1

Sren Aabye Kierkegaards Existentialism

A. Short Biography of Kierkegaard (F. Copleston)
Sren Aabye Kierkegaard was born at Copenhagen on May 15th, 1813. He was given an extremely
religious upbringing by his father, a man who suffered from melancholia and imagined that the
curse of God hung over him and his family. And Kierkegaard was himself affected to some degree by
this melancholy, concealed beneath a display of sarcastic wit. In 1830 Kierkegaard matriculated in the
university of Copenhagen and chose the faculty of theology, doubtless in accordance with his father's
wishes. But he paid little attention to theological studies and devoted himself instead to
philosophy, literature and history. It was at this time that he gained his knowledge of Hegelianism.
During this period Kierkegaard was very much the observer of life, cynical and disillusioned, yet
devoted to the social life of the university. Estranged from his father and his father's religion, he
spoke of the 'stuffy atmosphere' of Christianity and maintained that philosophy and Christianity
were incompatible. Religious disbelief was accompanied by laxity in moral standards. And Kierkegaard's
general attitude at this time fell under the heading of what he later called the aesthetic stage on
life's way. In the spring of 1836 Kierkegaard appears to have had a temptation to commit suicide, having
been overcome by a vision of his inner cynicism. But in June of that year he underwent a kind of
moral conversion, in the sense that he adopted moral standards and made an attempt, even if not
always successful, to live up to them. This period corresponds to the ethical stage in his later
dialectic.
On May 19th, 1838, the year in which his father died, Kierkegaard experienced a religious conversion,
accompanied by an 'indescribable joy'. He resumed the practice of his religion and in 1840 he passed his
examinations in theology. He became engaged to Regina Olsen, but a year later he broke off the
engagement. He evidently thought that he was unsuited for married life, a correct idea one would
imagine. But he had also become convinced that he was a man with a mission, and that marriage
would interfere with it. In 1843 Kierkegaard published Either-Or, a title which well expresses his
attitude to life and his abhorrence of what he took to be Hegel's 'Both-And', Fear and Trembling
and Repetition.
1
These works were followed in 1844 by The Concept of Dread and Philosophical
Fragments, in 1845 by Stages on Life's Way and in 1846 by the Concluding Unscientific Postscript
which, though its name may not suggest it, is a large and weighty tome. He also published some
'edifying discourses in these years. The works of this period appeared under various pseudonyms,
though the identity of the author was well enough known at Copenhagen. As far as the Christian faith
was concerned, it was presented from the point of view of an observer, by indirect communication
as Kierkegaard put it, rather than from the point of view of an apostle intent on direct
communication of the truth.

1
As a boy, Kierkegaard's father bad tended sheep on a Jutland heath. One day afflicted with hunger, cold and
loneliness, he had cursed God. And this incident was indelibly printed on his memory.

2

In the spring of 1848 Kierkegaard enjoyed a religious experience which, as he wrote in his journal,
changed his nature and impelled him to direct communication. He did not at once abandon the use of
pseudonyms, but with Anti-Climacus the change to a direct and positive presentation of the
standpoint of Christian faith becomes apparent. The year 1848 saw the publication of Christian
Discourses, and The Point of View was also composed at this time, though it was published only
after Kierkegaard's death. The Sickness unto Death appeared in 1849. Kierkegaard was meditating a
frontal attack on the Danish State Church which, in his opinion, scarcely deserved any more the name of
Christian. For as far as its official representatives at least were concerned, it appeared to him to
have watered down Christianity to a polite moral humanism with a modicum of religious beliefs
calculate d not to offend the susceptibilities of the educated. However, to avoid wounding Bishop
Mynster, who had been a friend of his father, Kierkegaard did not open fire until 1854, after the
prelates death. A vigorous controversy ensued in the course of which Kierkegaard maintained that what
here presented was simply ordinary honesty. The emasculated Christianity of the established Church
should recognize and admit that it was not Christianity.
Kierkegaard died on November 4th, 1855. At his funeral there was an unfortunate scene when his
nephew interrupted the Dean to protest against the appropriation by the Danish Church of a man
who had so vigorously condemned it.
Readings: On Kierkegaard, 1-13.
From Rationalism to Existentialism, 69-73.

B. Attack on Hegelianism: On Kierkegaard, 24-29
Rationalism to Existentialism, 77-82.

C. Existence for Kierkegaard
Existence, as will be explained presently, was for Kierkegaard a category relating to the free individual.
In his use of the term, to exist means realizing oneself through free choice between alternatives,
through self-commitment. To exist, therefore, means becoming more and more an individual and less
and less a mere member of a group. It means, one can say, transcending universality in favor of
individuality.
In the passage quoted above which gives Kierkegaard's unconventional definition of truth mention is
made of the existing individual'. It has already been explained that the term' existence', as used by
Kierkegaard, is a specifically human category which cannot be applied, for example, to a stone. But
something more must be said about it here.
To illustrate his use of the concept of existence Kierkegaard employs the following analogy. A man sits
in a cart and holds the reins, but the horse goes along its accustomed path without any active
control by the driver, who may be asleep. Another man actively guides and directs his horse. In one
sense both men can be said to be drivers. But in another sense it is only the second man who can be
said to be driving. In an analogous manner the man who drifts with the crowd, who merges himself
in the anonymous 'One', can be said to exist in one sense of the term, though in another sense he
3

cannot be said to exist. For he is not the 'existing individual' who strives resolutely towards an end
which cannot be realized once and for all at a given moment and is thus in a constant state of
becoming, making himself, as it were, by his repeated acts of choice. Again, the man who contents
himself with the role of spectator of the world and of life and transmutes everything into a dialectic
of abstract concepts exists indeed in one sense but not in another. For he wishes to understand
everything and commits himself to nothing. The existing individual', however, is the actor rather than
the spectator. He commits himself and so gives form and direction to his life. He exists towards an end
for which he actively strives by choosing this and rejecting that. In other words, the term 'existence'
has with Kierkegaard more or less the same sense as the term 'authentic existence' as used by some
modem existentialist philosophers. If understood simply in this way, the term 'existence' is neutral,
in the sense that it can be applied within any of the three stages of the dialectic. Indeed.
Kierkegaard says explicitly that there are three spheres of existence: the aesthetic, the ethical. The
religious. A man can 'exist' within the aesthetic sphere if he deliberately, resolutely and
consistently acts as the aesthetic man, excluding alternatives. In this sense Don Juan typifies the existing
individual within the aesthetic sphere. Similarly, the man who sacrifices his own inclinations to the
universal moral law and constantly strives after the fulfilment of a moral ideal which beckons him ever
forward is an existing individual within the ethical sphere. 'An existing individual is himself in process
of becoming. . . . In existence the watchword is always forward.'
What made Hegel comic for Kierkegaard was that this great philosopher tried to capture all of reality in
his system of thought and, in the process, lost the most important element, namely existence.
Kierkegaard reserved the term existence for the individual human being, an individual who strives, who
considers alternatives, who chooses, who decides, and who above all, makes a commitment. Existence
does not belong to inert or inactive things, whether these are spectators, or stones.
Living and Existing
The two terms living and existing are identical and co-extensive. These can be used interchangeably
in the case of human beings. If man exists, then he also lives, and vice-versa. But there is a slight
difference between these terms. Living can be understood in the biological sense while existing can
be understood in the basis of experience. Plants and animals grow and therefore, are alive, yet they
dont have any consciousness to undergo a certain experience. This presupposes an idea that not all
living things are existing in the real sense of the word.
To Exist means to stand as different from others. Man can always decide what is best for his own self.
He is capable of adding essence and meaning to his life toward a realization of his dreams and a
fulfillment of his destiny.
Readings: From Rationalism to Existentialism, 84-90.
D. Individualism: On Kierkegaard, 33-42.
Reading: That Individual, From Dostoevsky to Sartre, Kauffman, 92-99.


4



E. Kierkegaards concept of the crowd
Who are these others?
Existentially, they are beings-other-than-myself. In phenomenological philosophy since Husserl others
refers to humans other than the subject, self, or ego. It is healthy for man to be with others in the world.
But not that he has to resign his freedom and possibilities to these others. It is a sad thing to note when
he becomes not in accordance to his own freewill. A person who has been enshrouded and has not
regained his existence because of the manipulative control of the crowd gets lost. When one resigns his
freedom and possibilities to the they, he will lose himself.
I AM ME
It is market day, and a father and his son decided to sell their carabao. As the three walked side by side,
a faction of people along the road laughed at their stupidity because nobody rode on the animal. Having
heard this, the father told his son to mount the beast. However, on the next station a group of looked at
the son with dismay because with the strength of his youth, he should be the one walking and not the
old man. The son, convinced with the wisdom of the comment, got off and told his father to take his
place. Walking another mile, a crowd of women was disgusted with what they saw. How can a father
with all his vigour bear to see his fragile son suffer that much? they asked. Upon hearing this, the father
told his son to join him riding the brute creature. He thought to himself that with both of them now
mounted on the beast, everyone will agree that they did the right thing. They were taken aback when
they passed by a gathering of carabao owners who lamented: Dont they have pity on the animal?
Confused with all the varying comments, they got a big pole, tied the feet of the carabao and carried it
to the market.
The crowd could be so harsh but oftentimes we allow them to control our lives. We live trying to please
others and think much of what others would opine should we do one thing or another. Worse, we
sometimes apologize for having done something which was entirely right, only that it displeased others.
Why have we come to this? Have we been reduced to life forms, without a mind of our own and acting
not because we deem it is true but because of the loud urging of the crowd?
Within us is the power to determine for ourselves the road we want to take, the actions to make. People
may see things differently. If we desire nothing but to give in to their whims, pander to every demand,
we will end up satisfying no one and lose ourselves in the process.
For Kierkegaard, there are no longer human beings in this age. There are no human beings because the
individual man has taken refuge in the collective idea: the masses, the group, the crowd, and the
public. This compelled Kierkegaard to complain that nothing becomes personal in this age of the
crowd. At the lowest level, for Kierkegaard, the individual is no more than an anonymous member of a
crowd; accepting unquestioningly the opinions, sentiments, and goals of the mob.
5

For Kierkegaard it is not of any help to lose oneself in the crowd. According to him a crowd in its very
concept is the untruth by reason of the fact that it renders the individual completely impenitent and
irresponsible, or at least weaken his sense of responsibility by reducing it to a fraction. Being in a crowd
in short unmakes ones nature as an individual by diluting the self.
According to him, man must struggle to exist by dissociating himself from the crowd-existence. When
man is detached from the crowd, only then he can consider his life a significant existence, when one
realizes his personal freedom, his subjectivity, his commitment, and his responsibility. Man has to
consider his being a human individual who is designated to his own life, to master his life, to frame his
life and to consider his own values. Kierkegaard asserts that man can attain authentic individual
existence when man detaches himself from the crowd and binds himself to commit to his
responsibilities and options in life. In sum, Kierkegaardian concept of existence requires and individual
to recover his being a person from the crowd by shattering all his attachments to it. He is lost in the
crowd, and, therefore, he must find himself again.
There is an obvious sense in which every human being is and remains an individual, distinct from other
persons and things. In this sense of individuality even the members of an enraged mob are individuals.
At the same time there is a sense in which the individuality of the members of such a mob is sunk in a
common consciousness. The mob is possessed, as it were, by a common emotion, and it is a
notorious fact that a mob is capable of performing actions which its members would not perform
precisely as individuals. This is indeed an extreme example. But I mention it to show in a simple way
that we can quite easily give a cash value to the idea of man's being more or less of an individual.
One might, of course, take less dramatic examples. Suppose that my opinions are dictated
predominantly by what' one thinks', my emotive reactions by what' one feels', and my actions by
the social conventions of my environment. To the extent that this is the case I can be said to think,
feel and act as a member of 'the One', as a member of an impersonal collectivity, rather than as
this individual. If, however, I become aware of my anonymous status, so to speak, and begin to
form my own principles of conduct and to act resolutely in accordance with them, even if this means
acting in a way quite opposed to the customary ways of acting of my social environment, there is a
sense in which I can be said to have become more of an individual, in spite of the fact that in
another sense I am no more and no less an individual than I was before. If space permitted, these
concepts would obviously require careful analysis. But even in this unanalysed state they may serve to
facilitate understanding of the following quotation from Kierkegaard.
'A crowd-not this crowd or that, the crowd now living or the crowd long deceased, a crowd of
humble people or of superior people, of rich or of poor, etc.-a crowd in its very concept is the
untruth, by reason of the fact that it renders the individual completely impenitent and
irresponsible, or at least weakens his sense of responsibility by reducing it to a fraction.'!
Kierkegaard is not, of course, concerned simply with the dangers of allowing oneself to become a
member of a crowd in the sense of a mob. His point is that philosophy, with its emphasis on the
universal rather than on the particular, has tried to show that man realizes his true essence in
proportion as he rises above what is contemptuously regarded as his mere particularity and becomes
a moment in the life of the universal. This theory, Kierkegaard argues, is false, whether the universal
6

is considered as the State or as the economic or social class or as Humanity or as absolute
Thought. 'I have endeavoured to express the thought that to employ the category "race" to
indicate what it is to be a man, and especially as an indication of the highest attainment, is a
misunderstanding and mere paganism, because the race, mankind, differs from an animal race not
merely by its general superiority as a race, but by the human characteristic that every single
individual within the race (not merely distinguished individuals but every individual) is more than the
race. For to relate oneself to God is a far higher thing than to be related to the race and through
the race to God.'!
The last sentence of this quotation indicates the general direction of Kierkegaard's thought. The highest
self-actualization of the individual is 'the relating of oneself to God, not as the universal, absolute
Thought, but as the absolute Thou. But further explanation of what Kierkegaard means by
becoming the individual is best reserved for the context of his theory of the three stages. For the
moment it is sufficient to notice that it means the opposite of self-dispersal in 'the One' or self-
submerging in the universal, however this may be conceived. The exaltation of the universal, the
collectivity, the totality, is for Kierkegaard 'mere paganism'. But he also insists that historic paganism
was orientated towards Christianity, whereas the new paganism is a falling away or an apostasy from
Christianity.
The crowd is the untruth
Kierkegaard writes, There is a view of life which holds that where the crowd is, the truth is also, that its
a need in truth itself, that it must have the crowd on its side. The existentialists (and most reasonable
people) are fiercely opposed to crowd-driven conformity. Sadly, most people dont act until they know
what the crowd thinks. For them, the crowd is truth. For Kierkegaard, its the opposite: The crowd is
untruth. In arguing against conformity, Kierkegaard points out St. Pauls suggestion in the Bible that
only one receives the prize. Although St. Pauls meaning is clearly religious, you can take Kierkegaards
point in a more general way. Kierkegaard suggests that living authentically, or living in truth, can occur
only to an individual. Passionately living life to the fullest cant occur for a person as a member of a
group because in the crowd, you arent an individual. As a result, the prize must be claimed outside
the hands of the crowd. To win it, you must face existence alone.
As we explain in the next few sections, Kierkegaard has some reasons for thinking that crowd-dwellers
are forever losers in the game of life. The crowd believes only whats authorized by many The logical
fallacy (form of bad reasoning) known as the appeal to the people occurs when you suggest that
something is true because a majority of people believe its true.
Although clearly problematic (the earth isnt flat even if lots of people say it is), Kierkegaard is more
concerned with the way of approaching life that this fallacy embodies. Specifically, crowd-dwelling
requires a detachment from your own life. The crowd-dweller avoids (mostly due to fear) grappling with
how to respond to the very concrete and particular situations he lives through. The crowd-dweller
doesnt want to take on the risk of embracing an individual path. Instead, he detaches from his own
existence and seeks to express whats common to everyones experiences, losing touch with his own
particular life. What he does and his motivation for pursuing it arent his own.
7

The crowd embraces anonymity
As you detach from the realities of your own individual life and seek to submerge yourself within the
crowd, you begin to live as a shadow without real substance. Your desire to live as an expression of
everyone means you reject the need to be a particular person with a particular name. You take no
positions on existence that reveal you as an individual chooser. As a face in the crowd, youre
successfully hidden and anonymous. When you do take positions, you simulate living by taking on false
commitments as a group member. For example, you dont commit to fidelity to your spouse; good
Christians do! Simulated life is like the life that you watch an actor portray on stage. The actor is playing
a role. The actor isnt committed as an individual to what hes doing. When you do things as good
Christians do or as good fathers do, youre playacting through life. As an individual, you dont exist.
The crowd is cowardice and false courage
Individual existence requires great courage. You have to stand on your own two feet and face up to the
mysteries and risk involved in making your own decisions about living. After youre safely hidden within
the group, your choices cant be risky, because everyone understands and approves them. Best of all, if
your choices dont work out, everyone is at fault, and all can share the blame. As Kierkegaard puts it, in
the crowd each individual contributes his share of cowardice to the cowardice which is the crowd. Of
course, although the crowd is cowardice, within it people quickly acquire a false feeling of courage.
No wonder: Within the crowd, people become willing to carry out actions that they otherwise may not.
Think of a crowd riot. Although its possible that no one person has the courage to riot, you can hide
behind your anonymity as a crowd dweller and avoid the consequences of your actions. In your hidden
form, youve become unaccountable. You draw a false strength from your invisibility and from the sheer
numbers around you. Performing an action when everyones in it together is easy; performing an action
in isolation and in full view, when everyone knows its you, is really living. Real courage comes from
within, not from without. If risk, mystery, passion, and devoted commitment to a path that gives
expression to ones individual existence are what mark living in truth, living in the crowd is clearly the
sign of untruth. You must take the business of individual existence seriously; the more people who are
around, the harder getting down to that business in a meaningful way will be.
Socrates the crowd-hater
If you want to live in the crowd, you need a few skills. You need to be good at appeasing those around
you. You have to make them feel good about themselves. You need to be a good social chameleon, to
be sure your way of acting assures others that youre one of them. If that means moving from one belief
or behavior to another in different situations, do it. You need to become what the ancient Greeks called
a sophist. Sophists were notoriously uninterested in truth and cared more about persuasion and
rhetoric. Socrates lived as an antisophist, and he paid the ultimate price for doing it. Socrates avoided
crowds and preferred to speak only to individuals. He felt, as Kierkegaard did, that truth wasnt in the
domain of the crowd but belonged only to individuals. In fact, Socrates felt that individuals needed to
free themselves from the crowds alleged wisdom and learn to approach existence truthfully. In
spurning the crowd in this way, he made lots of enemies, some of whom put him to death on false
8

charges. In fact, in his defense trial (described in Platos Apology), Socrates told the Athenian assembly
the crowd that would judge him that he would not treat them in the ways crowds like to be
treated. He told them that he would not flatter them and play to their cowardice.
Required Readings: Blackwell Companion to Pheno. And Exist., 142.

F. Spheres of Existence
Required Readings: On Kierkegaard, 44-54
Rationalism to Existentialism, 90- 97.
Socrates to Sartre, 343-345.
Existentialism for the Perplexed, 32-35.

Ethics and Religion in Kierkegaard (From History of Philosophy by Sir Anthony Kenny)
A supplementary reading to the Spheres of Existence
While Schopenhauer, in Frankfurt, was expanding The World as Will and Idea, a Danish philosopher in
Copenhagen was bringing out a series of treatises that presented a similar call to asceticism on a quite
different metaphysical basis. This was Sren Aabye Kierkegaard, born in 1813 into a tragic family. His
mother and five of his six siblings died before he reached adulthood, and his father believed himself
cursed for a blasphemy uttered long ago while a shepherd boy. Sent to Copenhagen University in 1830
to study theology, Kierkegaard acquired, like Schopenhauer, a familiarity with, and a hatred for, the
philosophy of Hegel. He disliked theology, but in 1838 he underwent a religious conversion,
accompanied by a mystical experience of indescribable joy. In 1840 he became engaged to Regine
Olsen, but he broke off the engagement a year later, deciding that his own and his familys history
rendered him unsuitable for marriage. Henceforth he saw himself as a man with a vocation as a
philosopher.
In 1841, after completing a dissertation on Socratic irony, Kierkegaard went to Berlin and attended the
lectures of Schelling. His distaste for German idealism increased; but unlike Schopenhauer, he thought
that its mistake was to undervalue the concrete individual. Like Schopenhauer, though, he sketched out
for his readers a spiritual career that ends with renunciation. In his version, however, each upward
phase in the career, far from being a diminution of individuality, is a stage in the affirmation of ones
own unique personality.
Kierkegaards system was expounded, between 1843 and 1846, in a series of works published under
different pseudonyms. Either/Or, of 1843, presents two different life-views, one aesthetic and one
ethical. From a starting point in which the individual is an unquestioning member of a crowd, the
aesthetic life is the first stage towards self-realization. The aesthetic person pursues pleasure, but does
so with taste and elegance. The essential feature of his character is that he avoids taking on any
commitment, whether personal, social, or official,that would limit his options for seizing what-ever is
immediately attractive. As time goes on, such a person may realize that his demand for instant freedom
9

is actually a limitation on his powers. If so, he moves on to the ethical stage, in which he takes his place
within social institutions and accepts the obligations that flow from them. But however hard he tries to
fulfil the moral law, he finds that his powers are unequal to it. Before God he is always in the wrong.
Both aesthetic and ethical ways of life have to be transcended in an ascent to the religious sphere. This
message is conveyed in different ways in further pseudonymous works: Fear and Trembling in 1843, The
Concept of Anxiety in 1844, and Stages on Lifes Way in 1845. The series reached its climax with the
publication of the lengthy Concluding Scientific Postscript in 1846, whose message is that faith is not the
outcome of any objective reasoning as the Hegelians had claimed. The transition from the ethical to the
religious sphere is vividly portrayed in Fear and Trembling, which takes as its text the biblical story of
Gods command to Abraham to kill his son Isaac in sacrifice. An ethical hero, such as Socrates, lays down
his life for the sake of a universal moral law; but Abraham breaks a moral law in obedience to an
individual command of God. This is what Kierkegaard calls the teleological suspension of the ethical
Abrahams act transgresses the ethical order to pursue a higher end (telos) outside it. But if an individual
feels a call to violate the moral law, no one can tell him whether this is a mere temptation or a genuine
command of God. He cannot even know or prove it to himself: he has to make a decision in blind faith.
After a second mystical experience in 1848 Kierkegaard adopted a more transparent method of writing,
and published, under his own name, a number of Christian discourses and works such as Purity of Heart
is to Will One Thing (1847) and Works of Love (1847). But he reverted to a pseudonym for Sickness unto
Death, which presents faith as being the only alternative to despair, and as the necessary condition for a
full realization of ones authentic existence or selfhood.
Much of the latter part of Kierkegaards life was taken up in conflict with the established Danish Church,
which he regarded as Christian only in name. He was highly critical of the Primate, Bishop J. P. Mynster,
and after his death in 1854 published a bitter attack on him. He founded and funded an anticlerical
broadsheet, The Moment, which ran for nine issues, after which he collapsed in the street and died,
after a few weeks illness, in November 1855. Against his wishes, and against the protests of his nephew,
he was given a church funeral.
The Moral Ascent in Kierkegaard
Kierkegaards moral system resembles Schopenhauers in several ways. Both philosophers take a deeply
pessimistic view of the ethical condition of the average human being, and both philosophers hold out a
spiritual career that leads to renunciation. But whereas Schopenhauers system was built on an atheistic
metaphysic, Kierkegaards evolves against a back-ground of Protestant Christianity. For him the
renunciation that is the high point of the ethical life is only a preliminary to an ultimate leap of faith.
Whereas Schopenhauers programme is designed to lead to the erasure of individuality, Kierkegaards
aims to put the individual in full possession of his own personality as a unique creature of God.
Our present concern is with the previous stagethe ethical, which comes between the aesthetic and
the religious. Kierkegaards aesthetic person is governed by his feelings, and blind to spiritual values; but
we must not think of him as a sensual boor, a philistine glutton, or a sexual deviant. As he is portrayed as
one of the two protagonists in Either/Or he is a cultured, law-abiding person, popular in society and not
10

without consideration for others. What distinguishes him from a serious moral agent is that he avoids
entering into any engagements that would limit his capacity for the pursuit of whatever is immediately
attractive. To preserve his freedom of choice he refuses to take any public or private office; he avoids
any deep friendship, and marriage above all.
The aesthetic person, Kierkegaard argues, is deluded when he thinks of his existence as one of freedom;
in fact it is extremely limited. In case one were to think of a house, consisting of cellar, ground floor, and
premiere tage, so tenanted, or rather so arranged, that it was planned for a distinction of rank between
the dwellers on the several floors; and in case one were to make a comparison between such a house
and what it is to be a manthen unfortunately this is the sorry and ludicrous condition of the majority
of men, that in their own house they prefer to live in the cellar. The soulishbodily synthesis in every
man is planned with a view to being spirit, such is the building; but the man prefers to dwell in the cellar,
that is, in the determinants of sensuousness. And not only does he prefer to dwell in the cellar; no, he
loves that to such a degree that he becomes furious if anyone would propose to him to occupy the piano
nobile which stands empty at his dispositionfor in fact he is dwelling in his own house. (SD 176)
Such a person, Kierkegaard says, is in a state of despair. Despair, as used in Sickness unto Death and
other works, does not mean a state of gloom or despondency; the aesthetic person, in fact, may well
believe that he is happy. A despairing person, in Kierkegaards terms, is a person who has no hope of
anything higher than his present life. To despair is to lack awareness of the possibility of achieving a
higher, spiritual self. Despair, so understood, is not a rare, but a well-nigh universal phenomenon. Most
men, in Kierkegaards expressive phrase, pawn themselves to the world. They use their talents,
accumulate money, carry on worldly affairs, calculate shrewdly etc., etc., are perhaps mentioned in
history, but them- selves they are not; spiritually understood they have no self, no self for whose sake
they could venture everything (SD 168).
The first step towards a cure is the realization that one is in despair. Already, in the hidden recesses of
the aesthetic persons happiness, there dwells an anxious dread. Gradually, he may come to realize that
his dissipation is a dispersal of himself. He will be faced with the choice of abandoning himself to
despair, or of moving upward by committing himself to an ethical existence.
The nature of such an existence, and the necessity for undertaking it, is spelt out most fully in the
correspondence of Judge Vilhelm, the fictional author of the second part of Either/Or. Vilhelm is himself
a fully paid-up member of ethical society: he is happily married, the father of four children, and a civil
court judge. Unhappily for the reader, he also has a ponderous and repetitious manner of writing style,
quite different from the witty and novelettish style with which Kierkegaard endowed the aesthetic
author of Either/Ors first part, who is now the recipient of the edifying letters.
Vilhelm goes to great lengths to express the contrast between the aesthetic and the ethical character,
and sums it up in the following terms: We said that every aesthetic life-view was despair; this was
because it was built upon what may or may not be. That is not the case with the ethical life-view, for this
builds life upon what has being as its essential property. The aesthetic, we said, is that in which a person
is immediately what he is; the ethical is that whereby a person becomes what he becomes. (E/O 525)
11

Kierkegaard attaches great importance to the concept of the self. People often wish to have the talents
or virtues of others; but they never seriously wish to be another person, to have a self other than their
own (E/O 517). In the aesthetic stage, the self is undeveloped and undifferentiated; a morass of
unrealized and conflicting possibilities: life is a hysterical series of experiments with no outcome. The
aesthete is in a state of permanent pregnancy: always in travail and never giving birth to a self. To enter
the ethical stage is to undertake the formation of ones true self, where self means some-thing like a
freely chosen character. Instead of merely developing ones talents one follows a vocation. The ethical
life is a life of duty; of duty, however, not externally imposed but internally realized. The proper
development of the individual involves the internalization of universal law.
Only when the individual himself is the universal, only then can the ethical be realized. This is the secret
of conscience; it is the secret the individual life shares with itself, that is at one and the same time an
individual life and also the universal....The person who regards life ethically sees the universal, and the
person who lives ethically expresses his life in the universal; he makes himself into the universal man,
not by divesting himself of his concretion, for then he would be nothing at all, but by clothing himself in
it and permeating it with the universal. (E/O 547)
The man whom Kierkegaard most often chooses as a paradigm of the ethical person is Socrates. His life
illustrates the fact that the ethical stage may make strict demands on the individual, and call for heroic
self- sacrifice. Judge Vilhelm does not offer us Kierkegaards last word on morality, because in his system
the ethical is not the highest category. Kierkegaard himself neither took a job nor got married, which are
the two marks of the ethical life. Because of his own and his familys history he felt incapable of the total
sharing of all secrets which he thought was essential to a good marriage. Faced with the demands made
by the ethical life, Kierkegaard tells us, the individual becomes vividly conscious of human weakness; he
may try to overcome it by strength of will, but find himself unable to do so. He becomes aware that his
own powers are insufficient to meet the demands of the moral law. This brings him to a sense of guilt
and a consciousness of sinfulness. If he is to escape from this, he must rise from the ethical sphere to
this religious sphere: he must make the leap of faith.
G. Truth is Subjectivity
An objective uncertainty held fast in an appropriation- process of the most passionate inwardness
is the truth, the highest truth attainable for an existing individual.
Kierkegaard is not denying that there is any such thing as objective, impersonal truth. But mathematical
truths, for example, do not concern the 'existing individual' as such. That is to say, they are irrelevant to
a man's life of total self-commitment. He accepts them. He cannot do otherwise. But he does not stake
his whole being on them. That on which I stake my whole being is not something which I cannot deny
without logical contradiction or something which is so obviously true that I cannot deny it without
palpable absurdity. It is something which I can doubt but which is so important to me that if I accept
it, I do so with a passionate self-commitment. It is in a sense my truth. The truth is precisely the
venture which chooses an objective uncertainty with the passion of the infinite. I contemplate the
order of nature in the hope of finding God, and I see omnipotence and wisdom; but I also see
much else that disturbs my mind and excites anxiety. The sum of all this is an objective uncertainty.
12

But it is for this very reason that the inwardness becomes as intense as it is, for it embraces this
objective uncertainty with the entire passion of the infinite.
Obviously, truth as so described is precisely what Kierkegaard means by faith. The definition of truth as
subjectivity and the definition of faith are the same. Without risk there is no faith. Faith is precisely the
contradiction between the infinite passion of the individuals inwardness and the objective uncertainty.
Kierkegaard does indeed assert more than once that the eternal truth is not in itself a paradox. But it
becomes paradoxical in relation to us. One can indeed see some evidence in Nature of God's work, but
at the same time one can see much which points in the opposite direction. There is, and remains,
'objective uncertainty', whether we look at Nature or at the Gospels. For the idea of the God-Man is
itself paradoxical for the finite reason. Faith grasps the objectively uncertain and affirms it; but it
has to maintain itself, as it were, over a fathomless sea. Religious truth exists only in the passionate
appropriation of the objectively uncertain. In point of fact Kierkegaard does not say that there are
no rational motives at all for making the act of faith and that it is a purely arbitrary act of capricious
choice. 'But he certainly takes delight in minimizing the rational motives for religious belief and in
emphasizing the subjectivity of truth and the nature of faith as a leap. Hence he inevitably gives the
impression that faith is for him an arbitrary act of the will And Catholic theologians at least criticize him
on this score. But if we prescind from the theological analysis of faith and concentrate on the
psychological aspect of the matter, there is no difficulty in recognizing, whether one is Catholic or
Protestant, that there are certainly some who under- stand very well from their own experience what
Kierkegaard is driving at when he describes faith as a venture or risk. And, in general, Kierkegaard's
phenomenological analysis of the three distinct attitudes or levels of consciousness which he
describes possess a value and a stimulative power which is not destroyed by his characteristic
exaggerations.
Further Readings:
From Rationalism to Existentialism, 71, 79.
Socrates to Sartre, 342-343.
On Kierkegaard, 33-42.
Blackwell Companion to Pheno. And Exist., 144.

H. Kierkegaard and Passion
Readings: On Kierkegaard

Cultivating a sense of passion
Its centrally important that you embrace the kind of existence thats proper and specific to you, one
that has freedom at its core. Face it unlike cats and cows and tables and chairs, youre not a passive
object. Youre an active subject. Living with passion means embracing your subjectivity. When you
succeed in embracing your nature as a subject, you cultivate passion. What does passionate life look
like? Most people mistake passion with reckless impulsiveness. For them, living passionately means
living life to the fullest by going to lots of parties, skydiving, and bungee-jumping from bridges.
13

Now dont get the wrong impression the existentialists arent against fun. Bungee-jumping can take
place in a passionate life. But activities of that sort dont define passion. In fact, passion isnt something
you can necessarily say a person has by simply looking at him and watching what he does. Passion isnt
an externality; it centers on a kind of focus and intensity, a type of deliberateness about how you go
about things. Kierkegaard calls it inwardness.


Why We Need More Passion in Our Lives
To Kierkegaard, passionate people are inward because they strive to be and to exist as subjects and not
as objects. An object is passive in its existence because it has no choice about how it exists. It does what
its world dictates that it do. Objects like rocks or cats dont take on the question of their own existence,
or how to face their future, because they cant; they dont have the ability. A subject is active in its
existence due to its capacity to choose how to exist or how to face its future. Subjects can direct
themselves and can interact with the question of what it means to exist. Unlike objects, they can decide
for themselves how to be in the world. Passionate people take their very existence seriously. In
cultivating their passion, they seek to develop their subjectivity, or existence as a subject. When you
immerse yourself within subjectivity, you exhibit a deep sense of care about who you are, about the way
in which you exist. You realize that youve been handed a gift the power of self-determination and
you use it. Passionate people are purposeful. Their sense of care about their own existence creates an
intensity in them, a level of depth not seen in people who simply go with the flow.
You may think passionate people sound pretty grim because theyre so serious about life. Not so. What
is true is that passionate people recognize that each decision they make plays a role in determining who
they become. Because they care about themselves, they refuse to treat their lives in trivial ways. For
them, not being passionate about life is what sounds grim!
Its not what you do but how you do it
One way to understand passionate life is to draw the distinction between living as a participator and
living as a detached observer. For a participator, living a full life is more about how actions occur. For the
observer, living a full life is about what gets done. Passion participates rather than observes. Imagine
that a person saves a child from being hit by a car. A question arises: Whats important here, ethically? Is
it that the person saved the child or how he came about doing it? For some people, all that matters is
that the child was saved. They focus on what occurs as ethically meaningful. Similarly, for some people,
living to the fullest or living meaningfully always means doing things. Did you do this? Did you do that?
Did you go to the party? Did you ride on the roller coaster at the park? The answer to whether a person
really lived a full life always comes down to something that anyone can see from the outside. If you
want to know whether you yourself are living passionately, you can do so by floating above your body
and just watching yourself to see whether youre doing the right things. For the non-passionate
observer, whether Bob lives a full life, or a meaningful or significant life, can be determined by following
Bob around all his life and just observing what he does.
14

Existentialists like Kierkegaard disagree with this non-passionate observer. Passionate life isnt just
about doing certain things. Whats missing is engagement. People centrally concerned simply with what
a person does, Kierkegaard says, have forgotten what it means to exist, and what inwardness signifies.
To really exist requires engagement. Think about the child-rescue example again. Some people focus on
what action is performed, but others focus on how that action took place. Maybe the person saved the
child but did it for a reward only. For some, this way of coming at the action rules it out as ethical,
regardless of what the action does, as seen from the outside. According to these people, ethical
importance is centrally determined by how the action is carried out.
Kierkegaards point about living a full life is similar. How you come at life is important. Are you resolute
in your living? Does your action flow from a deep commitment to being a certain kind of individual?
Does it fill you with a sheer excitement about life? These questions are integral for existentialists. In
other words, how something is done matters! In fact, for Kierkegaard, the how is always more important
than the what.
Note that this principle opens a tremendous number of possibilities for you. Because living a full life isnt
restricted to doing a certain set of actions, figur- ing out what path to follow is up to you. At that point,
existentialists are concerned with how you pursue it! So its important to remember that: Its up to you
to figure out what path, out of all the ones possible for you, to take. After you choose that path, the
existentialists urge you to pursue it with passion and engagement, with a fire of lived intensity.
I. The Chief Thing in Life: On Kierkegaard, 69-72.