mind the nature of the demand, the amount involved, and the fact that it was made by a
lawyer. Certainly Atty. Gonzales would have known that a world of difference exists between and and or in the
manner that the word was employed in the letter.

A rule in statutory construction is that the word or is a disjunctive term signifying dissociation and independence of one
thing from other things enumerated unless the context requires a different interpretation.[22]

In its elementary sense, or, as used in a statute, is a disjunctive article indicating an alternative. It often connects a series
of words or propositions indicating a choice of either. When or is used, the various members of the enumeration are to
be taken separately.[23]

The word or is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence of one thing from each of the other things
enumerated.[24] (Emphasis in the original.)

Given that HLI secured approval of its SDP in November 1989, well within the two-year period reckoned from June 1988
when RA 6657 took effect, then HLI did not violate the last paragraph of Sec. 31 of RA 6657. Pertinently, said provision
does not bar Us from applying the operative fact doctrine.

Besides, it should be recognized that this Court, in its July 5, 2011 Decision, affirmed the revocation of Resolution No.
89-12-2 and ruled for the compulsory coverage of the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita in view of HLIs violation of
the SDP and DAO 10. By applying the operative fact doctrine, this Court merely gave the qualified FWBs the option to
remain as stockholders of HLI and ruled that they will retain the homelots and other benefits which they received from
HLI by virtue of the SDP.

It bears stressing that the application of the operative fact doctrine by the Court in its July 5, 2011 Decision is favorable to
the FWBs because not only were the FWBs allowed to retain the benefits and homelots they received under the stock
distribution scheme, they were also given the option to choose for themselves whether they want to remain as
stockholders of HLI or not. This is in recognition of the fact that despite the claims of certain farmer groups that they
represent the qualified FWBs in Hacienda Luisita, none of them can show that they are duly authorized to speak on their
behalf. As We have mentioned, To date, such authorization document, which would logically include a list of the names
of the authorizing FWBs, has yet to be submitted to be part of the records.

II. Constitutionality of Sec. 31, RA 6657

FARM insists that the issue of constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657 is the lis mota of the case, raised at the earliest
opportunity, and not to be considered as moot and academic.[25]

This contention is unmeritorious. As We have succinctly discussed in Our July 5, 2011 Decision:

While there is indeed an actual case or controversy, intervenor FARM, composed of a small minority of 27 farmers, has
yet to explain its failure to challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 3l of RA 6657, since as early as November 21, l989
when PARC approved the SDP of Hacienda Luisita or at least within a reasonable time thereafter and why its members
received benefits from the SDP without so much of a protest. It was only on December 4, 2003 or 14 years after approval
of the SDP via PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2 dated November 21, 1989 that said plan and approving resolution were
sought to be revoked, but not, to stress, by FARM or any of its members, but by petitioner AMBALA. Furthermore, the
AMBALA petition did NOT question the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, but concentrated on the purported flaws
and gaps in the subsequent implementation of the SDP. Even the public respondents, as represented by the Solicitor
General, did not question the constitutionality of the provision. On the other hand, FARM, whose 27 members formerly
belonged to AMBALA, raised the constitutionality of Sec. 31 only on May 3, 2007 when it filed its Supplemental
Comment with the Court. Thus, it took FARM some eighteen (18) years from November 21, 1989 before it challenged the
constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657 which is quite too late in the day. The FARM members slept on their rights and
even accepted benefits from the SDP with nary a complaint on the alleged unconstitutionality of Sec. 31 upon which the
benefits were derived. The Court cannot now be goaded into resolving a constitutional issue that FARM failed to assail
after the lapse of a long period of time and the occurrence of numerous events and activities which resulted from the
application of an alleged unconstitutional legal provision.

It has been emphasized in a number of cases that the question of constitutionality will not be passed upon by the Court
unless it is properly raised and presented in an appropriate case at the first opportunity. FARM is, therefore, remiss in
belatedly questioning the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657. The second requirement that the constitutional question
should be raised at the earliest possible opportunity is clearly wanting.

The last but the most important requisite that the constitutional issue must be the very lis mota of the case does not
likewise obtain. The lis mota aspect is not present, the constitutional issue tendered not being critical to the resolution of
the case. The unyielding rule has been to avoid, whenever plausible, an issue assailing the constitutionality of a statute or
governmental act. If some other grounds exist by which judgment can be made without touching the constitutionality of a
law, such recourse is favored. Garcia v. Executive Secretary explains why:

Lis Mota the fourth requirement to satisfy before this Court will undertake judicial review means that the Court will
not pass upon a question of unconstitutionality, although properly presented, if the case can be disposed of on some other
ground, such as the application of the statute or the general law. The petitioner must be able to show that the case cannot
be legally resolved unless the constitutional question raised is determined. This requirement is based on the rule that every
law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality; to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution, and not one that is doubtful, speculative, or argumentative.

The lis mota in this case, proceeding from the basic positions originally taken by AMBALA (to which the FARM
members previously belonged) and the Supervisory Group, is the alleged non-compliance by HLI with the conditions of
the SDP to support a plea for its revocation. And before the Court, the lis mota is whether or not PARC acted in grave
abuse of discretion when it ordered the recall of the SDP for such non-compliance and the fact that the SDP, as couched
and implemented, offends certain constitutional and statutory provisions. To be sure, any of these key issues may be
resolved without plunging into the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657. Moreover, looking deeply into the underlying
petitions of AMBALA, et al., it is not the said section per se that is invalid, but rather it is the alleged application of the
said provision in the SDP that is flawed.

It may be well to note at this juncture that Sec. 5 of RA 9700, amending Sec. 7 of RA 6657, has all but superseded Sec.
31 of RA 6657 vis--vis the stock distribution component of said Sec. 31. In its pertinent part, Sec. 5 of RA 9700
provides: [T]hat after June 30, 2009, the modes of acquisition shall be limited to voluntary offer to sell and compulsory
acquisition. Thus, for all intents and purposes, the stock distribution scheme under Sec. 31 of RA 6657 is no longer an
available option under existing law. The question of whether or not it is unconstitutional should be a moot issue.
(Citations omitted; emphasis in the original.)

Based on the foregoing disquisitions, We maintain that this Court is NOT compelled to rule on the constitutionality of
Sec. 31 of RA 6657. In this regard, We clarify that this Court, in its July 5, 2011 Decision, made no ruling in favor of the
constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657. There was, however, a determination of the existence of an apparent grave
violation of the Constitution that may justify the resolution of the issue of constitutionality, to which this Court ruled in
the negative. Having clarified this matter, all other points raised by both FARM and AMBALA concerning the
constitutionality of RA 6657 deserve scant consideration.



III. Coverage of Compulsory Acquisition

FARM argues that this Court ignored certain material facts when it limited the maximum area to be covered to 4,915.75
hectares, whereas the area that should, at the least, be covered is 6,443 hectares,[26] which is the agricultural land
allegedly covered by RA 6657 and previously held by Tarlac Development Corporation (Tadeco).[27]

We cannot subscribe to this view. Since what is put in issue before the Court is the propriety of the revocation of the SDP,
which only involves 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land and not 6,443 has., then We are constrained to rule only as regards
the 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land.

Moreover, as admitted by FARM itself, this issue was raised for the first time by FARM in its Memorandum dated
September 24, 2010 filed before this Court.[28] In this regard, it should be noted that [a]s a legal recourse, the special
civil action of certiorari is a limited form of review.[29] The certiorari jurisdiction of this Court is narrow in scope as it is
restricted to resolving errors of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion, and not errors of judgment.[30] To allow
additional issues at this stage of the proceedings is violative of fair play, justice and due process.[31]

Nonetheless, it should be taken into account that this should not prevent the DAR, under its mandate under the agrarian
reform law, from subsequently subjecting to agrarian reform other agricultural lands originally held by Tadeco that were
allegedly not transferred to HLI but were supposedly covered by RA 6657.

DAR, however, contends that the declaration of the area[32] to be awarded to each FWB is too restrictive. It stresses that
in agricultural landholdings like Hacienda Luisita, there are roads, irrigation canals, and other portions of the land that are
considered commonly-owned by farmworkers, and this may necessarily result in the decrease of the area size that may be
awarded per FWB.[33] DAR also argues that the July 5, 2011 Decision of this Court does not give it any leeway in
adjusting the area that may be awarded per FWB in case the number of actual qualified FWBs decreases.[34]

The argument is meritorious. In order to ensure the proper distribution of the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita per
qualified FWB, and considering that matters involving strictly the administrative implementation and enforcement of
agrarian reform laws are within the jurisdiction of the DAR,[35] it is the latter which shall determine the area with which
each qualified FWB will be awarded.

(a) Conversion of Agricultural Lands

AMBALA insists that the conversion of the agricultural lands violated the conditions of RA 6657 and DAO 10, stating
that keeping the land intact and unfragmented is one of the essential conditions of [the] SD[P], RA 6657 and DAO
10.[36] It asserts that this provision or conditionality is not mere decoration and is intended to ensure that the farmers
can continue with the tillage of the soil especially since it is the only occupation that majority of them knows.[37]

We disagree. As We amply discussed in Our July 5, 2011 Decision:

Contrary to the almost parallel stance of the respondents, keeping Hacienda Luisita unfragmented is also not among the
imperative impositions by the SDP, RA 6657, and DAO 10.

The Terminal Report states that the proposed distribution plan submitted in 1989 to the PARC effectively assured the
intended stock beneficiaries that the physical integrity of the farm shall remain inviolate. Accordingly, the Terminal
Report and the PARC-assailed resolution would take HLI to task for securing approval of the conversion to non-
agricultural uses of 500 hectares of the hacienda. In not too many words, the Report and the resolution view the
conversion as an infringement of Sec. 5(a) of DAO 10 which reads: a. that the continued operation of the corporation
with its agricultural land intact and unfragmented is viable with potential for growth and increased profitability.

The PARC is wrong.

In the first place, Sec. 5(a)just like the succeeding Sec. 5(b) of DAO 10 on increased income and greater benefits to
qualified beneficiariesis but one of the stated criteria to guide PARC in deciding on whether or not to accept an SDP.
Said Sec. 5(a) does not exact from the corporate landowner-applicant the undertaking to keep the farm intact and
unfragmented ad infinitum. And there is logic to HLIs stated observation that the key phrase in the provision of Sec. 5(a)
is viability of corporate operations: [w]hat is thus required is not the agricultural land remaining intact x x x but the
viability of the corporate operations with its agricultural land being intact and unfragmented. Corporate operation may be
viable even if the corporate agricultural land does not remain intact or [un]fragmented.[38]

It is, of course, anti-climactic to mention that DAR viewed the conversion as not violative of any issuance, let alone
undermining the viability of Hacienda Luisitas operation, as the DAR Secretary approved the land conversion applied for
and its disposition via his Conversion Order dated August 14, 1996 pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA 6657 which reads:

Sec. 65. Conversion of Lands.After the lapse of five years from its award when the land ceases to be economically
feasible and sound for agricultural purposes, or the locality has become urbanized and the land will have a greater
economic value for residential, commercial or industrial purposes, the DAR upon application of the beneficiary or
landowner with due notice to the affected parties, and subject to existing laws, may authorize the x x x conversion of the
land and its dispositions. x x x

Moreover, it is worth noting that the application for conversion had the backing of 5,000 or so FWBs, including
respondents Rene Galang, and Jose Julio Suniga, then leaders of the AMBALA and the Supervisory Group, respectively,
as evidenced by the Manifesto of Support they signed and which was submitted to the DAR.[39] If at all, this means that
AMBALA should be estopped from questioning the conversion of a portion of Hacienda Luisita, which its leader has fully
supported.

(b) LIPCO and RCBC as Innocent Purchasers for Value

The AMBALA, Rene Galang and the FARM are in accord that Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) and
Luisita Industrial Park Corporation (LIPCO) are not innocent purchasers for value. The AMBALA, in particular, argues
that LIPCO, being a wholly-owned subsidiary of HLI, is conclusively presumed to have knowledge of the agrarian dispute
on the subject land and could not feign ignorance of this fact, especially since they have the same directors and
stockholders.[40] This is seconded by Rene Galang and AMBALA, through the PILC, which intimate that a look at the
General Information Sheets of the companies involved in the transfers of the 300-hectare portion of Hacienda Luisita,
specifically, Centennary Holdings, Inc. (Centennary), LIPCO and RCBC, would readily reveal that their directors are
interlocked and connected to Tadeco and HLI.[41] Rene Galang and AMBALA, through the PILC, also allege that with
the clear-cut involvement of the leadership of all the corporations concerned, LIPCO and RCBC cannot feign ignorance
that the parcels of land they bought are under the coverage of the comprehensive agrarian reform program [CARP] and
that the conditions of the respective sales are imbued with public interest where normal property relations in the Civil Law
sense do not apply.[42]

Avowing that the land subject of conversion still remains undeveloped, Rene Galang and AMBALA, through the PILC,
further insist that the condition that [t]he development of the land should be completed within the period of five [5] years
from the issuance of this Order was not complied with. AMBALA also argues that since RCBC and LIPCO merely
stepped into the shoes of HLI, then they must comply with the conditions imposed in the conversion order.[43]

In addition, FARM avers that among the conditions attached to the conversion order, which RCBC and LIPCO
necessarily have knowledge of, are (a) that its approval shall in no way amend, diminish, or alter the undertaking and
obligations of HLI as contained in the [SDP] approved on November 21, 1989; and (b) that the benefits, wages and the
like, received by the FWBs shall not in any way be reduced or adversely affected, among others.[44]

The contentions of respondents are wanting. In the first place, there is no denying that RCBC and LIPCO knew that the
converted lands they bought were under the coverage of CARP. Nevertheless, as We have mentioned in Our July 5, 2011
Decision, this does not necessarily mean that both LIPCO and RCBC already acted in bad faith in purchasing the
converted lands. As this Court explained:

It cannot be claimed that RCBC and LIPCO acted in bad faith in acquiring the lots that were previously covered by the
SDP. Good faith consists in the possessors belief that the person from whom he received it was the owner of the same
and could convey his title. Good faith requires a well-founded belief that the person from whom title was received was
himself the owner of the land, with the right to convey it. There is good faith where there is an honest intention to abstain
from taking any unconscientious advantage from another. It is the opposite of fraud.

To be sure, intervenor RCBC and LIPCO knew that the lots they bought were subjected to CARP coverage by means of a
stock distribution plan, as the DAR conversion order was annotated at the back of the titles of the lots they acquired.
However, they are of the honest belief that the subject lots were validly converted to commercial or industrial purposes
and for which said lots were taken out of the CARP coverage subject of PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2 and, hence, can be
legally and validly acquired by them. After all, Sec. 65 of RA 6657 explicitly allows conversion and disposition of
agricultural lands previously covered by CARP land acquisition after the lapse of five (5) years from its award when the
land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes or the locality has become urbanized and the
land will have a greater economic value for residential, commercial or industrial purposes. Moreover, DAR notified all
the affected parties, more particularly the FWBs, and gave them the opportunity to comment or oppose the proposed
conversion. DAR, after going through the necessary processes, granted the conversion of 500 hectares of Hacienda
Luisita pursuant to its primary jurisdiction under Sec. 50 of RA 6657 to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters
and its original exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform. The DAR
conversion order became final and executory after none of the FWBs interposed an appeal to the CA. In this factual
setting, RCBC and LIPCO purchased the lots in question on their honest and well-founded belief that the previous
registered owners could legally sell and convey the lots though these were previously subject of CARP coverage. Ergo,
RCBC and LIPCO acted in good faith in acquiring the subject lots. (Emphasis supplied.)

In the second place, the allegation that the converted lands remain undeveloped is contradicted by the evidence on record,
particularly, Annex X of LIPCOs Memorandum dated September 23, 2010,[45] which has photographs showing that
the land has been partly developed.[46] Certainly, it is a general rule that the factual findings of administrative agencies
are conclusive and binding on the Court when supported by substantial evidence.[47] However, this rule admits of certain
exceptions, one of which is when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted
by the evidence on record.[48]

In the third place, by arguing that the companies involved in the transfers of the 300-hectare portion of Hacienda Luisita
have interlocking directors and, thus, knowledge of one may already be imputed upon all the other companies, AMBALA
and Rene Galang, in effect, want this Court to pierce the veil of corporate fiction. However, piercing the veil of corporate
fiction is warranted only in cases when the separate legal entity is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong,
protect fraud, or defend crime, such that in the case of two corporations, the law will regard the corporations as merged
into one.[49] As succinctly discussed by the Court in Velarde v. Lopez, Inc.:[50]

Petitioner argues nevertheless that jurisdiction over the subsidiary is justified by piercing the veil of corporate fiction.
Piercing the veil of corporate fiction is warranted, however, only in cases when the separate legal entity is used to defeat
public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, such that in the case of two corporations, the law will
regard the corporations as merged into one. The rationale behind piercing a corporations identity is to remove the barrier
between the corporation from the persons comprising it to thwart the fraudulent and illegal schemes of those who use the
corporate personality as a shield for undertaking certain proscribed activities.

In applying the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction, the following requisites must be established: (1) control,
not merely majority or complete stock control; (2) such control must have been used by the defendant to commit fraud or
wrong, to perpetuate the violation of a statutory or other positive legal duty, or dishonest acts in contravention of
plaintiffs legal rights; and (3) the aforesaid control and breach of duty must proximately cause the injury or unjust loss
complained of. (Citations omitted.)

Nowhere, however, in the pleadings and other records of the case can it be gathered that respondent has complete control
over Sky Vision, not only of finances but of policy and business practice in respect to the transaction attacked, so that
Sky Vision had at the time of the transaction no separate mind, will or existence of its own. The existence of interlocking
directors, corporate officers and shareholders is not enough justification to pierce the veil of corporate fiction in the
absence of fraud or other public policy considerations.

Absent any allegation or proof of fraud or other public policy considerations, the existence of interlocking directors,
officers and stockholders is not enough justification to pierce the veil of corporate fiction as in the instant case.

And in the fourth place, the fact that this Court, in its July 5, 2011 Decision, ordered the payment of the proceeds of the
sale of the converted land, and even of the 80.51-hectare land sold to the government, through the Bases Conversion
Development Authority, to the qualified FWBs, effectively fulfils the conditions in the conversion order, to wit: (1) that
its approval shall in no way amend, diminish, or alter the undertaking and obligations of HLI as contained in the SDP
approved on November 21, 1989; and (2) that the benefits, wages and the like, received by the FWBs shall not in any way
be reduced or adversely affected, among others.

A view has also been advanced that the 200-hectare lot transferred to Luisita Realty Corporation (LRC) should be
included in the compulsory coverage because the corporation did not intervene.

We disagree. Since the 200-hectare lot formed part of the SDP that was nullified by PARC Resolution 2005-32-01, this
Court is constrained to make a ruling on the rights of LRC over the said lot. Moreover, the 500-hectare portion of
Hacienda Luisita, of which the 200-hectare portion sold to LRC and the 300-hectare portion subsequently acquired by
LIPCO and RCBC were part of, was already the subject of the August 14, 1996 DAR Conversion Order. By virtue of the
said conversion order, the land was already reclassified as industrial/commercial land not subject to compulsory coverage.
Thus, if We place the 200-hectare lot sold to LRC under compulsory coverage, this Court would, in effect, be disregarding
the DAR Conversion Order, which has long attained its finality. And as this Court held in Berboso v. CA,[51] Once final
and executory, the Conversion Order can no longer be questioned. Besides, to disregard the Conversion Order through
the revocation of the approval of the SDP would create undue prejudice to LRC, which is not even a party to the
proceedings below, and would be tantamount to deprivation of property without due process of law.

Nonethess, the minority is of the adamant view that since LRC failed to intervene in the instant case and was, therefore,
unable to present evidence supporting its good faith purchase of the 200-hectare converted land, then LRC should be
given full opportunity to present its case before the DAR. This minority view is a contradiction in itself. Given that LRC
did not intervene and is, therefore, not a party to the instant case, then it would be incongruous to order them to present
evidence before the DAR. Such an order, if issued by this Court, would not be binding upon the LRC.

Moreover, LRC may be considered to have waived its right to participate in the instant petition since it did not intervene
in the DAR proceedings for the nullification of the PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2 which approved the SDP.

(c) Proceeds of the sale of the 500-hectare converted land
and of the 80.51-hectare land used for the SCTEX


As previously mentioned, We ruled in Our July 5, 2011 Decision that since the Court excluded the 500-hectare lot subject
of the August 14, 1996 Conversion Order and the 80.51-hectare SCTEX lot acquired by the government from compulsory
coverage, then HLI and its subsidiary, Centennary, should be liable to the FWBs for the price received for said lots. Thus:

There is a claim that, since the sale and transfer of the 500 hectares of land subject of the August 14, 1996 Conversion
Order and the 80.51-hectare SCTEX lot came after compulsory coverage has taken place, the FWBs should have their
corresponding share of the lands value. There is merit in the claim. Since the SDP approved by PARC Resolution No.
89-12-2 has been nullified, then all the lands subject of the SDP will automatically be subject of compulsory coverage
under Sec. 31 of RA 6657. Since the Court excluded the 500-hectare lot subject of the August 14, 1996 Conversion Order
and the 80.51-hectare SCTEX lot acquired by the government from the area covered by SDP, then HLI and its subsidiary,
Centennary, shall be liable to the FWBs for the price received for said lots. HLI shall be liable for the value received for
the sale of the 200-hectare land to LRC in the amount of PhP 500,000,000 and the equivalent value of the 12,000,000
shares of its subsidiary, Centennary, for the 300-hectare lot sold to LIPCO for the consideration of PhP 750,000,000.
Likewise, HLI shall be liable for PhP 80,511,500 as consideration for the sale of the 80.51-hectare SCTEX lot.

We, however, note that HLI has allegedly paid 3% of the proceeds of the sale of the 500-hectare land and 80.51-hectare
SCTEX lot to the FWBs. We also take into account the payment of taxes and expenses relating to the transfer of the land
and HLIs statement that most, if not all, of the proceeds were used for legitimate corporate purposes. In order to
determine once and for all whether or not all the proceeds were properly utilized by HLI and its subsidiary, Centennary,
DAR will engage the services of a reputable accounting firm to be approved by the parties to audit the books of HLI to
determine if the proceeds of the sale of the 500-hectare land and the 80.51-hectare SCTEX lot were actually used for
legitimate corporate purposes, titling expenses and in compliance with the August 14, 1996 Conversion Order. The cost
of the audit will be shouldered by HLI. If after such audit, it is determined that there remains a balance from the proceeds
of the sale, then the balance shall be distributed to the qualified FWBs.

HLI, however, takes exception to the above-mentioned ruling and contends that it is not proper to distribute the unspent or
unused balance of the proceeds of the sale of the 500-hectare converted land and 80.51-hectare SCTEX lot to the qualified
FWBs for the following reasons: (1) the proceeds of the sale belong to the corporation, HLI, as corporate capital and
assets in substitution for the portions of its land asset which were sold to third parties; (2) to distribute the cash sales
proceeds of the portions of the land asset to the FWBs, who are stockholders of HLI, is to dissolve the corporation and
distribute the proceeds as liquidating dividends without even paying the creditors of the corporation; and (3) the doing of
said acts would violate the stringent provisions of the Corporation Code and corporate practice.[52]

Apparently, HLI seeks recourse to the Corporation Code in order to avoid its liability to the FWBs for the price received
for the 500-hectare converted lot and the 80.51-hectare SCTEX lot. However, as We have established in Our July 5, 2011
Decision, the rights, obligations and remedies of the parties in the instant case are primarily governed by RA 6657 and
HLI cannot shield itself from the CARP coverage merely under the convenience of being a corporate entity. In this regard,
it should be underscored that the agricultural lands held by HLI by virtue of the SDP are no ordinary assets. These are
special assets, because, originally, these should have been distributed to the FWBs were it not for the approval of the SDP
by PARC. Thus, the government cannot renege on its responsibility over these assets. Likewise, HLI is no ordinary
corporation as it was formed and organized precisely to make use of these agricultural lands actually intended for
distribution to the FWBs. Thus, it cannot shield itself from the coverage of CARP by invoking the Corporation Code. As
explained by the Court:

HLI also parlays the notion that the parties to the SDOA should now look to the Corporation Code, instead of to RA 6657,
in determining their rights, obligations and remedies. The Code, it adds, should be the applicable law on the disposition
of the agricultural land of HLI.

Contrary to the view of HLI, the rights, obligations and remedies of the parties to the SDOA embodying the SDP are
primarily governed by RA 6657. It should abundantly be made clear that HLI was precisely created in order to comply
with RA 6657, which the OSG aptly described as the mother law of the SDOA and the SDP.[53] It is, thus, paradoxical
for HLI to shield itself from the coverage of CARP by invoking exclusive applicability of the Corporation Code under the
guise of being a corporate entity.

Without in any way minimizing the relevance of the Corporation Code since the FWBs of HLI are also stockholders, its
applicability is limited as the rights of the parties arising from the SDP should not be made to supplant or circumvent the
agrarian reform program.

Without doubt, the Corporation Code is the general law providing for the formation, organization and regulation of private
corporations. On the other hand, RA 6657 is the special law on agrarian reform. As between a general and special law, the
latter shall prevailgeneralia specialibus non derogant.[54] Besides, the present impasse between HLI and the private
respondents is not an intra-corporate dispute which necessitates the application of the Corporation Code. What private
respondents questioned before the DAR is the proper implementation of the SDP and HLIs compliance with RA 6657.
Evidently, RA 6657 should be the applicable law to the instant case. (Emphasis supplied.)

Considering that the 500-hectare converted land, as well as the 80.51-hectare SCTEX lot, should have been included in
the compulsory coverage were it not for their conversion and valid transfers, then it is only but proper that the price
received for the sale of these lots should be given to the qualified FWBs. In effect, the proceeds from the sale shall take
the place of the lots.

The Court, in its July 5, 2011 Decision, however, takes into account, inter alia, the payment of taxes and expenses relating
to the transfer of the land, as well as HLIs statement that most, if not all, of the proceeds were used for legitimate
corporate purposes. Accordingly, We ordered the deduction of the taxes and expenses relating to the transfer of titles to
the transferees, and the expenditures incurred by HLI and Centennary for legitimate corporate purposes, among others.

On this note, DAR claims that the [l]egitimate corporate expenses should not be deducted as there is no basis for it,
especially since only the auditing to be conducted on the financial records of HLI will reveal the amounts to be offset
between HLI and the FWBs.[55]

The contention is unmeritorious. The possibility of an offsetting should not prevent Us from deducting the legitimate
corporate expenses incurred by HLI and Centennary. After all, the Court has ordered for a proper auditing [i]n order to
determine once and for all whether or not all the proceeds were properly utilized by HLI and its subsidiary, Centennary.
In this regard, DAR is tasked to engage the services of a reputable accounting firm to be approved by the parties to audit
the books of HLI to determine if the proceeds of the sale of the 500-hectare land and the 80.51-hectare SCTEX lot were
actually used for legitimate corporate purposes, titling expenses and in compliance with the August 14, 1996 Conversion
Order. Also, it should be noted that it is HLI which shall shoulder the cost of audit to reduce the burden on the part of the
FWBs. Concomitantly, the legitimate corporate expenses incurred by HLI and Centennary, as will be determined by a
reputable accounting firm to be engaged by DAR, shall be among the allowable deductions from the proceeds of the sale
of the 500-hectare land and the 80.51-hectare SCTEX lot.

We, however, find that the 3% production share should not be deducted from the proceeds of the sale of the 500-hectare
converted land and the 80.51-hectare SCTEX lot. The 3% production share, like the homelots, was among the benefits
received by the FWBs as farmhands in the agricultural enterprise of HLI and, thus, should not be taken away from the
FWBs.

Contrarily, the minority is of the view that as a consequence of the revocation of the SDP, the parties should be restored to
their respective conditions prior to its execution and approval, subject to the application of the principle of set-off or
compensation. Such view is patently misplaced.

The law on contracts, i.e. mutual restitution, does not apply to the case at bar. To reiterate, what was actually revoked by
this Court, in its July 5, 2011 Decision, is PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2 approving the SDP. To elucidate, it was the
SDP, not the SDOA, which was presented for approval by Tadeco to DAR.[56] The SDP explained the mechanics of the
stock distribution but did not make any reference nor correlation to the SDOA. The pertinent portions of the proposal
read:

MECHANICS OF STOCK DISTRIBUTION PLAN

Under Section 31 of Republic Act No. 6657, a corporation owning agricultural land may distribute among the qualified
beneficiaries such proportion or percentage of its capital stock that the value of the agricultural land actually devoted to
agricultural activities, bears in relation to the corporations total assets. Conformably with this legal provision, Tarlac
Development Corporation hereby submits for approval a stock distribution plan that envisions the following:[57] (Terms
and conditions omitted; emphasis supplied)

x x x x

The above stock distribution plan is hereby submitted on the basis of all these benefits that the farmworker-beneficiaries
of Hacienda Luisita will receive under its provisions in addition to their regular compensation as farmhands in the
agricultural enterprise and the fringe benefits granted to them by their collective bargaining agreement with
management.[58]

Also, PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2 reads as follows:

RESOLUTION APPROVING THE STOCK DISTRIBUTION PLAN OF TARLAC DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY/HACIENDA LUISITA INCORPORATED (TDC/HLI)

NOW THEREFORE, on motion duly seconded,

RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved, to approve the stock distribution plan of TDC/HLI.

UNANIMOUSLY APPROVED.[59] (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, what was approved by PARC is the SDP and not the SDOA. There is, therefore, no basis for this Court to apply
the law on contracts to the revocation of the said PARC Resolution.

IV. Just Compensation

In Our July 5, 2011 Decision, We stated that HLI shall be paid just compensation for the remaining agricultural land that
will be transferred to DAR for land distribution to the FWBs. We also ruled that the date of the taking is November 21,
1989, when PARC approved HLIs SDP per PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2.

In its Motion for Clarification and Partial Reconsideration, HLI disagrees with the foregoing ruling and contends that the
taking should be reckoned from finality of the Decision of this Court, or at the very least, the reckoning period may be
tacked to January 2, 2006, the date when the Notice of Coverage was issued by the DAR pursuant to PARC Resolution
No. 2006-34-01 recalling/revoking the approval of the SDP.[60]

For their part, Mallari, et al. argue that the valuation of the land cannot be based on November 21, 1989, the date of
approval of the SDP. Instead, they aver that the date of taking for valuation purposes is a factual issue best left to the
determination of the trial courts.[61]

At the other end of the spectrum, AMBALA alleges that HLI should no longer be paid just compensation for the
agricultural land that will be distributed to the FWBs, since the Manila Regional Trial Court (RTC) already rendered a
decision ordering the Cojuangcos to transfer the control of Hacienda Luisita to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform, which
will distribute the land to small farmers after compensating the landowners P3.988 million.[62] In the event, however,
that this Court will rule that HLI is indeed entitled to compensation, AMBALA contends that it should be pegged at forty
thousand pesos (PhP 40,000) per hectare, since this was the same value that Tadeco declared in 1989 to make sure that
the farmers will not own the majority of its stocks.[63]

Despite the above propositions, We maintain that the date of taking is November 21, 1989, the date when PARC
approved HLIs SDP per PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2, in view of the fact that this is the time that the FWBs were
considered to own and possess the agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita. To be precise, these lands became subject of the
agrarian reform coverage through the stock distribution scheme only upon the approval of the SDP, that is, November 21,
1989. Thus, such approval is akin to a notice of coverage ordinarily issued under compulsory acquisition. Further, any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the FWBs. As this Court held in Perez-Rosario v. CA:[64]

It is an established social and economic fact that the escalation of poverty is the driving force behind the political
disturbances that have in the past compromised the peace and security of the people as well as the continuity of the
national order. To subdue these acute disturbances, the legislature over the course of the history of the nation passed a
series of laws calculated to accelerate agrarian reform, ultimately to raise the material standards of living and eliminate
discontent. Agrarian reform is a perceived solution to social instability. The edicts of social justice found in the
Constitution and the public policies that underwrite them, the extraordinary national experience, and the prevailing
national consciousness, all command the great departments of government to tilt the balance in favor of the poor and
underprivileged whenever reasonable doubt arises in the interpretation of the law. But annexed to the great and sacred
charge of protecting the weak is the diametric function to put every effort to arrive at an equitable solution for all parties
concerned: the jural postulates of social justice cannot shield illegal acts, nor do they sanction false sympathy towards a
certain class, nor yet should they deny justice to the landowner whenever truth and justice happen to be on her side. In the
occupation of the legal questions in all agrarian disputes whose outcomes can significantly affect societal harmony, the
considerations of social advantage must be weighed, an inquiry into the prevailing social interests is necessary in the
adjustment of conflicting demands and expectations of the people, and the social interdependence of these interests,
recognized. (Emphasis supplied.)

The minority contends that it is the date of the notice of coverage, that is, January 2, 2006, which is determinative of the
just compensation HLI is entitled to for its expropriated lands. To support its contention, it cited numerous cases where
the time of the taking was reckoned on the date of the issuance of the notice of coverage.

However, a perusal of the cases cited by the minority would reveal that none of them involved the stock distribution
scheme. Thus, said cases do not squarely apply to the instant case. Moreover, it should be noted that it is precisely because
the stock distribution option is a distinctive mechanism under RA 6657 that it cannot be treated similarly with that of
compulsory land acquisition as these are two (2) different modalities under the agrarian reform program. As We have
stated in Our July 5, 2011 Decision, RA 6657 provides two (2) alternative modalities, i.e., land or stock transfer,
pursuant to either of which the corporate landowner can comply with CARP.

In this regard, it should be noted that when HLI submitted the SDP to DAR for approval, it cannot be gainsaid that the
stock distribution scheme is clearly HLIs preferred modality in order to comply with CARP. And when the SDP was
approved, stocks were given to the FWBs in lieu of land distribution. As aptly observed by the minority itself, [i]nstead
of expropriating lands, what the government took and distributed to the FWBs were shares of stock of petitioner HLI in
proportion to the value of the agricultural lands that should have been expropriated and turned over to the FWBs. It
cannot, therefore, be denied that upon the approval of the SDP submitted by HLI, the agricultural lands of Hacienda
Luisita became subject of CARP coverage. Evidently, the approval of the SDP took the place of a notice of coverage
issued under compulsory acquisition.

Also, it is surprising that while the minority opines that under the stock distribution option, title to the property remains
with the corporate landowner, which should presumably be dominated by farmers with majority stockholdings in the
corporation, it still insists that the just compensation that should be given to HLI is to be reckoned on January 2, 2006,
the date of the issuance of the notice of coverage, even after it found that the FWBs did not have the majority
stockholdings in HLI contrary to the supposed avowed policy of the law. In effect, what the minority wants is to prejudice
the FWBs twice. Given that the FWBs should have had majority stockholdings in HLI but did not, the minority still wants
the government to pay higher just compensation to HLI. Even if it is the government which will pay the just compensation
to HLI, this will also affect the FWBs as they will be paying higher amortizations to the government if the taking will
be considered to have taken place only on January 2, 2006.

The foregoing notwithstanding, it bears stressing that the DAR's land valuation is only preliminary and is not, by any
means, final and conclusive upon the landowner. The landowner can file an original action with the RTC acting as a
special agrarian court to determine just compensation. The court has the right to review with finality the determination in
the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function.[65]

A view has also been advanced that HLI should pay the qualified FWBs rental for the use and possession of the land up to
the time it surrenders possession and control over these lands. What this view fails to consider is the fact that the FWBs
are also stockholders of HLI prior to the revocation of PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2. Also, the income earned by the
corporation from its possession and use of the land ultimately redounded to the benefit of the FWBs based on its business
operations in the form of salaries, benefits voluntarily granted by HLI and other fringe benefits under their Collective
Bargaining Agreement. That being so, there would be unjust enrichment on the part of the FWBs if HLI will still be
required to pay rent for the use of the land in question.

V. Sale to Third Parties

There is a view that since the agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita were placed under CARP coverage through the SDOA
scheme on May 11, 1989, then the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657 lapsed on
May 10, 1999, and, consequently, the qualified FWBs should already be allowed to sell these lands with respect to their
land interests to third parties, including HLI, regardless of whether they have fully paid for the lands or not.

The proposition is erroneous. Sec. 27 of RA 6657 states:

SEC. 27. Transferability of Awarded Lands. - Lands acquired by beneficiaries under this Act may not be sold, transferred
or conveyed except through hereditary succession, or to the government, or to the LBP, or to other qualified beneficiaries
for a period of ten (10) years: Provided, however, That the children or the spouse of the transferor shall have a right to
repurchase the land from the government or LBP within a period of two (2) years. Due notice of the availability of the
land shall be given by the LBP to the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) of the barangay where the land is
situated. The Provincial Agrarian Coordinating Committee (PARCCOM), as herein provided, shall, in turn, be given due
notice thereof by the BARC.

If the land has not yet been fully paid by the beneficiary, the right to the land may be transferred or conveyed, with prior
approval of the DAR, to any heir of the beneficiary or to any other beneficiary who, as a condition for such transfer or
conveyance, shall cultivate the land himself. Failing compliance herewith, the land shall be transferred to the LBP which
shall give due notice of the availability of the land in the manner specified in the immediately preceding paragraph.

In the event of such transfer to the LBP, the latter shall compensate the beneficiary in one lump sum for the amounts the
latter has already paid, together with the value of improvements he has made on the land. (Emphasis supplied.)

To implement the above-quoted provision, inter alia, DAR issued Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1989 (DAO 1)
entitled Rules and Procedures Governing Land Transactions. Said Rules set forth the rules on validity of land transactions,
to wit:

II. RULES ON VALIDITY OF LAND TRANSACTIONS

A. The following transactions are valid:

1. Those executed by the original landowner in favor of the qualified beneficiary from among those certified by DAR.

2. Those in favor of the government, DAR or the Land Bank of the Philippines.

3. Those covering lands retained by the landowner under Section 6 of R.A. 6657 duly certified by the designated DAR
Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) as a retention area, executed in favor of transferees whose total landholdings
inclusive of the land to be acquired do not exceed five (5) hectares; subject, however, to the right of pre-emption and/or
redemption of tenant/lessee under Section 11 and 12 of R.A. 3844, as amended.

x x x x

4. Those executed by beneficiaries covering lands acquired under any agrarian reform law in favor of the government,
DAR, LBP or other qualified beneficiaries certified by DAR.

5. Those executed after ten (10) years from the issuance and registration of the Emancipation Patent or Certificate of
Land Ownership Award.

B. The following transactions are not valid:

1. Sale, disposition, lease management contract or transfer of possession of private lands executed by the original
landowner prior to June 15, 1988, which are registered on or before September 13, 1988, or those executed after June 15,
1988, covering an area in excess of the five-hectare retention limit in violation of R.A. 6657.

2. Those covering lands acquired by the beneficiary under R.A. 6657 and executed within ten (10) years from the
issuance and registration of an Emancipation Patent or Certificate of Land Ownership Award.

3. Those executed in favor of a person or persons not qualified to acquire land under R.A. 6657.

4. Sale, transfer, conveyance or change of nature of the land outside of urban centers and city limits either in whole or
in part as of June 15, 1988, when R.A. 6657 took effect, except as provided for under DAR Administrative Order No. 15,
series of 1988.

5. Sale, transfer or conveyance by beneficiary of the right to use or any other usufructuary right over the land he
acquired by virtue of being a beneficiary, in order to circumvent the law.

x x x x (Emphasis supplied.)

Without a doubt, under RA 6657 and DAO 1, the awarded lands may only be transferred or conveyed after ten (10) years
from the issuance and registration of the emancipation patent (EP) or certificate of land ownership award (CLOA).
Considering that the EPs or CLOAs have not yet been issued to the qualified FWBs in the instant case, the 10-year
prohibitive period has not even started. Significantly, the reckoning point is the issuance of the EP or CLOA, and not the
placing of the agricultural lands under CARP coverage.

Moreover, if We maintain the position that the qualified FWBs should be immediately allowed the option to sell or
convey the agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita, then all efforts at agrarian reform would be rendered nugatory by this
Court, since, at the end of the day, these lands will just be transferred to persons not entitled to land distribution under
CARP. As aptly noted by the late Senator Neptali Gonzales during the Joint Congressional Conference Committee on the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program Bills:

SEN. GONZALES. My point is, as much as possible let the said lands be distributed under CARP remain with the
beneficiaries and their heirs because that is the lesson that we have to learn from PD No. 27. If you will talk with the
Congressmen representing Nueva Ecija, Pampanga and Central Luzon provinces, law or no law, you will find out that
more than one-third of the original, of the lands distributed under PD 27 are no longer owned, possessed or being worked
by the grantees or the awardees of the same, something which we ought to avoid under the CARP bill that we are going to
enact.[66] (Emphasis supplied.)

Worse, by raising that the qualified beneficiaries may sell their interest back to HLI, this smacks of outright indifference
to the provision on retention limits[67] under RA 6657, as this Court, in effect, would be allowing HLI, the previous
landowner, to own more than five (5) hectares of agricultural land, which We cannot countenance. There is a big
difference between the ownership of agricultural lands by HLI under the stock distribution scheme and its eventual
acquisition of the agricultural lands from the qualified FWBs under the proposed buy-back scheme. The rule on retention
limits does not apply to the former but only to the latter in view of the fact that the stock distribution scheme is sanctioned
by Sec. 31 of RA 6657, which specifically allows corporations to divest a proportion of their capital stock that the
agricultural land, actually devoted to agricultural activities, bears in relation to the companys total assets. On the other
hand, no special rules exist under RA 6657 concerning the proposed buy-back scheme; hence, the general rules on
retention limits should apply.

Further, the position that the qualified FWBs are now free to transact with third parties concerning their land interests,
regardless of whether they have fully paid for the lands or not, also transgresses the second paragraph of Sec. 27 of RA
6657, which plainly states that [i]f the land has not yet been fully paid by the beneficiary, the right to the land may be
transferred or conveyed, with prior approval of the DAR, to any heir of the beneficiary or to any other beneficiary who, as
a condition for such transfer or conveyance, shall cultivate the land himself. Failing compliance herewith, the land shall be
transferred to the LBP x x x. When the words and phrases in the statute are clear and unequivocal, the law is applied
according to its express terms.[68] Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no
departure.[69]

The minority, however, posits that [t]o insist that the FWBs rights sleep for a period of ten years is unrealistic, and may
seriously deprive them of real opportunities to capitalize and maximize the victory of direct land distribution. By
insisting that We disregard the ten-year restriction under the law in the case at bar, the minority, in effect, wants this Court
to engage in judicial legislation, which is violative of the principle of separation of powers.[70] The discourse by Ruben
E. Agpalo, in his book on statutory construction, is enlightening:

Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says and the court has no choice but to
see to it that its mandate is obeyed. Where the law is clear and free from doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for
construction or interpretation. Thus, where what is not clearly provided in the law is read into the law by construction
because it is more logical and wise, it would be to encroach upon legislative prerogative to define the wisdom of the law,
which is judicial legislation. For whether a statute is wise or expedient is not for the courts to determine. Courts must
administer the law, not as they think it ought to be but as they find it and without regard to consequences.[71] (Emphasis
supplied.)

And as aptly stated by Chief Justice Renato Corona in his Dissenting Opinion in Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v.
COMELEC:[72]

Regardless of the personal beliefs and biases of its individual members, this Court can only apply and interpret the
Constitution and the laws. Its power is not to create policy but to recognize, review or reverse the policy crafted by the
political departments if and when a proper case is brought before it. Otherwise, it will tread on the dangerous grounds of
judicial legislation.

Considerably, this Court is left with no other recourse but to respect and apply the law.

VI. Grounds for Revocation of the SDP

AMBALA and FARM reiterate that improving the economic status of the FWBs is among the legal obligations of HLI
under the SDP and is an imperative imposition by RA 6657 and DAO 10.[73] FARM further asserts that [i]f that
minimum threshold is not met, why allow [stock distribution option] at all, unless the purpose is not social justice but a
political accommodation to the powerful.[74]

Contrary to the assertions of AMBALA and FARM, nowhere in the SDP, RA 6657 and DAO 10 can it be inferred that
improving the economic status of the FWBs is among the legal obligations of HLI under the SDP or is an imperative
imposition by RA 6657 and DAO 10, a violation of which would justify discarding the stock distribution option. As We
have painstakingly explained in Our July 5, 2011 Decision:


In the Terminal Report adopted by PARC, it is stated that the SDP violates the agrarian reform policy under Sec. 2 of RA
6657, as the said plan failed to enhance the dignity and improve the quality of lives of the FWBs through greater
productivity of agricultural lands. We disagree.

Sec. 2 of RA 6657 states:

SECTION 2. Declaration of Principles and Policies.It is the policy of the State to pursue a Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP). The welfare of the landless farmers and farm workers will receive the highest consideration to
promote social justice and to move the nation towards sound rural development and industrialization, and the
establishment of owner cultivatorship of economic-sized farms as the basis of Philippine agriculture.




To this end, a more equitable distribution and ownership of land, with due regard to the rights of landowners to just
compensation and to the ecological needs of the nation, shall be undertaken to provide farmers and farm workers with the
opportunity to enhance their dignity and improve the quality of their lives through greater productivity of agricultural
lands.

The agrarian reform program is founded on the right of farmers and regular farm workers, who are landless, to own
directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farm workers, to receive a share of the fruits thereof. To
this end, the State shall encourage the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to the priorities and retention limits
set forth in this Act, having taken into account ecological, developmental, and equity considerations, and subject to the
payment of just compensation. The State shall respect the right of small landowners and shall provide incentives for
voluntary land-sharing.

Paragraph 2 of the above-quoted provision specifically mentions that a more equitable distribution and ownership of land
x x x shall be undertaken to provide farmers and farm workers with the opportunity to enhance their dignity and improve
the quality of their lives through greater productivity of agricultural lands. Of note is the term opportunity which is
defined as a favorable chance or opening offered by circumstances. Considering this, by no stretch of imagination can said
provision be construed as a guarantee in improving the lives of the FWBs. At best, it merely provides for a possibility or
favorable chance of uplifting the economic status of the FWBs, which may or may not be attained.

Pertinently, improving the economic status of the FWBs is neither among the legal obligations of HLI under the SDP nor
an imperative imposition by RA 6657 and DAO 10, a violation of which would justify discarding the stock distribution
option. Nothing in that option agreement, law or department order indicates otherwise.

Significantly, HLI draws particular attention to its having paid its FWBs, during the regime of the SDP (1989-2005), some
PhP 3 billion by way of salaries/wages and higher benefits exclusive of free hospital and medical benefits to their
immediate family. And attached as Annex G to HLIs Memorandum is the certified true report of the finance manager
of Jose Cojuangco & Sons Organizations-Tarlac Operations, captioned as HACIENDA LUISITA, INC. Salaries,
Benefits and Credit Privileges (in Thousand Pesos) Since the Stock Option was Approved by PARC/CARP, detailing
what HLI gave their workers from 1989 to 2005. The sum total, as added up by the Court, yields the following numbers:
Total Direct Cash Out (Salaries/Wages & Cash Benefits) = PhP 2,927,848; Total Non-Direct Cash Out (Hospital/Medical
Benefits) = PhP 303,040. The cash out figures, as stated in the report, include the cost of homelots; the PhP 150 million
or so representing 3% of the gross produce of the hacienda; and the PhP 37.5 million representing 3% from the proceeds
of the sale of the 500-hectare converted lands. While not included in the report, HLI manifests having given the FWBs 3%
of the PhP 80 million paid for the 80 hectares of land traversed by the SCTEX. On top of these, it is worth remembering
that the shares of stocks were given by HLI to the FWBs for free. Verily, the FWBs have benefited from the SDP.

To address urgings that the FWBs be allowed to disengage from the SDP as HLI has not anyway earned profits through
the years, it cannot be over-emphasized that, as a matter of common business sense, no corporation could guarantee a
profitable run all the time. As has been suggested, one of the key features of an SDP of a corporate landowner is the
likelihood of the corporate vehicle not earning, or, worse still, losing money.

The Court is fully aware that one of the criteria under DAO 10 for the PARC to consider the advisability of approving a
stock distribution plan is the likelihood that the plan would result in increased income and greater benefits to [qualified
beneficiaries] than if the lands were divided and distributed to them individually. But as aptly noted during the oral
arguments, DAO 10 ought to have not, as it cannot, actually exact assurance of success on something that is subject to the
will of man, the forces of nature or the inherent risky nature of business.[75] Just like in actual land distribution, an SDP
cannot guarantee, as indeed the SDOA does not guarantee, a comfortable life for the FWBs. The Court can take judicial
notice of the fact that there were many instances wherein after a farmworker beneficiary has been awarded with an
agricultural land, he just subsequently sells it and is eventually left with nothing in the end.

In all then, the onerous condition of the FWBs economic status, their life of hardship, if that really be the case, can hardly
be attributed to HLI and its SDP and provide a valid ground for the plans revocation. (Citations omitted; emphasis in the
original.)

This Court, despite the above holding, still affirmed the revocation by PARC of its approval of the SDP based on the
following grounds: (1) failure of HLI to fully comply with its undertaking to distribute homelots to the FWBs under the
SDP; (2) distribution of shares of stock to the FWBs based on the number of man days or number of days worked by
the FWB in a years time; and (3) 30-year timeframe for the implementation or distribution of the shares of stock to the
FWBs.

Just the same, Mallari, et al. posit that the homelots required to be distributed have all been distributed pursuant to the
SDOA, and that what merely remains to be done is the release of title from the Register of Deeds.[76] They further assert
that there has been no dilution of shares as the corporate records would show that if ever not all of the 18,804.32 shares
were given to the actual original FWB, the recipient of the difference is the next of kin or children of said original
FWB.[77] Thus, they submit that since the shares were given to the same family beneficiary, this should be deemed as
substantial compliance with the provisions of Sec. 4 of DAO 10.[78] Also, they argue that there has been no violation of
the three-month period to implement the SDP as mandated by Sec. 11 of DAO, since this provision must be read in light
of Sec. 10 of Executive Order No. 229, the pertinent portion of which reads, The approval by the PARC of a plan for
such stock distribution, and its initial implementation, shall be deemed compliance with the land distribution requirement
of the CARP.[79]

Again, the matters raised by Mallari, et al. have been extensively discussed by the Court in its July 5, 2011 Decision. As
stated:

On Titles to Homelots

Under RA 6657, the distribution of homelots is required only for corporations or business associations owning or
operating farms which opted for land distribution. Sec. 30 of RA 6657 states:

SEC. 30. Homelots and Farmlots for Members of Cooperatives.The individual members of the cooperatives or
corporations mentioned in the preceding section shall be provided with homelots and small farmlots for their family use,
to be taken from the land owned by the cooperative or corporation.

The preceding section referred to in the above-quoted provision is as follows:

SEC. 29. Farms Owned or Operated by Corporations or Other Business Associations.In the case of farms owned or
operated by corporations or other business associations, the following rules shall be observed by the PARC.

In general, lands shall be distributed directly to the individual worker-beneficiaries.

In case it is not economically feasible and sound to divide the land, then it shall be owned collectively by the worker-
beneficiaries who shall form a workers cooperative or association which will deal with the corporation or business
association. Until a new agreement is entered into by and between the workers cooperative or association and the
corporation or business association, any agreement existing at the time this Act takes effect between the former and the
previous landowner shall be respected by both the workers cooperative or association and the corporation or business
association.

Noticeably, the foregoing provisions do not make reference to corporations which opted for stock distribution under Sec.
31 of RA 6657. Concomitantly, said corporations are not obliged to provide for it except by stipulation, as in this case.

Under the SDP, HLI undertook to subdivide and allocate for free and without charge among the qualified family-
beneficiaries x x x residential or homelots of not more than 240 sq. m. each, with each family beneficiary being assured of
receiving and owning a homelot in the barrio or barangay where it actually resides, within a reasonable time.

More than sixteen (16) years have elapsed from the time the SDP was approved by PARC, and yet, it is still the
contention of the FWBs that not all was given the 240-square meter homelots and, of those who were already given, some
still do not have the corresponding titles.

During the oral arguments, HLI was afforded the chance to refute the foregoing allegation by submitting proof that the
FWBs were already given the said homelots:

Justice Velasco: x x x There is also an allegation that the farmer beneficiaries, the qualified family beneficiaries were not
given the 240 square meters each. So, can you also [prove] that the qualified family beneficiaries were already provided
the 240 square meter homelots.

Atty. Asuncion: We will, your Honor please.

Other than the financial report, however, no other substantial proof showing that all the qualified beneficiaries have
received homelots was submitted by HLI. Hence, this Court is constrained to rule that HLI has not yet fully complied with
its undertaking to distribute homelots to the FWBs under the SDP.

On Man Days and the Mechanics of Stock Distribution

In our review and analysis of par. 3 of the SDOA on the mechanics and timelines of stock distribution, We find that it
violates two (2) provisions of DAO 10. Par. 3 of the SDOA states:

3. At the end of each fiscal year, for a period of 30 years, the SECOND PARTY [HLI] shall arrange with the FIRST
PARTY [TDC] the acquisition and distribution to the THIRD PARTY [FWBs] on the basis of number of days worked
and at no cost to them of one-thirtieth (1/30) of 118,391,976.85 shares of the capital stock of the SECOND PARTY that
are presently owned and held by the FIRST PARTY, until such time as the entire block of 118,391,976.85 shares shall
have been completely acquired and distributed to the THIRD PARTY.

Based on the above-quoted provision, the distribution of the shares of stock to the FWBs, albeit not entailing a cash out
from them, is contingent on the number of man days, that is, the number of days that the FWBs have worked during the
year. This formula deviates from Sec. 1 of DAO 10, which decrees the distribution of equal number of shares to the FWBs
as the minimum ratio of shares of stock for purposes of compliance with Sec. 31 of RA 6657. As stated in Sec. 4 of DAO
10:

Section 4. Stock Distribution Plan.The [SDP] submitted by the corporate landowner-applicant shall provide for the
distribution of an equal number of shares of the same class and value, with the same rights and features as all other shares,
to each of the qualified beneficiaries. This distribution plan in all cases, shall be at least the minimum ratio for purposes of
compliance with Section 31 of R.A. No. 6657.

On top of the minimum ratio provided under Section 3 of this Implementing Guideline, the corporate landowner-applicant
may adopt additional stock distribution schemes taking into account factors such as rank, seniority, salary, position and
other circumstances which may be deemed desirable as a matter of sound company policy.

The above proviso gives two (2) sets or categories of shares of stock which a qualified beneficiary can acquire from the
corporation under the SDP. The first pertains, as earlier explained, to the mandatory minimum ratio of shares of stock to
be distributed to the FWBs in compliance with Sec. 31 of RA 6657. This minimum ratio contemplates of that proportion
of the capital stock of the corporation that the agricultural land, actually devoted to agricultural activities, bears in relation
to the companys total assets. It is this set of shares of stock which, in line with Sec. 4 of DAO 10, is supposed to be
allocated for the distribution of an equal number of shares of stock of the same class and value, with the same rights and
features as all other shares, to each of the qualified beneficiaries.

On the other hand, the second set or category of shares partakes of a gratuitous extra grant, meaning that this set or
category constitutes an augmentation share/s that the corporate landowner may give under an additional stock distribution
scheme, taking into account such variables as rank, seniority, salary, position and like factors which the management, in
the exercise of its sound discretion, may deem desirable.

Before anything else, it should be stressed that, at the time PARC approved HLIs SDP, HLI recognized 6,296 individuals
as qualified FWBs. And under the 30-year stock distribution program envisaged under the plan, FWBs who came in after
1989, new FWBs in fine, may be accommodated, as they appear to have in fact been accommodated as evidenced by their
receipt of HLI shares.

Now then, by providing that the number of shares of the original 1989 FWBs shall depend on the number of man days,
HLI violated the afore-quoted rule on stock distribution and effectively deprived the FWBs of equal shares of stock in the
corporation, for, in net effect, these 6,296 qualified FWBs, who theoretically had given up their rights to the land that
could have been distributed to them, suffered a dilution of their due share entitlement. As has been observed during the
oral arguments, HLI has chosen to use the shares earmarked for farmworkers as reward system chips to water down the
shares of the original 6,296 FWBs. Particularly:

Justice Abad: If the SDOA did not take place, the other thing that would have happened is that there would be CARP?

Atty. Dela Merced: Yes, Your Honor.

Justice Abad: Thats the only point I want to know x x x. Now, but they chose to enter SDOA instead of placing the land
under CARP. And for that reason those who would have gotten their shares of the land actually gave up their rights to this
land in place of the shares of the stock, is that correct?

Atty. Dela Merced: It would be that way, Your Honor.

Justice Abad: Right now, also the government, in a way, gave up its right to own the land because that way the
government takes own [sic] the land and distribute it to the farmers and pay for the land, is that correct?

Atty. Dela Merced: Yes, Your Honor.

Justice Abad: And then you gave thirty-three percent (33%) of the shares of HLI to the farmers at that time that numbered
x x x those who signed five thousand four hundred ninety eight (5,498) beneficiaries, is that correct?

Atty. Dela Merced: Yes, Your Honor.

Justice Abad: But later on, after assigning them their shares, some workers came in from 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992 and the
rest of the years that you gave additional shares who were not in the original list of owners?

Atty. Dela Merced: Yes, Your Honor.

Justice Abad: Did those new workers give up any right that would have belong to them in 1989 when the land was
supposed to have been placed under CARP?

Atty. Dela Merced: If you are talking or referring (interrupted)

Justice Abad: None! You tell me. None. They gave up no rights to land?

Atty. Dela Merced: They did not do the same thing as we did in 1989, Your Honor.

Justice Abad: No, if they were not workers in 1989 what land did they give up? None, if they become workers later on.

Atty. Dela Merced: None, Your Honor, I was referring, Your Honor, to the original (interrupted)

Justice Abad: So why is it that the rights of those who gave up their lands would be diluted, because the company has
chosen to use the shares as reward system for new workers who come in? It is not that the new workers, in effect, become
just workers of the corporation whose stockholders were already fixed. The TADECO who has shares there about sixty
six percent (66%) and the five thousand four hundred ninety eight (5,498) farmers at the time of the SDOA? Explain to
me. Why, why will you x x x what right or where did you get that right to use this shares, to water down the shares of
those who should have been benefited, and to use it as a reward system decided by the company?

From the above discourse, it is clear as day that the original 6,296 FWBs, who were qualified beneficiaries at the time of
the approval of the SDP, suffered from watering down of shares. As determined earlier, each original FWB is entitled to
18,804.32 HLI shares. The original FWBs got less than the guaranteed 18,804.32 HLI shares per beneficiary, because the
acquisition and distribution of the HLI shares were based on man days or number of days worked by the FWB in a
years time. As explained by HLI, a beneficiary needs to work for at least 37 days in a fiscal year before he or she
becomes entitled to HLI shares. If it falls below 37 days, the FWB, unfortunately, does not get any share at year end. The
number of HLI shares distributed varies depending on the number of days the FWBs were allowed to work in one year.
Worse, HLI hired farmworkers in addition to the original 6,296 FWBs, such that, as indicated in the Compliance dated
August 2, 2010 submitted by HLI to the Court, the total number of farmworkers of HLI as of said date stood at 10,502.
All these farmworkers, which include the original 6,296 FWBs, were given shares out of the 118,931,976.85 HLI shares
representing the 33.296% of the total outstanding capital stock of HLI. Clearly, the minimum individual allocation of
each original FWB of 18,804.32 shares was diluted as a result of the use of man days and the hiring of additional
farmworkers.

Going into another but related matter, par. 3 of the SDOA expressly providing for a 30-year timeframe for HLI-to-FWBs
stock transfer is an arrangement contrary to what Sec. 11 of DAO 10 prescribes. Said Sec. 11 provides for the
implementation of the approved stock distribution plan within three (3) months from receipt by the corporate landowner
of the approval of the plan by PARC. In fact, based on the said provision, the transfer of the shares of stock in the names
of the qualified FWBs should be recorded in the stock and transfer books and must be submitted to the SEC within sixty
(60) days from implementation. As stated:

Section 11. Implementation/Monitoring of Plan.The approved stock distribution plan shall be implemented within three
(3) months from receipt by the corporate landowner-applicant of the approval thereof by the PARC, and the transfer of the
shares of stocks in the names of the qualified beneficiaries shall be recorded in stock and transfer books and submitted to
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) within sixty (60) days from the said implementation of the stock
distribution plan.

It is evident from the foregoing provision that the implementation, that is, the distribution of the shares of stock to the
FWBs, must be made within three (3) months from receipt by HLI of the approval of the stock distribution plan by PARC.
While neither of the clashing parties has made a compelling case of the thrust of this provision, the Court is of the view
and so holds that the intent is to compel the corporate landowner to complete, not merely initiate, the transfer process of
shares within that three-month timeframe. Reinforcing this conclusion is the 60-day stock transfer recording (with the
SEC) requirement reckoned from the implementation of the SDP.

To the Court, there is a purpose, which is at once discernible as it is practical, for the three-month threshold. Remove this
timeline and the corporate landowner can veritably evade compliance with agrarian reform by simply deferring to absurd
limits the implementation of the stock distribution scheme.

The argument is urged that the thirty (30)-year distribution program is justified by the fact that, under Sec. 26 of RA
6657, payment by beneficiaries of land distribution under CARP shall be made in thirty (30) annual amortizations. To
HLI, said section provides a justifying dimension to its 30-year stock distribution program.

HLIs reliance on Sec. 26 of RA 6657, quoted in part below, is obviously misplaced as the said provision clearly deals
with land distribution.

SEC. 26. Payment by Beneficiaries.Lands awarded pursuant to this Act shall be paid for by the beneficiaries to the LBP
in thirty (30) annual amortizations x x x.

Then, too, the ones obliged to pay the LBP under the said provision are the beneficiaries. On the other hand, in the instant
case, aside from the fact that what is involved is stock distribution, it is the corporate landowner who has the obligation to
distribute the shares of stock among the FWBs.

Evidently, the land transfer beneficiaries are given thirty (30) years within which to pay the cost of the land thus awarded
them to make it less cumbersome for them to pay the government. To be sure, the reason underpinning the 30-year
accommodation does not apply to corporate landowners in distributing shares of stock to the qualified beneficiaries, as the
shares may be issued in a much shorter period of time.

Taking into account the above discussion, the revocation of the SDP by PARC should be upheld for violating DAO 10. It
bears stressing that under Sec. 49 of RA 6657, the PARC and the DAR have the power to issue rules and regulations,
substantive or procedural. Being a product of such rule-making power, DAO 10 has the force and effect of law and must
be duly complied with. The PARC is, therefore, correct in revoking the SDP. Consequently, the PARC Resolution No.
89-12-2 dated November 21, l989 approving the HLIs SDP is nullified and voided. (Citations omitted; emphasis in the
original.)

Based on the foregoing ruling, the contentions of Mallari, et al. are either not supported by the evidence on record or are
utterly misplaced. There is, therefore, no basis for the Court to reverse its ruling affirming PARC Resolution No. 2005-32-
01 and PARC Resolution No. 2006-34-01, revoking the previous approval of the SDP by PARC.

VII. Control over Agricultural Lands

After having discussed and considered the different contentions raised by the parties in their respective motions, We are
now left to contend with one crucial issue in the case at bar, that is, control over the agricultural lands by the qualified
FWBs.

Upon a review of the facts and circumstances, We realize that the FWBs will never have control over these agricultural
lands for as long as they remain as stockholders of HLI. In Our July 5, 2011 Decision, this Court made the following
observations:

There is, thus, nothing unconstitutional in the formula prescribed by RA 6657. The policy on agrarian reform is that
control over the agricultural land must always be in the hands of the farmers. Then it falls on the shoulders of DAR and
PARC to see to it the farmers should always own majority of the common shares entitled to elect the members of the
board of directors to ensure that the farmers will have a clear majority in the board. Before the SDP is approved, strict
scrutiny of the proposed SDP must always be undertaken by the DAR and PARC, such that the value of the agricultural
land contributed to the corporation must always be more than 50% of the total assets of the corporation to ensure that the
majority of the members of the board of directors are composed of the farmers. The PARC composed of the President of
the Philippines and cabinet secretaries must see to it that control over the board of directors rests with the farmers by
rejecting the inclusion of non-agricultural assets which will yield the majority in the board of directors to non-farmers.
Any deviation, however, by PARC or DAR from the correct application of the formula prescribed by the second
paragraph of Sec. 31 of RA 6675 does not make said provision constitutionally infirm. Rather, it is the application of said
provision that can be challenged. Ergo, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 does not trench on the constitutional policy of ensuring
control by the farmers. (Emphasis supplied.)




In line with Our finding that control over agricultural lands must always be in the hands of the farmers, We reconsider our
ruling that the qualified FWBs should be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI, inasmuch as these qualified
FWBs will never gain control given the present proportion of shareholdings in HLI.

A revisit of HLIs Proposal for Stock Distribution under CARP and the Stock Distribution Option Agreement (SDOA)
upon which the proposal was based reveals that the total assets of HLI is PhP 590,554,220, while the value of the
4,915.7466 hectares is PhP 196,630,000. Consequently, the share of the farmer-beneficiaries in the HLI capital stock is
33.296% (196,630,000 divided by 590,554.220); 118,391,976.85 HLI shares represent 33.296%. Thus, even if all the
holders of the 118,391,976.85 HLI shares unanimously vote to remain as HLI stockholders, which is unlikely, control will
never be placed in the hands of the farmer-beneficiaries. Control, of course, means the majority of 50% plus at least one
share of the common shares and other voting shares. Applying the formula to the HLI stockholdings, the number of
shares that will constitute the majority is 295,112,101 shares (590,554,220 divided by 2 plus one [1] HLI share). The
118,391,976.85 shares subject to the SDP approved by PARC substantially fall short of the 295,112,101 shares needed by
the FWBs to acquire control over HLI. Hence, control can NEVER be attained by the FWBs. There is even no assurance
that 100% of the 118,391,976.85 shares issued to the FWBs will all be voted in favor of staying in HLI, taking into
account the previous referendum among the farmers where said shares were not voted unanimously in favor of retaining
the SDP. In light of the foregoing consideration, the option to remain in HLI granted to the individual FWBs will have to
be recalled and revoked.





Moreover, bearing in mind that with the revocation of the approval of the SDP, HLI will no longer be operating under
SDP and will only be treated as an ordinary private corporation; the FWBs who remain as stockholders of HLI will be
treated as ordinary stockholders and will no longer be under the protective mantle of RA 6657.

In addition to the foregoing, in view of the operative fact doctrine, all the benefits and homelots[80] received by all the
FWBs shall be respected with no obligation to refund or return them, since, as We have mentioned in our July 5, 2011
Decision, the benefits x x x were received by the FWBs as farmhands in the agricultural enterprise of HLI and other
fringe benefits were granted to them pursuant to the existing collective bargaining agreement with Tadeco.

One last point, the HLI land shall be distributed only to the 6,296 original FWBs. The remaining 4,206 FWBs are not
entitled to any portion of the HLI land, because the rights to said land were vested only in the 6,296 original FWBs
pursuant to Sec. 22 of RA 6657.

In this regard, DAR shall verify the identities of the 6,296 original FWBs, consistent with its administrative prerogative to
identify and select the agrarian reform beneficiaries under RA 6657.[81]







WHEREFORE, the Motion for Partial Reconsideration dated July 20, 2011 filed by public respondents Presidential
Agrarian Reform Council and Department of Agrarian Reform, the Motion for Reconsideration dated July 19, 2011 filed
by private respondent Alyansa ng mga Manggagawang Bukid sa Hacienda Luisita, the Motion for Reconsideration dated
July 21, 2011 filed by respondent-intervenor Farmworkers Agrarian Reform Movement, Inc., and the Motion for
Reconsideration dated July 22, 2011 filed by private respondents Rene Galang and AMBALA are PARTIALLY
GRANTED with respect to the option granted to the original farmworker-beneficiaries of Hacienda Luisita to remain with
Hacienda Luisita, Inc., which is hereby RECALLED and SET ASIDE. The Motion for Clarification and Partial
Reconsideration dated July 21, 2011 filed by petitioner HLI and the Motion for Reconsideration dated July 21, 2011 filed
by private respondents Noel Mallari, Julio Suniga, Supervisory Group of Hacienda Luisita, Inc. and Windsor Andaya are
DENIED.

The fallo of the Courts July 5, 2011 Decision is hereby amended and shall read:

PARC Resolution No. 2005-32-01 dated December 22, 2005 and Resolution No. 2006-34-01 dated May 3, 2006, placing
the lands subject of HLIs SDP under compulsory coverage on mandated land acquisition scheme of the CARP, are
hereby AFFIRMED with the following modifications:

All salaries, benefits, the 3% of the gross sales of the production of the agricultural lands, the 3% share in the
proceeds of the sale of the 500-hectare converted land and the 80.51-hectare SCTEX lot and the homelots already
received by the 10,502 FWBs composed of 6,296 original FWBs and the 4,206 non-qualified FWBs shall be respected
with no obligation to refund or return them. The 6,296 original FWBs shall forfeit and relinquish their rights over the HLI
shares of stock issued to them in favor of HLI. The HLI Corporate Secretary shall cancel the shares issued to the said
FWBs and transfer them to HLI in the stocks and transfer book, which transfers shall be exempt from taxes, fees and
charges. The 4,206 non-qualified FWBs shall remain as stockholders of HLI.

DAR shall segregate from the HLI agricultural land with an area of 4,915.75 hectares subject of PARCs SDP-approving
Resolution No. 89-12-2 the 500-hectare lot subject of the August 14, l996 Conversion Order and the 80.51-hectare lot sold
to, or acquired by, the government as part of the SCTEX complex. After the segregation process, as indicated, is done, the
remaining area shall be turned over to DAR for immediate land distribution to the original 6,296 FWBs or their
successors-in-interest which will be identified by the DAR. The 4,206 non-qualified FWBs are not entitled to any share in
the land to be distributed by DAR.

HLI is directed to pay the original 6,296 FWBs the consideration of PhP 500,000,000 received by it from Luisita Realty,
Inc. for the sale to the latter of 200 hectares out of the 500 hectares covered by the August 14, 1996 Conversion Order, the
consideration of PhP 750,000,000 received by its owned subsidiary, Centennary Holdings, Inc., for the sale of the
remaining 300 hectares of the aforementioned 500-hectare lot to Luisita Industrial Park Corporation, and the price of PhP
80,511,500 paid by the government through the Bases Conversion Development Authority for the sale of the 80.51-
hectare lot used for the construction of the SCTEX road network. From the total amount of PhP 1,330,511,500 (PhP
500,000,000 + PhP 750,000,000 + PhP 80,511,500 = PhP 1,330,511,500) shall be deducted the 3% of the proceeds of said
transfers that were paid to the FWBs, the taxes and expenses relating to the transfer of titles to the transferees, and the
expenditures incurred by HLI and Centennary Holdings, Inc. for legitimate corporate purposes. For this purpose, DAR is
ordered to engage the services of a reputable accounting firm approved by the parties to audit the books of HLI and
Centennary Holdings, Inc. to determine if the PhP 1,330,511,500 proceeds of the sale of the three (3) aforementioned lots
were actually used or spent for legitimate corporate purposes. Any unspent or unused balance and any disallowed
expenditures as determined by the audit shall be distributed to the 6,296 original FWBs.

HLI is entitled to just compensation for the agricultural land that will be transferred to DAR to be reckoned from
November 21, 1989 which is the date of issuance of PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2. DAR and LBP are ordered to
determine the compensation due to HLI.

DAR shall submit a compliance report after six (6) months from finality of this judgment. It shall also submit, after
submission of the compliance report, quarterly reports on the execution of this judgment within the first 15 days after the
end of each quarter, until fully implemented.

The temporary restraining order is lifted.

SO ORDERED.


PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:



Please see concurring and dissenting opinion:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice



I concur with Justice Velasco and maintain
my vehement disagreement with Justice Serenos opinion
which will put the land beyond the capacity of the farmers
to pay, based on her strained construction/interpretation
No Part, prior inhibition of the law re: date of taking.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice Associate Justice



I certify the Mr. Justice Brion submitted a
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:
ARTURO D. BRION DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice Associate Justice



With councurring & dissenting opinion
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice Associate Justice



I join C.J. R.C. Coronas opinion
ROBERTO A. ABAD MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice



I maintain my positions in my separate
opinion except as to the reckoning date
just compensation. It should be from November 24, 1989
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice Associate Justice



See Concurring and Dissenting Opinion Subject of dissenting opinion of Justice Bersamin
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice Associate Justice



Subj. to J. Bersamins dissenting opinion
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice







C E R T I F I C A T I O N


Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.




RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice


[1] Jose Julio Zuniga in some parts of the records.
[2] The Motion for Reconsideration dated July 22, 2011 was filed by private respondents Rene Galang and AMBALA,
through Atty. Romeo T. Capulong of the Public Interest Law Center, as lead counsel for Rene Galang and as collaborating
counsel of Atty. Jobert Pahilga of SENTRA for AMBALA.
[3] G.R. No. 171101, July 5, 2011; hereinafter referred to as July 5, 2011 Decision.
[4] PARC/DAR Motion for Reconsideration (MR), p. 7.
[5] PARC/DAR MR, p. 16.
[6] AMBALA MR, p. 51.
[7] AMBALA MR, pp. 55-60.
[8] Rene Galang and AMBALA MR, pp. 11-13.
[9] FARM MR, p. 47.
[10]Under PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2 dated November 21, 1989, then Secretary Miriam Defensor-Santiago approved
the SDP of HLI/Tarlac Development Corporation (Tadeco).
[11] G.R. No. L-23127, April 29, 1971, 38 SCRA 429.
[12] G.R. No. L-28113, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 533.
[13] G.R. No. 138965, June 30, 2006, 494 SCRA 53.
[14] G.R. No. 85481-82, October 18, 1990, 190 SCRA 686.
[15] G.R. Nos. L-54558 and L-69882, May 22, 1987, 150 SCRA 144.
[16] Id. at 159.
[17] League of Cities of the Phils. v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 176951, 177499 and 178056, August 24, 2010, 628 SCRA
819, 833.
[18] LCK Industries, Inc. v. Planters Development Bank, G.R. No. 170606, November 23, 2007, 538 SCRA 634, 652;
cited in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Ong, G.R. No. 190755, November 24, 2010, 636 SCRA 266, 280.
[19] Brito, Sr. v. Dianala, G.R. No. 171717, December 15, 2010.
[20] Saludaga v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 184537, April 23, 2010, 619 SCRA 364, 374; citing AGPALO, STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION, 2003 p. 204 and The Heirs of George Poe v. Malayan Insurance Company, Inc., G.R. No. 156302,
April 7, 2009.
[21] G.R. No. 142618, July 12, 2007, 527 SCRA 405, 422.
[22] Citing Pimentel v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 126394, April 24, 1998, 289 SCRA 586, 597.
[23] Citing Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos, G.R. No. 113092, September 1, 1994, 236 SCRA 197, 206.
[24] Citing Castillo-Co v. Barbers, G.R. No. 129952, June 16, 1998, 290 SCRA 717, 723.
[25] FARM MR, pp. 6-11, 30-36.
[26] Id. at 52.
[27] Id.
[28] Id.
[29] Apostol v. CA, G.R. No. 141854, October 15, 2008, 569 SCRA 80, 92; citing Almuete v, Andres, 421 Phil 522, 531
(2001).
[30] Id.; citing Tolentino v. People, G.R. No. 170396, August 31, 2006, 500 SCRA 721, 724 and Suyat, Jr. v. Torres, G.R.
No. 133530, October 25, 2004, 441 SCRA 265, 274-275.
[31] See C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. v. Espanol, Jr., G.R. No. 155903, September 14, 2007, 533 SCRA 424, 438-
439.
[32] We stated in Our July 5, 2011 Decision that if a qualified FWB will choose land distribution, he or she will get
6,886.5 square meters of agricultural land in Hacienda Luisita.
[33] DAR MR, p. 37.
[34] Id.
[35] See Soriano v. Bravo, G.R. No. 152086, December 15, 2010, 638 SCRA 403, 420.
[36] AMBALA MR, p. 67.
[37] Id.
[38] HLI Consolidated Reply and Opposition, p. 65.
[39] Id. at 80, Petition of HLI; id. at 944, Consolidated Reply of HLI; id. at 1327-1328.
[40] AMBALA MR, p. 76.
[41] Galang MR, p. 21.
[42] Id. at 22.
[43] AMBALA MR, p. 72.
[44] FARM MR, p. 94.
[45] Rollo, Vol. 3, pp. 3280-3323.
[46] Id. at 3428-3468.
[47] Nicolas v. Del-Nacia Corp., G.R. No. 158026, April 23, 2008, 552 SCRA 545, 556.
[48] Bascos, Jr. v. Taganahan, G.R. No. 180666, February 18, 2009, 579 SCRA 653, 674-675.
[49] Velarde v. Lopez, Inc., G.R. No. 153886, January 14, 2004, 419 SCRA 422, 431-432; citing Tan Boon Bee & Co.,
Inc. v. Jarencio, 163 SCRA 205 (1988) and Yutivo Sons Hardware Co. v. CTA, 1 SCRA 160 (1961).
[50] Id.
[51] G.R. Nos. 141593-94, July 12, 2006, 494 SCRA 583, 602.
[52] HLI MR, pp. 3-4.
[53] TSN, August 24, 2010, p. 13.
[54] Koruga v. Arcenas, G.R. Nos. 168332 and 169053, June 19, 2009, 590 SCRA 49, 68; citing In Re: Petition for
Assistance in the Liquidation of the Rural Bank of Bokod (Benguet), Inc., PDIC v. Bureau of Internal Revenue, G.R. No.
158261, December 18, 2006, 511 SCRA 123, 141.
[55] DAR MR, p.33.
[56] As stated in the SDP:
Under Section 31 of Republic Act No. 6657, a corporation owning agricultural land may distribute among the qualified
beneficiaries such proportion or percentage of its capital stock that the value of the agricultural land actually devoted to
agricultural activities, bears in relation to the corporations total assets. Conformably with this legal provision, Tarlac
Development Corporation hereby submits for approval a stock distribution plan that envisions the following: x x x
(Rollo, p. 1322)
[57] Rollo, p. 1322; Annex AA.
[58] Id. at 3747-3748.
[59] Id. at 151.
[60] HLI MR, pp. 18-21.
[61] Mallari, et al. MR, pp. 3-4.
[62] AMBALA MR, p. 70.
[63] Id. at 71.
[64] G.R. No. 140796, June 30, 2006, 494 SCRA 66, 92-93.
[65] Heirs of Lorenzo and Carmen Vidad v. Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 1664691, April 30, 2010.
[66] Joint Congressional Conference Committee on the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program Bills, May 26, 1988,
pp. 45-46.
[67] SEC. 6. Retention Limits. - Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own or retain, directly, any
public or private agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according to factors governing a viable family-sized farm,
such as commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform
Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall the retention by the landowner exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3)
hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to the following qualifications: (1) that he is at least
fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly managing the farm: Provided, That
landowners whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally
retained by them thereunder; Provided, further, That original homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own
the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to
cultivate said homestead.
The right to choose the area to be retained, which shall be compact or contiguous, shall pertain to the landowner:
Provided, however, That in case the area selected for retention by the landowner is tenanted, the tenant shall have the
option to choose whether to remain therein or be a beneficiary in the same or another agricultural land with similar or
comparable features. In case the tenant chooses to remain in the retained area, he shall be considered a leaseholder and
shall lose his right to be a beneficiary under this Act. In case the tenant chooses to be a beneficiary in another agricultural
land, he loses his right as a leaseholder to the land retained by the landowner. The tenant must exercise this option within
a period of one (1) year from the time the landowner manifests his choice of the area for retention.
In all cases, the security of tenure of the farmers or farm workers on the land prior to the approval of this Act shall be
respected.
Upon the effectivity of this Act, any sale, disposition, lease, management contract or transfer of possession of private
lands executed by the original landowner in violation of this Act shall be null and void: Provided, however, That those
executed prior to this Act shall be valid only when registered with the Register of Deeds within a period of three (3)
months after the effectivity of this Act. Thereafter, all Registers of Deeds shall inform the DAR within thirty (30) days of
any transaction involving agricultural lands in excess of five (5) hectares.
[68] Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Central Luzon Drug Corp., G.R. No. 148512, June 26, 2006, 492 SCRA 575,
581.
[69] Philippine Amusement & Gaming Corp. v. Philippine Gaming Jurisdiction, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 177333, April 24,
2009, 586 SCRA 658, 664-665.
[70] Fort Bonifacio Development Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. Nos. 158885 & 170680,
October 2, 2009, 602 SCRA 159, 169.
[71] R.E. Agpalo, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 125 (5th edition, 2003); citations omitted.
[72] G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010.
[73] AMBALA MR, pp. 65-66; FARM MR, p. 60.
[74] FARM MR, p. 60.
[75] TSN, August 24, 2010, p. 125.
[76] Mallari, et al. MR, p. 3.
[77] Id.
[78] Id.
[79] Id.
[80] Rollo, p. 3738. These homelots do not form part of the 4,915.75 hectares of agricultural land in Hacienda Luisita.
These are part of the residential land with a total area of 120.9234 hectares, as indicated in the SDP.
[81] See Concha v. Rubio, G.R. No. 162446, March 29, 2010, 617 SCRA 22, 31.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC



G.R. Nos. L-68379-81 September 22, 1986

EVELIO B. JAVIER, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and ARTURO F. PACIFICADOR, respondents.

Raul S. Roco and Lorna Patajo-Kapunan for petitioner.



CRUZ, J.:

The new Solicitor General has moved to dismiss this petition on the ground that as a result of supervening events it has
become moot and academic. It is not as simple as that. Several lives have been lost in connection with this case, including
that of the petitioner himself. The private respondent is now in hiding. The purity of suffrage has been defiled and the
popular will scorned through a confabulation of those in authority. This Court cannot keep silent in the face of these
terrible facts. The motion is denied.

The petitioner and the private respondent were candidates in Antique for the Batasang Pambansa in the May 1984
elections. The former appeared to enjoy more popular support but the latter had the advantage of being the nominee of the
KBL with all its perquisites of power. On May 13, 1984, the eve of the elections, the bitter contest between the two came
to a head when several followers of the petitioner were ambushed and killed, allegedly by the latter's men. Seven suspects,
including respondent Pacificador, are now facing trial for these murders. The incident naturally heightened tension in the
province and sharpened the climate of fear among the electorate. Conceivably, it intimidated voters against supporting the
Opposition candidate or into supporting the candidate of the ruling party.

It was in this atmosphere that the voting was held, and the post-election developments were to run true to form. Owing to
what he claimed were attempts to railroad the private respondent's proclamation, the petitioner went to the Commission on
Elections to question the canvass of the election returns. His complaints were dismissed and the private respondent was
proclaimed winner by the Second Division of the said body. The petitioner thereupon came to this Court, arguing that the
proclamation was void because made only by a division and not by the Commission on Elections en banc as required by
the Constitution. Meanwhile, on the strength of his proclamation, the private respondent took his oath as a member of the
Batasang Pambansa.

The case was still being considered by this Court when on February 11, 1986, the petitioner was gunned down in cold
blood and in broad daylight. The nation, already indignant over the obvious manipulation of the presidential elections in
favor of Marcos, was revolted by the killing, which flaunted a scornful disregard for the law by the assailants who
apparently believed they were above the law. This ruthless murder was possibly one of the factors that strengthened the
cause of the Opposition in the February revolution that toppled the Marcos regime and installed the present government
under President Corazon C. Aquino.

The abolition of the Batasang Pambansa and the disappearance of the office in dispute between the petitioner and the
private respondent-both of whom have gone their separate ways-could be a convenient justification for dismissing this
case. But there are larger issues involved that must be resolved now, once and for all, not only to dispel the legal
ambiguities here raised. The more important purpose is to manifest in the clearest possible terms that this Court will not
disregard and in effect condone wrong on the simplistic and tolerant pretext that the case has become moot and academic.

The Supreme Court is not only the highest arbiter of legal questions but also the conscience of the government. The
citizen comes to us in quest of law but we must also give him justice. The two are not always the same. There are times
when we cannot grant the latter because the issue has been settled and decision is no longer possible according to the law.
But there are also times when although the dispute has disappeared, as in this case, it nevertheless cries out to be resolved.
Justice demands that we act then, not only for the vindication of the outraged right, though gone, but also for the guidance
of and as a restraint upon the future.

It is a notorious fact decried by many people and even by the foreign press that elections during the period of the Marcos
dictatorship were in the main a desecration of the right of suffrage. Vote-buying, intimidation and violence, illegal listing
of voters, falsified returns, and other elections anomalies misrepresented and vitiated the popular will and led to the
induction in office of persons who did not enjoy the confidence of the sovereign electorate. Genuine elections were a
rarity. The price at times was human lives. The rule was chicanery and irregularity, and on all levels of the polls, from the
barangay to the presidential. This included the rigged plebiscites and referenda that also elicited the derision and provoked
the resentments of the people.

Antique in 1984 hewed to the line and equaled if it did not surpass the viciousness of elections in other provinces
dominated by the KBL. Terrorism was a special feature, as demonstrated by the killings previously mentioned, which
victimized no less than one of the main protagonists and implicated his rival as a principal perpetrator. Opposition leaders
were in constant peril of their lives even as their supporters were gripped with fear of violence at the hands of the party in
power.

What made the situation especially deplorable was the apparently indifferent attitude of the Commission on Elections
toward the anomalies being committed. It is a matter of record that the petitioner complained against the terroristic acts of
his opponents. All the electoral body did was refer the matter to the Armed Forces without taking a more active step as
befitted its constitutional role as the guardian of free, orderly and honest elections. A more assertive stance could have
averted the Sibalom election eve massacre and saved the lives of the nine victims of the tragedy.

Public confidence in the Commission on Elections was practically nil because of its transparent bias in favor of the
administration. This prejudice left many opposition candidates without recourse except only to this Court.

Alleging serious anomalies in the conduct of the elections and the canvass of the election returns, the petitioner went to
the Commission on Elections to prevent the impending proclamation of his rival, the private respondent herein. 1
Specifically, the petitioner charged that the elections were marred by "massive terrorism, intimidation, duress, vote-
buying, fraud, tampering and falsification of election returns under duress, threat and intimidation, snatching of ballot
boxes perpetrated by the armed men of respondent Pacificador." 2 Particular mention was made of the municipalities of
Caluya, Cabate, Tibiao, Barbaza, Laua-an, and also of San Remigio, where the petitioner claimed the election returns
were not placed in the ballot boxes but merely wrapped in cement bags or Manila paper.

On May 18, 1984, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections directed the provincial board of canvassers of
Antique to proceed with the canvass but to suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate until further orders. 3 On
June 7, 1984, the same Second Division ordered the board to immediately convene and to proclaim the winner without
prejudice to the outcome of the case before the Commission. 4 On certiorari before this Court, the proclamation made by
the board of canvassers was set aside as premature, having been made before the lapse of the 5-day period of appeal,
which the petitioner had seasonably made. 5 Finally, on July 23, 1984, the Second Division promulgated the decision now
subject of this petition which inter alia proclaimed Arturo F. Pacificador the elected assemblyman of the province of
Antique. 6

This decision was signed by Chairman Victoriano Savellano and Commissioners Jaime Opinion and Froilan M.
Bacungan. Previously asked to inhibit himself on the ground that he was a former law partner of private respondent
Pacificador, Opinion had refused. 7

The petitioner then came to this Court, asking us to annul the said decision.

The core question in this case is one of jurisdiction, to wit: Was the Second Division of the Commission on Elections
authorized to promulgate its decision of July 23, 1984, proclaiming the private respondent the winner in the election?

The applicable provisions are found in Article XII-C, Sections 2 and 3, of the 1973 Constitution.

Section 2 confers on the Commission on Elections the power to:

(2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of all member of the Batasang
Pambansa and elective provincial and city officials.

Section 3 provides:

The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in three divisions. All election cases may be heard and decided by
divisions except contests involving members of the Batasang Pambansa, which shall be heard and decided en banc. Unless
otherwise provided by law, all election cases shall be decided within ninety days from the date of their submission for
decision.

While both invoking the above provisions, the petitioner and the respondents have arrived at opposite conclusions. The
records are voluminous and some of the pleadings are exhaustive and in part even erudite. And well they might be, for the
noble profession of the law-despite all the canards that have been flung against it-exerts all efforts and considers all
possible viewpoints in its earnest search of the truth.

The petitioner complains that the Proclamation made by the Second Division is invalid because all contests involving the
members of the Batasang Pambansa come under the jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections en banc. This is as it
should be, he says, to insure a more careful decision, considering the importance of the offices involved. The respondents,
for their part, argue that only contests need to be heard and decided en banc and all other cases can be-in fact, should be-
filed with and decided only by any of the three divisions.

The former Solicitor General makes much of this argument and lays a plausible distinction between the terms "contests"
and "cases" to prove his point. 8 Simply put, his contention is that the pre-proclamation controversy between the petitioner
and the private respondent was not yet a contest at that time and therefore could be validly heard by a mere division of the
Commission on Elections, consonant with Section 3. The issue was at this stage still administrative and so was resoluble
by the Commission under its power to administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections, 9 not its authority as sole
judge of the election contest.

A contest, according to him, should involve a contention between the parties for the same office "in which the contestant
seeks not only to oust the intruder but also to have himself inducted into the office." 10 No proclamation had as yet been
made when the petition was filed and later decided. Hence, since neither the petitioner nor the private respondent had at
that time assumed office, there was no Member of the Batasang Pambansa from Antique whose election, returns or
qualifications could be examined by the Commission on Elections en banc.

In providing that the Commission on Elections could act in division when deciding election cases, according to this
theory, the Constitution was laying down the general rule. The exception was the election contest involving the members
of the Batasang Pambansa, which had to be heard and decided en banc. 11 The en banc requirement would apply only
from the time a candidate for the Batasang Pambansa was proclaimed as winner, for it was only then that a contest could
be permitted under the law. All matters arising before such time were, necessarily, subject to decision only by division of
the Commission as these would come under the general heading of "election cases."

As the Court sees it, the effect of this interpretation would be to divide the jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections
into two, viz.: (1) over matters arising before the proclamation, which should be heard and decided by division in the
exercise of its administrative power; and (2) over matters arising after the proclamation, which could be heard and decided
only en banc in the exercise of its judicial power. Stated otherwise, the Commission as a whole could not act as sole judge
as long as one of its divisions was hearing a pre-proclamation matter affecting the candidates for the Batasang Pambansa
because there was as yet no contest; or to put it still another way, the Commission en banc could not do what one of its
divisions was competent to do, i.e., decide a pre-proclamation controversy. Moreover, a mere division of the Commission
on Elections could hear and decide, save only those involving the election, returns and qualifications of the members of
the Batasang Pambansa, all cases involving elective provincial and city officials from start to finish, including pre-
proclamation controversies and up to the election protest. In doing so, it would exercise first administrative and then
judicial powers. But in the case of the Commission en banc, its jurisdiction would begin only after the proclamation was
made and a contest was filed and not at any time and on any matter before that, and always in the exercise only of judicial
power.

This interpretation would give to the part more powers than were enjoyed by the whole, granting to the division while
denying to the banc. We do not think this was the intention of the Constitution. The framers could not have intended such
an irrational rule.

We believe that in making the Commission on Elections the sole judge of all contests involving the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial and city officials, the Constitution
intended to give it full authority to hear and decide these cases from beginning to end and on all matters related thereto,
including those arising before the proclamation of the winners.

It is worth observing that the special procedure for the settlement of what are now called "pre-proclamation controversies"
is a relatively recent innovation in our laws, having been introduced only in 1978, through P.D. No. 1296, otherwise
known as the 1978 Election Code. Section 175 thereof provided:

Sec. 175. Suspension and annulment of proclamation.-The Commission shall be the sole judge of all pre-
proclamation controversies and any of its decisions, orders or rulings shall be final and executory. It may, motu proprio or
upon written petition, and after due notice and hearing order the suspension of the proclamation of a candidate-elect or
annul any proclamation, if one has been made, on any of the grounds mentioned in Sections 172, 173 and 174 thereof.

Before that time all proceedings affecting the election, returns and qualifications of public officers came under the
complete jurisdiction of the competent court or tribunal from beginning to end and in the exercise of judicial power only.
It therefore could not have been the intention of the framers in 1935, when the Commonwealth Charter was adopted, and
even in 1973, when the past Constitution was imposed, to divide the electoral process into the pre-proclamation stage and
the post-proclamation stage and to provide for a separate jurisdiction for each stage, considering the first administrative
and the second judicial.

Besides, the term "contest" as it was understood at the time Article XII-C. Section 2(2) was incorporated in the 1973
Constitution did not follow the strict definition of a contention between the parties for the same office. Under the Election
Code of 1971, which presumably was taken into consideration when the 1973 Constitution was being drafted, election
contests included the quo warranto petition that could be filed by any voter on the ground of disloyalty or ineligibility of
the contestee although such voter was himself not claiming the office involved. 12

The word "contests" should not be given a restrictive meaning; on the contrary, it should receive the widest possible scope
conformably to the rule that the words used in the Constitution should be interpreted liberally. As employed in the 1973
Constitution, the term should be understood as referring to any matter involving the title or claim of title to an elective
office, made before or after proclamation of the winner, whether or not the contestant is claiming the office in dispute.
Needless to stress, the term should be given a consistent meaning and understood in the same sense under both Section
2(2) and Section 3 of Article XII-C of the Constitution.

The phrase "election, returns and qualifications" should be interpreted in its totality as referring to all matters affecting the
validity of the contestee's title. But if it is necessary to specify, we can say that "election" referred to the conduct of the
polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of the votes;
"returns" to the canvass of the returns and the proclamation of the winners, including questions concerning the
composition of the board of canvassers and the authenticity of the election returns and "qualifications" to matters that
could be raised in a quo warranto proceeding against the proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty or ineligibility or the
inadequacy of his certificate of candidacy.

All these came under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections insofar as they applied to the members of
the defunct Batasang Pambansa and, under Article XII-C, Section 3, of the 1973 Constitution, could be heard and decided
by it only en banc.

We interpret "cases" as the generic term denoting the actions that might be heard and decided by the Commission on
Elections, only by division as a general rule except where the case was a "contest" involving members of the Batasang
Pambansa, which had to be heard and decided en banc.

As correctly observed by the petitioner, the purpose of Section 3 in requiring that cases involving members of the
Batasang Pambansa be heard and decided by the Commission en banc was to insure the most careful consideration of such
cases. Obviously, that objective could not be achieved if the Commission could act en banc only after the proclamation
had been made, for it might then be too late already. We are all-too-familiar with the grab-the-proclamation-and-delay-
the-protest strategy of many unscrupulous candidates which has resulted in the frustration of the popular will and the
virtual defeat of the real winners in the election. The respondent's theory would make this gambit possible for the pre-
proclamation proceedings, being summary in nature, could be hastily decided by only three members in division, without
the care and deliberation that would have otherwise been observed by the Commission en banc.

After that, the delay. The Commission en banc might then no longer be able to rectify in time the proclamation summarily
and not very judiciously made by the division. While in the end the protestant might be sustained, he might find himself
with only a Phyrric victory because the term of his office would have already expired.

It may be argued that in conferring the initial power to decide the pre- proclamation question upon the division, the
Constitution did not intend to prevent the Commission en banc from exercising the power directly, on the theory that the
greater power embraces the lesser. It could if it wanted to but then it could also allow the division to act for it. That
argument would militate against the purpose of the provision, which precisely limited all questions affecting the election
contest, as distinguished from election cases in general, to the jurisdiction of the Commission en banc as sole judge
thereof. "Sole judge" excluded not only all other tribunals but also and even the division of the Commission A decision
made on the contest by less than the Commission en banc would not meet the exacting standard of care and deliberation
ordained by the Constitution

Incidentally, in making the Commission the "sole judge" of pre- proclamation controversies in Section 175, supra, the law
was obviously referring to the body sitting en banc. In fact, the pre-proclamation controversies involved in Aratuc vs.
Commission on Elections, 13 where the said provision was applied, were heard and decided en banc.

Another matter deserving the highest consideration of this Court but accorded cavalier attention by the respondent
Commission on Elections is due process of law, that ancient guaranty of justice and fair play which is the hallmark of the
free society. Commissioner Opinion ignored it. Asked to inhibit himself on the ground that he was formerly a law partner
of the private respondent, he obstinately insisted on participating in the case, denying he was biased. 14

Given the general attitude of the Commission on Elections toward the party in power at the time, and the particular
relationship between Commissioner Opinion and MP Pacificador, one could not be at least apprehensive, if not certain,
that the decision of the body would be adverse to the petitioner. As in fact it was. Commissioner Opinion's refusal to
inhibit himself and his objection to the transfer of the case to another division cannot be justified by any criterion of
propriety. His conduct on this matter belied his wounded protestations of innocence and proved the motives of the Second
Division when it rendered its decision.

This Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge" as the indispensable
imperative of due process. 15 To bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge must not only be impartial but must
also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. 16 The litigants are entitled to
no less than that. They should be sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a judge who shall give them
justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all. They must believe in his sense of fairness,
otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without such confidence, there would be no point in invoking his action for the
justice they expect.

Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice Frankfurter calls the
rudiments of fair play. Fair play cans for equal justice. There cannot be equal justice where a suitor approaches a court
already committed to the other party and with a judgment already made and waiting only to be formalized after the
litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also extra-judicial) proceedings are not
orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed to make the motions and reach the denouement according to a
prepared script. There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his conclusions only after all the
evidence is in and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of the established facts and the pertinent law.

The relationship of the judge with one of the parties may color the facts and distort the law to the prejudice of a just
decision. Where this is probable or even only posssible, due process demands that the judge inhibit himself, if only out of
a sense of delicadeza. For like Caesar's wife, he must be above suspicion. Commissioner Opinion, being a lawyer, should
have recognized his duty and abided by this well-known rule of judicial conduct. For refusing to do so, he divested the
Second Division of the necessary vote for the questioned decision, assuming it could act, and rendered the proceeding null
and void. 17

Since this case began in 1984, many significant developments have taken place, not the least significant of which was the
February revolution of "people power" that dislodged the past regime and ended well nigh twenty years of travail for this
captive nation. The petitioner is gone, felled by a hail of bullets sprayed with deadly purpose by assassins whose motive is
yet to be disclosed. The private respondent has disappeared with the "pomp of power" he had before enjoyed. Even the
Batasang Pambansa itself has been abolished, "an iniquitous vestige of the previous regime" discontinued by the Freedom
Constitution. It is so easy now, as has been suggested not without reason, to send the rec rds of this case to the archives
and say the case is finished and the book is closed.

But not yet.

Let us first say these meager words in tribute to a fallen hero who was struck down in the vigor of his youth because he
dared to speak against tyranny. Where many kept a meekly silence for fear of retaliation, and still others feigned and
fawned in hopes of safety and even reward, he chose to fight. He was not afraid. Money did not tempt him. Threats did
not daunt him. Power did not awe him. His was a singular and all-exacting obsession: the return of freedom to his country.
And though he fought not in the barricades of war amid the sound and smoke of shot and shell, he was a soldier
nonetheless, fighting valiantly for the liberties of his people against the enemies of his race, unfortunately of his race too,
who would impose upon the land a perpetual night of dark enslavement. He did not see the breaking of the dawn, sad to
say, but in a very real sense Evelio B. Javier made that dawn draw nearer because he was, like Saul and Jonathan, "swifter
than eagles and stronger than lions."

A year ago this Court received a letter which began: "I am the sister of the late Justice Calixto Zaldivar. I am the mother
of Rhium Z. Sanchez, the grandmother of Plaridel Sanchez IV and Aldrich Sanchez, the aunt of Mamerta Zaldivar. I lost
all four of them in the election eve ambush in Antique last year." She pleaded, as so did hundreds of others of her
provincemates in separate signed petitions sent us, for the early resolution of that horrible crime, saying: "I am 82 years
old now. I am sick. May I convey to you my prayer in church and my plea to you, 'Before I die, I would like to see justice
to my son and grandsons.' May I also add that the people of Antique have not stopped praying that the true winner of the
last elections will be decided upon by the Supreme Court soon."

That was a year ago and since then a new government has taken over in the wake of the February revolution. The despot
has escaped, and with him, let us pray, all the oppressions and repressions of the past have also been banished forever. A
new spirit is now upon our land. A new vision limns the horizon. Now we can look forward with new hope that under the
Constitution of the future every Filipino shall be truly sovereign in his own country, able to express his will through the
pristine ballow with only his conscience as his counsel.

This is not an impossible dream. Indeed, it is an approachable goal. It can and will be won if we are able at last, after our
long ordeal, to say never again to tyranny. If we can do this with courage and conviction, then and only then, and not until
then, can we truly say that the case is finished and the book is closed.

WHEREFORE, let it be spread in the records of this case that were it not for the supervening events that have legally
rendered it moot and academic, this petition would have been granted and the decision of the Commission on Elections
dated July 23, 1984, set aside as violative of the Constitution.

SO ORDERED.

Feria, Yap, Narvasa, Alampay and Paras, JJ., concur.

Fernan and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur in the result.



Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:

I concur and reserve the filing of a separate concurrence.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring in the result:

I concur in the result. The questioned Decision of the Second Division of the COMELEC, dated July 23, 1984,
proclaiming private respondent, Arturo F. Pacificador, as the duly elected Assemblyman of the province of Antique,
should be set aside for the legal reason that all election contests, without any distinction as to cases or contests, involving
members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa fall under the jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc pursuant to Sections 2
and 3 of Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution.

FELICIANO, J., concurring in the result:

I agree with the result reached, that is, although this petition has become moot and academic, the decision, dated 23 July
1984, of the Second Division of the Commission on Elections which had proclaimed Arturo F. Pacificador as the duly
elected Assemblyman of the Province of Antique must be set aside or, more accurately, must be disregarded as bereft of
any effect in law. I reach this result on the same single, precisely drawn, ground relied upon by Melencio-Herrera, J.: that
all election contests involving members of the former Batasan Pambansa must be decided by the Commission on
Elections en banc under Sections 2 and 3 of Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution. These Sections do not distinguish
between "pre-proclamation" and "post-proclamation" contests nor between "cases" and "contests."





Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:

I concur and reserve the filing of a separate concurrence.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring in the result:

I concur in the result. The questioned Decision of the Second Division of the COMELEC, dated July 23, 1984,
proclaiming private respondent, Arturo F. Pacificador, as the duly elected Assemblyman of the province of Antique,
should be set aside for the legal reason that all election contests, without any distinction as to cases or contests, involving
members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa fall under the jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc pursuant to Sections 2
and 3 of Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution.

FELICIANO, J., concurring in the result:

I agree with the result reached, that is, although this petition has become moot and academic, the decision, dated 23 July
1984, of the Second Division of the Commission on Elections which had proclaimed Arturo F. Pacificador as the duly
elected Assemblyman of the Province of Antique must be set aside or, more accurately, must be disregarded as bereft of
any effect in law. I reach this result on the same single, precisely drawn, ground relied upon by Melencio-Herrera, J.: that
all election contests involving members of the former Batasan Pambansa must be decided by the Commission on
Elections en banc under Sections 2 and 3 of Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution. These Sections do not distinguish
between "pre-proclamation" and "post-proclamation" contests nor between "cases" and "contests."

Footnotes

1 Rollo, p. 26.

2 Rollo, p. 26.

3 Ibid., p. 9; p. 28.

4 Id, p. 30.

5 Id, p. 30.

6 Id, p. 62.

7 Id, p. 62; pp. 107-111.

8 Id., pp. 11-16; pp. 196-208.

9 Art. XII-C, Sec. 2(l), 1973 Constitution.

10 Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 191.

11 Art. XII-C, Sec. 3, 1973 Constitution.

12 Election Code of 1971, Sec. 219.

13 88 SCRA 251.

14 Rollo, pp. 109-111.

15 Mateo vs. Villaluz, 50 SCRA 18; Gutierrez vs. Santos, 2 SCRA 249.

16 People vs. Opida, G.R. No. L-46272, July 13, 1986, citing Fernandez vs. Presbitero, 79 SCRA 61; Sardinia-Linco
vs. Pineda, 104 SCRA 757.

17 Comelec Res. No. 1669, Sec. 5.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City

EN BANC

DENNIS A. B. FUNA,
Petitioner,



- versus -



THE CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, REYNALDO A. VILLAR,
Respondent.

G.R. No. 192791

Present:

CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA,
SERENO,
REYES, and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.

Promulgated:

April 24, 2012
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

D E C I S I O N

VELASCO, JR., J.:

In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65, Dennis A. B. Funa challenges the constitutionality of the
appointment of Reynaldo A. Villar as Chairman of the Commission on Audit and accordingly prays that a judgment issue
declaring the unconstitutionality of the appointment.

The facts of the case are as follows:

On February 15, 2001, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President Macapagal-Arroyo) appointed Guillermo N.
Carague (Carague) as Chairman of the Commission on Audit (COA) for a term of seven (7) years, pursuant to the 1987
Constitution.[1] Caragues term of office started on February 2, 2001 to end on February 2, 2008.

Meanwhile, on February 7, 2004, President Macapagal-Arroyo appointed Reynaldo A. Villar (Villar) as the third member
of the COA for a term of seven (7) years starting February 2, 2004 until February 2, 2011.

Following the retirement of Carague on February 2, 2008 and during the fourth year of Villar as COA Commissioner,
Villar was designated as Acting Chairman of COA from February 4, 2008 to April 14, 2008. Subsequently, on April 18,
2008, Villar was nominated and appointed as Chairman of the COA. Shortly thereafter, on June 11, 2008, the
Commission on Appointments confirmed his appointment. He was to serve as Chairman of COA, as expressly indicated
in the appointment papers, until the expiration of the original term of his office as COA Commissioner or on February 2,
2011. Challenged in this recourse, Villar, in an obvious bid to lend color of title to his hold on the chairmanship, insists
that his appointment as COA Chairman accorded him a fresh term of seven (7) years which is yet to lapse. He would
argue, in fine, that his term of office, as such chairman, is up to February 2, 2015, or 7 years reckoned from February 2,
2008 when he was appointed to that position.

Meanwhile, Evelyn R. San Buenaventura (San Buenaventura) was appointed as COA Commissioner to serve the
unexpired term of Villar as Commissioner or up to February 2, 2011.

Before the Court could resolve this petition, Villar, via a letter dated February 22, 2011 addressed to President Benigno S.
Aquino III, signified his intention to step down from office upon the appointment of his replacement. True to his word,
Villar vacated his position when President Benigno Simeon Aquino III named Ma. Gracia Pulido-Tan (Chairman Tan)
COA Chairman. This development has rendered this petition and the main issue tendered therein moot and academic.

A case is considered moot and academic when its purpose has become stale,[2] or when it ceases to present a justiciable
controversy owing to the onset of supervening events,[3] so that a resolution of the case or a declaration on the issue
would be of no practical value or use.[4] In such instance, there is no actual substantial relief which a petitioner would be
entitled to, and which will anyway be negated by the dismissal of the basic petition.[5] As a general rule, it is not within
Our charge and function to act upon and decide a moot case. However, in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,[6] We
acknowledged and accepted certain exceptions to the issue of mootness, thus:

The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a
case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution,
second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved, third, when constitutional
issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public, and fourth, the case
is capable of repetition yet evading review.

Although deemed moot due to the intervening appointment of Chairman Tan and the resignation of Villar, We consider
the instant case as falling within the requirements for review of a moot and academic case, since it asserts at least four
exceptions to the mootness rule discussed in David, namely: there is a grave violation of the Constitution; the case
involves a situation of exceptional character and is of paramount public interest; the constitutional issue raised requires the
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar and the public; and the case is capable of repetition yet
evading review.[7] The situation presently obtaining is definitely of such exceptional nature as to necessarily call for the
promulgation of principles that will henceforth guide the bench, the bar and the public should like circumstance arise.
Confusion in similar future situations would be smoothed out if the contentious issues advanced in the instant case are
resolved straightaway and settled definitely. There are times when although the dispute has disappeared, as in this case, it
nevertheless cries out to be addressed. To borrow from Javier v. Pacificador,[8] Justice demands that we act then, not
only for the vindication of the outraged right, though gone, but also for the guidance of and as a restraint in the future.

Both procedural and substantive issues are raised in this proceeding. The procedural aspect comes down to the question of
whether or not the following requisites for the exercise of judicial review of an executive act obtain in this petition, viz:
(1) there must be an actual case or justiciable controversy before the court; (2) the question before it must be ripe for
adjudication; (3) the person challenging the act must be a proper party; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be raised
at the earliest opportunity and must be the very litis mota of the case.[9]

To Villar, all the requisites have not been met, it being alleged in particular that petitioner, suing as a taxpayer and citizen,
lacks the necessary standing to challenge his appointment.[10] On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), while recognizing the validity of Villars appointment for the period ending February 11, 2011, has expressed the
view that petitioner should have had filed a petition for declaratory relief or quo warranto under Rule 63 or Rule 66,
respectively, of the Rules of Court instead of certiorari under Rule 65.

Villars posture on the absence of some of the mandatory requisites for the exercise by the Court of its power of judicial
review must fail. As a general rule, a petitioner must have the necessary personality or standing (locus standi) before a
court will recognize the issues presented. In Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, We defined locus standi as:

x x x a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain a direct injury as a
result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The term interest means a material interest, an interest in issue
affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. The gist
of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions.[11]

To have legal standing, therefore, a suitor must show that he has sustained or will sustain a direct injury as a
result of a government action, or have a material interest in the issue affected by the challenged official act.[12]
However, the Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus standi requirements and has accorded certain
individuals, not otherwise directly injured, or with material interest affected, by a Government act, standing to sue
provided a constitutional issue of critical significance is at stake.[13] The rule on locus standi is after all a mere
procedural technicality in relation to which the Court, in a catena of cases involving a subject of transcendental import,
has waived, or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators,
to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any other
government act.[14] In David, the Court laid out the bare minimum norm before the so-called non-traditional suitors
may be extended standing to sue, thusly:

1.) For taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional;
2.) For voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question;
3.) For concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be
settled early; and
4.) For legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes their prerogatives as legislators.

This case before Us is of transcendental importance, since it obviously has far-reaching implications, and there is a need
to promulgate rules that will guide the bench, bar, and the public in future analogous cases. We, thus, assume a liberal
stance and allow petitioner to institute the instant petition.

Anent the aforestated posture of the OSG, there is no serious disagreement as to the propriety of the availment of
certiorari as a medium to inquire on whether the assailed appointment of respondent Villar as COA Chairman infringed
the constitution or was infected with grave abuse of discretion. For under the expanded concept of judicial review under
the 1987 Constitution, the corrective hand of certiorari may be invoked not only to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government.[15] Grave abuse of discretion denotes:

such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, in other words, where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in
contemplation of law.[16]


We find the remedy of certiorari applicable to the instant case in view of the allegation that then President Macapagal-
Arroyo exercised her appointing power in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion.

This brings Us to the pivotal substantive issue of whether or not Villars appointment as COA Chairman, while sitting in
that body and after having served for four (4) years of his seven (7) year term as COA commissioner, is valid in light of
the term limitations imposed under, and the circumscribing concepts tucked in, Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution,
which reads:

(2) The Chairman and Commissioners [on Audit] shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission
on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office
for seven years, one commissioner for five years, and the other commissioner for three years, without reappointment.
Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor. In no case shall any
member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. (Emphasis added.)[17]


And if valid, for how long can he serve?

At once clear from a perusal of the aforequoted provision are the defined restricting features in the matter of the
composition of COA and the appointment of its members (commissioners and chairman) designed to safeguard the
independence and impartiality of the commission as a body and that of its individual members.[18] These are, first, the
rotational plan or the staggering term in the commission membership, such that the appointment of commission members
subsequent to the original set appointed after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution shall occur every two years; second,
the maximum but a fixed term-limit of seven (7) years for all commission members whose appointments came about by
reason of the expiration of term save the aforementioned first set of appointees and those made to fill up vacancies
resulting from certain causes; third, the prohibition against reappointment of commission members who served the full
term of seven years or of members first appointed under the Constitution who served their respective terms of office;
fourth, the limitation of the term of a member to the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor; and fifth, the
proscription against temporary appointment or designation.

To elucidate on the mechanics of and the adverted limitations on the matter of COA-member appointments with fixed
but staggered terms of office, the Court lays down the following postulates deducible from pertinent constitutional
provisions, as construed by the Court:

1. The terms of office and appointments of the first set of commissioners, or the seven, five and three-year termers
referred to in Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution, had already expired. Hence, their respective terms of office find
relevancy for the most part only in understanding the operation of the rotational plan. In Gaminde v. Commission on
Audit,[19] the Court described how the smooth functioning of the rotational system contemplated in said and like
provisions covering the two other independent commissions is achieved thru the staggering of terms:

x x x [T]he terms of the first Chairmen and Commissioners of the Constitutional Commissions under the 1987
Constitution must start on a common date [February 02, 1987, when the 1987 Constitution was ratified] irrespective of the
variations in the dates of appointments and qualifications of the appointees in order that the expiration of the first terms of
seven, five and three years should lead to the regular recurrence of the two-year interval between the expiration of the
terms.

x x x In case of a belated appointment, the interval between the start of the terms and the actual appointment shall be
counted against the appointee.[20] (Italization in the original; emphasis added.)

Early on, in Republic v. Imperial,[21] the Court wrote of two conditions, both indispensable to [the] workability of the
rotational plan. These conditions may be described as follows: (a) that the terms of the first batch of commissioners
should start on a common date; and (b) that any vacancy due to death, resignation or disability before the expiration of the
term should be filled only for the unexpired balance of the term. Otherwise, Imperial continued, the regularity of the
intervals between appointments would be destroyed. There appears to be near unanimity as to the purpose/s of the
rotational system, as originally conceived, i.e., to place in the commission a new appointee at a fixed interval (every two
years presently), thus preventing a four-year administration appointing more than one permanent and regular
commissioner,[22] or to borrow from Commissioner Monsod of the 1986 CONCOM, to prevent one person (the
President of the Philippines) from dominating the commissions.[23] It has been declared too that the rotational plan
ensures continuity in, and, as indicated earlier, secure the independence of, the commissions as a body.[24]

2. An appointment to any vacancy in COA, which arose from an expiration of a term, after the first chairman and
commissioners appointed under the 1987 Constitution have bowed out, shall, by express constitutional fiat, be for a term
of seven (7) years, save when the appointment is to fill up a vacancy for the corresponding unserved term of an outgoing
member. In that case, the appointment shall only be for the unexpired portion of the departing commissioners term of
office. There can only be an unexpired portion when, as a direct result of his demise, disability, resignation or
impeachment, as the case may be, a sitting member is unable to complete his term of office.[25] To repeat, should the
vacancy arise out of the expiration of the term of the incumbent, then there is technically no unexpired portion to speak of.
The vacancy is for a new and complete seven-year term and, ergo, the appointment thereto shall in all instances be for a
maximum seven (7) years.
3. Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the 1987 Constitution prohibits the reappointment of a member of COA after his
appointment for seven (7) years. Writing for the Court in Nacionalista Party v. De Vera,[26] a case involving the
promotion of then COMELEC Commissioner De Vera to the position of chairman, then Chief Justice Manuel Moran
called attention to the fact that the prohibition against reappointment comes as a continuation of the requirement that the
commissionersreferring to members of the COMELEC under the 1935 Constitutionshall hold office for a term of
nine (9) years. This sentence formulation imports, notes Chief Justice Moran, that reappointment is not an absolute
prohibition.

4. The adverted system of regular rotation or the staggering of appointments and terms in the membership for all three
constitutional commissions, namely the COA, Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and Civil Service Commission
(CSC) found in the 1987 Constitution was patterned after the amended 1935 Constitution for the appointment of the
members of COMELEC[27] with this difference: the 1935 version entailed a regular interval of vacancy every three (3)
years, instead of the present two (2) years and there was no express provision on appointment to any vacancy being
limited to the unexpired portion of the his predecessors term. The model 1935 provision reads:

Section 1. There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and two other members to be
appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, who shall hold office for a term of nine
years and may not be reappointed. Of the Members of the Commission first appointed, one shall hold office for nine
years, another for six years and the third for three years. x x x


Petitioner now asseverates the view that Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the 1987 Constitution proscribes reappointment of any
kind within the commission, the point being that a second appointment, be it for the same position (commissioner to
another position of commissioner) or upgraded position (commissioner to chairperson) is a prohibited reappointment and
is a nullity ab initio. Attention is drawn in this regard to the Courts disposition in Matibag v. Benipayo.[28]

Villars promotional appointment, so it is argued, is void from the start, constituting as it did a reappointment enjoined by
the Constitution, since it actually needed another appointment to a different office and requiring another confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments.

Central to the adjudication of the instant petition is the correct meaning to be given to Sec. 1(2), Article IX(D) of the
Constitution on the ban against reappointment in relation to the appointment issued to respondent Villar to the position of
COA Chairman.

Without question, the parties have presented two (2) contrasting and conflicting positions. Petitioner contends that
Villars appointment is proscribed by the constitutional ban on reappointment under the aforecited constitutional
provision. On the other hand, respondent Villar initially asserted that his appointment as COA Chairman is valid up to
February 2, 2015 pursuant to the same provision.

The Court finds petitioners position bereft of merit. The flaw lies in regarding the word reappointment as, in context,
embracing any and all species of appointment.

The rule is that if a statute or constitutional provision is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal
meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.[29] This is known as the plain meaning rule enunciated by the
maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure.[30]
The primary source whence to ascertain constitutional intent or purpose is the language of the provision itself.[31] If
possible, the words in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning, save where technical terms are employed.
J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration illustrates the verbal legis rule in this wise:


We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We do not of course stop there, but that is
where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective
sought to be attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in which
case the significance thus attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyers document, it being
essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the peoples consciousness, its language as much as
possible should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision
to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers
and the people mean what they say. Thus there are cases where the need for construction is reduced to a minimum.[32]
(Emphasis supplied.)

Let us dissect and examine closely the provision in question:

(2) The Chairman and Commissioners [on Audit] shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission
on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold
office for seven years, one commissioner for five years, and the other commissioner for three years, without
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor. x x x
(Emphasis added.)

The first sentence is unequivocal enough. The COA Chairman shall be appointed by the President for a term of
seven years, and if he has served the full term, then he can no longer be reappointed or extended another appointment. In
the same vein, a Commissioner who was appointed for a term of seven years who likewise served the full term is barred
from being reappointed. In short, once the Chairman or Commissioner shall have served the full term of seven years, then
he can no longer be reappointed to either the position of Chairman or Commissioner. The obvious intent of the framers is
to prevent the president from dominating the Commission by allowing him to appoint an additional or two more
commissioners.

The same purpose obtains in the second sentence of Sec. 1(2). The Constitutional Convention barred reappointment
to be extended to commissioner-members first appointed under the 1987 Constitution to prevent the President from
controlling the commission. Thus, the first Chairman appointed under the 1987 Constitution who served the full term of
seven years can no longer be extended a reappointment. Neither can the Commissioners first appointed for the terms of
five years and three years be eligible for reappointment. This is the plain meaning attached to the second sentence of Sec.
1(2), Article IX(D).

On the other hand, the provision, on its face, does not prohibit a promotional appointment from commissioner to
chairman as long as the commissioner has not served the full term of seven years, further qualified by the third sentence of
Sec. 1(2), Article IX (D) that the appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the
predecessor. In addition, such promotional appointment to the position of Chairman must conform to the rotational plan
or the staggering of terms in the commission membership such that the aggregate of the service of the Commissioner in
said position and the term to which he will be appointed to the position of Chairman must not exceed seven years so as not
to disrupt the rotational system in the commission prescribed by Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).

In conclusion, there is nothing in Sec. 1(2), Article IX(D) that explicitly precludes a promotional appointment from
Commissioner to Chairman, provided it is made under the aforestated circumstances or conditions.

It may be argued that there is doubt or ambiguity on whether Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D), as couched, allows a
promotional appointment from Commissioner to Chairman. Even if We concede the existence of an ambiguity, the
outcome will remain the same. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc.[33] teaches that in case of doubt as to the import and react of a
constitutional provision, resort should be made to extraneous aids of construction, such as debates and proceedings of the
Constitutional Convention, to shed light on and ascertain the intent of the framers or the purpose of the provision being
construed.

The understanding of the Convention as to what was meant by the terms of the constitutional provision which was
the subject of the deliberation goes a long way toward explaining the understanding of the people when they ratified it.
The Court applied this principle in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary:

A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under consideration.
Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be
accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be
examined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was
framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular
provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words
consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose.[34] (Emphasis added.)

And again in Nitafan v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue:

x x x The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional construction that
the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in
constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the
people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution
were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers.[35] (Emphasis added.)

Much weight and due respect must be accorded to the intent of the framers of the Constitution in interpreting its
provisions.
Far from prohibiting reappointment of any kind, including a situation where a commissioner is upgraded to the position of
chairman, the 1987 Constitution in fact unequivocally allows promotional appointment, but subject to defined parameters.
The ensuing exchanges during the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission (CONCOM) on a draft proposal
of what would eventually be Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the present Constitution amply support the thesis that a promotional
appointment is allowed provided no one may be in the COA for an aggregate threshold period of 7 years:

MS. AQUINO: In the same paragraph, I would propose an amendment x x x. Between x x x the sentence which begins
with In no case, insert THE APPOINTEE SHALL IN NO CASE SERVE AN AGGREGATE PERIOD OF MORE
THAN SEVEN YEARS. I was thinking that this may approximate the situation wherein a commissioner is first appointed
as chairman. I am willing to withdraw that amendment if there is a representation on the part of the Committee that there
is an implicit intention to prohibit a term that in the aggregate will exceed more than seven years. If that is the intention, I
am willing to withdraw my amendment.

MR. MONSOD: If the [Gentlewoman] will read the whole Article, she will notice that there is no reappointment of any
kind and, therefore, as a whole there is no way somebody can serve for more than seven years. The purpose of the last
sentence is to make sure that this does not happen by including in the appointment both temporary and acting capacities.

MS. AQUINO. Yes. Reappointment is fine; that is accounted for. But I was thinking of a situation wherein a
commissioner is upgraded to a position of chairman. But if this provision is intended to cover that kind of situation, then I
am willing to withdraw my amendment.

MR. MONSOD. It is covered.

MR. FOZ. There is a provision on line 29 precisely to cover that situation. It states: Appointment to any vacancy shall be
only for the unexpired portion of the predecessor. In other words, if there is upgrading of position from commissioner to
chairman, the appointee can serve only the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor.

MS. AQUINO: But we have to be very specific x x x because it might shorten the term because he serves only the
unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor.

MR. FOZ: He takes it at his own risk. He knows that he will only have to serve the unexpired portion of the term of the
predecessor. (Emphasis added.)[36]

The phrase upgrading of position found in the underscored portion unmistakably shows that Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the
1987 Constitution, for all its caveat against reappointment, does not per se preclude, in any and all cases, the promotional
appointment or upgrade of a commissioner to chairman, subject to this proviso: the appointees tenure in office does not
exceed 7 years in all. Indeed, such appointment does not contextually come within the restricting phrase without
reappointment twice written in that section. Delegate Foz even cautioned, as a matter of fact, that a sitting commissioner
accepting a promotional appointment to fill up an unexpired portion pertaining to the higher office does so at the risk of
shortening his original term. To illustrate the Fozs concern: assume that Carague left COA for reasons other than the
expiration of his threshold 7-year term and Villar accepted an appointment to fill up the vacancy. In this situation, the
latter can only stay at the COA and served the unexpired portion of Caragues unexpired term as departing COA
Chairman, even if, in the process, his (Villars) own 7-year term as COA commissioner has not yet come to an end. In this
illustration, the inviolable regularity of the intervals between appointments in the COA is preserved.

Moreover, jurisprudence tells us that the word reappointment means a second appointment to one and the same
office.[37] As Justice Arsenio Dizon (Justice Dizon) aptly observed in his dissent in Visarra v. Miraflor,[38] the
constitutional prohibition against the reappointment of a commissioner refers to his second appointment to the same office
after holding it for nine years.[39] As Justice Dizon observed, [T]he occupant of an office obviously needs no such
second appointment unless, for some valid cause, such as the expiration of his term or resignation, he had ceased to be the
legal occupant thereof. [40] The inevitable implication of Justice Dizons cogent observation is that a promotion from
commissioner to chairman, albeit entailing a second appointment, involves a different office and, hence, not, in the strict
legal viewpoint, a reappointment. Stated a bit differently, reappointment refers to a movement to one and the same
office. Necessarily, a movement to a different position within the commission (from Commissioner to Chairman) would
constitute an appointment, or a second appointment, to be precise, but not reappointment.

A similar opinion was expressed in the same Visarra case by the concurring Justice Angelo Bautista, although he
expressly alluded to a promotional appointment as not being a prohibited appointment under Art. X of the 1935
Constitution.

Petitioners invocation of Matibag as additional argument to contest the constitutionality of Villars elevation to the COA
chairmanship is inapposite. In Matibag, then President Macapagal-Arroyo appointed, ad interim, Alfredo Benipayo as
COMELEC Chairman and Resurreccion Borra and Florentino Tuason as Commissioners, each for a term of office of
seven (7) years. All three immediately took their oath of, and assumed, office. These appointments were twice renewed
because the Commission on Appointments failed to act on the first two ad interim appointments. Via a petition for
prohibition, some disgruntled COMELEC officials assail as infirm the appointments of Benipayo, et al.

Matibag lists (4) four situations where the prohibition on reappointment would arise, or to be specific, where the proviso
[t]he Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed x x x for a term of seven years without reappointment shall
apply. Justice Antonio T. Carpio declares in his dissent that Villars appointment falls under a combination of two of the
four situations.
Conceding for the nonce the correctness of the premises depicted in the situations referred to in Matibag, that case is of
doubtful applicability to the instant petition. Not only is it cast against a different milieu, but the lis mota of the case, as
expressly declared in the main opinion, is the very constitutional issue raised by petitioner.[41] And what is/are
this/these issue/s? Only two defined issues in Matibag are relevant, viz: (1) the nature of an ad interim appointment and
subsumed thereto the effect of a by-passed ad interim appointment; and (2) the constitutionality of renewals of ad interim
appointments. The opinion defined these issues in the following wise: Petitioner [Matibag] filed the instant petition
questioning the appointment and the right to remain in office of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason as Chairman and
Commissioners of the COMELEC, respectively. Petitioner claims that the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, et al.
violate the constitutional provisions on the independence of COMELEC, as well as on the prohibitions on temporary
appointments and reappointments of its Chairman and members. As may distinctly be noted, an upgrade or promotion
was not in issue in Matibag.

We shall briefly address the four adverted situations outlined in Matibag, in which, as there urged, the uniform proviso on
no reappointmentafter a member of any of the three constitutional commissions is appointed for a term of seven (7)
yearsshall apply. Matibag made the following formulation:

The first situation is where an ad interim appointee after confirmation by the Commission on Appointments serves his full
7-year term. Such person cannot be reappointed whether as a member or as chairman because he will then be actually
serving more than seven (7) years.

The second situation is where the appointee, after confirmation, serves part of his term and then resigns before his seven-
year term of office ends. Such person cannot be reappointed whether as a member or as chair to a vacancy arising from
retirement because a reappointment will result in the appointee serving more than seven years.

The third situation is where the appointee is confirmed to serve the unexpired portion of someone who died or resigned,
and the appointee completes the unexpired term. Such person cannot be reappointed whether as a member or as chair to a
vacancy arising from retirement because a reappointment will result in the appointee also serving more than seven (7)
years.

The fourth situation is where the appointee has previously served a term of less than seven (7) years, and a vacancy arises
from death or resignation. Even if it will not result in his serving more than seven years, a reappointment of such person to
serve an unexpired term is also prohibited because his situation will be similar to those appointed under the second
sentence of Sec. 1(20), Art. IX-C of the Constitution [referring to the first set of appointees (the 5 and 3 year termers)
whose term of office are less than 7 years but are barred from being reappointed under any situation].[42] (Words in
brackets and emphasis supplied.)

The situations just described constitute an obiter dictum, hence without the force of adjudication, for the corresponding
formulation of the four situations was not in any way necessary to resolve any of the determinative issues specifically
defined in Matibag. An opinion entirely unnecessary for the decision of the case or one expressed upon a point not
necessarily involved in the determination of the case is an obiter.[43]

There can be no serious objection to the scenarios depicted in the first, second and third situations, both hewing with the
proposition that no one can stay in any of the three independent commissions for an aggregate period of more than seven
(7) years. The fourth situation, however, does not commend itself for concurrence inasmuch as it is basically predicated
on the postulate that reappointment, as earlier herein defined, of any kind is prohibited under any and all circumstances.
To reiterate, the word reappointment means a second appointment to one and the same office; and Sec. 1(2), Art.
IX(D) of the 1987 Constitution and similar provisions do not peremptorily prohibit the promotional appointment of a
commissioner to chairman, provided the new appointees tenure in both capacities does not exceed seven (7) years in all.
The statements in Matibag enunciating the ban on reappointment in the aforecited fourth situation, perforce, must be
abandoned, for, indeed, a promotional appointment from the position of Commissioner to that of Chairman is
constitutionally permissible and not barred by Sec. 1(2), Art. IX (D) of the Constitution.

One of the aims behind the prohibition on reappointment, petitioner urges, is to ensure and preserve the independence of
COA and its members,[44] citing what the dissenting Justice J.B.L Reyes wrote in Visarra, that once appointed and
confirmed, the commissioners should be free to act as their conscience demands, without fear of retaliation or hope or
reward. Pursued to its logical conclusion, petitioners thesis is that a COA member may no longer act with independence
if he or she can be rewarded with a promotion or appointment, for then he or she will do the bidding of the appointing
authority in the hope of being promoted or reappointed.

The unstated reason behind Justice J.B.L. Reyes counsel is that independence is really a matter of choice. Without taking
anything away from the gem imparted by the eminent jurist, what Chief Justice Moran said on the subject of
independence is just as logically sound and perhaps even more compelling, as follows:

A Commissioner, hopeful of reappointment may strive to do good. Whereas, without that hope or other hope of material
reward, his enthusiasm may decline as the end of his term approaches and he may even lean to abuses if there is no higher
restrain in his moral character. Moral character is no doubt the most effective safeguard of independence. With moral
integrity, a commissioner will be independent with or without the possibility of reappointment.[45]

The Court is likewise unable to sustain Villars proposition that his promotional appointment as COA Chairman gave him
a completely fresh 7-year termfrom February 2008 to February 2015given his four (4)-year tenure as COA
commissioner devalues all the past pronouncements made by this Court, starting in De Vera, then Imperial, Visarra, and
finally Matibag. While there had been divergence of opinion as to the import of the word reappointment, there has been
unanimity on the dictum that in no case can one be a COA member, either as chairman or commissioner, or a mix of both
positions, for an aggregate term of more than 7 years. A contrary view would allow a circumvention of the aggregate 7-
year service limitation and would be constitutionally offensive as it would wreak havoc to the spirit of the rotational
system of succession. Imperial, passing upon the rotational system as it applied to the then organizational set-up of the
COMELEC, stated:

The provision that of the first three commissioners appointed one shall hold office for 9 years, another for 6 years and the
third for 3 years, when taken together with the prescribed term of office for 9 years without reappointment, evinces a
deliberate plan to have a regular rotation or cycle in the membership of the commission, by having subsequent members
appointable only once every three years.[46]


To be sure, Villars appointment as COA Chairman partakes of a promotional appointment which, under appropriate
setting, would be outside the purview of the constitutional reappointment ban in Sec 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution.
Nonetheless, such appointment, even for the term appearing in the underlying appointment paper, ought still to be struck
down as unconstitutional for the reason as shall be explained.

Consider:

In a mandatory tone, the aforecited constitutional provision decrees that the appointment of a COA member shall be for a
fixed 7-year term if the vacancy results from the expiration of the term of the predecessor. We reproduce in its pertinent
part the provision referred to:

(2) The Chairman and Commissioners [on Audit] shall be appointed x x x for a term of seven years without
reappointment. x x x Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor.
x x x

Accordingly, the promotional appointment as COA Chairman of Villar for a stated fixed term of less than seven (7) years
is void for violating a clear, but mandatory constitutional prescription. There can be no denying that the vacancy in the
position of COA chairman when Carague stepped down in February 2, 2008 resulted from the expiration of his 7-year
term. Hence, the appointment to the vacancy thus created ought to have been one for seven (7) years in line with the
verbal legis approach[47] of interpreting the Constitution. It is to be understood, however, following Gaminde, that in case
of a belated appointment, the interval between the start of the term and the actual appointment shall be counted against the
7-year term of the appointee. Posing, however, as an insurmountable barrier to a full 7-year appointment for Villar is the
rule against one serving the commission for an aggregate term of more than seven (7) years.

Where the Constitution or, for that matter, a statute, has fixed the term of office of a public official, the appointing
authority is without authority to specify in the appointment a term shorter or longer than what the law provides. If the
vacancy calls for a full seven-year appointment, the President is without discretion to extend a promotional appointment
for more or for less than seven (7) years. There is no in between. He or she cannot split terms. It is not within the power of
the appointing authority to override the positive provision of the Constitution which dictates that the term of office of
members of constitutional bodies shall be seven (7) years.[48] A contrary reasoning would make the term of office to
depend upon the pleasure or caprice of the [appointing authority] and not upon the will [of the framers of the Constitution]
of the legislature as expressed in plain and undoubted language in the law.[49]

In net effect, then President Macapagal-Arroyo could not have had, under any circumstance, validly appointed Villar as
COA Chairman, for a full 7-year appointment, as the Constitution decrees, was not legally feasible in light of the 7-year
aggregate rule. Villar had already served 4 years of his 7-year term as COA Commissioner. A shorter term, however, to
comply with said rule would also be invalid as the corresponding appointment would effectively breach the clear purpose
of the Constitution of giving to every appointee so appointed subsequent to the first set of commissioners, a fixed term of
office of 7 years. To recapitulate, a COA commissioner like respondent Villar who serves for a period less than seven (7)
years cannot be appointed as chairman when such position became vacant as a result of the expiration of the 7-year term
of the predecessor (Carague). Such appointment to a full term is not valid and constitutional, as the appointee will be
allowed to serve more than seven (7) years under the constitutional ban.

On the other hand, a commissioner who resigned before serving his 7- year term can be extended an appointment to the
position of chairman for the unexpired period of the term of the latter, provided the aggregate of the period he served as
commissioner and the period he will serve as chairman will not exceed seven (7) years. This situation will only obtain
when the chairman leaves the office by reason of death, disability, resignation or impeachment. Let us consider, in the
concrete, the situation of then Chairman Carague and his successor, Villar. Carague was appointed COA Chairman
effective February 2, 2001 for a term of seven (7) years, or up to February 2, 2008. Villar was appointed as
Commissioner on February 2, 2004 with a 7-year term to end on February 2, 2011. If Carague for some reason vacated
the chairmanship in 2007, then Villar can resign as commissioner in the same year and later be appointed as chairman to
serve only up to February 2, 2008, the end of the unexpired portion of Caragues term. In this hypothetical scenario,
Villars appointment to the position of chairman is valid and constitutional as the aggregate periods of his two (2)
appointments will only be five (5) years which neither distorts the rotational scheme nor violates the rule that the sum
total of said appointments shall not exceed seven (7) years. Villar would, however, forfeit two (2) years of his original
seven (7)-year term as Commissioner, since, by accepting an upgraded appointment to Caragues position, he agreed to
serve the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor. As illustrated earlier, following Mr. Fozs line, if there is an
upgrading of position from commissioner to chairman, the appointee takes the risk of cutting short his original term,
knowing pretty well before hand that he will serve only the unexpired portion of the term of his predecessor, the outgoing
COA chairman.

In the extreme hypothetical situation that Villar vacates the position of chairman for causes other than the expiration of the
original term of Carague, the President can only appoint the successor of Villar for the unexpired portion of the Carague
term in line with Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution. Upon the expiration of the original 7-year term of Carague, the
President can appoint a new chairman for a term of seven (7) full years.

In his separate dissent, my esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Mendoza, takes strong exception to the view that the
promotional appointment of a sitting commissioner is plausible only when he is appointed to the position of chairman for
the unexpired portion of the term of said official who leaves the office by reason of any the following reasons: death,
disability, resignation or impeachment, not when the vacancy arises out as a result of the expiration of the 7-year term of
the past chairman. There is nothing in the Constitution, so Justice Mendoza counters, that restricts the promotion of an
incumbent commissioner to the chairmanship only in instances where the tenure of his predecessor was cut short by any
of the four events referred to. As earlier explained, the majority view springs from the interplay of the following
premises: The explicit command of the Constitution is that the Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by
the President x x x for a term of seven years [and] appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of
the term of the predecessor. To repeat, the President has two and only two options on term appointments. Either he
extends an appointment for a full 7-year term when the vacancy results from the expiration of term, or for a shorter period
corresponding to the unexpired term of the predecessor when the vacancy occurs by reason of death, physical disability,
resignation or impeachment. If the vacancy calls for a full seven-year appointment, the Chief Executive is barred from
extending a promotional appointment for less than seven years. Else, the President can trifle with terms of office fixed by
the Constitution.

Justice Mendoza likewise invites attention to an instance in history when a commissioner had been promoted chairman
after the expiration of the term of his predecessor, referring specifically to the appointment of then COMELEC
Commissioner Gaudencio Garcia to succeed Jose P. Carag after the expiration of the latters term in 1959 as COMELEC
chairman. Such appointment to the position of chairman is not constitutionally permissible under the 1987 Constitution
because of the policy and intent of its framers that a COA member who has served his full term of seven (7) years or even
for a shorter period can no longer be extended another appointment to the position of chairman for a full term of seven (7)
years. As revealed in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission that crafted the 1987 Constitution, a member of
COA who also served as a commissioner for less than seven (7) years in said position cannot be appointed to the position
of chairman for a full term of seven (7) years since the aggregate will exceed seven (7) years. Thus, the adverted Garcia
appointment in 1959 made under the 1935 Constitution cannot be used as a precedent to an appointment of such nature
under the 1987 Constitution. The dissent further notes that the upgrading remained uncontested. In this regard, suffice it
to state that the promotion in question was either legal or it was not. If it were not, no amount of repetitive practices
would clear it of invalidating taint.

Lastly, Villars appointment as chairman ending February 2, 2011 which Justice Mendoza considers as valid is likewise
unconstitutional, as it will destroy the rationale and policy behind the rotational system or the staggering of appointments
and terms in COA as prescribed in the Constitution. It disturbs in a way the staggered rotational system of appointment
under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the 1987 Constitution. Consider: If Villars term as COA chairman up to February 2, 2011
is viewed as valid and constitutional as espoused by my esteemed colleague, then two vacancies have simultaneously
occurred and two (2) COA members going out of office at once, opening positions for two (2) appointables on that date as
Commissioner San Buenaventuras term also expired on that day. This is precisely one of the mischiefs the staggering of
terms and the regular intervals appointments seek to address. Note that San Buenaventura was specifically appointed to
succeed Villar as commissioner, meaning she merely occupied the position vacated by her predecessor whose term as
such commissioner expired on February 2, 2011. The result is what the framers of the Constitution doubtless sought to
avoid, a sitting President with a 6-year term of office, like President Benigno C. Aquino III, appointing all or at least two
(2) members of the three-man Commission during his term. He appointed Ma. Gracia Pulido-Tan as Chairman for the
term ending February 2, 2015 upon the relinquishment of the post by respondent Villar, and Heidi Mendoza was
appointed Commissioner for a 7-year term ending February 2, 2018 to replace San Buenaventura. If Justice Mendozas
version is adopted, then situations like the one which obtains in the Commission will definitely be replicated in gross
breach of the Constitution and in clear contravention of the intent of its framers. Presidents in the future can easily control
the Commission depriving it of its independence and impartiality.

To sum up, the Court restates its ruling on Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution, viz:

1. The appointment of members of any of the three constitutional commissions, after the expiration of the
uneven terms of office of the first set of commissioners, shall always be for a fixed term of seven (7) years; an
appointment for a lesser period is void and unconstitutional.

The appointing authority cannot validly shorten the full term of seven (7) years in case of the expiration of the term as this
will result in the distortion of the rotational system prescribed by the Constitution.

2. Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain causes (death, resignation, disability or impeachment) shall
only be for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor, but such appointments cannot be less than the unexpired
portion as this will likewise disrupt the staggering of terms laid down under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).

3. Members of the Commission, e.g. COA, COMELEC or CSC, who were appointed for a full term of seven
years and who served the entire period, are barred from reappointment to any position in the Commission. Corollarily, the
first appointees in the Commission under the Constitution are also covered by the prohibition against reappointment.

4. A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for less than seven years is eligible for an
appointment to the position of Chairman for the unexpired portion of the term of the departing chairman. Such
appointment is not covered by the ban on reappointment, provided that the aggregate period of the length of service as
commissioner and the unexpired period of the term of the predecessor will not exceed seven (7) years and provided
further that the vacancy in the position of Chairman resulted from death, resignation, disability or removal by
impeachment. The Court clarifies that reappointment found in Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) means a movement to one and the
same office (Commissioner to Commissioner or Chairman to Chairman). On the other hand, an appointment involving a
movement to a different position or office (Commissioner to Chairman) would constitute a new appointment and, hence,
not, in the strict legal sense, a reappointment barred under the Constitution.

5. Any member of the Commission cannot be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.

WHEREFORE the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The appointment of then Commissioner Reynaldo A. Villar to the
position of Chairman of the Commission on Audit to replace Guillermo N. Carague, whose term of office as such
chairman has expired, is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL for violation of Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the
Constitution.

SO ORDERED.



PRESBITERO J. VELASCO JR.
Associate Justice





























WE CONCUR:



RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice



ANTONIO T. CARPIO TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice Associate Justice




ARTURO D. BRION DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice Associate Justice



LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice Associate Justice




ROBERTO A. ABAD MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice




JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice Associate Justice




MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice Associate Justice




ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice






C E R T I F I C A T I O N


Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.




RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

[1] Art. IX(D), Sec. 1(2).The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the
Chairman shall hold office for seven years, one Commissioner for five years, and the other Commissioner for three years,
without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the
predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
[2] Joya v. PCGG, G.R. No. 96541, August 24, 1993, 225 SCRA 568.
[3] Prov. Of Batangas v. Romulo, G.R. No. 1522774, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 736.
[4] Go v. Sandiganbayn, G.R. Nos. 150329-30, September 11, 2007, 532 SCRA 574; citing Vda. De Davao v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 116526, March 23, 2004, 426 SCRA 91 and other cases.
[5] Olanolan v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 165491, March 31, 2005, 807 SCRA 454.
[6] G.R. Nos. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483, 171400, 171489 & 171424, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 161.
[7] Id.
[8] G.R. Nos. 68379-81, September 22, 1986, 144 SCRA 194.
[9] Herrera, REMEDIAL LAW 96 (2000).
[10] Rollo, pp. 270, 274-275.
[11] G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000, 338 SCRA 81; citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186.
[12] Id.
[13] David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, supra note 6.
[14] Abaya v. Ebdane, G.R. No. 167919, February 14, 2007, 515 SCRA 720; Agan v. Philippine International Air
Terminals Co., Inc., 450 Phil. 744 (2003); Del Mar v. PAGCOR, 400 Phil. 307 (2000).
[15] CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII, Sec. 1.
[16] Benito v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 134913, January 19, 2001, 349 SCRA 705.
[17] An identical provision is repeated for the Civil Service Commission and the COMELEC, differing only in the case of
the COMELEC as to the numerical composition and the number of appointees involved in the staggered appointments.
[18] Republic v. Imperial, 96 Phil. 770 (1955).
[19] G.R. No. 140335, December 13, 2000, 347 SCRA 655, 662-663; citing Republic v. Imperial, supra note 18.
[20] Id.
[21] Supra note 18.
[22] Id.
[23] 1986 Constitutional Commission, Record of Proceedings and Debates, Vol. 1, pp. 574-575.
[24] Republic v. Imperial, supra note 18; Concurring Opinion of Justice Angelo Bautista in Visarra v. Miraflor, 8 Phil. 1
(1963); Record of Proceeding and Debates, 1986 Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 585; Matibag v. Benipayo, G.R.
No. 149036, April 2, 2002, 380 SCRA 49.
[25] Republic v. Imperial, supra note 18.
[26] No. L-3474, December 7, 1949, 85 SCRA 126.
[27] Gaminde v. COA, supra note 19. The COMELEC, then a 3-man body, is now composed of a Chairman and six (6)
Commissioners.
[28] G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002, 380 SCRA 49.
[29] Agpalo, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 94 (1990).
[30] Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 82511, March 3, 1992, 206 SCRA 701, 711.
[31] Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 147589 & 147613, June 26, 2001,
359 SCRA 698, 724.
[32] No. L-21064, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413.
[33] Id.
[34] G.R. No. 83896, February 22, 1991, 194 SCRA 317, 325.
[35] No. L-78780, July 23, 1987, 152 SCRA 284, 291-292.
[36] I Records of the Constitutional Convention Proceedings and Debates, pp. 586 et seq.; cited in Bernas, THE INTENT
OF THE 1986 CONSTITUTION WRITERS 591-592 (1995).
[37] Sibal, PHILIPPINE LEGAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 826 (1995 reprint); citing Visarra v. Miraflor, supra note 24.
[38] Supra note 24.
[39] Referring to a COMELEC commissioner who was then entitled to a 9-year term of office.
[40] Visarra v. Miraflor, supra note 24, at 46.
[41] Supra note 28, at 65.
[42] Id. at 82.
[43] American Home Assurance Co. v. NLRC, 328 Phil. 606 (1996); City of Manila v. Entote, 156 Phil. 498 (1974).
[44] Rollo, p. 25.
[45] Nacionalista Party v. De Vera, supra note 26, at 136.
[46] Supra note 18, at 775.
[47] Whenever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning, except when technical
terms are employed.
[48] See rollo, p. 315.
[49] Baker v. Kirk, 33 Ind. 517; cited in Republic v. Imperial, supra note 18.

Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

HAZEL MA. C. ANTOLIN,

G.R. No. 165036
Petitioner,





- versus -





ABELARDO T. DOMONDON,


JOSE A. GANGAN, and


VIOLETA J. JOSEF,


Respondents.


x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x





HAZEL MA. C. ANTOLIN

G.R. No. 175705
Petitioner,







Present:





CORONA, C. J., Chairperson,
- versus -

VELASCO, JR.,


LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,


DEL CASTILLO, and


PEREZ, JJ.



ANTONIETA FORTUNA-IBE,

Promulgated:
Respondent.

July 5, 2010
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x


D E C I S I O N


DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Examinations have a two-fold purpose. First, they are summative; examinations are intended to assess and record
what and how much the students have learned. Second, and perhaps more importantly, they are formative; examinations
are intended to be part and parcel of the learning process. In a perfect system, they are tools for learning. In view of the
pedagogical aspect of national examinations, the need for all parties to fully ventilate their respective positions, and the
view that government transactions can only be improved by public scrutiny, we remand these cases to the trial court for
further proceedings.

Factual Antecedents

Petitioner took the accountancy licensure examinations (the Certified Public Accountant [CPA] Board Exams) conducted
by the Board of Accountancy (the Board) in October 1997.[1] The examination results were released on October 29,
1997; out of 6,481 examinees, only 1,171 passed. Unfortunately, petitioner did not make it. When the results were
released, she received failing grades in four out of the seven subjects.[2]


Subject
Petitioners Grade
Theory of Accounts
65 %
Business Law
66 %
Management Services
69 %
Auditing Theory
82 %
Auditing Problems
70 %
Practical Accounting I
68 %
Practical Accounting II
77 %


Convinced that she deserved to pass the examinations, she wrote to respondent Abelardo T. Domondon (Domondon),
Acting Chairman of the Board of Accountancy, and requested that her answer sheets be re-corrected.[3] On November 3,
1997, petitioner was shown her answer sheets, but these consisted merely of shaded marks, so she was unable to
determine why she failed the exam.[4] Thus, on November 10, 1997, she again wrote to the Board to request for copies of
(a) the questionnaire in each of the seven subjects (b) her answer sheets; (c) the answer keys to the questionnaires, and (d)
an explanation of the grading system used in each subject (collectively, the Examination Papers).[5]

Acting Chairman Domondon denied petitioners request on two grounds: first, that Section 36, Article III of the Rules and
Regulations Governing the Regulation and Practice of Professionals, as amended by Professional Regulation Commission
(PRC) Resolution No. 332, series of 1994, only permitted access to the petitioners answer sheet (which she had been
shown previously), and that reconsideration of her examination result was only proper under the grounds stated therein:

Sec. 36 An examinee shall be allowed to have access or to go over his/her test papers or answer sheets on a
date not later than thirty (30) days from the official release of the results of the examination. Within ten (10) days from
such date, he/she may file his/her request for reconsideration of ratings. Reconsideration of rating shall be effected only
on grounds of mechanical error in the grading of his/her testpapers or answer sheets, or malfeasance.[6]


Second, Acting Chairman Domondon clarified that the Board was precluded from releasing the Examination Papers (other
than petitioners answer sheet) by Section 20, Article IV of PRC Resolution No. 338, series of 1994, which provides:

Sec. 20. Illegal, Immoral, Dishonorable, Unprofessional Acts The hereunder acts shall constitute prejudicial,
illegal, grossly immoral, dishonorable, or unprofessional conduct:

A. Providing, getting, receiving, holding, using or reproducing questions

x x x x

3. that have been given in the examination except if the test bank for the subject has on deposit at least two thousand
(2,000) questions.[7]


After a further exchange of correspondence,[8] the Board informed petitioner that an investigation was conducted into her
exam and there was no mechanical error found in the grading of her test papers.[9]

Proceedings before the Regional Trial Court

Undeterred, on January 12, 1998, petitioner filed a Petition for Mandamus with Damages against the Board of
Accountancy and its members[10] before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. The case was raffled to Branch 33,
and docketed as Civil Case No. 98-86881. The Petition included a prayer for the issuance of a preliminary mandatory
injunction ordering the Board of Accountancy and its members (the respondents) to furnish petitioner with copies of the
Examination Papers. Petitioner also prayed that final judgment be issued ordering respondents to furnish petitioner with
all documents and other materials as would enable her to determine whether respondents fairly administered the
examinations and correctly graded petitioners performance therein, and, if warranted, to issue to her a certificate of
registration as a CPA.[11]

On February 5, 1998, respondents filed their Opposition to the Application for a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction, and argued, inter alia, that petitioner was not entitled to the relief sought, that the respondents did not have the
duty to furnish petitioner with copies of the Examination Papers, and that petitioner had other plain, speedy, adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, namely, recourse to the PRC.[12] Respondents also filed their Answer with
Compulsory Counterclaim in the main case, which asked that the Petition for Mandamus with Damages be dismissed for
lack of merit on the following grounds: (1) petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies; (2) the petition stated no
cause of action because there was no ministerial duty to release the information demanded; and (3) the constitutional right
to information on matters of public concern is subject to limitations provided by law, including Section 20, Article IV, of
PRC Resolution No. 338, series of 1994.[13]

On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed an Amended Petition (which was admitted by the RTC), where she included the
following allegation in the body of her petition:

The allegations in this amended petition are meant only to plead a cause of action for access to the documents
requested, not for re-correction which petitioner shall assert in the proper forum depending on, among others, whether she
finds sufficient error in the documents to warrant such or any other relief. None of the allegations in this amended
petition, including those in the following paragraphs, is made to assert a cause of action for re-correction.[14]


If only to underscore the fact that she was not asking for a re-checking of her exam, the following prayer for relief
was deleted from the Amended Petition: and, if warranted, to issue to her a certificate of registration as a CPA.

On June 23, 1998, respondents filed a Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss Application for Writ of Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction, on the ground that petitioner had taken and passed the May 1998 CPA Licensure Examination and
had taken her oath as a CPA.[15] Petitioner filed her Opposition on July 8, 1998.[16] Subsequently, on October 29, 1998,
respondents filed their Answer with Counterclaim to the amended petition. They reiterated their original allegations and
further alleged that there was no cause of action because at the time the Amended Petition was admitted, they had ceased
to be members of the Board of Accountancy and they were not in possession of the documents sought by the
petitioner.[17]

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In an Order dated October 16, 1998, the trial court granted respondents Motion to Dismiss Petitioners Application for a
Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction (not the main case), ruling that the matter had become moot since petitioner
passed the May CPA Licensure 1998 Examination and had already taken her oath as a CPA.[18]

Undaunted, petitioner sought and obtained leave to file a Second Amended Petition for Mandamus with Damages[19]
where she finally impleaded the PRC as respondent and included the following plea in her prayer:

WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prays that:

x x x x

2. Judgment be issued

(a) commanding respondents to give petitioner all documents and other materials as would enable her to
determine whether respondents fairly administered the same examinations and correctly graded petitioners performance
therein and, if warranted, to make the appropriate revisions on the results of her examination. (Emphasis ours)


On June 21, 2002, the trial court dismissed the petition on the ground that the petition had already become moot, since
petitioner managed to pass the 1998 CPA Board examinations.[20] Petitioner sought reconsideration[21] which was
granted by the trial court in its Omnibus Order[22] dated November 11, 2002. The Omnibus Order provides in part:

On the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner, the Court is inclined to reconsider its Order dismissing
the petition. The Court agrees with the petitioner that the passing of the petitioner in the subsequent CPA examination did
not render the petition moot and academic because the relief and if warranted, to issue to her a certificate of registration
as Certified Public Accountant was deleted from the original petition. As regard the issue of whether the petitioner has
the constitutional right to have access to the questioned documents, the Court would want first the parties to adduce
evidence before it can resolve the issue so that it can make a complete determination of the rights of the parties.

The Court would also want the Professional Regulation Commission to give its side of the case the moment it is
impleaded as a respondent in the Second Amended Petition for Mandamus filed by the petitioner which this Court is
inclined to grant.

As to the Motion for Conservatory Measures filed by the petitioner, the Court denies the same. It is clear that
the PRC has in custody the documents being requested by the petitioner. It has also an adequate facility to preserve and
safeguard the documents. To be sure that the questioned documents are preserved and safeguarded, the Court will order
the PRC to preserve and safeguard the documents and make them available anytime the Court or petitioner needs them.

WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court dated June 20, 2002 is reconsidered and set aside. The Professional
Regulation Commission is ordered to preserve and safeguard the following documents:

a) Questionnaire in each of the seven subjects comprising the Accountancy Examination of October, 1997;
b) Petitioners Answer Sheets; and
c) Answer keys to the questionnaires.

SO ORDERED.[23]


Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied.[24]

Proceedings before the Court of Appeals

The RTC Decisions led to the filing of three separate petitions for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA):


(a) CA-GR SP No. 76498, a petition filed by respondents Domondon, Gangan, and Josef on April 11,
2003;
(b) CA-GR SP No. 76546, a petition filed by respondent Ibe on April 30, 2003; and
(c) CA-GR SP No. 76545, a petition filed by the Board of Accountancy and PRC.


It is the first two proceedings that are pending before us. In both cases, the CA set aside the RTC Decisions and ordered
the dismissal of Civil Case No. 98-8681.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its December 11, 2006 Decision[25] in CA-GR SP No. 76546, the CA ruled that the petition has become moot in view
of petitioners eventual passing of the 1998 CPA Board Exam. In CA-GR SP No. 76498, the CA found, in a Decision
dated February 16, 2004,[26] that (i) Section 20, Article IV of PRC Resolution No. 338 constituted a valid limitation on
petitioners right to information and access to government documents; (ii) the Examination Documents were not of public
concern, because petitioner merely sought review of her failing marks; (iii) it was not the ministerial or mandatory
function of the respondents to review and reassess the answers to examination questions of a failing examinee; (iv) the
case has become moot, since petitioner already passed the May 1998 CPA Board Examinations and took her oath as a
CPA; and (v) petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies, because, having failed to secure the desired outcome
from the respondents, she did not elevate the matter to the PRC before seeking judicial intervention.[27]

CA-GR SP No. 76498 and CA-GR SP No. 76546 were brought before us by the petitioner and docketed as G.R. Nos.
165036 and 175705, respectively. The cases were then consolidated, in view of the similarity of the factual antecedents
and issues, and to avoid the possibility of conflicting decisions by different divisions of this Court.[28]

Issues

Before us, petitioner argues that she has a right to obtain copies of the examination papers so she can determine for herself
why and how she failed and to ensure that the Board properly performed its duties. She argues that the Constitution[29] as
well as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees[30] support her right to demand
access to the Examination Papers. Furthermore, she claims that there was no need to exhaust administrative remedies,
since no recourse to the PRC was available, and only a pure question of law is involved in this case. Finally, she claims
that her demand for access to documents was not rendered moot by her passing of the 1998 CPA Board Exams.

Our Ruling

Propriety of Writ of Mandamus

At the very outset let us be clear of our ruling. Any claim for re-correction or revision of her 1997 examination
cannot be compelled by mandamus. This much was made evident by our ruling in Agustin-Ramos v. Sandoval,[31]
where we stated:

After deliberating on the petition in relation to the other pleadings filed in the proceedings at bar, the Court
resolved to DENY said petition for lack of merit. The petition at bar prays for the setting aside of the Order of respondent
Judge dismissing petitioners mandamus action to compel the other respondents (Medical Board of Examiners and the
Professional Regulation Commission) to reconsider, recorrect and/or rectify the board ratings of the petitioners from
their present failing grades to higher or passing marks. The function of reviewing and re-assessing the petitioners
answers to the examination questions, in the light of the facts and arguments presented by them x x x is a discretionary
function of the Medical Board, not a ministerial and mandatory one, hence, not within the scope of the writ of mandamus.
The obvious remedy of the petitioners from the adverse judgment by the Medical Board of Examiners was an appeal to
the Professional Regulation Commission itself, and thence to the Court of Appeals; and since they did not apply for relief
to the Commission prior to their institution of the special civil action of mandamus in the Regional Trial Court, the
omission was fatal to the action under the familiar doctrine requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies. Apart from
the obvious undesirability of a procedure which would allow Courts to substitute their judgment for that of Government
boards in the determination of successful examinees in any administered examination an area in which courts have no
expertise and the circumstance that the law declares the Court of Appeals to be the appropriate review Court, the
Regional Trial Court was quite correct in refusing to take cognizance of an action seeking reversal of the quasi-judicial
action taken by the Medical Board of Examiners.[32] (Emphasis ours)


For a writ of mandamus to issue, the applicant must have a well-defined, clear, and certain legal right to the thing
demanded. The corresponding duty of the respondent to perform the required act must be equally clear.[33] No such
clarity exists here; neither does petitioners right to demand a revision of her examination results. And despite petitioners
assertions that she has not made any demand for re-correction, the most cursory perusal of her Second Amended Petition
and her prayer that the respondents make the appropriate revisions on the results of her examination belies this claim.

Like the claimants in Agustin, the remedy of petitioner from the refusal of the Board to release the Examination Papers
should have been through an appeal to the PRC. Undoubtedly, petitioner had an adequate remedy from the Boards
refusal to provide her with copies of the Examination Papers. Under Section 5(a) of Presidential Decree No. 223,[34] the
PRC has the power to promulgate rules and regulations to implement policies for the regulation of the accounting
profession.[35] In fact, it is one such regulation (PRC Resolution No. 338) that is at issue in this case. In addition, under
Section 5(c), the PRC has the power to

review, coordinate, integrate and approve the policies, resolutions, rules and regulations, orders or decisions promulgated
by the various Boards with respect to the profession or occupation under their jurisdictions including the results of their
licensure examinations but their decisions on administrative cases shall be final and executory unless appealed to the
Commission within thirty (30) days from the date of promulgation thereof.


Petitioner posits that no remedy was available because the PRCs power to review and approve in Section 5(c)
only refers to appeals in decisions concerning administrative investigations[36] and not to instances where documents are
being requested. Not only is this position myopic and self-serving, it is bereft of either statutory or jurisprudential basis.
The PRCs quasi-legislative and enforcement powers, encompassing its authority to review and approve policies,
resolutions, rules and regulations, orders, or decisions cover more than administrative investigations conducted pursuant
to its quasi-judicial powers.[37] More significantly, since the PRC itself issued the resolution questioned by the petitioner
here, it was in the best position to resolve questions addressed to its area of expertise. Indeed, petitioner could have saved
herself a great deal of time and effort had she given the PRC the opportunity to rectify any purported errors committed by
the Board.
One of the reasons for exhaustion of administrative remedies is our well-entrenched doctrine on separation of powers,
which enjoins upon the Judiciary a becoming policy of non-interference with matters falling primarily (albeit not
exclusively) within the competence of other departments.[38] Courts, for reasons of law, comity and convenience, should
not entertain suits unless the available administrative remedies have first been resorted to and the proper authorities have
been given an appropriate opportunity to act and correct their alleged errors, if any, committed in the administrative
forum. [39]

However, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is subject to exceptions, among which is when only a
question of law is involved.[40] This is because issues of law such as whether petitioner has a constitutional right to
demand access to the Examination Papers - cannot be resolved with finality by the administrative officer.[41]

Issues of Mootness

We now turn to the question of whether the petition has become moot in view of petitioners having passed the 1998 CPA
examination. An issue becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy, so that a
declaration on the issue would be of no practical use or value.[42]

In this jurisdiction, any citizen may challenge any attempt to obstruct the exercise of his or her right to information and
may seek its enforcement by mandamus.[43] And since every citizen possesses the inherent right to be informed by the
mere fact of citizenship,[44] we find that petitioners belated passing of the CPA Board Exams does not automatically
mean that her interest in the Examination Papers has become mere superfluity. Undoubtedly, the constitutional question
presented, in view of the likelihood that the issues in this case will be repeated, warrants review.[45]

The crux of this case is whether petitioner may compel access to the Examination Documents through mandamus. As
always, our inquiry must begin with the Constitution. Section 7, Article III provides:

Sec.7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well to government
research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law.


Together with the guarantee of the right to information, Section 28, Article II promotes full disclosure and transparency in
government, viz:

Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full
public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.


Like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute. The people's right to information is limited
to "matters of public concern," and is further "subject to such limitations as may be provided by law." Similarly, the
State's policy of full disclosure is limited to "transactions involving public interest," and is "subject to reasonable
conditions prescribed by law". The Court has always grappled with the meanings of the terms "public interest" and
"public concern." As observed in Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission:[46]

In determining whether x x x a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test which can be
applied. "Public concern" like "public interest" is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad
spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because
such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a
case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.


We have also recognized the need to preserve a measure of confidentiality on some matters, such as national security,
trade secrets and banking transactions, criminal matters, and other confidential matters.[47]

We are prepared to concede that national board examinations such as the CPA Board Exams are matters of public
concern. The populace in general, and the examinees in particular, would understandably be interested in the fair and
competent administration of these exams in order to ensure that only those qualified are admitted into the accounting
profession. And as with all matters pedagogical, these examinations could be not merely quantitative means of
assessment, but also means to further improve the teaching and learning of the art and science of accounting.

On the other hand, we do realize that there may be valid reasons to limit access to the Examination Papers in order
to properly administer the exam. More than the mere convenience of the examiner, it may well be that there exist inherent
difficulties in the preparation, generation, encoding, administration, and checking of these multiple choice exams that
require that the questions and answers remain confidential for a limited duration. However, the PRC is not a party to
these proceedings. They have not been given an opportunity to explain the reasons behind their regulations or articulate
the justification for keeping the Examination Documents confidential. In view of the far-reaching implications of this
case, which may impact on every board examination administered by the PRC, and in order that all relevant issues may be
ventilated, we deem it best to remand these cases to the RTC for further proceedings.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petitions are GRANTED. The December 11, 2006 and February 16, 2004
Decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 76546 and CA-GR SP No. 76498, respectively, are hereby SET
ASIDE. The November 11, 2002 and January 30, 2003 Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 33, in Civil
Case No. 98-86881 are AFFIRMED. The case is remanded to the Regional Trial Court for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.


MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice


WE CONCUR:



RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson


PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice





JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.





RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

[1] The examination questions were of the multiple choice type, where each question was followed by four possible
answers to choose from. The examinee was required to indicate his or her answer by shading in pencil one of four small
circles corresponding to each choice.
[2] Rollo (G.R. No.175705), p. 73.
[3] Id. at 69.
[4] Id. at 70.
[5] Id. at 71.
[6] Id. at 72.
[7] Id. at 38.
[8] Id. at 73-78.
[9] Rollo (G.R. No. 165036), pp. 107-108.
[10] Namely, Conchita L. Manabat, Abelardo T. Domondon, Reynaldo D. Gamboa, Jose V. Ramos, Violeta J. Josef,
Antonieta Fortuna-Ibe, and Jose Gangan.
[11] Rollo (G.R. No. 175705), pp. 34-42.
[12] CA rollo (CA G.R. SP No. 76498), pp. 62-70.
[13] Id. at 76-90.
[14] Id. at 91-93.
[15] Id. at 76-90.
[16] Id. at 120-123.
[17] Id. at 127-130.
[18] Id. at 131.
[19] Id. at 150-159.
[20] Id. at 36-38; penned by Judge Reynaldo G. Ros.
[21] Id. at 215-227. On August 26, 2002, private respondents filed their Comment/Opposition; id. at 234-241. Petitioner
filed her Reply, id. at 242-249.
[22] Id. at 29-30.
[23] Id. at 30.
[24] Id. at 33.
[25] Rollo (G.R. No. 175705), pp. 22-33; penned by Associate Justice Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa and concurred in by
Associate Justices Martin S. Villarama, Jr. and Lucas P. Bersamin.
[26] Rollo (G.R. No. 165036), pp. 37-53; penned by Associate Justice Renato C. Dacudao and concurred in by
Associate Justice Danilo B. Pine and Presiding Justice Cancio C. Garcia.
[27] Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated August 24, 2004.
[28] Rollo (G.R. No. 175075), pp. 89-90.
[29] Article III, Sec. 7 provides:
Section 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as
may be provided by law.
Article XI, Sec. 1 provides:
Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must, at all times, be accountable to the
people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act with patriotism and justice, and lead
modest lives.
[30] Republic Act No. 6713, An Act Establishing A Code Of Conduct And Ethical Standards For Public Officials And
Employees, To Uphold The Time-Honored Principle Of Public Office Being A Public Trust, Granting Incentives And
Rewards For Exemplary Service, Enumerating Prohibited Acts And Transactions And Providing Penalties For Violations
Thereof And For Other Purposes (1989).
Section 5. Duties of Public Officials and Employees. - In the performance of their duties, all public officials and
employees are under obligation to:
x x x x
(e) Make documents accessible to the public. - All public documents must be made accessible to, and readily available
for inspection by, the public within reasonable working hours.
[31] G.R. No. 84470, February 2, 1989 (Minute Resolution).
[32] Id.
[33] Lemi v. Valencia, 135 Phil. 185, 193 (1968); Subido v. Hon. Ocampo, 164 Phil. 438, 447-448 (1976).
[34] Creating The Professional Regulation Commission And Prescribing Its Powers And Functions (1973).
[35] See also Section 5(a), which provides:
Section 5. Powers of the Commission. The powers of the Commission are as follows:
a) To administer, implement and enforce the regulatory policies of the National Government with respect to the
regulation and licensing of the various professions and occupations under its jurisdiction including the maintenance of
professional and occupational standards and ethics and the enforcement of the rules and regulations relative thereto.
x x x x
m) To exercise general supervision over the members of the various Boards;
[36] Pursuant to the Rules and Regulations Governing the Regulation and Practice of Professionals.
[37] See Lupangco v. Court of Appeals, 243 Phil. 993, 1002 (1988).
[38] Merida Water District v. Bacarro, G.R. No. 165993, September 30, 2008, 567 SCRA 203, 209.
[39] Laguna CATV Network, Inc. v. Hon. Maraan, 440 Phil. 734, 740 (2002).
[40] Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., 252 Phil. 264, 269 (1989).
[41] Castro v. Secretary of Education, G.R. No. 132174, August 20, 2001
[42] See Gancho-on v. Secretary Gloria, 337 Phil. 654, 658 (1997); Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Pascua, 456 Phil. 425,
436 (2003); David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. Nos. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483, 171400, 171489, 171424, May 3,
2006, 489 SCRA 160, 213-214; Soriano Vda. De Dabao v. Court of Appeals, 469 Phil. 928, 937 (2004).
[43] Bantay Republic Act or BA-RA 7941v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 177271 & 177314, May 4, 2007, 523
SCRA 1, 14-15.
[44] Taada v. Hon. Tuvera, 220 Phil. 422, 433-434 (1985).
[45] Even if we were to assume that the issue has become moot, we have repeatedly enumerated the exceptions to the
rule on mootness, thus:
The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case.
Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the
exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when the constitutional issue
raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is
capable of repetition yet evading review. David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, supra note 42 at 214-215.
[46] Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, 234 Phil. 521, 535 (1987).
[47] Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, 360 Phil. 133, 160 (1998).

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR. and JOSE MA. O. HIZON,
Petitioners,

- versus -

TOLL REGULATORY BOARD, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, MANILA NORTH
TOLLWAYS CORPORATION, BENPRES HOLDINGS CORPORATION, FIRST PHILIPPINE INFRASTRUCTURE
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, TOLLWAY MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, PNCC SKYWAY
CORPORATION, CITRA METRO MANILA TOLLWAYS CORPORATION and HOPEWELL CROWN
INFRASTRUCTURE, INC.,
Respondents.
x-------------------------------------------x
HON. IMEE R. MARCOS, RONALDO B. ZAMORA, CONSUMERS UNION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., QUIRINO
A. MARQUINEZ, HON. LUIS A. ASISTIO, HON. ERICO BASILIO A. FABIAN, HON. RENATO KA RENE B.
MAGTUBO, HON. RODOLFO G. PLAZA, HON. ANTONIO M. SERAPIO, HON. EMMANUEL JOEL J.
VILLANUEVA, HON. ANIBAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA AGRIKULTURA (AMA), INC., ANIBAN NG MGA
MAGSASAKA, MANGINGISDA AT MANGGAGAWA SA AGRIKULTURA-KATIPUNAN, INC., KAISAHAN NG
MGA MAGSASAKA SA AGRIKULTURA, INC., KILUSAN NG MANGAGAWANG MAKABAYAN,
Petitioners,

- versus -

The REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, acting by and through the TOLL REGULATORY BOARD, MANILA NORTH
TOLLWAYS CORPORATION, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, and FIRST
PHILIPPINE INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT CORP.,
Respondents.
x-------------------------------------------x
GISING KABATAAN MOVEMENT, INC., BARANGAY COUNCIL OF SAN ANTONIO, MUNICIPALITY OF SAN
PEDRO, LAGUNA [as Represented by COUNCILOR CARLON G. AMBAYEC], and YOUNG PROFESSIONALS
AND ENTREPRENEURS OF SAN PEDRO, LAGUNA
Petitioners,

- versus -

THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, acting through the TOLL REGULATORY BOARD (TRB), PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION (PNCC),
Respondents.
x-------------------------------------------x
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the TOLL REGULATORY BOARD,
Petitioner,

- versus -

YOUNG PROFESSIONALS AND ENTREPRENEURS OF SAN PEDRO, LAGUNA,
Respondent.


G.R. No. 166910

Present:

CORONA, CJ,
CARPIO,
CARPIO-MORALES,*
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,*
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA, and
SERENO, JJ.







G.R. No. 169917






































G.R. No. 173630





















G.R. No. 183599





Promulgated:


October 19, 2010
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

D E C I S I O N

VELASCO, JR., J.:

Before us are four petitions; the first three are special civil actions under Rule 65, assailing and seeking to nullify certain
statutory provisions, presidential actions and implementing orders, toll operation-related contracts and issuances on the
construction, maintenance and operation of the major tollway systems in Luzon. The petitions likewise seek to restrain
and permanently prohibit the implementation of the allegedly illegal toll fee rate hikes for the use of the North Luzon
Expressway (NLEX), South Luzon Expressway (SLEX) and the South Metro Manila Skyway (SMMS). The fourth,
a petition for review under Rule 45, seeks to annul and set aside the decision dated June 23, 2008 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pasig, in SCA No. 3138-PSG, enjoining the original toll operating franchisee from collecting toll fees in
the SLEX.

By Resolution of March 20, 2007, the Court ordered the consolidation of the first three petitions, docketed as G.R. Nos.
166910, 169917 and 173630, respectively. The fourth petition, G.R. No. 183599, would later be ordered consolidated with
the earlier three petitions.

The Facts

The antecedent facts are as follows
On March 31, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. (P.D.) 1112, authorizing the
establishment of toll facilities on public improvements.[1] This issuance, in its preamble, explicitly acknowledged the
huge financial requirements and the necessity of tapping the resources of the private sector to implement the
governments infrastructure programs. In order to attract private sector involvement, P.D. 1112 allowed the collection of
toll fees for the use of certain public improvements that would allow a reasonable rate of return on investments. The
same decree created the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) and invested it under Section 3 (a) (d) and (e) with the power to
enter, for the Republic, into contracts for the construction, maintenance and operation of tollways, grant authority to
operate a toll facility, issue therefor the necessary Toll Operation Certificate (TOC) and fix initial toll rates, and, from
time to time, adjust the same after due notice and hearing.

On the same date, P.D. 1113 was issued, granting to the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), then
known as the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP), for a period of thirty years from
May 1977 or up to May 2007 a franchise to construct, maintain and operate toll facilities in the North Luzon and
South Luzon Expressways, with the right to collect toll fees at such rates as the TRB may fix and/or authorize.
Particularly, Section 1 of P.D. 1113 delineates the coverage of the expressways from Balintawak, Caloocan City to
Carmen, Rosales, Pangasinan and from Nichols, Pasay City to Lucena, Quezon. And because the franchise is not self-
executing, as it was in fact made subject, under Section 3 of P.D. 1113, to such conditions as may be imposed by the
Board in an appropriate contract to be executed for such purpose, TRB and PNCC signed in October 1977, a Toll
Operation Agreement (TOA) on the North Luzon and South Luzon Tollways, providing for the detailed terms and
conditions for the construction, maintenance and operation of the expressway.[2]

On December 22, 1983, P.D. 1894 was issued therein further granting PNCC a franchise over the Metro Manila
Expressway (MMEX), and the expanded and delineated NLEX and SLEX. Particularly, PNCC was granted the right,
privilege and authority to construct, maintain and operate any and all such extensions, linkages or stretches, together with
the toll facilities appurtenant thereto, from any part of the North Luzon Expressway, South Luzon Expressway and/or
Metro Manila Expressway and/or to divert the original route and change the original end-points of the North Luzon
Expressway and/or South Luzon Expressway as may be approved by the [TRB].[3] Under Section 2 of P.D. 1894, the
franchise granted the [MMEX] and all extensions, linkages, stretches and diversions after the approval of the decree that
may be constructed after the approval of this decree [on December 22, 1983] shall likewise have a term of thirty (30)
years, commencing from the date of completion of the project.

As expressly set out in P.D. 1113 and reiterated in P.D. 1894, PNCC may sell or assign its franchise thereunder granted or
cede the usufruct[4] thereof upon the Presidents approval.[5] This same provision on franchise transfer and cession of
usufruct is likewise found in P.D. 1112.[6]

Then came the 1987 Constitution with its franchise provision.[7]
In 1993, the Government Corporate Counsel (GCC), acting on PNCCs request, issued Opinion No. 224, s. 1993,[8]
later affirmed by the Secretary of Justice,[9] holding that PNCC may, subject to certain clearance and approval
requirements, enter into a joint venture (JV) agreement (JVA) with private entities without going into public bidding
in the selection of its JV partners. PNCCs query was evidently prompted by the need to seek out alternative sources of
financing for expanding and improving existing expressways, and to link them to economic zones in the north and to the
CALABARZON area in the south.

MOU for the construction, rehabilitation
and expansion of expressways

On February 8, 1994, the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), TRB, PNCC, Benpres Holdings
Corporation (Benpres) and First Philippine Holdings Corporation (FPHC), among other private and government
entities/agencies, executed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) envisaged to open the door for the entry of private
capital in the rehabilitation, expansion (to Subic and Clark) and extension, as flagship projects, of the expressways north
of Manila, over which PNCC has a franchise. To carry out their undertakings under the MOU, Benpres and FPHC
formed, as their infrastructure holding arm, the First Philippine Infrastructure and Development Corporation (FPIDC).

Consequent to the MOU execution, PNCC entered into financial and/or technical JVAs with private entities/investors for
the toll operation of its franchised areas following what may be considered as a standard pattern, viz.: (a) after a JVA is
concluded and the usual government approval of the assignment by PNCC of the usufruct in the franchise under P.D.
1113, as amended, secured, a new JV company is specifically formed to undertake a defined toll road project; (b) the
Republic of the Philippines, through the TRB, as grantor, PNCC, as operator, and the new corporation, as
investor/concessionaire, with its lender, as the case may be, then execute a Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement
(STOA) to implement the TOA previously issued; and (c) once the requisite STOA approval is given, project
prosecution starts and upon the completion of the toll road project or of a divisible phase thereof, the TRB fixes or
approves the initial toll rate after which, it passes a board resolution prescribing the periodic toll rate adjustment.

The STOA defines the scope of the road project coverage, the terminal date of the concession, and includes provisions on
initial toll rate and a built-in formula for adjustment of toll rates, investment recovery clauses and contract termination in
the event of the concessionaires, PNCCs or TRBs default, as the case may be.

The following events or transactions, involving the personalities as indicated, transpired with respect to the following
projects:

The South Metro Manila Skyway (SMMS)
(Buendia Bicutan elevated stretch) Project

PNCC entered into a JV partnership arrangement with P.T. Citra, an Indonesian company, and created, for the SMMS
project, the Citra Metro Manila Tollways Corporation (CMMTC).

On November 27, 1995, TRB, PNCC and CMMTC executed a STOA for the SMMS project (CITRA STOA). And on
April 7, 1996, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved the CITRA STOA.

Phase I of the SMMS project the Bicutan to Buendia elevated expressway stretch was completed in December 1998,
and the consequent initial toll rates for its use implemented a month after. On November 26, 2004, the TRB passed
Resolution No. 2004-53, approving the periodic toll rate adjustment for the SMMS.

The NLEX Expansion Project (Rehabilitated and Widened NLEX, Subic Expressway, Circumferential Road C-5)

In reply to the query of the then TRB Chairman, the Department of Justice (DOJ) issued DOJ Opinion No. 79, s. of
1994, echoing an earlier opinion of the GCC, that the TRB can implement the NLEX expansion project through a JV
scheme with private investors possessing the requisite technical and financial capabilities.

On May 16, 1995, then President Ramos approved the assignment of PNCCs usufructuary rights as franchise holder to a
JV company to be formed by PNCC and FPIDC. PNCC and FPIDC would later ink a JVA for the rehabilitation and
modernization of the NLEX referred in certain pleadings as the North Luzon Tollway project.[10] The Manila North
Tollways Corporation (MNTC) was formed for the purpose.

On April 30, 1998, the Republic, through the TRB, PNCC and MNTC, executed a STOA for the North Luzon Tollway
project (MNTC STOA) in which MNTC was authorized, inter alia, to subcontract the operation and maintenance of the
project, provided that the majority of the outstanding shares of the contractor shall be owned by MNTC. The MNTC
STOA covers three phases comprising of ten segments, including the rehabilitated and widened NLEX, the Subic
Expressway and the circumferential Road C-5.[11] The STOA is to be effective for thirty years, reckoned from the
issuance of the toll operation permit for the last completed phase or until December 31, 2030, whichever is earlier. The
Office of the President (OP) approved the STOA on June 15, 1998.
On August 2, 2000, pursuant to the MNTC STOA, the Tollways Management Corporation (TMC)formerly known as
the Manila North Tollways Operation and Maintenance Corporationwas created to undertake the operation and
maintenance of the NLEX tollway facilities, interchanges and related works.

On January 27, 2005, the TRB issued Resolution No. 2005-04 approving the initial authorized toll rates for the closed and
flat toll systems applicable to the new NLEX.

The South Luzon Expressway Project (Nichols to Lucena City)

For the SLEX expansion project, PNCC and Hopewell Holdings Limited (HHL), as JV partners, executed a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA),[12] which eventually led to the formation of a JV company Hopewell Crown
Infrastructure, Inc. (HCII), now MTD Manila Expressways, Inc., (MTDME). And pursuant to the PNCC-MTDME
JVA, the South Luzon Tollway Corporation (SLTC) and the Manila Toll Expressway Systems, Inc. (MATES) were
incorporated to undertake the financing, construction, operation and maintenance of the resulting Project Toll Roads
forming part of the SLEX. The toll road projects are divisible toll sections or segments, each segment defined as to its
starting and end points and each with the corresponding distance coverage. The proposed JVA, as later amended, between
PNCC and MTDME was approved by the OP on June 30, 2000.

Eventually, or on February 1, 2006, a STOA[13] for the financing, design, construction, lane expansion and maintenance
of the Project Toll Roads (PTR) of the rehabilitated and improved SLEX was executed by and among the Republic,
PNCC, SLTC, as investor, and MATES, as operator. To be precise, the PTRs, under the STOA, comprise and
contemplated the full rehabilitation and/or roadway widening of the following existing toll roads or facilities: PTR 1 that
portion of the tollway commencing at the end of South MM Skyway to the Filinvest exit at Alabang (1-242 km); PTR 2
the tollway from Alabang to Calamba, Laguna (27.28 km); PTR 3 the tollway from Calamba to Sto. Tomas, Batangas
(7.6 km) and PTR 4 the tollway from Sto. Tomas to Lucena City (54.27 km).[14]

Under Clause 6.03 of the STOA, the Operator, after substantially completing a TPR, shall file an application for a Toll
Operation Permit over the relevant completed TPR or segment, which shall include a request for a review and approval by
the TRB of the calculation of the new current authorized toll rate.

G.R. No. 166910

Petitioners Francisco and Hizon, as taxpayers and expressway users, seek to nullify the various STOAs adverted to above
and the corresponding TRB resolutions, i.e. Res. Nos. 2004-53 and 2005-04, fixing initial rates and/or approving periodic
toll rate adjustments therefor. To the petitioners, the STOAs and the toll rate-fixing resolutions violate the Constitution in
that they veritably impose on the public the burden of financing tollways by way of exorbitant fees and thus depriving the
public of property without due process. These STOAs are also alleged to be infirm as they effectively awarded purported
build-operate-transfer (BOT) projects without public bidding in violation of the BOT Law (R.A. 6957, as amended by
R.A. 7718).

Petitioners likewise assail the constitutionality of Sections 3 (a) and (d) of P.D. 1112 in relation to Section 8 (b) of P.D.
1894 insofar as they vested the TRB, on one hand, toll operation awarding power while, on the other hand, granting it also
the power to issue, modify and promulgate toll rate charges. The TRB, so petitioners bemoan, cannot be an awarding
party of a TOA and, at the same time, be the regulator of the tollway industry and an adjudicator of rate exactions
disputes.

Additionally, petitioners also seek to nullify certain provisions of P.D. 1113 and P.D. 1894, which uniformly grant the
President the power to approve the transfer or assignment of usufruct or the rights and privileges thereunder by the
tollway operator to third parties, particularly the transfer effected by PNCC to MNTC. As argued, the authority to
approve partakes of an exercise of legislative power under Article VI, Section 1 of the Constitution.[15]

In the meantime, or on April 8, 2010, the TRB issued a Certificate of Substantial Completion[16] with respect to PTR 1
(Alabang-Filinvest stretch) and PTR 2 (Alabang-Calamba segments) of SLEX, signifying the completion of the full
rehabilitation/expansion of both segments and the linkages/interchanges in between pursuant to the requirements of the
corresponding STOA. TRB on even date issued a Toll Operation Permit in favor of MATES over said PTRs 1 and 2.[17]
Accordingly, upon due application, the TRB approved the publication of the toll rate matrix for PTRs 1 and 2, the rate to
take effect on June 30, 2010.[18] The implementation of the published rate would, however, be postponed to August
2010.

On July 5, 2010, petitioner Francisco filed a Supplemental Petition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order (TRO) and/or status quo order focused on the impending collection of what was perceived to be toll rate increases
in the SLEX. The assailed adjustments were made public in a TRB notice of toll rate increases for the SLEX from
Alabang to Calamba on June 6, 2010, and were supposed to have been implemented on June 30, 2010. On August 13,
2010, the Court granted the desired TRO, enjoining the respondents in the consolidated cases from implementing the toll
rate increases in the SLEX.

In their Consolidated Comment/Opposition to the Supplemental Petition, respondents SLTC et al., aver that the disputed
rates are actually initial and opening rates, not an increase or adjustment of the prevailing rate, for the new expanded and
rehabilitated SLEX. In fine, the new toll rates are, per SLTC, for a new and upgraded facility, i.e. the aforementioned
Project Toll Roads 1 and 2 put up pursuant to the 2006 Republic-PNCC-SLTC-MATES STOA adverted to.

G.R. No. 169917

While they raise, for the most part, the same issues articulated in G.R. No. 166910, such as the public bidding
requirement, the power of the President to approve the assignment of PNCCs usufructuary rights to cover (as petitioners
Imee R. Marcos, et al., would stress) even the assignment of the expressway from Balintawak to Tabang, the virtual
amendment and extension of a statutory franchise by way of administrative action (e.g., the execution of a STOA or
issuance of a TOC), petitioners in G.R. No. 169917 some of them then and still are members of the House of
Representatives have, as their main focus, the North Luzon Tollway project and the agreements and devices entered in
relation therewith.

Petitioners also assail the MNTC STOA on the ground that it granted the lenders (Asian Development Bank/World Bank)
of MNTC, as project concessionaire, the unrestricted rights to appoint a substitute entity to replace MNTC in case of an
MNTC Default before prepayment of the loans, while also granting said lenders, in appropriate cases, the option to extend
the concession or franchise for a period not exceeding fifty years coinciding with the full payment of the loans.

G.R. No. 173630

Apart from those taken up in the other petitions for certiorari and prohibition, petitioners, in G.R. No. 173630, whose
members and constituents allegedly traverse SLEX daily, aver that TRB ought to have applied the provisions of R.A.
6957 [BOT Law] and R.A. 9184 [Government Procurement Reform Act], which require public bidding for the
prosecution of the SLEX project.

G.R. No. 183599

Civil Case SCA No. 3138-PSG before the RTC

On September 14, 2007, the Young Professionals and Entrepreneurs of San Pedro, Laguna (YPES), one of the
petitioners in G.R. No. 173630, filed before the RTC, Branch 155, in Pasig City, a special civil action for certiorari, etc.,
against the TRB, docketed as SCA No. 3138-PSG, containing practically identical issues raised in G.R. No. 173630. Like
its petition in G.R. No. 173630, YPES, before the RTC, assailed and sought to nullify the April 27, 2007 TOC, which
TRB issued to PNCC inasmuch as the TOC worked to extend PNCCs tollway operation franchise for the SLEX. As
YPES argued, only the Congress can extend the term of PNCCs franchise which expired on May 1, 2007.

Ruling of the RTC in SCA No. 3138-PSG

By Decision[19] dated June 23, 2008, the RTC, for the main stated reason that the authority to grant or renew franchises
belongs only to Congress, granted YPES petition, disposing as follows:

ACCORDINGLY, the instant Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus is hereby GRANTED and the questioned
Toll Operation Certificate (TOC) covering the [SLEX] issued by respondent TRB in April, 2007, is hereby ordered
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

FURTHER, respondent PNCC is hereby immediately PROHIBITED from collecting toll fess along the SLEX facilities as
it no longer has the power and authority to do so.

FINALLY, as mandated under Section 9 of PD No. 1113, respondent PNCC is hereby COMMANDED to turn over
without further delay the physical assets and facilities of the SLEX including improvements thereon, together with the
equipment and appurtenances directly related to their operations, without any cost, to the Government through the Toll
Regulatory Board x x x.[20]

Thus, the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, filed by the TRB on pure questions of law, docketed as
G.R. No. 183599.

In their separate comments, public and private respondents uniformly seek the dismissal of the three special civil actions
on the threshold issue of the absence of a justiciable case and lack of locus standi on the part of the petitioners therein.
Other grounds raised range from the impropriety of certiorari to nullify toll operation agreements; the inapplicability of
the public bidding rules in the selection by PNCC of its JV partners and the authority of the President to approve TOAs
and the transfer of usufructuary rights. PNCC argues, in esse, that its continuous toll operations did not constitute an
extension of its franchise, its authority to operate after the expiry date thereof in May 2007 being based on the valid
authority of TRB to issue TOC.

The Issues

The principal consolidated but interrelated issues tendered before the Court, most of which with constitutional undertones,
may be reduced into six (6) and formulated in the following wise: first, whether or not an actual case or controversy
exists and, relevantly, whether petitioners in the first three petitions have locus standi; second, whether the TRB is vested
with the power and authority to grant what amounts to a franchise over tollway facilities; third, corollary to the second,
whether the TRB can enter into TOAs and, at the same time, promulgate toll rates and rule on petitions for toll rate
adjustments; fourth, whether the President is duly authorized to approve contracts, inclusive of assignment of contracts,
entered into by the TRB relative to tollway operations; fifth, whether the subject STOAs covering the NLEX, SLEX and
SMMS and their respective extensions, linkages, etc. are valid; sixth, whether a public bidding is required or mandatory
for these tollway projects.

Expressly prayed, if not subsumed, in the first three petitions, is to prohibit TRB and its concessionaires from collecting
toll fees along the Skyway and Luzon Tollways.

Preliminary Issues
Existence of an Actual Controversy, its Ripeness and
the Locus Standi to Sue

The power of judicial review can only be exercised in connection with a bona fide controversy involving a statute, its
implementation or a government action.[21] Withal, courts will decline to pass upon constitutional issues through
advisory opinions, bereft as they are of authority to resolve hypothetical or moot questions.[22] The limitation on the
power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies defines the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite
allocation of power, to assure that the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of
government.[23]

In The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral
Domain (GRP), the Court has expounded anew on the concept of actual case or controversy and the requirement of
ripeness for judicial review, thus:

An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of
judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. There must be a contrariety of
legal rights x x x. The Court can decide the constitutionality of an act x x x only when a proper case between opposing
parties is submitted for judicial determination.

Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for
adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. x x x [I]t is a
prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the
picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the
challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a
result of the act complained of.[24]

But even with the presence of an actual case or controversy, the Court may refuse judicial review unless the constitutional
question or the assailed illegal government act is brought before it by a party who possesses what in Latin is technically
called locus standi or the standing to challenge it.[25] To have standing, one must establish that he has a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement.[26]
Particularly, he must show that (1) he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal
conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be
redressed by a favorable action.[27]

Petitions for certiorari and prohibition are, as here, appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or
prohibit or nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials.[28] The present petitions allege that then
President Ramos had exercised vis--vis an assignment of franchise, a function legislative in character. As alleged, too,
the TRB, in the guise of entering into contracts or agreements with PNCC and other juridical entities, virtually enlarged,
modified to the core and/or extended the statutory franchise of PNCC, thereby usurping a legislative prerogative. The
usurpation came in the form of executing the assailed STOAs and the issuance of TOCs. Grave abuse of discretion is also
laid on the doorstep of the TRB for its act of entering into these same contracts or agreements without the required public
bidding mandated by law, specifically the BOT Law (R.A. 6957, as amended) and the Government Procurement Reform
Act (R.A. 9184).

In fine, the certiorari petitions impute on then President Ramos and the TRB, the commission of acts that translate inter
alia into usurpation of the congressional authority to grant franchises and violation of extant statutes. The petitions make
a prima facie case for certiorari and prohibition; an actual case or controversy ripe for judicial review exists. Verily, when
an act of a branch of government is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but
in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. In doing so, the judiciary merely defends the sanctity of its duties and
powers under the Constitution.[29]

In any case, the rule on standing is a matter of procedural technicality, which may be relaxed when the subject in issue or
the legal question to be resolved is of transcendental importance to the public.[30] Hence, even absent any direct injury to
the suitor, the Court can relax the application of legal standing or altogether set it aside for non-traditional plaintiffs, like
ordinary citizens, when the public interest so requires.[31] There is no doubt that individual petitioners, Marcos, et al., in
G.R. No. 169917, as then members of the House of Representatives, possess the requisite legal standing since they assail
acts of the executive they perceive to injure the institution of Congress. On the other hand, petitioners Francisco, Hizon,
and the other petitioning associations, as taxpayers and/or mere users of the tollways or representatives of such users,
would ordinarily not be clothed with the requisite standing. While this is so, the Court is wont to presently relax the rule
on locus standi owing primarily to the transcendental importance and the paramount public interest involved in the
implementation of the laws on the Luzon tollways, a roadway complex used daily by hundreds of thousands of motorists.
What we said a century ago in Severino v. Governor General is just as apropos today:

When the relief is sought merely for the protection of private rights, x x x [the relators] right must clearly appear. On the
other hand, when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a
public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest, and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are
instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen
and as such interested in the execution of the laws.[32] (Words in bracket and emphasis added.)


Accordingly, We take cognizance of the present case on account of its transcendental importance to the public.

Second Issue: TRB Empowered to Grant Authority to Operate
Toll Facility /System

It is abundantly clear that Sections 3 (a) and (e) of P.D. 1112 in relation to Section 4 of P.D. 1894 have invested the TRB
with sufficient power to grant a qualified person or entity with authority to construct, maintain, and operate a toll facility
and to issue the corresponding toll operating permit or TOC.

Sections 3 (a) and (e) of P.D. 1112 and Section 4 of P.D. 1894 amply provide the power to grant authority to operate toll
facilities:

Section 3. Powers and Duties of the Board. The Board shall have in addition to its general powers of administration the
following powers and duties:

(a) Subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines, to enter into contracts in behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines with persons, natural or juridical, for the construction, operation and maintenance of toll facilities such as but
not limited to national highways, roads, bridges, and public thoroughfares. Said contract shall be open to citizens of the
Philippines and/or to corporations or associations qualified under the Constitution and authorized by law to engage in toll
operations;

x x x x

(e) To grant authority to operate a toll facility and to issue therefore the necessary Toll Operation Certificate subject to
such conditions as shall be imposed by the Board including inter alia the following:

(1) That the Operator shall desist from collecting toll upon the expiration of the Toll Operation Certificate.

(2) That the entire facility operated as a toll system including all operation and maintenance equipment directly related
thereto shall be turned over to the government immediately upon the expiration of the Toll Operation Certificate.

(3) That the toll operator shall not lease, transfer, grant the usufruct of, sell or assign the rights or privileges acquired
under the Toll Operation Certificate to any person, firm, company, corporation or other commercial or legal entity, nor
merge with any other company or corporation organized for the same purpose, without the prior approval of the President
of the Philippines. In the event of any valid transfer of the Toll Operation Certificate, the Transferee shall be subject to all
the conditions, terms, restrictions and limitations of this Decree as fully and completely and to the same extent as if the
Toll Operation Certificate has been granted to the same person, firm, company, corporation or other commercial or legal
entity.

(4) That in time of war, rebellion, public peril, emergency, calamity, disaster or disturbance of peace and order, the
President of the Philippines may cause the total or partial closing of the toll facility or order to take over thereof by the
Government without prejudice to the payment of just compensation.

(5) That no guarantee, Certificate of Indebtedness, collateral, securities, or bonds shall be issued by any government
agency or government-owned or controlled corporation on any financing program of the toll operator in connection with
his undertaking under the Toll Operation Certificate.

(6) The Toll Operation Certificate may be amended, modified or revoked whenever the public interest so requires.

(a) The Board shall promulgate rules and regulations governing the procedures for the grant of Toll Certificates. The
rights and privileges of a grantee under a Toll Operation Certificate shall be defined by the Board.

(b) To issue rules and regulations to carry out the purposes of this Decree.

SECTION 4. The Toll Regulatory Board is hereby given jurisdiction and supervision over the GRANTEE with respect to
the Expressways, the toll facilities necessarily appurtenant thereto and, subject to the provisions of Section 8 and 9 hereof,
the toll that the GRANTEE will charge the users thereof.

By explicit provision of law, the TRB was given the power to grant administrative franchise for toll facility projects.

The concerned petitioners would argue, however, that PNCCs [then CDCPs] franchise, as toll operator, was granted via
P.D. 1113, on the same day P.D. 1112, creating the TRB, was issued. It is thus pointed out that P.D. 1112 could not have
plausibly granted the TRB with the power and jurisdiction to issue a similar franchise. Pushing the point, they maintain
that only Congress has, under the 1987 Constitution, the exclusive prerogative to grant franchise to operate public utilities.

We are unable to agree with petitioners stance and their undue reliance on Article XII, Section 11 of the Constitution,
which states that:

SEC. 11. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted
except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines at least
sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, nor shall such franchise, certificate, or authorization be
exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. Neither shall any such franchise or right be granted except
under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the common good so
requires x x x.


The limiting thrust of the foregoing constitutional provision on the grant of franchise or other forms of authorization to
operate public utilities may, in context, be stated as follows: (a) the grant shall be made only in favor of qualified Filipino
citizens or corporations; (b) Congress can impair the obligation of franchises, as contracts; and (c) no such authorization
shall be exclusive or exceed fifty years.

A franchise is basically a legislative grant of a special privilege to a person.[33] Particularly, the term, franchise,
includes not only authorizations issuing directly from Congress in the form of statute, but also those granted by
administrative agencies to which the power to grant franchise has been delegated by Congress.[34] The power to
authorize and control a public utility is admittedly a prerogative that stems from the Legislature. Any suggestion,
however, that only Congress has the authority to grant a public utility franchise is less than accurate. As stressed in
Albano v. Reyesa case decided under the aegis of the 1987 Constitutionthere is nothing in the Constitution remotely
indicating the necessity of a congressional franchise before each and every public utility may operate, thus:

That the Constitution provides x x x that the issuance of a franchise, certificate or other form of authorization for the
operation of a public utility shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by Congress does not necessarily imply x x
x that only Congress has the power to grant such authorization. Our statute books are replete with laws granting specified
agencies in the Executive Branch the power to issue such authorization for certain classes of public utilities.[35]
(Emphasis ours.)

In such a case, therefore, a special franchise directly emanating from Congress is not necessary if the law already
specifically authorizes an administrative body to grant a franchise or to award a contract.[36] This is the same view
espoused by the Secretary of Justice in his opinion dated January 9, 2006, when he stated:

That the administrative agencies may be vested with the authority to grant administrative franchises or concessions over
the operation of public utilities under their respective jurisdiction and regulation, without need of the grant of a separate
legislative franchise, has been upheld by the Supreme Court x x x.[37]

Under the 1987 Constitution, Congress has an explicit authority to grant a public utility franchise. However, it may
validly delegate its legislative authority, under the power of subordinate legislation,[38] to issue franchises of certain
public utilities to some administrative agencies. In Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Center v. Garcia, Jr., We explained the
reason for the validity of subordinate legislation, thus:

Such delegation of legislative power to an administrative agency is permitted in order to adapt to the increasing
complexity of modern life. As subjects for governmental regulation multiply, so does the difficulty of administering the
laws. Hence, specialization even in legislation has become necessary.[39] (Emphasis ours.)


As aptly pointed out by the TRB and other private respondents, the Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory
Board (LTFRB), the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC), and
the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA), to name a few, have been such delegates. The TRB may very well be added to the
growing list, having been statutorily endowed, as earlier indicated, the power to grant to qualified persons, authority to
construct road projects and operate thereon toll facilities. Such grant, as evidenced by the corresponding TOC or set out
in a TOA, may be amended, modified, or revoked [by the TRB] whenever the public interest so requires.[40]

In Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board,[41] the Court reiterated its holding in Albano that the CAB, like
the PPA, has sufficient statutory powers under R.A. 776 to issue a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity, or
Temporary Operating Permit to a domestic air transport operator who, although not possessing a legislative franchise,
meets all the other requirements prescribed by law. We held therein that there is nothing in the law nor in the
Constitution which indicates that a legislative franchise is an indispensable requirement for an entity to operate as a
domestic air transport operator.[42] We further explicated:
Congress has granted certain administrative agencies the power to grant licenses for, or to authorize the operation of
certain public utilities. With the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental
regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency towards the
delegation of greater powers by the legislature, and towards the approval of the practice by the courts. It is generally
recognized that a franchise may be derived indirectly from the state through a duly designated agency, and to this extent,
even the power to grant franchises has frequently been delegated, even to agencies other than those of a legislative nature.
In pursuance of this, it has been held that privileges conferred by grant by local authorities as agents for the state
constitute as much a legislative franchise as though the grant had been made by an act of the Legislature.[43] (Emphasis
ours.)

The validity of the delegation by Congress of its franchising prerogative is beyond cavil. So it was that in Tatad v.
Secretary of the Department of Energy,[44] We again ruled that the delegation of legislative power to administrative
agencies is valid. In the instant case, the certiorari petitioners assume and harp on the lack of authority of PNCC to
continue with its NLEX, SLEX, MMEX operations, in joint venture with private investors, after the lapse of its P.D. 1113
franchise. None of these petitioners seemed to have taken due stock of and appreciated the valid delegation of the
appropriate power to TRB under P.D. 1112, as enlarged in P.D. 1894. To be sure, a franchise may be derived indirectly
from the state through a duly designated agency, and to this extent, the power to grant franchises has frequently been
delegated, even to agencies other than those of a legislative nature.[45] Consequently, it has been held that privileges
conferred by grant by administrative agencies as agents for the state constitute as much a legislative franchise as though
the grant had been made by an act of the Legislature.[46]



While it may be, as held in Strategic Alliance Development Corporation v. Radstock Securities Limited,[47] that PNCCs
P.D. 1113 franchise had already expired effective May 1, 2007, this fact of expiration did not, however, carry with it the
cancellation of PNCCs authority and that of its JV partners granted under P.D. 1112 in relation to Section 1 of P.D. 1894
to construct, operate and maintain any and all such extensions, linkages or stretches, together with the toll facilities
appurtenant thereto, from any part of the North Luzon Expressway, South Luzon Expressway and/or Metro Manila
Expressway and/or to divert the original route and change the original end-points of the [NLEX]and/or [SLEX] as may be
approved by the [TRB]. And to highlight the point, the succeeding Section 2 of P.D. 1894 specifically provides that the
franchise for the extension and toll road projects constructed after the approval of P.D. 1894 shall be thirty years, counted
from project completion. Indeed, prior to the expiration of PNCCs original franchise in May 2007, the TRB, in the
exercise of its special powers under P.D. 1112, signed supplemental TOAs with PNCC and its JV partners. These STOAs
covered the expansion and rehabilitation of NLEX and SLEX, as the case may be, and/or the construction, operation and
maintenance of toll road projects contemplated in P.D.1894. And there can be no denying that the corresponding toll
operation permits have been issued.

In fine, the STOAs[48] TRB entered with PNCC and its JV partners had the effect of granting authorities to construct,
operate and maintain toll facilities, but with the injection of additional private sector investments consistent with the intent
of P.D. Nos. 1112, 1113 and 1894.[49] The execution of these STOAs came in 1995, 1998 and 2006, or before the
expiration of PNCCs original franchise on May 1, 2007. In accordance with applicable laws, these transactions have
actually been authorized and approved by the President of the Philippines.[50] And as a measure to ensure the legality of
the said transactions and in line with due diligence requirements, a review thereof was secured from the GCC and the
DOJ, prior to their execution.

Inasmuch as its charter empowered the TRB to authorize the PNCC and like entities to maintain and operate toll facilities,
it may be stated as a corollary that the TRB, subject to certain qualifications, infra, can alter the conditions of such
authorization. Well settled is the rule that a legislative franchise cannot be modified or amended by an administrative body
with general delegated powers to grant authorities or franchises. However, in the instant case, the law granting a direct
franchise to PNCC[51] evidently and specifically conferred upon the TRB the power to impose conditions in an
appropriate contract.[52] And to reiterate, Section 3 of P.D. 1113 provides that [t]his [PNCC] franchise is granted
subject to such conditions as may be imposed by the [TRB] in an appropriate contract to be executed for this purpose, and
with the understanding and upon the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal when public
interest so requires.[53] A similarly worded proviso is found in Section 6 of P.D. 1894. It is in this light that the TRB
entered into the subject STOAs in order to allow the infusion of additional investments in the subject infrastructure
projects. Prior to the expiration of PNCCs franchise on May 1, 2007, the STOAs merely imposed additional
conditionalities, or as aptly pointed out by SLTC et al., obviously having in mind par. 16.06 of its STOA with TRB,[54]
served as supplement, to the existing TOA of PNCC with TRB. We have carefully gone over the different STOAs and
discovered that the tollway projects covered thereby were all undertaken under the P.D. 1113 franchise of PNCC. And it
cannot be over-emphasized that the respective STOAs of MNTC and SLTC each contain provisions addressing the
eventual expiration of PNCCs P.D. 1113 franchise and authorizing, thru the issuance by the TRB of a TOC, the
implementation of a given toll project even after May 1, 2007. Thus:

MNTC STOA

2.6 CONCESSION PERIOD. In order to sustain the financial viability and integrity of the Project, GRANTOR [TRB]
hereby grants MNTC the CONCESSION for the PROJECT ROADS for a period commencing upon the date that this
[STOA] comes into effect under Clause 4.1 until 31 December 2030 or thirty years after the issuance of the corresponding
TOLL OPERATION PERMIT for the last completed phase. Accordingly, unless the PNCC FRANCHISE is further
extended beyond its expiry on 01 May 2007, GRANTOR undertakes to issue the necessary [TOC] for the rehabilitated
and refurbished [NLEX] six months prior to the expiry of the PNCC FRANCHISE on 01 May 2007.

SLTC STOA

2.03 Authority of Investor and Operator to Undertake the Project

(1) The GRANTOR [TRB] has determined that the Project Toll Roads are within the existing SLEX and are thus
covered by the PNCC Franchise that is due to expire on May 1, 2007. PNCC has committed to exert its best efforts to
obtain an extension x x x It is understood and agreed that in the event the PNCC Franchise is not renewed beyond the said
expiry date, this [STOA] and the Concession granted x x x will stand in place of the PNCC Franchise and serve as a new
concession, or authority, pursuant to Section 3 (a) of the TRB Charter, for the Investor to undertake the Project and for the
Operator to Operate and Maintain the Project Toll Roads immediately upon the expiration of the PNCC Franchise,
without need of the execution x x x of any other document to effect the same.

(2) x x x in the event it is subsequently decreed by competent authority that the issuance by the Grantor of a [TOC] is
necessary x x x the Grantor shall x x x cause the TRB x x x to issue such [TOC] in favor of the Operator, embodying the
terms and conditions of this Agreement.


The foregoing notwithstanding, there are to be sure certain aspects in PNCCs legislative franchise beyond the altering
reach of TRB. We refer to the coverage area of the tollways and the expiry date of PNCCs original franchise, which is
May 1, 2007, as expressly stated under Sections 1 and 2 of P.D. 1894, respectively. The fact that these two items were
specifically and expressly defined by law, i.e. P.D. 1113, indicates an intention that any alteration, modification or repeal
thereof should only be done through the same medium. We said as much in Radstock, thus: [T]he term of the x x x
franchise, which is 30 years from 1 May 1977, shall remain the same, as expressly provided in the first sentence of x x x
Section 2 of P.D. 1894.[55] It is likewise worth noting what We further held in that case:

The TRB does not have the power to give back to PNCC the toll assets and facilities which were automatically turned
over to the Government, by operation of law, upon the expiration of the franchise of the PNCC on 1 May 2007. Whatever
power the TRB may have to grant authority to operate a toll facility or to issue a [TOC], such power does not obviously
include the authority to transfer back to PNCC ownership of National Government assets, like the toll assets and facilities,
which have become National Government property upon the expiry of PNCCs franchise x x x.[56] (Emphasis in the
original.)

Verily, upon the expiration of PNCCs legislative franchise on May 1, 2007, the new authorities to construct, maintain
and operate the subject tollways and toll facilities granted by the TRB pursuant to the validly executed STOAs and TOCs,
shall begin to operate and be treated as administrative franchises or authorities. Pursuant to Section 3 (e) P.D. 1112, TRB
possesses the power and duty, inter alia to:

x x x grant authority to operate a toll facility and to issue therefore the necessary Toll Operation Certificate subject to
such conditions as shall be imposed by the [TRB] including inter alia x x x.

This is likewise consistent with the position of the Secretary of Justice in Opinion No. 122 on November 24, 1995,[57]
thus:

TRB has no authority to extend the legislative franchise of PNCC over the existing NSLE (North and South Luzon
Expressways). However, TRB is not precluded under Section 3 (e) of P.D. No. 1112 (TRB Charter) to grant PNCC and
its joint venture partner the authority to operate the existing toll facility of the NSLE and to issue therefore the necessary
Toll Operation Certificate x x x.
It should be noted that the existing franchise of PNCC over the NSLE, which will expire on May 1, 2007, gives it the
right, privilege and authority to construct, maintain and operate the NSLE. The Toll Operation Certificate which TRB
may issue to the PNCC and its joint venture partner after the expiration of its franchise on May 1, 2007 is an entirely new
authorization, this time for the operation and maintenance of the NSLE x x x. In other words, the right of PNCC and its
joint venture partner, after May 7, 2007 [sic] to operate and maintain the existing NSLE will no longer be founded on its
legislative franchise which is not thereby extended, but on the new authorization to be granted by the TRB pursuant to
Section 3 (e), above quoted, of P.D. No. 1112. (Emphasis ours.)


The same opinion was thereafter made by the Secretary of Justice on January 9, 2006, in Opinion No. 1,[58] stating that:

The existing franchise of PNCC over the NSLE, which will expire on May 1, 2007, gives it the right, privilege and
authority to construct, maintain and operate the NSLE. The Toll Operation Certificate which the TRB may issue to the
PNCC and its joint venture partner after the expiration of its franchise on May 1, 2007 is an entirely new authorization,
this time for the operation and maintenance of the NSLE. [T]he right of PNCC and its joint venture partner, after May
1, 2007, to operate and maintain the existing NSLE will no longer be founded on its legislative franchise which is not
thereby extended, but on the new authorization to be granted by the TRB pursuant to Section 3 (e) of PD No. 1112.

It appears therefore, that the effect of the STOA is not to extend the Franchise of PNCC, but rather, to grant a new
Concession over the SLEX Project and the OMCo., entities which are separate and distinct from PNCC. While initially,
the authority of SLTC and OMCo. to enter into the STOA with the TRB and thereby become grantees of the Concession,
will stem from and be based on the JVA and the assignment by PNCC to the OMCo. of the Usufruct in the Franchise, we
submit that upon the execution by SLTC and the TRB of the STOA, the right to the Concession will emanate from the
STOA itself and from the authority of the TRB under Section 3 (a) of the TRB Charter. Such being the case, the
expiration of the Franchise on 1 May 2007, since such Concession is an entirely new and distinct concession from the
Franchise and is, as stated, granted to entities other than PNCC.

Finally, with regards (sic) the authority of the TRB this Office in Secretary of Justice Opinion No. 92, s. 2000, stated that:

Suffice it to say that official acts of the President enjoy full faith and confidence of the Government of the Republic of
the Philippines which he represents. Furthermore, considering that the queries raised herein relates to the exercise by the
TRB of its regulatory powers over toll road project, the same falls squarely within the exclusive jurisdiction of TRB
pursuant to P.D. No. 1112. Consequently, it is, therefore, solely within TRBs prerogative and determination as to what
rule shall govern and is made applicable to a specific toll road project proposal.

The STOA is an explicit grant of the Concession by the Republic of the Philippines, through the TRB pursuant to P.D.
(No.) 1112 and as approved by the President xxx. The foregoing grant is in full accord with the provisions of P.D. (No.)
1112 which authorizes TRB to enter into contracts on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines for the construction,
operation and maintenance of toll facilities. Such being the case, we opine that no other legal requirement is necessary to
make the STOA effective of to confirm MNTCs (In this case, SLTC and the OMCO) rights and privileges granted
therein. (Emphasis in the original.)

Considering, however, that all toll assets and facilities pertaining to PNCC pursuant to its P.D. 1113 franchise are deemed
to have already been turned over to the National Government on May 1, 2007,[59] whatever participation that PNCC may
have in the new authorities to construct, maintain and operate the subject tollways, shall be limited to doing the same in
trust for the National Government. In Radstock, the Court held that [w]ith the expiration of PNCCs franchise, [its]
assets and facilities were automatically turned over, by operation of law, to the government at no cost.[60] The Court
went on further to state that the Governments ownership of PNCCs toll assets inevitably resulted in its owning too of the
toll fees and the net income derived, after May 1, 2007, from the toll assets and facilities.[61] But as We have earlier
discussed, the tollways and toll facilities should remain functioning in accordance with the validly executed STOAs and
TOCs. However, PNCCs assets and facilities, or, in short, its very share/participation in the JVAs and the STOAs,
inclusive of its percentage share in the toll fees collected by the JV companies currently operating the tollways shall
likewise automatically accrue to the Government.

In fine, petitioners claim about PNCCs franchise being amenable to an amendment only by an act of Congress, or, what
practically amounts to the same thing, that the TRB is without authority at all to modify the terms and conditions of
PNCCs franchise, i.e. by amending its TOA/TOC, has to be rejected. Their lament then that the TRB, through the
instrumentality of mere contracts and an administrative operating certificate, or STOAs and TOC, to be precise,
effectively, but invalidly amended PNCC legislative franchise, are untenable. For, the bottom line is, the TRB has,
through the interplay of the pertinent provisions of P.D. Nos. 1112, 1113 and 1894, the power to grant the authority to
construct and operate toll road projects and toll facilities by way of a TOA and the corresponding TOC. What is
otherwise a legislative power to grant or renew a franchise is not usurped by the issuance by the TRB of a TOC. But to
emphasize, the case of the TRB is quite peculiarly unique as the special law conferring the legislative franchise likewise
vested the TRB with the power to impose conditions on the franchise, albeit in a limited sense, by excluding from the
investiture the power to amend or modify the stated lifetime of the franchise, its coverage and the ownership arrangement
of the toll assets following the expiration of the legislative franchise.[62]

At this juncture, the Court wishes to express the observation that P.D. Nos. 1112, 1113 and 1894, as couched and
considered as a package, very well endowed the TRB with extraordinary powers. For, subject to well-defined limitations
and approval requirements, the TRB can, by way of STOAs, allow and authorize, as it has allowed and authorized, a
legislative franchisee, PNCC, to share its concession with another entity or JV partners, the authorization effectively
covering periods beyond May 2007. However, this unpalatable reality, a leftover of the martial law regime, presents
issues on the merits and the wisdom of the economic programs, which properly belong to the legislature or the executive
to address. The TRB is not precluded from granting PNCC and its joint venture partners authority, through a TOC for a
period following the term of the proposed SMMS, with the said TOC serving as an entirely new authorization upon the
expiration of PNCCs franchise on May 1, 2007. In short, after May 1, 2007, the operation and maintenance of the NLEX
and the other subject tollways will no longer be founded on P.D. 1113 or portions of P.D. 1894 (PNCCs original
franchise) but on an entirely new authorization, i.e. a TOC, granted by the TRB pursuant to its statutory authority under
Sections 3 (a) and (e) of P.D. 1112.

Likewise needing no extended belaboring, in the light of the foregoing dispositions, is the untenable holding of the RTC
in SCA No. 3138-PSG that the TRB is without power to issue a TOC to PNCC, amend or renew its authority over the
SLEX tollways without separate legislative enactment. And lest it be overlooked, the TRB may validly issue an entirely
new authorization to a JV company after the lapse of PNCCs franchise under P.D. 1113. Its thirty-year concession under
P.D. 1894, however, does not have the quality of definiteness as to its start, as by the terms of the issuance, it commences
and is to be counted from the date of approval of the project, the term project obviously referring to Metro Manila
Expressways and all extensions, linkages, stretches and diversions refurbishing and rehabilitation of the existing NLEX
and SLEX constructed after the approval of the decree in December 1983. The suggestion, therefore, of the petitioners
in G.R. No. 169917, citing a 1989 Court of Appeals (CA) decision in CA-G.R. 13235 (Republic v. Guerrero, et al.), that
the Balintawak to Tabang portion of the expressway no longer forms part of PNCCs franchise and, therefore, PNCC is
without any right to assign the same to MNTC via a JVA, is specious. Firstly, in its Decision[63] in G.R. No. 89557, a
certiorari proceeding commenced by PNCC to nullify the CA decision adverted to, the Court approved a compromise
agreement, which referred to (1) the PNCCs authority to collect toll and maintenance fees; and (2) the supervision,
approval and control by the DPWH[64] of the construction of additional facilities, on the questioned portion of the
NLEX.[65] And still in another Decision,[66] the Court ruled that the Balintawak to Tabang stretch was recognized as
part of the franchise of, or otherwise restored as toll facilities to be operated by x x x PNCC.[67] Once stamped with
judicial imprimatur, and unless amended, modified or revoked by the parties, a compromise agreement becomes more
than a mere binding contract; as thus sanctioned, the agreement constitutes the courts determination of the controversy,
enjoining the parties to faithfully comply thereto.[68] Verily, like any other judgment, it has the effect and authority of
res judicata.[69]

At any rate, the PNCC was likewise granted temporary or interim authority by the TRB to operate the SLEX,[70] to
ensure the continued development, operations and progress of the projects. We have ruled in Oroport Cargohandling
Services, Inc. v. Phividec Industrial Authority that an administrative agency vested by law with the power to grant
franchises or authority to operate can validly grant the same in the interim when it is necessary, temporary and beneficial
to the public.[71] The grant by the TRB to PNCC as interim operator of the SLEX was certainly intended to guarantee the
continued operation of the said tollway facility, and to ensure the want of any delay and inconvenience to the motoring
public.

All given, the cited CA holding is not a binding precedent. The time limitation on PNCCs franchise under either P.D.
1113 or P.D. 1894 does not detract from or diminish the TRBs delegated authority under P.D. 1112 to enter into separate
toll concessions apart and distinct from PNCCs original legislative franchise.

Third Issue: TRBs Power to Enter into Contracts; Issue,
Modify And Promulgate Toll Rates; and to Rule on Petitions
Relative to Toll Rates Level and Increases Valid

The petitioners in the special civil actions cases would have the Court declare as invalid (a) Section 3 (a) and (d) of P.D.
1112 (which accord the TRB, on one hand, the power to enter into contracts for the construction, and operation of toll
facilities, while, on the other hand, granting it the power to issue and promulgate toll rates) and (b) Section 8 (b) of P.D.
1894 (granting TRB adjudicatory jurisdiction over matters involving toll rate movements). As submitted, granting the
TRB the power to award toll contracts is inconsistent with its quasi-judicial function of adjudicating petitions for initial
toll and periodic toll rate adjustments. There cannot, so petitioners would postulate, be impartiality in such a situation.

The assailed provisions of P.D. 1112 and P.D. 1894 read:

P.D. 1112

Section 3. Powers and Duties of the Board. The Board shall have in addition to its general powers of administration the
following powers and duties:

(a) Subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines, to enter into contracts in behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines with persons, natural or juridical, for the construction, operation and maintenance of toll facilities such as but
not limited to national highways, roads, bridges, and public thoroughfares. Said contract shall be open to citizens of the
Philippines and/or to corporations or associations qualified under the Constitution and authorized by law to engage in toll
operations;

(d) Issue, modify and promulgate from time to time the rates of toll that will be charged the direct users of toll facilities
and upon notice and hearing, to approve or disapprove petitions for the increase thereof. Decisions of the Board on
petitions for the increase of toll rate shall be appealable to the Office of the President within ten (10) days from the
promulgation thereof. Such appeal shall not suspend the imposition of the new rates, provided however, that pending the
resolution of the appeal, the petitioner for increased rates in such case shall deposit in a trust fund such amounts as may be
necessary to reimburse toll payers affected in case a reversal of the decision. (Emphasis ours.)

P.D. 1894

SECTION 8. x x x

(b) For the Metro Manila Expressway and such extensions, linkages, stretches and diversions of the Expressways which
may henceforth be constructed, maintained and operated by the GRANTEE, the GRANTEE shall collect toll at such rates
as shall initially be approved by the Toll Regulatory Board. The Toll Regulatory Board shall have the authority to approve
such initial toll rates without the necessity of any notice and hearing, except as provided in the immediately succeeding
paragraph of this Section. For such purpose, the GRANTEE shall submit for the approval of the Toll Regulatory Board
the toll proposed to be charged the users. After approval of the toll rate(s) by the Toll Regulatory Board and publication
thereof by the GRANTEE once in a newspaper of general circulation, the toll shall immediately be enforceable and
collectible upon opening of the expressway to traffic use.

Any interested Expressways users shall have the right to file, within a period of ninety (90) days after the date of
publication of the initial toll rate, a petition with the Toll Regulatory Board for a review of the initial toll rate; provided,
however, that the filing of such petition and the pendency of the resolution thereof shall not suspend the enforceability and
collection of the toll in question. The Toll Regulatory Board, at a public hearing called for the purpose after due notice,
shall then conduct a review of the initial toll shall be appealable (sic) to the Office of the President within ten (10) days
from the promulgation thereof. The GRANTEE may be required to post a bond in such amount and from such surety or
sureties and under such terms and conditions as the Toll Regulatory Board shall fix in case of any petition for review of,
or appeal from, decisions of the Toll Regulatory Board.

In case it is finally determined, after a review by the Toll Regulatory Board or appeal therefrom, that the GRANTEE is
not entitled, in whole or in part, to the initial toll, the GRANTEE shall deposit in the escrow account the amount collected
under the approved initial toll fee and such amount shall be refunded to Expressways users who had paid said toll in
accordance with the procedure as may be prescribed or promulgated by the Toll Regulatory Board. (Emphasis ours.)

The petitioners are indulging in gratuitous, if not unfair, conclusion as to the capacity of the TRB to act as a fair and
objective tribunal on matters of toll fee fixing.

Administrative bodies have expertise in specific matters within the purview of their respective jurisdictions. Accordingly,
the law concedes to them the power to promulgate implementing rules and regulations (IRR) to carry out declared
statutory policies provided that the IRR conforms to the terms and standards prescribed by that statute.[72]

The Court does not perceive an irreconcilable clash in the enumerated TRBs statutory powers, such that the exercise of
one negates another. The ascription of impartiality on the part of the TRB cannot, under the premises, be accorded
cogency. Petitioners have not shown that the TRB lacks the expertise, competence and capacity to implement its mandate
of balancing the interests of the toll-paying motoring public and the imperative of allowing the concessionaires to recoup
their investment with reasonable profits. As it were, Section 9 of P.D. 1894 provides a parametric formula for adjustment
of toll rates that takes into account the Peso-US Dollar exchange rate, interest rate and construction materials price index,
among other verifiable and quantifiable variables.

While not determinative of the issue immediately at hand, the grant to and the exercise by an administrative agency of
regulating and allowing the operation of public utilities and, at the same time, fixing the fees that they may charge their
customers is now commonplace. It must be presumed that the Congress, in creating said agencies and clothing them with
both adjudicative powers and contract-making prerogatives, must have carefully studied such dual authority and found the
same not breaching any constitutional principle or concept.[73] So must it be for P.D. Nos. 1112 and 1894.

The Court can take judicial cognizance of the exercise by the LTFRB and NTC both spin-off agencies of the now
defunct Public Service Commission of similar concurrent powers. The LTFRB, under Executive Order No. (E.O.)
202,[74] series of 1987, is empowered,[75] among others, to regulate the operation of public utilities or for hire vehicles
and to grant franchises or certificates of public convenience (CPC); and to fix rates or fares, to approve petitions for fare
rate increases and to resolve oppositions to such petitions.

The NTC, on the other hand, has been granted similar powers of granting franchises, allocating areas of operations, rate-
fixing and to rule on petitions for rate increases under E.O. 546,[76] s. of 1979.

The Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) likewise enjoys on the one hand, the power (a) to grant, modify or
revoke an authority to operate facilities used in the generation of electricity, and on the other, (b) to determine, fix and
approve rates and tariffs of transmission, and distribution retail wheeling charges and tariffs of franchise electric utilities
and all electric power rates including that which is charged to end-users.[77] In Chamber of Real Estate and Builders
Association, Inc. v. ERC, We even categorically stated that the ERC is a quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative regulatory
body created under Section 38 of the EPIRA, [and] x x x an administrative agency vested with broad regulatory and
monitoring functions over the Philippine electric industry to ensure its successful restructuring and modernization x x
x.[78]

To summarize, the fact that an administrative agency is exercising its administrative or executive functions (such as the
granting of franchises or awarding of contracts) and at the same time exercising its quasi-legislative (e.g. rule-making)
and/or quasi-judicial functions (e.g. rate-fixing), does not support a finding of a violation of due process or the
Constitution. In C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. v. Hibionada,[79] We explained the rationale, thus:

It is by now commonplace learning that many administrative agencies exercise and perform adjudicatory powers and
functions, though to a limited extent only. Limited delegation of judicial or quasi-judicial authority to administrative
agencies (e.g. the Securities and Exchange Commission and the National Labor Relations Commission) is well recognized
in our jurisdiction, basically because the need for special competence and experience has been recognized as essential in
the resolution of questions of complex or specialized character and because of a companion recognition that the dockets of
our regular courts have remained crowded and clogged.

x x x x

As a result of the growing complexity of the modern society, it has become necessary to create more and more
administrative bodies to help in the regulation of its ramified activities. Specialized in the particular fields assigned to
them, they can deal with the problems thereof with more expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the legislature
or the courts of justice. This is the reason for the increasing vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in what
is now not unquestionably called the fourth department of the government.

x x x x

There is no question that a statute may vest exclusive original jurisdiction in an administrative agency over certain
disputes and controversies falling within the agency's special expertise. The very definition of an administrative agency
includes its being vested with quasi-judicial powers. The ever increasing variety of powers and functions given to
administrative agencies recognizes the need for the active intervention of administrative agencies in matters calling for
technical knowledge and speed in countless controversies which cannot possibly be handled by regular courts. (Emphasis
ours.)

Fourth Issue: President Amply Vested With Statutory
Power To Approve TRB Contracts

Just like their parallel stance on the grant to TRB of the power to enter into toll agreements, e.g., TOAs or STOAs, the
petitioners in the first three petitions would assert that the grant to the President of the power to peremptorily authorize the
assignment by PNCC, as franchise holder, of its franchise or the usufruct in its franchise is unconstitutional. It is
unconstitutional, so petitioners would claim, for being an encroachment of legislative power.

As earlier indicated, Section 3 (a) of P.D. 1112 requires approval by the President of any contract TRB may have entered
into or effected for the construction and operation of toll facilities. Complementing Section 3 (a) is 3 (e) (3) of P.D. 1112
enjoining the transfer of the usufruct of PNCCs franchise without the Presidents prior approval. For perspective, Section
3 (e) (3) of P.D. 1112 provides:

That the toll operator shall not lease, transfer, grant the usufruct of, sell or assign the rights or privileges acquired under
the [TOC] to any person x x x or legal entity nor merge with any other company or corporation organized for the same
purpose without the prior approval of the President of the Philippines. In the event of any valid transfer of the TOC, the
Transferee shall be subject to all the conditions, terms, restrictions and limitations of this Decree x x x.[80]


The Presidents approving authority is of statutory origin. To us, there is nothing illegal, let alone unconstitutional, with
the delegation to the President of the authority to approve the assignment by PNCC of its rights and interest in its
franchise, the assignment and delegation being circumscribed by restrictions in the delegating law itself. As the Court
stressed in Kilosbayan v. Guingona, Jr.,[81] the rights and privileges conferred under a franchise may be assigned if
authorized by a statute, subject to such restrictions as may be provided by law, such as the prior approval of the grantor or
a government agency.[82]

There can, therefore, be no serious challenge to this presidential- approving prerogative. Should grave abuse of discretion
in some way infect the exercise of the prerogative, then the approval action may be nullified for that reason, but not on the
ground that the underlying authority is constitutionally doubtful. If the TRB may validly be empowered to grant private
entities the authority to operate toll facilities, would a delegation of a lesser authority to approve the grant to the head of
the administrative machinery of the government be objectionable?

The fact that P.D. 1112 partakes of a martial law issuance does not per se provide an objectionable feature to the decree,
albeit it may be argued with some plausibility that then President Marcos intended to have the final say as to who shall act
as the toll operators of the Luzon expressways. Be that as it may, all proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and
acts promulgated, issued, or done by the former President (Ferdinand E. Marcos) are part of the law of the land, and shall
remain valid, legal, binding, and effective, unless modified, revoked or superseded by subsequent proclamations, orders,
decrees, instructions, or other acts of the President.[83] To emphasize, Padua v. Ranada cited Association of Small
Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, quoting that:

The Court wryly observes that during the past dictatorship, every presidential issuance, by whatever name it was called,
had the force and effect of law because it came from President Marcos. Such are the ways of despots. Hence, it is futile
to argue that LOI 474 could not have repealed P.D. No. 27 because the former was only a letter of instruction. The
important thing is that it was issued by President Marcos, whose word was law during that time.[84]

Fifth Issue: Assailed STOAs Validly Entered

This brings us to the issue of the validity of certain provisions of the STOAs and related agreements entered into by the
TRB, as duly approved by the President.

Relying on Clause 17.4.1[85] of the MNTC STOA that the lenders have the unrestricted right to appoint a substitute entity
in case of default of MNTC or of the occurrence of an event of default in respect of the loans, petitioners argue that since
MNTC is the assignee or transferee of PNCCs franchise, then it steps into the shoes of PNCC. They contend that the act
of replacing MNTC as grantee is tantamount to an amendment or alteration of the PNCCs original franchise and hence
unconstitutional, considering that the constitutional power to appoint a new franchise holder is reserved to Congress.[86]

This contention is bereft of merit.

Petitioners presupposition that only Congress has the power to directly grant franchises is misplaced. Time and again,
We have held that administrative agencies may be empowered by the Legislature by means of a law to grant franchises or
similar authorizations.[87] And this, We have sufficiently addressed in the present case.[88] To reiterate, We discussed
in Albano that our statute books are replete with laws granting administrative agencies the power to issue
authorizations.[89] This delegation of legislative power to administrative agencies is allowed in order to adapt to the
increasing complexity of modern life.[90] Consequently, We have held that the privileges conferred by grant by local
authorities as agents for the state constitute as much a legislative franchise as though the grant had been made by an act of
the Legislature.[91]

In this case, the TRBs charter itself, or Section 3 (e) of P.D. 1112, specifically empowers it to grant authority to operate
a toll facility and to issue therefore the necessary Toll Operation Certificate subject to such conditions as shall be
imposed by the [TRB]x x x.[92] Section 3 (a) of the same law permits the TRB to enter into contracts for the
construction, operation and maintenance of toll facilities. Clearly, there is no question that the TRB is vested by the
Legislature, through P.D. 1112, with the power not only to grant an authority to operate a toll facility, but also to enter
into contracts for the construction, operation and maintenance thereof.

Petitioners also contend that substituting MNTC as the grantee in case of its default with respect to its loans is tantamount
to an amendment of PNCCs original franchise and is hence, unconstitutional. We also find this assertion to be without
merit. Besides holding that the Legislature may properly empower administrative agencies to grant franchises pursuant to
a law, We have also earlier explained in this case that P.D. 1113 and the amendatory P.D. 1894 both vested the TRB with
the power to impose conditions on PNCCs franchise in an appropriate contract and may therefore amend or alter the
same when public interest so requires;[93] save for the conditions stated in Sections 1 and 2 of P.D. 1894, which relates to
the coverage area of the tollways and the expiration of PNCCs original franchise.[94] P.D. 1112 provided further that the
TRB has the power to amend or modify a Toll Operation Certificate that it issued when public interest so requires.[95]
Accordingly, to Our mind, there is nothing infirm much less questionable about the provision in the STOA, allowing the
substitution of MNTC in case it defaults in its loans.

Furthermore, in the subject provision (Clause 17.4.1[96]), the unrestricted right of the lender to appoint a substituted
entity is never intended to afford such lender a plenary power to do so. The subject clause states:

17.4.1 The PARTIES acknowledge that following a Notice of Substitution under clauses 17.2 or 17.3 the LENDERS
have, subject to the provisions of Clause 17.4.3, the unrestricted right to appoint a SUBSTITUTED ENTITY in place of
MNTC following the declaration of the occurrence of a MNTC DEFAULT prior to full repayment of the LOANS or of an
event of default in respect of the LOANS. GRANTOR shall extend all reasonable assistance to the AGENT to put in
place a SUBSTITUTED ENTITY. MNTC shall make available all necessary information to potential SUBSTITUTED
ENTITY to enable such entity to evaluate the Project. (Emphasis ours.)

It is clear from the above-quoted provision that Clause 17.4.1 should always be construed and read in conjunction with
Clauses 17.2, 17.3, 17.4.2, 17.4.3 and 20.12. Clauses 17.2 and 17.3 discuss the procedures that must be followed and
undertaken in case of MNTCs default prior to the full repayment of the loans, and before the substitution under Clause
17.4.1 could take place. These clauses provide the following process:

Prior to Full Repayment of the LOANS:

17.2 Upon occurrence of an MNTC DEFAULT under Clause 17.1(a) and (e) prior to full repayment of the LOANS,
GRANTOR shall serve a written Notice of Default to MNTC with copy to the AGENT giving a reasonable period of time
to cure the MNTC DEFAULT, such period being three (3) months from receipt of the notice or such longer period as may
be approved by GRANTOR, taking due consideration of the nature of the default and of the repair works required. If
MNTC fails to remedy such default during such three (3) month or [sic] curing period, GRANTOR may issue a Notice of
Substitution on MNTC, copy furnished to the AGENT, which shall take effect upon the assumption and take over by the
SUBSTITUTED ENTITY pursuant to the provisions of Clause 17.4 hereof; Provided, However, that prior to such
assumption and take over by the SUBSTITUTED ENTITY, MNTC shall continue to OPERATE AND MAINTAIN the
PROJECT ROADS and shall place in an escrow account the TOLL revenues, save such amounts as may be needed to
primarily cover the OPERATING COSTS and as may be owing and due to the lenders under the LOANS and,
secondarily, to cover the PNCC Gross Toll Revenue Share, Provided, Further, that upon the assumption and take over by
the SUBSTITUTED ENTITY, such assumption and take over shall have the effect of revoking the rights, privileges and
obligations of MNTC under this AGREEMENT in favor of the SUBSTITUTED ENTITY and MNTC shall cease to be a
PARTY to this AGREEMENT.

17.3 If prior to full repayment of the LOANS MNTC fails to remedy MNTC DEFAULT under Clause 17.1 (b) or an
MNTC DEFAULT occurs under Clause 17.1 (c), (d) or (f) prior to full repayment of the LOANS, GRANTOR shall serve
a Notice of Substitution on MNTC, copy furnished to the AGENT, as provided under Clause 17.4.[97] (Emphasis ours)

It is apparent from the above-quoted provision that it is the TRB representing the Republic of the Philippines as Grantor
which has control over the situation before Clause 17.4.1 could come into place. To stress, following the condition
under Clause 17.4.1, it is only when Clauses 17.2 and 17.3 have been complied with that the entire Clause 17.4 could
begin to materialize.

Clauses 17.4.2 and 17.4.3 also provide for certain parameters as to when a substituted entity could be considered
acceptable, and enumerate the conditions that should be undertaken and complied with.[98] Particularly, the subject
provisions state:

17.4.2 The SUBSTITUTED ENTITY shall be required to provide evidence to GRANTOR that at the time of substitution:

(i) it is legally and validly nominated by the AGENT as MNTCs substitute to continue the implementation of the
PROJECT.

(ii) it is legally and validly constituted and has the capability to enter into such agreement as may be required to give
effect to the substitution;

17.4.3 The AGENT shall have one (1) year to effect a substitution under Clause 17.4; Provided, However, that during this
time the AGENT shall not take any action which may jeopardize the continuity of the service and shall take the necessary
action to ensure its continuation. To effect such substitution, the AGENT shall notify its intention to GRANTOR and
shall, at the same time, give all necessary information to GRANTOR. GRANTOR shall, within one (1) month following
such notification, inform the AGENT of its acceptance of the substitution, if the conditions set forth in Clause 17.4.2 have
been satisfied. The SUBSTITUTED ENTITY shall be permitted a reasonable period to cure any MNTC DEFAULT
under Clause 17.1 (a), (b) or (e).


From the foregoing, it is clear that the lenders do not actually have an absolute or unrestricted right to appoint the
SUBSTITUTED ENTITY in view of TRBs right to accept or reject the substitution within one (1) month from notice and
such right to appoint comes into force only if and when the TRB decides to effectuate the substitution of MNTC as
allowed in Clause 17.2 of the MNTC STOA.

At the same time, Clause 17.4.4 particularizes the conditions upon which the substitution shall become effective, to wit:

17.4.4 The Substitution shall be effective upon:

(a) the appointment of a SUBSTITUTED ENTITY in accordance with the provisions of this Clause 17.4; and,

(b) assumption by the SUBSTITUTED ENTITY of all of the rights and obligations of MNTC under this AGREEMENT,
including the payment of PNCCs Gross Toll Revenue Share under the JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT dated 29
August 1995 and all other agreements in connection with this agreement signed and executed by and between PNCC and
MNTC.


The afore-quoted Section (a) of Clause 17.4.4 reiterates the necessity of compliance by the substituted entity with all the
conditions provided under Clause 17.4. Furthermore, following the above-quoted conditions veritably protects the
interests of the Government. As previously discussed supra, PNCCs assets with respect to its legislative franchise under
P.D. 1113, as amended, has already been automatically turned over to the Government. And whatever share PNCC has in
relation to the currently implemented administrative authority granted by the TRB is merely being held in trust by it in
favor of the Government. Accordingly, the fact that Section b of Clause 17.4.4 ensures that the obligation to pay
PNCCs Gross Toll Revenue Share is assumed by the substituted entity, necessarily means that the Governments Gross
Toll Revenue Share is safeguarded and kept intact.

The MNTC STOA also states that only in case no substituted entity is established in accordance with Clause 17.4 that
Clause 17.5 shall be applied. Clause 17.5 grants the lenders the power to extend the concession in case the Grantor
(Republic of the Philippines) takes over the same, for a period not exceeding fifty years, until full payment of the
loans.[99] Petitioners contend that the option to extend the concession for that stated period is, however, unconstitutional.

This assertion is impressed with merit. At the outset, Clause 17.5 does not actually grant the lenders of the defaulting
concessionaire, the power to unilaterally extend the concession for a period not exceeding fifty years. For reference, the
pertinent provision states:

17.5 Only if no SUBSTITUTE ENTITY is established shall the GRANTOR [TRB] be entitled to take-over the
CONCESSION with no commitment on the LOANS in which case the OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE
CONTRACT shall be assigned to any entity that the AGENT[100] may designate provided such entity has a sufficient
legal and technical capacity to perform and assume the obligations of the OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE
CONTRACT under this AGREEMENT. The LENDERS shall receive all TOLL, excepting PNCCs revenue share
provided for under the JOINT INVESTMENT PROPOSAL (vide: Annex C hereof), for as long as required until full
repayment of the LOANS including if necessary an extension of the CONCESSION PERIOD which in no case shall
exceed fifty (50) years; Provided that the LENDERS support all amounts payable under the OPERATION AND
MAINTENANCE CONTRACT. For avoidance of doubt, the GRANTOR will have no obligation in relation to liabilities
incurred by MNTC prior to such take-over.[101] (Emphasis supplied)

The afore-quoted provision should be read in conjunction with Clause 20.12, which expressly provides that the MNTC
STOA is made under and shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the Philippines, and
particularly, by the provisions of P.D. Nos. 1112, 1113 and 1894. Under the applicable laws, the TRB may very well
amend, modify, alter or revoke the authority/franchise whenever the public interest so requires.[102] In a word, the
power to determine whether or not to continue or extend the authority granted to a concessionaire to operate and maintain
a tollway is vested to the TRB by the applicable laws. The necessity of whether or not to extend the concession or the
authority to construct, operate and maintain a tollway rests, by operation of law, with the TRB. As such, the lenders
cannot unilaterally extend the concession period, or, with like effect, impose upon or demand that the TRB agree to
extend such concession.

Be that as it may, it must be noted, however, that while the TRB is vested by law with the power to extend the
administrative franchise or authority that it granted, nevertheless, it cannot do so for an accumulated period exceeding
fifty years. Otherwise, it would violate the proscription under Article XII, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution, which
states that:[103]

Sec. 11. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted
except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines at least
sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, nor shall such franchise, certificate, or authorization be
exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. Neither shall any such franchise or right be granted except
under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress when the common good so
requires. The State shall encourage equity participation in public utilities by the general public. The participation of
foreign investors in the governing body of any public utility enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate share in its
capital, and all the executive and managing officers of such corporation or associations must be citizens of the Philippines.
(Emphasis Ours)

In this case, the MNTC STOA already has an original stipulated period of thirty years.[104] Clause 17.5 allows the
extension of this period if necessary to fully repay the loans made by MNTC to the lenders, thus:

x x x The LENDERS shall receive all TOLL, excepting PNCCs revenue share provided for under the JOINT
INVESTMENT PROPOSAL (vide: Annex C hereof), for as long as required until full repayment of the LOANS
including if necessary an extension of the CONCESSION PERIOD which in no case shall exceed a maximum period of
fifty (50) years; x x x (Emphasis ours.)

If the maximum extension as provided for in Clause 17.5, i.e. fifty years, shall be utilized, the accumulated concession
period that would be granted in this case would effectively be eighty years. To Us, this is a clear violation of the fifty-
year franchise threshold set by the Constitution. It is in this regard that we strike down the above-quoted clause,
including if necessary an extension of the CONCESSION PERIOD which in no case shall exceed a maximum period of
fifty (50) years in Clause 17.5 as void for being violative of the Constitution.[105] It must be made abundantly clear,
however, that the nullity shall be limited to such extension beyond the 50-year constitutional limit.

All told, petitioners allegations that the TRB acted with grave abuse of discretion and with gross disadvantage to the
Government with respect to Clauses 17.4.1 and 17.5 of the MNTC STOA are unfounded and speculative.

Petitioners also allege that the MNTC STOA is grossly disadvantageous to the Government since under Clause 11.7
thereof, the Government, through the TRB, guarantees the viability of the financing program of a toll operator. Under
Clause 11.7 of the MNTC STOA, the TRB agreed to pay monthly, the difference in the toll fees actually collected by
MNTC and that which it could have realized under the STOA. The pertinent provisions states:

11.7 To insure the viability and integrity of the Project, the Parties recognize the necessity for adjustments of the
AUTHORIZED TOLL RATE . In the event that said adjustment are not effected as provided under this Agreement for
reasons not attributable to MNTC, the GRANTOR [TRB] warrants and so undertakes to compensate, on a monthly basis,
the resulting loss of revenue due to the difference between the AUTHORIZED TOLL RATE actually collected and the
AUTHORIZED TOLL RATE which MNTC would have been able to collect had the adjustments been implemented.
(Emphasis ours)

As set out in the preamble of P.D. 1112, the need to encourage the infusion of private capital in tollway projects is the
underlying rationale behind the enactment of said decree. Owing to the scarce capital available to bankroll a huge capital-
intensive project, such as the North Luzon Tollway project, it is well-nigh inevitable that the financing of these types of
projects is sourced from private investors. Quite naturally, the investors expect the regularity of the cash flow. It is
perhaps in this broad context that the obligation of the Grantor under Clause 11.7 of the MNTC STOA was included in the
STOA. To Us, Clause 11.7 is not only grossly disadvantageous to the Government but a manifest violation of the
Constitution.

Section 3 (e) (5) of P.D. 1112 explicitly states:

[t]hat no guarantee, Certificate of Indebtedness, collateral securities, or bonds shall be issued by any government agency
or government-owned or controlled corporation on any financing program of the toll operator in connection with his
undertaking under the Toll Operation Certificate.


What the law seeks to prevent in this situation is the eventuality that the Government, through any of its agencies, could
be obligated to pay or secure, whether directly or indirectly, the financing by the private investor of the project. In this
case, under Clause 11.7 of the MNTC STOA, the Republic of the Philippines (through the TRB) guaranteed the security
of the project against revenue losses that could result, in case the TRB, based on its determination of a just and reasonable
toll fee, decides not to effect a toll fee adjustment under the STOAs periodic/interim adjustment formula. The OSG, in
its Comment, admitted that the amounts the government undertook to pay in case of Clause 11. 7 violation is an
undertaking to pay compensatory damage for something akin to a breach of contract.[106] As P.D. 1112 itself expressly
prohibits the guarantee of a security in the financing of the toll operator pursuant to its tollway project, Clause 11.7 cannot
be a valid stipulation in the STOA.

This is more so for being in violation of the Constitution. Article VI, Section 29 (1) of the Constitution mandates that
[n]o money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.[107] We have held
in Radstock that government funds or property shall be spent or used solely for public purposes, as expressly mandated
by Section 4 (2) of PD 1445 or the Government Auditing Code.[108] Particularly, We held in Radstock case that:

[t]he power to appropriate money from the General Funds of the Government belongs exclusively to the Legislature. Any
act in violation of this iron-clad rule is unconstitutional.

Reinforcing this Constitutional mandate, Sections 84 and 85 of PD 1445 require that before a government agency can
enter into a contract involving the expenditure of government funds, there must be an appropriation law for such
expenditure, thus:

Section 84. Disbursement of government funds.

1. Revenue funds shall not be paid out of any public treasury or depository except in pursuance of an appropriation law or
other specific statutory authority.

x x x x

Section 85. Appropriation before entering into contract.

No contract involving the expenditure of public funds shall be entered into unless there is an appropriation therefor, the
unexpended balance of which, free of other obligations, is sufficient to cover the proposed expenditure.

x x x x

Section 86 of PD 1445, on the other hand, requires that the proper accounting official must certify that funds have been
appropriated for the purpose. Section 87 of PD 1445 provides that any contract entered into contrary to the requirements
of Sections 85 and 86 shall be void.[109] (Emphasis ours.)

In the instant case, the TRB, by warranting to compensate MNTC with the loss of revenue resulting from the non-
implementation of the periodic and interim toll fee adjustments, violates the very constitutionally guaranteed power of the
Legislature, to exclusively appropriate money for public purpose from the General Funds of the Government. The TRB
veritably accorded unto itself the exclusive authority granted to Congress to appropriate money that comes from the
General Funds, by making a warranty to compensate a revenue loss under Clause 11.7 of the MNTC STOA. There is not
even a badge of indication that the aforementioned requisites under the Constitution and P.D. 1445 in respect of
appropriation of money from the General Funds of the Government have been properly complied with. Worse, P.D. 1112
expressly prohibits the guarantee of security of the financing of a toll operator in connection with his undertaking under
the Toll Operation Certificate. Accordingly, Clause 11.7 of the MNTC STOA, under which the TRB warrants and
undertakes to compensate MNTCs loss of revenue resulting from the non-implementation of the periodic and interim toll
fee adjustments, is illegal, unconstitutional and hence void.

Parenthetically, We also find a similar provision in the SLTC STOA under Clause 8.08 thereof, which states that:[110]

(2) In the event the Authorized Toll Rate and adjustments thereto are not implemented or made effective in accordance
with the provisions of this Agreement, for reasons not attributable to the fault of the Investor and/or the Operator,
including the reversal by the TRB or by any competent court or authority of any such adjustment in the Authorized Toll
Rate previously approved by the TRB, except where such reversal is by reason of a determination of the misapplication of
the Authorized Toll Rates, the Grantor shall compensate the Operator, on a monthly basis and within thirty (30) days of
submission by the Operator of a notice thereof, without interest, for the resulting loss of revenue computed as the
difference between:

(a) the actual traffic volume for the month in question multiplied by the Current Authorized Toll Rate as escalated
and/or adjusted, that should be in effect; and

(b) the Gross Toll Revenue for the month in question.

(3) The obligation of the Grantor to compensate the Operator shall continue until the applicable Current Authorized Toll
Rate is implemented.

Akin to what is contemplated in Clause 11.7 of the MNTC STOA, Clauses 8.08 (2) and (3) of the SLTC STOA, under
which the TRB warrants or is obligated to compensate the Operator for its loss of revenue resulting from the non-
implementation of the calculation/formula of authorized toll price and toll rate adjustments found in Clause 8 thereof, are
illegal, unconstitutional and, hence, void. This ruling is consistent with the TRBs power to determine, without any
influence or compulsion direct or indirect as to whether a change in the toll fee rates is warranted. We will discuss the
same below.

Petitioners argue that the CITRA, SLTC and MNTC STOAs tie the hands of the TRB as it is bound by the stipulated
periodic and interim toll rate adjustments provided therein. Petitioners contend that the SMMS (CITRA STOA), the
SLTC and the MNTC STOAs provisions on initial toll rates and periodic/interim toll rate adjustments, by using a built-in
automatic toll rate adjustment formula,[111] allegedly guaranteed fixed returns for the investors and negated the public
hearing requirement.
This contention is erroneous. The requisite public hearings under Section 3 (d) of P.D. 1112 and Section 8 (b) of P.D.
1894 are not negated by the fixing of the initial toll rates and the periodic adjustments under the STOA.

Prefatorily, a clear distinction must be made between the statutory prescription on the fixing of initial toll rates, on the one
hand, and of periodic/interim or subsequent toll rates, on the other. First, the hearing required under the said provisos
refers to notice and hearing for the approval or denial of petitions for toll rate adjustments or the subsequent toll rates,
not to the fixing of initial toll rates. By express legal provision, the TRB is authorized to approve the initial toll rates
without the necessity of a hearing. It is only when a challenge on the initial toll rates fixed ensues that public hearings are
required. Section 8 of P.D. 1894 says so:

x x x the GRANTEE shall collect toll at such rates as shall initially be approved by the [TRB]. The [TRB] shall have the
authority to approve such initial toll rates without the necessity of any notice and hearing, except as provided in the
immediately succeeding paragraph of this Section. For such purpose, the GRANTEE shall submit for the approval of the
[TRB] the toll proposed to be charged the users. After approval of the toll rate(s) by the [TRB] and publication thereof by
the GRANTEE once in a newspaper of general circulation, the toll shall immediately be enforceable and collectible upon
opening of the expressway to traffic use.

Any interested Expressways users shall have the right to file, within x x x (90) days after the date of publication of the
initial toll rate, a petition with the [TRB] for a review of the initial toll rate; provided, however, that the filing of such
petition and the pendency of the resolution thereof shall not suspend the enforceability and collection of the toll in
question. The [TRB], at a public hearing called for the purpose shall then conduct a review of the initial toll (sic) shall
be appealable to the [OP] within ten (10) days from the promulgation thereof. (Emphasis ours.)

Of the same tenor is Section 3 (d) of P.D. 1112 stating that the TRB has the power and duty to:

[i]ssue, modify and promulgate from time to time the rates of toll that will be charged the direct users of toll facilities and
upon notice and hearing, to approve or disapprove petitions for the increase thereof. Decisions of the [TRB] on petitions
for the increase of toll rate shall be appealable to the [OP] within ten (10) days from the promulgation thereof. Such
appeal shall not suspend the imposition of the new rates, provided however, that pending the resolution of the appeal, the
petitioner for increased rates in such case shall deposit in a trust fund such amounts as may be necessary to reimburse toll
payers affected in case a (sic) reversal of the decision.[112] (Emphasis Ours.)

Similarly in Padua v. Ranada, the fixing of provisional toll rates by the TRB without a public hearing was held to be valid,
such procedure being expressly provided by law.[113] To be very clear, it is only the fixing of the initial and the
provisional toll rates where a public hearing is not a vitiating requirement. Accordingly, subsequent toll rate adjustments
are mandated by law to undergo both the requirements of public hearing and publication.

In Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) v. Blancaflor, the Court expounded on the necessity of a public
hearing in rate fixing/increases scenario. There, the Court ruled that the MIAA, being an agency attached to the
Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), is governed by Administrative Code of 1987,[114] Book
VII, Section 9 of which specifically mandates the conduct of a public hearing.[115] Accordingly, the MIAAs
resolutions, which increased the rates and charges for the use of its facilities without the required hearing, were struck
down as void.[116] Similarly, as We do concede, the TRB, being likewise an agency attached to the DOTC,[117] is
governed by the same Code and consequently requires public hearing in appropriate cases. It is, therefore, imperative that
in implementing and imposing new, i.e. subsequent toll rates arrived at using the toll rate adjustment formula, the subject
tollway operators and the TRB must necessarily comply not only with the requirement of publication but also with the
equally important public hearing. Accordingly, any fixing of the toll rate, which did not or does not comply with the twin
requirements of public hearing and publication, must therefore be struck down as void. In such case, the previously valid
toll rate shall consequently apply, pending compliance with the twin requirements for the new toll rate.

In the instant consolidated cases, the fixing of the initial toll rates may have indeed come to pass without any public
hearing.[118] Unfortunately for petitioners, and notwithstanding its presumptive validity, they did not assail the initial
toll rates within the timeframe provided in P.D. 1112 and P.D. 1894.[119] Besides, as earlier explicated, the STOA
provisions on periodic rate adjustments are not a bar to a public hearing as the formula set forth therein remains constant,
serving only as a guide in the determination of the level of toll rates that may be allowed.

It is apropos to state at this juncture that, in determining the reasonableness of the subsequent toll rate increases, it
behooves the TRB to seek out the Commission on Audit (COA) for assistance in examining and auditing the financial
books of the public utilities concerned. Section 22, Chapter 4, Subtitle B, Title 1, Book V of the Administrative Code of
1987 expressly authorizes the COA to examine the aforementioned documents in connection with the fixing of rates of
every nature, including as in this case, the fixing of toll fees.[120] We have on certain occasions applied this provision.
Manila Electric Company, Inc. v. Lualhati easily comes to mind where this Court tasked the Energy Regulatory
Commission to seek the assistance of the COA in determining the reasonableness of the rate increases that MERALCO
intended to implement.[121] We have consistently held that the law is deemed written into every contract.[122] Being
a provision of law, this authority of the COA under the Administrative Code should therefore be deemed written in the
subject contracts i.e. the STOAs.

In this regard, during the examination and audit, the public utilities concerned are mandated to produce all the reports,
records, books of accounts and such other papers as may be required, and the COA is empowered to examine under
oath any official or employee of the said public utilit[ies].[123] Any public utility unreasonably denying COA access to
the aforementioned documents, unnecessarily obstructs the examination and audit and may be adjudged liable of
concealing any material information concerning its financial status, shall be subject to the penalties provided by
law.[124] Finally, the TRB is further obliged to take the appropriate action on the COA Report with respect to its
finding of reasonableness of the proposed rate increases.[125]

Furthermore, while the periodic, interim and other toll rate adjustment formulas are indicated in the STOAs,[126] it does
not necessarily mean that the TRB should accept a rate adjustment predicated on the economic data, references or
assumptions adopted by the toll operator. At the end of the day, the final figures should be those of the TRB based on its
appreciation of the relevant rate-influencing data. In fine, the TRB should exercise its rate-fixing powers vested to it by
law within the context of the agreed formula, but always having in mind that the rates should be just and reasonable.
Conversely, it is very well within the power of the TRB under the law to approve the change in the current toll fees.[127]
Section 3 (d) of P.D. 1112 grants the TRB the power to [i]ssue, modify and promulgate from time to time the rates of toll
that will be charged the direct users of toll facilities. But the reasonableness of a possible increase in the fees must first
be clearly and convincingly established by the petitioning entities, i.e. the toll operators. Otherwise, the same should not
be granted by the approving authority concerned. In Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation v. Alcuaz,[128] the
Court had the opportunity to explain what is meant by a just and reasonable fixing of rates, thus:

Hence, the inherent power and authority of the State, or its authorized agent, to regulate the rates charged by public
utilities should be subject always to the requirement that the rates so fixed shall be reasonable and just. A commission has
no power to fix rates which are unreasonable or to regulate them arbitrarily. This basic requirement of reasonableness
comprehends such rates which must not be so low as to be confiscatory, or too high as to be oppressive.

What is a just and reasonable rate is not a question of formula but of sound business judgment based upon the evidence it
is a question of fact calling for the exercise of discretion, good sense, and a fair, enlightened and independent judgment.
In determining whether a rate is confiscatory, it is essential also to consider the given situation, requirements and
opportunities of the utility. A method often employed in determining reasonableness is the fair return upon the value of
the property to the public utility x x x. (Emphasis ours.)

If in case the TRB finds the change in the rates to be reasonable and therefore merited, the increase shall then be
implemented after the formalities of public hearing and publication are complied with. In this case, it is clear that the
change in the toll fees is immediately effective and implementable. This is notwithstanding that, in case of an increase in
the toll fees, an appeal thereon is filed. The law is clear. Thus:

x x x Decisions of the [TRB] on petitions for the increase of toll rate shall be appealable to the Office of the President
within ten (10) days from the promulgation thereof. Such appeal shall not suspend the imposition of the new rates,
provided however, that pending the resolution of the appeal, the petitioner for increased rates in such case shall deposit in
a trust fund such amounts as may be necessary to reimburse toll payers affected in case a reversal of the decision.[129]
(Emphasis ours.)

Besides the settled rule under Section 3 (d) of P.D. 1112 that the power to issue, modify and promulgate toll fees rests
with the TRB, it must also be underscored that the periodic and the interim adjustments found in Clauses 11.4 to 11.6 of
the MNTC STOA do not necessarily guarantee an increase in the toll fees. To stress, the formula is based on many
variable factors that could mean either an increase or a decrease in the toll fees, depending, inter alia, on how well certain
economies are doing; and on the projections and figures published by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP).[130] It is
therefore arduous to contemplate a grossness in a disadvantage that could only possibly arise in case of a non-
implementation of a change particularly, an increase in the toll rates.

Petitioners have not incidentally shown that it is the traveling public, the users of the expressways, who shouldered or will
shoulder the completion of the projects by way of exorbitant fees payment, with the investors ending up with a killing
therefrom. This conclusion, for all its factual dimension, is too simplistic for acceptance. And it does not consider the
reality that the Court is not a trier of facts. Neither does it take stock of the nature and function of toll roads and toll fees
paid by motorists, as aptly elucidated in North Negros Sugar Co., Inc. v. Hidalgo,[131] thus:

Toll is the price of the privilege to travel over that particular highway, and it is a quid pro quo. It rests on the principle
that he who, receives the toll does or has done something as an equivalent to him who pays it. Every traveler has the right
to use the turnpike as any other highway, but he must pay the toll.[132]

A toll road is a public highway, differing from the ordinary public highways chiefly in this: that the cost of its
construction in the first instance is borne by individuals, or by a corporation, having authority from the state to build it,
and, further, in the right of the public to use the road after completion, subject only to the payment of toll.[133]

Toll roads are in a limited sense public roads, and are highways for travel, but we do not regard them as public roads in a
just sense, since there is in them a private proprietary right x x x.[134] (Emphasis ours.)


Parenthetically, our review of Section 7 of the SMMS STOA readily yields the information that the level of the initial toll
rates hinges on a mix of factors. Tax holidays that may be granted and the tax treatment of dividends may be mentioned.
On the other hand, the subsequent periodic adjustments are provided to address factors that usually weigh on the financial
condition of any business endeavor, such as currency devaluation, inflation and the usual increases in maintenance and
operational costs incorporated into the formula provided therefor. Even with the existence of an automatic toll rate
adjustment formula, compliance by the TRB and the other respondents with the twin requirements of public hearing and
publication is still mandatory. To reiterate, laws always occupy a plane higher than mere contract provisions. In case the
minimum statutory requirements are stiffer than that of a contract, or when the contract does not expressly stipulate the
minimum requirements of the law, then We rule that compliance with such minimum legal requirements should be done.
To summarize, any toll fee increase should comply with the legal twin requirements of publication and public hearing, the
absence of which will nullify the imposition and collection of the new toll fees.

In all, the initial toll rates and periodic adjustments appear to Us as simply predicated on the basic rationale for investing
in a toll project, which to repeat is: a reasonable rate of return for the investment. Section 2 (o) of the BOT Law, as
amended, provides for a definition for a reasonable rate of return on investments and operating and maintenance
cost.[135] Running through the gamut of our statutes providing for and encouraging partnership of the public and private
sector is the paramount common good for infrastructure projects and the equally important factor of giving a reasonable
rate of return to private sectors investments. The viability of any infrastructure project depends on the returns which
should be reasonable of the investment coming from the private sector.

While the interests of the public are ideally to be accorded primacy in considering government contracts, the reality on the
ground is that the tollway projects may not at all be possible or would be difficult to realize without the involvement of
the investing private sector, which expects its usual share of profit. Thus, the Court is at a loss to understand how the
level of the initial toll rates, which depended on several factors indicated above, and the subsequent adjustments resulted
in the charging of exorbitant toll fees that, to petitioners, enabled the investors to shift the burden of financing the
completion of the projects on the motoring public.

Neither does the alleged drasticif we may characterize it as suchsteep increase in the level of toll rates for NLEX
constitute a killing for PNCC and its partner MNTC. Petitioners make much of the amount of the toll fees vis--vis the
then prevailing minimum wage. These plays of figures detract from the essential concern on the propriety of the level of
the toll rates vis--vis the investments sunk in the NLEX project with a view, on the part of private investors, to a
reasonable return on their investment. Where no substantial figures were provided on the investments, the projected
operating and maintenance costs vis--vis the projected revenue from the toll fees, no substantial conclusions may
reasonably be deduced therefrom. Besides, to be taken into account in relation to the costs of the construction and
rehabilitation of the NLEX is the length of the tollway and for which motorists have to pay the corresponding toll.
Certainly, the allegations and conclusions of petitioners as to the unreasonable increase of the toll rates are without
adequate factual mooring.

The use of a tollway is a privilege that comes at a cost. The toll is a price paid for the use of a privilege. There are to be
sure alternative roads and routes, which motorists may fall back on if they are unwilling to pay the toll. The toll, as might
be expected, is pegged at a level that makes the developmental projects and their maintenance viable; otherwise, no
investment can be expected for the furtherance of the projects.

Petitioners Francisco and Hizon alleged that, per the minutes of the TRB meetings, the Board deliberately refrained,
particularly with respect to the Skyway project, from conducting public hearings for the grant of the initial toll rates and
on the rate adjustment formula to be used in order to accelerate the implementation of the projects. The allegation is far
from correct. A perusal of the pertinent minutes of the TRB meetings, particularly that held on August 17, 1995,[136] in
fact would disclose a picture different from that depicted by said petitioners. Nothing in the minutes of said meeting tends
to indicate that the TRB resolved to dispense with public hearings. We, therefore, find petitioners Francisco and Hizons
attempt to mislead the Court by falsely citing supposed portions[137] of the August 17, 1995 TRB meeting very
unfortunate. They quoted a correction on the minutes of the Special Board Meeting No. 95-05 held on July 26, 1995,
which was taken up in the August 17, 1995 meeting for the approval of the minutes of the previous meeting. In said
special meeting of July 26, 1995,[138] the Board deliberated on the recommendation of ADG Santos for the conduct of a
public hearing or soliciting the endorsement of the Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA).[139] But the TRB
did not resolve to omit a public hearing with respect to the toll rates. In fact, the deliberations used the words in the
event the Board decides and if the Board conducts, clearly conveying the notion that the TRB had not decided or
resolved the issue of public hearings. Be that as it may, We rule that the TRB is mandated to comply with the twin
requirements of public hearing and publication.

Petitioners Francisco and Hizons lament about the TRB merely relying on, if not yielding to, the recommendation and
findings of the Technical Working Group (TWG) of the DPWH on matters relative to STOA stipulations and toll-rate
fixing cannot be accorded cogency. In the area involving big finance and complex project planning, banking on the data
supplied by technicians and experts is at once practical as it is inevitable. The Court cannot see its way clear to understand
why petitioners would begrudge the TRB for tapping the technical know-how of others. And it cannot be overemphasized
that a recommendation is no more than an exhortation or an urging as to what is advisable or expedient, not binding on the
person to which it is being made.[140] To recommend involves the idea that another has the final decision.[141] The
ultimate decision still rests with the TRB whether or not to accept the findings of the TWG. The minutes of the TRB
meetings show that its members went through the tedious process of deliberating on the formula to be used in computing
the toll rates. The fact that the TRB might have adopted the TWGs recommendation would not, on that ground alone,
vitiate the bona fides of the formers decision nor stain the proceedings leading to such decision. In any case, as earlier
held, the toll rate adjustment formula does not and cannot contravene the legal twin requirements of public hearing and
publication.

In another bid to nullify the STOAs in question, petitioners would foist on the Court the arguments that, firstly, President
Ramos twisted the arms of the TRB towards entering into the agreements in question and, secondly, that the CITRA
STOA contained restrictive confidentiality provisions barring the public from knowing their contents and the details of the
negotiations related thereto.

We are not persuaded by the first ground, not necessarily because the pressure brought to bear on TRB rendered the
STOAs infirm, but because the allegations on pressure-tactics allegedly employed by President Ramos are too speculative
for acceptance.

On the second ground, We fail to see how the insertion of the alleged confidentiality clause in the CITRA STOA
translates into grave abuse of discretion or a violation of the Constitution, particularly Article III, Section 7[142] thereof.
First off, the Court can take judicial notice that most commercial contracts, including finance-related project agreements
carry the standard confidentiality clause to protect proprietary data and/or intellectual property rights. This protection
angle appears to be the intent of Clause 14.04(l)[143] of the CITRA STOA. And as may be noted, the succeeding Clause
14.04 (2)[144] removes from the ambit of the confidentiality restriction the following: disclosure of any information: (a)
not otherwise done by the parties; (b) which is required by law to be disclosed to any person who is authorized by law to
receive the same; (c) to a tribunal hearing pertinent proceedings relative to the contract or agreement; and (d) to
confidential entities and persons relative to the disclosing party like its banks, consultants, financiers and advisors. The
second (item b) exception provides a reasonable dimension to the assailed confidentiality clause.

Needless to stress, the obligation of the government to make information available cannot be exaggerated.[145] The
constitutional right to information does not mean that every day and every hour is open house in government offices
having custody of the desired documents.[146] Petitioners have not sufficiently shown, thus cannot really be heard to
complain, that they had been unreasonably denied access to information with regard to the MNTC or SMMS STOA.
Besides, the remedy for unreasonable denial of information that is a matter of public concern is by way of
mandamus.[147]

Finally, as to petitioners catch-all claim that the STOAs are disadvantageous to the government, as therein represented by
the TRB, suffice it to state for the nonce that behind these agreements are the Boards expertise and policy determination
on technical, financial and operational matters involving expressways and tollways. It is not for courts to look into the
wisdom and practicalities behind the exercise by the TRB of its contract-making prerogatives under P.D. Nos. 1112, 1113
and 1894, absent proof of grave abuse of discretion which would justify judicial review. In this regard, the Court recalls
what it wrote in G & S Transport Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[148] to wit:

x x x courts, as a rule, refuse to interfere with proceedings undertaken by administrative bodies or officials in the exercise
of administrative functions. This is because such bodies are generally better equipped technically to decide administrative
questions and that non-legal factors, such as government policy on the matter are usually involved in the decision.


Sixth Issue: Public Bidding Not Required

Private petitioners would finally maintain that public bidding is required for the SMMS and the North Luzon/South Luzon
Tollways, partaking as these projects allegedly do of the nature of a BOT infrastructure undertaking under the BOT Law.
Prescinding from this premise, they would conclude that the STOAs in question and related preliminary and post-STOA
agreements are null and void for want of the necessary public bidding required for government infrastructure projects.

The contention is patently flawed.

The BOT Law does not squarely apply to the peculiar case of PNCC, which exercised its prerogatives and obligations
under its franchise to pursue the construction, rehabilitation and expansion of the tollways with chosen partners. The
tollway projects may very well qualify as a build-operate-transfer undertaking. However, given that the projects in the
instant case have been undertaken by PNCC in the exercise of its franchise under P.D. Nos. 1113 and 1894, in joint
partnership with its chosen partners at the time when it was held valid to do so by the OGCC and the DOJ, the public
bidding provisions under the BOT Law do not strictly apply. For, as aptly noted by the OSG, the subject STOAs are not
ordinary contracts for the construction of government infrastructure projects, which requires under the Government
Procurement Reform Act or the now-repealed P.D. 1594,[149] public bidding as the preferred mode of contract award.
Neither are they contracts where financing or financial guarantees for the project are obtained from the government.
Rather, the STOAs actually constitute a statutorily-authorized transfer or assignment of usufruct of PNCCs existing
franchise to construct, maintain and operate expressways.[150]

The conclusion would perhaps be different if the tollway projects were to be prosecuted by an outfit completely different
from, and not related to, PNCC. In such a scenario, the entity awarded the winning bid in a BOT-scheme infrastructure
project will have to construct, operate and maintain the tollways through an automatic grant of a franchise or TOC, in
which case, public bidding is required under the law.

Where, in the instant case, a franchisee undertakes the tollway projects of construction, rehabilitation and expansion of the
tollways under its franchise, there is no need for a public bidding. In pursuing the projects with the vast resource
requirements, the franchisee can partner with other investors, which it may choose in the exercise of its management
prerogatives. In this case, no public bidding is required upon the franchisee in choosing its partners as such process was
done in the exercise of management prerogatives and in pursuit of its right of delectus personae.[151] Thus, the subject
tollway projects were undertaken by companies, which are the product of the joint ventures between PNCC and its chosen
partners.

Petitioners Francisco and Hizons assertions about the TRB awarding the tollway projects to favored companies,
unsubstantiated as they are, need no belaboring. Suffice it to state that the discretion to choose who shall stand as critical
JV partners remained all along with PNCC, at least theoretically. Needless to say, the records do not show that the TRB
committed an oversight as an administrative body over any aspect of tollway operations with regard to PNCCs selection
of partners.

The foregoing disquisitions considered, there is no more point in passing upon the propriety of prohibiting or enjoining,
on the ground of unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion, the implementation of the initial toll rates and/or the
adjusted toll rates for the SMSS, expanded NLEX and SLEX, as authorized by the separate TRB resolutions, subject of
and originally challenged in these proceedings.

These TRB resolutions and the STOAs upon which they are predicated have long been in effect. The parties have acted on
these issuances and contracts whose existence, as an operative fact, cannot be ignored, let alone erased, even if the charge
of unconstitutionality is given currency.

While not exactly of governing applicability in this case, what the Court wrote in De Agbayani v. Philippine National
Bank,[152] on the operative fact doctrine is apropos:

x x x When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall
govern. Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws
of the Constitution. .

Such a view has support in logic and possesses the merit of simplicity. It may not however be sufficiently realistic. It does
not admit of doubt that prior to the declaration of nullity such challenged legislative or executive act must have been in
force and had to be complied with. This is so as until after the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares its invalidity, it is
entitled to obedience and respect. Parties may have acted under it and may have changed their positions. What could be
more fitting than that in a subsequent litigation regard be had to what has been done while such legislative or executive act
was in operation and presumed to be valid in all respects. It is now accepted as a doctrine that prior to its being nullified,
its existence as a fact must be reckoned with. This is merely to reflect awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the
governmental organ which has the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of time
may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be
to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such
adjudication.

In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination
[of constitutionality], is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot
always be erased by a new judicial declaration x x x. (Emphasis in the original.)

The petitioners in the first three (3) petitions and the respondent in the fourth have not so said explicitly, but their brief is
against the issuance of P.D. Nos. 1112, 1113 and 1894, which conferred a package of express and implied powers and
discretion to the TRB and the President resulting in the execution of what is perceived to be offending STOAs and the
runaway collection of illegal toll fees. And they have come to the Court to strike down all these issuances, agreements and
exactions. While the Court is not insensitive to their concerns, the rule is that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in
favor of the constitutionality of a statute,[153] and the validity of the acts taken in pursuant thereof. It follows, therefore,
that the Court will not set aside a law as violative of the Constitution except in a clear case of breach[154] and only as a
last resort.[155] And as the theory of separation of powers prescribes, the Court does not pass upon questions of wisdom,
expediency and justice of legislation. To Us, petitioners and respondent YPES in the fourth petition have not discharged
the heavy burden of demonstrating in a clear and convincing manner the unconstitutionality of the decrees challenged or
the invalidity of assailed acts of the President and the TRB. Because they failed to do so, the Court must uphold the
presumptive constitutionality and validity of the provisions of the three decrees in question, and the subject contracts and
TOCs.

Regarding petitioner Franciscos Supplemental Petition, the toll rates, the collection of which in the amount based
on the formula and assumptions set forth in the law, and the adverted STOA dated February 1, 2006 and subject of the
TRO issued on August 13, 2010, has been duly published[156] and approved by the TRB, as required by Section 5 of P.D.
1112.[157] And the party-concessionaires have adequately demonstrated, and the TRB has virtually acknowledged[158]
that the said rates subject of the TRO partake of the nature of opening or initial toll rates, which have not yet been
implemented since the time the SLTC STOA took effect.[159] To note, the toll rates subject of the TRO were approved
and are to be implemented in connection with the new facility, such as Project Toll Roads 1 and 2 pursuant to the new
SLTC STOA and the expanded and rehabilitated SLEX.[160] As earlier discussed, public hearing is not required in the
fixing and implementation of initial toll rates. But an interested party aggrieved by the initial rates imposed is not without
any resource as he may, within the time frame provided by Section 8 (b) of P.D. 1894, repair to the TRB for review and
thereafter to the OP.[161] As expressly provided in the same section, however, the pendency of the petition for review, if
there be any, shall not suspend the enforceability and collection of the toll in question. In net effect, the challenge before
the Court of the SLEX toll rate imposition is premature. However, the Court treats this Supplemental Petition assailing
the toll rates covered by the TRB Notice of Toll Rates published on June 6, 2010 as a petition for review filed under P.D.
1894, and hereby remands the same to the TRB for a review of the questioned rates to determine the propriety thereof.

WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 166910 and 173630 are hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, We
declare as VALID AND CONSTITUTIONAL the following:

1. the Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement dated April 30, 1998 covering the North Luzon Tollway Project
and the TRB Board Resolution No. 2005-4 issued pursuant thereto;

2. the Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement dated November 27, 1995 covering the South Metro Manila
Skyway and the TRB Board Resolution No. 2004-53 and previous TRB resolutions issued pursuant thereto;

3. the Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement covering the South Luzon Tollway Project or South Luzon
Expressway and the TRB Board resolutions issued pursuant to the said agreement, particularly the TRB Board resolutions
allowing the toll rate increases that are supposed to have been implemented on June 30, 2010;

4. Section 3, paragraph (a) of Presidential Decree No. 1112, otherwise known as the Toll Operation Decree, in
relation to Section 3, paragraph (d) thereof and Section 8, paragraph (b) of Presidential Decree No. 1894; and

5. Section 3, paragraph (e) 3 of P.D. No. 1112 and Section 13 of P.D. No. 1894.

We however declare Clause 11.7 of the Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines,
represented by respondent TRB, as grantor, the Philippine National Construction Corporation, as franchisee, and the
Manila North Tollways Corporation (MNTC) dated April 30, 1998; and the clause including if necessary an extension
of the CONCESSION PERIOD which in no case shall exceed a maximum period of fifty (50) years in Clause 17.5 of the
same STOA, as VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
We likewise declare Clauses 8.08 (2) & (3) of the Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement between the Republic of the
Philippines, represented by respondent TRB, as grantor, the Philippine National Construction Corporation as franchisee,
the South Luzon Tollway Corporation as investor, and the Manila Toll Expressway Systems, Inc. as operator, dated
February 1, 2006, as VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

The petition in G.R. No. 169917 is likewise hereby DENIED for lack of merit. We declare as VALID and
CONSTITUTIONAL the following:

1. Notice of Approval dated May 16, 1995 by former President Fidel V. Ramos on the assignment of PNCCs
usufructuary rights;

2. the Joint Venture Agreement dated August 29, 1995;

3. the Joint Investment Proposal, etc. dated June 16, 1996;

4. the Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement (STOA) dated April 30, 1998 and the Notice of Approval of
said STOA dated June 15, 1998 by former President Fidel V. Ramos; and

5. the provisional toll rate increases published February 9, 2005, granted by the TRB.

The petition in G.R. No. 183599 is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated June 23, 2008 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 155 in Pasig City, docketed as SCA No. 3138-PSG, annulling the TOC covering the SLEX, enjoining the
original toll operating franchisee from collecting toll fees in the SLEX, and ordering the turnover of related assets to the
Government, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the petition filed therein by the Young Professionals and
Entrepreneurs of San Pedro, Laguna with the RTC of Pasig is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

In view of the foregoing dispositions in the petitions at bar, the TRO issued by the Court on August 13, 2010 is hereby
ordered LIFTED, with respect to the petitions in G.R. Nos. 166910, 169917, 173630 and 183599.

The challenge contained in the Supplemental Petition in G.R. No. 166910 against the toll rates subject of the TRB Notice
of Toll Rates published on June 6, 2010, for the SLEX projects, Toll Road Projects 1 and 2 of the new SLTC STOA, and
the expanded and rehabilitated SLEX, is REMANDED to the TRB for a review of the assailed toll rates to determine
whether SLTC and MATES are entitled to the toll fees.

No Cost.

SO ORDERED.



PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice


















WE CONCUR:



RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice


(On leave)
ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice



ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice Associate Justice



ARTURO D. BRION DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice Associate Justice



LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice Associate Justice


(On leave)
ROBERTO A. ABAD MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice



JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice Associate Justice



MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Associate Justice










C E R T I F I C A T I O N


Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court En Banc.



RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice



* On leave.

[1] Authorizing the Establishment of Toll Facilities on Public Improvements, Creating a Board for the Regulation thereof
and for other Purposes, P.D. 1112 [Toll Operation Decree], whereas clause (March 31, 1977).
[2] See P.D. 1113, 3.
[3] Amending the Franchise of the [PNCC] to Construct, Maintain and Operate Toll Facilities in the North Luzon and
South Luzon Expressways to Include the Metro Manila Expressway to Serve as an Additional Artery in the Transportation
of Trade and Commerce in the Metro Manila Area, P.D. 1894, 1.
[4] What is involved when the usufruct is ceded are, inter alia, the right to collect and keep toll; operate, repair or replace
the toll collection system for the project toll roads; and provide continuing operation and maintenance during the
concession period.
[5] P.D. 1113, 8; P.D. 1894, 13.
[6] P.D. 1112, 3 (e) (3).
[7] Philippine Constitution, Art. XII, 11.

Sec. 11. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted
except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines at least
sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, nor shall such franchise, certificate, or authorization be
exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. Neither shall any such franchise or right be granted except
under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress when the common good so
requires. The State shall encourage equity participation in public utilities by the general public. The participation of
foreign investors in the governing body of any public utility enterprise shall belimited to their proportionate share in its
capital, and all the executive and managing officers of such corporation or association must be citizens of the Philippines.
[8] Rollo (G.R. No. 166910), pp. 152-160.
[9] Id. at 166-171; DOJ Opinion No. 79, s. 1994.
[10] In the same way that the improvement of the SLEX would also be referred to as the South Luzon Tollway project.
[11] Rollo (G.R. No. 169917), pp. 194-196; MNTC STOA, clause 3.1.
[12] Initial focus of the MOA are the full rehabilitation and construction of the Alabang viaduct and full rehabilitation and
expansion of the Alabang-Calamba Santo Tomas stretch.
[13] Annex 14, SLTCs and MATES Consolidated Comment/Opposition to the Supplemental Petition of petitioner
Francisco.
[14] Sections 2.01 of the STOA.
[15] Article VI, Section 1 of the Constitution provides that legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines x x x.
[16] Annex 16, Consolidated Comment/Opposition to petitioner Franciscos Supplemental Petition.
[17] Annex 17, Consolidated Comment/Opposition to petitioner Franciscos Supplemental Petition.
[18] Id.
[19] Rollo (G.R. No. 183599), pp. 58-70.
[20] Rollo (G.R. No. 183599), p. 70.
[21] Dumlao v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-52245, January 22, 1980, 95 SCRA 392, 401.
[22] Muskrat v. U.S., 219 U.S. 346 (1913).
[23] See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 20 E Ed 2d 947, 88 S. Ct. 1942, 1950 (1968).
[24] G.R. Nos. 183591, 183752, 183893 & 183591, October 14, 2008, 568 SCRA 402, 405 [citations omitted]; see also
PACU v. Secretary of Education, 97 Phil. 806, 810 (1955).
[25] Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary 939 (2003).
[26] Id. at 939-40; citing People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 89 (1937); Macasiano v. National Housing Authority, G.R. No.
107921, July 1, 1993, 224 SCRA 236.
[27] Gonzales v. Narvasa, G.R. No. 140835, August 14, 2000, 337 SCRA 733, 740.
[28] See Taada v. Angara, G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997, 272 SCRA 18.
[29] Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 158 (1936).
[30] Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, July 9, 2002, 384 SCRA 152; Lim v. Executive Secretary,
G.R. No. 151445, April 11, 2002, 380 SCRA 739; IBP v. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000; Tatad v. Secretary
of the Department of Energy [DOE], G.R. Nos. 124360 & 127867, November 5, 1997, 281 SCRA 330; Kilosbayan v.
Guingona, Jr., G.R. No. 113375, May 5, 1994, 232 SCRA 110, 137-38.
[31] Tatad v. DOE, id. at 349; De Guia v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 104712, May 6, 1992, 208 SCRA 420, 422.
[32] Severino v. Governor General,16 Phil. 366, 371 (1910).
[33] Del Mar v. PAGCOR, G.R. No. 138298, November 29, 2000, 346 SCRA 485, 503.
[34] Metropolitan Cebu Water District v. Adala, G.R. No. 168914, July 4, 2007, 526 SCRA 465, 466.
[35] Albano v. Reyes, G.R. No. 83561, July 11, 1989, 175 SCRA 264.
[36] Id. at 264.
[37] DOJ Opinion No. 1, s. 2006; Annex 15, Consolidated Comment/Opposition to supplemental petition.
[38] Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Center v. Garcia, Jr., G.R. No. 115381, Dec. 23, 1994, 239 SCRA 386, 405.
[39] Id.
[40] P.D. 1112, 3, e.
[41] Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board, G.R. No. 119528, March 26, 1997, 270 SCRA 538.
[42] Philippine Airlines, Inc., id. at 551.
[43] Philippine Airlines, Inc., id. at 549-50.
[44] See Tatad v. DOE, supra note 30, 349; De Guia v. COMELEC, supra note 31, at 422.
[45] Philippine Airlines, Inc., supra note 41, at 550; citing Dyer v. Tuskaloosa Bridge Co., 2 Port. 296, 27 Am. D. 655;
Christian Toda Tel. Co. v. Commonwealth, 161 S.W. 543, 156 Ky. 557, 37 C.J.S. 158.
[46] Philippine Airlines, Inc., id.; citing Ynchausti Steamship Co. v. Public Utility Commissioner, 42 Phil. 642 (1923).
[47] G.R. No. 178158, December 4, 2009, 607 SCRA 413, 492-94.
[48] See STOA (Covering the South Metro Manila Skyway) among the Republic, PNCC and Citra Metro Manila
Tollways Corporation, November 27, 1995, Rollo (G.R. No. 166910), pp. 329-397; STOA (Covering the Manila-North
Expressway) among the Republic, PNCC and Manila North Tollways Corporation, April 1998, Rollo (G.R. No. 169917),
pp. 177-242.
[49] See P.D. 1112, whereas clauses; P.D. 1113, whereas clauses; P.D. 1894, whereas clauses.
[50] See e.g. Rollo (G.R. No. 169917), p. 243; see also Rollo (G.R. No. 169917), p. 106.
[51] P.D. 1894, amending P.D. 1113.
[52] P.D. 1113, 3; P.D. 1894, 6.
[53] P.D. 1894, 6. (Emphasis ours.)
[54] 16.06 Supplemental Effect This Agreement [STOA] is intended as a supplement to the [TRB-PNCC] TOA.
Accordingly, to the extent possible, both agreements should be regarded as one integrated instrument whose provisions
are fully consistent with each other; provided however, that in respect of the Project or any of the Project Toll Roads, the
provisions of this Agreement shall have primacy of application and shall be deemed to have modified or replaced
provisions of the TOA that is contrary or inconsistent with any provision of this Agreement.
[55] Strategic Alliance Development Corporation v. Radstock Securities Limited, supra note 47, at 494. (Emphasis in the
original.)
[56] Id. at 495.
[57] DOJ Opinion No. 122, s. 1995; Rollo (G.R. No. 169917), p. 363.
[58] DOJ Opinion No. 1, s. 2006.
[59] Strategic Alliance Development Corporation v. Radstock Securities Limited, supra note 47, at 495.
[60] Id. at 494.
[61] Id.
[62] See supra.
[63] Dated Aug. 20, 1990; reported in 188 SCRA 775.
[64] The DPWH had jurisdiction over the TRB pursuant to E.O. No. 644 (July 30, 2007).
[65] PNCC v. Republic, G.R. No. 89557, August 20, 1990, 188 SCRA 775, 790-91.
[66] PNCC v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104437, December 17, 1993, 228 SCRA 565.
[67] Id. at 572.
[68] Id. at 567 & 570.
[69] Martir v. Verano, 497 SCRA 120, 126-27 (2006); citing Armed Forces of the Philippines Mutual Benefit
Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126745, July 26, 1999, 311 SCRA 143, 154-55.
[70] In relation to G.R. No. 183599.
[71] G.R. No. 166785, July 28, 2008, 560 SCRA 197, 198, 208-209.
[72] Eastern Assurance & Surety Corporation (EASCO) v. Land Transportation and Franchising Regulatory Board
(LTFRB), G.R. No. 149717, October 7, 2003, 413 SCRA 75, 90.
[73] Drilon v. Lim, 235 SCRA 135 (1994).
[74] Entitled Creating The Land Transportation Franchising And Regulatory Board.
[75] Sec. 5. Powers and Functions of the [LTFRB].The Board shall have the following powers and functions:

a. To prescribe and regulate routes of service, economically viable capacities and zones or areas of operation of public
land transportation services provided by motorized vehicles xxxx;

b. To issue x x x or cancel x x x or permits authorizing the operation of public land transportation services x x x and to
prescribe the appropriate terms and conditions therefor;

c. To determine, prescribe and approve xxx reasonable fares, rates and other related charges, relative to the operation of
public land transportation services provided by motorized vehicles;

.
g. To conduct investigations and hearings of complaints for violation of the public service laws on land transportation and
of the Board's rules and regulations, orders, decisions and/or rulings and to impose fines and/or penalties for such
violations;

[76] Entitled Creating A Ministry Of Public Works And A Ministry Of Transportation And Communications.
x x x x

Sec. 15. Functions of the Commission.The Commission shall exercise the following functions:

a. Issue [CPC] for the operation of communications utilities and services, radio communications systems, wire or wireless
telephone or telegraph systems, radio and television broadcasting system and other similar public utilities;

b. Establish, prescribe and regulate areas of operation of particular operators of public service communications; and
determine and prescribe charges or rates pertinent to the operation of such public utility facilities and services except in
cases x x x;

c. Grant permits for the use of radio frequencies for wireless telephone and telegraph systems and radio communication
systems including amateur radio stations and radio and television broadcasting systems;

x x x x

g. Promulgate such rules and regulations, as public safety and interest may require, to encourage a larger and more
effective use of communications, radio and television broadcasting facilities, and to maintain effective competition among
private entities in these activities whenever the Commission finds it reasonably feasible;

x x x x
[77] An Act Ordaining Reforms in the Electric Power Industry, Amending for the Purpose Certain Laws and for Other
Purposes, R.A. 9136 [Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001], 4 (w), 6, 8, 34, 38 & 43 (f).
[78] Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association, Inc. v. ERC and MERALCO, G.R. No. 174697, July 8, 2010.
[79] C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. v. Hibionada, et al., G.R. No. 80916, November 9, 1990.
[80] Sec. 8 of P.D. 1113 and Sec. 13 of P.D. 1894 each contains a similar provision but use the word grantee instead of
toll operator found in Sec. 3 of P.D. 1112, thus:

The grantee shall not lease, transfer, grant the usufruct of, sell or assign the franchise nor the rights or privileges acquired
thereby, x x x nor merge with any other company or corporation without the prior approval of the President of the
Philippines. x x x
.
[81] G.R. No. 113375, May 5, 1994, 232 SCRA 110; citing 36 Am. Jur. 2D, Franchises, 63.
[82] National Federation of Labor v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No 127718, March 2, 2000, 327 SCRA
158, 165.
[83] Padua v. Ranada, G.R. No. 141949, 390 SCRA 663, 679.
[84] Padua v. Ranada, id. at 679; citing Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform, 175 SCRA 343 (1989).
[85] Rollo (G.R. No. 169917), p. 217.
[86] Id. at 46-47.
[87] See supra; see e.g. Albano v. Reyes, supra note 35, at 264; Philippine Airlines, Inc., supra note 41, at 538, 549-551.
[88] See supra.
[89] Albano v. Reyes, supra note 35, at 264.
[90] Kilusang Mayo Uno, supra note 38, at 405.
[91] Philippine Airlines, Inc., supra note 41, at 549-550.
[92] P.D. 1112, 3 (e).
[93] P.D. 1113, 3; P.D. 1894, 6.
[94] See supra; see also P.D. 1894, 1 & 2.

SECTION 1. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, there is hereby granted to the Philippine National
Construction Corporation, a corporation duly organized and existing under by the virtue of Philippine laws (hereinafter
called the GRANTEE), the right, privilege and authority to construct, maintain and operate the following expressways
(hereinafter collectively called "the Expressways"), together with the toll facilities appurtenant thereto:

(a) the North Luzon Expressway from Balintawak (Station 9 + 563) to Carmen, Rosales, Pangasinan;

(b) the South Luzon Expressway from Nichols, Pasay City (Station 10 + 540) to Lucena, Quezon;

(c) the Metro Manila Expressway, from Bicutan, Paraaque, Metro Manila (Station 18 +720) to Meycauayan, Bulacan
(approximate Station 63 + 290) with an approximate length of 44.570 km., to serve as an artery in the transportation of
trade and commerce in the Metropolitan Manila area.

The GRANTEE is hereby further granted the right, privilege and authority to construct, maintain and operate any and all
such extensions, linkages or stretches, together with the toll facilities appurtenant thereto, from any part of the North
Luzon Expressway, South Luzon Expressway and/or Metro Manila Expressway and/or to divert the original route and
change the original end-points of the North Luzon Expressway and/or South Luzon Expressway as may be approved by
the Toll Regulatory Board (any and all such extensions, linkages, stretches and diversions hereinafter deemed included in
the term Expressways).

SECTION 2. The term of the franchise provided under Presidential Decree No. 1113 for the North Luzon
Expressway and the South Luzon Expressway which is thirty (30) years from 1 May 1977 shall remain the same; provided
that, the franchise granted for the Metro Manila Expressway and all extensions linkages, stretches and diversions that may
be constructed after the date of approval of this decree shall likewise have a term of thirty (30) years commencing from
the date of completion of the project.
[95] P.D. 1112, 3 (e) (6).
[96] 17.4.1 The PARTIES acknowledge that following a Notice of Substitution under clauses 17.2 or 17.3 the LENDERS
have, subject to the provisions of Clause 17.4.3, the unrestricted right to appoint a SUBSTITUTED ENTITY in place of
MNTC following the declaration of the occurrence of a MNTC DEFAULT prior to full repayment of the LOANS or of an
event of default in respect of the LOANS. GRANTOR shall extend all reasonable assistance to the AGENT to put in
place a SUBSTITUTED ENTITY. MNTC shall make available all necessary information to potential SUBSTITUTED
ENTITY to enable such entity to evaluate the Project.
[97] Rollo (G.R. No. 169917), pp. 227-228.
[98] Id. at 228.
[99] MNTC STOA, Clause 17.5, id. Rollo, G.R. No. 166917, at 228.
[100] Id. at 184. Clause 1.1.1 AGENT shall mean the authorized representative/s appointed by the LENDERS to act
and negotiate on their behalf with respect to the LOANS and to this AGREEMENT and notified to GRANTOR by
MNTC. Id. at 184.
[101] Supra note 99.
[102] P.D. 1112, 3, e, P.D. 1113, 3; P.D. 1894, 6.
[103] Phil. Const., Art. XII, 11.
[104] Rollo (G.R. No. 166917), p. 192.
[105] Phil. Const., Art. XII, 11.
[106] Rollo (G.R. No. 169971), p. 507.
[107] Phil. Const., Art. VI, 29 (1).
[108] Strategic Alliance Development Corporation v. Radstock Securities Limited, supra note 47, at 498.
[109] Id. at 498-500.
[110] SLTC STOA, 8.08 (2) & (3).
[111] See e.g. MNTC STOA, 11.4 & 11.5; SLTC STOA, 8.06 & 8.08.

11.4 Periodic Adjustment.

11.4.1 The AUTHORIZED TOLL RATE shall be adjusted as provided in this Clause every two calendar years, the first
such adjustment to occur on the OPERATION DATE; Provided, However, that in the event that a delay in completion of
any relevant PHASE is attributable to MNTC, MNTC shall not be entitled to an additional adjustment of the Initial
AUTHORIZED TOLL RATE at the actual OPERATION DATE of the delayed phase.

11.4.2 The adjustment formula will be as follows:

1. Until the time the LOANS have been fully repaid but not later than 31 December 2013, the projected final
repayment date as per the PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE and the FINANCIAL PROJECTIONS:

ATRp = ATR0 x Ip

where:

ATRp = AUTHORIZED TOLL RATE for year p

ATR0 = Initial Reference AUTHORIZED TOLL RATE as defined in Clause 11.3.

Ip = Toll adjustment index for year p
= PCPIp Ep/E0
PCPI0 x (1 + Fc)p x [AP + BP x ( DP/D0 )]

PCPIP = Philippine Consumer Price Index for the month prior to filing the request for adjustment in year p (or the last
index available at that time)

USCPIp = USA Consumer Price Index for the month prior to filing the request for adjustment in year p (or the last index
available at that time)

PCPI0 = Base Philippine Consumer Price Index as defined in the FINANCIAL PROJECTIONS as published by the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas as of 30 June 1995

USCPI0 = Base USA Consumer Price Index as defined in the FINANCIAL PROJECTIONS as of 30 June 1995

Ap = Percentage of total debt service (or debt outstanding if there is no debt service in that period) in PESO during
the period of six (6) months prior to filing the request for adjustment in year p

Bp = Percentage of total debt service (or debt outstanding if there is no debt service in that period) in US$ during
the period of six (6) months prior to filing the request for adjustment in year p. Bp shall not exceet Fifty percent (50%)
after the first adjustment of the AUTHORIZED TOLL RATE made on OPERATION DATE.

Ep = Rolling average of US$ selling rate against PESO, as published by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, for
the period of six (6) months prior to filing the request for adjustment in year p

Dp = Consumer Price Index differential between Philippines and USA calculated as PCPIp / USCPIp

E0 = Base average of US$ selling rate against PESO, as published by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas as stated in
the FINANCIAL PROJECTIONS as of 30 June 1995

D0 = Base Consumer Price Index differential between Philippines and USA calculated as PCPI0 / USCPI0

Fc = One percent (1%) for the period up to the OPERATION DATE of the first PHASE including the first
adjustment of the TOLL RATE.

= One and one fourth of a percent (1.25%) for the period following the OPERATION DATE of PHASE 1

2. From the time when the LOANS have been fully repaid not later than 31 December 2013:

PCPIp
ATRp = ATRp-1 x [ 1 + ( PCPIp-1 - 1 ) x 50% ]

where:

ATRp-1 = AUTHORIZED TOLL RATE for year p-1

If, for any reason, the Philippine Consumer Price Index as published by the National Statistics Office ceases to be
published or is not available in the month in question, the PARTIES shall use the index published by the Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas as substitute index for the purpose of effecting the above calculation or, in case the latter index is also not
published or available, another index agreed mutually by the GRANTOR and MNTC.

11.4.3 Any such notice for adjustment to the AUTHORIZED TOLL RATE which results in the increase of the existing
AUTHORIZED TOLL RATE shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation no later than 30 November of the
year in which it is calculated and shall become enforceable and be collected by MNTC on the first day of January of the
immediately succeeding year.

11.5 Interim Adjustment.

11.5.1 In addition to the Periodic Adjustment, (a) in the circumstances contemplated in Clauses 15 and 16, MNTC shall
be entitled to Interim Adjustment of the Initial Reference AUTHORIZED TOLL RATE provided under Clause 11.3 or the
AUTHORIZED TOLL RATE provided under Clause 11.4, as compensation under such provisions, or (b) when the
rolling average over two months of either the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas foreign exchange selling rate (PESO/US$)
(Ep as defined below) has varied by ten percent (10%) as long as the Toll Rate Adjustment Formula described in Clause
11.4.2.1 applies or the Consumer Price Index for the Philippines (PCPIp as defined below) has varied by fifteen percent
(15%) compared to the level of this rate and/or index to the level of Ep-1 and PCPIp-1, respectively, MNTC shall be
entitled to an adjustment of the Initial Reference AUTHORIZED TOLL RATE or AUTHORIZED TOLL RATE after the
first Periodic Adjustment.

11.5.2 Any proposal for an adjustment of the Initial Reference AUTHORIZED TOLL RATE or AUTHORIZED TOLL
RATE, as the case may be, pursuant to Clauses 15, 16 or 11.5.1 (b) hereof shall be submitted to GRANTOR, with a
supporting calculation. Such calculation shall be subject to verification and approval by GRANTOR.

11.5.3 Any such proposal for an interim adjustment in the Initial Reference AUTHORIZED TOLL RATE or
AUTHORIZED TOLL RATE as the case may be, which results in the increase of the existing AUTHORIZED TOLL
RATE shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation no later than 30 November of the year in which it is
calculated and shall become enforceable and be collected by MNTC on the first day of January of the immediately
succeeding year.

11.5.4 An Interim Adjustment shall, other than those made by reason of the occurrence of circumstances specified under
Clause 15 and 16, be considered as an advance to MNTC to be set off against future TOLL RATE Periodic Adjustment;
Provided, However, that in computing the amount to be set off against the foregoing advance, the time value thereof shall
be considered as recognized in the FINANCIAL PROJECTIONS.
[112] P.D. 1112, 3, d.
[113] Padua v. Ranada, G.R. Nos. 141949 & 151108, October 14, 2002, 390 SCRA 663, 678-83.
[114] Manila International Airport Authority v. Blancaflor, G.R. No. 157581, December 1, 2004, 445 SCRA 471, 479.
[115] Manila International Airport Authority, id. at 479.
[116] Manila International Airport Authority, id. at 479-480.
[117] Executive Order No. 686 (December 19, 2007).
[118] See P.D. 1894, 8, b.
[119] Within the period of 90 days after the date of publication of the initial toll rate.
[120] Instituting the Administrative Code of 1987 [Administrative Code], Executive Order No. 292, book V, title 1,
subtitle B, chapter 4, 22 (1) (1987).

Section 22. Authority to Examine Accounts of Public Utilities. -

(1) The [COA] shall examine and audit the books, records and accounts of public utilities in connection with the fixing of
rates of every nature, or in relation to the proceedings of the proper regulatory agencies, for purposes of determining
franchise taxes;
[121] G.R. Nos. 166769 & 166818, December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA 455.
[122] Heirs of Severina San Miguel v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 136054, September 5, 2001.
[123] Administrative Code, Book V, Title 1, subtitle B, Chapter 4, 22 (3).
[124] Administrative Code, Book V, Title 1, subtitle B, Chapter 4, 22 (2).
[125] See Manila Electric Company, Inc. v. Lualhati, 510 SCRA at 478.
[126] MNTC STOA, Clause 11; CITRA STOA, Clause 7; SLTC STOA, Clauses 7-8.
[127] P.D. 1112, 3, d.
[128] G.R. No. 84818, December 18, 1989, 180 SCRA 218.
[129] P.D. 1112, 3, d.
[130] Rollo (G.R. No. 169971), pp. 214-217.
[131] North Negros Sugar Co., Inc. v. Hidalgo, G.R. No. L-42334, October 31, 1936, 63 Phil. 664.
[132] Ibid, citing City of St. Louis v. Creen, 7 Mo. App., 468, 476.
[133] Id., citing Virginia Caon Toll Road Co. v. People, 45 Pac., 396, 399; 22 Colo., 429; 37 L. R. A., 711.
[134] North Negros Sugar Co., Inc., 63 Phil. 664; citing Board of Shelby County Commissioners v. Castetter, 33 N. E.,
986, 987; 7 Ind. App., 309.
[135] Sec. 2 (o) Reasonable rate of return on investments and operating and maintenance cost The rate of return that
reflects the prevailing cost of capital in the domestic and international markets x x x Provided further that for negotiated
contracts for public utility projects which are monopolies, the rate of return on rate base shall be determined by existing
laws, which in no case shall exceed twelve per centum (12%).
[136] Rollo (G.R. No. 166910), pp. 275-285.
[137] Id. at 88. Petitioners quoted:

1. 17 August 1995 Board Meeting

The Board resolved that (i)n the event that the Board decides on a hearing before the TOA approval, this will mean delay
in the start of the construction and considering that the President has given instructions to accelerate the implementation
of this project, the issue of the delay should be raised to the President. If the Board conducts the hearing after the
approval of the TOA, this will allow construction to start soon and would eventually result in time savings. However, if
the rates are rejected in public hearing, then government may be considered in default.
[138] Id. at 219-226.
[139] Id. at 225. The discussion went like this:

The representative of ADG Santos brought to the attention of the Board the latters position that if the parametric formula
is adopted, there shall be no default on the part of government in case no toll rate adjustment is given. He further stated
that if default is insisted by the proponent, ADG Santos is recommending for the conduct of a public hearing before
approval. ADG Santos further suggested that before the contract is signed, the Board shall conduct a public hearing or
solicit the indorsement of MMDA. In the event that the Board decides on a hearing before the TOA approval, this will
mean delay in the start of construction and considering that the President has given instructions to accelerate the
implementation of this project, the issue of the delay should be addressed to the President. If the Board conducts the
hearing after the approval of the TOA, this will allow construction to start soon and would eventually result in time
savings. However, if rates are rejected in the public hearing, then government may be considered in default.
[140] Cuyegkeng v. Cruz, G.R. No. L-16263, July 26, 1960, 108 Phil. 1147.
[141] Simon v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 101251, November 5, 1992, 215 SCRA 410, 418.
[142] Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents, papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research
data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizens, subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law.
[143] 14.04 CONFIDENTIALITY. 1. None of the parties shall xxx without the consent of the other, divulge x x x any of
the contents of this Agreement or any information relating to the negotiation concerning the operations, contracts,
commercial or financial arrangements or affairs of the other parties hereto x x x.
[144]Rollo (G.R. No. 166910), p. 392.
[145] Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines 337 (1996).
[146] See Baldoza v. Judge Dimaano, A.M. No. 1120-MTJ, May 5, 1976, 17 SCRA 14.
[147] See Taada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. 63915, April 24, 1985, 136 SCRA 27; Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, G.R.
No. 72119, May 29, 1987, 150 SCRA 530.
[148] 432 Phil. 7 (2002).
[149] Dated June 11, 1978 entitled, Prescribing Policies, Guidelines, Rules and Regulations for Government
Infrastructure Contracts; Expressly repealed by R.A. 9184.
[150] Rollo (G.R. No. 166910), pp. 820-821.
[151] Choice of persons; the selection of persons satisfactory to ones self for a position involving trust and confidence in
the others character.
[152] De Agbayani, v. Philippine National Bank, G.R. No. L-23127, April 29, 1971, 38 SCRA 429-430.
[153] Basco v. PAGCOR, G.R. Nos. 138298, November 29, 2000, 346 SCRA 485.
[154] Angara v. Electoral Commission, G.R. No. 45081, July 15, 1936, 63 Phil. 139.
[155] 16 Am. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law, Sec. 115, citing cases.
[156] Annex 18-A-2, Consolidated Comment/Opposition to Supplemental Petition.
[157] P.D. 1112, 5.
[158] See Annexes 18-A-2 & 18-C-2, supra wherein the TRB gave notice that any interested expressway user shall have
the right to file, within a period of ninety (90) days from the date of publication of the toll rate matrix, a petition for
review.
[159] See Supplemental Petition of petitioner Francisco, at 18, Annex C.
[160] Consolidated Comment/Opposition to petitioner Franciscos Supplemental Petition, at 43-50, Annex 16.
[161] See also Annex 18-C-2, Consolidated Comment/Opposition to petitioner Franciscos Supplemental Petition.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC



G.R. No. 96541 August 24, 1993

DEAN JOSE JOYA, CARMEN GUERRERO NAKPIL, ARMIDA SIGUION REYNA, PROF. RICARTE M.
PURUGANAN, IRMA POTENCIANO, ADRIAN CRISTOBAL, INGRID SANTAMARIA, CORAZON FIEL,
AMBASSADOR E. AGUILAR CRUZ, FLORENCIO R. JACELA, JR., MAURO MALANG, FEDERICO AGUILAR
ALCUAZ, LUCRECIA R. URTULA, SUSANO GONZALES, STEVE SANTOS, EPHRAIM SAMSON, SOLER
SANTOS, ANG KIU KOK, KERIMA POLOTAN, LUCRECIA KASILAG, LIGAYA DAVID PEREZ, VIRGILIO
ALMARIO, LIWAYWAY A. ARCEO, CHARITO PLANAS, HELENA BENITEZ, ANNA MARIA L. HARPER,
ROSALINDA OROSA, SUSAN CALO MEDINA, PATRICIA RUIZ, BONNIE RUIZ, NELSON NAVARRO, MANDY
NAVASERO, ROMEO SALVADOR, JOSEPHINE DARANG, and PAZ VETO PLANAS, petitioners,
vs.
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), CATALINO MACARAIG, JR., in his official
capacity, and/or the Executive Secretary, and CHAIRMAN MATEO A.T. CAPARAS, respondents.

M.M. Lazaro & Associates for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondents.



BELLOSILLO, J.:

All thirty-five (35) petitioners in this Special Civil Action for Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for Preliminary
Injunction and/or Restraining Order seek to enjoin the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) from
proceeding with the auction sale scheduled on 11 January 1991 by Christie's of New York of the Old Masters Paintings
and 18th and 19th century silverware seized from Malacaang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila and placed in the
custody of the Central Bank.

The antecedents: On 9 August 1990, Mateo A.T. Caparas, then Chairman of PCGG, wrote then President Corazon C.
Aquino, requesting her for authority to sign the proposed Consignment Agreement between the Republic of the
Philippines through PCGG and Christie, Manson and Woods International, Inc. (Christie's of New York, or CHRISTIE'S)
concerning the scheduled sale on 11 January 1991 of eighty-two (82) Old Masters Paintings and antique silverware seized
from Malacaang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila alleged to be part of the ill-gotten wealth of the late President
Marcos, his relatives and cronies.

On 14 August 1990, then President Aquino, through former Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr., authorized
Chairman Caparas to sign the Consignment Agreement allowing Christie's of New York to auction off the subject art
pieces for and in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines.

On 15 August 1990, PCGG, through Chairman Caparas, representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines,
signed the Consignment Agreement with Christie's of New York. According to the agreement, PCGG shall consign to
CHRISTIE'S for sale at public auction the eighty-two (82) Old Masters Paintings then found at the Metropolitan Museum
of Manila as well as the silverware contained in seventy-one (71) cartons in the custody of the Central Bank of the
Philippines, and such other property as may subsequently be identified by PCGG and accepted by CHRISTIE'S to be
subject to the provisions of the agreement. 1

On 26 October 1990, the Commission on Audit (COA) through then Chairman Eufemio C. Domingo submitted to
President Aquino the audit findings and observations of COA on the Consignment Agreement of 15 August 1990 to the
effect that: (a) the authority of former PCGG Chairman Caparas to enter into the Consignment Agreement was of doubtful
legality; (b) the contract was highly disadvantageous to the government; (c) PCGG had a poor track record in asset
disposal by auction in the U.S.; and, (d) the assets subject of auction were historical relics and had cultural significance,
hence, their disposal was prohibited by law. 2

On 15 November 1990, PCGG through its new Chairman David M. Castro, wrote President Aquino defending the
Consignment Agreement and refuting the allegations of COA Chairman Domingo. 3 On the same date, Director of
National Museum Gabriel S. Casal issued a certification that the items subject of the Consignment Agreement did not fall
within the classification of protected cultural properties and did not specifically qualify as part of the Filipino cultural
heritage. 4 Hence, this petition originally filed on 7 January 1991 by Dean Jose Joya, Carmen Guerrero Nakpil, Armida
Siguion Reyna, Prof. Ricarte M. Puruganan, Irma Potenciano, Adrian Cristobal, Ingrid Santamaria, Corazon Fiel,
Ambassador E. Aguilar Cruz, Florencio R. Jacela, Jr., Mauro Malang, Federico Aguilar Alcuaz, Lucrecia R. Urtula,
Susano Gonzales, Steve Santos, Ephraim Samson, Soler Santos, Ang Kiu Kok, Kerima Polotan, Lucrecia Kasilag, Ligaya
David Perez, Virgilio Almario and Liwayway A. Arceo.

After the oral arguments of the parties on 9 January 1991, we issued immediately our resolution denying the application
for preliminary injunction to restrain the scheduled sale of the artworks on the ground that petitioners had not presented a
clear legal right to a restraining order and that proper parties had not been impleaded.

On 11 January 1991, the sale at public auction proceeded as scheduled and the proceeds of $13,302,604.86 were turned
over to the Bureau of Treasury. 5

On 5 February 1991, on motion of petitioners, the following were joined as additional petitioners: Charito Planas, Helena
Benitez, Ana Maria L. Harper, Rosalinda Orosa, Susan Carlo Medina, Patricia Ruiz, Bonnie Ruiz, Nelson Navarro,
Mandy Navasero, Romeo Salvador, Josephine Darang and Paz Veto Planas.

On the other hand, Catalino Macaraig, Jr., in his capacity as former Executive Secretary, the incumbent Executive
Secretary, and Chairman Mateo A.T. Caparas were impleaded as additional respondents.

Petitioners raise the following issues: (a) whether petitioners have legal standing to file the instant petition; (b) whether
the Old Masters Paintings and antique silverware are embraced in the phrase "cultural treasure of the nation" which is
under the protection of the state pursuant to the 1987 Constitution and/or "cultural properties" contemplated under R.A.
4846, otherwise known as "The Cultural Properties Preservation and Protection Act;" (c) whether the paintings and
silverware are properties of public dominion on which can be disposed of through the joint concurrence of the President
and Congress;
(d) whether respondent, PCGG has the jurisdiction and authority to enter into an agreement with Christie's of New York
for the sale of the artworks; (e) whether, PCGG has complied with the due process clause and other statutory requirements
for the exportation and sale of the subject items; and, (f) whether the petition has become moot and academic, and if so,
whether the above issues warrant resolution from this Court.

The issues being interrelated, they will be discussed jointly hereunder. However, before proceeding, we wish to
emphasize that we admire and commend petitioners' zealous concern to keep and preserve within the country great works
of art by well-known old masters. Indeed, the value of art cannot be gainsaid. For, by serving as a creative medium
through which man can express his innermost thoughts and unbridled emotions while, at the same time, reflecting his
deep-seated ideals, art has become a true expression of beauty, joy, and life itself. Such artistic creations give us insights
into the artists' cultural heritage the historic past of the nation and the era to which they belong in their triumphant,
glorious, as well as troubled and turbulent years. It must be for this reason that the framers of the 1987 Constitution
mandated in Art. XIV, Sec. 14, that is the solemn duty of the state to "foster the preservation, enrichment, and dynamic
evolution of a Filipino national culture based on the principle of unity in diversity in a climate of free artistic and
intellectual expression." And, in urging this Court to grant their petition, petitioners invoke this policy of the state on the
protection of the arts.

But, the altruistic and noble purpose of the petition notwithstanding, there is that basic legal question which must first be
resolved: whether the instant petition complies with the legal requisites for this Court to exercise its power of judicial
review over this case.

The rule is settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard
and decided by the court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: that the question
must be raised by the proper party; that there must be an actual case or controversy; that the question must be raised at the
earliest possible opportunity; and, that the decision on the constitutional or legal question must be necessary to the
determination of the case itself. 6 But the most important are the first two (2) requisites.

On the first requisite, we have held that one having no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the
court as party-plaintiff in an
action. 7 This is premised on Sec. 2, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court which provides that every action must be prosecuted
and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, and that all persons having interest in the subject of the action and
in obtaining the relief demanded shall be joined as plaintiffs. The Court will exercise its power of judicial review only if
the case is brought before it by a party who has the legal standing to raise the constitutional or legal question. "Legal
standing" means a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury
as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The term "interest" is material interest, an interest in issue and
to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. 8
Moreover, the interest of the party plaintiff must be personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional
right of some third and related party. 9

There are certain instances however when this Court has allowed exceptions to the rule on legal standing, as when a
citizen brings a case for mandamus to procure the enforcement of a public duty for the fulfillment of a public right
recognized by the Constitution, 10 and when a taxpayer questions the validity of a governmental act authorizing the
disbursement of public funds. 11

Petitioners claim that as Filipino citizens, taxpayers and artists deeply concerned with the preservation and protection of
the country's artistic wealth, they have the legal personality to restrain respondents Executive Secretary and PCGG from
acting contrary to their public duty to conserve the artistic creations as mandated by the 1987 Constitution, particularly
Art. XIV, Secs. 14 to 18, on Arts and Culture, and R.A. 4846 known as "The Cultural Properties Preservation and
Protection Act," governing the preservation and disposition of national and important cultural properties. Petitioners also
anchor their case on the premise that the paintings and silverware are public properties collectively owned by them and by
the people in general to view and enjoy as great works of art. They allege that with the unauthorized act of PCGG in
selling the art pieces, petitioners have been deprived of their right to public property without due process of law in
violation of the Constitution. 12

Petitioners' arguments are devoid of merit. They lack basis in fact and in law. They themselves allege that the paintings
were donated by private persons from different parts of the world to the Metropolitan Museum of Manila Foundation,
which is a non-profit and non-stock corporations established to promote non-Philippine arts. The foundation's chairman
was former First Lady Imelda R. Marcos, while its president was Bienvenido R. Tantoco. On this basis, the ownership of
these paintings legally belongs to the foundation or corporation or the members thereof, although the public has been
given the opportunity to view and appreciate these paintings when they were placed on exhibit.

Similarly, as alleged in the petition, the pieces of antique silverware were given to the Marcos couple as gifts from friends
and dignitaries from foreign countries on their silver wedding and anniversary, an occasion personal to them. When the
Marcos administration was toppled by the revolutionary government, these paintings and silverware were taken from
Malacaang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila and transferred to the Central Bank Museum. The confiscation of
these properties by the Aquino administration however should not be understood to mean that the ownership of these
paintings has automatically passed on the government without complying with constitutional and statutory requirements
of due process and just compensation. If these properties were already acquired by the government, any constitutional or
statutory defect in their acquisition and their subsequent disposition must be raised only by the proper parties the true
owners thereof whose authority to recover emanates from their proprietary rights which are protected by statutes and
the Constitution. Having failed to show that they are the legal owners of the artworks or that the valued pieces have
become publicly owned, petitioners do not possess any clear legal right whatsoever to question their alleged unauthorized
disposition.

Further, although this action is also one of mandamus filed by concerned citizens, it does not fulfill the criteria for a
mandamus suit. In Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, 13 this Court laid down the rule that a writ of mandamus may be
issued to a citizen only when the public right to be enforced and the concomitant duty of the state are unequivocably set
forth in the Constitution. In the case at bar, petitioners are not after the fulfillment of a positive duty required of
respondent officials under the 1987 Constitution. What they seek is the enjoining of an official act because it is
constitutionally infirmed. Moreover, petitioners' claim for the continued enjoyment and appreciation by the public of the
artworks is at most a privilege and is unenforceable as a constitutional right in this action for mandamus.

Neither can this petition be allowed as a taxpayer's suit. Not every action filed by a taxpayer can qualify to challenge the
legality of official acts done by the government. A taxpayer's suit can prosper only if the governmental acts being
questioned involve disbursement of public funds upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the
state for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds, which may be
enjoined at the request of a taxpayer. 14 Obviously, petitioners are not challenging any expenditure involving public funds
but the disposition of what they allege to be public properties. It is worthy to note that petitioners admit that the paintings
and antique silverware were acquired from private sources and not with public money.

Anent the second requisite of actual controversy, petitioners argue that this case should be resolved by this Court as an
exception to the rule on moot and academic cases; that although the sale of the paintings and silver has long been
consummated and the possibility of retrieving the treasure trove is nil, yet the novelty and importance of the issues raised
by the petition deserve this Court's attention. They submit that the resolution by the Court of the issues in this case will
establish future guiding principles and doctrines on the preservation of the nation's priceless artistic and cultural
possessions for the benefit of the public as a whole. 15

For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case of controversy one which involves a
conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot
or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. 16 A case
becomes moot and academic when its purpose has become stale, 17 such as the case before us. Since the purpose of this
petition for prohibition is to enjoin respondent public officials from holding the auction sale of the artworks on a particular
date 11 January 1991 which is long past, the issues raised in the petition have become moot and academic.

At this point, however, we need to emphasize that this Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not
satisfy the requirements of an actual case or legal standing when paramount public interest is involved. 18 We find
however that there is no such justification in the petition at bar to warrant the relaxation of the rule.

Section 2 of R.A. 4846, as amended by P.D. 374, declares it to be the policy of the state to preserve and protect the
important cultural properties and national cultural treasures of the nation and to safeguard their intrinsic value. As to what
kind of artistic and cultural properties are considered by the State as involving public interest which should therefore be
protected, the answer can be gleaned from reading of the reasons behind the enactment of R.A. 4846:

WHEREAS, the National Museum has the difficult task, under existing laws and regulations, of preserving and protecting
the cultural properties of the nation;

WHEREAS, inumerable sites all over the country have since been excavated for cultural relics, which have passed on to
private hands, representing priceless cultural treasure that properly belongs to the Filipino people as their heritage;

WHEREAS, it is perhaps impossible now to find an area in the Philippines, whether government or private property,
which has not been disturbed by commercially-minded diggers and collectors, literally destroying part of our historic past;

WHEREAS, because of this the Philippines has been charged as incapable of preserving and protecting her cultural
legacies;

WHEREAS, the commercialization of Philippine relics from the contact period, the Neolithic Age, and the Paleolithic
Age, has reached a point perilously placing beyond reach of savants the study and reconstruction of Philippine prehistory;
and

WHEREAS, it is believed that more stringent regulation on movement and a limited form of registration of important
cultural properties and of designated national cultural treasures is necessary, and that regardless of the item, any cultural
property exported or sold locally must be registered with the National Museum to control the deplorable situation
regarding our national cultural properties and to implement the Cultural Properties Law (emphasis supplied).

Clearly, the cultural properties of the nation which shall be under the protection of the state are classified as the "important
cultural properties" and the "national cultural treasures." "Important cultural properties" are cultural properties which have
been singled out from among the innumerable cultural properties as having exceptional historical cultural significance to
the Philippines but are not sufficiently outstanding to merit the classification of national cultural treasures. 19 On the other
hand, a "national cultural treasures" is a unique object found locally, possessing outstanding historical, cultural, artistic
and/or scientific value which is highly significant and important to this country and nation. 20 This Court takes note of the
certification issued by the Director of the Museum that the Italian paintings and silverware subject of this petition do not
constitute protected cultural properties and are not among those listed in the Cultural Properties Register of the National
Museum.

We agree with the certification of the Director of the Museum. Under the law, it is the Director of the Museum who is
authorized to undertake the inventory, registration, designation or classification, with the aid of competent experts, of
important cultural properties and national cultural treasures. 21 Findings of administrative officials and agencies who have
acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but at
times even finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence and are controlling on the reviewing authorities
because of their acknowledged expertise in the fields of specialization to which they are assigned. 22

In view of the foregoing, this Court finds no compelling reason to grant the petition. Petitioners have failed to show that
respondents Executive Secretary and PCGG exercised their functions with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of their
jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition for prohibition and mandamus is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Melo, Quiason,
Puno and Vitug, JJ., concur.



# Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 55-66.

2 Rollo, pp. 37-39.

3 Rollo, pp. 48-53.

4 Rollo, p. 186.

5 Ibid.

6 Cruz, Isagani A., Philippine Political Law, 1991 ed., p. 235; Dumlao v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. L-
50245, 22 January 1980, 95 SCRA 392.

7 Sustiguer v. Tamayo, G.R. No. L-29341, 21 August 1989, 176 SCRA 579.

8 House International Building Tenants Association, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-75287, 30
June 1987, 151 SCRA 703.

9 Bernas, Joaquin B., The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, 1988 Ed., p. 279.

10 Taada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. L- 63915, 24 April 1985, 136 SCRA 27; Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, G.R.
No. L- 72119, 29 May 1987, 150 SCRA 530.

11 Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phil 331 (1960).

12 Rollo, pp. 156-157.

13 G.R. No. L-72119, 29 May 1987, 150 SCRA 530.

14 Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phil 331 (1960).

15 Rollo, pp. 174-175.

16 See Note 6.

17 Manila Jockey Club, Inc. v. Montano Jr., G.R. No. L-24465, 28 February 1977, 75 SCRA 264.

18 Dumlao v. Comelec, G.R. No. L- 50245, 22 January 1980, 95 SCRA 392.

19 Sec. 2, par. b, R.A. 4846, as amended.

20 Sec. 3, par. c, R.A. 4846, as amended.

21 Id., Secs. 5-7.

22 Biak-na-Bato Mining Company v. Tanco, Jr., G.R. Nos. L-34267-68, 25 January 1991, 193 SCRA 323.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 165109 December 14, 2009

MANUEL N. MAMBA, RAYMUND P. GUZMAN and LEONIDES N. FAUSTO, Petitioners,
vs.
EDGAR R. LARA, JENERWIN C. BACUYAG, WILSON O. PUYAWAN, ALDEGUNDO Q. CAYOSA, JR.,
NORMAN A. AGATEP, ESTRELLA P. FERNANDEZ, VILMER V. VILORIA, BAYLON A. CALAGUI, CECILIA
MAEVE T. LAYOS, PREFERRED VENTURES CORP., ASSET BUILDERS CORP., RIZAL COMMERCIAL
BANKING CORPORATION, MALAYAN INSURANCE CO., and LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

The decision to entertain a taxpayers suit is discretionary upon the Court. It can choose to strictly apply the rule or take a
liberal stance depending on the controversy involved. Advocates for a strict application of the rule believe that leniency
would open floodgates to numerous suits, which could hamper the government from performing its job. Such possibility,
however, is not only remote but also negligible compared to what is at stake - "the lifeblood of the State". For this reason,
when the issue hinges on the illegal disbursement of public funds, a liberal approach should be preferred as it is more in
keeping with truth and justice.

This Petition for Review on Certiorari with prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction,
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeks to set aside the April 27, 2004 Order 1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 5, Tuguegarao City, dismissing the Petition for Annulment of Contracts and Injunction with prayer for the
issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction, 2 docketed as Civil Case No. 6283. Likewise
assailed in this Petition is the August 20, 2004 Resolution 3 of RTC, Branch 1, Tuguegarao City denying the Motion for
Reconsideration of the dismissal.

Factual Antecedents

On November 5, 2001, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cagayan passed Resolution No. 2001-272 4 authorizing
Governor Edgar R. Lara (Gov. Lara) to engage the services of and appoint Preferred Ventures Corporation as financial
advisor or consultant for the issuance and flotation of bonds to fund the priority projects of the governor without cost and
commitment.

On November 19, 2001, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, through Resolution No. 290-2001, 5 ratified the Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) 6 entered into by Gov. Lara and Preferred Ventures Corporation. The MOA provided that the
provincial government of Cagayan shall pay Preferred Ventures Corporation a one-time fee of 3% of the amount of bonds
floated.

On February 15, 2002, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan approved Resolution No. 2002-061-A 7 authorizing Gov. Lara to
negotiate, sign and execute contracts or agreements pertinent to the flotation of the bonds of the provincial government in
an amount not to exceed P500 million for the construction and improvement of priority projects to be approved by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan.

On May 20, 2002, the majority of the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cagayan approved Ordinance No. 19-
2002, 8 authorizing the bond flotation of the provincial government in an amount not to exceed P500 million to fund the
construction and development of the new Cagayan Town Center. The Resolution likewise granted authority to Gov. Lara
to negotiate, sign and execute contracts and agreements necessary and related to the bond flotation subject to the approval
and ratification by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.

On October 20, 2003, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan approved Resolution No. 350-2003 9 ratifying the Cagayan
Provincial Bond Agreements entered into by the provincial government, represented by Gov. Lara, to wit:

a. Trust Indenture with the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) Trust and Investment Division and
Malayan Insurance Company, Inc. (MICO).

b. Deed of Assignment by way of security with the RCBC and the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP).

c. Transfer and Paying Agency Agreement with the RCBC Trust and Investment Division.

d. Guarantee Agreement with the RCBC Trust and Investment Division and MICO.

e. Underwriting Agreement with RCBC Capital Corporation.

On even date, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan also approved Resolution No. 351-2003, 10 ratifying the Agreement for the
Planning, Design, Construction, and Site Development of the New Cagayan Town Center 11 entered into by the
provincial government, represented by Gov. Lara and Asset Builders Corporation, represented by its President, Mr.
Rogelio P. Centeno.

On May 20, 2003, Gov. Lara issued the Notice of Award to Asset Builders Corporation, giving to the latter the planning,
design, construction and site development of the town center project for a fee of P213,795,732.39. 12

Proceedings before the Regional Trial Court

On December 12, 2003, petitioners Manuel N. Mamba, Raymund P. Guzman and Leonides N. Fausto filed a Petition for
Annulment of Contracts and Injunction with prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction 13
against Edgar R. Lara, Jenerwin C. Bacuyag, Wilson O. Puyawan, Aldegundo Q. Cayosa, Jr., Norman A. Agatep, Estrella
P. Fernandez, Vilmer V. Viloria, Baylon A. Calagui, Cecilia Maeve T. Layos, Preferred Ventures Corporation, Asset
Builders Corporation, RCBC, MICO and LBP.1avvphi1

At the time of the filing of the petition, Manuel N. Mamba was the Representative of the 3rd Congressional District of the
province of Cagayan 14 while Raymund P. Guzman and Leonides N. Fausto were members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Cagayan. 15

Edgar R. Lara was sued in his capacity as governor of Cagayan, 16 while Jenerwin C. Bacuyag, Wilson O. Puyawan,
Aldegundo Q. Cayosa, Jr., Norman A. Agatep, Estrella P. Fernandez, Vilmer V. Viloria, Baylon A. Calagui and Cecilia
Maeve T. Layos were sued as members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cagayan. 17 Respondents Preferred Ventures
Corporation, Asset Builders Corporation, RCBC, MICO and LBP were all impleaded as indispensable or necessary
parties.

Respondent Preferred Ventures Corporation is the financial advisor of the province of Cagayan regarding the bond
flotation undertaken by the province. 18 Respondent Asset Builders Corporation was awarded the right to plan, design,
construct and develop the proposed town center. 19 Respondent RCBC, through its Trust and Investment Division, is the
trustee of the seven-year bond flotation undertaken by the province for the construction of the town center, 20 while
respondent MICO is the guarantor. 21 Lastly, respondent LBP is the official depositary bank of the province. 22

In response to the petition, public respondents filed an Answer with Motion to Dismiss, 23 raising the following defenses:
a) petitioners are not the proper parties or they lack locus standi in court; b) the action is barred by the rule on state
immunity from suit and c) the issues raised are not justiciable questions but purely political.

For its part, respondent Preferred Ventures Corporation filed a Motion to Dismiss 24 on the following grounds: a)
petitioners have no cause of action for injunction; b) failure to join an indispensable party; c) lack of personality to sue
and d) lack of locus standi. Respondent MICO likewise filed a Motion to Dismiss 25 raising the grounds of lack of cause
of action and legal standing. Respondent RCBC similarly argued in its Motion to Dismiss 26 that: a) petitioners are not
the real parties-in-interest or have no legal standing to institute the petition; b) petitioners have no cause of action as the
flotation of the bonds are within the right and power of both respondent RCBC and the province of Cagayan and c) the
viability of the construction of a town center is not a justiciable question but a political question.

Respondent Asset Builders Corporation, on the other hand, filed an Answer 27 interposing special and affirmative
defenses of lack of legal standing and cause of action. Respondent LBP also filed an Answer 28 alleging in the main that
petitioners have no cause of action against it as it is not an indispensable party or a necessary party to the case.

Two days after the filing of respondents respective memoranda on the issues raised during the hearing of the special
and/or affirmative defenses, petitioners filed a Motion to Admit Amended Petition 29 attaching thereto the amended
petition. 30 Public respondents opposed the motion for the following reasons: 1) the motion was belatedly filed; 2) the
Amended Petition is not sufficient in form and in substance; 3) the motion is patently dilatory and 4) the Amended
Petition was filed to cure the defect in the original petition. 31

Petitioners also filed a Consolidated Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss 32 followed by supplemental pleadings 33 in
support of their prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction.

On April 27, 2004, the RTC issued the assailed Order denying the Motion to Admit Amended Petition and dismissing the
petition for lack of cause of action. It ruled that:

The language of Secs. 2 & 3 of Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure dealing on the filing of an amended pleading
is quite clear. As such, the Court rules that the motion was belatedly filed. The granting of leave to file amended pleadings
is a matter peculiarly within the sound discretion of the trial court. But the rule allowing amendments to pleadings is
subject to the general but inflexible limitation that the cause of action or defense shall not be substantially changed or the
theory of the case altered to the prejudice of the other party (Avecilla vs. Yatcvo, 103 Phil. 666).

On the assumption that the controversy presents justiciable issues which this Court may take cognizance of, petitioners in
the present case who presumably presented legitimate interests in the controversy are not parties to the questioned
contract. Contracts produce effect as between the parties who execute them. Only a party to the contract can maintain an
action to enforce the obligations arising under said contract (Young vs. CA, 169 SCRA 213). Since a contract is binding
only upon the parties thereto, a third person cannot ask for its rescission if it is in fraud of his rights. One who is not a
party to a contract has no rights under such contract and even if the contrary may be voidable, its nullity can be asserted
only by one who is a party thereto; a third person would have absolutely no personality to ask for the annulment (Wolfson
vs. Estate of Martinez, 20 Phil. 340; Ibaez vs. Hongkong & Shanghai Bank, 22 Phil. 572; Ayson vs. CA, G.R. Nos. L-
6501 & 6599, May 21, 1955).

It was, however, held that a person who is not a party obliged principally or subsidiarily in a contract may exercise an
action for nullity of the contract if he is prejudiced in his rights with respect to one of the contracting parties and can show
the detriment which would positively result to him from the contract in which he had no intervention (Baez vs. CA, 59
SCRA 15; Anyong Hsan vs. CA, 59 SCRA 110, 112-113; Leodovica vs. CA, 65 SCRA 154-155). In the case at bar,
petitioners failed to show that they were prejudiced in their rights [or that a] detriment x x x would positively result to
them. Hence, they lack locus standi in court.

x x x x

To the mind of the Court, procedural matters in the present controversy may be dispensed with, stressing that the instant
case is a political question, a question which the court cannot, in any manner, take judicial cognizance. Courts will not
interfere with purely political questions because of the principle of separation of powers (Taada vs. Cuenco, 103 Phil.
1051). Political questions are those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or [to the]
executive branch of the government (Nuclear Free Phils. Coalition vs. NPC, 141 SCRA 307 (1986); Torres vs. Gonzales,
152 SCRA 272; Citizens Alliance for Consumer Protection vs. Energy Regulatory Board, G.R. No. 78888-90, June 23,
1988).

The citation made by the provincial government[, to] which this Court is inclined to agree, is that the matter falls under
the discretion of another department, hence the decision reached is in the category of a political question and consequently
may not be the subject of judicial jurisdiction (Cruz in Political Law, 1998 Ed., page 81) is correct.

It is [a] well-recognized principle that purely administrative and discretionary functions may not be interfered with by the
courts (Adm. Law Test & Cases, 2001 Ed., De Leon, De Leon, Jr.).

The case therefore calls for the doctrine of ripeness for judicial review. This determines the point at which courts may
review administrative action. The basic principle of ripeness is that the judicial machinery should be conserved for
problems which are real and present or imminent and should not be squandered on problems which are future, imaginary
or remote. This case is not ripe for judicial determination since there is no imminently x x x substantial injury to the
petitioners.

In other words, the putting up of the New Cagayan Town Center by the province over the land fully owned by it and the
concomitant contracts entered into by the same is within the bounds of its corporate power, an undertaking which falls
within the ambit of its discretion and therefore a purely political issue which is beyond the province of the court x x x.
[Consequently, the court cannot,] in any manner, take judicial cognizance over it. The act of the provincial government
was in pursuance of the mandate of the Local Government Code of 1991.

x x x x

Indeed, adjudication of the procedural issues presented for resolution by the present action would be a futile exercise in
exegesis.

What defeats the plea of the petitioners for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is the fact that their averments
are merely speculative and founded on conjectures. An injunction is not intended to protect contingent or future rights nor
is it a remedy to enforce an abstract right (Cerebo vs. Dictado, 160 SCRA 759; Ulang vs. CA, 225 SCRA 637). An
injunction, whether preliminary or final, will not issue to protect a right not in in esse and which may never arise, or to
restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of action. The complainants right on title, moreover, must be clear and
unquestioned [since] equity, as a rule, will not take cognizance of suits to establish title and will not lend its preventive aid
by injunction where the complainants title or right is doubtful or disputed. The possibility of irreparable damage, without
proof of violation of an actual existing right, is no ground for injunction being a mere damnum, absque injuria (Talisay-
Silay Milling Company, Inc. vs. CFI of Negros Occidental, et. al. 42 SCRA 577, 582).

x x x x

For lack of cause of action, the case should be dismissed.

The facts and allegations [necessarily] suggest also that this court may dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction.

The rule has to be so because it can motu propio dismiss it as its only jurisdiction is to dismiss it if it has no jurisdiction.
This is in line with the ruling in Andaya vs. Abadia, 46 SCAD 1036, G.R. No. 104033, Dec. 27, 1993 where the court
may dismiss a complaint even without a motion to dismiss or answer.

Upon the foregoing considerations, the case is hereby dismissed without costs.

SO ORDERED. 34

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration 35 to which respondents filed their respective Oppositions. 36 Petitioners
then filed a Motion to Inhibit, which the court granted. Accordingly, the case was re-raffled to Branch 1 of the RTC of
Tuguegarao City. 37

On August 20, 2004, Branch 1 of the RTC of Tuguegarao City issued a Resolution denying petitioners plea for
reconsideration. The court found the motion to be a mere scrap of paper as the notice of hearing was addressed only to the
Clerk of Court in violation of Section 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. As to the merits, the court sustained the findings of
Branch 5 that petitioners lack legal standing to sue and that the issue involved is political.

Issues

Hence, the present recourse where petitioners argue that:

A. The lower court decided a question of substance in a way not in accord with law and with the applicable decision of the
Supreme Court, and

B. The lower court has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to call for an exercise
of the power of supervision in that:

I. It denied locus standi to petitioners;

II. [It] determined that the matter of contract entered into by the provincial government is in the nature of a political
question;

III. [It] denied the admission of Amended Petition; and

IV. [It] found a defect of substance in the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. 38

Our Ruling

The petition is partially meritorious.

Petitioners have legal standing to sue as taxpayers

A taxpayer is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed, or that the public money is
being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law. 39 A person suing as a taxpayer, however, must show that the act complained of directly involves
the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. 40 He must also prove that he has sufficient interest in
preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he will sustain a direct injury because of the
enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. 41 In other words, for a taxpayers suit to prosper, two requisites must
be met: (1) public funds derived from taxation are disbursed by a political subdivision or instrumentality and in doing so,
a law is violated or some irregularity is committed and (2) the petitioner is directly affected by the alleged act. 42

In light of the foregoing, it is apparent that contrary to the view of the RTC,

a taxpayer need not be a party to the contract to challenge its validity. 43 As long as taxes are involved, people have a
right to question contracts entered into by the government.

In this case, although the construction of the town center would be primarily sourced from the proceeds of the bonds,
which respondents insist are not taxpayers money, a government support in the amount of P187 million would still be
spent for paying the interest of the bonds. 44 In fact, a Deed of Assignment 45 was executed by the governor in favor of
respondent RCBC over the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) and other revenues of the provincial government as
payment and/or security for the obligations of the provincial government under the Trust Indenture Agreement dated
September 17, 2003. Records also show that on March 4, 2004, the governor requested the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to
appropriate an amount of P25 million for the interest of the bond. 46 Clearly, the first requisite has been met.

As to the second requisite, the court, in recent cases, has relaxed the stringent "direct injury test" bearing in mind that
locus standi is a procedural technicality. 47 By invoking "transcendental importance", "paramount public interest", or "far-
reaching implications", ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to sue even if they failed to show direct injury. 48 In
cases where serious legal issues were raised or where public expenditures of millions of pesos were involved, the court
did not hesitate to give standing to taxpayers. 49

We find no reason to deviate from the jurisprudential trend.

To begin with, the amount involved in this case is substantial. Under the various agreements entered into by the governor,
which were ratified by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, the provincial government of Cagayan would incur the following
costs: 50

Compensation to Preferred Ventures - P 6,150,000.00
(3% of P205M) 51 Resolution No. 290-2001
Management and Underwriting Fees - 3,075,000.00
(1.5% of P205M) 52
Documentary Tax - 1,537,500.00
(0.75% of P205M) 53
Guarantee Fee 54 - 7,350,000.00
Construction and Design of town center 55 - 213,795,732.39
Total Cost - P231,908,232.39
What is more, the provincial government would be shelling out a total amount of P187 million for the period of seven
years by way of subsidy for the interest of the bonds. Without a doubt, the resolution of the present petition is of
paramount importance to the people of Cagayan who at the end of the day would bear the brunt of these agreements.

Another point to consider is that local government units now possess more powers, authority and resources at their
disposal, 56 which in the hands of unscrupulous officials may be abused and misused to the detriment of the public. To
protect the interest of the people and to prevent taxes from being squandered or wasted under the guise of government
projects, a liberal approach must therefore be adopted in determining locus standi in public suits.

In view of the foregoing, we are convinced that petitioners have sufficient standing to file the present suit. Accordingly,
they should be given the opportunity to present their case before the RTC.

Having resolved the core issue, we shall now proceed to the remaining issues.

The controversy involved is justiciable

A political question is a question of policy, which is to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity or by the
legislative or the executive branch of the government to which full discretionary authority has been delegated. 57

In filing the instant case before the RTC, petitioners seek to restrain public respondents from implementing the bond
flotation and to declare null and void all contracts related to the bond flotation and construction of the town center. In the
petition before the RTC, they alleged grave abuse of discretion and clear violations of law by public respondents. They
put in issue the overpriced construction of the town center; the grossly disadvantageous bond flotation; the irrevocable
assignment of the provincial governments annual regular income, including the IRA, to respondent RCBC to cover and
secure the payment of the bonds floated; and the lack of consultation and discussion with the community regarding the
proposed project, as well as a proper and legitimate bidding for the construction of the town center.

Obviously, the issues raised in the petition do not refer to the wisdom but to the legality of the acts complained of. Thus,
we find the instant controversy within the ambit of judicial review. Besides, even if the issues were political in nature, it
would still come within our powers of review under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us by Section 1, Article
VIII of the Constitution, which includes the authority to determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess
or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or instrumentality of the government. 58

The Motion to Admit Amended Petition was properly denied

However, as to the denial of petitioners Motion to Admit Amended Petition, we find no reason to reverse the same. The
inclusion of the province of Cagayan as a petitioner would not only change the theory of the case but would also result in
an absurd situation. The provincial government, if included as a petitioner, would in effect be suing itself considering that
public respondents are being sued in their official capacity.

In any case, there is no need to amend the petition because petitioners, as we have said, have legal standing to sue as
taxpayers.

Section 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court was substantially complied with

This brings us to the fourth and final issue.

A perusal of the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners would show that the notice of hearing was addressed only
to the Clerk of Court in violation of Section 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, which requires the notice of hearing to be
addressed to all parties concerned. This defect, however, did not make the motion a mere scrap of paper. The rule is not a
ritual to be followed blindly. 59 The purpose of a notice of hearing is simply to afford the adverse parties a chance to be
heard before a motion is resolved by the court. 60 In this case, respondents were furnished copies of the motion, and
consequently, notified of the scheduled hearing. Counsel for public respondents in fact moved for the postponement of the
hearing, which the court granted. 61 Moreover, respondents were afforded procedural due process as they were given
sufficient time to file their respective comments or oppositions to the motion. From the foregoing, it is clear that the rule
requiring notice to all parties was substantially complied with. 62 In effect, the defect in the Motion for Reconsideration
was cured.

We cannot overemphasize that procedural rules are mere tools to aid the courts in the speedy, just and inexpensive
resolution of cases. 63 Procedural defects or lapses, if negligible, should be excused in the higher interest of justice as
technicalities should not override the merits of the case. Dismissal of cases due to technicalities should also be avoided to
afford the parties the opportunity to present their case. Courts must be reminded that the swift unclogging of the dockets
although a laudable objective must not be done at the expense of substantial justice. 64

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The April 27, 2004 Order of Branch 5 and the August
20, 2004 Resolution of Branch 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao City are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE
insofar as the dismissal of the petition is concerned. Accordingly, the case is hereby REMANDED to the court a quo for
further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO*
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES**
Associate Justice TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO***
Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

A T T E S T A T I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons attestation, it is hereby certified
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice


Footnotes

* Per Special Order No. 775 dated November 3, 2009.

** In lieu of Justice Arturo D. Brion who is on leave per Special Order No. 807 dated December 7, 2009.

*** Additional member per Special Order No. 776 dated November 3, 2009.

1 Rollo, pp. 221-230; penned by Judge Elmo M. Alameda.

2 Id. at 36-54.

3 Id. at 256 -258; penned by Judge Jimmy H. F. Luczon, Jr.

4 Id. at 55-56.

5 Id. at 57-59.

6 Id. at 60-63.

7 Id. at 64-65.

8 Id. at 66-68.

9 Id. at 69-70.

10 Id. at 71-72.

11 Id. at 78-90.

12 Id. at 440.

13 Id. at 36-54.

14 Id. at 36.

15 Id. at 36-37.

16 Id. at 37.

17 Id.

18 Id. at 437.

19 Id.

20 Id.

21 Id.

22 Id.

23 Id. at 126-141.

24 Id. at 142-150.

25 Id. at 179-189.

26 Id. at 163-171.

27 Id. at 151-162.

28 Id. at 172-178.

29 Id. at 98-100.

30 Id. at 101-118.

31 Id. at 119-125.

32 Id. at 190-204.

33 Id. at 205-215 and 216-220.

34 Id. at 224-230.

35 Id. at 231-241.

36 Id. at 242-246 and 247-254.

37 Id. at 718.

38 Id. at 15.

39 Constantino, Jr. v. Cuisia, G.R. No. 106064, October 13, 2005, 472 SCRA 505, 518-519.

40 Bayan (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora, 396 Phil. 623, 647 (2000).

41 Bugnay Construction and Development Corporation v. Judge Laron, 257 Phil. 245, 256 (1989).

42 Bagatsing v. San Juan, 329 Phil. 8, 13 (1996).

43 Abaya v. Ebdane, Jr., G.R. No. 167919, February 14, 2007, 515 SCRA 720, 758.

44 Rollo, p. 129; Answer with Motion to Dismiss of public respondents.

45 Id. at 93-95.

46 Id. at 215.

47 Garcillano v. House of Representatives Committees on Public Information, Public Order and Safety, National Defense
and Security, Information and Communications Technology, and Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, G.R. Nos. 1708338 &
179275, December 23, 2008, 575 SCRA 170, 185.

48 David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. Nos. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483, 171400, 171489 & 171424, May 3, 2006,
489 SCRA 160.

49 See Constantino, Jr. v. Cuisia, supra at note 39; Abaya v. Ebdane, Jr., supra at note 43; Province of North Cotabato v.
Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain (GRP), G.R. Nos. 183591, 183752,
183893, 183951 & 183962, October 14, 2008, 568 SCRA 402; Garcillano v. House of Representatives Committees on
Public Information, Public Order and Safety, National Defense and Security, Information and Communications
Technology, and Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, supra at note 47.

50 See Rollo, p. 11.

51 Id. at 58; Resolution No. 290-2001.

52 Id. at 73; Underwriting Agreement, paragraph 7.1.

53 Id. at 74; Underwriting Agreement, paragraph 7.3.

54 Id. at 77; Guarantee Agreement, paragraph 3.1.

55 Id. at 83; Agreement for the Planning, Design, Construction and Site Development of the New Cagayan Town Center,
paragraph 7.1.

56 Republic Act No. 7160, Section 2, otherwise known as the "Local Government Code of 1991".

57 Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. Nos. 78742, 79310,
79744 & 79777, July 14, 1989, 175 SCRA 343, 377.

58 Daza v. Singson, G.R. No. 86344, December 21, 1989, 180 SCRA 496, 507.

59 KKK Foundation, Inc. v. Calderon-Bargas, G.R. No. 163785, December 27, 2007, 541 SCRA 432, 441.

60 Vlason Enterprises Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 369 Phil. 269, 299 (1999).

61 Rollo, p. 255.

62 See Philippine National Bank v. Paneda, G.R. No. 149236, February 14, 2007, 515 SCRA 639, 652.

63 Incon Industrial Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 161871, July 24, 2007, 528 SCRA 139, 144.

64 Tacloban II Neighborhood Association, Inc. v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 168561, September 26, 2008, 566
SCRA 493, 510.
EN BANC


ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., G.R. No. 166501
Petitioner,
Present:

PANGANIBAN, C.J.,
PUNO,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- versus - CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA, and
VELASCO, JJ.
HON. BAYANI F. FERNANDO,
in his capacity as Chairman of the
Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority, and METROPOLITAN
MANILA DEVELOPMENT Promulgated:
AUTHORITY,
Respondents. November 16, 2006
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x


R E S O L U T I O N


CARPIO, J.:

Petitioner Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. (petitioner), as member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and taxpayer,
filed this original action for the issuance of the writs of Prohibition and Mandamus. Petitioner prays for the Prohibition
writ to enjoin respondents Bayani F. Fernando, Chairman of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA)
and the MMDA (respondents) from further implementing its wet flag scheme (Flag Scheme).[1] The Mandamus
writ is to compel respondents to respect and uphold the x x x rights of pedestrians to due process x x x and equal
protection of the laws x x x.

Petitioner contends that the Flag Scheme: (1) has no legal basis because the MMDAs governing body, the Metro Manila
Council, did not authorize it; (2) violates the Due Process Clause because it is a summary punishment for jaywalking; (3)
disregards the Constitutional protection against cruel, degrading, and inhuman punishment; and (4) violates pedestrian
rights as it exposes pedestrians to various potential hazards.[2]
In their Comment, respondents sought the dismissal of the petition for petitioners lack of standing to litigate and
for violation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Alternatively, respondents contended that the Flag Scheme is a valid
preventive measure against jaywalking.

Petitioner filed a Reply, claiming that the Court should take cognizance of the case as it raises issues of paramount
and transcendental importance. Petitioner also contended that he filed this petition directly with the Court because the
issues raised in the petition deserve the direct x x x intervention of the x x x [C]ourt x x x.

We dismiss the petition.

A citizen can raise a constitutional question only when (1) he can show that he has personally suffered some actual
or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action; and (3) a favorable action will likely redress the injury.[3] On the other hand, a party suing as a
taxpayer must specifically show that he has a sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by
taxation and that he will sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute.[4] Petitioner meets
none of the requirements under either category.

Nor is there merit to petitioners claim that the Court should relax the standing requirement because of the
transcendental importance of the issues the petition raises. As an exception to the standing requirement, the
transcendental importance of the issues raised relates to the merits of the petition.[5] Thus, the party invoking it must
show, among others, the presence of a clear disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition.[6] Petitioner has not
shown such clear constitutional or statutory violation.

On the Flag Schemes alleged lack of legal basis, we note that all the cities and municipalities within the MMDAs
jurisdiction,[7] except Valenzuela City, have each enacted anti-jaywalking ordinances or traffic management codes with
provisions for pedestrian regulation. Such fact serves as sufficient basis for respondents implementation of schemes, or
ways and means, to enforce the anti-jaywalking ordinances and similar regulations. After all, the MMDA is an
administrative agency tasked with the implementation of rules and regulations enacted by proper authorities.[8] The
absence of an anti-jaywalking ordinance in Valenzuela City does not detract from this conclusion absent any proof that
respondents implemented the Flag Scheme in that city.

Further, the petition ultimately calls for a factual determination of whether the Flag Scheme is a reasonable
enforcement of anti-jaywalking ordinances and similar enactments. This Court is not a trier of facts.[9] The petition
proffers mere surmises and speculations on the potential hazards of the Flag Scheme. This Court cannot determine the
reasonableness of the Flag Scheme based on mere surmises and speculations.

Lastly, petitioner violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts when he filed this petition directly with us. This
Courts jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus, while
concurrent with the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals, does not give litigants unrestrained freedom of choice
of forum from which to seek such relief.[10] We relax this rule only in exceptional and compelling
circumstances.[11] This is not the case here.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition.

SO ORDERED.



ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:


ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice




REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice




LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice



CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice









ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice


RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice






CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice




ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice




ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice


DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice




MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice




PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice


CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.



ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

[1] As first implemented on 17 January 2005, respondents describe the Flag Scheme as follows: [F]ifteen mobile
units bearing wet white flags, measuring seven (7) by five (5) feet with the words MAGLAKAD AT MAG-ABANG SA
BANGKETA, were deployed along major Metro Manila thoroughfares. Specifically, the wet flags are hung on the right
side of the MMDA mobile units, perpendicular to the sidewalks and in full view of pedestrians and commuters awaiting
for a ride, which move slowly along the street. (Rollo, pp. 74-75)
[2] Petitioner listed the following as the hazards likely to result from the Flag Schemes implementation (rollo,
pp. 34-35):
a) Pedestrians walking ahead of a [sic] MMDA moving vehicle with their backs towards the latter are
likely to be hit by the wet flag even before they will come to know that the wet flag is behind them;
b) The scheme is likely to cause accident and injuries in case of a sudden scampering of pedestrians
to avoid getting hit by the wet flag;
c) Employees going to work are likely to miss a days work or be late for work because either they
have to change clothes or wait for the clothes they are wearing to dry;
d) Students going to school are likely to miss school or be late for school because either they have to
change clothes or wait for their wet clothes to dry;
e) Women are subjected to indignities because if drenched, sensitive parts of their bodies may be
exposed, or they might end up using just any place wherein to change clothes or to dry their clothes;
f) As a matter of fact, anyone hit by the wet flag or wet [sic] or drenched with water is likely to get sick if he or
she does not change clothes;
g) Employees coming back from strenuous work are likely to have health problems if hit by the wet flag or wet
or drenched with water;
h) Old men and women and children are most likely to be hit and drenched by the wet flag because they do not
have the speed and agility to avoid the wet flag on board a moving MMDA vehicle;
i) As observed, the manner of throwing water into the wet flag is so crude and primitive that other pedestrians
and bystanders on the sidewalk are likely to get wet by spilled water as water is being thrown by a [sic] MMDA personnel
into the wet flag; and,
j) Likewise, as observed, the wet flag itself is already so dirty after just a day or two of use that using it to wet
or drench pedestrians is so unsanitary and exposes pedestrians to possible health problems.
[3] Telecommunications & Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. v. COMELEC, 352 Phil. 153 (1998).
[4] Id.
[5] Id.
[6] Senate of the Philippines v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, 20 April 2006.
[7] MMDA has jurisdiction over the cities of Caloocan, Las Pias, Makati, Malabon, Mandaluyong, Manila,
Marikina, Muntinlupa, Paraaque, Pasay, Pasig, Quezon, San Juan, Taguig, and Valenzuela and the municipalities of
Navotas and Pateros.
[8] Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village Association, 385 Phil. 586 (2000);
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Garin, G.R. No. 130230, 15 April 2005, 456 SCRA 176.
[9] Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, 433 Phil. 506 (2002).
[10] People v. Cuaresma, G.R. No. 67787, 18 April 1989, 172 SCRA 415.
[11] Santiago v. Vasquez, G.R. Nos. 99289-90, 27 January 1993, 217 SCRA 633.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 202242 April 16, 2013

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDICIALAND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR.,
Respondents.

R E S O L U T I O N

MENDOZA, J.:

This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration1 filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) on behalf of the
respondents, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents), duly opposed2 by
the petitioner, former Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez (petitioner).

By way of recapitulation, the present action stemmed from the unexpected departure of former Chief Justice Renato C.
Corona on May 29, 2012, and the nomination of petitioner, as his potential successor. In his initiatory pleading, petitioner
asked the Court to determine 1] whether the first paragraph of Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution allows
more than one (1) member of Congress to sit in the JBC; and 2] if the practice of having two (2) representatives from each
House of Congress with one (1) vote each is sanctioned by the Constitution.

On July 17, 2012, the Court handed down the assailed subject decision, disposing the same in the following manner:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current numerical composition of the Judicial and Bar Council is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and Bar Council is hereby enjoined to reconstitute itself so that only one (1)
member of Congress will sit as a representative in its proceedings, in accordance with Section 8(1), Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution.

This disposition is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

On July 31, 2012, following respondents motion for reconsideration and with due regard to Senate Resolution Nos. 111,3
112,4 113,5 and 114,6 the Court set the subject motion for oral arguments on August 2, 2012.7 On August 3, 2012, the
Court discussed the merits of the arguments and agreed, in the meantime, to suspend the effects of the second paragraph
of the dispositive portion of the July 17, 2012 Decision which decreed that it was immediately executory. The decretal
portion of the August 3, 2012 Resolution8 reads:

WHEREFORE, the parties are hereby directed to submit their respective MEMORANDA within ten (10) days from
notice. Until further orders, the Court hereby SUSPENDS the effect of the second paragraph of the dispositive portion of
the Courts July 17, 2012 Decision, which reads: "This disposition is immediately executory."9

Pursuant to the same resolution, petitioner and respondents filed their respective memoranda.10

Brief Statement of the Antecedents

In this disposition, it bears reiterating that from the birth of the Philippine Republic, the exercise of appointing members
of the Judiciary has always been the exclusive prerogative of the executive and legislative branches of the government.
Like their progenitor of American origins, both the Malolos Constitution11 and the 1935 Constitution12 vested the power
to appoint the members of the Judiciary in the President, subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. It
was during these times that the country became witness to the deplorable practice of aspirants seeking confirmation of
their appointment in the Judiciary to ingratiate themselves with the members of the legislative body.13

Then, under the 1973 Constitution,14 with the fusion of the executive and legislative powers in one body, the appointment
of judges and justices ceased to be subject of scrutiny by another body. The power became exclusive and absolute to the
Executive, subject only to the condition that the appointees must have all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications.

Prompted by the clamor to rid the process of appointments to the Judiciary of the evils of political pressure and partisan
activities,15 the members of the Constitutional Commission saw it wise to create a separate, competent and independent
body to recommend nominees to the President.

Thus, it conceived of a body, representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial appointment process, and called it the
Judicial and Bar Council (JBC). The Framers carefully worded Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution in this
wise:

Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the
Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members,
a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of
the private sector.

From the moment of the creation of the JBC, Congress designated one (1) representative to sit in the JBC to act as one of
the ex-officio members.16 Pursuant to the constitutional provision that Congress is entitled to one (1) representative, each
House sent a representative to the JBC, not together, but alternately or by rotation.

In 1994, the seven-member composition of the JBC was substantially altered.1wphi1 An eighth member was added to
the JBC as the two (2) representatives from Congress began sitting simultaneously in the JBC, with each having one-half
(1/2) of a vote.17

In 2001, the JBC En Banc decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full
vote each.18 It has been the situation since then.

Grounds relied upon by Respondents

Through the subject motion, respondents pray that the Court reconsider its decision and dismiss the petition on the
following grounds: 1] that allowing only one representative from Congress in the JBC would lead to absurdity considering
its bicameral nature; 2] that the failure of the Framers to make the proper adjustment when there was a shift from
unilateralism to bicameralism was a plain oversight; 3] that two representatives from Congress would not subvert the
intention of the Framers to insulate the JBC from political partisanship; and 4] that the rationale of the Court in declaring a
seven-member composition would provide a solution should there be a stalemate is not exactly correct.

While the Court may find some sense in the reasoning in amplification of the third and fourth grounds listed by
respondents, still, it finds itself unable to reverse the assailed decision on the principal issues covered by the first and
second grounds for lack of merit. Significantly, the conclusion arrived at, with respect to the first and second grounds,
carries greater bearing in the final resolution of this case.

As these two issues are interrelated, the Court shall discuss them jointly.

Ruling of the Court

The Constitution evinces the direct action of the Filipino people by which the fundamental powers of government are
established, limited and defined and by which those powers are distributed among the several departments for their safe
and useful exercise for the benefit of the body politic.19 The Framers reposed their wisdom and vision on one suprema lex
to be the ultimate expression of the principles and the framework upon which government and society were to operate.
Thus, in the interpretation of the constitutional provisions, the Court firmly relies on the basic postulate that the Framers
mean what they say. The language used in the Constitution must be taken to have been deliberately chosen for a definite
purpose. Every word employed in the Constitution must be interpreted to exude its deliberate intent which must be
maintained inviolate against disobedience and defiance. What the Constitution clearly says, according to its text, compels
acceptance and bars modification even by the branch tasked to interpret it.

For this reason, the Court cannot accede to the argument of plain oversight in order to justify constitutional construction.
As stated in the July 17, 2012 Decision, in opting to use the singular letter "a" to describe "representative of Congress,"
the Filipino people through the Framers intended that Congress be entitled to only one (1) seat in the JBC. Had the
intention been otherwise, the Constitution could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided, as can be read in its other
provisions.

A reading of the 1987 Constitution would reveal that several provisions were indeed adjusted as to be in tune with the
shift to bicameralism. One example is Section 4, Article VII, which provides that a tie in the presidential election shall be
broken "by a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately."20 Another is Section 8
thereof which requires the nominee to replace the Vice-President to be confirmed "by a majority of all the Members of
both Houses of the Congress, voting separately."21 Similarly, under Section 18, the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may be revoked or continued by the Congress, voting separately,
by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members."22 In all these provisions, the bicameral nature of Congress was
recognized and, clearly, the corresponding adjustments were made as to how a matter would be handled and voted upon
by its two Houses.

Thus, to say that the Framers simply failed to adjust Section 8, Article VIII, by sheer inadvertence, to their decision to
shift to a bicameral form of the legislature, is not persuasive enough. Respondents cannot just lean on plain oversight to
justify a conclusion favorable to them. It is very clear that the Framers were not keen on adjusting the provision on
congressional representation in the JBC because it was not in the exercise of its primary function to legislate. JBC was
created to support the executive power to appoint, and Congress, as one whole body, was merely assigned a contributory
non-legislative function.

The underlying reason for such a limited participation can easily be discerned. Congress has two (2) Houses. The need to
recognize the existence and the role of each House is essential considering that the Constitution employs precise language
in laying down the functions which particular House plays, regardless of whether the two Houses consummate an official
act by voting jointly or separately. Whether in the exercise of its legislative23 or its non-legislative functions such as inter
alia, the power of appropriation,24 the declaration of an existence of a state of war,25 canvassing of electoral returns for
the President and Vice-President,26 and impeachment,27 the dichotomy of each House must be acknowledged and
recognized considering the interplay between these two Houses. In all these instances, each House is constitutionally
granted with powers and functions peculiar to its nature and with keen consideration to 1) its relationship with the other
chamber; and 2) in consonance with the principle of checks and balances, as to the other branches of government.

In checkered contrast, there is essentially no interaction between the two Houses in their participation in the JBC. No
mechanism is required between the Senate and the House of Representatives in the screening and nomination of judicial
officers. Rather, in the creation of the JBC, the Framers arrived at a unique system by adding to the four (4) regular
members, three (3) representatives from the major branches of government - the Chief Justice as ex-officio Chairman
(representing the Judicial Department), the Secretary of Justice (representing the Executive Department), and a
representative of the Congress (representing the Legislative Department). The total is seven (7), not eight. In so providing,
the Framers simply gave recognition to the Legislature, not because it was in the interest of a certain constituency, but in
reverence to it as a major branch of government.

On this score, a Member of Congress, Hon. Simeon A. Datumanong, from the Second District of Maguindanao, submitted
his well-considered position28 to then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno:

I humbly reiterate my position that there should be only one representative of Congress in the JBC in accordance with
Article VIII, Section 8 (1) of the 1987 Constitution x x x.

The aforesaid provision is clear and unambiguous and does not need any further interpretation. Perhaps, it is apt to
mention that the oft-repeated doctrine that "construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that
application is impossible or inadequate without them."

Further, to allow Congress to have two representatives in the Council, with one vote each, is to negate the principle of
equality among the three branches of government which is enshrined in the Constitution.

In view of the foregoing, I vote for the proposition that the Council should adopt the rule of single representation of
Congress in the JBC in order to respect and give the right meaning to the above-quoted provision of the Constitution.
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)

On March 14, 2007, then Associate Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing, also a JBC Consultant, submitted to the Chief
Justice and ex-officio JBC Chairman his opinion,29 which reads:

8. Two things can be gleaned from the excerpts and citations above: the creation of the JBC is intended to curtail the
influence of politics in Congress in the appointment of judges, and the understanding is that seven (7) persons will
compose the JBC. As such, the interpretation of two votes for Congress runs counter to the intendment of the framers.
Such interpretation actually gives Congress more influence in the appointment of judges. Also, two votes for Congress
would increase the number of JBC members to eight, which could lead to voting deadlock by reason of even-numbered
membership, and a clear violation of 7 enumerated members in the Constitution. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

In an undated position paper,30 then Secretary of Justice Agnes VST Devanadera opined:

As can be gleaned from the above constitutional provision, the JBC is composed of seven (7) representatives coming from
different sectors. From the enumeration it is patent that each category of members pertained to a single individual only.
Thus, while we do not lose sight of the bicameral nature of our legislative department, it is beyond dispute that Art. VIII,
Section 8 (1) of the 1987 Constitution is explicit and specific that "Congress" shall have only "xxx a representative."
Thus, two (2) representatives from Congress would increase the number of JBC members to eight (8), a number beyond
what the Constitution has contemplated. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

In this regard, the scholarly dissection on the matter by retired Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, a former JBC
consultant, is worth reiterating.31 Thus:

A perusal of the records of the Constitutional Commission reveals that the composition of the JBC reflects the
Commissions desire "to have in the Council a representation for the major elements of the community." xxx The ex-
officio members of the Council consist of representatives from the three main branches of government while the regular
members are composed of various stakeholders in the judiciary. The unmistakeable tenor of Article VIII, Section 8(1) was
to treat each ex-officio member as representing one co-equal branch of government. xxx Thus, the JBC was designed to
have seven voting members with the three ex-officio members having equal say in the choice of judicial nominees.

x x x

No parallelism can be drawn between the representative of Congress in the JBC and the exercise by Congress of its
legislative powers under Article VI and constituent powers under Article XVII of the Constitution. Congress, in relation to
the executive and judicial branches of government, is constitutionally treated as another co-equal branch in the matter of
its representative in the JBC. On the other hand, the exercise of legislative and constituent powers requires the Senate and
the House of Representatives to coordinate and act as distinct bodies in furtherance of Congress role under our
constitutional scheme. While the latter justifies and, in fact, necessitates the separateness of the two Houses of Congress
as they relate inter se, no such dichotomy need be made when Congress interacts with the other two co-equal branches of
government.

It is more in keeping with the co-equal nature of the three governmental branches to assign the same weight to
considerations that any of its representatives may have regarding aspiring nominees to the judiciary. The representatives
of the Senate and the House of Representatives act as such for one branch and should not have any more quantitative
influence as the other branches in the exercise of prerogatives evenly bestowed upon the three. Sound reason and principle
of equality among the three branches support this conclusion. [Emphases and underscoring supplied]

The argument that a senator cannot represent a member of the House of Representatives in the JBC and vice-versa is,
thus, misplaced. In the JBC, any member of Congress, whether from the Senate or the House of Representatives, is
constitutionally empowered to represent the entire Congress. It may be a constricted constitutional authority, but it is not
an absurdity.

From this score stems the conclusion that the lone representative of Congress is entitled to one full vote. This
pronouncement effectively disallows the scheme of splitting the said vote into half (1/2), between two representatives of
Congress. Not only can this unsanctioned practice cause disorder in the voting process, it is clearly against the essence of
what the Constitution authorized. After all, basic and reasonable is the rule that what cannot be legally done directly
cannot be done indirectly. To permit or tolerate the splitting of one vote into two or more is clearly a constitutional
circumvention that cannot be countenanced by the Court. Succinctly put, when the Constitution envisioned one member
of Congress sitting in the JBC, it is sensible to presume that this representation carries with him one full vote.

It is also an error for respondents to argue that the President, in effect, has more influence over the JBC simply because all
of the regular members of the JBC are his appointees. The principle of checks and balances is still safeguarded because
the appointment of all the regular members of the JBC is subject to a stringent process of confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments, which is composed of members of Congress.

Respondents contention that the current irregular composition of the JBC should be accepted, simply because it was only
questioned for the first time through the present action, deserves scant consideration. Well-settled is the rule that acts done
in violation of the Constitution no matter how frequent, usual or notorious cannot develop or gain acceptance under the
doctrine of estoppel or laches, because once an act is considered as an infringement of the Constitution it is void from the
very beginning and cannot be the source of any power or authority.

It would not be amiss to point out, however, that as a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights;
it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all. This
rule, however, is not absolute. Under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the declaration of
unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified. This is essential in the interest of fair play. To reiterate
the doctrine enunciated in Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation:32

The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair play. It
nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of
unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot
always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will
impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when a
declaration of unconstitutionality would put the accused in double jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts done by a
municipality in reliance upon a law creating it.33

Under the circumstances, the Court finds the exception applicable in this case and holds that notwithstanding its finding of
unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its prior official actions are nonetheless valid.

Considering that the Court is duty bound to protect the Constitution which was ratified by the direct action of the Filipino
people, it cannot correct what respondents perceive as a mistake in its mandate. Neither can the Court, in the exercise of
its power to interpret the spirit of the Constitution, read into the law something that is contrary to its express provisions
and justify the same as correcting a perceived inadvertence. To do so would otherwise sanction the Court action of
making amendment to the Constitution through a judicial pronouncement.

In other words, the Court cannot supply the legislative omission. According to the rule of casus omissus "a case omitted is
to be held as intentionally omitted."34 "The principle proceeds from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object
or thing has been omitted from a legislative enumeration."35 Pursuant to this, "the Court cannot under its power of
interpretation supply the omission even though the omission may have resulted from inadvertence or because the case in
question was not foreseen or contemplated."36 "The Court cannot supply what it thinks the legislature would have
supplied had its attention been called to the omission, as that would be judicial legislation."37

Stated differently, the Court has no power to add another member by judicial construction.

The call for judicial activism fails to stir the sensibilities of the Court tasked to guard the Constitution against usurpation.
The Court remains steadfast in confining its powers in the sphere granted by the Constitution itself. Judicial activism
should never be allowed to become judicial exuberance.38 In cases like this, no amount of practical logic or convenience
can convince the Court to perform either an excision or an insertion that will change the manifest intent of the Framers.
To broaden the scope of congressional representation in the JBC is tantamount to the inclusion of a subject matter which
was not included in the provision as enacted. True to its constitutional mandate, the Court cannot craft and tailor
constitutional provisions in order to accommodate all of situations no matter how ideal or reasonable the proposed
solution may sound. To the exercise of this intrusion, the Court declines.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondents is hereby DENIED.

The suspension of the effects of the second paragraph of the dispositive portion of the July 17, 2012 Decision of the
Court, which reads, "This disposition is immediately executory," is hereby LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, T hereby certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice


Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 257-286.

2 Id. at 287-298.

3 Entitled "Resolution expressing the sense of the Senate that the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) defer the consideration
of all nominees and the preparation of the short list to be submitted to the President for the position of Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court;" id. at 303-304.

4 Entitled "Resolution expressing anew the sense of the Senate that the Senate and House of Representatives should have
one (1) representative each in the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) and that each representative is entitled to a full vote;" id.
at 305-307.

5 Entitled "Resolution to file an urgent motion with the Supreme Court to set for oral argument the motion for
reconsideration filed by the representatives of Congress to the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) in the case of Francisco
Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, Sen. Francis Joseph G.. Escudero and Rep. Niel Tupas Jr., G.R. No. 2022242
considering the primordial importance of the constitutional issues involved;" id. at 308-310.

6 Entitled "Resolution authorizing Senator Joker P. Arroyo to argue, together with the Counsel-of-record, the motion for
reconsideration filed by the representative of the Senate to the Judicial and Bar Council in the case of Francisco Chavez v.
Judicial and Bar Council, Sen. Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Rep. Niel Tupas, Jr.;" id. at 311-312.

7 Id. at 313-314.

8 Id. at (318-I)-(318-K).

9 Id. at 318-J.

10 Petitioners Memorandum, id. at 326-380; Respondents Memorandum, id. at 381-424.

11 Malolos Constitution Article 80 Title X. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and the Solicitor-General shall be
chosen by the National Assembly in concurrence with the President of the Republic and the Secretaries of the
Government, and shall be absolutely independent of the Legislative and Executive Powers."

12 1935 Constitution Article VIII, Section 5. The Members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts shall
be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments."

13 1 Records of the Constitutional Commission Proceedings and Debates, 437.

14 Section 4 Article X of the 1973 Constitution provides: "The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of inferior
courts shall be appointed by the President."

15 1 Records, Constitutional Commission, Proceedings and Debates, p. 487.

16 List of JBC Chairpersons, Ex-Officio and Regular Members, Ex Officio Secretaries and Consultants, issued by the
Office of the Executive Officer, Judicial and Bar Council, rollo, pp. 62-63.

17 Id.

18 Id. at 80, citing Minutes of the 1st En Banc Executive Meeting, January 12, 2000 and Minutes of the 12th En Banc
Meeting, May 30, 2001.

19 Malcolm, The Constitutional Law of the Philippine Islands (2nd ed. 1926), p. 26.

20 1987 Constitution, Article VII, Section 4. The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by direct vote of the
people for a term of six years which shall begin at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following the day of the election
and shall end at noon of the same date, six years thereafter. The President shall not be eligible for any re-election. No
person who has succeeded as President and has served as such for more than four years shall be qualified for election to
the same office at any time.

x x x

The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in case two or more shall have an equal
and highest number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members of both
Houses of the Congress, voting separately. (Emphasis supplied)

x x x.

21 1987 Constitution, Article VII, Section 9. Whenever there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice-President during the
term for which he was elected, the President shall nominate a Vice-President from among the Members of the Senate and
the House of Representatives who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all the Members of both
Houses of the Congress, voting separately. (Emphasis supplied)

22 1987 Constitution, Article VII, Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the
Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not
exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under
martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by
a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension,
which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the
same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or
rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it. (Emphasis supplied)

23 1987 Constitution, Article VI Section 27(1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be
presented to the President. If he approves the same, he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his
objections to the House where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and proceed to
reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it
shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved
by two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the votes of each House shall be
determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the Members voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal. The
President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it originated within thirty days after the date of
receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it.

24 1987 Constitution, Article VI Section 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of public
debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate
may propose or concur with amendments.

25 1987 Constitution, Article VI Section 23 (1). The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in joint session
assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole power to declare the existence of a state of war.

26 1987 Constitution, Article VII Section 4. The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly
certified by the board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to the President
of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after
the day of the election, open all certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public
session, and the Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner provided by
law, canvass the votes.

The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in case two or more shall have an equal
and highest number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members of both
Houses of the Congress, voting separately.

27 1987 Constitution, Article XI Section 3 (1). The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate
all cases of impeachment.

xxx

(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the
Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the
Members of the Senate.

28 Dated March 27, 2007; Annex "D," rollo, p. 104.

29 Annex C, id. at 95. Quoting the interpretation of Article VIII, Section (1) of the Constitution by Fr. Joaquin Bernas in
page 984 of his book, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, A Commentary. He quoted another
author, Hector de Leon, and portions of the decisions of this Court in Flores v. Drilon, and Escalante v. Santos, before
extensively quoting the Record of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 (pages 444 to 491).

30 Annex "E," id. at 1205.

31 Rollo, pp. 91-93.

32 G.R. No. 166006, March 14, 2008, 548 SCRA 485.

33 Id. at 516-517. (Citations omitted.)

34 Blacks Law Dictionary, Fifth ed., p. 198.

35 Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 2009 ed., p. 231.

36 Id., citing Cartwrite v. Cartwrite, 40 A2d 30, 155 ALR 1088 (1944).

37 Id., Agpalo, p. 232

38 Dissenting Opinion, Chief Justice Panganiban, Central Bank (Now Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas) Employees
Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, G.R. No. 148208, December 15, 2004, 446 SCRA 299, citing Peralta v.
COMELEC. No. L-47771, March 11, 1978, 82 SCRA 30, 77, citing concurring and dissenting opinion of former Chief
Justice Fernando, citing Malcolm.


The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

DISSENTING OPINION

ABAD, J.:

On July 17, 2012, the Court rendered a Decision1 granting the petition for declaration of unconstitutionality, prohibition,
and injunction filed by petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, and declaring that the current numerical composition of the Judicial
and Bar Council (JBC) is unconstitutional. The Court also enjoined the JBC to reconstitute itself so that only one member
of Congress will sit as a representative in its proceedings, in accordance with Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution.

On July 24, 2012, respondents Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. moved for
reconsideration.2 The Court then conducted and heard the parties in oral arguments on the following Issues:

1. Whether or not the current practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight members, two of whom are members
of Congress, runs counter to the letter and spirit of Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.

A. Whether or not the JBC should be composed of seven members only.

B. Whether or not Congress is entitled to more than one seat in the JBC.

C. Assuming Congress is entitled to more than one seat, whether or not each representative of Congress should be entitled
to exercise one whole vote.

I maintain my dissent to the majority opinion now being reconsidered.

To reiterate, the vital question that needs to be resolved is: whether or not the Senate and the House of Representatives are
entitled to one representative each in the JBC, both with the right to cast one full vote in its deliberations.

At the core of the present controversy is Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that:

Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the
Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members,
a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of
the private sector. (Emphasis supplied)

In interpreting Section 8(1) above, the majority opinion reiterated that in opting to use the singular letter "a" to describe
"representative of the Congress," the Filipino people through the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended Congress to
just have one representative in the JBC. The majority opinion added that there could not have been any plain oversight in
the wordings of the provision since the other provisions of the 1987 Constitution were amended accordingly with the shift
to a bicameral legislative body.

The mere fact, however, that adjustments were made in some provisions should not mislead the Court into concluding that
all provisions have been amended to recognize the bicameral nature of Congress. As I have previously noted in my
dissenting opinion, Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, a member of the Constitutional Commission himself, admitted that the
committee charged with making adjustments in the previously passed provisions covering the JBC, failed to consider the
impact of the changed character of the Legislature on the inclusion of "a representative of the Congress" in the
membership of the JBC.3

Indeed, to insist that only one member of Congress from either the Senate or the House of Representatives should sit at
any time in the JBC, is to ignore the fact that they are still separate and distinct from each other although they are both
involved in law-making. Both legislators are elected differently, maintain separate administrative organizations, and
deliberate on laws independently. In fact, neither the Senate nor the House of Representatives can by itself claim to
represent the Congress.

Again, that the framers of the 1987 Constitution did not intend to limit the term "Congress" to just either of the two
Houses can be seen from the words that they used in crafting Section 8(1 ). While the provision provides for just "a
representative of the Congress," it also provides that such representation is "ex officio" or "by virtue of one's office, or
position."4

Under the Senate rules, the Chairperson of its Justice Committee is automatically the Senate representative to the JBC. In
the same way, under the House of Representatives rules, the Chairperson of its Justice Committee is the House
representative to the JBC. Consequently, there are actually two persons in Congress who hold separate offices or positions
with the attached function of sitting in the JBC. If the Court adheres to a literal translation of Section 8(1 ), no
representative from Congress will qualify as "ex officio" member of the JBC. This would deny Congress the
representation that the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended it to have.

Having said that the Senate and the House of Representatives should have one representative each in the JBC, it is logical
to conclude that each should also have the right to cast one full vote in its deliberations. To split the vote between the two
legislators would be an absurdity since it would diminish their standing and make them second class members of the JBC,
something that the Constitution clearly does not contemplate. Indeed, the JBC abandoned the half-a-vote practice on
January 12, 2000 and recognized the right of both legislators to cast one full vote each. Only by recognizing this right can
the true spirit and reason of Section 8(1) be attained.

For the above reasons, I vote to GRANT the motion for reconsideration.

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice


Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 226-250.

2 Id. at 257-284.

3 http://opinion. inquirer.net/31813/jbc-odds-and-ends (last accessed February 15, 2013).

4 Webster's New World College Dictionary, 3rd Edition, p. 477.


The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

DISSENTING OPINION

LEONEN, J.:

I dissent.

Both the Senate and the House of Representatives must be represented in the Judicial and Bar Council. This is the
Constitution's mandate read as a whole and in the light of the ordinary and contemporary understanding of our people of
the structure of our government. Any other interpretation diminishes Congress and negates the effectivity of its
representation in the Judicial and Bar Council.

It is a Constitution we are interpreting. More than privileging a textual preposition, our duty is to ensure that the
constitutional project ratified by our people is given full effect.

At issue in this case is the interpretation of Article VIII, Section 8 of the Constitution which provides the following:

Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the
Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of

Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of
law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector. (Emphasis provided)

Mainly deploying verba legis as its interpretative modality, the main opinion chooses to focus on the article "a." As
correctly pointed out in the original dissent of Justice Robert A bad, the entire phrase includes the words "representative
of Congress" and "ex officio Members." In the context of the constitutional plan involving a bicameral Congress, these
words create ambiguity.

A Bicameral Congress

Our Constitution creates a Congress consisting of two chambers. Thus, in Article VI, Section 1, the Constitution provides
the following:

The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives x x x. (Emphasis provided)

Senators are "elected at large by the qualified voters of the Philippines".1 Members of the House of Representatives, on
the other hand, are elected by legislative districts2 or through the party list system.3 The term of a Senator4 is different
from that of a Member of the House of Representatives.5 Therefore, the Senate and the House of Representatives while
component parts of the Congress are not the same in terms of their representation. The very rationale of a bicameral
system is to have the Senators represent a national constituency. Representatives of the House of Representatives, on the
other hand, are dominantly from legislative districts except for one fifth which are from the party list system.

Each chamber is organized separately.6 The Senate and the House each promulgates their own rules of procedure. 7 Each
chamber maintains separate Journals.8 They each have separate Records of their proceedings.9 The Senate and the House
of Representatives discipline their own respective members.10

To belabor the point: There is no presiding officer for the Congress of the Philippines, but there is a Senate President and
a Speaker of the House of Representatives. There is no single journal for the Congress of the Philippines, but there is a
journal for the Senate and a journal for the House of Representatives. There is no record of proceedings for the entire
Congress of the Philippines, but there is a Record of proceedings for the Senate and a Record of proceedings for the
House of Representatives. The Congress of the Philippines does not discipline its members. It is the Senate that
promulgates its own rules and disciplines its members. Likewise, it is the House that promulgates its own rules and
disciplines its members.

No Senator reports to the Congress of the Philippines. Rather, he or she reports to the Senate. No Member of the House of
Representatives reports to the Congress of the Philippines. Rather, he or she reports to the House of Representatives.

Congress, therefore, is the Senate and the House of Representatives. Congress does not exist separate from the Senate and
the House of Representatives.

Any Senator acting ex officio or as a representative of the Senate must get directions from the Senate. By constitutional
design, he or she cannot get instructions from the House of Representatives. If a Senator represents the Congress rather
than simply the Senate, then he or she must be open to amend or modify the instructions given to him or her by the Senate
if the House of Representatives instructions are different. Yet, the Constitution vests disciplinary power only on the
Senate for any Senator.

The same argument applies to a Member of the House of Representatives.

No Senator may carry instructions from the House of Representatives. No Member of the House of Representatives may
carry instructions from the Senate. Neither Senator nor Member of the House of Representatives may therefore represent
Congress as a whole.

The difference between the Senate and the House of Representative was a subject of discussion in the Constitutional
Commission. In the July 21, 1986 Records of the Constitutional Commission, Commissioner Jose F. S. Bengzon
presented the following argument during the discussion on bicameralism, on the distinction between Congressmen and
Senators, and the role of the Filipino people in making these officials accountable:

I grant the proposition that the Members of the House of Representatives are closer to the people that they represent. I
grant the proposition that the Members of the House of Representatives campaign on a one-to-one basis with the people in
the barrios and their constituencies. I also grant the proposition that the candidates for Senator do not have as much time
to mingle around with their constituencies in their respective home bases as the candidates for the House. I also grant the
proposition that the candidates for the Senate go around the country in their efforts to win the votes of all the members of
the electorate at a lesser time than that given to the candidates for the House of Representatives. But then the lesson of the
last 14 years has made us mature in our political thinking and has given us political will and self-determination. We really
cannot disassociate the fact that the Congressman, the Member of the House of Representatives, no matter how national
he would like to think, is very much strongly drawn into the problems of his local constituents in his own district.

Due to the maturity of the Filipinos for the last 14 years and because of the emergence of people power, I believe that this
so-called people power can be used to monitor not only the Members of the House of Representatives but also the
Members of the Senate. As I said we may have probably adopted the American formula in the beginning but over these
years, I think we have developed that kind of a system and adopted it to our own needs. So at this point in time, with
people power working, it is not only the Members of the House who can be subjected to people power but also the
Members of the Senate because they can also be picketed and criticized through written articles and talk shows. And even
the people not only from their constituencies in their respective regions and districts but from the whole country can
exercise people power against the Members of the Senate because they are supposed to represent the entire country. So
while the Members of Congress become unconsciously parochial in their desire to help their constituencies, the Members
of the Senate are there to take a look at all of these parochial proposals and coordinate them with the national problems.
They may be detached in that sense but they are not detached from the people because they themselves know and realize
that they owe their position not only to the people from their respective provinces but also to the people from the whole
country. So, I say that people power now will be able to monitor the activities of the Members of the House of
Representatives and that very same people power can be also used to monitor the activities of the Members of the
Senate.11

Commissioner Bengzon provided an illustration of the fundamental distinction between the House of Representatives and
the Senate, particularly regarding their respective constituencies and electorate. These differences, however, only illustrate
that the work of the Senate and the House of Representatives taken together results in a Congress functioning as one
branch of government. Article VI, Section 1, as approved by the Commission, spoke of one Congress whose powers are
vested in both the House of Representatives and the Senate.

Thus, when the Constitution provides that a "representative of Congress" should participate in the Judicial and Bar
Council, it cannot mean a Senator carrying out the instructions of the House or a Member of the House of Representative
carrying out instructions from the Senate. It is not the kind of a single Congress contemplated by our Constitution. The
opinion therefore that a Senator or a Member of the House of Representative may represent the Congress as a whole is
contrary to the intent of the Constitution. It is unworkable.

One mechanism used in the past to work out the consequence of the majoritys opinion is to allow a Senator and a
Member of the House of Representative to sit in the Judicial and Bar Council but to each allow them only half a vote.

Within the Judicial and Bar Council, the Chief Justice is entitled to one vote. The Secretary of Justice is also entitled to
one whole vote and so are the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the private sector, legal academia, and retired justices.
Each of these sectors are given equal importance and rewarded with one whole vote. However, in this view, the Senate is
only worth fifty percent of the wisdom of these sectors. Likewise, the wisdom of the House of Representatives is only
worth fifty percent of these institutions.

This is constitutionally abominable. It is inconceivable that our people, in ratifying the Constitution granting awesome
powers to Congress, intended to diminish its component parts. After all, they are institutions composed of people who
have submitted themselves to the electorate. In creating shortlists of possible candidates to the judiciary, we can safely
suppose that their input is not less than the input of the professor of law or the member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines or the member from the private sector.

The other solution done in the past was to alternate the seat between a Senator and a Member of the House of
Representatives.

To alternate the seat given to Congress between the Senate and the House of Representatives would mean not giving a
seat to the Congress at all. Again, when a Senator is seated, he or she represents the Senate and not Congress as a whole.
When a Member of the House of Representative is seated, he or she can only represent Congress as a whole. Thus,
alternating the seat not only diminishes congressional representation; it negates it.

Constitutional Interpretation

The argument that swayed the majority in this cases original decision was that if those who crafted our Constitution
intended that there be two representatives from Congress, it would not have used the preposition "a" in Article VIII,
Section 8 (1). However, beyond the number of representatives, the Constitution intends that in the Judicial and Bar
Council, there will be representation from Congress and that it will be "ex officio", i.e., by virtue of their positions or
offices. We note that the provision did not provide for a number of members to the Judicial and Bar Council. This is
unlike the provisions creating many other bodies in the Constitution.12

In other words, we could privilege or start our interpretation only from the preposition "a" and from there provide a
meaning that ensures a difficult and unworkable result -- one which undermines the concept of a bicameral congress
implied in all the other 114 other places in the Constitution that uses the word "Congress".

Or, we could give the provision a reasonable interpretation that is within the expectations of the people who ratified the
Constitution by also seeing and reading the words "representative of Congress" and "ex officio."

This proposed interpretation does not violate the basic tenet regarding the authoritativeness of the text of the Constitution.
It does not detract from the text. It follows the canonical requirement of verba legis. But in doing so, we encounter an
ambiguity.

In Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal,13 we said:

As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyers document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever
be present in the peoples consciousness, its language as much as possible should be understood in the sense they have in
common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the
power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus these are
cases where the need for construction is reduced to a minimum.

However, where there is ambiguity or doubt, the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the
intent of its framers or ratio legis et anima. A doubtful provision must be examined in light of the history of the times, and
the condition and circumstances surrounding the framing of the Constitution. In following this guideline, courts should
bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished in adopting a doubtful constitutional provision, and the evils sought to
be prevented or remedied. Consequently, the intent of the framers and the people ratifying the constitution, and not the
panderings of self-indulgent men, should be given effect.

Last, ut magis valeat quam pereat the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. We intoned thus in the landmark case
of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary:

It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from
all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into
view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject
should be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not
to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together.

In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction which will render
every word operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and nugatory. (Emphasis provided)

And in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,13 we said:

A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under consideration. Thus, it
has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its
adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of
the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to
ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose sought
to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and calculated
to effect that purpose.

The authoritativeness of text is no excuse to provide an unworkable result or one which undermines the intended structure
of government provided in the Constitution. Text is authoritative, but it is not exhaustive of the entire universe of
meaning.

There is no compelling reason why we should blind ourselves as to the meaning of "representative of Congress" and "ex
officio." There is no compelling reason why there should only be one representative of a bicameral Congress.

Proposed Reasons for Only One Representative of Congress

The first reason to support the need for only one representative of Congress is the belief that there needs to be an odd
number in the Judicial and Bar Council.

This is true only if the decision of the constitutional organ in question is a dichotomous one, i.e., a yes or a no. It is in this
sense that a tie-breaker will be necessary.

However, the Judicial and Bar Council is not that sort of a constitutional organ. Its duty is to provide the President with a
shortlist of candidates to every judicial position. We take judicial notice that for vacancies, each member of the Judicial
and Bar Council is asked to list at least three (3) names. All these votes are tallied and those who garner a specific
plurality are thus put on the list and transmitted to the President. There had been no occasion when the Judicial and Bar
Council ever needed to break a tie. The Judicial and Bar Councils functions proceed regardless of whether they have
seven or eight members.

The second reason that the main opinion accepted as persuasive was the opinion that Congress does not discharge its
function to check and balance the power of both the Judiciary and the Executive in the Judicial and Bar Council. From
this premise, it then proceeds to argue that the Representative of Congress, who is ex officio, does not need to consult
with Congress as a whole.

This is very perplexing and difficult to accept.

By virtue of the fundamental premise of separation of powers, the appointing power in the judiciary should be done by the
Supreme Court. However, for judicial positions, this is vested in the Executive. Furthermore, because of the importance of
these appointments, the Presidents discretion is limited to a shortlist submitted to him by the Judicial and Bar Council
which is under the supervision of the Supreme Court but composed of several components.

The Judicial and Bar Council represents the constituents affected by judicial appointments and by extension, judicial
decisions. It provides for those who have some function vis a vis the law that should be applied and interpreted by our
courts. Hence, represented are practicing lawyers (Integrated Bar of the Philippines), prosecutors (Secretary of the
Department of Justice), legal academia (professor of law), and judges or justices (retired justice and the Chief Justice).
Also represented in some way are those that will be affected by the interpretation directly (private sector representative).

Congress is represented for many reasons.

One, it crafts statutes and to that extent may want to ensure that those who are appointed to the judiciary are familiar with
these statutes and will have the competence, integrity, and independence to read its meaning.

Two, the power of judicial review vests our courts with the ability to nullify their acts. Congress, therefore, has an interest
in the judicial philosophy of those considered for appointment into our judiciary.

Three, Congress is a political organ. As such, it is familiar with the biases of our political leaders including that of the
President. Thus, it will have greater sensitivity to the necessity for political accommodations if there be any. Keeping in
mind the independence required of our judges and justices, the Members of Congress may be able to appreciate the kind
of balance that will be necessary -- the same balance that the President might be able to likewise appreciate -- when
putting a person in the shortlist of judicial candidates. Not only do they appreciate this balance, they embody it. Senators
and Members of the House of Representatives (unlike any of the other members of the Judicial and Bar Council),
periodically submit themselves to the electorate.

It is for these reasons that the Congressional representatives in the Judicial and Bar Council may be instructed by their
respective chambers to consider some principles and directions. Through resolutions or actions by the Congressional
Committees they represent, the JBC Congressional representatives choices may be constrained. Therefore, they do not sit
there just to represent themselves. Again, they are "representatives of Congress" "ex officio".

The third reason to support only one representative of Congress is the belief that there is the "unmistakable tenor" in the
provision in question that one co-equal branch should be represented only by one Representative.14 It may be true that the
Secretary of Justice is the political alter ego of the President or the Executive. However, Congress as a whole does not
have a political alter ego. In other words, while the Executive may be represented by a single individual, Congress cannot
be represented by an individual. Congress, as stated earlier, operates through the Senate and the House of Representatives.
Unlike the Executive, the Legislative branch cannot be represented by only one individual.

A Note on the Work of the Constitutional Commission

Time and again, we have clarified the interpretative value to Us of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
Thus in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, we emphasized:

While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention in order
to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail as
said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the
constitutional convention are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reason for
their votes, but they give Us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass or our
fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe
the constitution from what appears upon its face.The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was
understood by the people adopting it than in the framers understanding thereof.15 (Emphasis provided)

Also worth Our recall is the celebrated comment of Charles P. Curtis, Jr. on the role of history in constitutional
exegesis:16

The intention of the framers of the Constitution, even assuming we could discover what it was, when it is not adequately
expressed in the Constitution, that is to say, what they meant when they did not say it, surely that has no binding force
upon us. If we look behind or beyond what they set down in the document, prying into what else they wrote and what they
said, anything we may find is only advisory. They may sit in at our councils. There is no reason why we should eavesdrop
on theirs.17 (Emphasis provided)

In addition to the interpretative value of the discussion in the Constitutional Commission, we should always be careful
when we quote from their records without understanding their context.

The Committees of the Constitutional Commission were all tasked to finish their reports not later than July 7, 1986.18 The
Second and Third Readings were scheduled to finish not later than August 15, 1986.19 The members of the Sponsorship
and Style Committee were tasked to finish their work of formulating and polishing the style of the final draft of the new
Constitution scheduled for submission to the entire membership of the Commission not later than August 25, 1986.20

The Rules of the Constitutional Commission also provided for a process of approving resolutions and amendments.

Constitutional proposals were embodied in resolutions signed by the author.21 If they emanated from a committee, the
resolution was signed by its chairman.22 Resolutions were filed with the Secretary-General.23 The First Reading took
place when the titles of the resolutions were read and referred to the appropriate committee.24

The Committees then submitted a Report on each resolution.25 The Steering Committee took charge of including the
committee report in the Calendar for Second Reading.26 The Second Reading took place on the day set for the
consideration of a resolution.27 The provisions were read in full with the amendments proposed by the committee, if there
were any.28

A motion to close debate took place after three speeches for and two against, or if only one speech has been raised and
none against it.29 The President of the Constitutional Commission had the prerogative to allow debates among those who
had indicated that they intended to be heard on certain matters.30 After the close of the debate, the Constitutional
Commission proceeded to consider the Committee amendments.31

After a resolution was approved on Second Reading, it was included in the Calendar for Third Reading.32 Neither further
debate nor amendment shall be made on the resolution on its Third Reading.33 All constitutional proposals approved by
the Commission after Third Reading were referred to the Committees on Sponsorship and Style for collation,
organization, and consolidation into a complete and final draft of the Constitution.34 The final draft was submitted to the
Commission for the sole purpose of determining whether it reflects faithfully and accurately the proposals as approved on
Second Reading.35

With respect to the provision which is now Article VIII, Section 8 (1), the timetable was as follows:

On July 10, 1986, the Committee on the Judiciary presented its Report to the Commission.36 Deliberations then took
place on the same day; on July 11, 1986; and on July 14, 1986. It was on July 10 that Commissioner Rodrigo raised points
regarding the Judicial and Bar Council.37 The discussion spoke of the Judicial and Bar Council having seven members.

Numerous mentions of the Judicial and Bar Council being comprised of seven members were also made by
Commissioners on July 14, 1986. On the same day, the amended article was approved by unanimous voting.38

On July 19, 1986, the vote on Third Reading on the Article on the Judiciary took place.39 The vote was 43 and none
against.40

Committee Report No. 22 proposing an article on a National Assembly was reported out by July 21, 1986.41 It provided
for a unicameral assembly. Commissioner Hilario Davide, Jr., made the presentation and stated that they had a very
difficult decision to make regarding bicameralism and unicameralism.42 The debate occupied the Commission for the
whole day.

Then, a vote on the structure of Congress took place.43 Forty four (44) commissioners cast their votes during the roll
call.44 The vote was 23 to 22.45

On October 8, 1986, the Article on the Judiciary was reopened for purposes of introducing amendments to the proposed
Sections 3, 7, 10, 11, 13, and 14.46

On October 9, 1986, the entire Article on the Legislature was approved on Third Reading.47

By October 10, 1986, changes in style on the Article on the Legislature were introduced.48

On October 15, 1986, Commissioner Guingona presented the 1986 Constitution to the President of the Constitutional
Commission, Cecilia Munoz-Palma.49

It is apparent that the Constitutional Commission either through the Style and Sponsorship Committee or the Committees
on the Legislature and the Judiciary was not able to amend the provision concerning the Judicial and Bar Council after the
Commission had decided to propose a bicameral Congress. We can take judicial notice of the chronology of events during
the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. The chronology should be taken as much as the substance of
discussions exchanged between the Commissioners.

The quotations from the Commissioners mentioned in the main opinion and in the proposed resolution of the present
Motion for Reconsideration should thus be appreciated in its proper context.

The interpellation involving Commissioners Rodrigo and Concepcion took place on July 10, 1986 and on July 14,
1986.50 These discussions were about Committee Report No. 18 on the Judiciary. Thus:

MR. RODRIGO: Let me go to another point then.

On page 2, Section 5, there is a novel provision about appointments of members of the Supreme Court and of judges of
lower courts. At present it is the President who appoints them. If there is a Commission on Appointments, then it is the
President with the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. In this proposal, we would like to establish a new
office, a sort of a board composed of seven members, called the Judicial and Bar Council. And while the President will
still appoint the members of the judiciary, he will be limited to the recommendees of this Council.

x x x x

MR. RODRIGO: Of the seven members of the Judicial and Bar Council, the President appoints four of them who are the
regular members.

x x x x

MR. CONCEPCION: The only purpose of the Committee is to eliminate partisan politics.51

x x x x

It must also be noted that during the same day and in the same discussion, both Commissioners Rodrigo and Concepcion
later on referred to a National Assembly and not a Congress, as can be seen here:

MR. RODRIGO: Another point. Under our present Constitution, the National Assembly may enact rules of court, is that
right? On page 4, the proviso on lines 17 to 19 of the Article on the Judiciary provides:

The National Assembly may repeal, alter, or supplement the said rules with the advice and concurrence of the Supreme
Court.

MR. CONCEPCION: Yes.

MR. RODRIGO: So, two things are required of the National Assembly before it can repeal, alter or supplement the rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, etc. it must have the advice and
concurrence of the Supreme Court.

MR. CONCEPCION: That is correct.52

On July 14, 1986, the Commission proceeded with the Period of Amendments. This was when the exchange noted in the
main opinion took place. Thus:

MR. RODRIGO: If my amendment is approved, then the provision will be exactly the same as the provision in the 1935
Constitution, Article VIII, Section 5.

x x x x

If we do not remove the proposed amendment on the creation of the Judicial and Bar Council, this will be a diminution of
the appointing power of the highest magistrate of the land, of the President of the Philippines elected by all the Filipino
people. The appointing power will be limited by a group of seven people who are not elected by the people but only
appointed.

Mr. Presiding Officer, if this Council is created, there will be no uniformity in our constitutional provisions on
appointments. The members of the Judiciary will be segregated from the rest of the government. Even a municipal judge
cannot be appointed by the President except upon recommendation or nomination of three names by this committee of
seven people, commissioners of the Commission on Elections, the COA and Commission on Civil Service x x x even
ambassadors, generals of the Army will not come under this restriction. Why are we going to segregate the Judiciary from
the rest of our government in the appointment of the high-ranking officials?

Another reason is that this Council will be ineffective. It will just besmirch the honor of our President without being
effective at all because this Council will be under the influence of the President. Four out of seven are appointees of the
President, and they can be reappointed when their term ends. Therefore, they would kowtow to the President. A fifth
member is the Minister of Justice, an alter ego of the President. Another member represents the legislature. In all
probability, the controlling party in the legislature belongs to the President and, therefore, this representative from the
National Assembly is also under the influence of the President. And may I say, Mr. Presiding Officer, that even the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court is an appointee of the President. So, it is futile; he will be influenced anyway by the
President.53

It must again be noted that during this day and period of amendments after the quoted passage in the Decision, the
Commission later on made use of the term National Assembly and not Congress again:

MR. MAAMBONG: Presiding Officer and members of the Committee, I propose to delete the last sentence on Section
16, lines 28 to 30 which reads: "The Chief Justice shall address the National Assembly at the opening of each regular
session."

May I explain that I have gone over the operations of other deliberative assemblies in some parts of the world, and I
noticed that it is only the Chief Executive or head of state who addresses the National Assembly at its opening. When we
say "opening," we are referring to the first convening of any national assembly. Hence, when the Chief Executive or head
of state addresses the National Assembly on that occasion, no other speaker is allowed to address the body.

So I move for the deletion of this last sentence.54

Based on the chronology of events, the discussions cited by the main ponencia took place when the commissioners were
still contemplating a unicameral legislature in the course of this discussion. Necessarily, only one Representative would
be needed to fully effect the participation of a unicameral legislature. Therefore, any mention of the composition of the
JBC having seven members in the records of the Constitutional Commission, particularly during the dates cited, was
obviously within the context that the Commission had not yet voted and agreed upon a bicameral legislature.

The composition of the Congress as a bilateral legislature became final only after the JBC discussions as a seven-member
Council indicated in the Records of the Constitutional Commission took place. This puts into the proper context the
recognition by Commissioner Christian Monsod on July 30, 1986, which runs as follows:

Last week, we voted for a bicameral legislature. Perhaps it is symptomatic of what the thinking of this group is, that all the
provisions that were being drafted up to that time assumed a unicameral government.55

The repeated mentions of the JBC having seven members as indicated in the Records of the Constitutional Commission
do not justify the points raised by petitioner. This is a situation where the records of the Constitutional Commission do not
serve even as persuasive means to ascertain intent at least in so far as the intended numbers for the Judicial and Bar
Council. Certainly they are not relevant even to advise us on how Congress is to be represented in that constitutional
organ.

We should never forget that when we interpret the Constitution, we do so with full appreciation of every part of the text
within an entire document understood by the people as they ratified it and with all its contemporary consequences. As an
eminent author in constitutional theory has observed while going through the various interpretative modes presented in
jurisprudence: "x x x all of the methodologies that will be discussed, properly understood, figure in constitutional analysis
as opportunities: as starting points, constituent parts of complex arguments, or concluding evocations." 56

Discerning that there should be a Senator and a Member of the House of Representatives that sit in the Judicial and Bar
Council so that Congress can be fully represented ex officio is not judicial activism. It is in keeping with the constitutional
project of a bicameral Congress that is effective whenever and wherever it is represented. It is in tune with how our people
understand Congress as described in the fundamental law. It is consistent with our duty to read the authoritative text of the
Constitution so that ordinary people who seek to understand this most basic law through Our decisions would understand
that beyond a single isolated text -- even beyond a prepos1t10n in Article VIII, Section 8 (1 ), our primordial values and
principles are framed, congealed and will be given full effect.

In a sense, we do not just read words in a legal document; we give meaning to a Constitution.

For these reasons, I vote to grant the Motion for Reconsideration and deny the Petition for lack of merit.

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice


Footnotes

1 CONSTITUTION, Art. VI, Sec. 2.

2 CONSTITUTION, Art. VI, Sec. 5 (1).

3 CONSTITUTION, Art. VI, Sec. 5 (2). See also the recent case of Atong Paglaum v. COMELEC et al., G.R. No.
203766, for the most recent discussion on the nature of the party list system.

4 The term of a senator is six years, extendible for another term. CONSTITUTION, Art. VI, Sec. 4.

5 The term of a member of the House of Representatives is three years, and may be extendible for three consecutive
terms. CONSTITUTION, Art. VI, Sec. 7.

6 CONSTITUTION, Art. VI, Sec. 16.

7 CONSTITUTION, Art. VI, Sec. 16 (1).

8 CONSTITUTION, Art. VI, Sec. 16 (4), par. (1).

9 CONSTITUTION, Art. VI, Sec. 16 (4), par. (2).

10 CONSTITUTION, Art. VI, Sec. 16 (3).

11 II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 63 (July 21, 1986).

12 CONSTITUTION, Art. VI, Sec. 2: The Senate shall be composed of twenty-four Senators who shall be elected at large
by the qualified voters of the Philippines, as may be provided by law.;

Art. VI, Sec. 5: The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law...;

Art. VI, Sec. 17: The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral
Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by
the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may
be;

Art. VI, Sec. 18: There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex officio
Chairman, twelve Senators, and twelve Members of the House of Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein.;

Art. VIII, Sec. 4.1: The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen
Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members...;

Art. IX (B), Sec. 1: The civil service shall be administered by the Civil Service Commission composed of a Chairman and
two Commissioners...;

Art. IX (C), Sec. 1: There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners...;

Art. IX (D), Sec. 1: There shall be a Commission on Audit composed of a Chairman and two Commissioners...;

Art. XI, Sec. 11: There is hereby created the independent Office of the Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman to be
known as Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy and at least one Deputy each for Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. A separate
Deputy for the military establishment may likewise be appointed.;

Art. XII, Sec. 17 (2): The Commission [on Human Rights] shall be composed of a Chairman and four Members who must
be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and a majority of whom shall be members of the Bar.

13 Atty. Romulo A. Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 191618, November 23, 2010, 635 SCRA 783,
797-799.

13 Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 83896, February 22, 1981, 194 SCRA 317, 325.

14 Francisco I. Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, Sen. Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Rep. Neil C. Tupas, Jr., G.R.
No. 202242, July 17, 2012, p. 18.

15 Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, supra at 337.

16 Charles P. Curtis. LIONS UNDER THE THRONE 2, Houghton Mifflin, 1947.

17 Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, 412 Phil. 308, 363 (2001).

18 I RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION Appendix 2, p. 1900, (July 10, 1986), PROPOSED RESOLUTION
NO. 50, RESOLUTION PROVIDING FOR THE RULES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION (PROPOSED
RESOLUTION NO. 50), Rule II, Sec. 9.

19 Proposed Resolution No. 50, Rule II, Sec. 9.

20 Proposed Resolution No. 50, Rule II, Sec. 9.

21 Proposed Resolution No. 50, Rule IV, Sec. 20.

22 Proposed Resolution No. 50, Rule IV, Sec. 20.

23 Proposed Resolution No. 50, Rule IV, Sec. 20.

24 Proposed Resolution No. 50, Rule IV, Sec. 21.

25 Proposed Resolution No. 50, Rule IV, Sec. 22.

26 Proposed Resolution No. 50, Rule IV, Sec. 22.

27 Proposed Resolution No. 50, Rule IV, Sec. 23.

28 Proposed Resolution No. 50, Rule IV, Sec. 23.

29 Proposed Resolution No. 50, Rule IV, Sec. 24.

30 Proposed Resolution No. 50, Rule IV, Sec. 25.

31 Proposed Resolution No. 50, Rule IV, Sec. 26.

32 Proposed Resolution No. 50, Rule IV, Sec. 27.

33 Proposed Resolution No. 50, Rule IV, Sec. 27.

34 Proposed Resolution No. 50, Rule IV, Sec. 29.

35 Proposed Resolution No. 50, Rule IV, Sec. 29.

36 I RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION, JOURNAL NO. 27 (Thursday, July 10, 1986).

37 I RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION, RECORD NO. 27 (Thursday, July 10, 1986).

38 I RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION, JOURNAL NO. 27 (Thursday, July 10, 1986).

39 I RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION, JOURNAL NO. 34 (Saturday, July 19, 1986).

40 I RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION, JOURNAL NO. 34 (Saturday, July 19, 1986).

41 I RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION, JOURNAL NO. 34 (Saturday, July 19, 1986), which reads:

RECONSIDERATION AND APPROVAL, ON THIRD READING, OF THE ARTICLE ON THE JUDICIARY. On
motion of Mr. Bengzon, there being no objection, the Body reconsidered the approval, on Third Reading, of the Article on
the Judiciary, to afford the other Members opportunity to cast their votes. Thereupon, upon direction of the Chair, the
Secretary-General called the Roll for nominal voting and the following Members cast an affirmative vote:

Abubakar

Alonto

Azcuna

Natividad

Tadeo

With 5 additional affirmative votes, making a total of 43 Members voting in favor and none against, the Chair declared
the Article on the Judiciary approved on Third Reading.

42 I RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION, NO. 35 (Monday, July 21, 1986), which reads in part:

MR. DAVIDE:

x x x

A Unicameral Structure of the National Assembly. In the records of the 1935 and 1971 Constitutional Conventions,
and now the 1986 Constitutional Commission, advocates of unicameralism and bicameralism have eloquently discoursed
on the matter. The draft proposal of the 1986 UP Law Constitution Project analyzes exhaustively the best features and the
disadvantages of each. Our people, having experienced both systems, are faced with a difficult decision to make.

Madam President and my dear colleagues, even in our own Committee, I had to break the tie in favor of unicameralism.
Commissioner Sarmiento, in his Resolution No. 396, aptly stated that the Philippines needs a unicameral legislative
assembly which is truly representative of the people, responsive to their needs and welfare, economical to maintain and
efficient and effective in the exercise of its powers, functions and duties in the discharge of its responsibilities.
Commissioner Tingson, however, said that despite its simplicity of organization, resulting in economy and efficiency, and
achieving a closer relationship between the legislative and executive, it also resulted in the authoritarian manipulation by
the Chief Executive, depriving in the process the people from expressing their true sentiments through their chosen
representatives. Thus, under Resolution No. 321, Commissioner Tingson calls for the restoration of the bicameral form of
legislature to maximize the participation of people in decision-making.

43 I, RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION, JOURNAL NO. 35, (Monday July 21, 1986).

44 I, RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION, JOURNAL NO. 35, (Monday July 21, 1986), which reads in part:

x x x

With 22 Members voting for a unicameral system and 23 Members voting for bicameralism, the Body approved the
proposal for a bicameral legislature.

45 Bernas, Joaquin, THE INTENT OF THE 1986 CONSTITUTION WRITERS, 1995, pp. 310-311.

46 III, RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION, JOURNAL NO. 102 (Tuesday and Wednesday, October 7 and
8, 1987).

47 III, RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION, JOURNAL NO. 103 (Thursday, October 9, 1986), which reads
in part:

x x x

With 29 Members voting in favor, none against and 7 abstentions, the Body approved, on Third Reading, the Article on
the Legislative.

48 III, RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION, JOURNAL NO. 104 (Friday, October 10, 1986).

49 V, RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION, JOURNAL NO. 109 (Wednesday, October 15, 1986), which
reads in part:

x x x

MR. GUINGONA: Madam President, I have the honor on behalf of the Sponsorship Committee to officially announce
that on October 12, the 1986 Constitutional Commission had completed under the able, firm and dedicated leadership of
our President, the Honorable Cecilia Muoz Palma, the task of drafting a Constitution for our people, a Constitution
reflective of the spirit of the time a spirit of nationalism, a spirit of dedication to the democratic way of life, a spirit of
liberation and rising expectations, a spirit of confidence in the Filipino. On that day, Madam President, the Members of
this Constitutional Commission had approved on Third Reading the draft Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines
a practical instrument suited to the circumstances of our time but which is broad enough to allow future generations to
respond to challenges which we of this generation could not foretell, a Charter which would seek to establish in this fair
land a community characterized by social progress, political stability, economic prosperity, peace, justice and freedom for
all

50 I RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 445 (July 10, 1986) AND I RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL
COMMISSION 486-487 (July 14, 1986).

51 I RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 445 (July 10, 1986).

52 I RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 445 (July 10, 1986).

53 I RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 486-487 (July 14, 1986).

54 I RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 510 (July 14, 1986).

55 II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 434 (July 30, 1986).

56 Lawrence Tribe, as cited in It is a Constitution We Are Expounding, p. 21 (2009), previously published in
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, Chapter 1: Approaches to Constitutional Analysis (3rd ed.2000).

Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila

THIRD DIVISION


PLANTERS PRODUCTS, INC., G.R. No. 166006
Petitioner,
Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- versus - CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.


Promulgated:
FERTIPHIL CORPORATION,
Respondent. March 14, 2008

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

D E C I S I O N


REYES, R.T., J.:


THE Regional Trial Courts (RTC) have the authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of statutes,
executive orders, presidential decrees and other issuances. The Constitution vests that power not only in the Supreme
Court but in all Regional Trial Courts.

The principle is relevant in this petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming
with modification that of
the RTC in Makati City,[2] finding petitioner Planters Products, Inc. (PPI) liable to private respondent Fertiphil
Corporation (Fertiphil) for the levies it paid under Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 1465.

The Facts

Petitioner PPI and private respondent Fertiphil are private corporations incorporated under Philippine laws.[3] They are
both engaged in the importation and distribution of fertilizers, pesticides and agricultural chemicals.

On June 3, 1985, then President Ferdinand Marcos, exercising his legislative powers, issued LOI No. 1465 which
provided, among others, for the imposition of a capital recovery component (CRC) on the domestic sale of all grades of
fertilizers in the Philippines.[4] The LOI provides:

3. The Administrator of the Fertilizer Pesticide Authority to include in its fertilizer pricing formula a capital contribution
component of not less than P10 per bag. This capital contribution shall be collected until adequate capital is raised to
make PPI viable. Such capital contribution shall be applied by FPA to all domestic sales of fertilizers in the
Philippines.[5] (Underscoring supplied)

Pursuant to the LOI, Fertiphil paid P10 for every bag of fertilizer it sold in the domestic market to the Fertilizer and
Pesticide Authority (FPA). FPA then remitted the amount collected to the Far East Bank and Trust Company, the
depositary bank of PPI. Fertiphil paid P6,689,144 to FPA from July 8, 1985 to January 24, 1986.[6]

After the 1986 Edsa Revolution, FPA voluntarily stopped the imposition of the P10 levy. With the return of democracy,
Fertiphil demanded from PPI a refund of the amounts it paid under LOI No. 1465, but PPI refused to accede to the
demand.[7]

Fertiphil filed a complaint for collection and damages[8] against FPA and PPI with the RTC in Makati. It questioned the
constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 for being unjust, unreasonable, oppressive, invalid and an unlawful imposition that
amounted to a denial of due process of law.[9] Fertiphil alleged that the LOI solely favored PPI, a privately owned
corporation, which used the proceeds to maintain its monopoly of the fertilizer industry.

In its Answer,[10] FPA, through the Solicitor General, countered that the issuance of LOI No. 1465 was a valid exercise
of the police power of the State in ensuring the stability of the fertilizer industry in the country. It also averred that
Fertiphil did not sustain any damage from the LOI because the burden imposed by the levy fell on the ultimate consumer,
not the seller.

RTC Disposition

On November 20, 1991, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Fertiphil, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendant Planters Product, Inc., ordering the latter to pay the former:

1) the sum of P6,698,144.00 with interest at 12% from the time of judicial demand;
2) the sum of P100,000 as attorneys fees;
3) the cost of suit.

SO ORDERED.[11]




Ruling that the imposition of the P10 CRC was an exercise of the States inherent power of taxation, the RTC
invalidated the levy for violating the basic principle that taxes can only be levied for public purpose, viz.:

It is apparent that the imposition of P10 per fertilizer bag sold in the country by LOI 1465 is purportedly in the exercise of
the power of taxation. It is a settled principle that the power of taxation by the state is plenary. Comprehensive and
supreme, the principal check upon its abuse resting in the responsibility of the members of the legislature to their
constituents. However, there are two kinds of limitations on the power of taxation: the inherent limitations and the
constitutional limitations.

One of the inherent limitations is that a tax may be levied only for public purposes:

The power to tax can be resorted to only for a constitutionally valid public purpose. By the same token, taxes may
not be levied for purely private purposes, for building up of private fortunes, or for the redress of private wrongs. They
cannot be levied for the improvement of private property, or for the benefit, and promotion of private enterprises, except
where the aid is incident to the public benefit. It is well-settled principle of constitutional law that no general tax can be
levied except for the purpose of raising money which is to be expended for public use. Funds cannot be exacted under the
guise of taxation to promote a purpose that is not of public interest. Without such limitation, the power to tax could be
exercised or employed as an authority to destroy the economy of the people. A tax, however, is not held void on the
ground of want of public interest unless the want of such interest is clear. (71 Am. Jur. pp. 371-372)

In the case at bar, the plaintiff paid the amount of P6,698,144.00 to the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority pursuant
to the P10 per bag of fertilizer sold imposition under LOI 1465 which, in turn, remitted the amount to the defendant
Planters Products, Inc. thru the latters depository bank, Far East Bank and Trust Co. Thus, by virtue of LOI 1465 the
plaintiff, Fertiphil Corporation, which is a private domestic corporation, became poorer by the amount of P6,698,144.00
and the defendant, Planters Product, Inc., another private domestic corporation, became richer by the amount of
P6,698,144.00.

Tested by the standards of constitutionality as set forth in the afore-quoted jurisprudence, it is quite evident that
LOI 1465 insofar as it imposes the amount of P10 per fertilizer bag sold in the country and orders that the said amount
should go to the defendant Planters Product, Inc. is unlawful because it violates the mandate that a tax can be levied only
for a public purpose and not to benefit, aid and promote a private enterprise such as Planters Product, Inc.[12]

PPI moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied.[13] PPI then filed a notice of appeal with the RTC but it
failed to pay the requisite appeal docket fee. In a separate but related proceeding, this Court[14] allowed the appeal of PPI
and remanded the case to the CA for proper disposition.

CA Decision

On November 28, 2003, the CA handed down its decision affirming with modification that of the RTC, with the
following fallo:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, subject to the
MODIFICATION that the award of attorneys fees is hereby DELETED.[15]

In affirming the RTC decision, the CA ruled that the lis mota of the complaint for collection was the
constitutionality of LOI No. 1465, thus:

The question then is whether it was proper for the trial court to exercise its power to judicially determine the
constitutionality of the subject statute in the instant case.

As a rule, where the controversy can be settled on other grounds, the courts will not resolve the constitutionality of
a law (Lim v. Pacquing, 240 SCRA 649 [1995]). The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions
and to presume that the acts of political departments are valid, absent a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary.

However, the courts are not precluded from exercising such power when the following requisites are obtaining in a
controversy before it: First, there must be before the court an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial review.
Second, the question must be ripe for adjudication. Third, the person challenging the validity of the act must have
standing to challenge. Fourth, the question of constitutionality must have been raised at the earliest opportunity; and
lastly, the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case (Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 338
SCRA 81 [2000]).

Indisputably, the present case was primarily instituted for collection and damages. However, a perusal of the
complaint also reveals
that the instant action is founded on the claim that the levy imposed was an unlawful and unconstitutional special
assessment. Consequently, the requisite that the constitutionality of the law in question be the very lis mota of the case is
present, making it proper for the trial court to rule on the constitutionality of LOI 1465.[16]

The CA held that even on the assumption that LOI No. 1465 was issued under the police power of the state, it is still
unconstitutional because it did not promote public welfare. The CA explained:

In declaring LOI 1465 unconstitutional, the trial court held that the levy imposed under the said law was an invalid
exercise of the States power of taxation inasmuch as it violated the inherent and constitutional prescription that taxes be
levied only for public purposes. It reasoned out that the amount collected under the levy was remitted to the depository
bank of PPI, which the latter used to advance its private interest.

On the other hand, appellant submits that the subject statutes passage was a valid exercise of police power. In
addition, it disputes the court a quos findings arguing that the collections under LOI 1465 was for the benefit of Planters
Foundation, Incorporated (PFI), a foundation created by law to hold in trust for millions of farmers, the stock ownership
of PPI.

Of the three fundamental powers of the State, the exercise of police power has been characterized as the most
essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great public needs. It may be exercised
as long as the activity or the property sought to be regulated has some relevance to public welfare (Constitutional Law, by
Isagani A. Cruz, p. 38, 1995 Edition).

Vast as the power is, however, it must be exercised within the limits set by the Constitution, which requires the
concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method. Thus, our courts have laid down the test to determine the validity of
a police measure as follows: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
requires its exercise; and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals (National Development Company v. Philippine Veterans Bank, 192 SCRA 257
[1990]).

It is upon applying this established tests that We sustain the trial courts holding LOI 1465 unconstitutional. To be
sure, ensuring the continued supply and distribution of fertilizer in the country is an undertaking imbued with public
interest. However, the method by which LOI 1465 sought to achieve this is by no means a measure that will promote the
public welfare. The governments commitment to support the successful rehabilitation and continued viability of PPI, a
private corporation, is an unmistakable attempt to mask the subject statutes impartiality. There is no way to treat the self-
interest of a favored entity,
like PPI, as identical with the general interest of the countrys farmers or even the Filipino people in general. Well to
stress, substantive due process exacts fairness and equal protection disallows distinction where none is needed. When a
statutes public purpose is spoiled by private interest, the use of police power becomes a travesty which must be struck
down for being an arbitrary exercise of government power. To rule in favor of appellant would contravene the general
principle that revenues derived from taxes cannot be used for purely private purposes or for the exclusive benefit of
private individuals.[17]

The CA did not accept PPIs claim that the levy imposed under LOI No. 1465 was for the benefit of Planters
Foundation, Inc., a foundation created to hold in trust the stock ownership of PPI. The CA stated:

Appellant next claims that the collections under LOI 1465 was for the benefit of Planters Foundation, Incorporated
(PFI), a foundation created by law to hold in trust for millions of farmers, the stock ownership of PFI on the strength of
Letter of Undertaking (LOU) issued by then Prime Minister Cesar Virata on April 18, 1985 and affirmed by the Secretary
of Justice in an Opinion dated October 12, 1987, to wit:

2. Upon the effective date of this Letter of Undertaking, the Republic shall cause FPA to include in its fertilizer
pricing formula a capital recovery component, the proceeds of which will be used initially for the purpose of funding the
unpaid portion of the outstanding capital stock of Planters presently held in trust by Planters Foundation, Inc. (Planters
Foundation), which unpaid capital is estimated at approximately P206 million (subject to validation by Planters and
Planters Foundation) (such unpaid portion of the outstanding capital stock of Planters being hereafter referred to as the
Unpaid Capital), and subsequently for such capital increases as may be required for the continuing viability of Planters.

The capital recovery component shall be in the minimum amount of P10 per bag, which will be added to the price
of all domestic sales of fertilizer in the Philippines by any importer and/or fertilizer mother company. In this connection,
the Republic hereby acknowledges that the advances by Planters to Planters Foundation which were applied to the
payment of the Planters shares now held in trust by Planters Foundation, have been assigned to, among others, the
Creditors. Accordingly, the Republic, through FPA, hereby agrees to deposit the proceeds of the capital recovery
component in the special trust account designated in the notice dated April 2, 1985, addressed by counsel for the Creditors
to Planters Foundation. Such proceeds shall be deposited by FPA on or before the 15th day of each month.



The capital recovery component shall continue to be charged and collected until payment in full of (a) the Unpaid
Capital and/or (b) any shortfall in the payment of the Subsidy Receivables, (c) any carrying cost accruing from the date
hereof on the amounts which may be outstanding from time to time of the Unpaid Capital and/or the Subsidy Receivables
and (d) the capital increases contemplated in paragraph 2 hereof. For the purpose of the foregoing clause (c), the carrying
cost shall be at such rate as will represent the full and reasonable cost to Planters of servicing its debts, taking into
account both its peso and foreign currency-denominated obligations. (Records, pp. 42-43)

Appellants proposition is open to question, to say the least. The LOU issued by then Prime Minister Virata taken
together with the Justice Secretarys Opinion does not preponderantly demonstrate that the collections made were held in
trust in favor of millions of farmers. Unfortunately for appellant, in the absence of sufficient evidence to establish its
claims, this Court is constrained to rely on what is explicitly provided in LOI 1465 that one of the primary aims in
imposing the levy is to support the successful rehabilitation and continued viability of PPI.[18]

PPI moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied.[19] It then filed the present petition with this Court.

Issues

Petitioner PPI raises four issues for Our consideration, viz.:

I
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LOI 1465 CANNOT BE COLLATERALLY ATTACKED AND BE DECREED VIA
A DEFAULT JUDGMENT IN A CASE FILED FOR COLLECTION AND DAMAGES WHERE THE ISSUE OF
CONSTITUTIONALITY IS NOT THE VERY LIS MOTA OF THE CASE. NEITHER CAN LOI 1465 BE
CHALLENGED BY ANY PERSON OR ENTITY WHICH HAS NO STANDING TO DO SO.

II
LOI 1465, BEING A LAW IMPLEMENTED FOR THE PURPOSE OF ASSURING THE FERTILIZER SUPPLY AND
DISTRIBUTION IN THE COUNTRY, AND FOR BENEFITING A FOUNDATION CREATED BY LAW TO HOLD
IN TRUST FOR MILLIONS OF FARMERS THEIR STOCK OWNERSHIP IN PPI CONSTITUTES A VALID
LEGISLATION PURSUANT TO THE EXERCISE OF TAXATION AND POLICE POWER FOR PUBLIC
PURPOSES.

III
THE AMOUNT COLLECTED UNDER THE CAPITAL RECOVERY COMPONENT WAS REMITTED TO THE
GOVERNMENT, AND BECAME GOVERNMENT FUNDS PURSUANT TO AN EFFECTIVE AND VALIDLY
ENACTED LAW WHICH IMPOSED DUTIES AND CONFERRED RIGHTS BY VIRTUE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF
OPERATIVE FACT PRIOR TO ANY DECLARATION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF LOI 1465.

IV
THE PRINCIPLE OF UNJUST VEXATION (SHOULD BE ENRICHMENT) FINDS NO APPLICATION IN THE
INSTANT CASE.[20] (Underscoring supplied)

Our Ruling

We shall first tackle the procedural issues of locus standi and the jurisdiction of the RTC to resolve constitutional
issues.

Fertiphil has locus standi because it suffered direct injury; doctrine of standing is a mere procedural technicality which
may be waived.

PPI argues that Fertiphil has no locus standi to question the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 because it does not have a
personal and substantial interest in the case or will sustain direct injury as a result of its enforcement.[21] It asserts that
Fertiphil did not suffer any damage from the CRC imposition because incidence of the levy fell on the ultimate consumer
or the farmers themselves, not on the seller fertilizer company.[22]

We cannot agree. The doctrine of locus standi or the right of appearance in a court of justice has been adequately
discussed by this Court in a catena of cases. Succinctly put, the doctrine requires a litigant to have a material interest in
the outcome of a case. In private suits, locus standi requires a litigant to be a real party in interest, which is defined as
the
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.[23]

In public suits, this Court recognizes the difficulty of applying the doctrine especially when plaintiff asserts a public right
on behalf of the general public because of conflicting public policy issues. [24] On one end, there is the right of the
ordinary citizen to petition the courts to be freed from unlawful government intrusion and illegal official action. At the
other end, there is the public policy precluding excessive judicial interference in official acts, which may unnecessarily
hinder the delivery of basic public services.

In this jurisdiction, We have adopted the direct injury test to determine locus standi in public suits. In People v.
Vera,[25] it was held that a person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in
the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result. The direct injury test in public suits is
similar to the real party in interest rule for private suits under Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.[26]

Recognizing that a strict application of the direct injury test may hamper public interest, this Court relaxed the
requirement in cases of transcendental importance or with far reaching implications. Being a mere procedural
technicality, it has also been held that locus standi may be waived in the public interest.[27]




Whether or not the complaint for collection is characterized as a private or public suit, Fertiphil has locus standi to file it.
Fertiphil suffered a direct injury from the enforcement of LOI No. 1465. It was required, and it did pay, the P10 levy
imposed for every bag of fertilizer sold on the domestic market. It may be true that Fertiphil has passed some or all of the
levy to the ultimate consumer, but that does not disqualify it from attacking the constitutionality of the LOI or from
seeking a refund. As seller, it bore the ultimate burden of paying the levy. It faced the possibility of severe sanctions for
failure to pay the levy. The fact of payment is sufficient injury to Fertiphil.

Moreover, Fertiphil suffered harm from the enforcement of the LOI because it was compelled to factor in its product the
levy. The levy certainly rendered the fertilizer products of Fertiphil and other domestic sellers much more expensive.
The harm to their business consists not only in fewer clients because of the increased price, but also in adopting
alternative corporate strategies to meet the demands of LOI No. 1465. Fertiphil and other fertilizer sellers may have
shouldered all or part of the levy just to be competitive in the market. The harm occasioned on the business of Fertiphil is
sufficient injury for purposes of locus standi.

Even assuming arguendo that there is no direct injury, We find that the liberal policy consistently adopted by this Court on
locus standi must apply. The issues raised by Fertiphil are of paramount public importance. It involves not only the
constitutionality of a tax law but, more importantly, the use of taxes for public purpose. Former President Marcos issued
LOI No. 1465 with the intention of rehabilitating an ailing private company. This is clear from the text of the LOI. PPI is
expressly named in the LOI as the direct beneficiary of the levy. Worse, the levy was made dependent and conditional
upon PPI becoming financially viable. The LOI provided that the capital contribution shall be collected until adequate
capital is raised to make PPI viable.

The constitutionality of the levy is already in doubt on a plain reading of the statute. It is Our constitutional duty to
squarely resolve the issue as the final arbiter of all justiciable controversies. The doctrine of standing, being a mere
procedural technicality, should be waived, if at all, to adequately thresh out an important constitutional issue.

RTC may resolve constitutional issues; the constitutional issue was adequately raised in the complaint; it is the lis mota of
the case.

PPI insists that the RTC and the CA erred in ruling on the constitutionality of the LOI. It asserts that the constitutionality
of the LOI cannot be collaterally attacked in a complaint for collection.[28] Alternatively, the resolution of the
constitutional issue is not necessary for a determination of the complaint for collection.[29]

Fertiphil counters that the constitutionality of the LOI was adequately pleaded in its complaint. It claims that the
constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 is the very lis mota of the case because the trial court cannot determine its claim without
resolving the issue.[30]

It is settled that the RTC has jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a statute, presidential decree or an executive
order. This is clear from Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:




SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

x x x x

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide,
final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. (Underscoring supplied)

In Mirasol v. Court of Appeals,[31] this Court recognized the power of the RTC to resolve constitutional issues, thus:

On the first issue. It is settled that Regional Trial Courts have the authority and jurisdiction to consider the
constitutionality of a statute, presidential decree, or executive order. The Constitution vests the power of judicial review
or the power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in all Regional Trial Courts.[32]

In the recent case of Equi-Asia Placement, Inc. v. Department of Foreign Affairs,[33] this Court reiterated:

There is no denying that regular courts have jurisdiction over cases involving the validity or constitutionality of a rule or
regulation issued by administrative agencies. Such jurisdiction, however, is not limited to the Court of Appeals or to this
Court alone for even the regional trial courts can take cognizance of actions assailing a specific rule or set of rules
promulgated by administrative bodies. Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare
a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the
courts, including the regional trial courts.[34]

Judicial review of official acts on the ground of unconstitutionality may be sought or availed of through any of the actions
cognizable by courts of justice, not necessarily in a suit for declaratory relief. Such review may be had in criminal
actions, as in People v. Ferrer[35] involving the constitutionality of the now defunct Anti-Subversion law, or in ordinary
actions, as in Krivenko v. Register of Deeds[36] involving the constitutionality of laws prohibiting aliens from acquiring
public lands. The constitutional issue, however, (a) must be properly raised and presented in the case, and (b) its
resolution is necessary to a determination of the case, i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota
presented.[37]

Contrary to PPIs claim, the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 was properly and adequately raised in the complaint for
collection filed with the RTC. The pertinent portions of the complaint allege:

6. The CRC of P10 per bag levied under LOI 1465 on domestic sales of all grades of fertilizer in the Philippines, is
unlawful, unjust, uncalled for, unreasonable, inequitable and oppressive because:

x x x x

(c) It favors only one private domestic corporation, i.e., defendant PPPI, and imposed at the expense and disadvantage of
the other fertilizer importers/distributors who were themselves in tight business situation and were then exerting all efforts
and maximizing management and marketing skills to remain viable;

x x x x

(e) It was a glaring example of crony capitalism, a forced program through which the PPI, having been presumptuously
masqueraded as the fertilizer industry itself, was the sole and anointed beneficiary;

7. The CRC was an unlawful; and unconstitutional special assessment and its imposition is tantamount to illegal exaction
amounting to a denial of due process since the persons of entities which had to bear the burden of paying the CRC derived
no benefit therefrom; that on the contrary it was used by PPI in trying to regain its former despicable monopoly of the
fertilizer industry to the detriment of other distributors and importers.[38] (Underscoring supplied)

The constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 is also the very lis mota of the complaint for collection. Fertiphil filed the
complaint to compel PPI to refund the levies paid under the statute on the ground that the law imposing the levy is
unconstitutional. The thesis is that an unconstitutional law is void. It has no legal effect. Being void, Fertiphil had no
legal obligation to pay the levy. Necessarily, all levies duly paid pursuant to an unconstitutional law should be refunded
under the civil code principle against unjust enrichment. The refund is a mere consequence of the law being declared
unconstitutional. The RTC surely cannot order PPI to refund Fertiphil if it does not declare the LOI unconstitutional. It is
the unconstitutionality of the LOI which triggers the refund. The issue of constitutionality is the very lis mota of the
complaint with the RTC.

The P10 levy under LOI No. 1465 is an exercise of the power of taxation.

At any rate, the Court holds that the RTC and the CA did not err in ruling against the constitutionality of the LOI.

PPI insists that LOI No. 1465 is a valid exercise either of the police power or the power of taxation. It claims that the LOI
was implemented for the purpose of assuring the fertilizer supply and distribution in the country and for benefiting a
foundation created by law to hold in trust for millions of farmers their stock ownership in PPI.

Fertiphil counters that the LOI is unconstitutional because it was enacted to give benefit to a private company. The levy
was imposed to pay the corporate debt of PPI. Fertiphil also argues that, even if the LOI is enacted under the police
power, it is still unconstitutional because it did not promote the general welfare of the people or public interest.

Police power and the power of taxation are inherent powers of the State. These powers are distinct and have different
tests for validity. Police power is the power of the State to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or
property in order to promote the general welfare,[39] while the power of taxation is the power to levy taxes to be used for
public purpose. The main purpose of police power is the regulation of a behavior or conduct, while taxation is revenue
generation. The lawful subjects and lawful means tests are used to determine the validity of a law enacted under the
police power.[40] The power of taxation, on the other hand, is circumscribed by inherent and constitutional limitations.

We agree with the RTC that the imposition of the levy was an exercise by the State of its taxation power. While it is true
that the power of taxation can be used as an implement of police power,[41] the primary purpose of the levy is revenue
generation. If the purpose is primarily revenue, or if revenue is, at least, one of the real and substantial purposes, then the
exaction is properly called a tax.[42]

In Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Edu,[43] it was held that the imposition of a vehicle registration fee is not an exercise by the
State of its police power, but of its taxation power, thus:

It is clear from the provisions of Section 73 of Commonwealth Act 123 and Section 61 of the Land Transportation and
Traffic Code that the legislative intent and purpose behind the law requiring owners of vehicles to pay for their
registration is mainly to raise funds for the construction and maintenance of highways and to a much lesser degree, pay for
the operating expenses of the administering agency. x x x Fees may be properly regarded as taxes even though they also
serve as an instrument of regulation.

Taxation may be made the implement of the state's police power (Lutz v. Araneta, 98 Phil. 148). If the purpose is
primarily revenue, or if revenue is, at least, one of the real and substantial purposes, then the exaction is properly called a
tax. Such is the case of motor vehicle registration fees. The same provision appears as Section 59(b) in the Land
Transportation Code. It is patent therefrom that the legislators had in mind a regulatory tax as the law refers to the
imposition on the registration, operation or ownership of a motor vehicle as a tax or fee. x x x Simply put, if the
exaction under Rep. Act 4136 were merely a regulatory fee, the imposition in Rep. Act 5448 need not be an additional
tax. Rep. Act 4136 also speaks of other fees such as the special permit fees for certain types of motor vehicles (Sec. 10)
and additional fees for change of registration (Sec. 11). These are not to be understood as taxes because such fees are
very minimal to be revenue-raising. Thus, they are not mentioned by Sec. 59(b) of the Code as taxes like the motor
vehicle registration fee and chauffeurs license fee. Such fees are to go into the expenditures of the Land Transportation
Commission as provided for in the last proviso of Sec. 61.[44] (Underscoring supplied)

The P10 levy under LOI No. 1465 is too excessive to serve a mere regulatory purpose. The levy, no doubt, was a big
burden on the seller or the ultimate consumer. It increased the price of a bag of fertilizer by as much as five percent.[45]
A plain reading of the LOI also supports the conclusion that the levy was for revenue generation. The LOI expressly
provided that the levy was imposed until adequate capital is raised to make PPI viable.

Taxes are exacted only for a public purpose. The P10 levy is unconstitutional because it was not for a public purpose. The
levy was imposed to give undue benefit to PPI.

An inherent limitation on the power of taxation is public purpose. Taxes are exacted only for a public purpose. They
cannot be used for purely private purposes or for the exclusive benefit of private persons.[46] The reason for this is
simple. The power to tax exists for the general welfare; hence, implicit in its power is the limitation that it should be used
only for a public purpose. It would be a robbery for the State to tax its citizens and use the funds generated for a private
purpose. As an old United States case bluntly put it: To lay with one hand, the power of the government on the property
of the citizen, and with the other to bestow it upon favored individuals to aid private enterprises and build up private
fortunes, is nonetheless a robbery because it is done under the forms of law and is called taxation.[47]

The term public purpose is not defined. It is an elastic concept that can be hammered to fit modern standards.
Jurisprudence states that public purpose should be given a broad interpretation. It does not only pertain to those
purposes which are traditionally viewed as essentially government functions, such as building roads and delivery of basic
services, but also includes those purposes designed to promote social justice. Thus, public money may now be used for
the relocation of illegal settlers, low-cost housing and urban or agrarian reform.

While the categories of what may constitute a public purpose are continually expanding in light of the expansion of
government functions, the inherent requirement that taxes can only be exacted for a public purpose still stands. Public
purpose is the heart of a tax law. When a tax law is only a mask to exact funds from the public when its true intent is to
give undue benefit and advantage to a private enterprise, that law will not satisfy the requirement of public purpose.

The purpose of a law is evident from its text or inferable from other secondary sources. Here, We agree with the RTC and
that CA that the levy imposed under LOI No. 1465 was not for a public purpose.

First, the LOI expressly provided that the levy be imposed to benefit PPI, a private company. The purpose is explicit from
Clause 3 of the law, thus:

3. The Administrator of the Fertilizer Pesticide Authority to include in its fertilizer pricing formula a capital contribution
component of not less than P10 per bag. This capital contribution shall be collected until adequate capital is raised to
make PPI viable. Such capital contribution shall be applied by FPA to all domestic sales of fertilizers in the
Philippines.[48] (Underscoring supplied)



It is a basic rule of statutory construction that the text of a statute should be given a literal meaning. In this case, the text
of the LOI is plain that the levy was imposed in order to raise capital for PPI. The framers of the LOI did not even hide
the insidious purpose of the law. They were cavalier enough to name PPI as the ultimate beneficiary of the taxes levied
under the LOI. We find it utterly repulsive that a tax law would expressly name a private company as the ultimate
beneficiary of the taxes to be levied from the public. This is a clear case of crony capitalism.

Second, the LOI provides that the imposition of the P10 levy was conditional and dependent upon PPI becoming
financially viable. This suggests that the levy was actually imposed to benefit PPI. The LOI notably does not fix a
maximum amount when PPI is deemed financially viable. Worse, the liability of Fertiphil and other domestic sellers of
fertilizer to pay the levy is made indefinite. They are required to continuously pay the levy until adequate capital is raised
for PPI.

Third, the RTC and the CA held that the levies paid under the LOI were directly remitted and deposited by FPA to Far
East Bank and Trust Company, the depositary bank of PPI.[49] This proves that PPI benefited from the LOI. It is also
proves that the main purpose of the law was to give undue benefit and advantage to PPI.

Fourth, the levy was used to pay the corporate debts of PPI. A reading of the Letter of Understanding[50] dated May 18,
1985 signed by then Prime Minister Cesar Virata reveals that PPI was in deep financial problem because of its huge
corporate debts. There were pending petitions for rehabilitation against PPI before the Securities and Exchange
Commission. The government guaranteed payment of PPIs debts to its foreign creditors. To fund the payment, President
Marcos issued LOI No. 1465. The pertinent portions of the letter of understanding read:

Republic of the Philippines
Office of the Prime Minister
Manila

LETTER OF UNDERTAKING

May 18, 1985

TO: THE BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
LISTED IN ANNEX A HERETO WHICH ARE
CREDITORS (COLLECTIVELY, THE CREDITORS)
OF PLANTERS PRODUCTS, INC. (PLANTERS)

Gentlemen:

This has reference to Planters which is the principal importer and distributor of fertilizer, pesticides and
agricultural chemicals in the Philippines. As regards Planters, the Philippine Government confirms its awareness of the
following: (1) that Planters has outstanding obligations in foreign currency and/or pesos, to the Creditors, (2) that Planters
is currently experiencing financial difficulties, and (3) that there are presently pending with the Securities and Exchange
Commission of the Philippines a petition filed at Planters own behest for the suspension of payment of all its obligations,
and a separate petition filed by Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company, Manila Offshore Branch for the appointment of a
rehabilitation receiver for Planters.

In connection with the foregoing, the Republic of the Philippines (the Republic) confirms that it considers and
continues to consider Planters as a major fertilizer distributor. Accordingly, for and in consideration of your expressed
willingness to consider and participate in the effort to rehabilitate Planters, the Republic hereby manifests its full and
unqualified support of the successful rehabilitation and continuing viability of Planters, and to that end, hereby binds and
obligates itself to the creditors and Planters, as follows:

x x x x

2. Upon the effective date of this Letter of Undertaking, the Republic shall cause FPA to include in its fertilizer pricing
formula a capital recovery component, the proceeds of which will be used initially for the purpose of funding the unpaid
portion of the outstanding capital stock of Planters presently held in trust by Planters Foundation, Inc. (Planters
Foundation), which unpaid capital is estimated at approximately P206 million (subject to validation by Planters and
Planters Foundation) such unpaid portion of the outstanding capital stock of Planters being hereafter referred to as the
Unpaid Capital), and subsequently for such capital increases as may be required for the continuing viability of Planters.

x x x x

The capital recovery component shall continue to be charged and collected until payment in full of (a) the Unpaid Capital
and/or (b) any shortfall in the payment of the Subsidy Receivables, (c) any carrying cost accruing from the date hereof on
the amounts which may be outstanding from time to time of the Unpaid Capital and/or the Subsidy Receivables, and (d)
the capital increases contemplated in paragraph 2 hereof. For the purpose of the foregoing clause (c), the carrying cost
shall be at such rate as will represent the full and reasonable cost to Planters of servicing its debts, taking into account
both its peso and foreign currency-denominated obligations.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
By:
(signed)
CESAR E. A. VIRATA
Prime Minister and Minister of Finance[51]

It is clear from the Letter of Understanding that the levy was imposed precisely to pay the corporate debts of PPI. We
cannot agree with PPI that the levy was imposed to ensure the stability of the fertilizer industry in the country. The letter
of understanding and the plain text of the LOI clearly indicate that the levy was exacted for the benefit of a private
corporation.

All told, the RTC and the CA did not err in holding that the levy imposed under LOI No. 1465 was not for a public
purpose. LOI No. 1465 failed to comply with the public purpose requirement for tax laws.

The LOI is still unconstitutional even if enacted under the police power; it did not promote public interest.

Even if We consider LOI No. 1695 enacted under the police power of the State, it would still be invalid for failing
to comply with the test of lawful subjects and lawful means. Jurisprudence states the test as follows: (1) the interest
of the public generally, as distinguished from those of particular class, requires its exercise; and (2) the means employed
are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.[52]
For the same reasons as discussed, LOI No. 1695 is invalid because it did not promote public interest. The law was
enacted to give undue advantage to a private corporation. We quote with approval the CA ratiocination on this point,
thus:

It is upon applying this established tests that We sustain the trial courts holding LOI 1465 unconstitutional. To be sure,
ensuring the continued supply and distribution of fertilizer in the country is an undertaking imbued with public interest.
However, the method by which LOI 1465 sought to achieve this is by no means a measure that will promote the public
welfare. The governments commitment to support the successful rehabilitation and continued viability of PPI, a private
corporation, is an unmistakable attempt to mask the subject statutes impartiality. There is no way to treat the self-interest
of a favored entity, like PPI, as identical with the general interest of the countrys farmers or even the Filipino people in
general. Well to stress, substantive due process exacts fairness and equal protection disallows distinction where none is
needed. When a statutes public purpose is spoiled by private interest, the use of police power becomes a travesty which
must be struck down for being an arbitrary exercise of government power. To rule in favor of appellant would contravene
the general principle that revenues derived from taxes cannot be used for purely private purposes or for the exclusive
benefit of private individuals. (Underscoring supplied)

The general rule is that an unconstitutional law is void; the doctrine of operative fact is inapplicable.

PPI also argues that Fertiphil cannot seek a refund even if LOI No. 1465 is declared unconstitutional. It banks on the
doctrine of operative fact, which provides that an unconstitutional law has an effect before being declared
unconstitutional. PPI wants to retain the levies paid under LOI No. 1465 even if it is subsequently declared to be
unconstitutional.

We cannot agree. It is settled that no question, issue or argument will be entertained on appeal, unless it has been raised in
the court a quo.[53] PPI did not raise the applicability of the doctrine of operative fact with the RTC and the CA. It
cannot belatedly raise the issue with Us in order to extricate itself from the dire effects of an unconstitutional law.

At any rate, We find the doctrine inapplicable. The general rule is that an unconstitutional law is void. It produces no
rights, imposes no duties and affords no protection. It has no legal effect. It is, in legal contemplation, inoperative as if it
has not been passed.[54] Being void, Fertiphil is not required to pay the levy. All levies paid should be refunded in
accordance with the general civil code principle against unjust enrichment. The general rule is supported by Article 7 of
the Civil Code, which provides:

ART. 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse
or custom or practice to the contrary.

When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.

The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair play.[55] It
nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of
unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot
always be erased by a new judicial declaration.[56]

The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have
relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when a declaration of unconstitutionality would put the
accused in double jeopardy[57] or would put in limbo the acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a law creating
it.[58]

Here, We do not find anything iniquitous in ordering PPI to refund the amounts paid by Fertiphil under LOI No. 1465. It
unduly benefited from the levy. It was proven during the trial that the levies paid were remitted and deposited to its bank
account. Quite the reverse, it would be inequitable and unjust not to order a refund. To do so would unjustly enrich PPI
at the expense of Fertiphil. Article 22 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that every person who, through an act of
performance by another comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground shall
return the same to him. We cannot allow PPI to profit from an unconstitutional law. Justice and equity dictate that PPI
must refund the amounts paid by Fertiphil.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated November 28, 2003 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.



RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice



WE CONCUR:




CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson




MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice Associate Justice




ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice





A T T E S T A T I O N


I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.



CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson




C E R T I F I C A T I O N


Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.



REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice



[1] Rollo, pp. 51-59. Penned by Associate Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr., with Associate Justices Bienvenido L. Reyes
and Arsenio L. Magpale, concurring.
[2] Id. at 75-77. Penned by Judge Teofilo L. Guadiz, Jr.
[3] Id. at 8.
[4] Id. at 75.
[5] Id. at 155.
[6] Id. at 76.
[7] Id.
[8] Id. at 195-202.
[9] Id. at 196.
[10] Id. at 66-73, 277.
[11] Id. at 77.
[12] Id. at 76-77.
[13] Id. at 14.
[14] Id. at 83-93. G.R. No. 156278, entitled Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation.
[15] Id. at 59.
[16] Id. at 54-55.
[17] Id. at 129-130.
[18] Id. at 55-58.
[19] Id. at 61-62.
[20] Id. at 15.
[21] Id. at 21.
[22] Id.
[23] Rules of Civil Procedure (1997), Rule 3, Sec. 2 provides:
A real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law of these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party-in-interest.
[24] David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. Nos. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483, 171400, 171489 & 171424, May 3, 2006,
489 SCRA 160.
[25] 65 Phil. 56 (1937).
[26] See note 23.
[27] See note 24.
[28] Rollo, p. 17.
[29] Id. at 18.
[30] Id. at 290.
[31] G.R. No. 128448, February 1, 2001, 351 SCRA 44.
[32] Mirasol v. Court of Appeals, id. at 51.
[33] G.R. No. 152214, September 19, 2006, 502 SCRA 295.
[34] Equi-Asia Placement, Inc. v. Department of Foreign Affairs, id. at 309.
[35] G.R. Nos. L-32613-14, December 27, 1972, 48 SCRA 382.
[36] 79 Phil. 461 (1947).
[37] Tropical Homes, Inc. v. National Housing Authority, G.R. No. L-48672, July 31, 1987, 152 SCRA 540.
[38] Rollo, pp. 197-198.
[39] Edu v. Ericta, G.R. No. L-32096, October 24, 1970, 35 SCRA 481.
[40] Lim v. Pacquing, G.R. Nos. 115044 & 117263, January 27, 1995, 240 SCRA 649.
[41] Lutz v. Araneta, 98 Phil. 148 (1966).
[42] Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Edu, G.R. No. L-41383, August 15, 1988, 164 SCRA 320.
[43] Supra.
[44] Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Edu, supra note 42, at 327-329.
[45] Rollo, p. 197.
[46] Cruz, I., Constitutional Law, 1998 ed., p. 90.
[47] Bernas, J., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 ed., p. 714.
[48] Rollo, p. 155.
[49] Id. at 52, 75-76.
[50] Id. at 150-154.
[51] Id.
[52] Id. at 55-58.
[53] Cojuangco, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119398, July 2, 1999, 309 SCRA 602, 614-615.
[54] See note 46, at 33-34.
[55] Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 79732, November 8, 1993, 227 SCRA 509.
[56] Peralta v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 95832, August 10, 1992, 212 SCRA 425.
[57] Tan v. Barrios, G.R. Nos. 85481-82, October 18, 1990, 190 SCRA 686, citing Aquino, Jr. v. Military Commission
No. 2, G.R. No. L-37364, May 9, 1975, 63 SCRA 546.
[58] Id., citing Municipality of Malabang v. Benito, G.R. No. L-28113, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 533.

Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila

EN BANC

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP), represented by LCP National President Jerry P. Treas; CITY OF
CALBAYOG, represented by Mayor Mel Senen S. Sarmiento; and JERRY P. TREAS, in his personal capacity as
Taxpayer,
Petitioners,


- versus -


COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF BAYBAY, PROVINCE OF LEYTE; MUNICIPALITY OF
BOGO, PROVINCE OF CEBU; MUNICIPALITY OF CATBALOGAN, PROVINCE OF WESTERN SAMAR;
MUNICIPALITY OF TANDAG, PROVINCE OF SURIGAO DEL SUR; MUNICIPALITY OF BORONGAN,
PROVINCE OF EASTERN SAMAR; AND MUNICIPALITY OF TAYABAS, PROVINCE OF QUEZON,
Respondents.

X- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - X

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP), represented by LCP National President Jerry P. Treas; CITY OF
CALBAYOG, represented by Mayor Mel Senen S. Sarmiento; and JERRY P. TREAS, in his personal capacity as
Taxpayer,
Petitioners,
- versus -

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF LAMITAN, PROVINCE OF BASILAN; MUNICIPALITY OF
TABUK, PROVINCE OF KALINGA; MUNICIPALITY OF BAYUGAN, PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL SUR;
MUNICIPALITY OF BATAC, PROVINCE OF ILOCOS NORTE; MUNICIPALITY OF MATI, PROVINCE OF
DAVAO ORIENTAL; AND MUNICIPALITY OF GUIHULNGAN, PROVINCE OF NEGROS ORIENTAL,
Respondents.

X- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - X

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP), represented by LCP National President Jerry P. Treas; CITY OF
CALBAYOG, represented by Mayor Mel Senen S. Sarmiento; and JERRY P. TREAS, in his personal capacity as
Taxpayer,
Petitioners,


- versus -


COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF CABADBARAN, PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL NORTE;
MUNICIPALITY OF CARCAR, PROVINCE OF CEBU; MUNICIPALITY OF EL SALVADOR, PROVINCE OF
MISAMIS ORIENTAL; MUNICIPALITY OF NAGA, CEBU; and DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT,
Respondents.




G.R. No. 176951































G.R. No. 177499































G.R. No. 178056

Present:

CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA, and
SERENO, JJ.





Promulgated:

February 15, 2011
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x


RESOLUTION

BERSAMIN, J.:


For consideration of this Court are the following pleadings:

1. Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated August 24, 2010 dated and filed on September 14, 2010 by
respondents Municipality of Baybay, et al.; and

2. Opposition [To the Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated August 24, 2010].

Meanwhile, respondents also filed on September 20, 2010 a Motion to Set Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution dated August 24, 2010 for Hearing. This motion was, however, already denied by the Court En Banc.

A brief background

These cases were initiated by the consolidated petitions for prohibition filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines
(LCP), City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treas, assailing the constitutionality of the sixteen (16) laws,[1]
each converting the municipality covered thereby into a component city (Cityhood Laws), and seeking to enjoin the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the subject laws.

In the Decision dated November 18, 2008, the Court En Banc, by a 6-5 vote,[2] granted the petitions and struck down the
Cityhood Laws as unconstitutional for violating Sections 10 and 6, Article X, and the equal protection clause.

In the Resolution dated March 31, 2009, the Court En Banc, by a 7-5 vote,[3] denied the first motion for reconsideration.

On April 28, 2009, the Court En Banc issued a Resolution, with a vote of 6-6,[4] which denied the second motion for
reconsideration for being a prohibited pleading.

In its June 2, 2009 Resolution, the Court En Banc clarified its April 28, 2009 Resolution in this wise

As a rule, a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading pursuant to Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure which provides that: No second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same party
shall be entertained. Thus, a decision becomes final and executory after 15 days from receipt of the denial of the first
motion for reconsideration.

However, when a motion for leave to file and admit a second motion for reconsideration is granted by the Court, the Court
therefore allows the filing of the second motion for reconsideration. In such a case, the second motion for reconsideration
is no longer a prohibited pleading.

In the present case, the Court voted on the second motion for reconsideration filed by respondent cities. In effect, the
Court allowed the filing of the second motion for reconsideration. Thus, the second motion for reconsideration was no
longer a prohibited pleading. However, for lack of the required number of votes to overturn the 18 November 2008
Decision and 31 March 2009 Resolution, the Court denied the second motion for reconsideration in its 28 April 2009
Resolution.[5]


Then, in another Decision dated December 21, 2009, the Court En Banc, by a vote of 6-4,[6] declared the Cityhood Laws
as constitutional.

On August 24, 2010, the Court En Banc, through a Resolution, by a vote of 7-6,[7] resolved the Ad Cautelam Motion for
Reconsideration and Motion to Annul the Decision of December 21, 2009, both filed by petitioners, and the Ad Cautelam
Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners-in-intervention Batangas City, Santiago City, Legazpi City, Iriga City,
Cadiz City, and Oroquieta City, reinstating the November 18, 2008 Decision. Hence, the aforementioned pleadings.

Considering these circumstances where the Court En Banc has twice changed its position on the constitutionality of the 16
Cityhood Laws, and especially taking note of the novelty of the issues involved in these cases, the Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution dated August 24, 2010 deserves favorable action by this Court on the basis of the
following cogent points:

1.
The 16 Cityhood Bills do not violate Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution.

Article X, Section 10 provides

Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.

The tenor of the ponencias of the November 18, 2008 Decision and the August 24, 2010 Resolution is that the exemption
clauses in the 16 Cityhood Laws are unconstitutional because they are not written in the Local Government Code of 1991
(LGC), particularly Section 450 thereof, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9009, which took effect on June 30,
2001, viz.

Section 450. Requisites for Creation. a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city
if it has a locally generated annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least One Hundred Million
Pesos (P100,000,000.00) for at least two (2) consecutive years based on 2000 constant prices, and if it has either of the
following requisites:

x x x x

(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers,
and non-recurring income. (Emphasis supplied)


Prior to the amendment, Section 450 of the LGC required only an average annual income, as certified by the Department
of Finance, of at least P20,000,000.00 for the last two (2) consecutive years, based on 1991 constant prices.

Before Senate Bill No. 2157, now R.A. No. 9009, was introduced by Senator Aquilino Pimentel, there were 57 bills
filed for conversion of 57 municipalities into component cities. During the 11th Congress (June 1998-June 2001), 33 of
these bills were enacted into law, while 24 remained as pending bills. Among these 24 were the 16 municipalities that
were converted into component cities through the Cityhood Laws.

The rationale for the enactment of R.A. No. 9009 can be gleaned from the sponsorship speech of Senator Pimentel
on Senate Bill No. 2157, to wit

Senator Pimentel. Mr. President, I would have wanted this bill to be included in the whole set of proposed amendments
that we have introduced to precisely amend the Local Government Code. However, it is a fact that there is a mad rush of
municipalities wanting to be converted into cities. Whereas in 1991, when the Local Government was approved, there
were only 60 cities, today the number has increased to 85 cities, with 41 more municipalities applying for conversion to
the same status. At the rate we are going, I am apprehensive that before long this nation will be a nation of all cities and
no municipalities.

It is for that reason, Mr. President, that we are proposing among other things, that the financial requirement, which, under
the Local Government Code, is fixed at P20 million, be raised to P100 million to enable a municipality to have the right to
be converted into a city, and the P100 million should be sourced from locally generated funds.

What has been happening, Mr. President, is, the municipalities aspiring to become cities say that they qualify in terms of
financial requirements by incorporating the Internal Revenue share of the taxes of the nation on to their regularly
generated revenue. Under that requirement, it looks clear to me that practically all municipalities in this country would
qualify to become cities.

It is precisely for that reason, therefore, that we are seeking the approval of this Chamber to amend, particularly Section
450 of Republic Act No. 7160, the requisite for the average annual income of a municipality to be converted into a city or
cluster of barangays which seek to be converted into a city, raising that revenue requirement from P20 million to P100
million for the last two consecutive years based on 2000 constant prices.[8]

While R.A. No. 9009 was being deliberated upon, Congress was well aware of the pendency of conversion bills of several
municipalities, including those covered by the Cityhood Laws, desiring to become component cities which qualified under
the P20 million income requirement of the old Section 450 of the LGC. The interpellation of Senate President Franklin
Drilon of Senator Pimentel is revealing, thus

THE PRESIDENT. The Chair would like to ask for some clarificatory point.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT. This is just on the point of the pending bills in the Senate which propose the conversion of a number
of municipalities into cities and which qualify under the present standard.

We would like to know the view of the sponsor: Assuming that this bill becomes a law, will the Chamber apply
the standard as proposed in this bill to those bills which are pending for consideration?

SENATOR PIMENTEL. Mr. President, it might not be fair to make this bill, on the assumption that it is approved,
retroact to the bills that are pending in the Senate conversion from municipalities to cities.

THE PRESIDENT. Will there be an appropriate language crafted to reflect that view? Or does it not become a policy of
the Chamber, assuming that this bill becomes a law tomorrow, that it will apply to those bills which are already approved
by the House under the old version of the Local Government Code and are now pending in the Senate? The Chair does
not know if we can craft a language which will limit the application to those which are not yet in the Senate. Or is that a
policy that the Chamber will adopt?

SENATOR PIMENTEL. Mr. President, personally, I do not think it is necessary to put that provision because what we
are saying here will form part of the interpretation of this bill. Besides, if there is no retroactivity clause, I do not think
that the bill would have any retroactive effect.

THE PRESIDENT. So the understanding is that those bills which are already pending in the Chamber will not be
affected.

SENATOR PIMENTEL. These will not be affected, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT. Thank you Mr. Chairman.[9]


Clearly, based on the above exchange, Congress intended that those with pending cityhood bills during the 11th Congress
would not be covered by the new and higher income requirement of P100 million imposed by R.A. No. 9009. When the
LGC was amended by R.A. No. 9009, the amendment carried with it both the letter and the intent of the law, and such
were incorporated in the LGC by which the compliance of the Cityhood Laws was gauged.

Notwithstanding that both the 11th and 12th Congress failed to act upon the pending cityhood bills, both the letter
and intent of Section 450 of the LGC, as amended by R.A. No. 9009, were carried on until the 13th Congress, when the
Cityhood Laws were enacted. The exemption clauses found in the individual Cityhood Laws are the express articulation
of that intent to exempt respondent municipalities from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009.

Even if we were to ignore the above quoted exchange between then Senate President Drilon and Senator Pimentel,
it cannot be denied that Congress saw the wisdom of exempting respondent municipalities from complying with the
higher income requirement imposed by the amendatory R.A. No. 9009. Indeed, these municipalities have proven
themselves viable and capable to become component cities of their respective provinces. It is also acknowledged that they
were centers of trade and commerce, points of convergence of transportation, rich havens of agricultural, mineral, and
other natural resources, and flourishing tourism spots. In this regard, it is worthy to mention the distinctive traits of each
respondent municipality, viz

Batac, Ilocos Norte It is the biggest municipality of the 2nd District of Ilocos Norte, 2nd largest and most progressive
town in the province of Ilocos Norte and the natural convergence point for the neighboring towns to transact their
commercial ventures and other daily activities. A growing metropolis, Batac is equipped with amenities of modern living
like banking institutions, satellite cable systems, telecommunications systems. Adequate roads, markets, hospitals, public
transport systems, sports, and entertainment facilities. [Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 5941, introduced by Rep.
Imee R. Marcos.]

El Salvador, Misamis Oriental It is located at the center of the Cagayan-Iligan Industrial Corridor and home to a number
of industrial companies and corporations. Investment and financial affluence of El Salvador is aptly credited to its
industrious and preserving people. Thus, it has become the growing investment choice even besting nearby cities and
municipalities. It is home to Asia Brewery as distribution port of their product in Mindanao. The Gokongwei Group of
Companies is also doing business in the area. So, the conversion is primarily envisioned to spur economic and financial
prosperity to this coastal place in North-Western Misamis Oriental. [Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 6003,
introduced by Rep. Augusto H. Bacullo.]
Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte It is the largest of the eleven (11) municipalities in the province of Agusan del Norte. It
plays strategic importance to the administrative and socio-economic life and development of Agusan del Norte. It is the
foremost in terms of trade, commerce, and industry. Hence, the municipality was declared as the new seat and capital of
the provincial government of Agusan del Norte pursuant to Republic Act No. 8811 enacted into law on August 16, 2000.
Its conversion will certainly promote, invigorate, and reinforce the economic potential of the province in establishing
itself as an agro-industrial center in the Caraga region and accelerate the development of the area. [Explanatory Note of
House Bill No. 3094, introduced by Rep. Ma. Angelica Rosedell M. Amante.]

Borongan, Eastern Samar It is the capital town of Eastern Samar and the development of Eastern Samar will depend to a
certain degree of its urbanization. It will serve as a catalyst for the modernization and progress of adjacent towns
considering the frequent interactions between the populace. [Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 2640, introduced by
Rep. Marcelino C. Libanan.]

Lamitan, Basilan Before Basilan City was converted into a separate province, Lamitan was the most progressive part of
the city. It has been for centuries the center of commerce and the seat of the Sultanate of the Yakan people of Basilan.
The source of its income is agro-industrial and others notably copra, rubber, coffee and host of income generating
ventures. As the most progressive town in Basilan, Lamitan continues to be the center of commerce catering to the
municipalities of Tuburan, Tipo-Tipo and Sumisip. [Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 5786, introduced by Rep. Gerry
A. Salapuddin.]

Catbalogan, Samar It has always been the socio-economic-political capital of the Island of Samar even during the
Spanish era. It is the seat of government of the two congressional districts of Samar. Ideally located at the crossroad
between Northern and Eastern Samar, Catbalogan also hosts trade and commerce activates among the more prosperous
cities of the Visayas like Tacloban City, Cebu City and the cities of Bicol region. The numerous banks and
telecommunication facilities showcases the healthy economic environment of the municipality. The preeminent and
sustainable economic situation of Catbalogan has further boosted the call of residents for a more vigorous involvement of
governance of the municipal government that is inherent in a city government. [Explanatory Note of House Bill No.
2088, introduced by Rep. Catalino V. Figueroa.]

Bogo, Cebu Bogo is very qualified for a city in terms of income, population and area among others. It has been elevated
to the Hall of Fame being a five-time winner nationwide in the clean and green program. [Explanatory Note of House Bill
No. 3042, introduced by Rep. Clavel A. Martinez.]

Tandag, Surigao del Sur This over 350 year old capital town the province has long sought its conversion into a city that
will pave the way not only for its own growth and advancement but also help in the development of its neighboring
municipalities and the province as a whole. Furthermore, it can enhance its role as the provinces trade, financial and
government center. [Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 5940, introduced by Rep. Prospero A. Pichay, Jr.]

Bayugan, Agusan del Sur It is a first class municipality and the biggest in terms of population in the entire province. It
has the most progressive and thickly populated area among the 14 municipalit ies that comprise the province. Thus, it has
become the center for trade and commerce in Agusan del Sur. It has a more developed infrastructure and facilities than
other municipalities in the province. [Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 1899, introduced by Rep. Rodolfo Ompong
G. Plaza.]

Carcar, Cebu Through the years, Carcar metamorphosed from rural to urban and now boast of its manufacturing
industry, agricultural farming, fishing and prawn industry and its thousands of large and small commercial establishments
contributing to the bulk of economic activities in the municipality. Based on consultation with multi-sectoral groups,
political and non-government agencies, residents and common folk in Carcar, they expressed their desire for the
conversion of the municipality into a component city. [Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 3990, introduced by Rep.
Eduardo R. Gullas.]

Guihulngan, Negros Oriental Its population is second highest in the province, next only to the provincial capital and
higher than Canlaon City and Bais City. Agriculture contributes heavily to its economy. There are very good prospects in
agricultural production brought about by its favorable climate. It has also the Tanon Strait that provides a good fishing
ground for its numerous fishermen. Its potential to grow commercially is certain. Its strategic location brought about by
its existing linkage networks and the major transportation corridors traversing the municipality has established
Guihulngan as the center of commerce and trade in this part of Negros Oriental with the first congressional district as its
immediate area of influence. Moreover, it has beautiful tourist spots that are being availed of by local and foreign tourists.
[Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 3628, introduced by Rep. Jacinto V. Paras.]

Tayabas, Quezon It flourished and expanded into an important politico-cultural center in [the] Tagalog region. For 131
years (1179-1910), it served as the cabecera of the province which originally carried the cabeceras own name, Tayabas.
The locality is rich in culture, heritage and trade. It was at the outset one of the more active centers of coordination and
delivery of basic, regular and diverse goods and services within the first district of Quezon Province. [Explanatory Note
of House Bill No. 3348, introduced by Rep. Rafael P. Nantes.]

Tabuk, Kalinga It not only serves as the main hub of commerce and trade, but also the cultural center of the rich
customs and traditions of the different municipalities in the province. For the past several years, the income of Tabuk has
been steadily increasing, which is an indication that its economy is likewise progressively growing. [Explanatory Note of
House Bill No. 3068, introduced by Rep. Laurence P. Wacnang.]

Available information on Baybay, Leyte; Mati, Davao Oriental; and Naga, Cebu shows their economic viability, thus:

Covering an area of 46,050 hectares, Baybay [Leyte] is composed of 92 barangays, 23 of which are in the poblacion. The
remaining 69 are rural barangays. Baybay City is classified as a first class city. It is situated on the western coast of the
province of Leyte. It has a Type 4 climate, which is generally wet. Its topography is generally mountainous in the eastern
portion as it slopes down west towards the shore line. Generally an agricultural city, the common means of livelihood are
farming and fishing. Some are engaged in hunting and in forestall activities. The most common crops grown are rice,
corn, root crops, fruits, and vegetables. Industries operating include the Specialty Products Manufacturing, Inc. and the
Visayan Oil Mill. Various cottage industries can also be found in the city such as bamboo and rattan craft, ceramics,
dress-making, fiber craft, food preservation, mat weaving, metal craft, fine Philippine furniture manufacturing and other
related activities. Baybay has great potential as a tourist destination, especially for tennis players. It is not only rich in
biodiversity and history, but it also houses the campus of the Visayas State University (formerly the Leyte State
University/Visayas State College of Agriculture/Visayas Agricultural College/Baybay National Agricultural
School/Baybay Agricultural High School and the Jungle Valley Park.) Likewise, it has river systems fit for river cruising,
numerous caves for spelunking, forests, beaches, and marine treasures. This richness, coupled with the friendly
Baybayanos, will be an element of a successful tourism program. Considering the role of tourism in development,
Baybay City intends to harness its tourism potential. (<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baybay City> visited September 19,
2008)

Mati [Davao Oriental] is located on the eastern part of the island of Mindanao. It is one hundred sixty-five (165)
kilometers away from Davao City, a one and a half-hour drive from Tagum City. Visitors can travel from Davao City
through the Madaum diversion road, which is shorter than taking the Davao-Tagum highway. Travels by air and sea are
possible, with the existence of an airport and seaport. Mati boasts of being the coconut capital of Mindanao if not the
whole country. A large portion of its fertile land is planted to coconuts, and a significant number of its population is
largely dependent on it. Other agricultural crops such as mango, banana, corn, coffee and cacao are also being cultivated,
as well as the famous Menzi pomelo and Valencia oranges. Mati has a long stretch of shoreline and one can find beaches
of pure, powder-like white sand. A number of resorts have been developed and are now open to serve both local and
international tourists. Some of these resorts are situated along the coast of Pujada Bay and the Pacific Ocean. Along the
western coast of the bay lies Mt. Hamiguitan, the home of the pygmy forest, where bonsai plants and trees grow, some of
which are believed to be a hundred years old or more. On its peak is a lake, called Tinagong Dagat, or hidden sea, so
covered by dense vegetation a climber has to hike trails for hours to reach it. The mountain is also host to rare species of
flora and fauna, thus becoming a wildlife sanctuary for these life forms. (<http://mati.wetpain.com/?t=anon> accessed on
September 19, 2008.)

Mati is abundant with nickel, chromite, and copper. Louie Rabat, Chamber President of the Davao Oriental Eastern
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, emphasized the big potential of the mining industry in the province of Davao
Oriental. As such, he strongly recommends Mati as the mining hub in the Region.
(<http://www.pia.gov.ph/default.asp?m=12&sec=reader&rp=1&fi=p080115.htm&no.=9&date, accessed on September
19, 2008)

Naga [Cebu]: Historical BackgroundIn the early times, the place now known as Naga was full of huge trees locally
called as Narra. The first settlers referred to this place as Narra, derived from the huge trees, which later simply became
Naga. Considered as one of the oldest settlements in the Province of Cebu, Naga became a municipality on June 12,
1829. The municipality has gone through a series of classifications as its economic development has undergone changes
and growth. The tranquil farming and fishing villages of the natives were agitated as the Spaniards came and discovered
coal in the uplands. Coal was the first export of the municipality, as the Spaniards mined and sent it to Spain. The mining
industry triggered the industrial development of Naga. As the years progressed, manufacturing and other industries
followed, making Naga one of the industrialized municipalities in the Province of Cebu.

Class of Municipality 1st class
Province Cebu
Distance from Cebu City 22 kms.
Number of Barangays 28
No. of Registered Voters 44,643 as of May 14, 2007
Total No. of Precincts 237 (as of May 14, 2007)
Ann. Income (as of Dec. 31, 2006) Php112,219,718.35 Agricultural,
Industrial, Agro-Industrial, Mining Product
(<http://www.nagacebu.com/index.php?option=com.content&view=article id=53:naga-facts-and-figures&catid=51:naga-
facts-and-figures&Itemid=75> visited September 19, 2008)


The enactment of the Cityhood Laws is an exercise by Congress of its legislative power. Legislative power is the
authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them.[10] The Constitution, as the expression of
the will of the people in their original, sovereign, and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the Congress of the
Philippines. The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general, and comprehensive. The legislative body
possesses plenary powers for all purposes of civil government. Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and
tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere. In fine, except as limited
by the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative power embraces all subjects, and extends to matters of
general concern or common interest.[11]

Without doubt, the LGC is a creation of Congress through its law-making powers. Congress has the power to alter
or modify it as it did when it enacted R.A. No. 9009. Such power of amendment of laws was again exercised when
Congress enacted the Cityhood Laws. When Congress enacted the LGC in 1991, it provided for quantifiable indicators of
economic viability for the creation of local government unitsincome, population, and land area. Congress deemed it fit
to modify the income requirement with respect to the conversion of municipalities into component cities when
it enacted R.A. No. 9009, imposing an amount of P100 million, computed only from locally-generated sources. However,
Congress deemed it wiser to exempt respondent municipalities from such a belatedly imposed modified income
requirement in order to uphold its higher calling of putting flesh and blood to the very intent and thrust of the LGC, which
is countryside development and autonomy, especially accounting for these municipalities as engines for economic growth
in their respective provinces.

Undeniably, R.A. No. 9009 amended the LGC. But it is also true that, in effect, the Cityhood Laws amended R.A.
No. 9009 through the exemption clauses found therein. Since the Cityhood Laws explicitly exempted the concerned
municipalities from the amendatory R.A. No. 9009, such Cityhood Laws are, therefore, also amendments to the LGC
itself. For this reason, we reverse the November 18, 2008 Decision and the August 24, 2010 Resolution on their strained
and stringent view that the Cityhood Laws, particularly their exemption clauses, are not found in the LGC.



2.
The Cityhood Laws do not violate Section 6, Article X and the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

Both the November 18, 2008 Decision and the August 24, 2010 Resolution impress that the Cityhood Laws violate
the equal protection clause enshrined in the Constitution. Further, it was also ruled that Section 6, Article X was violated
because the Cityhood Laws infringed on the just share that petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention shall receive from
the national taxes (IRA) to be automatically released to them.

Upon more profound reflection and deliberation, we declare that there was valid classification, and the Cityhood
Laws do not violate the equal protection clause.

As this Court has ruled, the equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution permits a valid classification, provided that it:
(1) rests on substantial distinctions; (2) is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) is not limited to existing conditions only;
and (4) applies equally to all members of the same class.[12]

The petitioners argue that there is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in
the 11th Congress and municipalities that did not have pending bills, such that the mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the
11th Congress is not a material difference to distinguish one municipality from another for the purpose of the income
requirement. This contention misses the point.


It should be recalled from the above quoted portions of the interpellation by Senate President Drilon of Senator
Pimentel that the purpose of the enactment of R.A. No 9009 was merely to stop the mad rush of municipalities wanting
to be converted into cities and the apprehension that before long the country will be a country of cities and without
municipalities. It should be pointed out that the imposition of the P100 million average annual income requirement for
the creation of component cities was arbitrarily made. To be sure, there was no evidence or empirical data, such as
inflation rates, to support the choice of this amount. The imposition of a very high income requirement of P100 million,
increased from P20 million, was simply to make it extremely difficult for municipalities to become component cities.
And to highlight such arbitrariness and the absurdity of the situation created thereby, R.A. No. 9009 has, in effect, placed
component cities at a higher standing than highly urbanized cities under Section 452 of the LGC, to wit

Section 452. Highly Urbanized Cities. (a) Cities with a minimum population of two hundred thousand (200,000)
inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics Office, and with the latest annual income of at least Fifty Million Pesos
(P50,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices, as certified by the city treasurer, shall be classified as highly urbanized
cities.

(b) Cities which do not meet above requirements shall be considered component cities of the province in which
they are geographically located. (Emphasis supplied)


The P100 million income requirement imposed by R.A. No. 9009, being an arbitrary amount, cannot be
conclusively said to be the only amount sufficient, based on acceptable standards, to provide for all essential
government facilities and services and special functions

commensurate with the size of its population, per Section 7[13] of the LGC. It was imposed merely because it is difficult
to comply with. While it could be argued that P100 million, being more than P20 million, could, of course, provide the
essential government facilities, services, and special functions vis--vis the population of a municipality wanting to
become a component city, it cannot be said that the minimum amount of P20 million would be insufficient. This is
evident from the existing cities whose income, up to now, do not comply with the P100 million income requirement, some
of which have lower than the P20 million average annual income. Consider the list[14] below

CITY
AVERAGE ANNUAL INCOME
1. Marawi City
5,291,522.10
2. Palayan City
6,714,651.77
3. Sipalay City
9,713,120.00
4. Canlaon City
13,552,493.79
5. Himamaylan City
15,808,530.00
6. Isabela City
16,811,246.79
7. Munoz City
19,693,358.61
8. Dapitan City
20,529,181.08
9. Tangub City
20,943,810.04
10. Bayawan City
22,943,810.04
11. Island Garden City of Samal
23,034,731.83
12. Tanjay City
23,723,612.44
13. Tabaco City
24,152,853.71
14. Oroquieta City
24,279,966.51
15. Ligao City
28,326,745.86
16. Sorsogon City
30,403,324.59
17. Maasin City
30,572,113.65
18. Escalante City
32,113,970.00
19. Iriga City
32,757,871.44
20. Gapan City
34,254,986.47
21. Candon City
36,327,705.86
22. Gingoog City
37,327,705.86
23. Masbate City
39,454,508.28
24. Passi City
40,314,620.00
25. Calbayog City
40,943,128.73
26. Calapan City
41,870,239.21
27. Cadiz City
43,827,060.00
28. Alaminos City
44,352,501.00
29. Bais City
44, 646,826.48
30. San Carlos City
46,306,129.13
31. Silay City
47,351,730.00
32. Bislig City
47,360,716.24
33. Tacurong City
49,026,281.56
34. Talisay City (Negros Occidental)
52,609,790.00
35. Kabankalan City
53,560,580.00
36. Malaybalay City
54,423,408.55
37. La Carlota City
54,760,290.00
38. Vigan City
56,831,797.19
39. Balanga City
61,556,700.49
40. Sagay City
64,266,350.00
41. Cavite City
64,566,079.05
42. Koronadal City
66,231,717.19
43. Cotabato City
66,302,114.52
44. Toledo City
70,157,331.12
45. San Jose City
70,309,233.43
46. Danao City
72,621,955.30
47. Bago City
74,305,000.00
48. Valencia City
74,557,298.92
49. Victorias City
75,757,298.92
50. Cauayan City
82,949,135.46
51. Santiago City
83,816,025.89
52. Roxas City
85,397,830.00
53. Dipolog City
85,503,262.85
54. Trece Martires City
87,413,786.64
55. Talisay City (Cebu)
87,964,972.97
56. Ozamis city
89,054,056.12
57. Surigao City
89,960,971.33
58. Panabo City
91,425,301.39
59. Digos City
92,647,699.13


The undeniable fact that these cities remain viable as component cities of their respective provinces emphasizes the
arbitrariness of the amount of P100 million as the new income requirement for the conversion of municipalities into
component cities. This arbitrariness can also be clearly gleaned from the respective distinctive traits and level of
economic development of the individual respondent municipalities as above submitted.

Verily, the determination of the existence of substantial distinction with respect to respondent municipalities does
not simply lie on the mere pendency of their cityhood bills during the 11th Congress. This Court sees the bigger picture.
The existence of substantial distinction with respect to respondent municipalities covered by the Cityhood Laws is
measured by the purpose of the law, not by R.A. No. 9009, but by the very purpose of the LGC, as provided in its Section
2 (a), thus

SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy.(a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the territorial and
political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest
development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals.
Toward this end, the State shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted
through a system of decentralization whereby local government units shall be given more powers, authority,
responsibilities and resources. The process of decentralization shall proceed from the National Government to the local
government units.


Indeed, substantial distinction lies in the capacity and viability of respondent municipalities to become component
cities of their respective provinces. Congress, by enacting the Cityhood Laws, recognized this capacity and viability of
respondent municipalities to become the States partners in accelerating economic growth and development in the
provincial regions, which is the very thrust of the LGC, manifested by the pendency of their cityhood bills during the 11th
Congress and their relentless pursuit for cityhood up to the present. Truly, the urgent need to become a component city
arose way back in the 11th Congress, and such condition continues to exist.

Petitioners in these cases complain about the purported reduction of their just share in the IRA. To be sure,
petitioners are entitled to a just share, not a specific amount. But the feared reduction proved to be false when, after the
implementation of the Cityhood Laws, their respective shares increased, not decreased. Consider the table[15] below

CITY
CY 2006 IRA
(Before Implementation of Sixteen [16] Cityhood Laws)
CY 2008 IRA
(Actual Release After Implementation of Sixteen [16] Cityhood Laws)
Bais
219,338,056.00
242,193,156.00
Batangas
334,371,984.00
388,871,770.00
Bayawan
353,150,158.00
388,840,062.00
Cadiz
329,491,285.00
361,019,211.00
Calapan
227,772,199.00
252,587,779.00
Calbayog
438,603,378.00
485,653,769.00
Cauayan
250,477,157.00
277,120,828.00
Gen. Santos
518,388,557.00
631,864,977.00
Gingoog
314,425,637.00
347,207,725.00
Himamaylan
248,154,381.00
277,532,458.00
Iloilo
358,394,268.00
412,506,278.00
Iriga
183,132,036.00
203,072,932.00
Legaspi
235,314,016.00
266,537,785.00
Ligao
215,608,112.00
239,696,441.00
Oroquieta
191,803,213.00
211,449,720.00
Pagadian
292,788,255.00
327,401,672.00
San Carlos
239,524,249.00
260,515,711.00
San Fernando
182,320,356.00
204,140,940.00
Santiago
508,326,072.00
563,679,572.00
Silay
216,372,314.00
241,363,845.00
Surigao
233,968,119.00
260,708,071.00
Tacurong
179,795,271.00
197,880,665.00
Tagaytay
130,159,136.00
152,445,295.00
Tarlac
348,186,756.00
405,611,581.00
Tangub
162,248,610.00
180,640,621.00
Urdaneta
187,721,031.00
207,129,386.00
Victorias
176,367,959.00
194,162,687.00
Zamboanga
918,013,016.00
1,009,972,704.00


What these petitioner cities were stating as a reduction of their respective IRA shares was based on a computation of what
they would receive if respondent municipalities were not to become component cities at all. Of course, that would mean a
bigger amount to which they have staked their claim. After considering these, it all boils down to money and how much
more they would receive if respondent municipalities remain as municipalities and not share in the 23% fixed IRA from
the national government for cities.

Moreover, the debates in the Senate on R.A. No. 9009, should prove enlightening:

SENATOR SOTTO. Mr. President, we just want to be enlightened again on the previous qualification and the present
one being proposed. Before there were three

SENATOR PIMENTEL. There are three requisites for a municipality to become a city. Let us start with the finance.
SENATOR SOTTO. Will the distinguished sponsor please refresh us? I used to be the chairman of the Committee on
Local Government, but the new job that was given to me by the Senate has erased completely my memory as far as the
Local Government Code is concerned.

SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes, Mr. President, with pleasure. There are three requirements. One is financial.

SENATOR SOTTO. All right. It used to be P20 million.

SENATOR PIMENTEL. It is P20 million. Now we are raising it to P100 million of locally generated funds.

SENATOR SOTTO. In other words, the P20 million before includes the IRA.

SENATOR PIMENTEL. No, Mr. President.

SENATOR SOTTO. It should not have been included?

SENATOR PIMENTEL. The internal revenue share should never have been included. That was not the intention when
we first crafted the Local Government Code. The financial capacity was supposed to be demonstrated by the municipality
wishing to become a city by its own effort, meaning to say, it should not rely on the internal revenue share that comes
from the government. Unfortunately, I think what happened in past conversions of municipalities into cities was, the
Department of Budget and Management, along with the Department of Finance, had included the internal revenue share as
a part of the municipality, demonstration that they are now financially capable and can measure up to the requirement of
the Local Government Code of having a revenue of at least P20 million.

SENATOR SOTTO. I am glad that the sponsor, Mr. President, has spread that into the Record because otherwise, if he
did not mention the Department of Finance and the Department of Budget and Management, then I would have been
blamed for the misinterpretation. But anyway, the gentleman is correct. That was the interpretation given to us during the
hearings.

So now, from P20 million, we make it P100 million from locally generated income as far as population is
concerned.

SENATOR PIMENTEL. As far as population is concerned, there will be no change, Mr. President. Still 150,000.

SENATOR SOTTO. Still 150,000?

SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes.

SENATOR SOTTO. And then the land area?

SENATOR PIMENTEL. As to the land area, there is no change; it is still 100 square kilometers.

SENATOR SOTTO. But before it was either/or?

SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is correct. As long as it has one of the three requirements, basically, as long as it meets the
financial requirement, then it may meet the territorial requirement or the population requirement.

SENATOR SOTTO. So, it remains or?

SENATOR PIMENTEL. We are now changing it into AND.

SENATOR SOTTO. AND?

SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes.

SENATOR SOTTO. I see.

SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is the proposal, Mr. President. In other words

SENATOR SOTTO. Does the gentleman not think there will no longer be any municipality that will qualify, Mr.
President?

SENATOR PIMENTEL. There may still be municipalities which can qualify, but it will take a little time. They will have
to produce more babies. I do not knowexpand their territories, whatever, by reclamation or otherwise. But the whole
proposal is geared towards making it difficult for municipalities to convert into cities.

On the other hand, I would like to advert to the fact that in the amendments that we are proposing for the
entire Local Government Code, we are also raising the internal revenue share of the municipalities.

SENATOR SOTTO. I see.

SENATOR PIMENTEL. So that, more or less, hindi naman sila dehado in this particular instance.

SENATOR SOTTO. Well, then, because of that information, Mr. President, I throw my full support behind the measure.

Thank you, Mr. President.

SENATOR PIMENTEL. Thank you very much, Mr. President. (Emphasis supplied)[16]


From the foregoing, the justness in the act of Congress in enacting the Cityhood Laws becomes obvious, especially
considering that 33 municipalities were converted into component cities almost immediately prior to the enactment of
R.A. No. 9009. In the enactment of the Cityhood Laws, Congress merely took the 16 municipalities covered thereby from
the disadvantaged position brought about by the abrupt increase in the income requirement of R.A. No. 9009,
acknowledging the privilege that they have already given to those newly-converted component cities, which prior to the
enactment of R.A. No. 9009, were undeniably in the same footing or class as the respondent municipalities. Congress
merely recognized the capacity and readiness of respondent municipalities to become component cities of their respective
provinces.

Petitioners complain of the projects that they would not be able to pursue and the expenditures that they would not be able
to meet, but totally ignored the respondent municipalities obligations arising from the contracts they have already entered
into, the employees that they have already hired, and the projects that they have already initiated and completed as
component cities. Petitioners have completely overlooked the need of respondent municipalities to become effective
vehicles intending to accelerate economic growth in the countryside. It is like the elder siblings wanting to kill the newly-
borns so that their inheritance would not be diminished.

Apropos is the following parable:

There was a landowner who went out at dawn to hire workmen for his vineyard. After reaching an agreement with them
for the usual daily wage, he sent them out to his vineyard. He came out about midmorning and saw other men standing
around the marketplace without work, so he said to them, You too go along to my vineyard and I will pay you whatever
is fair. They went. He came out again around noon and mid-afternoon and did the same. Finally, going out in late
afternoon he found still others standing around. To these he said, Why have you been standing here idle all day? No
one has hired us, they told him. He said, You go to the vineyard too. When evening came, the owner of the vineyard
said to his foreman, Call the workmen and give them their pay, but begin with the last group and end with the first.
When those hired late in the afternoon came up they received a full days pay, and when the first group appeared they
thought they would get more, yet they received the same daily wage. Thereupon they complained to the owner, This last
group did only an hours work, but you have paid them on the same basis as us who have worked a full day in the
scorching heat. My friend, he said to one in reply, I do you no injustice. You agreed on the usual wage, did you not?
Take your pay and go home. I intend to give this man who was hired last the same pay as you. I am free to do as I please
with my money, am I not? Or are you envious because I am generous?[17]

Congress, who holds the power of the purse, in enacting the Cityhood Laws, only sought the well-being of respondent
municipalities, having seen their respective capacities to become component cities of their provinces, temporarily stunted
by the enactment of R.A. No. 9009. By allowing respondent municipalities to convert into component cities, Congress
desired only to uphold the very purpose of the LGC, i.e., to make the local government units enjoy genuine and
meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them
more effective partners in the attainment of national goals, which is the very mandate of the Constitution.

Finally, we should not be restricted by technical rules of procedure at the expense of the transcendental interest of justice
and equity. While it is true that litigation must end, even at the expense of errors in judgment, it is nobler rather for this
Court of last resort, as vanguard of truth, to toil in order to dispel apprehensions and doubt, as the following
pronouncement of this Court instructs:

The right and power of judicial tribunals to declare whether enactments of the legislature exceed the constitutional
limitations and are invalid has always been considered a grave responsibility, as well as a solemn duty. The courts
invariably give the most careful consideration to questions involving the interpretation and application of the Constitution,
and approach constitutional questions with great deliberation, exercising their power in this respect with the greatest
possible caution and even reluctance; and they should never declare a statute void, unless its invalidity is, in their
judgment, beyond reasonable doubt. To justify a court in pronouncing a legislative act unconstitutional, or a provision of
a state constitution to be in contravention of the Constitution x x x, the case must be so clear to be free from doubt, and the
conflict of the statute with the constitution must be irreconcilable, because it is but a decent respect to the wisdom, the
integrity, and the patriotism of the legislative body by which any law is passed to presume in favor of its validity until the
contrary is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, in no doubtful case will the judiciary pronounce a legislative act
to be contrary to the constitution. To doubt the constitutionality of a law is to resolve the doubt in favor of its validity.[18]


WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated August 24, 2010, dated and filed on September
14, 2010 by respondents Municipality of Baybay, et al. is GRANTED. The Resolution dated August 24, 2010 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Cityhood LawsRepublic Acts Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398,
9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491are declared CONSTITUTIONAL.

SO ORDERED.



LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice


WE CONCUR:



RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice



See dissenting opinion
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice


I maintain my vote in the original ponencia. Hence, I concur with the dissent of J. Carpio
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice




PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice



No part
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice


I certify that J. De Castro left her vote concurring with J. Bersamin
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice


I join the dissent of J. Carpio
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice


I join the dissenting opinion of Justice Carpio
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice


(No part)
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice



See concurring opinion
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice



I join the dissenting opinion of J. Carpio
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice



JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice



JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice


I join the dissent of J. Carpio
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice



C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above resolution had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.



RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice




[1] Republic Acts 9389 [Baybay City, Leyte], 9390 [Bogo City, Cebu], 9391 [Catbalogan City, Samar], 9392 [Tandag
City, Surigao del Sur], 9393 [Lamitan City, Basilan], 9394 [Borongan City, Samar], 9398 [Tayabas City, Quezon], 9404
[Tabuk City, Kalinga], 9405 [Bayugan City, Agusan del Sur], 9407 [Batac City, Ilocos Norte], 9408 [Mati City, Davao
Oriental], 9409 [Guihulngan City, Negros Oriental], 9434 [Cabadbaran City, Agusan del Norte], 9435 [El Salvador City,
Misamis Oriental], 9436 [Carcar City, Cebu], and 9491 [Naga City, Cebu].
[2] Penned by J. Carpio, with JJ. Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Velasco, Jr., and Brion, concurring;
dissenting, J. Reyes, joined by JJ. Corona, Azcuna, Chico-Nazario, and Leonardo-De Castro; C.J. Puno, and JJ. Nachura
and Tinga took no part; J. Ynares-Santiago was on leave.
[3] Justice Velasco, Jr. wrote a Dissenting Opinion, joined by Justices Ynares-Santiago, Corona, Chico-Nazario, and
Leonardo-De Castro. Chief Justice Puno and Justice Nachura took no part.
[4] Justice Velasco, Jr. wrote a Dissenting Opinion, joined by Justices Ynares-Santiago, Corona, Chico-Nazario,
Leonardo-De Castro, and Bersamin. Chief Justice Puno and Justice Nachura took no part. Justice Quisumbing was on
leave.
[5] Citations omitted.
[6] Penned by J. Velasco, Jr., with JJ. Corona, Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, Abad, and Villarama concurring;
dissenting, J. Carpio, joined by JJ. Carpio-Morales, Brion, and Peralta; C.J. Puno and JJ. Nachura and Del Castillo took no
part.
[7] Penned by J. Carpio, with JJ. Carpio-Morales, Brion, Peralta, Villarama, Mendoza, and Sereno, concurring;
dissenting,, J. Velasco, Jr., joined by C.J. Corona, and JJ. Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, Abad, and Perez; JJ. Nachura
and Del Castillo took no part.
[8] II Record, Senate, 13th Congress, p. 164 (October 5, 2000); rollo (G.R. No. 176951), Vol. 5, p. 3765.
[9] Id. at 167-168; id. at 3768-3769.
[10] Review Center Association of the Philippines v. Ermita, G.R. No. 180046, April 2, 2009, 583 SCRA 428, 450,
citing Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Director-General, National Economic Development Authority, G.R. No. 167798, April 19,
2006, 487 SCRA 623.
[11] Id., citing Ople v. Torres, 354 Phil. 948 (1998).

[12] De Guzman, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 391 Phil. 70, 79 (2000); Tiu v. Court of Tax Appeals, 361 Phil. 229,
242 (1999).

[13] SECTION 7. Creation and Conversion. As a general rule, the creation of a local government unit or its
conversion from one level to another level shall be based on verifiable indicators of viability and projected capacity to
provide services, to wit:
(a) Income. It must be sufficient, based on acceptable standards, to provide for all essential government facilities and
services and special functions commensurate with the size of its population, as expected of the local government unit
concerned;
(b) Population . It shall be determined as the total number of inhabitants within the territorial jurisdiction of the local
government unit concerned; and
(c) Land Area . It must be contiguous, unless it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a local
government unit independent of the others; properly identified by metes and bound with technical descriptions; and
sufficient to provide for such basic services and facilities to meet the requirements of its populace.
Compliance with the foregoing indicators shall be attested to by the Department of Finance (DOF), the National Statistics
Office (NSO), and the Lands Management Bureau (LMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR). (Emphasis supplied.)
[14] The figures reflect the actual income of the cities for 2006. If R.A. No. 9009 is to be applied such that the figures
are expressed in 2000 constant prices, the income of the cities will even be lower. (Certification from the Bureau of Local
Government Finance dated December 5, 2008; rollo [G.R. No. 176951], Vol. 5, pp. 3731-3734.)
[15] Based on the letter dated December 9, 2008 of the Department of Budget and Management; rollo (G.R. No.
176951), Vol. 5, pp. 3978-3986.
[16] Committee Amendments re S. No. 2157, Records of the Senate, Vol. II, No. 24, October 5, 2000, pp. 165-166; id.
at 3766-3767.
[17] Mat. 20: 1-15.
[18] Churchill v. Rafferty, 32 Phil. 580, 584 (1915).

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC



G.R. No. 132601 January 19, 1999

LEO ECHEGARAY, petitioner,
vs.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL., respondents.

R E S O L U T I O N



PUNO, J.:

For resolution are public respondents' Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of this Court dated January 4,
1990 temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner and Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration.
It is the submission of public respondents that:

The Decision in this case having become final and executory, its execution enters the exclusive ambit of authority of the
executive authority. The issuance of the TRO may be construed as trenching on that sphere of executive authority;
The issuance of the temporary restraining order . . . creates dangerous precedent as there will never be an end to litigation
because there is always a possibility that Congress may repeal a law.
Congress had earlier deliberated extensively on the death penalty bill. To be certain, whatever question may now be raised
on the Death Penalty Law before the present Congress within the 6-month period given by this Honorable Court had in all
probability been fully debated upon . . .
Under the time honored maxim lex futuro, judex praeterito, the law looks forward while the judge looks at the past, . . .
the Honorable Court in issuing the TRO has transcended its power of judicial review.
At this moment, certain circumstances/supervening events transpired to the effect that the repeal or modification of the
law imposing death penalty has become nil, to wit:
The public pronouncement of President Estrada that he will veto any law imposing the death penalty involving heinous
crimes.
The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al., that they are against the repeal of the law;
The fact that Senator Roco's resolution to repeal the law only bears his signature and that of Senator Pimentel.
In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, public respondents attached a copy of House
Resolution No. 629 introduced by Congressman Golez entitled "Resolution expressing the sense of the House of
Representative to reject any move to review Republic Act No. 7659 which provided for the re-imposition of death
penalty, notifying the Senate, the Judiciary and the Executive Department of the position of the House of Representative
on this matter, and urging the President to exhaust all means under the law to immediately implement the death penalty
law." The Resolution was concurred in by one hundred thirteen (113) congressman.

In their Consolidated Comment, petitioner contends: (1) the stay order. . . is within the scope of judicial power and duty
and does not trench on executive powers nor on congressional prerogatives; (2) the exercise by this Court of its power to
stay execution was reasonable; (3) the Court did not lose jurisdiction to address incidental matters involved or arising
from the petition; (4) public respondents are estopped from challenging the Court's jurisdiction; and (5) there is no
certainty that the law on capital punishment will not be repealed or modified until Congress convenes and considers all the
various resolutions and bills filed before it.

Prefatorily, the Court likes to emphasize that the instant motions concern matters that are not incidents in G.R. No.
117472, where the death penalty was imposed on petitioner on automatic review of his conviction by this Court. The
instant motions were filed in this case, G.R. No. 132601, where the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8177 (Lethal Injection
Law) and its implementing rules and regulations was assailed by petitioner. For this reason, the Court in its Resolution of
January 4, 1999 merely noted the Motion to Set Aside of Rodessa "Baby" R. Echegaray dated January 7, 1999 and Entry
of Appearance of her counsel dated January 5, 1999. Clearly, she has no legal standing to intervene in the case at bar, let
alone the fact that the interest of the State is properly represented by the Solicitor General.

We shall now resolve the basic issues raised by the public respondents.

I

First. We do not agree with the sweeping submission of the public respondents that this Court lost its jurisdiction over the
case at bar and hence can no longer restrain the execution of the petitioner. Obviously, public respondents are invoking
the rule that final judgments can no longer be altered in accord with the principle that "it is just as important that there
should be a place to end as there should be a place to begin litigation. " 1 To start with, the Court is not changing even a
comma of its final Decision. It is appropriate to examine with precision the metes and bounds of the Decision of this
Court that became final. These metes and bounds are clearly spelled out in the Entry of Judgment in this case, viz:

ENTRY OF JUDGMENT

This is to certify that on October 12, 1998 a decision rendered in the above-entitled case was filed in this Office, the
dispositive part of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED insofar as petitioner seeks to declare the assailed statute (Republic Act No. 8177)
as unconstitutional; but GRANTED insofar as Sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic
Act No. 8177 are concerned, which are hereby declared INVALID because (a) Section 17 contravenes Article 83 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659; and (b) Section 19 fails to provide for review
and approval of the Lethal Injection Manual by the Secretary of Justice, and unjustifiably makes the manual confidential,
hence unavailable to interested parties including the accused/convict and counsel. Respondents are hereby enjoined from
enforcing and implementing Republic Act No. 8177 until the aforesaid Sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to
Implement Republic Act No. 8177 are appropriately amended, revised and/or corrected in accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

and that the same has, on November 6, 1988 become final and executory and is hereby recorded in the Book of Entries of
Judgment.

Manila, Philippine.

Clerk of Court

By: (SGD) TERESITA G. DIMAISIP

Acting Chief

Judicial Records Office

The records will show that before the Entry of Judgment, the Secretary of Justice, the Honorable Serafin Cuevas, filed
with this Court on October 21, 1998 a Compliance where he submitted the Amended Rules and Regulations implementing
R.A. No. 8177 in compliance with our Decision. On October 28, 1998, Secretary Cuevas submitted a Manifestation
informing the Court that he has caused the publication of the said Amended Rules and Regulations as required by the
Administrative Code. It is crystalline that the Decision of this Court that became final and unalterable mandated: (1) that
R.A. No. 8177 is not unconstitutional; (2) that sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement R.A. No.
8177 are invalid, and (3) R.A. No. 8177 cannot be enforced and implemented until sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and
Regulations to Implement R.A. No. 8177 are amended. It is also daylight clear that this Decision was not altered a whit by
this Court. Contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General, the rule on finality of judgment cannot divest this Court of
its jurisdiction to execute and enforce the same judgment. Retired Justice Camilo Quiason synthesized the well established
jurisprudence on this issue as
follows: 2

xxx xxx xxx

the finality of a judgment does not mean that the Court has lost all its powers nor the case. By the finality of the judgment,
what the court loses is its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Even after the judgment has become final the
court retains its jurisdiction to execute and enforce it. 3 There is a difference between the jurisdiction of the court to
execute its judgment and its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. The former continues even after the judgment
has become final for the purpose of enforcement of judgment; the latter terminates when the judgment becomes final. 4 . .
. For after the judgment has become final facts and circumstances may transpire which can render the execution unjust or
impossible. 5

In truth, the arguments of the Solicitor General has long been rejected by this Court. As aptly pointed out by the
petitioner, as early as 1915, this Court has unequivocably ruled in the case of Director of Prisons v. Judge of First
Instance, 6 viz:

This Supreme Court has repeatedly declared in various decisions, which constitute jurisprudence on the subject, that in
criminal cases, after the sentence has been pronounced and the period for reopening the same cannot change or alter its
judgment, as its jurisdiction has terminated . . . When in cases of appeal or review the cause has been returned thereto for
execution, in the event that the judgment has been affirmed, it performs a ministerial duty in issuing the proper order. But
it does not follow from this cessation of functions on the part of the court with reference to the ending of the cause that the
judicial authority terminates by having then passed completely to the Executive. The particulars of the execution itself,
which are certainly not always included in the judgment and writ of execution, in any event are absolutely under the
control of the judicial authority, while the executive has no power over the person of the convict except to provide for
carrying out of the penalty and to pardon.

Getting down to the solution of the question in the case at bar, which is that of execution of a capital sentence, it must be
accepted as a hypothesis that postponement of the date can be requested. There can be no dispute on this point. It is a
well-known principle that notwithstanding the order of execution and the executory nature thereof on the date set or at the
proper time, the date therefor can be postponed, even in sentences of death. Under the common law this postponement can
be ordered in three ways: (1) By command of the King; (2) by discretion (arbitrio) of the court; and (3) by mandate of the
law. It is sufficient to state this principle of the common law to render impossible that assertion in absolute terms that after
the convict has once been placed in jail the trial court can not reopen the case to investigate the facts that show the need
for postponement. If one of the ways is by direction of the court, it is acknowledged that even after the date of the
execution has been fixed, and notwithstanding the general rule that after the (court) has performed its ministerial duty of
ordering the execution . . . and its part is ended, if however a circumstance arises that ought to delay the execution, and
there is an imperative duty to investigate the emergency and to order a postponement. Then the question arises as to whom
the application for postponing the execution ought to be addressed while the circumstances is under investigation and so
to who has jurisdiction to make the investigation.

The power to control the execution of its decision is an essential aspect of jurisdiction. It cannot be the subject of
substantial subtraction for our Constitution 7 vests the entirety of judicial power in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law. To be sure, the important part of a litigation, whether civil or criminal, is the process
of execution of decisions where supervening events may change the circumstance of the parties and compel courts to
intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness. It is because of these unforseen, supervening
contingencies that courts have been conceded the inherent and necessary power of control of its processes and orders to
make them conformable to law and justice. 8 For this purpose, Section 6 of Rule 135 provides that "when by law
jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it
into effect may be employed by such court or officer and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such
jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by law or by these rules, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be
adopted which appears conformable to the spirit of said law or rules." It bears repeating that what the Court restrained
temporarily is the execution of its own Decision to give it reasonable time to check its fairness in light of supervening
events in Congress as alleged by petitioner. The Court, contrary to popular misimpression, did not restrain the effectivity
of a law enacted by Congress.1wphi1.nt

The more disquieting dimension of the submission of the public respondents that this Court has no jurisdiction to restrain
the execution of petitioner is that it can diminish the independence of the judiciary. Since the implant of republicanism in
our soil, our courts have been conceded the jurisdiction to enforce their final decisions. In accord with this unquestioned
jurisdiction, this Court promulgated rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure which, among others, spelled out
the rules on execution of judgments. These rules are all predicated on the assumption that courts have the inherent,
necessary and incidental power to control and supervise the process of execution of their decisions. Rule 39 governs
execution, satisfaction and effects of judgments in civil cases. Rule 120 governs judgments in criminal cases. It should be
stressed that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure was granted by our Constitutions to this
Court to enhance its independence, for in the words of Justice Isagani Cruz "without independence and integrity, courts
will lose that popular trust so essential to the maintenance of their vigor as champions of justice." 9 Hence, our
Constitutions continuously vested this power to this Court for it enhances its independence. Under the 1935 Constitution,
the power of this Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure was granted but it appeared to be
co-existent with legislative power for it was subject to the power of Congress to repeal, alter or supplement. Thus, its
Section 13, Article VIII provides:

Sec.13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all
courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby
repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the
same. The Congress have the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure,
and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.

The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it may appear on its surface. In In re Cunanan 10 Congress in
the exercise of its power to amend rules of the Supreme Court regarding admission to the practice of law, enacted the Bar
Flunkers Act of 1953 11 which considered as a passing grade, the average of 70% in the bar examinations after July 4,
1946 up to August 1951 and 71% in the 1952 bar examinations. This Court struck down the law as unconstitutional. In his
ponencia, Mr. Justice Diokno held that " . . . the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment a judgment
promulgated by this Court during the aforecited years affecting the bar candidates concerned; and although this Court
certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and not the
legislative nor executive department, that may do so. Any attempt on the part of these department would be a clear
usurpation of its function, as is the case with the law in question." 12 The venerable jurist further ruled: "It is obvious,
therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law
passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum
conditions for the license." By its ruling, this Court qualified the absolutist tone of the power of Congress to "repeal, alter
or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines.

The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed by the 1973 Constitution. For the 1973 Constitution reiterated
the power of this Court "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, . . . which,
however, may be repealed, altered or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa . . . ." More completely, Section 5(2)5 of
its Article X provided:

xxx xxx xxx

Sec.5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.

xxx xxx xxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law,
and the integration of the Bar, which, however, may be repealed, altered, or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa.
Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for
all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.

Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further strengthened the independence of the judiciary by giving to it the
additional power to promulgate rules governing the integration of the Bar. 13

The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary. Among others, it enhanced the rule
making power of this Court. Its Section 5(5), Article VIII provides:

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx xxx xxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall
be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the power to promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also granted for the first time the power
to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution
took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In
fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress,
more so with the Executive. If the manifest intent of the 1987 Constitution is to strengthen the independence of the
judiciary, it is inutile to urge, as public respondents do, that this Court has no jurisdiction to control the process of
execution of its decisions, a power conceded to it and which it has exercised since time immemorial.

To be sure, it is too late in the day for public respondents to assail the jurisdiction of this Court to control and supervise
the implementation of its decision in the case at bar. As aforestated, our Decision became final and executory on
November 6, 1998. The records reveal that after November 6, 1998, or on December 8, 1998, no less than the Secretary of
Justice recognized the jurisdiction of this Court by filing a Manifestation and Urgent Motion to compel the trial judge, the
Honorable Thelma A. Ponferrada, RTC, Br. 104, Quezon City to provide him ". . . a certified true copy of the Warrant of
Execution dated November 17, 1998 bearing the designated execution day of death convict Leo Echegaray and allow
(him) to reveal or announce the contents thereof, particularly the execution date fixed by such trial court to the public
when requested." The relevant portions of the Manifestation and Urgent Motion filed by the Secretary of Justice
beseeching this Court "to provide the appropriate relief" state:

xxx xxx xxx

5. Instead of filing a comment on Judge Ponferrada's Manifestation however, herein respondent is submitting the
instant Manifestation and Motion (a) to stress, inter alia, that the non-disclosure of the date of execution deprives herein
respondent of vital information necessary for the exercise of his statutory powers, as well as renders nugatory the
constitutional guarantee that recognizes the people's right to information of public concern, and (b) to ask this Honorable
Court to provide the appropriate relief.

6. The non-disclosure of the date of execution deprives herein respondent of vital information necessary for the
exercise of his power of supervision and control over the Bureau of Corrections pursuant to Section 39, Chapter 8, Book
IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, in relation to Title III, Book IV of such Administrative Code, insofar as the
enforcement of Republic Act No. 8177 and the Amended Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 is
concerned and for the discharge of the mandate of seeing to it that laws and rules relative to the execution of sentence are
faithfully observed.

7. On the other hand, the willful omission to reveal the information about the precise day of execution limits the
exercise by the President of executive clemency powers pursuant to Section 19, Article VII (Executive Department) of the
1987 Philippine Constitution and Article 81 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, which provides that the death
sentence shall be carried out "without prejudice to the exercise by the President of his executive powers at all times."
(Emphasis supplied) For instance, the President cannot grant reprieve, i.e., postpone the execution of a sentence to a day
certain (People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 110 [1937]) in the absence of a precise date to reckon with. The exercise of such
clemency power, at this time, might even work to the prejudice of the convict and defeat the purpose of the Constitution
and the applicable statute as when the date at execution set by the President would be earlier than that designated by the
court.

8. Moreover, the deliberate non-disclosure of information about the date of execution to herein respondent and the
public violates Section 7, Article III (Bill of Rights) and Section 28, Article II (Declaration of Principles and State
Policies) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which read:

Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records,
and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data
used as basis for policy development shall, be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public
disclosure of all transactions involving public interest.

9. The "right to information" provision is self-executing. It supplies "the rules by means of which the right to
information may be enjoyed (Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations, 167 [1972]) by guaranteeing the right
and mandating the duty to afford access to sources of information. Hence, the fundamental right therein recognized may
be asserted by the people upon the ratification of the Constitution without need for any ancillary act of the Legislature
(Id., at p. 165) What may be provided for by the Legislature are reasonable conditions and limitations upon the access to
be afforded which must, of necessity, be consistent with the declared State policy of full public disclosure of all
transactions involving public interest (Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 28). However, it cannot be overemphasized that whatever
limitation may be prescribed by the Legislature, the right and the duty under Art. III, Sec. 7 have become operative and
enforceable by virtue of the adoption of the New Charter." (Decision of the Supreme Court En Banc in Legaspi v. Civil
Service Commission, 150 SCRA 530, 534-535 [1987].

The same motion to compel Judge Ponferrada to reveal the date of execution of petitioner Echegaray was filed by his
counsel, Atty. Theodore Te, on December 7, 1998. He invoked his client's right to due process and the public's right to
information. The Solicitor General, as counsel for public respondents, did not oppose petitioner's motion on the ground
that this Court has no more jurisdiction over the process of execution of Echegaray. This Court granted the relief prayed
for by the Secretary of Justice and by the counsel of the petitioner in its Resolution of December 15, 1998. There was not
a whimper of protest from the public respondents and they are now estopped from contending that this Court has lost its
jurisdiction to grant said relief. The jurisdiction of this Court does not depend on the convenience of litigants.

II

Second. We likewise reject the public respondents' contention that the "decision in this case having become final and
executory, its execution enters the exclusive ambit of authority of the executive department . . .. By granting the TRO, the
Honorable Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an executive function." 14 Public respondents cite as their
authority for this proposition, Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution which reads:

Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. He shall also have the
power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress.

The text and tone of this provision will not yield to the interpretation suggested by the public respondents. The provision
is simply the source of power of the President to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and
forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. It also provides the authority for the President to grant amnesty with the
concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress. The provision, however, cannot be interpreted as denying
the power of courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after their finality. In truth, an accused who has been
convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral rights and these rights can be claimed in the appropriate courts. For
instance, a death convict who become insane after his final conviction cannot be executed while in a state of insanity. 15
As observed by Antieau, "today, it is generally assumed that due process of law will prevent the government from
executing the death sentence upon a person who is insane at the time of execution." 16 The suspension of such a death
sentence is undisputably an exercise of judicial power. It is not a usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve though
its effects is the same the temporary suspension of the execution of the death convict. In the same vein, it cannot be
denied that Congress can at any time amend R.A. No. 7659 by reducing the penalty of death to life imprisonment. The
effect of such an amendment is like that of commutation of sentence. But by no stretch of the imagination can the exercise
by Congress of its plenary power to amend laws be considered as a violation of the power of the President to commute
final sentences of conviction. The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death
convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life. Indeed, in
various States in the United States, laws have even been enacted expressly granting courts the power to suspend execution
of convicts and their constitutionality has been upheld over arguments that they infringe upon the power of the President
to grant reprieves. For the public respondents therefore to contend that only the Executive can protect the right to life of
an accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the three branches of
our government.

III

Third. The Court's resolution temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner must be put in its proper perspective as it
has been grievously distorted especially by those who make a living by vilifying courts. Petitioner filed his Very Urgent
Motion for Issuance of TRO on December 28, 1998 at about 11:30 p.m. He invoked several grounds, viz: (1) that his
execution has been set on January 4, the first working day of 1999; (b) that members of Congress had either sought for his
executive clemency and/or review or repeal of the law authorizing capital punishment; (b.1) that Senator Aquilino
Pimentel's resolution asking that clemency be granted to the petitioner and that capital punishment be reviewed has been
concurred by thirteen (13) other senators; (b.2) Senate President Marcelo Fernan and Senator Miriam S. Defensor have
publicly declared they would seek a review of the death penalty law; (b.3) Senator Paul Roco has also sought the repeal of
capital punishment, and (b.4) Congressman Salacrib Baterina, Jr., and thirty five (35) other congressmen are demanding
review of the same law.

When the Very Urgent Motion was filed, the Court was already in its traditional recess and would only resume session on
January 18, 1999. Even then, Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. called the Court to a Special Session on January 4, 1991 17
at 10. a.m. to deliberate on petitioner's Very Urgent Motion. The Court hardly had five (5) hours to resolve petitioner's
motion as he was due to be executed at 3 p.m. Thus, the Court had the difficult problem of resolving whether petitioner's
allegations about the moves in Congress to repeal or amend the Death Penalty Law are mere speculations or not. To the
Court's majority, there were good reasons why the Court should not immediately dismiss petitioner's allegations as mere
speculations and surmises. They noted that petitioner's allegations were made in a pleading under oath and were widely
publicized in the print and broadcast media. It was also of judicial notice that the 11th Congress is a new Congress and has
no less than one hundred thirty (130) new members whose views on capital punishment are still unexpressed. The present
Congress is therefore different from the Congress that enacted the Death Penalty Law (R.A. No. 7659) and the Lethal
Injection Law (R.A. No. 8177). In contrast, the Court's minority felt that petitioner's allegations lacked clear factual bases.
There was hardly a time to verify petitioner's allegations as his execution was set at 3 p.m. And verification from
Congress was impossible as Congress was not in session. Given these constraints, the Court's majority did not rush to
judgment but took an extremely cautious stance by temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner. The suspension was
temporary "until June 15, 1999, coeval with the constitutional duration of the present regular session of Congress,
unless it sooner becomes certain that no repeal or modification of the law is going to be made." The extreme caution taken
by the Court was compelled, among others, by the fear that any error of the Court in not stopping the execution of the
petitioner will preclude any further relief for all rights stop at the graveyard. As life was at, stake, the Court refused to
constitutionalize haste and the hysteria of some partisans. The Court's majority felt it needed the certainty that the
legislature will not petitioner as alleged by his counsel. It was believed that law and equitable considerations demand no
less before allowing the State to take the life of one its citizens.

The temporary restraining order of this Court has produced its desired result, i.e., the crystallization of the issue whether
Congress is disposed to review capital punishment. The public respondents, thru the Solicitor General, cite posterior
events that negate beyond doubt the possibility that Congress will repeal or amend the death penalty law. He names these
supervening events as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

The public pronouncement of President Estrada that he will veto any law imposing the death penalty involving heinous
crimes.
The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al., that they are against the repeal of the law;
The fact that Senator Roco's resolution to repeal the law only bears his signature and that of Senator Pimentel. 18
In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, the Solicitor General cited House Resolution No.
629 introduced by Congressman Golez entitled "Resolution expressing the sense of the House of Representatives to reject
any move to review R.A. No. 7659 which provided for the reimposition of death penalty, notifying the Senate, the
Judiciary and the Executive Department of the position of the House of Representative on this matter and urging the
President to exhaust all means under the law to immediately implement the death penalty law." The Golez resolution was
signed by 113 congressman as of January 11, 1999. In a marathon session yesterday that extended up 3 o'clock in the
morning, the House of Representative with minor, the House of Representative with minor amendments formally adopted
the Golez resolution by an overwhelming vote. House Resolution No. 25 expressed the sentiment that the House ". . . does
not desire at this time to review Republic Act 7659." In addition, the President has stated that he will not request Congress
to ratify the Second Protocol in review of the prevalence of heinous crimes in the country. In light of these developments,
the Court's TRO should now be lifted as it has served its legal and humanitarian purpose.

A last note. In 1922, the famous Clarence Darrow predicted that ". . . the question of capital punishment had been the
subject of endless discussion and will probably never be settled so long as men believe in punishment." 19 In our clime
and time when heinous crimes continue to be unchecked, the debate on the legal and moral predicates of capital
punishment has been regrettably blurred by emotionalism because of the unfaltering faith of the pro and anti-death
partisans on the right and righteousness of their postulates. To be sure, any debate, even if it is no more than an exchange
of epithets is healthy in a democracy. But when the debate deteriorates to discord due to the overuse of words that wound,
when anger threatens to turn the majority rule to tyranny, it is the especial duty of this Court to assure that the guarantees
of the Bill of Rights to the minority fully hold. As Justice Brennan reminds us ". . . it is the very purpose of the
Constitution and particularly the Bill of Rights to declare certain values transcendent, beyond the reach of
temporary political majorities." 20 Man has yet to invent a better hatchery of justice than the courts. It is a hatchery where
justice will bloom only when we can prevent the roots of reason to be blown away by the winds of rage. The flame of the
rule of law cannot be ignited by rage, especially the rage of the mob which is the mother of unfairness. The business of
courts in rendering justice is to be fair and they can pass their litmus test only when they can be fair to him who is
momentarily the most hated by society. 21

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court grants the public respondents' Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental
Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and lifts the Temporary Restraining Order issued in its Resolution of
January 4, 1999.

The Court also orders respondent trial court judge (Hon. Thelma A. Ponferrada, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City,
Branch 104) to set anew the date for execution of the convict/petitioner in accordance with applicable provisions of law
and the Rules of Court, without further delay.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Kapunan, Mendoza, Martinez, Quisumbing, Purisima and Pardo, JJ., concur.

Vitug and Panganiban, JJ., Please see Separate Opinion.

Buena and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., took no part.







Separate Opinions



VITUG, J., separate opinion;

Let me state at the outset that I have humbly maintained that Republic Act No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the death
penalty, falls short of the strict norm set forth by the Constitution. I and some of my brethren on the Court, who hold
similarly, have consistently expressed this stand in the affirmance by the Court of death sentences imposed by Regional
Trial Courts.

In its resolution of 04 January 1999, the Court resolved to issue in the above-numbered petition a temporary restraining
order ("TRO") because, among other things, of what had been stated to be indications that Congress would re-examine the
death penalty law. It was principally out of respect and comity to a co-equal branch of the government, i.e., to reasonably
allow it that opportunity if truly minded, that motivated the Court to grant, after deliberation, a limited time for the
purpose.

The Court, it must be stressed, did not, by issuing the TRO, thereby reconsider its judgment convicting the accused or
recall the imposition of the death penalty.

The doctrine has almost invariably been that after a decision becomes final and executory, nothing else is further done
except to see to its compliance since for the Court to adopt otherwise would be to put no end to litigations The rule
notwithstanding, the Court retains control over the case until the full satisfaction of the final judgment conformably with
established legal processes. Hence, the Court has taken cognizance of the petition assailing before it the use of lethal
injection by the State to carry out the death sentence. In any event, jurisprudence teaches that the rule of immutability of
final and executory judgments admits of settled exceptions. Concededly, the Court may, for instance, suspend the
execution of a final judgment when it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice or when supervening events
warrant it. 1 Certainly, this extraordinary relief cannot be denied any man, whatever might be his station, whose right to
life is the issue at stake. The pronouncement in Director of Prisons vs. Judge of First Instance of Cavite, 2 should be
instructive. Thus

This Supreme Court has repeatedly declared in various decisions, which constitute jurisprudence on the subject, that in
criminal cases, after the sentence has been pronounced and the period for reopening the same has elapsed, the court can
not change or after its judgment, as its jurisdiction has terminated, functus est officio suo, according to the classical
phrase. When in cases of appeal or review the cause has been returned thereto for execution, in the event that the
judgment has been affirmed, it performs a ministerial duty in issuing the proper order. But it does not follow from this
cessation of functions on the part of the court with reference to the ending of the cause that the judicial authority
terminates by having then passed completely to the executive. The particulars of the execution itself, which are certainly
not always included in the judgment and writ of execution, in any event are absolutely under the control of the judicial
authority, while the executive has no power over the person of the convict except to provide for carrying out the penalty
and to pardon.

Getting down to the solution of the question in the case at bar, which is that of execution of a capital sentence, it must be
accepted as a hypothesis that postponement of the date can be requested. There can be no dispute on this point. It is a
well-known principle that, notwithstanding the order of execution and the executory nature thereof on the date set or at the
proper time, the date therefor can be postponed, even in sentences of death. Under the common law this postponement can
be ordered in three ways: (1) By command of the King; (2) by discretion (arbitrio) of the court; and (3) by mandate of the
law. It is sufficient to state this principle of the common law to render impossible the assertion in absolute terms that after
the convict has once been placed in jail the trial court can not reopen the case to investigate the facts that show the need
for postponement. If one of the ways is by direction of the court, it is acknowledged that even after the date of the
execution has been fixed, and notwithstanding the general rule that after the Court of First Instance has performed its
ministerial duty of ordering the execution, functus est officio suo, and its part is ended, if however a circumstance arises
that ought to delay the execution, there is an imperative duty to investigate the emergency and to order a postponement . .
..

In fine, the authority of the Court to see to the proper execution of its final judgment, the power of the President to grant
pardon, commutation or reprieve, and the prerogative of Congress to repeal or modify the law that could benefit the
convicted accused are not essentially preclusive of one another nor constitutionally incompatible and may each be
exercised within their respective spheres and confines. Thus, the stay of execution issued by the Court would not prevent
either the President from exercising his pardoning power or Congress from enacting a measure that may be advantageous
to the adjudged offender.

The TRO of this Court has provided that it shall be lifted even before its expiry date of 15 June 1999, "coeval with the
duration of the present regular session of Congress," if it "sooner becomes certain that no repeal or modification of the law
is going to be made." The "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration" filed by the Office of the Solicitor General states that as
of the moment, "certain circumstances/supervening events (have) transpired to the effect that the repeal or modification of
the law imposing death penalty has become nil . . .." If, indeed, it would be futile to yet expect any chance for a timely 3
re-examination by Congress of the death penalty law, then I can appreciate why the majority of the Justices on the Court
feel rightly bound even now to lift the TRO.

I am hopeful, nevertheless, that Congress will in time find its way clear to undertaking a most thorough and dispassionate
re-examination of the law not so much for its questioned wisdom as for the need to have a second look at the conditions
sine qua non prescribed by the Constitution in the imposition of the death penalty. In People vs. Masalihit, 4 in urging,
with all due respect, Congress to consider a prompt re-examination of the death penalty law, I have said:

The determination of when to prescribe the death penalty lies, in the initial instance, with the law-making authority, the
Congress of the Philippines, subject to the conditions that the Constitution itself has set forth; viz: (1) That there must be
compelling reasons to justify the imposition of the death penalty; and (2) That the capital offense must involve a heinous
crime. It appears that the fundamental law did not contemplate a simple 'reimposition' of the death penalty to offenses
theretofore already provided in the Revised Penal Code or, let alone, just because of it. The term 'compelling reasons'
would indicate to me that there must first be a marked change in the milieu from that which has prevailed at the time of
adoption of the 1987 Constitution, on the one hand, to that which exists at the enactment of the statute prescribing the
death penalty, upon the other hand, that would make it distinctively inexorable to allow the re-imposition of the death
penalty. Most importantly, the circumstances that would characterize the 'heinous nature' of the crime and make it so
exceptionally offensive as to warrant the death penalty must be spelled out with great clarity in the law, albeit without
necessarily precluding the Court from exercising its power of judicial review given the circumstances of each case. To
venture, in the case of murder, the crime would become 'heinous' within the Constitutional concept, when, to exemplify,
the victim is unnecessarily subjected to a painful and excruciating death or, in the crime of rape, when the offended party
is callously humiliated or even brutally killed by the accused. The indiscriminate imposition of the death penalty could
somehow constrain courts to apply, perhaps without consciously meaning to, stringent standards for conviction, not too
unlikely beyond what might normally be required in criminal cases, that can, in fact, result in undue exculpation of
offenders to the great prejudice of victims and society.

Today, I reiterate the above view and until the exacting standards of the Constitution are clearly met as so hereinabove
expressed, I will have to disagree, most respectfully, with my colleagues in the majority who continue to hold the
presently structured Republic Act No. 7659 to be in accord with the Constitution, an issue that is fundamental, constant
and inextricably linked to the imposition each time of the death penalty and, like the instant petition, to the legal incidents
pertinent thereto.

Accordingly, I vote against the lifting of the restraining order of the Court even as I, like everyone else, however, must
respect and be held bound by the ruling of the majority.



PANGANIBAN, J., separate opinion;

I agree with the Court's Resolution that, without doubt, this Court has jurisdiction to issue the disputed Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) on January 4, 1999. I will not repeat its well-reasoned disquisition. I write only to explain my
vote in the context of the larger issue of the death penalty.

Since the solicitor general has demonstrated that Congress will not repeal or amend RA 7659 during its current session
which ends on June 15, 1999 and that, in any event, the President will veto any such repeal or amendment, the TRO
should by its own terms be deemed lifted now. However, my objections to the imposition of the death penalty transcend
the TRO and permeate its juridical essence.

I maintain my view that RA 7659 (the Death Penalty Law) is unconstitutional insofar as some parts thereof prescribing the
capital penalty fail to comply with the requirements of "heinousness" and "compelling reasons" prescribed by the
Constitution of the Philippines. * This I have repeatedly stated in my Dissenting Opinion in various death cases decided
by the Court, as well as during the Court's deliberation on this matter on January 4, 1999. For easy reference, I hereby
attach a copy of my Dissent promulgated on February 7, 1997.

Consequently, I cannot now vote to lift TRO, because to do so would mean the upholding and enforcement of law (or the
relevant portions thereof) which, I submit with all due respect, is unconstitutional and therefore legally nonexistent. I also
reiterate that, in my humble opinion, RA 8177 (the Lethal Injection Law) is likewise unconstitutional since it merely
prescribes the manner in which RA 7659 ( the Death Penalty Law) is to implemented.

Having said that, I stress, however, that I defer to the rule of law and will abide by the ruling of the Court that both RA
7659 and RA 8177 are constitutional and that death penalty should, by majority vote, be implemented by means of lethal
injection.

FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, I vote to deny the solicitor general's Motion for Reconsideration.

G.R. No. 117472 February 7, 1997

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO.

Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration

SEPARATE OPINION

Death Penalty Law Unconstitutional

In his Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration 1 dated August 22, 1996 filed by his newly-retained counsel, 2 the
accused raises for the first time a very crucial ground for his defense: that Republic Act. No. 7659, the law reimposing the
death penalty, is unconstitutional. In the Brief and (original Motion for Reconsideration filed by his previous counsel, 3
this transcendental issue was nor brought up. Hence, it was not passed upon by this Court in its Decision affirming the
trial court's sentence of death. 4

The Constitution Abolished Death Penalty

Sec. 19, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Sec. 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall
death penalty be imposed, unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it.
Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. (Emphasis supplied)

The second and third sentences of the above provision are new and had not been written in the 1935, 1973 or even in the
1986 "Freedom Constitution." They proscribe the imposition 5 of the death penalty "unless for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes, Congress provides for it," and reduced "any death penalty already imposed" to reclusion
perpetua. The provision has both a prospective aspect (it bars the future imposition of the penalty) and a retroactive one (it
reduces imposed capital sentences to the lesser penalty of imprisonment).

This two-fold aspect is significant. It stresses that the Constitution did not merely suspend the imposition of the death
penalty, but in fact completely abolished it from the statute books. The automatic commutation or reduction to reclusion
perpetua of any death penalty extant as of the effectivity of the Constitution clearly recognizes that, while the conviction
of an accused for a capital crime remains, death as a penalty ceased to exist in our penal laws and thus may longer be
carried out. This is the clear intent of the framers of our Constitution. As Comm. Bernas ex-claimed, 6 "(t)he majority
voted for the constitutional abolition of the death penalty."

Citing this and other similar pronouncements of the distinguished Concom delegate, Mme. Justice Ameurfina Melencio-
Herrera emphasized, 7 "It is thus clear that when Fr. Bernas sponsored the provision regarding the non-imposition of the
death penalty, what he had in mind was the total abolition and removal from the statute books of the death penalty. This
became the intent of the frames of the Constitution when they approved the provision and made it a part of the Bill of
Rights." With such abolition as a premise, restoration thereof becomes an exception to a constitutional mandate. Being an
exception and thus in derogation of the Constitution, it must then be strictly construed against the State and liberally in
favor of the people. 8 In this light, RA 7659 enjoys no presumption of constitutionality.

The Constitution Strictly Limits

Congressional Prerogative to Prescribe Death

To me, it is very clear that the Constitution (1) effectively removed the death penalty from the then existing statutes but
(2) authorized Congress to restore it at some future time to enable or empower courts to reimpose it on condition that it
(Congress) 9 finds "compelling reasons, involving heinous crimes." The language of the Constitution is emphatic (even if
"awkward" 10): the authority of Congress to "provide for it" is not absolute. Rather, it is strictly limited:

by "compelling reasons" that may arise after the Constitution became effective; and
to crimes which Congress should identify or define or characterize as "heinous."
The Constitution inexorably placed upon Congress the burden of determining the existence of "compelling reasons" and
of defining what crimes are "heinous" before it could exercise its law-making prerogative to restore the death penalty. For
clarity's sake, may I emphasize that Congress, by law; prescribes the death penalty on certain crimes; and courts, by their
decisions, impose it on individual offenders found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing said crimes.

In the exercise of this fundamental mandate, Congress enacted RA 7659 11 to "provide for it" (the death penalty) (1) by
amending certain provisions of the Revised Penal Code; 12 (2) by incorporating a new article therein; 13 and (3) by
amending certain special laws. 14

But RA 7659 did not change the nature or the elements of the crimes stated in the Penal Code and in the special laws. It
merely made the penalty more severe. Neither did its provisions (other than the preamble, which was cast in general
terms) discuss or justify the reasons for the more sever sanction, either collectively for all the offenses or individually for
each of them.

Generally, it merely reinstated the concept of and the method by which the death penalty had been imposed until February
2, 1987, when the Constitution took effect as follows: (1) a person is convicted of a capital offense; and (2) the
commission of which was accompanied by aggravating circumstances not outweighed by mitigating circumstances.

The basic question then is: In enacting RA 7659, did Congress exceed the limited authority granted it by the Constitution?
More legally put: It reviving the death penalty, did Congress act with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of the very
limited power or jurisdiction conferred on it by Art. III, Sec. 19? The answer, I respectfully submit, is YES.

Heinous Crimes

To repeal, while he Constitution limited the power of Congress to prescribe the death penalty ONLY to "heinous" crimes,
it did not define or characterize the meaning of "heinous". Neither did Congress. As already stated, RA 7659 itself merely
selected some existing crimes for which it prescribed death as an applicable penalty. It did not give a standard or a
characterization by which courts may be able to appreciate the heinousness of a crime. I concede that Congress was only
too well aware of its constitutionally limited power. In deference thereto, it included a paragraph in the preambular or
"whereas" clauses of RA 7659, as follows:

WHEREAS, the crimes punishable by death under this Act are heinous for being grievous, odious and hateful offenses
and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and
outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society.

In my humble view, however, the foregoing clause is clearly an insufficient definition or characterization of what a
heinous crime is. It simply and gratuitously declared certain crimes to be "heinous" without adequately justifying its bases
therefor. It supplies no useful, workable, clear and unambiguous standard by which the presence of heinousness can be
determined. Calling the crimes "grievous, odious and hateful" is not a substitute for an objective juridical definition.
Neither is the description "inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity." Describing blood as
blue does not detract from its being crimson in fact; and renaming gumamela as rose will not arm it with thorns.

Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is merely an introduction to show its intent or purposes. It
cannot be the origin of rights and obligations. Where the meaning of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the preamble can
neither expand nor restrict its operation, much less prevail over its text. 15 In this case, it cannot be the authoritative
source to show compliance with the Constitution.

As already alluded to, RA 7659 merely amended certain laws to prescribe death as the maximum imposable penalty once
the court appreciates the presence or absence of aggravating circumstances. 16

In other words, it just reinstated capital punishment for crimes which were already punishable with death prior to the
effectivity of the 1987 Constitution. With the possible exception of plunder and qualified bribery, 17 no new crimes were
introduced by RA 7659. The offenses punished by death under said law were already to punishable by the Revised Penal
Code 18 and by special laws.

During the debate on Senate Bill No. 891 which later became RA 7659, Sen. Jose Lina, in answer to a question of Sen.
Ernesto Maceda, wryly said: 19

So we did not go that far from the Revised Penal Code, Mr. President, and from existing special laws which, before
abolition of the death penalty, had already death as the maximum penalty.

By merely reimposing capital punishment on the very same crimes which were already penalized with death prior to the
charter's effectivity, Congress I submit has not fulfilled its specific and positive constitutional duty. If the Constitutional
Commission intended merely to allow Congress to prescribe death for these very same crimes, it would not have written
Sec. 19 of Article III into the fundamental law. But the stubborn fact is it did. Verily, the intention to 1) delete the death
penalty from our criminal laws and 2) make its restoration possible only under and subject to stringent conditions is
evident not only from the language of the Constitution but also from the charter debates on this matter.

The critical phrase "unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes" was an amendment introduced by Comm.
Christian Monsod. In explaining what possible crimes could qualify as heinous, he and Comm. Jose Suarez agreed on
"organized murder" or "brutal murder of a rape victim". 20 Note that the honorable commissioners did not just say
"murder" but organized murder; not just rape but brutal murder of a rape victim. While the debates were admittedly rather
scanty, I believe that the available information shows that, when deliberating on "heinousness", the Constitutional
Commission did not have in mind the offenses already existing and already penalized with death. I also believe that the
heinousness clause requires that:

the crimes should be entirely new offenses, the elements of which have an inherent quality, degree or level of perversity,
depravity or viciousness unheard of until then; or
even existing crimes, provided some new element or essential ingredient like "organized" or "brutal" is added to show
their utter perversity, odiousness or malevolence; or
the means or method by which the crime, whether new or old, is carried out evinces a degree or magnitude of extreme
violence, evil, cruelty, atrocity, viciousness as to demonstrate its heinousness. 21
For this purpose, Congress could enact an entirely new set of circumstances to qualify the crime as "heinous", in the same
manner that the presence of treachery in a homicide aggravates the crime to murder for which a heavier penalty is
prescribed.

Compelling Reasons

Quite apart from requiring the attendant element of heinousness, the Constitution also directs Congress to determine
"compelling reasons" for the revival of the capital penalty. It is true that paragraphs 3 and 4 of the preamble of RA 7659
22 made some attempt at meeting this requirement. But such effort was at best feeble and inconsequential. It should be
remembered that every word or phrase in the Constitution is sacred and should never be ignored, cavalierly-treated or
brushed aside. Thus, I believe that the compelling reasons and the characterization of heinousness cannot be done
wholesale but must shown for each and every crime, individually and separately.

The words "compelling reasons" were included in the Charter because, in the words of Comm. Monsod, "in the future,
circumstances may arise which we should not preclude today . . . and that the conditions and the situation (during the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission) might change for very specific reasons" requiring the return of the
constitutionally-abhorred penalty.

In his sponsorship of House Bill No. 62 which later evolved into RA 7659, Congressman Pablo Garcia, in answer to
questions raised by Representative Edcel Lagman tried to explain these compelling reasons: 23

MR. LAGMAN: So what are the compelling reasons now, Mr. Speaker? . . .

MR. GARCIA (P.). The worsening peace and order condition in the country, Mr. Speaker. That is one.

MR. LAGMAN. So the compelling reason which the distinguished sponsor would like to justify or serve as an
anchor for the justification of the reimposition of the death penalty is the alleged worsening peace and order situation. The
Gentleman claims that is one the compelling reasons. But before we dissent this particular "compelling reason," may we
know what are the other compelling reasons, Mr. Speaker?

MR. GARCIA (P.) Justice, Mr. Speaker.

MR. LAGMAN. Justice.

MR. GARCIA (P.). Yes, Mr. Speaker.

MR. LAGMAN. Justice is a compelling reason, Mr. Speaker? Could the Gentleman kindly elaborate on that
answer? Why is justice a compelling reason as if justice was not obtained at the time the Constitution abolished the death
penalty? Any compelling reason should be a supervening circumstances after 1987.

MR. GARCIA (P.). Mr. Speaker, I have repeatedly said again and again that if one lives in an organized society
governed by law, justice demands that crime be punished and that the penalty imposed be commensurate with the offense
committed.

MR. LAGMAN. The Gentleman would agree with me that when the Constitution speaks of the compelling reasons
to justify the reimposition of death penalty, it refers to reasons which would supervene or come after the approval of the
1987 Constitution. Is he submitting that justice, in his own concept of a commensurate penalty for the offense committed,
was not obtained in 1987 when the Constitution abolished the death penalty and the people ratified it?

MR. GARCIA (P.). That is precisely why we are saying that now, under present conditions, because of the
seriousness of the offenses being committed at this time, justice demands that the appropriate penalty must be meted out
for those who have committed heinous crimes.

xxx xxx xxx

In short, Congressman Garcia invoked the preambular justifications of "worsening peace and order" and "justice". With
all due respect I submit that these grounds are not "compelling" enough to justify the revival of state-decreed deaths. In
fact, I dare say that these "reasons" were even non-existent. Statistics from the Philippine National Police show that the
crime volume and crime rate particularly on those legislated capital offenses did not worsen but in fact declined between
1987, the date when the Constitution took effect, and 1993, the year when RA 7659 was enacted. Witness the following
debate 24 also between Representatives Garcia and Lagman:

MR. LAGMAN. Very good, Mr. Speaker.

Now, can we go to 1987. Could the Gentleman from Cebu inform us the volume of the crime of murder in 1987?

MR. GARCIA (P.). The volume of the crime of murder in 1987 is 12,305.

MR. LAGMAN. So, the corresponding crime rate was 21 percent.

MR. GARCIA (P.). Yes, Mr. Speaker.

MR. LAGMAN. That was in 1987, Mr. Speaker, could the distinguished chairman inform us the volume of murder
in 1988?

MR. GARCIA (P.). It was 10,521, Mr. Speaker.

MR. LAGMAN. Or it was a reduction from 12,305 in 1987 to 10,521 in 1988. Correspondingly, the crime rate in
the very year after the abolition of the death penalty was reduced from 21 percent to 18 percent. Is that correct, Mr.
Speaker?

MR. GARCIA (P.). That is correct, Mr. Speaker. Those are the statistics supplied by the PC.

MR. LAGMAN. Now can we go again to 1987 when the Constitution abolished the death penalty? May we know
from the distinguished Gentleman the volume of robbery in 1987?

MR. GARCIA (P.). Will the Gentleman state the figure? I will confirm it.

MR. LAGMAN. No, Mr. Speaker, I am asking the question.

MR. GARCIA (P.). It was 22,942, Mr. Speaker, and the crime rate was 40 percent.

MR. LAGMAN. This was the year immediately after the abolition of the death penalty. Could the Gentleman tell
us the volume of robbery cases in 1988?

MR. GARCIA (P.). It was 16,926, Mr. Speaker.

MR. LAGMAN. Obviously, the Gentleman would agree with me. Mr. Speaker that the volume of robbery cases
declined from 22,942 in 1987 or crime rate of 40 percent to 16,926 or a crime rate of 29 percent. Would the Gentleman
confirm that, Mr. Speaker?

MR. GARCIA (P.). This is what the statistics say, I understand we are reading now from the same document.

MR. LAGMAN. Now, going to homicide, the volume 1987 was 12,870 or a crime rate of 22 percent. The volume
in 1988 was 11,132 or a crime rate of 19 percent. Would the Gentleman confirm that, Mr. Speaker?

MR. GARCIA (P.). As I Said, Mr. Speaker, we are reading from the same document and I would not want to say that
the Gentleman is misreading the document that I have here.

MR. LAGMAN. But would the Gentleman confirm that?

MR. GARCIA (P.). The document speaks for itself.

When interpellated by Sen. Arturo Tolentino, Sen. Jose Lina gave some figures on the number of persons arrested in
regard to drug-related offenses in the year 1987 as compared to 1991: 25

Let me cite this concrete statistics by the Dangerous Drug Board.

In 1987 this was the year when the death penalty was
abolished the persons arrested in drug-related cases were 3,062, and the figure dropped to 2,686 in 1988.

By the way, I will furnish my Colleagues with a photocopy of this report.

From 3,062 in 1987, it dropped to 2,686. Again, it increased a bit to 2,862 in 1989. It still decreased to 2,202 in 1990, and
it increased again to 2,862 in 1991.

But in 1987, when the death penalty was abolished, as far as the drug-related cases are concerned, the figure continued a
downward trend, and there was no death penalty in this time from, 1988 to 1991.

In a further attempt to show compelling reasons, the proponents of the death penalty argue that its reimposition "would
pose as an effective deterrent against heinous crimes." 26 However no statistical data, no sufficient proof, empirical or
otherwise, have been submitted to show with any conclusiveness the relationship between the prescription of the death
penalty for certain offenses and the commission or non-commission thereof. This is a theory that can be debated on and
on, 27 in the same manner that another proposition that the real deterrent to crime is the certainty of immediate arrest,
prosecution and conviction of the culprit without unnecessary risk, expense and inconvenience to the victim, his heirs or
his witnesses can be argued indefinitely. 28 This debate can last till the academics grow weary of the spoken word, but
it would not lessen the constitutionally-imposed burden of Congress to act within the "heinousness" and "compelling
reasons" limits of its death-prescribing power.

Other Constitutional Rights

Militate Against RA 7659

It should be emphasized that the constitutional ban against the death penalty is included in our Bill of Rights. As such, it
should like any other guarantee in favor of the accused be zealously protected, 29 and any exception thereto
meticulously screened. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the people, particularly where the right pertains to
persons accused of crimes. 30 Here the issue is not just crimes but capital crimes!

So too, all our previous Constitutions, including the first one ordained at Malolos, guarantee that "(n)o person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." 31 This primary right of the people to enjoy life life at
its fullest, life in dignity and honor is not only reiterated by the 1987 Charter but is in fact fortified by its other pro-life
and pro-human rights provisions. Hence, the Constitution values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full
respect for human rights, 32 expressly prohibits any form of torture 33 which is arguably a lesser penalty than death,
emphasizes the individual right to life by giving protection to the life of the mother and the unborn from the moment of
conception 34 and establishes the people's rights to health, a balanced ecology and education. 35

This Constitutional explosion of concern for man more than property for people more than the state, and for life more than
mere existence augurs well for the strict application of the constitutional limits against the revival of death penalty as the
final and irreversible exaction of society against its perceived enemies.

Indeed, volumes have been written about individual rights to free speech. assembly and even religion. But the most basic
and most important of these rights is the right to life. Without life, the other rights cease in their enjoyment, utility and
expression.

This opinion would not be complete without a word on the wrenching fact that the death penalty militates against the
poor, the powerless and the marginalized. The "Profile of 165 Death Row Convicts" submitted by the Free Legal
Assistance Group 36 highlights this sad fact:

Since the reimposition of the death penalty, 186 persons 37 have been sentenced to death. At the end of 1994, there were
24 death penalty convicts, at the end of 1995, the number rose to 90; an average of seven (7) convicts per month; double
the monthly average of capital sentences imposed the prior year. From January to June 1996, the number of death penalty
convicts reached 72, an average of 12 convicts per month, almost double the monthly average of capital sentences
imposed in 1995.
Of the 165 convicts polled, approximately twenty one percent (21%) earn between P200 to P2,900 monthly; while
approximately twenty seven percent (27%) earn between P3,000 to P3,999 monthly. Those earning above P4,000 monthly
are exceedingly few: seven percent (7%) earn between P4,000 to P4,999, four percent (4%) earn between P5,000 to
P5,999, seven percent (7%) earn between P6,000 to P6,999, those earning between P7,000 to P15,000 comprise only four
percent (4%), those earning P15,000 and above only one percent (1%). Approximately thirteen percent (13%) earn
nothing at all, while approximately two percent (2%) earn subsistence wages with another five percent (5%) earning
variable income. Approximately nine percent (9%) do not know how much they earn in a month.
Thus, approximately two-thirds of the convicts, about 112 of them, earn below the government-mandated minimum
monthly wage of P4,290; ten (10) of these earn below the official poverty line set by government. Twenty six (26) earn
between P4,500.00 and P11,0000.00 monthly, indicating they belong to the middle class; only one (1) earns P30.000.00
monthly. Nine (9) convicts earn variable income or earn on a percentage or allowance basis; fifteen (15) convicts do not
know or are unsure of their monthly income. Twenty two (22) convicts earn nothing at all.
In terms of occupation, approximately twenty one percent (21%) are agricultural workers or workers in animal husbandry;
of these thirty (30), or almost one-fifth thereof, are farmers. Thirty five percent (35%) are in the transport and construction
industry, with thirty one (31) construction workers or workers in allied fields (carpentry, painting, welding) while twenty
seven (27) are transport workers (delivery, dispatcher, mechanic, tire man, truck helper) with sixteen (16) of them drivers.
Eighteen percent (18%) are in clerical, sales and service industries, with fourteen (14) sales workers (engaged in buy and
sell or fish, cigarette or rice vendors), twelve (12) service workers (butchers, beauticians, security guards, shoemakers,
tour guides, computer programmers, radio technicians) and four (4) clerks (janitors, MERALCO employee and clerk)
About four percent (4%) are government workers, with six (6) persons belonging to the armed services (AFP, PNP and
even CAFGU). Professionals, administrative employee and executives comprise only three percent (3%), nine percent
(9%) are unemployed.
None of the DRC's use English as their medium of communication. About forty four percent (44%), or slightly less than
half speak and understand Tagalog; twenty six percent (26%), or about one-fourth, speak and understand Cebuano. The
rest speak and understand Bicolano, Ilocano, Ilonggo, Kapampangan, Pangasinense and Waray. One (1) convict is a
foreign national and speaks and understand Niponggo.
Approximately twelve percent (12%) graduated from college, about forty seven percent (47%) finished varying levels of
elementary education with twenty seven (27) graduating from elementary. About thirty five percent (35%), fifty eight (58)
convicts, finished varying levels of high school, with more than half of them graduating from high school. Two (2)
convicts finished vocational education; nine (9) convicts did not study at all.
The foregoing profile based on age, language and socio-economic situations sufficiently demonstrates that RA 7659 has
militated against the poor and the powerless in society those who cannot afford the legal services necessary in capital
crimes, where extensive preparation, investigation, research and presentation are required. The best example to shoe the
sad plight of the underprivileged is this very case where the crucial issue of constitutionality was woefully omitted in the
proceedings in the trial court and even before this Court until the Free legal Assistance Group belatedly brought it up in
the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration.

To the poor and unlettered, it is bad enough that the law is complex and written in a strange, incomprehensible language.
Worse still, judicial proceedings are themselves complicated, intimidating and damning. The net effect of having a death
penalty that is imposed more often than not upon the impecunious is to engender in the minds of the latter, a sense
unfounded, to be sure, but unhealthy nevertheless of the unequal balance of the scales of justice.

Most assuredly, it may be contended that the foregoing arguments, and in particular, the statistics above-cited, are in a
very real sense prone to be misleading, and that regardless of the socio-economic profile of the DRCs, the law reviving
capital punishment does not in any way single out or discriminate against the poor, the unlettered or the underprivileged.
To put it in another way, as far as the disadvantaged are concerned, the law would still be complex and written in a
strange and incomprehensible language, and judicial proceedings complicated and intimidating, whether the ultimate
penalty involved be life (sentence) or death. Another aspect of the whole controversy is that, whatever the penalties set by
law, it seems to me that there will always be certain class or classes of people in our society who, by reason of their
poverty, lack of educational attainment and employment opportunities, are consequently confined to living, working and
subsisting in less-than-ideal environments, amidst less-than-genteel neighbors similarly situated as themselves, and are
therefore inherently more prone to be involved (as victims or perpetrators) in vices, violence and crime. So from that
perspective, the law reviving the death penalty neither improves nor worsens their lot substantially. Or, to be more
precise, such law may even be said to help improve their situation (at least in theory) by posing a much stronger deterrent
to the commission of heinous crimes.

However, such a viewpoint simply ignores the very basic differences that exist in the situations of the poor and the non-
poor. Precisely because the underprivileged are what they are, they require and deserve a greater degree of protection and
assistance from our laws and Constitution, and from the courts and the State, so that in spite of themselves, they can be
empowered to rise above themselves and their situation. The basic postulates for such a position are, I think, simply that
everyone ultimately wants to better himself and that we cannot better ourselves individually to any significant degree if
we are unable to advance as an entire people and nation. All the pro-poor provisions of the Constitution point in this
direction. Yet we are faced with this law that effectively inflicts the ultimate punishment on none other than the poor and
disadvantaged in the greater majority of cases, and which penalty, being so obviously final and so irreversibly permanent,
erases all hope of reform, of change for the better. This law, I submit, has no place in our legal, judicial and constitutional
firmament.

Epilogue

In sum, I respectfully submit that:

(1) The 1987 Constitution abolished the death penalty from our statute books. It did not merely suspend or prohibit its
imposition.

(2) The Charter effectively granted a new right: the constitution right against the death penalty, which is really a
species of the right to life.

(3) Any law reviving the capital penalty must be strictly construed against the State and liberally in favor of the
accused because such a stature denigrates the Constitution, impinges on a basic right and tends to deny equal justice to the
underprivileged.

(4) Every word or phrase in the Constitution is sacred and should never be ignored, cavalierly-treated or brushed
aside.

(5) Congressional power death is severely limited by two concurrent requirements:


First, Congress must provide a set of attendant circumstances which the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt,
apart from the elements of the crime and itself. Congress must explain why and how these circumstances define or
characterize the crime as "heinous".

Second, Congress has also the duty of laying out clear and specific reasons which arose after the effectivity of the
Constitution compelling the enactment of the law. It bears repeating that these requirements are inseparable. They must
both be present in view of the specific constitutional mandate "for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes." The
compelling reason must flow from the heinous nature of the offense.
(6) In every law reviving the capital penalty, the heinousness and compelling reasons must be set out for each and
every crime, and not just for all crimes generally and collectively.

"Thou shall not kill" is fundamental commandment to all Christians, as well as to the rest of the "sovereign Filipino
people" who believe in Almighty God. 38 While the Catholic Church, to which the vast majority of our people belong,
acknowledges the power of public authorities to prescribe the death penalty, it advisedly limits such prerogative only to
"cases of extreme
gravity." 39 To quote Pope John Paul II in his encyclical Evangelium Vitae (A Hymn to Life), 40 "punishment must be
carefully evaluated and decided upon, and ought not to go to the extreme of executing the offender except in cases of
absolute necessity: in other words, when it would not be possible otherwise to defend society . . . (which is) very rare, if
not practically non-existent."

Although not absolutely banning it, both the Constitution and the Church indubitably abhor the death penalty. Both are
pro-people and pro-life. Both clearly recognize the primacy of human life over and above even the state which man
created precisely to protect, cherish and defend him. The Constitution reluctantly allows capital punishment only for
"compelling reasons involving heinous crimes" just as the Church grudgingly permits it only reasons of "absolute
necessity" involving crimes of "extreme gravity", which are very rare and practically non-existent.

In the face of these evident truisms, I ask: Has the Congress, in enacting RA 7659, amply discharged its constitutional
burden of proving the existence of "compelling reasons" to prescribe death against well-defined "heinous" crimes?

I respectfully submit it has not.

WHEREFORE, the premises considered, I respectfully vote to grant partially the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration and to modify the dispositive portion of the decision of the trial court by deleting the words "DEATH", as
provided for under RA 7659," and substitute therefore reclusion perpetua.

I further vote to declare RA 7659 unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the penalty of death for the crimes mentioned in
its text.

Separate Opinions
VITUG, J., separate opinion;

Let me state at the outset that I have humbly maintained that Republic Act No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the death
penalty, falls short of the strict norm set forth by the Constitution. I and some of my brethren on the Court, who hold
similarly, have consistently expressed this stand in the affirmance by the Court of death sentences imposed by Regional
Trial Courts.

In its resolution of 04 January 1999, the Court resolved to issue in the above-numbered petition a temporary restraining
order ("TRO") because, among other things, of what had been stated to be indications that Congress would re-examine the
death penalty law. It was principally out of respect and comity to a co-equal branch of the government, i.e., to reasonably
allow it that opportunity if truly minded, that motivated the Court to grant, after deliberation, a limited time for the
purpose.

The Court, it must be stressed, did not, by issuing the TRO, thereby reconsider its judgment convicting the accused or
recall the imposition of the death penalty.

The doctrine has almost invariably been that after a decision becomes final and executory, nothing else is further done
except to see to its compliance since for the Court to adopt otherwise would be to put no end to litigations The rule
notwithstanding, the Court retains control over the case until the full satisfaction of the final judgment conformably with
established legal processes. Hence, the Court has taken cognizance of the petition assailing before it the use of lethal
injection by the State to carry out the death sentence. In any event, jurisprudence teaches that the rule of immutability of
final and executory judgments admits of settled exceptions. Concededly, the Court may, for instance, suspend the
execution of a final judgment when it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice or when supervening events
warrant it. 1 Certainly, this extraordinary relief cannot be denied any man, whatever might be his station, whose right to
life is the issue at stake. The pronouncement in Director of Prisons vs. Judge of First Instance of Cavite, 2 should be
instructive. Thus

This Supreme Court has repeatedly declared in various decisions, which constitute jurisprudence on the subject, that in
criminal cases, after the sentence has been pronounced and the period for reopening the same has elapsed, the court can
not change or after its judgment, as its jurisdiction has terminated, functus est officio suo, according to the classical
phrase. When in cases of appeal or review the cause has been returned thereto for execution, in the event that the
judgment has been affirmed, it performs a ministerial duty in issuing the proper order. But it does not follow from this
cessation of functions on the part of the court with reference to the ending of the cause that the judicial authority
terminates by having then passed completely to the executive. The particulars of the execution itself, which are certainly
not always included in the judgment and writ of execution, in any event are absolutely under the control of the judicial
authority, while the executive has no power over the person of the convict except to provide for carrying out the penalty
and to pardon.

Getting down to the solution of the question in the case at bar, which is that of execution of a capital sentence, it must be
accepted as a hypothesis that postponement of the date can be requested. There can be no dispute on this point. It is a
well-known principle that, notwithstanding the order of execution and the executory nature thereof on the date set or at the
proper time, the date therefor can be postponed, even in sentences of death. Under the common law this postponement can
be ordered in three ways: (1) By command of the King; (2) by discretion (arbitrio) of the court; and (3) by mandate of the
law. It is sufficient to state this principle of the common law to render impossible the assertion in absolute terms that after
the convict has once been placed in jail the trial court can not reopen the case to investigate the facts that show the need
for postponement. If one of the ways is by direction of the court, it is acknowledged that even after the date of the
execution has been fixed, and notwithstanding the general rule that after the Court of First Instance has performed its
ministerial duty of ordering the execution, functus est officio suo, and its part is ended, if however a circumstance arises
that ought to delay the execution, there is an imperative duty to investigate the emergency and to order a postponement . .
..

In fine, the authority of the Court to see to the proper execution of its final judgment, the power of the President to grant
pardon, commutation or reprieve, and the prerogative of Congress to repeal or modify the law that could benefit the
convicted accused are not essentially preclusive of one another nor constitutionally incompatible and may each be
exercised within their respective spheres and confines. Thus, the stay of execution issued by the Court would not prevent
either the President from exercising his pardoning power or Congress from enacting a measure that may be advantageous
to the adjudged offender.

The TRO of this Court has provided that it shall be lifted even before its expiry date of 15 June 1999, "coeval with the
duration of the present regular session of Congress," if it "sooner becomes certain that no repeal or modification of the law
is going to be made." The "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration" filed by the Office of the Solicitor General states that as
of the moment, "certain circumstances/supervening events (have) transpired to the effect that the repeal or modification of
the law imposing death penalty has become nil . . .." If, indeed, it would be futile to yet expect any chance for a timely 3
re-examination by Congress of the death penalty law, then I can appreciate why the majority of the Justices on the Court
feel rightly bound even now to lift the TRO.

I am hopeful, nevertheless, that Congress will in time find its way clear to undertaking a most thorough and dispassionate
re-examination of the law not so much for its questioned wisdom as for the need to have a second look at the conditions
sine qua non prescribed by the Constitution in the imposition of the death penalty. In People vs. Masalihit, 4 in urging,
with all due respect, Congress to consider a prompt re-examination of the death penalty law, I have said:

The determination of when to prescribe the death penalty lies, in the initial instance, with the law-making authority, the
Congress of the Philippines, subject to the conditions that the Constitution itself has set forth; viz: (1) That there must be
compelling reasons to justify the imposition of the death penalty; and (2) That the capital offense must involve a heinous
crime. It appears that the fundamental law did not contemplate a simple 'reimposition' of the death penalty to offenses
theretofore already provided in the Revised Penal Code or, let alone, just because of it. The term 'compelling reasons'
would indicate to me that there must first be a marked change in the milieu from that which has prevailed at the time of
adoption of the 1987 Constitution, on the one hand, to that which exists at the enactment of the statute prescribing the
death penalty, upon the other hand, that would make it distinctively inexorable to allow the re-imposition of the death
penalty. Most importantly, the circumstances that would characterize the 'heinous nature' of the crime and make it so
exceptionally offensive as to warrant the death penalty must be spelled out with great clarity in the law, albeit without
necessarily precluding the Court from exercising its power of judicial review given the circumstances of each case. To
venture, in the case of murder, the crime would become 'heinous' within the Constitutional concept, when, to exemplify,
the victim is unnecessarily subjected to a painful and excruciating death or, in the crime of rape, when the offended party
is callously humiliated or even brutally killed by the accused. The indiscriminate imposition of the death penalty could
somehow constrain courts to apply, perhaps without consciously meaning to, stringent standards for conviction, not too
unlikely beyond what might normally be required in criminal cases, that can, in fact, result in undue exculpation of
offenders to the great prejudice of victims and society.

Today, I reiterate the above view and until the exacting standards of the Constitution are clearly met as so hereinabove
expressed, I will have to disagree, most respectfully, with my colleagues in the majority who continue to hold the
presently structured Republic Act No. 7659 to be in accord with the Constitution, an issue that is fundamental, constant
and inextricably linked to the imposition each time of the death penalty and, like the instant petition, to the legal incidents
pertinent thereto.

Accordingly, I vote against the lifting of the restraining order of the Court even as I, like everyone else, however, must
respect and be held bound by the ruling of the majority.



PANGANIBAN, J., separate opinion;

I agree with the Court's Resolution that, without doubt, this Court has jurisdiction to issue the disputed Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) on January 4, 1999. I will not repeat its well-reasoned disquisition. I write only to explain my
vote in the context of the larger issue of the death penalty.

Since the solicitor general has demonstrated that Congress will not repeal or amend RA 7659 during its current session
which ends on June 15, 1999 and that, in any event, the President will veto any such repeal or amendment, the TRO
should by its own terms be deemed lifted now. However, my objections to the imposition of the death penalty transcend
the TRO and permeate its juridical essence.

I maintain my view that RA 7659 (the Death Penalty Law) is unconstitutional insofar as some parts thereof prescribing the
capital penalty fail to comply with the requirements of "heinousness" and "compelling reasons" prescribed by the
Constitution of the Philippines. * This I have repeatedly stated in my Dissenting Opinion in various death cases decided
by the Court, as well as during the Court's deliberation on this matter on January 4, 1999. For easy reference, I hereby
attach a copy of my Dissent promulgated on February 7, 1997.

Consequently, I cannot now vote to lift TRO, because to do so would mean the upholding and enforcement of law (or the
relevant portions thereof) which, I submit with all due respect, is unconstitutional and therefore legally nonexistent. I also
reiterate that, in my humble opinion, RA 8177 (the Lethal Injection Law) is likewise unconstitutional since it merely
prescribes the manner in which RA 7659 ( the Death Penalty Law) is to implemented.

Having said that, I stress, however, that I defer to the rule of law and will abide by the ruling of the Court that both RA
7659 and RA 8177 are constitutional and that death penalty should, by majority vote, be implemented by means of lethal
injection.

FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, I vote to deny the solicitor general's Motion for Reconsideration.

G.R. No. 117472 February 7, 1997

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO.

Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration

SEPARATE OPINION

Death Penalty Law Unconstitutional

In his Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration 1 dated August 22, 1996 filed by his newly-retained counsel, 2 the
accused raises for the first time a very crucial ground for his defense: that Republic Act. No. 7659, the law reimposing the
death penalty, is unconstitutional. In the Brief and (original Motion for Reconsideration filed by his previous counsel, 3
this transcendental issue was nor brought up. Hence, it was not passed upon by this Court in its Decision affirming the
trial court's sentence of death. 4

The Constitution Abolished Death Penalty

Sec. 19, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Sec. 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall
death penalty be imposed, unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it.
Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. (Emphasis supplied)

The second and third sentences of the above provision are new and had not been written in the 1935, 1973 or even in the
1986 "Freedom Constitution." They proscribe the imposition 5 of the death penalty "unless for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes, Congress provides for it," and reduced "any death penalty already imposed" to reclusion
perpetua. The provision has both a prospective aspect (it bars the future imposition of the penalty) and a retroactive one (it
reduces imposed capital sentences to the lesser penalty of imprisonment).

This two-fold aspect is significant. It stresses that the Constitution did not merely suspend the imposition of the death
penalty, but in fact completely abolished it from the statute books. The automatic commutation or reduction to reclusion
perpetua of any death penalty extant as of the effectivity of the Constitution clearly recognizes that, while the conviction
of an accused for a capital crime remains, death as a penalty ceased to exist in our penal laws and thus may longer be
carried out. This is the clear intent of the framers of our Constitution. As Comm. Bernas ex-claimed, 6 "(t)he majority
voted for the constitutional abolition of the death penalty."

Citing this and other similar pronouncements of the distinguished Concom delegate, Mme. Justice Ameurfina Melencio-
Herrera emphasized, 7 "It is thus clear that when Fr. Bernas sponsored the provision regarding the non-imposition of the
death penalty, what he had in mind was the total abolition and removal from the statute books of the death penalty. This
became the intent of the frames of the Constitution when they approved the provision and made it a part of the Bill of
Rights." With such abolition as a premise, restoration thereof becomes an exception to a constitutional mandate. Being an
exception and thus in derogation of the Constitution, it must then be strictly construed against the State and liberally in
favor of the people. 8 In this light, RA 7659 enjoys no presumption of constitutionality.

The Constitution Strictly Limits

Congressional Prerogative to Prescribe Death

To me, it is very clear that the Constitution (1) effectively removed the death penalty from the then existing statutes but
(2) authorized Congress to restore it at some future time to enable or empower courts to reimpose it on condition that it
(Congress) 9 finds "compelling reasons, involving heinous crimes." The language of the Constitution is emphatic (even if
"awkward" 10): the authority of Congress to "provide for it" is not absolute. Rather, it is strictly limited:

by "compelling reasons" that may arise after the Constitution became effective; and
to crimes which Congress should identify or define or characterize as "heinous."
The Constitution inexorably placed upon Congress the burden of determining the existence of "compelling reasons" and
of defining what crimes are "heinous" before it could exercise its law-making prerogative to restore the death penalty. For
clarity's sake, may I emphasize that Congress, by law; prescribes the death penalty on certain crimes; and courts, by their
decisions, impose it on individual offenders found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing said crimes.

In the exercise of this fundamental mandate, Congress enacted RA
7659 11 to "provide for it" (the death penalty) (1) by amending certain provisions of the Revised Penal Code; 12 (2) by
incorporating a new article therein; 13 and (3) by amending certain special laws. 14

But RA 7659 did not change the nature or the elements of the crimes stated in the Penal Code and in the special laws. It
merely made the penalty more severe. Neither did its provisions (other than the preamble, which was cast in general
terms) discuss or justify the reasons for the more sever sanction, either collectively for all the offenses or individually for
each of them.

Generally, it merely reinstated the concept of and the method by which the death penalty had been imposed until February
2, 1987, when the Constitution took effect as follows: (1) a person is convicted of a capital offense; and (2) the
commission of which was accompanied by aggravating circumstances not outweighed by mitigating circumstances.

The basic question then is: In enacting RA 7659, did Congress exceed the limited authority granted it by the Constitution?
More legally put: It reviving the death penalty, did Congress act with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of the very
limited power or jurisdiction conferred on it by Art. III, Sec. 19? The answer, I respectfully submit, is YES.

Heinous Crimes

To repeal, while he Constitution limited the power of Congress to prescribe the death penalty ONLY to "heinous" crimes,
it did not define or characterize the meaning of "heinous". Neither did Congress. As already stated, RA 7659 itself merely
selected some existing crimes for which it prescribed death as an applicable penalty. It did not give a standard or a
characterization by which courts may be able to appreciate the heinousness of a crime. I concede that Congress was only
too well aware of its constitutionally limited power. In deference thereto, it included a paragraph in the preambular or
"whereas" clauses of RA 7659, as follows:

WHEREAS, the crimes punishable by death under this Act are heinous for being grievous, odious and hateful offenses
and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and
outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society.

In my humble view, however, the foregoing clause is clearly an insufficient definition or characterization of what a
heinous crime is. It simply and gratuitously declared certain crimes to be "heinous" without adequately justifying its bases
therefor. It supplies no useful, workable, clear and unambiguous standard by which the presence of heinousness can be
determined. Calling the crimes "grievous, odious and hateful" is not a substitute for an objective juridical definition.
Neither is the description "inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity." Describing blood as
blue does not detract from its being crimson in fact; and renaming gumamela as rose will not arm it with thorns.

Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is merely an introduction to show its intent or purposes. It
cannot be the origin of rights and obligations. Where the meaning of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the preamble can
neither expand nor restrict its operation, much less prevail over its text. 15 In this case, it cannot be the authoritative
source to show compliance with the Constitution.

As already alluded to, RA 7659 merely amended certain laws to prescribe death as the maximum imposable penalty once
the court appreciates the presence or absence of aggravating circumstances. 16

In other words, it just reinstated capital punishment for crimes which were already punishable with death prior to the
effectivity of the 1987 Constitution. With the possible exception of plunder and qualified bribery, 17 no new crimes were
introduced by RA 7659. The offenses punished by death under said law were already to punishable by the Revised Penal
Code 18 and by special laws.

During the debate on Senate Bill No. 891 which later became RA 7659, Sen. Jose Lina, in answer to a question of Sen.
Ernesto Maceda, wryly said: 19

So we did not go that far from the Revised Penal Code, Mr. President, and from existing special laws which, before
abolition of the death penalty, had already death as the maximum penalty.

By merely reimposing capital punishment on the very same crimes which were already penalized with death prior to the
charter's effectivity, Congress I submit has not fulfilled its specific and positive constitutional duty. If the Constitutional
Commission intended merely to allow Congress to prescribe death for these very same crimes, it would not have written
Sec. 19 of Article III into the fundamental law. But the stubborn fact is it did. Verily, the intention to 1) delete the death
penalty from our criminal laws and 2) make its restoration possible only under and subject to stringent conditions is
evident not only from the language of the Constitution but also from the charter debates on this matter.

The critical phrase "unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes" was an amendment introduced by Comm.
Christian Monsod. In explaining what possible crimes could qualify as heinous, he and Comm. Jose Suarez agreed on
"organized murder" or "brutal murder of a rape victim". 20 Note that the honorable commissioners did not just say
"murder" but organized murder; not just rape but brutal murder of a rape victim. While the debates were admittedly rather
scanty, I believe that the available information shows that, when deliberating on "heinousness", the Constitutional
Commission did not have in mind the offenses already existing and already penalized with death. I also believe that the
heinousness clause requires that:

the crimes should be entirely new offenses, the elements of which have an inherent quality, degree or level of perversity,
depravity or viciousness unheard of until then; or
even existing crimes, provided some new element or essential ingredient like "organized" or "brutal" is added to show
their utter perversity, odiousness or malevolence; or
3) the means or method by which the crime, whether new or old, is carried out evinces a degree or magnitude of
extreme violence, evil, cruelty, atrocity, viciousness as to demonstrate its heinousness. 21

For this purpose, Congress could enact an entirely new set of circumstances to qualify the crime as "heinous", in the same
manner that the presence of treachery in a homicide aggravates the crime to murder for which a heavier penalty is
prescribed.

Compelling Reasons

Quite apart from requiring the attendant element of heinousness, the Constitution also directs Congress to determine
"compelling reasons" for the revival of the capital penalty. It is true that paragraphs 3 and 4 of the preamble of RA 7659
22 made some attempt at meeting this requirement. But such effort was at best feeble and inconsequential. It should be
remembered that every word or phrase in the Constitution is sacred and should never be ignored, cavalierly-treated or
brushed aside. Thus, I believe that the compelling reasons and the characterization of heinousness cannot be done
wholesale but must shown for each and every crime, individually and separately.

The words "compelling reasons" were included in the Charter because, in the words of Comm. Monsod, "in the future,
circumstances may arise which we should not preclude today . . . and that the conditions and the situation (during the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission) might change for very specific reasons" requiring the return of the
constitutionally-abhorred penalty.

In his sponsorship of House Bill No. 62 which later evolved into RA 7659, Congressman Pablo Garcia, in answer to
questions raised by Representative Edcel Lagman tried to explain these compelling reasons: 23

MR. LAGMAN: So what are the compelling reasons now, Mr. Speaker? . . .

MR. GARCIA (P.). The worsening peace and order condition in the country, Mr. Speaker. That is one.

MR. LAGMAN. So the compelling reason which the distinguished sponsor would like to justify or serve as an
anchor for the justification of the reimposition of the death penalty is the alleged worsening peace and order situation. The
Gentleman claims that is one the compelling reasons. But before we dissent this particular "compelling reason," may we
know what are the other compelling reasons, Mr. Speaker?

MR. GARCIA (P.) Justice, Mr. Speaker.

MR. LAGMAN. Justice.

MR. GARCIA (P.). Yes, Mr. Speaker.

MR. LAGMAN. Justice is a compelling reason, Mr. Speaker? Could the Gentleman kindly elaborate on that
answer? Why is justice a compelling reason as if justice was not obtained at the time the Constitution abolished the death
penalty? Any compelling reason should be a supervening circumstances after 1987.

MR. GARCIA (P.). Mr. Speaker, I have repeatedly said again and again that if one lives in an organized society
governed by law, justice demands that crime be punished and that the penalty imposed be commensurate with the offense
committed.

MR. LAGMAN. The Gentleman would agree with me that when the Constitution speaks of the compelling reasons
to justify the reimposition of death penalty, it refers to reasons which would supervene or come after the approval of the
1987 Constitution. Is he submitting that justice, in his own concept of a commensurate penalty for the offense committed,
was not obtained in 1987 when the Constitution abolished the death penalty and the people ratified it?

MR. GARCIA (P.). That is precisely why we are saying that now, under present conditions, because of the
seriousness of the offenses being committed at this time, justice demands that the appropriate penalty must be meted out
for those who have committed heinous crimes.

xxx xxx xxx

In short, Congressman Garcia invoked the preambular justifications of "worsening peace and order" and "justice". With
all due respect I submit that these grounds are not "compelling" enough to justify the revival of state-decreed deaths. In
fact, I dare say that these "reasons" were even non-existent. Statistics from the Philippine National Police show that the
crime volume and crime rate particularly on those legislated capital offenses did not worsen but in fact declined between
1987, the date when the Constitution took effect, and 1993, the year when RA 7659 was enacted. Witness the following
debate 24 also between Representatives Garcia and Lagman:

MR. LAGMAN. Very good, Mr. Speaker.

Now, can we go to 1987. Could the Gentleman from Cebu inform us the volume of the crime of murder in 1987?

MR. GARCIA (P.). The volume of the crime of murder in 1987 is 12,305.

MR. LAGMAN. So, the corresponding crime rate was 21 percent.

MR. GARCIA (P.). Yes, Mr. Speaker.

MR. LAGMAN. That was in 1987, Mr. Speaker, could the distinguished chairman inform us the volume of murder
in 1988?

MR. GARCIA (P.). It was 10,521, Mr. Speaker.

MR. LAGMAN. Or it was a reduction from 12,305 in 1987 to 10,521 in 1988. Correspondingly, the crime rate in
the very year after the abolition of the death penalty was reduced from 21 percent to 18 percent. Is that correct, Mr.
Speaker?

MR. GARCIA (P.). That is correct, Mr. Speaker. Those are the statistics supplied by the PC.

MR. LAGMAN. Now can we go again to 1987 when the Constitution abolished the death penalty? May we know
from the distinguished Gentleman the volume of robbery in 1987?

MR. GARCIA (P.). Will the Gentleman state the figure? I will confirm it.

MR. LAGMAN. No, Mr. Speaker, I am asking the question.

MR. GARCIA (P.). It was 22,942, Mr. Speaker, and the crime rate was 40 percent.

MR. LAGMAN. This was the year immediately after the abolition of the death penalty. Could the Gentleman tell
us the volume of robbery cases in 1988?

MR. GARCIA (P.). It was 16,926, Mr. Speaker.

MR. LAGMAN. Obviously, the Gentleman would agree with me. Mr. Speaker that the volume of robbery cases
declined from 22,942 in 1987 or crime rate of 40 percent to 16,926 or a crime rate of 29 percent. Would the Gentleman
confirm that, Mr. Speaker?

MR. GARCIA (P.). This is what the statistics say, I understand we are reading now from the same document.

MR. LAGMAN. Now, going to homicide, the volume 1987 was 12,870 or a crime rate of 22 percent. The volume
in 1988 was 11,132 or a crime rate of 19 percent. Would the Gentleman confirm that, Mr. Speaker?

MR. GARCIA (P.). As I Said, Mr. Speaker, we are reading from the same document and I would not want to say that
the Gentleman is misreading the document that I have here.

MR. LAGMAN. But would the Gentleman confirm that?

MR. GARCIA (P.). The document speaks for itself.

When interpellated by Sen. Arturo Tolentino, Sen. Jose Lina gave some figures on the number of persons arrested in
regard to drug-related offenses in the year 1987 as compared to 1991: 25

Let me cite this concrete statistics by the Dangerous Drug Board.

In 1987 this was the year when the death penalty was abolished the persons arrested in drug-related cases were
3,062, and the figure dropped to 2,686 in 1988.

By the way, I will furnish my Colleagues with a photocopy of this report.

From 3,062 in 1987, it dropped to 2,686. Again, it increased a bit to 2,862 in 1989. It still decreased to 2,202 in 1990, and
it increased again to 2,862 in 1991.

But in 1987, when the death penalty was abolished, as far as the drug-related cases are concerned, the figure continued a
downward trend, and there was no death penalty in this time from, 1988 to 1991.

In a further attempt to show compelling reasons, the proponents of the death penalty argue that its reimposition "would
pose as an effective deterrent against heinous crimes." 26 However no statistical data, no sufficient proof, empirical or
otherwise, have been submitted to show with any conclusiveness the relationship between the prescription of the death
penalty for certain offenses and the commission or non-commission thereof. This is a theory that can be debated on and
on, 27 in the same manner that another proposition that the real deterrent to crime is the certainty of immediate arrest,
prosecution and conviction of the culprit without unnecessary risk, expense and inconvenience to the victim, his heirs or
his witnesses can be argued indefinitely. 28 This debate can last till the academics grow weary of the spoken word, but
it would not lessen the constitutionally-imposed burden of Congress to act within the "heinousness" and "compelling
reasons" limits of its death-prescribing power.

Other Constitutional Rights

Militate Against RA 7659

It should be emphasized that the constitutional ban against the death penalty is included in our Bill of Rights. As such, it
should like any other guarantee in favor of the accused be zealously protected, 29 and any exception thereto
meticulously screened. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the people, particularly where the right pertains to
persons accused of crimes. 30 Here the issue is not just crimes but capital crimes!

So too, all our previous Constitutions, including the first one ordained at Malolos, guarantee that "(n)o person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." 31 This primary right of the people to enjoy life life at
its fullest, life in dignity and honor is not only reiterated by the 1987 Charter but is in fact fortified by its other pro-life
and pro-human rights provisions. Hence, the Constitution values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full
respect for human rights, 32 expressly prohibits any form of torture 33 which is arguably a lesser penalty than death,
emphasizes the individual right to life by giving protection to the life of the mother and the unborn from the moment of
conception 34 and establishes the people's rights to health, a balanced ecology and education. 35

This Constitutional explosion of concern for man more than property for people more than the state, and for life more than
mere existence augurs well for the strict application of the constitutional limits against the revival of death penalty as the
final and irreversible exaction of society against its perceived enemies.

Indeed, volumes have been written about individual rights to free speech. assembly and even religion. But the most basic
and most important of these rights is the right to life. Without life, the other rights cease in their enjoyment, utility and
expression.

This opinion would not be complete without a word on the wrenching fact that the death penalty militates against the
poor, the powerless and the marginalized. The "Profile of 165 Death Row Convicts" submitted by the Free Legal
Assistance Group 36 highlights this sad fact:

Since the reimposition of the death penalty, 186 persons 37 have been sentenced to death. At the end of 1994, there were
24 death penalty convicts, at the end of 1995, the number rose to 90; an average of seven (7) convicts per month; double
the monthly average of capital sentences imposed the prior year. From January to June 1996, the number of death penalty
convicts reached 72, an average of 12 convicts per month, almost double the monthly average of capital sentences
imposed in 1995.
Of the 165 convicts polled, approximately twenty one percent (21%) earn between P200 to P2,900 monthly; while
approximately twenty seven percent (27%) earn between P3,000 to P3,999 monthly. Those earning above P4,000 monthly
are exceedingly few: seven percent (7%) earn between P4,000 to P4,999, four percent (4%) earn between P5,000 to
P5,999, seven percent (7%) earn between P6,000 to P6,999, those earning between P7,000 to P15,000 comprise only four
percent (4%), those earning P15,000 and above only one percent (1%). Approximately thirteen percent (13%) earn
nothing at all, while approximately two percent (2%) earn subsistence wages with another five percent (5%) earning
variable income. Approximately nine percent (9%) do not know how much they earn in a month.
Thus, approximately two-thirds of the convicts, about 112 of them, earn below the government-mandated minimum
monthly wage of P4,290; ten (10) of these earn below the official poverty line set by government. Twenty six (26) earn
between P4,500.00 and P11,0000.00 monthly, indicating they belong to the middle class; only one (1) earns P30.000.00
monthly. Nine (9) convicts earn variable income or earn on a percentage or allowance basis; fifteen (15) convicts do not
know or are unsure of their monthly income. Twenty two (22) convicts earn nothing at all.
In terms of occupation, approximately twenty one percent (21%) are agricultural workers or workers in animal husbandry;
of these thirty (30), or almost one-fifth thereof, are farmers. Thirty five percent (35%) are in the transport and construction
industry, with thirty one (31) construction workers or workers in allied fields (carpentry, painting, welding) while twenty
seven (27) are transport workers (delivery, dispatcher, mechanic, tire man, truck helper) with sixteen (16) of them drivers.
Eighteen percent (18%) are in clerical, sales and service industries, with fourteen (14) sales workers (engaged in buy and
sell or fish, cigarette or rice vendors), twelve (12) service workers (butchers, beauticians, security guards, shoemakers,
tour guides, computer programmers, radio technicians) and four (4) clerks (janitors, MERALCO employee and clerk)
About four percent (4%) are government workers, with six (6) persons belonging to the armed services (AFP, PNP and
even CAFGU). Professionals, administrative employee and executives comprise only three percent (3%), nine percent
(9%) are unemployed.
None of the DRC's use English as their medium of communication. About forty four percent (44%), or slightly less than
half speak and understand Tagalog; twenty six percent (26%), or about one-fourth, speak and understand Cebuano. The
rest speak and understand Bicolano, Ilocano, Ilonggo, Kapampangan, Pangasinense and Waray. One (1) convict is a
foreign national and speaks and understand Niponggo.
Approximately twelve percent (12%) graduated from college, about forty seven percent (47%) finished varying levels of
elementary education with twenty seven (27) graduating from elementary. About thirty five percent (35%), fifty eight (58)
convicts, finished varying levels of high school, with more than half of them graduating from high school. Two (2)
convicts finished vocational education; nine (9) convicts did not study at all.
The foregoing profile based on age, language and socio-economic situations sufficiently demonstrates that RA 7659 has
militated against the poor and the powerless in society those who cannot afford the legal services necessary in capital
crimes, where extensive preparation, investigation, research and presentation are required. The best example to shoe the
sad plight of the underprivileged is this very case where the crucial issue of constitutionality was woefully omitted in the
proceedings in the trial court and even before this Court until the Free legal Assistance Group belatedly brought it up in
the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration.

To the poor and unlettered, it is bad enough that the law is complex and written in a strange, incomprehensible language.
Worse still, judicial proceedings are themselves complicated, intimidating and damning. The net effect of having a death
penalty that is imposed more often than not upon the impecunious is to engender in the minds of the latter, a sense
unfounded, to be sure, but unhealthy nevertheless of the unequal balance of the scales of justice.

Most assuredly, it may be contended that the foregoing arguments, and in particular, the statistics above-cited, are in a
very real sense prone to be misleading, and that regardless of the socio-economic profile of the DRCs, the law reviving
capital punishment does not in any way single out or discriminate against the poor, the unlettered or the underprivileged.
To put it in another way, as far as the disadvantaged are concerned, the law would still be complex and written in a
strange and incomprehensible language, and judicial proceedings complicated and intimidating, whether the ultimate
penalty involved be life (sentence) or death. Another aspect of the whole controversy is that, whatever the penalties set by
law, it seems to me that there will always be certain class or classes of people in our society who, by reason of their
poverty, lack of educational attainment and employment opportunities, are consequently confined to living, working and
subsisting in less-than-ideal environments, amidst less-than-genteel neighbors similarly situated as themselves, and are
therefore inherently more prone to be involved (as victims or perpetrators) in vices, violence and crime. So from that
perspective, the law reviving the death penalty neither improves nor worsens their lot substantially. Or, to be more
precise, such law may even be said to help improve their situation (at least in theory) by posing a much stronger deterrent
to the commission of heinous crimes.

However, such a viewpoint simply ignores the very basic differences that exist in the situations of the poor and the non-
poor. Precisely because the underprivileged are what they are, they require and deserve a greater degree of protection and
assistance from our laws and Constitution, and from the courts and the State, so that in spite of themselves, they can be
empowered to rise above themselves and their situation. The basic postulates for such a position are, I think, simply that
everyone ultimately wants to better himself and that we cannot better ourselves individually to any significant degree if
we are unable to advance as an entire people and nation. All the pro-poor provisions of the Constitution point in this
direction. Yet we are faced with this law that effectively inflicts the ultimate punishment on none other than the poor and
disadvantaged in the greater majority of cases, and which penalty, being so obviously final and so irreversibly permanent,
erases all hope of reform, of change for the better. This law, I submit, has no place in our legal, judicial and constitutional
firmament.

Epilogue

In sum, I respectfully submit that:

The 1987 Constitution abolished the death penalty from our statute books. It did not merely suspend or prohibit its
imposition.
The Charter effectively granted a new right: the constitution right against the death penalty, which is really a species of
the right to life.
Any law reviving the capital penalty must be strictly construed against the State and liberally in favor of the accused
because such a stature denigrates the Constitution, impinges on a basic right and tends to deny equal justice to the
underprivileged.
Every word or phrase in the Constitution is sacred and should never be ignored, cavalierly-treated or brushed aside.
Congressional power death is severely limited by two concurrent requirements:

First, Congress must provide a set of attendant circumstances which the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt,
apart from the elements of the crime and itself. Congress must explain why and how these circumstances define or
characterize the crime as "heinous".
Second, Congress has also the duty of laying out clear and specific reasons which arose after the effectivity of the
Constitution compelling the enactment of the law. It bears repeating that these requirements are inseparable. They must
both be present in view of the specific constitutional mandate "for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes." The
compelling reason must flow from the heinous nature of the offense.

In every law reviving the capital penalty, the heinousness and compelling reasons must be set out for each and every
crime, and not just for all crimes generally and collectively.
"Thou shall not kill" is fundamental commandment to all Christians, as well as to the rest of the "sovereign Filipino
people" who believe in Almighty God. 38 While the Catholic Church, to which the vast majority of our people belong,
acknowledges the power of public authorities to prescribe the death penalty, it advisedly limits such prerogative only to
"cases of extreme
gravity." 39 To quote Pope John Paul II in his encyclical Evangelium Vitae (A Hymn to Life), 40 "punishment must be
carefully evaluated and decided upon, and ought not to go to the extreme of executing the offender except in cases of
absolute necessity: in other words, when it would not be possible otherwise to defend society . . . (which is) very rare, if
not practically non-existent."

Although not absolutely banning it, both the Constitution and the Church indubitably abhor the death penalty. Both are
pro-people and pro-life. Both clearly recognize the primacy of human life over and above even the state which man
created precisely to protect, cherish and defend him. The Constitution reluctantly allows capital punishment only for
"compelling reasons involving heinous crimes" just as the Church grudgingly permits it only reasons of "absolute
necessity" involving crimes of "extreme gravity", which are very rare and practically non-existent.

In the face of these evident truisms, I ask: Has the Congress, in enacting RA 7659, amply discharged its constitutional
burden of proving the existence of "compelling reasons" to prescribe death against well-defined "heinous" crimes?

I respectfully submit it has not.

WHEREFORE, the premises considered, I respectfully vote to grant partially the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration and to modify the dispositive portion of the decision of the trial court by deleting the words "DEATH", as
provided for under RA 7659," and substitute therefore reclusion perpetua.

I further vote to declare RA 7659 unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the penalty of death for the crimes mentioned in
its text.

Footnotes
1 Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 US 165, 172; 59 S. Ct. 134, 138; 83 L. ed. 104 [1938].

2 Philippine Courts and their Jurisdiction, p. 13, 1998 ed.

3 Citing Miranda v. Tiangco, 96 Phil. 526; Santos v. Acuna, 100 Phil. 230; American Insurance Co. v. US Lines
Co., 63 SCRA 325; Republic v. Reyes, 71 SCRA 426; Luzon Stevedoring Corp. v. Reyes, 71 SCRA 655; Agricultural and
Industrial Marketing Inc. v. CA, 118 SCRA 49; Vasco v. CA, 81 SCRA 712; Mindanao Portland Cement Corp. v.
Laquihan, 120 SCRA 930.

4 Ibid., at pp. 12-14, citing Miranda v. Tiangco, 96 Phil. 526; Santos v. Acuna, 63 O.G. 358; Cabaya v. Hon. R.
Mendoza, 113 SCRA 400; Bueno Industrial and Development Corp. v. Encaje, 104 SCRA 388.

5 Ibid., pp. 14-15 citing Molina v. dela Riva, 8 Phil. 569; Behn Meyer & Co. v. McMicking, 11 Phil. 276; Warmer
Barnes & Co. v. Jaucian, 13 Phil. 4; Espiritu v. Crossfield, 14 Phil. 588; Mata v. Lichauco, 36 Phil. 809; De la Costa v.
Cleofas, 67 Phil. 686; Omar v. Jose, 77 Phil. 703; City of Butuan v. Ortiz, 113 Phil. 636; De los Santos v. Rodriguez, 22
SCRA 551; City of Cebu v. Mendoza, 66 SCRA 174.

6 29 Phil. 267 (1915), p. 270.

7 Sec. 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.

8 Sec. 5(f), Rule 135.

9 Philippine Political Law, p. 225, 1993 ed.

10 94 Phil. 534 (1954), pp. 550-555.

11 R.A. No. 372.

12 94 Phil. 550, p. 551.

13 See In re Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, January 9, 1973, 49 SCRA 22.

14 See pp. 3-4 of Urgent Motion for Reconsideration.

15 See Art. 79 of the Revised Penal Code.

16 Modern Constitutional Law, Vol. 1, p. 409, 1969 ed., citing Caritativo v. California, 357 US 549, 21 L ed. 2d
1531, 78 S. Ct. 1263 [1958].

17 December 30 and 31, 1998 were declared holidays. January 1, 1999 was an official holiday. January 2 was a
Saturday and January 3 was a Sunday.

18 Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of Public respondents, p. 8.

19 Darrow, Crime: Its Cause and Treatment, p. 166 (1922).

20 Eisler, A Justice For All, p. 268.

21 "Where personal liberty is involved, a democratic society employs a different arithmetic and insists that it is less
important to reach an unshakable decision than to do justice." Pollack, Proposals to Curtail Habeas Corpus for State
Prisoners: Collateral Attack on the Great Writ. 66 Yale LJ 50, 65 (1956).

VITUG, J., separate opinion;

1 Candelana vs. Caizares, 4 SCRA 738; Philippine Veterans Bank vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 178 SCRA
545, Lipana vs. Development Bank of Rizal, 154 SCRA 257; Lee vs. De Guzman, 187 SCRA 276, Bachrach Corporation
vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128349, 25 September 1998.

2 29 Phil 267.

3 At least for Mr. Echegaray.

4 G.R. No 124329, 14 December 1998.

PANGANIBAN, J., separate opinion;

* I have further explained my unflinching position on this matter in my recent book Battles in the Supreme Court,
particularly on page 58 to 84.

Separate opinion;

1 It is called "Supplemental" because there was a (main) Motion for Reconsideration filed by the previous counsel
of the accused, which this Court already denied.

2 The Anti Death Penalty Task Force of the Free Legal Assistance Group Pablito V. Sanidad, Jose Manuel I.
Diokno, Arno V. Sanidad, Efren Moncupa, Eduardo R. Abaya and Ma. Victoria I. Diokno filed its Notice of
Appearance dated August 22, 1996 only on August 23, 1996, after the Per Curiam Decision of this Court was
promulgated on June 25, 1996.

3 Atty. Julian R. Vitug, Jr.

4 The bulk of jurisprudence precludes raising an issue for the first time only on appeal. See, for instance, Manila
Bay Club Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 249 SCRA 303, October 13, 1995; Manila Bay Club Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals, 245 SCRA 715, July 11, 1995; Securities and Exchange Commission vs. Court of Appeals, 246 SCRA 738, July
21, 1995. However, the Court resolved to tackle the question of constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659 in this case,
anticipating that the same question would be raised anyway in many other subsequent instances. The Court resolved to
determine and dispose of the issue once and for all, at the first opportunity. To let the issue pass unresolved just because it
was raised after the promulgation of the decision affirming conviction may result in grave injustice.

5 In People vs. Muoz, 170 SCRA 107, February 9, 1989, the Court, prior to the enactment and effectivity of RA
7659, ruled by a vote of 9-6 (J. Cruz, ponente, C.J. Fernan, JJ., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-
Aquino and Medialdea, concurring) that the death penalty was not abolished but only prohibited from imposed. But see
also the persuasive Dissenting Opinion of Mme. Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera (joined by JJ. Narvasa, Paras,
Sarmiento, Cortes and Regalado) who contended that the Constitution totally abolished the death penalty and removed it
form the statute books. People vs. Muoz reversed the earlier "abolition" doctrine uniformly held in People vs. Gavarra,
155 SCRA 327, October 30, 1987, (per C.J. Yap); People vs. Masangkay, 155 SCRA 113, October 27, 1987, (per J.
Melencio-Herrera) and People vs. Atencio, 156 SCRA 242, December 10, 1987 (per C.J. Narvasa). It is time that these
cases are revisited by this Court.

6 This quote is taken from I Record of the Constitutional Commission, p. 676 (July 17, 1986) as follows:

Fr. Bernas:

xxx xxx xxx

My recollection on this is that there was a division in the Committee not on whether the death penalty should be abolished
or not, but rather on whether the abolition should be done by the Constitution in which case it cannot be restored by the
legislature or left to the legislature. The majority voted for the constitutional abolition of the death penalty. And the
reason is that capital punishment is inhuman for the convict and his family who are traumatized by the waiting, even if it
is never carried out. There is no evidence that death penalty deterred deadly criminals, hence, life should not be destroyed
just in the hope that other lives might be saved. Assuming mastery over the life of another man is just too presumptuous
for any man. The fact that the death penalty as an institution has been there from time immemorial should not deter us
from reviewing it. Human life is more valuable than an institution intended precisely to serve human life. So basically,
this is the summary of the reason which were presented in support of the constitutional abolition of the death penalty
(emphasis supplied)

7 Dissenting Opinion in People vs. Muoz, supra, p. 129.

8 Thus in People vs. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1, September 4, 1986, we held that a statute which allows an exception to a
constitutional right (against warrantless arrests) should be strictly construed.

9 In his scholarly Memorandum, Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J. as amicus curiae in People vs. Pedro V. Malabago
(G.R. No. 115686, December 2, 1996), vigorously argues that RA 7659 has validly restored the death penalty which may
now be imposed provided that the prosecution proves, and the court is convinced, that (a) the accused is guilty of a crime
designated by RA 7659 as capital, (b) whose commission is accompanied by aggravating circumstances as defined by
Arts. 14 and 15 of the Revised Penal Code, (c) the accompanying aggravating circumstance must be one which can be
characterized by the court as making the crime "heinous", and (d) that the execution of the offender is demanded by
"compelling reasons" related to the offense. In other words, according to him, it is the courts not Congress that have
responsibility of determining the heinousness of a crime and the compelling reason for its imposition upon a particular
offender, depending on the facts of each case. I cannot however subscribe to this view. The Constitution clearly identifies
Congress as the sovereign entity which is given the onus of fulfilling these two constitutional limitations.

10 People vs. Muoz, supra, p. 121.

11 Which became effective on December 31, 1993, per People vs. Burgos, 234 SCRA 555, 569, July 29, 1994;
People vs. Godoy, 250 SCRA 676, December 6, 1995; People vs. Albert, 251 SCRA 136, December 11, 1995.

12 Art. 114 Treason; Art. 123 Qualified Piracy; Art. 246 Parricide;
Art. 248 Murder; Art. 255 Infanticide; Art. 267 Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention; Art. 294 Robbery
with violence against or intimidation of persons; Art. 320 Destructive Arson; Art. 335 Rape.

13 Art. 221-A on Qualified Bribery.

14 Sec. 2, RA 7080 Plunder; Secs. 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II of
RA 6425 Prohibited Drugs; Secs. 14, 14-A and 15 of Article III of said RA 6425 Carnapping.

15 A preamble is not an essential part of a statute. (Agpalo, Statutory Construction, Second Edition 1990; Martin,
Statutory Construction, Sixth Edition, 1984). The function of the preamble is to supply reasons and explanation and not to
confer power or determine rights. Hence it cannot be given the effect of enlarging the scope or effect of a statute. (C.
Dallas Sands, Statutes and Statutory Construction, Fourth Edition, Volume LA, 20.03).

16 Under Sec. 11, RA 7659, it appears that death is the mandatory penalty for rape, regardless of the presence or
absence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances, "(w)hen by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is
committed," or when it is "committed with any of the attendant circumstances enumerated" in said section.

17 While in plunder and qualified bribery are "new" capital offenses, RA 7659 nonetheless fails to justify why they
are considered heinous. In addition, the specific compelling reasons for the prescribed penalty of death are note laid out by
the statute.

18 In the case of rape, RA 7659 provided certain attendant circumstances which the prosecution must prove before
courts can impose the extreme penalty. Just the same however, the law did not explain why said circumstances would
make the crimes heinous. Neither did it set forth the complelling reasons therefor.

19 Record of the Senate, First Regular Session, January 18 to March 11, 1993, Volume III, No. 48, January 25, 1993,
p. 122.

20 I Record of the Constitutional Commission, July 18, 1986, pp. 742-743:

MR. SUAREZ The Gentleman advisedly used the words 'heinous crimes', whatever is the pronunciation. Will the
Gentleman give examples of 'heinous crimes'? For example, would the head of an organized syndicate in dope distribution
or dope smuggling fall within the qualification of a heinous offender such as to preclude the application of the principle of
abolition of death penalty?

MR. MONSOD Yes, Madam President. That is one of the possible crimes that would qualify for a heinous crime. Another
would be organized murder. In other words, yesterday there were many arguments for and against, and they all had merit.
But in the contemporary society, we recognize the sacredness of human life and I think it was Honorable Laurel who
said this yesterday it is only God who gives and takes life. However, the voice of the people is also the voice of God,
and we cannot presume to have the wisdom of the ages. Therefore, it is entirely possible in the future that circumstances
may arise which we should not preclude today. We know that this is very difficult question. The fact that the arguments
yesterday were quite impassioned and meritorious merely tell us that this is far from a well-settled issue. At least in my
personal opinion, we would like the death penalty to be abolished. However, in the future we should allow the National
Assembly in its wisdom and as representatives of the people, to still impose the death penalty for the common good, in
specific cases.

MR. SUAREZ. Thank you.

I would like to pursue some more the Gentleman's definition of 'heinous crimes'. Would the brutal murder of a rape victim
be considered as falling within that classification?

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, yes, particularly, if it is a person in authority. He would, therefore, add as an
aggravating circumstance to the crime the abuse of this position authority.

MR. SUAREZ. Thank you.

21 Some examples of this may be taken by Congress from Richmond vs. Lewis, 506 US 40, like "gratuitous
violence" or "needless mutilation" of the victim.

22 Paragraph 3 & 4 of the preamble reads:

WHEREAS, due to the alarming upsurge of such crimes which has resulted not only in the loss of human lives and
wanton destruction of property but has also affected the nation's efforts towards sustainable economic development and
prosperity while at the same time has undermined the people's faith in the Government and the latter's ability to maintain
peace and order in the country.

WHEREAS, the Congress, in the interest of justice, public order and the rule of law, and the need to rationalize and
harmonize the penal sanctions for heinous crimes, finds compelling reasons to impose the death penalty for said crimes;

23 Record of the House of Representatives, First Regular Session, 1992-1993, Volume IV, February 10, 1993, p.
674, emphasis supplied.

24 Record of the House of Representatives, First Regular Session, 1992-1993, Vol. III, November 10, 1992, p. 448;
emphasis supplied.

25 Record of the Senate, First Regular Session, January 18 to March 11, 1993, Volume III, No. 50, January 27, 1993,
pp. 176-177.

26 See "Sponsorship Remarks" of Rep. Manuel Sanchez, Record of the House of Representatives, November 9,
1992, pp. 40-42.

27 Witness, for instance, this interesting exchange between Commissioners Joaquin Bernas and Napoleon Rama (I
Record of the Constitutional Commission, p. 678):

FR. BERNAS. When some experts appeared before us and we asked them if there was evidence to show that the death
penalty had deterred the commission of deadly crimes, none of them was able to say that there was evidence, conclusive
evidence, for that.

MR. RAMA. I am curious. Who are experts then social scientist or penologists or what?

FR. BERNAS. Penologists.

MR. RAMA. Of course we are aware that there is also another school of thought here, another set of experts, who
would swear that the death penalty discourages crimes or criminality. Of course. Commissioner Bernas knows that never
in our history has there been a higher incidence of crime. I say that criminality was at its zenith during the last decade.

FR. BERNAS. Correct, in spite of the existence of the death penalty.

MR. RAMA. Yes, but not necessarily in spite of the existence of the death penalty. At any rate, does the sponsor think
that in removing the death penalty, it would not affect, one way or another, the crime rate of the country?

FR. BERNAS. The position taken by the majority of those who voted in favor of this provision is that means other than
the death penalty should be used for the prevention of crime.

28 Cf. Report to the United Nations Committee on Crime Prosecution and Control, United Nations Social Affairs
Division, Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Branch, Vienna, 1988, p. 110.

29 Former Chief Justice Enriquez M. Freehand, in his book, The Bill of Rights, (Second Edition, 1972, p. 4.) states:
"A regime of constitutionalism is thus unthinkable without an assurance of the primacy of a bill of rights. Precisely a
constitution exists to assure that in the discharge of the governmental functions, the dignity that is the birthright of every
human being is duly safeguarded. . . ." In the context of the role of a bill of right the vast powers of government are clearly
to be exercise within the limits set by the constitution, particularly the bill of rights. In Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel
Operators vs. City Mayor of Manila, (L-24693, July 31, 1967), it was held that the exercise of police power, insofar as it
may affect the life, liberty or property of any person is subject to judicial inquiry. The guarantee in Sec. 1 of Article III of
the Constitution embraces life, liberty and property. In the words of Justice Roberto Concepcion in People vs. Hernandez,
(99 Phil 515, 551-2 [1956]), ". . . individual freedom is too basic, too transcendental and vital in a republican state, like
ours, to be denied upon mere general principle and abstract consideration of public safety. Indeed, the preservation of
liberty is such a major preoccupation of our political system that, not satisfied with guaranteeing its enjoyment in the very
first paragraph of section (1) of the Bill of Rights, the framers of our Constitution devoted paragraphs (3), (4), (5), (6), (7),
(8), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16), (17), (18), and (21) of said section (1) to the protection of several aspects of freedom.
. . ." These guarantees are preserved in the 1987 Constitution, according to Fr. Bernas.

30 See, for instance People vs. Sinatao, 249 SCRA 554, 571, October 25, 1995, and People vs. Pidia, 249 SCRA 687,
702-703, November 10, 1995.

31 Art. III, Sec. 1.

32 Art. III, Sec. 11.

33 Art. II, Sec. 12 (2).

34 Art. II, Sec. 12.

35 Art. II, Secs. 15, 16 & 17.

36 For details, see Annex A of the Memorandum for the Accused-Appellant dated September 26, 1996 filed by the
Free Legal Assistance Group in People vs. Malabago, G.R. No. 115686, December 2, 1996.

37 The FLAG-submitted Profile states that have been sentenced to death by trial courts since the effectivity of RA
7659. The Philippine Star issue of December 9, 1996, page 17, however reports that, quoting Sen. Ernesto Herrera, the
total number of death row inmates has gone up to 267, as of November, 1996, of whom, more than one half (139) are rape
convicts. Some major dailies (Philippine Daily Inquirer, Philippine Star, Manila Standard) in their February 3, 1997 issue
up the death row figure to 300, as of the end of January 1997, with 450 as the probable number at the end of 1997.

38 The preamble of the Constitution is theistic. It declares the "sovereign Filipino people's imploration of the "aid of
Almighty God".

39 Cetechism of the Catholic Churh, p. 512, Word and Life Publications:

2266. Preserving the common good of society requires rendering the aggressor unable to inflict harm. For this reason
the traditional teaching of the Church has acknowledged as well-founded the right and duty of legitimate public authority
to punish malefactors by means of penalties commensurate with the gravity of the crime, not excluding, in cases of
extreme gravity, the death penalty. For analogous reasons those holding authority have the right to repel by armed force
aggressors against the community in their charge.

40 Evangelium Vitae, items no. 55 and 56 states:

55. This should not cause surprise: to kill a human being, in whom the image of God is present, is a particularly
serious sin. Only God is the master of life! Yet from the beginning, faced with the many and often tragic cases which
occur in the life of individuals and society, Christian reflection has sought a fuller and deeper understanding of what God's
commandment prohibits and prescribes. There are, in fact situations in which values proposed by God's Law seem to
involve a genuine paradox. This happens for example in the case of legitimate defence, in which the right to protect one's
own life and the duty not to harm someone else's life are difficult to reconcile in practice. Certainly, the intrinsic value of
life and the duty to love oneself no less than others are the basis of a true right to self-defence. The demanding
commandment of love of neighbor, set forth in the Old Testament and confirmed by Jesus, itself presupposes love of
oneself as the basis of comparison: "You shall love your neighbor as yourself" (Mk. 12:31). Consequently, no one can
renounce the right to self-defence out of lack of love for life or for self. This can only be done in virtue of a heroic love
which deepens and transfigures the love of self into a radical self-offering, according to the spirit of the Gospel Beatitudes
(cf. Mt. 5:38-40). The sublime example of this self-offering is the Lord Jesus himself.

Moreover, "legitimate defence can be not only a right but a grave duty for someone responsible for another's life, the
common good of the family or of the State." Unfortunately it happens that the need to render the aggresor incapable of
causing harm sometimes involves taking his life. In this case, the fatal outcome is attributable to the aggressor incapable
whose action brought it about, even though he may not be morally responsible because of a lack of the use of reason.

56. This is context in which to place the problem of the death penalty. On this matter there is a growing tendency,
both in the Church and in civil society, to demand that it be applied in a very limited way or even that it be abolished
completely. The problem must be viewed in the context of a system of penal justice even more in line with dignity and
thus, in the end, with God's plan for man and society. The primary purpose of the punishment which society inflicts is "to
redress the disorder caused by the offence." Public authority must redress the violation of personal and social rights by
imposing on the offender to regain the exercise of his or her freedom. In this way authority also fulfills the purpose of
defending public order and ensuring people's safety, while at the same time offering the offender an incentive and help to
change his or her behavior and be rehabilitated.

It is clear that, for these purposes to be achieved, the nature and extent of the punishment must be carefully evaluated and
decided upon, and ought not go to the extreme of executing the offender except in cases of absolute necessity: in other
words, when it would not be possible other wise to defend society. Today however, as a result of steady improvements in
the organization of the penal system, such cases are very rare, if not partically non-existent.1wphi1.nt

In any event, the principle, set forth in the new Catechism of the Catholic Church remains valid: "If bloodless means are
sufficient to defend human lives against an aggressor and to protect public order and the safety of persons, public
authority must limit itself to such means, because they better correspond to the concrete conditions of the common good
and are more in conformity to the dignity of the human person."


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 78780 July 23, 1987

DAVID G. NITAFAN, WENCESLAO M. POLO, and MAXIMO A. SAVELLANO, JR., petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and THE FINANCIAL OFFICER, SUPREME COURT OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

R E S O L U T I O N

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

Petitioners, the duly appointed and qualified Judges presiding over Branches 52, 19 and 53, respectively, of the Regional
Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, all with stations in Manila, seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin
respondents, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court, from making any
deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries.

In a nutshell, they submit that "any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as judicial officers constitutes a
decrease or diminution of their salaries, contrary to the provision of Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
mandating that "(d)uring their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased," even as it is anathema to the
Ideal of an independent judiciary envisioned in and by said Constitution."

It may be pointed out that, early on, the Court had dealt with the matter administratively in response to representations
that the Court direct its Finance Officer to discontinue the withholding of taxes from salaries of members of the Bench.
Thus, on June 4, 1987, the Court en banc had reaffirmed the Chief Justice's directive as follows:

RE: Question of exemption from income taxation. The Court REAFFIRMED the Chief Justice's previous and
standing directive to the Fiscal Management and Budget Office of this Court to continue with the deduction of the
withholding taxes from the salaries of the Justices of the Supreme Court as well as from the salaries of all other members
of the judiciary.

That should have resolved the question. However, with the filing of this petition, the Court has deemed it best to settle the
legal issue raised through this judicial pronouncement. As will be shown hereinafter, the clear intent of the Constitutional
Commission was to delete the proposed express grant of exemption from payment of income tax to members of the
Judiciary, so as to "give substance to equality among the three branches of Government" in the words of Commissioner
Rigos. In the course of the deliberations, it was further expressly made clear, specially with regard to Commissioner
Joaquin F. Bernas' accepted amendment to the amendment of Commissioner Rigos, that the salaries of members of the
Judiciary would be subject to the general income tax applied to all taxpayers.

This intent was somehow and inadvertently not clearly set forth in the final text of the Constitution as approved and
ratified in February, 1987 (infra, pp. 7-8). Although the intent may have been obscured by the failure to include in the
General Provisions a proscription against exemption of any public officer or employee, including constitutional officers,
from payment of income tax, the Court since then has authorized the continuation of the deduction of the withholding tax
from the salaries of the members of the Supreme Court, as well as from the salaries of all other members of the Judiciary.
The Court hereby makes of record that it had then discarded the ruling in Perfecto vs. Meer and Endencia vs. David, infra,
that declared the salaries of members of the Judiciary exempt from payment of the income tax and considered such
payment as a diminution of their salaries during their continuance in office. The Court hereby reiterates that the salaries of
Justices and Judges are properly subject to a general income tax law applicable to all income earners and that the payment
of such income tax by Justices and Judges does not fall within the constitutional protection against decrease of their
salaries during their continuance in office.

A comparison of the Constitutional provisions involved is called for. The 1935 Constitution provided:

... (The members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts) shall receive such compensation as may be fixed
by law, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office ... 1 (Emphasis supplied).

Under the 1973 Constitution, the same provision read:

The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme court, and of judges of inferior courts shall be
fixed by law, which shall not be decreased during their continuance in office. ... 2 (Emphasis ours).

And in respect of income tax exemption, another provision in the same 1973 Constitution specifically stipulated:

No salary or any form of emolument of any public officer or employee, including constitutional officers, shall be exempt
from payment of income tax. 3

The provision in the 1987 Constitution, which petitioners rely on, reads:

The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be
fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased. 4 (Emphasis supplied).

The 1987 Constitution does not contain a provision similar to Section 6, Article XV of the 1973 Constitution, for which
reason, petitioners claim that the intent of the framers is to revert to the original concept of "non-diminution "of salaries of
judicial officers.

The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission relevant to Section 10, Article VIII, negate such contention.

The draft proposal of Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution read:

Section 13. The salary of the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court and of judges of the lower
courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be diminished nor subjected to
income tax. Until the National Assembly shall provide otherwise, the Chief Justice shall receive an annual salary of
_____________ and each Associate Justice ______________ pesos. 5 (Emphasis ours)

During the debates on the draft Article (Committee Report No. 18), two Commissioners presented their objections to the
provision on tax exemption, thus:

MS. AQUINO. Finally, on the matter of exemption from tax of the salary of justices, does this not violate the principle of
the uniformity of taxation and the principle of equal protection of the law? After all, tax is levied not on the salary but on
the combined income, such that when the judge receives a salary and it is comingled with the other income, we tax the
income, not the salary. Why do we have to give special privileges to the salary of justices?

MR. CONCEPCION. It is the independence of the judiciary. We prohibit the increase or decrease of their salary during
their term. This is an indirect way of decreasing their salary and affecting the independence of the judges.

MS. AQUINO. I appreciate that to be in the nature of a clause to respect tenure, but the special privilege on taxation
might, in effect, be a violation of the principle of uniformity in taxation and the equal protection clause. 6

x x x x x x x x x

MR. OPLE. x x x

Of course, we share deeply the concern expressed by the sponsor, Commissioner Roberto Concepcion, for whom we have
the highest respect, to surround the Supreme Court and the judicial system as a whole with the whole armor of defense
against the executive and legislative invasion of their independence. But in so doing, some of the citizens outside,
especially the humble government employees, might say that in trying to erect a bastion of justice, we might end up with
the fortress of privileges, an island of extra territoriality under the Republic of the Philippines, because a good number of
powers and rights accorded to the Judiciary here may not be enjoyed in the remotest degree by other employees of the
government.

An example is the exception from income tax, which is a kind of economic immunity, which is, of course, denied to the
entire executive department and the legislative. 7

And during the period of amendments on the draft Article, on July 14, 1986, Commissioner Cirilo A. Rigos proposed that
the term "diminished" be changed to "decreased" and that the words "nor subjected to income tax" be deleted so as to
"give substance to equality among the three branches in the government.

Commissioner Florenz D. Regalado, on behalf of the Committee on the Judiciary, defended the original draft and referred
to the ruling of this Court in Perfecto vs. Meer 8 that "the independence of the judges is of far greater importance than any
revenue that could come from taxing their salaries." Commissioner Rigos then moved that the matter be put to a vote.
Commissioner Joaquin G. Bernas stood up "in support of an amendment to the amendment with the request for a
modification of the amendment," as follows:

FR. BERNAS. Yes. I am going to propose an amendment to the amendment saying that it is not enough to drop the phrase
"shall not be subjected to income tax," because if that is all that the Gentleman will do, then he will just fall back on the
decision in Perfecto vs. Meer and in Dencia vs. David [should be Endencia and Jugo vs. David, etc., 93 Phil. 696[ which
excludes them from income tax, but rather I would propose that the statement will read: "During their continuance in
office, their salary shall not be diminished BUT MAY BE SUBJECT TO GENERAL INCOME TAX."IN support of this
position, I would say that the argument seems to be that the justice and judges should not be subjected to income tax
because they already gave up the income from their practice. That is true also of Cabinet members and all other
employees. And I know right now, for instance, there are many people who have accepted employment in the government
involving a reduction of income and yet are still subject to income tax. So, they are not the only citizens whose income is
reduced by accepting service in government.

Commissioner Rigos accepted the proposed amendment to the amendment. Commissioner Rustico F. de los Reyes, Jr.
then moved for a suspension of the session. Upon resumption, Commissioner Bernas announced:

During the suspension, we came to an understanding with the original proponent, Commissioner Rigos, that his
amendment on page 6,. line 4 would read: "During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be
DECREASED."But this is on the understanding that there will be a provision in the Constitution similar to Section 6 of
Article XV, the General Provisions of the 1973 Constitution, which says:

No salary or any form of emolument of any public officer or employee, including constitutional officers, shall be exempt
from payment of income tax.

So, we put a period (.) after "DECREASED" on the understanding that the salary of justices is subject to tax.

When queried about the specific Article in the General Provisions on non-exemption from tax of salaries of public
officers, Commissioner Bernas replied:

FR BERNAS. Yes, I do not know if such an article will be found in the General Provisions. But at any rate, when we put a
period (.) after "DECREASED," it is on the understanding that the doctrine in Perfecto vs. Meer and Dencia vs. David
will not apply anymore.

The amendment to the original draft, as discussed and understood, was finally approved without objection.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Bengzon). The understanding, therefore, is that there will be a provision under the
Article on General Provisions. Could Commissioner Rosario Braid kindly take note that the salaries of officials of the
government including constitutional officers shall not be exempt from income tax? The amendment proposed herein and
accepted by the Committee now reads as follows: "During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be
DECREASED"; and the phrase "nor subjected to income tax" is deleted.9

The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional provision in question until it was finally
approved by the Commission disclosed that the true intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting it, was to
make the salaries of members of the Judiciary taxable. The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the
fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people
adopting it should be given effect.10 The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure
the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution.11 it may also be safely
assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the
framers.121avvphi1

Besides, construing Section 10, Articles VIII, of the 1987 Constitution, which, for clarity, is again reproduced hereunder:

The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be
fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased. (Emphasis supplied).

it is plain that the Constitution authorizes Congress to pass a law fixing another rate of compensation of Justices and
Judges but such rate must be higher than that which they are receiving at the time of enactment, or if lower, it would be
applicable only to those appointed after its approval. It would be a strained construction to read into the provision an
exemption from taxation in the light of the discussion in the Constitutional Commission.

With the foregoing interpretation, and as stated heretofore, the ruling that "the imposition of income tax upon the salary of
judges is a dimunition thereof, and so violates the Constitution" in Perfecto vs. Meer,13 as affirmed in Endencia vs. David
14 must be declared discarded. The framers of the fundamental law, as the alter ego of the people, have expressed in clear
and unmistakable terms the meaning and import of Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution that they have
adopted

Stated otherwise, we accord due respect to the intent of the people, through the discussions and deliberations of their
representatives, in the spirit that all citizens should bear their aliquot part of the cost of maintaining the government and
should share the burden of general income taxation equitably.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for Prohibition is hereby dismissed.

Teehankee, C.J., Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes,
JJ., concur.
Yap, J., is on leave.


Footnotes

1 Section 9,Articie VIII.

2 Section 10, Article X.

3 Section 6, Article XV, General Provisions.

4 Section 10, Article VIII.

5 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. I, p. 433.

6 Record of the Constitutional Commission, p. 460.

7 Ibid., at page 467,

8 85 Phil. 552 (1950).

9 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 506.

10 Gold Creek Mining Co. vs. Rodriguez, 66 Phil. 259 (1938).

11 J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Land Tenure Administration, No. L-21064, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413.

12 Tanada, Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines, Fourth Ed., Vol. 1, p. 21.

13 85 Phil. 552 (1950).

14 93 Phil. 696 (1953).

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC



G.R. No. 103524 April 15, 1992

CESAR BENGZON, QUERUBE MAKALINTAL, LINO M. PATAJO, JOSE LEUTERIO, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. FRANKLIN N. DRILON, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity
as Secretary of Department of Budget and Management, and HON. ROSALINA CAJUCOM, in her capacity as National
Treasurer, respondents.

A.M. No. 91-8-225-CA April 15, 1992

REQUEST OF RETIRED JUSTICES MANUEL P. BARCELONA, JUAN P. ENRIQUEZ, JUAN O. REYES, JR. and
GUARDSON R. LOOD FOR READJUSTMENT OF THEIR MONTHLY PENSION.



GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The issue in this petition is the constitutionality of the veto by the President of certain provisions in the General
Appropriations Act for the Fiscal Year 1992 relating to the payment of the adjusted pensions of retired Justices of the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.

The petitioners are retired Justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals who are currently receiving monthly
pensions under Republic Act No. 910 as amended by Republic Act No. 1797. They filed the instant petition on their own
behalf and in representation of all other retired Justices of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals similarly situated.

Named respondents are Hon. Franklin Drilon the Executive Secretary, Hon. Guillermo Carague as Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management, and Hon. Rosalinda Cajucom, the Treasurer of the Philippines. The respondents
are sued in their official capacities, being officials of the Executive Department involved in the implementation of the
release of funds appropriated in the Annual Appropriations Law.

We treat the Comments of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) as an Answer and decide the petition on its merits.

The factual backdrop of this case is as follows:

On June 20, 1953, Republic Act No, 910 was enacted to provide the retirement pensions of Justices of the Supreme Court
and of the Court of Appeals who have rendered at least twenty (20) years service either in the Judiciary or in any other
branch of the Government or in both, having attained the age of seventy (70) years or who resign by reason of incapacity
to discharge the duties of the office. The retired Justice shall receive during the residue of his natural life the salary which
he was receiving at the time of his retirement or resignation.

Republic Act No. 910 was amended by Republic Act No. 1797 (approved on June 21, 1957) which provided that:

Sec. 3-A. In case the salary of Justices of the Supreme Court or of the Court of Appeals is increased or decreased,
such increased or decreased salary shall, for purposes of this Act, be deemed to be the salary or the retirement pension
which a Justice who as of June twelve, nineteen hundred fifty-four had ceased to be such to accept another position in the
Government or who retired was receiving at the time of his cessation in office. Provided, that any benefits that have
already accrued prior to such increase or decrease shall not be affected thereby.

Identical retirement benefits were also given to the members of the Constitutional Commissions under Republic Act No.
1568, as amended by Republic Act No. 3595. On November 12, 1974, on the occasion of the Armed Forces Loyalty Day,
President Marcos signed Presidential Decree 578 which extended similar retirement benefits to the members of the Armed
Forces giving them also the automatic readjustment features of Republic Act No. 1797 and Republic Act No. 3595.

Two months later, however, President Marcos issued Presidential Decree 644 on January 25, 1975 repealing Section 3-A
of Republic Act No. 1797 and Republic Act No. 3595 (amending Republic Act No. 1568 and Presidential Decree No.
578) which authorized the adjustment of the pension of the retired Justices of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals,
Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions and the officers and enlisted members of the Armed Forces to
the prevailing rates of salaries.

Significantly, under Presidential Decree 1638 the automatic readjustment of the retirement pension of officers and enlisted
men was subsequently restored by President Marcos. A later decree Presidential Decree 1909 was also issued providing
for the automatic readjustment of the pensions of members of the Armed Forces who have retired prior to September 10,
1979.

While the adjustment of the retirement pensions for members of the Armed Forces who number in the tens of thousands
was restored, that of the retired Justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals who are only a handful and fairly
advanced in years, was not.

Realizing the unfairness of the discrimination against the members of the Judiciary and the Constitutional Commissions,
Congress approved in 1990 a bill for the reenactment of the repealed provisions of Republic Act No. 1797 and Republic
Act No. 3595. Congress was under the impression that Presidential Decree 644 became law after it was published in the
Official Gazette on April 7, 1977. In the explanatory note of House Bill No. 16297 and Senate Bill No. 740, the
legislature saw the need to reenact Republic Act Nos. 1797 and 3595 to restore said retirement pensions and privileges of
the retired Justices and members of the Constitutional Commissions, in order to assure those serving in the Supreme
Court, Court of Appeals and Constitutional Commissions adequate old age pensions even during the time when the
purchasing power of the peso has been diminished substantially by worldwide recession or inflation. This is underscored
by the fact that the petitioner retired Chief Justice, a retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court and the retired
Presiding Justice are presently receiving monthly pensions of P3,333.33, P2,666.66 and P2,333.33 respectively.

President Aquino, however vetoed House Bill No. 16297 on July 11, 1990 on the ground that according to her "it would
erode the very foundation of the Government's collective effort to adhere faithfully to and enforce strictly the policy on
standardization of compensation as articulated in Republic Act No. 6758 known as Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989." She further said that "the Government should not grant distinct privileges to select group of
officials whose retirement benefits under existing laws already enjoy preferential treatment over those of the vast majority
of our civil service servants."

Prior to the instant petition, however, Retired Court of Appeals Justices Manuel P. Barcelona, Juan P. Enriquez, Juan O.
Reyes, Jr. and Guardson R. Lood filed a letter/petition dated April 22, 1991 which we treated as Administrative Matter
No. 91-8-225-CA. The petitioners asked this Court far a readjustment of their monthly pensions in accordance with
Republic Act No. 1797. They reasoned out that Presidential Decree 644 repealing Republic Act No. 1797 did not become
law as there was no valid publication pursuant to Taada v. Tuvera, (136 SCRA 27 [1985]) and 146 SCRA 446 [1986]).
Presidential Decree 644 promulgated on January 24, 1975 appeared for the first time only in the supplemental issue of the
Official Gazette, (Vol. 74, No. 14) purportedly dated April 4, 1977 but published only on September 5, 1983. Since
Presidential Decree 644 has no binding force and effect of law, it therefore did not repeal Republic Act No. 1797.

In a Resolution dated November 28, 1991 the Court acted favorably on the request. The dispositive portion reads as
follows:

WHEREFORE, the requests of retired Justices Manuel P. Barcelona, Juan P. Enriquez, Juan O. Reyes and Guardson Lood
are GRANTED. It is hereby AUTHORIZED that their monthly pensions be adjusted and paid on the basis of RA 1797
effective January 1, 1991 without prejudice to the payment on their pension differentials corresponding to the previous
years upon the availability of funds for the purpose.

Pursuant to the above resolution, Congress included in the General Appropriations Bill for Fiscal Year 1992 certain
appropriations for the Judiciary intended for the payment of the adjusted pension rates due the retired Justices of the
Supreme Court and Court of Appeals.

The pertinent provisions in House Bill No. 34925 are as follows:

XXVIII. THE JUDICIARY

A. Supreme Court of the Philippines and the Lower Courts.

For general administration, administration of personnel benefits, supervision of courts, adjudication of constitutional
questions appealed and other cases, operation and maintenance of the Judicial and Bar Council in the Supreme Court, and
the adjudication of regional court cases, metropolitan court cases, municipal trial court cases in Cities, municipal circuit
court cases, municipal, court cases, Shari'a district court cases and Shari'a circuit court cases as indicated hereunder
P2,095,651,000

xxx xxx xxx

Special Provisions.

1. Augmentation of any Item in the Court's Appropriations. Any savings in the appropriation for the Supreme Court
and the Lower Courts may be utilized by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to augment any item of the Court's
appropriations for: (a) printing of decisions and publications of Philippine Reports; b) commutable terminal leaves of
Justices and other personnel of the Supreme Court and any payment of adjusted pension rates to retired Justices entitled
thereto pursuant to Administrative Matter No. 91-8-225-CA; (c) repair, maintenance, improvement, and other operating
expenses of the courts' books and periodicals; (d) purchase, maintenance and improvement of printing equipment; e)
necessary expenses for the employment of temporary employees, contractual and casual employees, for judicial
administration; f) maintenance and improvement of the Court's Electronic Data Processing; (g) extraordinary expenses of
the Chief Justice, attendance in international conferences and conduct of training programs; (h) commutable transportation
and representation allowances and fringe benefits for Justices, Clerks of Court, Court Administrator, Chief of Offices and
other Court personnel in accordance with the rates prescribed by law; and (i) compensation of attorneys-de-oficio;
PROVIDED, that as mandated by LOI No. 489 any increases in salary and allowances shall be subject to the usual
procedures and policies as provided for under P.D. No. 985 and other pertinent laws. (page 1071, General Appropriations
Act, FY 1992; Emphasis supplied)

xxx xxx xxx

4. Payment of Adjusted Pension Rates to Retired Justices. The amount herein appropriated for payment of pensions
to retired judges and justices shall include the payment of pensions at the adjusted rates to retired justices of the Supreme
Court entitled thereto pursuant to the ruling of the Court in Administrative Matter No. 91-8-225-C.A. (page 1071, General
Appropriations Act, FY 1992).

xxx xxx xxx

Activities and Purposes

1. General Administration and Support Services.

a. General administrative Services P 43,515,000
b. Payment of retirement gratuity
of national goverment officials
and employees P 206,717,000
c. Payment of terminal leave benefits to
officials and employees antitled thereto P 55,316,000
d. Payment of pension totired jude
and justice entitled thereto P 22,500,000

(page 1071, General Appropriations Act, FY 1992)

C. COURT OF APPEALS

For general administration, administration
of personnel benefit, benefits and the
adjudication of appealed and other cases
as indicated hereunder P114,615,000

Special Provisions.

1. Authority to Use Savings. Subject to the approval of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in accordance with
Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, the Presiding Justice may be authorized to
use any savings in any item of the appropriation for the Court of Appeals for purposes of: (1) improving its compound and
facilities; and (2) for augmenting any deficiency in any item of its appropriation including its extraordinary expenses and
payment of adjusted pension rates to retired justices entitled thereto pursuant to Administrative Matter No. 91-8-225-C.A.
(page 1079, General Appropriations Act, FY 1992; Emphasis supplied)

2. Payment of adjustment Pension Rates to Retired Justices. The amount herein appropriated for payment of
pensions to retired judges and justices shall include the payment of pensions at the adjusted rates to retired justices of the
Court of Appeals entitled thereto pursuant to the Ruling of the Supreme Court in Administrative Matter No. 91-6-225-
C.A. (page 1079 General Appropriations Act, FY 1992).

XL. GENERAL FUND ADJUSTMENT

For general fund adjustment for
operational and special requirements
as indicated hereunder P500,000,000

xxx xxx xxx

Special Provisions

1. Use of the Fund. This fund shall be used for:

xxx xxx xxx

1.3. Authorized overdrafts and/or valid unbooked obligations, including the payment of back salaries and related
personnel benefits arising from decision of competent authority including the Supreme Court decision in Administrative
Matter No. 91-8-225-C.A. and COA decision in No. 1704." (page 11649 Gen. Appropriations Act, FY 1992; Emphasis
supplied)

On January 15, 1992, the President vetoed the underlined portions of Section 1 and the entire Section 4 the Special
Provisions for the Supreme Court of the Philippines and the Lower Courts (General Appropriations Act, FY 1992, page
1071) and the underlined portions of Section 1 and the entire Section 2, of the Special Provisions for the Court of Appeals
(page 1079) and the underlined portions of Section 1.3 of Article XLV of the Special Provisions of the General Fund
Adjustments (page 1164, General Appropriations Act, FY 1992).

The reason given for the veto of said provisions is that "the resolution of this Honorable Court in Administrative Matter
No. 91-8-225-CA pursuant to which the foregoing appropriations for the payment of the retired Justices of the Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeals have been enacted effectively nullified the veto of the President on House Bill No. 16297,
the bill which provided for the automatic increase in the retirement pensions of the Justices of the Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeals and chairmen of the Constitutional Commissions by re-enacting Republic Act No. 1797 and Republic
Act No. 3595. The President's veto of the aforesaid provisions was further justified by reiterating the earlier reasons for
vetoing House Bill No. 16297: "they would erode the very foundation of our collective effort to adhere faithfully to and
enforce strictly the policy and standardization of compensation. We should not permit the grant of distinct privileges to
select group of officials whose retirement pensions under existing laws already enjoy preferential treatment over those of
the vast majority of our civil servants."

Hence, the instant petition filed by the petitioners with the assertions that:

1) The subject veto is not an item veto;

2) The veto by the Executive is violative of the doctrine of separation of powers;

3) The veto deprives the retired Justices of their rights to the pensions due them;

4) The questioned veto impairs the Fiscal Autonomy guaranteed by the Constitution.

Raising similar grounds, the petitioners in AM-91-8-225-CA, brought to the attention of this Court that the veto
constitutes no legal obstacle to the continued payment of the adjusted pensions pursuant to the Court's resolution.

On February 14, 1992, the Court resolved to consolidate Administrative Matter No. 91-8-225-CA with G.R. No. 103524.

The petitioners' contentions are well-taken.

I

It cannot be overstressed that in a constitutional government such as ours, the rule of law must prevail. The Constitution is
the basic and paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to which all persons including the highest official
of this land must defer. From this cardinal postulate, it follows that the three branches of government must discharge their
respective functions within the limits of authority conferred by the Constitution. Under the principle of separation of
powers, neither Congress, the President nor the Judiciary may encroach on fields allocated to the other branches of
government. The legislature is generally limited to the enactment of laws, the executive to the enforcement of laws and
the judiciary to their interpretation and application to cases and controversies.

The Constitution expressly confers or the judiciary the power to maintain inviolate what it decrees. As the guardian of the
Constitution we cannot shirk the duty of seeing to it that the officers in each branch of government do not go beyond their
constitutionally allocated boundaries and that the entire Government itself or any of its branches does not violate the basic
liberties of the people. The essence of this judicial duty was emphatically explained by Justice Laurel in the leading case
of Angara v. Electoral Commission, (63 Phil. 139 [1936]) to wit:

The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent of such
powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the
judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries it does not assert any superiority over the other department, it does
not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it
by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an
actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. (Emphasis supplied)

The act of the Executive in vetoing the particular provisions is an exercise of a constitutionally vested power. But even as
the Constitution grants the power, it also provides limitations to its exercise. The veto power is not absolute.

The pertinent provision of the Constitution reads:

The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill but the
veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object. (Section 27(2), Article VI, Constitution)

The OSG is correct when it states that the Executive must veto a bill in its entirety or not at all. He or she cannot act like
an editor crossing out specific lines, provisions, or paragraphs in a bill that he or she dislikes. In the exercise of the veto
power, it is generally all or nothing. However, when it comes to appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, the Administration
needs the money to run the machinery of government and it can not veto the entire bill even if it may contain
objectionable features. The President is, therefore, compelled to approve into law the entire bill, including its undesirable
parts. It is for this reason that the Constitution has wisely provided the "item veto power" to avoid inexpedient riders being
attached to an indispensable appropriation or revenue measure.

The Constitution provides that only a particular item or items may be vetoed. The power to disapprove any item or items
in an appropriate bill does not grant the authority to veto a part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of the
same item. (Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr., 191 SCRA 452, 464 [1990])

We distinguish an item from a provision in the following manner:

The terms item and provision in budgetary legislation and practice are concededly different. An item in a bill refers to the
particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts . . . of the bill (Bengzon, supra, at 916.) It is an indivisible sum of
money dedicated to a stated purpose (Commonwealth v. Dodson, 11 S.E. 2d 120, 124, 125, etc., 176 Va. 281) The United
States Supreme Court, in the case of Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice (299 U.S. 410, 414, 57 Ct. 252, 81 L. Ed, 312)
declared "that an "tem" of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which in itself is a specific appropriation of
money, not some general provision of law, which happens to be put into an appropriation bill." (id. at page 465)

We regret having to state that misimpressions or unfortunately wrong advice must have been the basis of the disputed
veto.

The general fund adjustment is an item which appropriates P500,000,000.00 to enable the Government to meet certain
unavoidable obligations which may have been inadequately funded by the specific items for the different branches,
departments, bureaus, agencies, and offices of the government.

The President did not veto this item. What were vetoed were methods or systems placed by Congress to insure that
permanent and continuing obligations to certain officials would be paid when they fell due.

An examination of the entire sections and the underlined portions of the law which were vetoed will readily show that
portions of the item have been chopped up into vetoed and unvetoed parts. Less than all of an item has been vetoed.
Moreover, the vetoed portions are not items. They are provisions.

Thus, the augmentation of specific appropriations found inadequate to pay retirement payments, by transferring savings
from other items of appropriation is a provision and not an item. It gives power to the Chief Justice to transfer funds from
one item to another. There is no specific appropriation of money involved.

In the same manner, the provision which states that in compliance with decisions of the Supreme Court and the
Commission on Audit, funds still undetermined in amount may be drawn from the general fund adjustment is not an item.
It is the "general fund adjustment" itself which is the item. This was not touched. It was not vetoed.

More ironic is the fact that misinformation led the Executive to believe that the items in the 1992 Appropriations Act were
being vetoed when, in fact, the veto struck something else.

What were really vetoed are:

(1) Republic Act No. 1797 enacted as early as June 21, 1957; and

(2) The Resolution of the Supreme Court dated November 28, 1991 in Administrative Matter No. 91-8-225-CA.

We need no lengthy justifications or citations of authorities to declare that no President may veto the provisions of a law
enacted thirty-five (35) years before his or her term of office. Neither may the President set aside or reverse a final and
executory judgment of this Court through the exercise of the veto power.

A few background facts may be reiterated to fully explain the unhappy situation.

Republic Act No. 1797 provided for the adjustment of pensions of retired Justices which privilege was extended to retired
members of Constitutional Commissions by Republic Act No. 3595.

On January 25, 1975, President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 644 which repealed Republic Acts 1797 and 3595.
Subsequently, automatic readjustment of pensions for retired Armed Forces officers and men was surreptitiously restored
through Presidential Decree Nos. 1638 and 1909.

It was the impression that Presidential Decree No. 644 had reduced the pensions of Justices and Constitutional
Commissioners which led Congress to restore the repealed provisions through House Bill No. 16297 in 1990. When her
finance and budget advisers gave the wrong information that the questioned provisions in the 1992 General
Appropriations Act were simply an attempt to overcome her earlier 1990 veto, she issued the veto now challenged in this
petition.

It turns out, however, that P.D. No. 644 never became valid law. If P.D. No. 644 was not law, it follows that Rep. Act No.
1797 was not repealed and continues to be effective up to the present. In the same way that it was enforced from 1951 to
1975, so should it be enforced today.

House Bill No. 16297 was superfluous as it tried to restore benefits which were never taken away validly. The veto of
House Bill No. 16297 in 1991 did not also produce any effect. Both were based on erroneous and non-existent premises.

From the foregoing discussion, it can be seen that when the President vetoed certain provisions of the 1992 General
Appropriations Act, she was actually vetoing Republic Act No. 1797 which, of course, is beyond her power to
accomplish.

Presidential Decree No. 644 which purportedly repealed Republic Act No. 1717 never achieved that purpose because it
was not properly published. It never became a law.

The case of Tada v. Tuvera (134 SCRA 27 [1985]and 146 SCRA 446 [1986]) specifically requires that "all laws shall
immediately upon their approval or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become
effective only after fifteen days from their publication, or on another date specified by the legislature, in accordance with
Article 2 of the Civil Code." This was the Court's answer to the petition of Senator Lorenzo Taada and other opposition
leaders who challenged the validity of Marcos' decrees which, while never published, were being enforced. Secret decrees
are anathema in a free society.

In support of their request, the petitioners in Administrative Matter No. 91-9-225-CA secured certification from Director
Lucita C. Sanchez of the National Printing Office that the April 4, 1977 Supplement to the Official Gazette was published
only on September 5, 1983 and officially released on September 29, 1983.

On the issue of whether or not Presidential Decree 644 became law, the Court has already categorically spoken in a
definitive ruling on the matter, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

PD 644 was promulgated by President Marcos on January 24, 1975, but was not immediately or soon thereafter published
although preceding and subsequent decrees were duly published in the Official Gazette. It now appears that it was
intended as a secret decree "NOT FOR PUBLICATION" as the notation on the face of the original copy thereof plainly
indicates (Annex B). It is also clear that the decree was published in the back-dated Supplement only after it was
challenged in the Taada case as among the presidential decrees that had not become effective for lack of the required
publication. The petition was filed on May 7, 1983, four months before the actual publication of the decree.

It took more than eight years to publish the decree after its promulgation in 1975. Moreover, the publication was made in
bad faith insofar as it purported to show that it was done in 1977 when the now demonstrated fact is that the April 4, 1977
supplement was actually published and released only in September 1983. The belated publication was obviously intended
to refute the petitioner's claim in the Taada case and to support the Solicitor General's submission that the petition had
become moot and academic.

xxx xxx xxx

We agree that PD 644 never became a law because it was not validly published and that, consequently, it did not have the
effect of repealing RA 1797. The requesting Justices (including Justice Lood, whose request for the upgrading of his
pension was denied on January 15, 1991) are therefore entitled to be paid their monthly pensions on the basis of the latter
measure, which remains unchanged to date.

The Supreme Court has spoken and it has done so with finality, logically and rightly so as to assure stability in legal
relations, and avoid confusion. (see Ver v. Quetullo, 163 SCRA 80 [1988]) Like other decisions of this Court, the ruling
and principles set out in the Court resolution constitute binding precedent. (Bulig-Bulig Kita Kamaganak Association, et
al. v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc., Regional Trial Court, etc., G.R. 847500 16 May 1989, En Banc, Minute Resolution)

The challenged veto has far-reaching implications which the Court can not countenance as they undermine the principle of
separation of powers. The Executive has no authority to set aside and overrule a decision of the Supreme Court.

We must emphasize that the Supreme Court did not enact Rep. Act No. 1797. It is not within its powers to pass laws in the
first place. Its duty is confined to interpreting or defining what the law is and whether or not it violates a provision of the
Constitution.

As early as 1953, Congress passed a law providing for retirement pensions to retired Justices of the Supreme Court and
the Court of Appeals. This law was amended by Republic Act 1797 in 1957. Funds necessary to pay the retirement
pensions under these statutes are deemed automatically appropriated every year.

Thus, Congress included in the General Appropriations Act of 1992, provisions identifying funds and savings which may
be used to pay the adjusted pensions pursuant to the Supreme Court Resolution. As long as retirement laws remain in the
statute book, there is an existing obligation on the part of the government to pay the adjusted pension rate pursuant to RA
1797 and AM-91-8-225-CA.

Neither may the veto power of the President be exercised as a means of repealing RA 1797. This is arrogating unto the
Presidency legislative powers which are beyond its authority. The President has no power to enact or amend statutes
promulgated by her predecessors much less to repeal existing laws. The President's power is merely to execute the laws as
passed by Congress.

II

There is a matter of greater consequence arising from this petition. The attempt to use the veto power to set aside a
Resolution of this Court and to deprive retirees of benefits given them by Rep. Act No. 1797 trenches upon the
constitutional grant of fiscal autonomy to the Judiciary.

Sec. 3, Art. VIII mandates that:

Sec. 3 The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced by the legislature
below the amount appropriated for the previous year and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly released.

We can not overstress the importance of and the need for an independent judiciary. The Court has on various past
occasions explained the significance of judicial independence. In the case of De la Llana v. Alba (112 SCRA 294 [1982]),
it ruled:

It is a cardinal rule of faith of our constitutional regime that it is the people who are endowed with rights, to secure which
a government is instituted. Acting as it does through public officials, it has to grant them either expressly or implicitly
certain powers. These they exercise not for their own benefit but for the body politic. . . .

A public office is a public trust. That is more than a moral adjuration. It is a legal imperative. The law may vest in a public
official certain rights. It does so to enable them to perform his functions and fulfill his responsibilities more efficiently. . .
. It is an added guarantee that justices and judges can administer justice undeterred by any fear of reprisal or untoward
consequence. Their judgments then are even more likely to be inspired solely by their knowledge of the law and the
dictates of their conscience, free from the corrupting influence of base or unworthy motives. The independence of which
they are assured is impressed with a significance transcending that of a purely personal right. (At pp. 338-339)

The exercise of the veto power in this case may be traced back to the efforts of the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) to ignore or overlook the plain mandate of the Constitution on fiscal autonomy. The OSG Comment
reflects the same truncated view of the provision.

We have repeatedly in the past few years called the attention of DBM that not only does it allocate less than one percent
(1%) of the national budget annually for the 22,769 Justices, Judges, and court personnel all over the country but it also
examines with a fine-toothed come how we spend the funds appropriated by Congress based on DBM recommendations.

The gist of our position papers and arguments before Congress is as follows:

The DBM requires the Supreme Court, with Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman to submit budget proposals
in accordance with parameters it establishes. DBM evaluates the proposals, asks each agency to defend its proposals
during DBM budget hearings, submits its own version of the proposals to Congress without informing the agency of
major alterations and mutilations inflicted on their proposals, and expects each agency to defend in Congress proposals
not of the agency's making.

After the general appropriations bill is passed by Congress and signed into law by the President, the tight and officious
control by DBM continues. For the release of appropriated funds, the Judiciary, Constitutional Commissions, and
Ombudsman are instructed through "guidelines", how to prepare Work and Financial Plans and requests for monthly
allotments. The DBM evaluates and approves these plans and requests and on the basis of its approval authorizes the
release of allotments with corresponding notices of cash allocation. These notices specify the maximum withdrawals each
month which the Supreme Court, the Commissions and the Ombudsman may make from the servicing government bank.
The above agencies are also required to submit to DBM monthly, quarterly and year-end budget accountability reports to
indicate their performance, physical and financial operations and income,

The DBM reserves to itself the power to review the accountability reports and when importuned for needed funds, to
release additional allotments to the agency. Since DBM always prunes the budget proposals to below subsistence levels
and since emergency situations usually occur during the fiscal year, the Chief Justices, Chairmen of the Commissions, and
Ombudsman are compelled to make pilgrimages to DBM for additional funds to tide their respective agencies over the
emergency.

What is fiscal autonomy?

As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary, the Civil Service Commission, the
Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections, and the Office of the Ombudsman contemplates a guarantee on full
flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require. It recognizes the
power and authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of compensation not exceeding the highest rates authorized
by law for compensation and pay plans of the government and allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided by law
or prescribed by them in the course of the discharge of their functions.

Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside control. If the Supreme Court says it needs 100 typewriters but DBM rules
we need only 10 typewriters and sends its recommendations to Congress without even informing us, the autonomy given
by the Constitution becomes an empty and illusory platitude.

The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the independence end flexibility needed
in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent
constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and
violative not only of the express mandate of the Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the
independence and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system is based. In the interest
of comity and cooperation, the Supreme Court, Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman have so far limited their
objections to constant reminders. We now agree with the petitioners that this grant of autonomy should cease to be a
meaningless provision.

In the case at bar, the veto of these specific provisions in the General Appropriations Act is tantamount to dictating to the
Judiciary how its funds should be utilized, which is clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy. The freedom of the Chief Justice
to make adjustments in the utilization of the funds appropriated for the expenditures of the judiciary, including the use of
any savings from any particular item to cover deficits or shortages in other items of the Judiciary is withheld. Pursuant to
the Constitutional mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy freedom in the disposition of the funds allocated to it in the
appropriations law. It knows its priorities just as it is aware of the fiscal restraints. The Chief Justice must be given a free
hand on how to augment appropriations where augmentation is needed.

Furthermore, in the case of Gonzales v. Macaraig (191 SCRA 452 [1990]), the Court upheld the authority of the President
and other key officials to augment any item or any appropriation from savings in the interest of expediency and efficiency.
The Court stated that:

There should be no question, therefore, that statutory authority has, in fact, been granted. And once given, the heads of the
different branches of the Government and those of the Constitutional Commissions are afforded considerable flexibility in
the use of public funds and resources (Demetria v. Alba, supra). The doctrine of separation of powers is in no way
endangered because the transfer is made within a department (or branch of government) and not from one department
(branch) to another.

The Constitution, particularly Article VI, Section 25(5) also provides:

Sec. 25. (5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the President of the
Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of
Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their
respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.

In the instant case, the vetoed provisions which relate to the use of savings for augmenting items for the payment of the
pension differentials, among others, are clearly in consonance with the abovestated pronouncements of the Court. The
veto impairs the power of the Chief Justice to augment other items in the Judiciary's appropriation, in contravention of the
constitutional provision on "fiscal autonomy."

III

Finally, it can not be denied that the retired Justices have a vested right to the accrued pensions due them pursuant to RA
1797.

The right to a public pension is of statutory origin and statutes dealing with pensions have been enacted by practically all
the states in the United States (State ex rel. Murray v, Riley, 44 Del 505, 62 A2d 236), and presumably in most countries
of the world. Statutory provisions for the support of Judges or Justices on retirement are founded on services rendered to
the state. Where a judge has complied with the statutory prerequisite for retirement with pay, his right to retire and draw
salary becomes vested and may not, thereafter, be revoked or impaired. (Gay v. Whitehurst, 44 So ad 430)

Thus, in the Philippines, a number of retirement laws have been enacted, the purpose of which is to entice competent men
and women to enter the government service and to permit them to retire therefrom with relative security, not only those
who have retained their vigor but, more so, those who have been incapacitated by illness or accident. (In re: Amount of
the Monthly Pension of Judges and Justices Starting From the Sixth Year of their Retirement and After the Expiration of
the Initial Five-year Period of Retirement, (190 SCRA 315 [1990]).

As early as 1953, Rep. Act No. 910 was enacted to grant pensions to retired Justices of the Supreme Court and Court of
Appeals.

This was amended by RA 1797 which provided for an automatic adjustment of the pension rates. Through the years, laws
were enacted and jurisprudence expounded to afford retirees better benefits.

P.D. No. 1438, for one, was promulgated on June 10, 1978 amending RA 910 providing that the lump sum of 5 years
gratuity to which the retired Justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals were entitled was to be computed on the
basis of the highest monthly aggregate of transportation, living and representation allowances each Justice was receiving
on the date of his resignation. The Supreme Court in a resolution dated October 4, 1990, stated that this law on gratuities
covers the monthly pensions of retired Judges and Justices which should include the highest monthly aggregate of
transportation, living and representation allowances the retiree was receiving on the date of retirement. (In Re: Amount of
the Monthly Pension of Judges and Justices, supra)

The rationale behind the veto which implies that Justices and Constitutional officers are unduly favored is, again, a
misimpression.

Immediately, we can state that retired Armed Forces officers and enlisted men number in the tens of thousands while
retired Justices are so few they can be immediately identified. Justices retire at age 70 while military men retire at a much
younger age some retired Generals left the military at age 50 or earlier. Yet the benefits in Rep. Act No. 1797 are made
to apply equally to both groups. Any ideas arising from an alleged violation of the equal protection clause should first be
directed to retirees in the military or civil service where the reason for the retirement provision is not based on indubitable
and constitutionally sanctioned grounds, not to a handful of retired Justices whose retirement pensions are founded on
constitutional reasons.

The provisions regarding retirement pensions of justices arise from the package of protections given by the Constitution to
guarantee and preserve the independence of the Judiciary.

The Constitution expressly vests the power of judicial review in this Court. Any institution given the power to declare, in
proper cases, that act of both the President and Congress are unconstitutional needs a high degree of independence in the
exercise of its functions. Our jurisdiction may not be reduced by Congress. Neither may it be increased without our advice
and concurrence. Justices may not be removed until they reach age 70 except through impeachment. All courts and court
personnel are under the administrative supervision of the Supreme Court. The President may not appoint any Judge or
Justice unless he or she has been nominated by the Judicial and Bar Council which, in turn, is under the Supreme Court's
supervision. Our salaries may not be decreased during our continuance in office. We cannot be designated to any agency
performing administrative or quasi-judicial functions. We are specifically given fiscal autonomy. The Judiciary is not only
independent of, but also co-equal and coordinate with the Executive and Legislative Departments. (Article VIII and
section 30, Article VI, Constitution)

Any argument which seeks to remove special privileges given by law to former Justices of this Court and the ground that
there should be no "grant of distinct privileges" or "preferential treatment" to retired Justices ignores these provisions of
the Constitution and, in effect, asks that these Constitutional provisions on special protections for the Judiciary be
repealed. The integrity of our entire constitutional system is premised to a large extent on the independence of the
Judiciary. All these provisions are intended to preserve that independence. So are the laws on retirement benefits of
Justices.

One last point.

The Office of the Solicitor General argues that:

. . . Moreover, by granting these benefits to retired Justices implies that public funds, raised from taxes on other citizens,
will be paid off to select individuals who are already leading private lives and have ceased performing public service. Said
the United States Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Miller: "To lay with one hand the power of the
government on the property of the citizen, and with the other to bestow upon favored individuals . . . is nonetheless a
robbery because it is done under the forms of law . . ." (Law Association V. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655) (Comment, p. 16)

The above arguments are not only specious, impolite and offensive; they certainly are unbecoming of an office whose top
officials are supposed to be, under their charter, learned in the law.

Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon and Chief Justice Querube Makalintal, Justices J.B.L. Reyes, Cecilia Muoz Palma, Efren
Plana, Vicente Abad Santos, and, in fact, all retired Justices of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals may no longer
be in the active service. Still, the Solicitor General and all lawyers under him who represent the government before the
two courts and whose predecessors themselves appeared before these retirees, should show some continuing esteem and
good manners toward these Justices who are now in the evening of their years.

All that the retirees ask is to be given the benefits granted by law. To characterize them as engaging in "robbery" is
intemperate, abrasive, and disrespectful more so because the argument is unfounded.

If the Comment is characteristic of OSG pleadings today, then we are sorry to state that the then quality of research in that
institution has severely deteriorated.

In the first place, the citation of the case is, wrong. The title is not LAW Association v. Topeka but Citizen's Savings and
Loan Association of Cleveland, Ohio v. Topeka City (20 Wall. 655; 87 U.S. 729; 22 Law. Ed. 455 [1874]. Second, the
case involved the validity of a statute authorizing cities and counties to issue bonds for the purpose of building bridges,
waterpower, and other public works to aid private railroads improve their services. The law was declared void on the
ground that the right of a municipality to impose a tax cannot be used for private interests.

The case was decided in 1874. The world has turned over more than 40,000 times since that ancient period. Public use is
now equated with public interest. Public money may now be used for slum clearance, low-cost housing, squatter
resettlement, urban and agrarian reform where only private persons are the immediate beneficiaries. What was "robbery"
in 1874 is now called "social justice." There is nothing about retirement benefits in the cited case. Obviously, the OSG
lawyers cited from an old textbook or encyclopedia which could not even spell "loan" correctly. Good lawyers are
expected to go to primary sources and to use only relevant citations.

The Court has been deluged with letters and petitions by former colleagues in the Judiciary requesting adjustments in their
pensions just so they would be able to cope with the everyday living expenses not to mention the high cost of medical
bills that old age entails. As Justice Cruz aptly stated in Teodoro J. Santiago v. COA, (G.R. No. 92284, July 12, 1991);

Retirement laws should be interpreted liberally in favor of the retiree because their intention is to provide for his
sustenance, and hopefully even comfort, when he no longer has the stamina to continue earning his livelihood. After
devoting the best years of his life to the public service, he deserves the appreciation of a grateful government as best
concretely expressed in a generous retirement gratuity commensurate with the value and length of his services. That
generosity is the least he should expect now that his work is done and his youth is gone. Even as he feels the weariness in
his bones and glimpses the approach of the lengthening shadows, he should be able to luxuriate in the thought that he did
his task well, and was rewarded for it.

For as long as these retired Justices are entitled under laws which continue to be effective, the government can not deprive
them of their vested right to the payment of their pensions.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned veto is SET ASIDE as illegal and unconstitutional. The
vetoed provisions of the 1992 Appropriations Act are declared valid and subsisting. The respondents are ordered to
automatically and regularly release pursuant to the grant of fiscal autonomy the funds appropriated for the subject
pensions as well as the other appropriations for the Judiciary. The resolution in Administrative Matter No. 91-8-225-CA
dated November 28, 1991 is likewise ordered to be implemented as promulgated.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr.,
Romero and Nocon, JJ., concur.

Bellosillo, J., is on leave.


SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 131457. August 19, 1999]
HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OF BUKIDNON, HON.
REY B. BAULA, MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF SUMILAO, BUKIDNON, NQSR
MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. HON.
RENATO C. CORONA, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ERNESTO D.
GARILAO, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
REFORM, respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J .:
This resolves the pending incidents before us, namely, respondents and intervenors separate motions for
reconsideration of our Resolution dated November 17, 1998, as well as their motions to refer this case to this
Court en banc.
Respondents and intervenors jointly argue, in fine, that our Resolution dated November 17, 1998, wherein we
voted two-two on the separate motions for reconsideration of our earlier Decision of April 24, 1998, as a result
of which the Decision was deemed affirmed, did not effectively resolve the said motions for reconsideration
inasmuch as the matter should have been referred to the Court sitting en banc, pursuant to Article VIII, Section
4(3) of the Constitution. Respondents and intervenors also assail our Resolution dated January 27, 1999,
wherein we noted without action the intervenors Motion For Reconsideration With Motion To Refer The
Matter To The Court En Banc filed on December 3, 1998, on the following considerations, to wit:
the movants have no legal personality to further seek redress before the Court after their motion
for leave to intervene in this case was denied in the April 24, 1998 Decision. Their subsequent
motion for reconsideration of the said decision, with a prayer to resolve the motion to the Court En
Banc, was also denied in the November 17, 1998 Resolution of the Court. Besides, their aforesaid
motion of December 3, 1998 is in the nature of a second motion for reconsideration which is a
forbidden motion (Section 2, Rule 52 in relation to Section 4, Rule 56 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure). The impropriety of movants December 3, 1998 motion becomes all the more glaring
considering that all the respondents in this case did not anymore join them (movants) in seeking a
reconsideration of the November 17, 1998 Resolution.
[1]

Subsequently, respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed their Motion For Reconsideration
Of The Resolution Dated November 17, 1998 And For Referral Of The Case To This Honorable Court En
Banc (With Urgent Prayer For Issuance Of A Restraining Order) on December 3, 1998, accompanied by a
Manifestation and Motion
[2]
and a copy of the Registered Mail Bill
[3]
evidencing filing of the said motion for
reconsideration to this Court by registered mail.
In their respective motions for reconsideration, both respondents and intervenors pray that this case be referred
to this Court en banc. They contend that inasmuch as their earlier motions for reconsideration (of the Decision
dated April 24, 1998) were resolved by a vote of two-two, the required number to carry a decision, i.e., three,
was not met. Consequently, the case should be referred to and be decided by this Court en banc, relying on the
following constitutional provision:
Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a
majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and
voted thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the
required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or
principle of law laid down by the Court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be
modified or reversed except by the Court sitting en banc.
[4]

A careful reading of the above constitutional provision, however, reveals the intention of the framers to draw a
distinction between cases, on the one hand, and matters, on the other hand, such that cases are decided while
matters, which include motions, are resolved. Otherwise put, the word decided must refer to cases; while
the word resolved must refer to matters, applying the rule of reddendo singula singulis. This is true not
only in the interpretation of the above-quoted Article VIII, Section 4(3), but also of the other provisions of the
Constitution where these words appear.
[5]

With the aforesaid rule of construction in mind, it is clear that only cases are referred to the Court en banc for
decision whenever the required number of votes is not obtained. Conversely, the rule does not apply where, as
in this case, the required three votes is not obtained in the resolution of a motion for reconsideration. Hence, the
second sentence of the aforequoted provision speaks only of case and not matter. The reason is
simple. The above-quoted Article VIII, Section 4(3) pertains to the disposition of cases by a division. If there
is a tie in the voting, there is no decision. The only way to dispose of the case then is to refer it to the Court en
banc. On the other hand, if a case has already been decided by the division and the losing party files a motion
for reconsideration, the failure of the division to resolve the motion because of a tie in the voting does not leave
the case undecided. There is still the decision which must stand in view of the failure of the members of the
division to muster the necessary vote for its reconsideration. Quite plainly, if the voting results in a tie, the
motion for reconsideration is lost. The assailed decision is not reconsidered and must therefore be deemed
affirmed. Such was the ruling of this Court in the Resolution of November 17, 1998.
It is the movants further contention in support of their plea for the referral of this case to the Court en banc that
the issues submitted in their separate motions are of first impression. In the opinion penned by Mr. Justice
Antonio M. Martinez during the resolution of the motions for reconsideration on November 17, 1998, the
following was expressed:
Regrettably, the issues presented before us by the movants are matters of no extraordinary import
to merit the attention of the Court en banc. Specifically, the issue of whether or not the power of
the local government units to reclassify lands is subject to the approval of the DAR is no longer
novel, this having been decided by this Court in the case of Province of Camarines Sur, et al. vs.
Court of Appeals wherein we held that local government units need not obtain the approval of the
DAR to convert or reclassify lands from agricultural to non-agricultural use. The dispositive
portion of the Decision in the aforecited case states:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals
is set aside insofar as it (a) nullifies the trial courts order allowing the Province of Camarines Sur
to take possession of private respondents property; (b) orders the trial court to suspend the
expropriation proceedings; and (c) requires the Province of Camarines Sur to obtain the
approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert or reclassify private respondents
property from agricultural to non-agricultural use.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, the Decision sought to be reconsidered was arrived at by a unanimous vote of all five
(5) members of the Second Division of this Court. Stated otherwise, this Second Division is of the
opinion that the matters raised by movants are nothing new and do not deserve the consideration of
the Court en banc. Thus, the participation of the full Court in the resolution of movants motions
for reconsideration would be inappropriate.
[6]

The contention, therefore, that our Resolution of November 17, 1998 did not dispose of the earlier motions for
reconsideration of the Decision dated April 24, 1998 is flawed. Consequently, the present motions for
reconsideration necessarily partake of the nature of a second motion for reconsideration which, according to the
clear and unambiguous language of Rule 56, Section 4, in relation to Rule 52, Section 2, of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, is prohibited.
True, there are exceptional cases when this Court may entertain a second motion for reconsideration, such as
where there are extraordinarily persuasive reasons. Even then, we have ruled that such second motions for
reconsideration must be filed with express leave of court first obtained.
[7]
In this case, not only did movants fail
to ask for prior leave of court, but more importantly, they have been unable to show that there are exceptional
reasons for us to give due course to their second motions for reconsideration. Stripped of the arguments for
referral of this incident to the Court en banc, the motions subject of this resolution are nothing more but
rehashes of the motions for reconsideration which have been denied in the Resolution of November 17,
1998. To be sure, the allegations contained therein have already been raised before and passed upon by this
Court in the said Resolution.
The crux of the controversy is the validity of the Win-Win Resolution dated November 7, 1997. We maintain
that the same is void and of no legal effect considering that the March 29, 1996 decision of the Office of the
President had already become final and executory even prior to the filing of the motion for reconsideration
which became the basis of the said Win-Win Resolution. This ruling, quite understandably, sparked a litany
of protestations on the part of respondents and intervenors including entreaties for a liberal interpretation of the
rules. The sentiment was that notwithstanding its importance and far-reaching effects, the case was disposed of
on a technicality. The situation, however, is not as simple as what the movants purport it to be. While it may
be true that on its face the nullification of the Win-Win Resolution was grounded on a procedural rule
pertaining to the reglementary period to appeal or move for reconsideration, the underlying consideration
therefor was the protection of the substantive rights of petitioners. The succinct words of Mr. Justice Artemio
V. Panganiban are quoted in the November 17, 1998 opinion of Mr. Justice Martinez, viz: Just as a losing
party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also has the correlative right
to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his/her case.
[8]

In other words, the finality of the March 29, 1996 OP Decision accordingly vested appurtenant rights to the land
in dispute on petitioners as well as on the people of Bukidnon and other parts of the country who stand to be
benefited by the development of the property. The issue in this case, therefore, is not a question of technicality
but of substance and merit.
[9]

Before finally disposing of these pending matters, we feel it necessary to rule once and for all on the legal
standing of intervenors in this case. In their present motions, intervenors insist that they are real parties in
interest inasmuch as they have already been issued certificates of land ownership award, or CLOAs, and that
while they are seasonal farmworkers at the plantation, they have been identified by the DAR as qualified
beneficiaries of the property. These arguments are, however, nothing new as in fact they have already been
raised in intervenors earlier motion for reconsideration of our April 24, 1998 Decision. Again as expressed in
the opinion of Mr. Justice Martinez, intervenors, who are admittedly not regular but seasonal farmworkers, have
no legal or actual and substantive interest over the subject land inasmuch as they have no right to own the
land. Rather, their right is limited only to a just share of the fruits of the land.
[10]
Moreover, the Win-Win
Resolution itself states that the qualified beneficiaries have yet to be carefully and meticulously determined by
the Department of Agrarian Reform.
[11]
Absent any definitive finding of the Department of Agrarian Reform,
intervenors cannot as yet be deemed vested with sufficient interest in the controversy as to be qualified to
intervene in this case. Likewise, the issuance of the CLOA's to them does not grant them the requisite standing
in view of the nullity of the Win-Win Resolution. No legal rights can emanate from a resolution that is null
and void.
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the following incidents, namely: intervenors Motion For
Reconsideration With Motion To Refer The Matter To The Court En Banc, dated December 3, 1998;
respondents Motion For Reconsideration Of The Resolution Dated November 17, 1998 And For Referral Of
The Case To This Honorable Court En Banc (With Urgent Prayer For Issuance Of A Restraining Order), dated
December 2, 1998; and intervenors Urgent Omnibus Motion For The Supreme Court Sitting En Banc To
Annul The Second Divisions Resolution Dated 27 January 1999 And Immediately Resolve The 28 May 1998
Motion For Reconsideration Filed By The Intervenors, dated March 2, 1999; are all DENIED with
FINALITY. No further motion, pleading, or paper will be entertained in this case.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, J., see separate opinion.
Puno, J., in the result, he maintain his original position that the case should go to CA for further proceedings.
Mendoza, J., in the result.
SEPARATE OPINION

MELO, J .:
On the merits, I still maintain my vote with Mr. Justice Puno that this case should be referred to the Court of
Appeals for further proceedings.
Since what is now before us is a second motion for reconsideration, which under the rules is generally
proscribed, the majority deemed it pertinent to limit its resolution in regard to cogent procedural points.
At the outset, I wish to point out that inasmuch as I am bound to abide by the Court En Bancs Resolution No.
99-1-09-SC dated January 22, 1999, which settled the issue of an even (2-2) vote in a division, I am constrained
to vote with the majority in denying all of the subject motions in the above-captioned case. Nevertheless, I wish
to express my views on this issue and put them on record, so, in the event that the Court decides to re-open and
re-discuss this issue at some future time, these considerations may be referred to.
I continue to have some reservations regarding the majoritys position regarding an even (2-2) vote in a
division, due to the following considerations:
By mandate of the Constitution, cases heard by a division when the required majority of at least 3 votes in
the division is not obtained are to be heard and decided by the Court En Banc. Specifically, Paragraph 3,
Section 4, Article VIII of the Constitution provides that:
x x x
(3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a
majority of the members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and
voted thereon, and in no case, without the concurrence of at least three of such
members. When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en
banc: provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision
rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc.
The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission disclose that if the case is not decided in a division by
a majority vote, it goes to the Court En Banc and not to a larger division. Moreover, the elevation of a case to
the Banc shall be automatic. Thus,
MR. RODRIGO: Madam President, may I ask some questions for clarification.
MR. PRESIDENT: Commissioner Rodrigo is recognized.
MR. RODRIGO: Under these provisions, there are 3 kinds of divisions : one would be a division composed of 3 justices
in which case there will be 5 divisions; another division is composed of 5 justices each, in which case there will be 3
divisions; and the other is composed of 7 members each, in which case, there will be 2 divisions.
Let us take the smallest division of 3 and the vote is 2-1. So, it is less than 3 votes. Should it immediately go to the
court en banc of 15 justices or should it first go to a bigger division?
MR. CONCEPCION: Yes.
MR. RODRIGO: They immediately go to the court en banc?
MR. SUAREZ: Yes, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO: Is that automatic? Let us say that in the division of 3, the vote is 2-1, automatically it goes to the
court en banc?
MR. SUAREZ: Yes, because the required number of 3 is not obtained. So, this last phrase would operate
automatically WHEN THE REQUIRED NUMBER IS NOT OBTAINED, THE CASE SHALL BE DECIDED
EN BANC.
x x x x x x x x x
(V Record 635, Oct. 8, 1986)
Explicit, therefore, is the requirement that at least 3 members must concur in any case or matter heard by a
division. Failing thus, or, when the required number of 3 votes is not obtained, the case or matter will have to
be decided by the Court En Banc.
In a situation where a division of 5 has only 4 members, the 5
t h
member having inhibited himself or is otherwise
not in a position to participate, or has retired, a minimum of 3 votes would still be required before there can be
any valid decision or resolution by that division. There may, then, be instances when a deadlock may occur,
i.e., the votes tied at 2-2. It is my humble view that under the clear and unequivocal provisions of the 1986
Constitution, if the required majority is not reached in a division, the case should automatically go to
Court En Banc.
A distinction has been made between cases and matters referred to in the above-quoted constitutional
provision. Cases being decided, and matters being resolved. Only cases are referred to the Court En
Banc for decision whenever the required number of votes is not obtained. Matters are not referred anymore.
I regret I cannot square with such position.
The majority view is that cases would only refer to deliberations at first instance on the merits of a case filed
with the Court, and other deliberations, such as motions, including motions for reconsideration, are matters to
be resolved. To give flesh to this distinction, it is cited that if a tie occurs in the voting on deliberations of
cases, no decision is passed, whereas, if a tie occurs in the voting on motions for reconsideration, the decision
which had already been passed stands.
This is not true all the time. It may be true only in original cases, as opposed to appealed cases, filed with the
Court. However, because of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, the only original cases which are taken
cognizance of by this Court are those wherein it has exclusive jurisdiction. But, invariably, these cases are all
required by the Constitution to be heard by the CourtEn Banc. So, there will be no instance when a division
will be ever taking cognizance of an original action filed with this Court.
It may be noted that cases taken cognizance of by the divisions are either petitions for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 or petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, under Rule 65. Under Rule
45, appeal by way of petition for review on certiorari is not a matter of right. Thus, should there be a tie in
the voting on deliberation of a case by the division, although apparently no action is passed, a decision may
still be rendered-the petition is hereby DENIED due course, and it is forthwith DISMISSED. This is definitely
in consonance with the majoritys line of reasoning in the 2-2 vote on motions for reconsideration. But why is
that, the 2-2 vote in the deliberation of the case at the first instance should still be referred to the Court En
Banc? The reason is simple. Because the express provision of the Constitution requires a vote of at least three
justices for there to be a valid and binding decision of the Court. But, why do we not apply the same rule to
motions for reconsideration? Even on this score alone, it is my view that, in all instances, whether it be in the
deliberations of a case at first instance or on a motion for reconsideration, a division having a 2-2 vote cannot
pass action.
I submit that the requirement of 3 votes equally applies to motions for reconsideration because the provision
contemplates cases or matters (which for me has no material distinction insofar as divisions are concerned)
heard by a division, and a motion for reconsideration cannot be divorced from the decision in a case that it seeks
to be reconsidered. Consequently, if the required minimum majority of 3 votes is not met, the matter of the
motion for reconsideration has to be heard by the Court En Banc, as mandated by the Constitution (par. 3, Sec.
4, Art. VIII). To say that the motion is lost in the division on a 2-2 vote, is to construe something which cannot
be sustained by a reading of the Constitution. To argue that a motion for reconsideration is not a case but
only a matter which does not concern a case, so that, even though the vote thereon in the division is 2-2, the
matter or issue is not required to elevated to the Court En Banc, is to engage in a lot of unfounded hairsplitting.
Furthermore, I humbly submit that the theory of leaving the issue hanging on a 2-2 vote or any even vote may
be sustained only in cases where there is no recourse to a higher assemblage.
In the Court of Appeals, for instance, an even vote in a division of 5 (2-2, with 1 abstaining) would result in the
motion not being carried, but only because there is and there cannot be recourse to the Court of Appeals En
Banc which, does not act on judicial matters. In a legislative body, an even vote results in the failure of the
proposition, only because there is no higher body which can take over. In our own Court En Banc, if the voting
is evenly split, on a 7-7 vote with 1 slot vacant, or with 1 justice inhibiting or disqualifying himself, the motion
shall, of course, not be carried because that is the end of the line.
But in the situation now facing us, the even vote is in a division, and there being recourse to the Court En
Banc, and more so, this being expressly directed by the Constitution, the matter of the motion for
reconsideration should, by all means, be decided by the Court En Banc.



[1]
Rollo, p. 1310. References to the Rollo pages are omitted.
[2]
Rollo, p. 1313.
[3]
Rollo, p. 1319.
[4]
Article VIII, Section 4 (3).
[5]
See Article VIII, Section 15; Article XVIII, Section 12 to 14.
[6]
Rollo, pp. 1243-1244; citation omitted.
[7]
Ortigas and Company Ltd. Partnership v. Judge Tirso Velasco, et al., 254 SCRA 234 (1996).
[8]
Videogram Regulatory Board v. Court of Appeals, 265 SCRA 50, 56 (1996).
[9]
Opinion of Justice Martinez, November 17, 1998, p. 10.
[10]
Ibid., pp. 12-13, citing the Constitution, Article XIII, Section 4, and Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, The 1987 Philippine Constitution: A
Reviewer-Primer, Third Edition (1997), p. 441.
[11]
Ibid., p. 13.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 132177. July 19, 2001]

JUDGE JOSE F. CAOIBES, JR., petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN and JUDGE FLORENTINO M. ALUMBRES,
respondents.
D E C I S I O N
BUENA, J.:

Petitioner Jose F. Caoibes, Jr., Presiding Judge of Branch 253 of the Regional Trial Court of Las Pias City, seeks the revie w of the
following orders of the Office of the Ombudsman: (1) the Order dated August 22, 1997 denying the ex-parte motion to refer to the
Supreme Court filed by petitioner; and (2) the Order dated December 22, 1997 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration and
directing petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and other controverting evidences.

On May 23, 1997, respondent Florentino M. Alumbres, Presiding Judge of Branch 255 of the Regional Trial Court of Las Pinas City,
filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, a Criminal Complaint[1] for physical injuries, malicious mischief for the destruction of
complainants eyeglasses, and assault upon a person in authority. Respondent alleged therein that on May 20, 1997, at the ha llway on
the third floor of the Hall of Justice, Las Pinas City, he requested petitioner to return the executive table he borrowed from respondent;
that petitioner did not answer so respondent reiterated his request but before he could finish talking, petitioner blurted Tarantado ito
ah, and boxed him at his right eyebrow and left lower jaw so that the right lens of his eyeglasses was thrown away, rendering his
eyeglasses unserviceable; and that respondent had the incident blottered with the Las Pias Police Station. He prayed that c riminal
charges be filed before the Sandiganbayan against the petitioner.

On June 13, 1997, respondent Judge lodged another Complaint[2] against petitioner, this time and administrative case with the
Supreme Court, docketed as Adm. Case No. 97-387-RTJ, praying for the dismissal of petitioner from the judiciary on the ground of
grave misconduct or conduct unbecoming a judicial officer. Said complaint is based on the same facts as those in the complai nt filed
earlier with the office of the Ombudsman.

In the Order[3] dated June 25, 1997, the Office of the Ombudsman required petitioner to file a counter-affidavit within ten (10) days
from receipt thereof. Instead of filing a counter-affidavit, petitioner filed on July 7, 1997 and Ex-Parte Motion for Referral to the
Honorable Supreme Court,[4] praying that the Office of the Ombudsman hold its investigation of Case No. OMB-0-97-0903 in
abeyance, and refer the same to the Supreme Court which, through the Office of the Court Administrator, is already investigat ing what
transpired on May 20, 1997. Petitioner contended that the Supreme Court, not the Office of the Ombudsman, has the authority to
make a preliminary determination of the respective culpability of petitioner and respondent Judge who, both being members of the
bench, are under its exclusive supervision and control.

On August 22, 197, the Office of the Ombudsman issued an Order[5] denying the motion for referral to the Supreme Court. Invo king
Section 15 (1) of Republic Act No. 6770, the Office of the Ombudsman held that it is within its jurisdiction to investigate the criminal
charges of respondent Judge against petitioner.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration[6] of the foregoing order, maintaining that the Office of the Ombudsman should either re fer Case
No. OMB-0-97-0903 to the Supreme Court for preliminary evaluation, or await the latters resolution of Adm. Case No. 97-387-RTJ
which involves the same parties and subject matter. Otherwise, petitioner argues, the absurd situation may result wherein th e Office
of the Ombudsman files criminal charges against petitioner who, on the other hand, is declared without fault by the Supreme Court.

In the Order[7] dated December 22, 1997, the Office of the Ombudsman denied the motion for reconsideration and required petit ioner
to submit a counter-affidavit within an inextendible period of five (5) days from receipt thereof.

Hence, petitioner filed this petition for certiorari, asking for the reversal of the assailed Orders dated August 22, 1997 and December
22, 1997 of the Office of the Ombudsman and the issuance of a writ of injunction or temporary restraining order, directing th e Office
of the Ombudsman to refrain from taking further action in the implementation of the challenged orders.

The issue in this case is whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman should defer action on case No. OMB-0-97-0903 pending
resolution of Adm. Case No. 97-387-RTJ.

The issue is not novel. In Maceda vs. Vasquez,[8] this Court resolved in the affirmative the issue of whether or not the Omb udsman
must defer action on a criminal complaint against a judge, or a court employee where the same arises from t heir administrative duties,
and refer the same to this Court for determination whether said judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their
administrative duties.

Invoking Section 15 of R.A. 6770, the Office of the Ombudsman refuses to refrain from taking cognizance of Case NO. OMB-0-97-
0903 in favor of this Court on the ground that, allegedly, the accusations therein against petitioner constitute simple criminal charges
falling within the parameters of its constitutional power and duty to investigate and prosecute any act or omission of any public officer
or employee which appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient.

Section 15 (1) of R.A. 6770 grants, among others, the following powers and duties to the Office of the Ombudsman:

(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee , office
or agency when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may takeover, at any stage, from any in vestigatory
agency of Government, the investigation of such cases;

(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any officer or employee of the Government, or of any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, as well as any government -owned or controlled corporations with original charter, to perform and expedite
any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties;

(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public officer or employee at fault or who neglects to perform an
act or discharge a duty required by law, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure or prosecution, and ensure
compliance therewith, or enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21 of this Act...

The foregoing provisions supply the legal basis for the Ombudsman in maintaining its jurisdiction over the charges of physical
injuries, malicious mischief and assault upon a person in authority filed by respondent Judge against petitioner. This concl usion
seems to be reinforced by Section 16 of R.A. 6770 which states that the powers of the Office of the Ombudsman apply to all kinds of
malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance committed by public officers and employees during their tenure or office.

The Office of the Solicitor General in its Manifestations, in Lieu of Comment, correctly opined and we quote:

xxx the grant of the aforequoted powers to the Office of the Ombudsman is not tantamount to giving it exclusive authority th ereon.
In fact, Section 15 (1) of R.A. 6770, which is relied upon by the Office of the Ombudsman in its assailed order, provides that it has
primary, not exclusive, jurisdiction over graft and corruption cases and felonies committed by public officers in relation to their office.
Moreover, it was held in Sanchez vs. Demetriou, 227 SCRA 627 [1993], that the Ombudsmans power under Section 15 (1) of R.A.
6770 is not an exclusive authority but rather a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged.[9]

It appears that the present case involves two members of the judiciary who were entangled in a fight within court premises over a
piece of office furniture. Under Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is the Supreme Court which is vested with e xclusive
administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel. Prescinding from this premise, the Ombudsman cannot determine for
itself and by itself whether a criminal complaint against a judge, or court employee, involves an administrative matter. The
Ombudsman is duty bound to have all cases against judges and court personnel filed before it, referred to the Supreme Court for
determination as to whether and administrative aspect is involved therein. This rule should hold true regardless of whether an
administrative case based on the act subject of the complaint before the Ombudsman is already pending with the Court. For, aside
from the fact that the Ombudsman would not know of this matter unless he is informed of it, he should give due respect for an d
recognition of the administrative authority of the Court, because in det ermining whether an administrative matter is involved, the
Court passes upon not only administrative liabilities but also other administrative concerns, as is clearly conveyed in the c ase of
Maceda vs. Vasquez.[10]

The Ombudsman cannot dictate to, and bind the Court, to its findings that a case before it does or does not have administrative
implications. To do so is to deprive the Court of the exercise of its administrative prerogatives and to arrogate unto itself a power not
constitutionally sanctioned. This is a dangerous policy which impinges, as it does, on judicial independence.

Maceda is emphatic that by virtue of its constitutional power of administrative supervision over all courts and court personn el, from
the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk, it is only the Supreme Court that can
oversee the judges and court personnels compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they
commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of
separation of powers.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The Ombudsman is hereby directed to dismiss the complaint filed by
respondent Judge Florentino M. Alumbres and to refer the same to this Court for appropriate action.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, J., on official business.

[1] Annex A, Petition, Rollo, pp. 14-15.

[2] Rollo, pp. 28-30.

[3] Original Records, p. 12.

[4] Annex B, Petition, Rollo, pp. 21-22.

[5] Annex C, Petition, Rollo, pp. 23-24.

[6] Annex D, Petition, Rollo, pp. 25-27.

[7] Annex E, Petition, Rollo, pp. 39-40.

[8] 221 SCRA 464 [1993].

[9] Manifestation in Lieu of Comment, p. 8, Rollo, p. 64.

[10] Supra.