Consciousness

by John Searle
Can consciousness be measured scientifically? What exactly is
consciousness? John Searle approaches the scientific
investigation of consciousness and its possible neurobiological
roots from a philosophical perspective.
Abstract
Originally published October 8, 1999 as an academic paper, University of California
at Berkeley. osted on !ur"#eil$%.net $ugust 1&, '((1. $rticle on )ohn *earle+s
home page can be read here.
Until very recently, most neurobiologists did not regard consciousness as a suitable
topic for scientific investigation. ,his reluctance #as based on certain philosophical
mistakes, primarily the mistake of supposing that the sub-ectivity of consciousness
made it beyond the reach of an ob-ective science. Once #e see that consciousness
is a biological phenomenon like any other, then it can be investigated
neurobiologically. Consciousness is entirely caused by neurobiological processes and
is reali"ed in brain structures. ,he essential trait of consciousness that #e need to
e.plain is unified /ualitative sub-ectivity. Consciousness thus differs from other
biological phenomena in that it has a sub-ective or first0person ontology, but this
sub-ective ontology does not prevent us from having an epistemically ob-ective
science of consciousness. 1e need to overcome the philosophical tradition that
treats the mental and the physical as t#o distinct metaphysical realms. ,#o
common approaches to consciousness are those that adopt the building block
model, according to #hich any conscious field is made of its various parts, and the
unified field model, according to #hich #e should try to e.plain the unified
character of sub-ective states of consciousness. ,hese t#o approaches are
discussed and reasons are given for preferring the unified field theory to the
building block model. *ome relevant research on consciousness involves the
sub-ects of blindsight, the split0brain e.periments, binocular rivalry, and gestalt
s#itching.
I. Resistance to the roblem
$s recently as t#o decades ago there #as little interest among neuroscientists,
philosophers, psychologists and cognitive scientists generally in the problem of
consciousness. 2easons for the resistance to the problem varied from discipline to
discipline. hilosophers had turned to the analysis of language, psychologists had
become convinced that a scientific psychology must be a science of behavior, and
cognitive scientists took their research program to be the discovery of the computer
programs in the brain that, they thought, #ould e.plain cognition. %t seemed
especially pu""ling that neuroscientists should be reluctant to deal #ith the problem
of consciousness, because one of the chief functions of the brain is to cause and
sustain conscious states. *tudying the brain #ithout studying consciousness #ould
be like studying the stomach #ithout studying digestion, or studying genetics
#ithout studying the inheritance of traits. 1hen % first got interested in this problem
seriously and tried to discuss it #ith brain scientists, % found that most of them
#ere not interested in the /uestion.
,he reasons for this resistance #ere various but they mostly boiled do#n to t#o.
3irst, many neuroscientists felt00and some still do00that consciousness is not a
suitable sub-ect for neuroscientific investigation. $ legitimate brain science can
study the microanatomy of the urkin-e cell, or attempt to discover ne#
neurotransmitters, but consciousness seems too airy0fairy and touchy0feely to be a
real scientific sub-ect. Others did not e.clude consciousness from scientific
investigation, but they had a second reason4 51e are not ready5 to tackle the
problem of consciousness. ,hey may be right about that, but my guess is that a lot
of people in the early 196(s thought #e #ere not ready to tackle the problem of the
molecular basis of life and heredity. ,hey #ere #rong7 and % suggest for the current
/uestion, the best #ay to get ready to deal #ith a research problem may be to try
to solve it.
,here #ere, of course, famous earlier t#entieth century e.ceptions to the general
reluctance to deal #ith consciousness, and their #ork has been valuable. % am
thinking in particular of the #ork of *ir $rthur *herrington, 2oger *perry, and *ir
)ohn 8ccles.
1hatever #as the case '( years ago, today many serious researchers are
attempting to tackle the problem. $mong neuroscientists #ho have #ritten recent
books about consciousness are Cotterill 91998:, Crick 9199;:, <amasio 91999:,
8delman 91989, 199':, 3reeman 91996:, =a""aniga 91988:, =reenfield 91996:,
>obson 91999:, ?ibet 9199&:, and 1eiskrant" 9199@:. $s far as % can tell, the race
to solve the problem of consciousness is already on. Ay aim here is not to try to
survey this literature but to characteri"e some of the neurobiological problems of
consciousness from a philosophical point of vie#.
II. Consciousness as a !iological roblem
1hat e.actly is the neurobiological problem of consciousnessB ,he problem, in its
crudest terms, is this4 >o# e.actly do brain processes cause conscious states and
ho# e.actly are those states reali"ed in brain structuresB *o stated, this problem
naturally breaks do#n into a number of smaller but still large problems4 1hat
e.actly are the neurobiological correlates of conscious states 9CCC:, and #hich of
those correlates are actually causally responsible for the production of
consciousnessB 1hat are the principles according to #hich biological phenomena
such as neuron firings can bring about sub-ective states of sentience or a#arenessB
>o# do those principles relate to the already #ell understood principles of biologyB
Can #e e.plain consciousness #ith the e.isting theoretical apparatus or do #e need
some revolutionary ne# theoretical concepts to e.plain itB %s consciousness
locali"ed in certain regions of the brain or is it a global phenomenonB %f it is
confined to certain regions, #hich onesB %s it correlated #ith specific anatomical
features, such as specific types of neurons, or is it to be e.plained functionally #ith
a variety of anatomical correlatesB 1hat is the right level for e.plaining
consciousnessB %s it the level of neurons and synapses, as most researchers seem
to think, or do #e have to go to higher functional levels such as neuronal maps
98delman 1989, 199':, or #hole clouds of neurons 93reeman 1996:, or are all of
these levels much too high and #e have to go belo# the level of neurons and
synapses to the level of the microtubules 9enrose 199; and >ameroff 1998a,
1998b:B Or do #e have to think much more globally in terms of 3ourier transforms
and holography 9ribram 19@D, 1991, 1999:B
$s stated, this cluster of problems sounds similar to any other such set of problems
in biology or in the sciences in general. %t sounds like the problem concerning
microorganisms4 >o#, e.actly, do they cause disease symptoms and ho# are those
symptoms manifested in patientsB Or the problem in genetics4 By #hat
mechanisms e.actly does the genetic structure of the "ygote produce the
phenotypical traits of the mature organismB %n the end % think that is the right #ay
to think of the problem of consciousness00it is a biological problem like any other,
because consciousness is a biological phenomenon in e.actly the same sense as
digestion, gro#th, or photosynthesis. But unlike other problems in biology, there is
a persistent series of philosophical problems that surround the problem of
consciousness and before addressing some current research % #ould like to address
some of these problems.
III. Identifying the "arget# "he $efinition of
Consciousness.
One often hears it said that 5consciousness5 is frightfully hard to define. But if #e
are talking about a definition in common sense terms, sufficient to identify the
target of the investigation, as opposed to a precise scientific definition of the sort
that typically comes at the end of a scientific investigation, then the #ord does not
seem to me hard to define. >ere is the definition4 Consciousness consists of inner,
/ualitative, sub-ective states and processes of sentience or a#areness.
Consciousness, so defined, begins #hen #e #ake in the morning from a dreamless
sleep 0 and continues until #e fall asleep again, die, go into a coma or other#ise
become 5unconscious.5 %t includes all of the enormous variety of the a#areness that
#e think of as characteristic of our #aking life. %t includes everything from feeling a
pain, to perceiving ob-ects visually, to states of an.iety and depression, to #orking
out cross #ord pu""les, playing chess, trying to remember your aunt+s phone
number, arguing about politics, or to -ust #ishing you #ere some#here else.
<reams on this definition are a form of consciousness, though of course they are in
many respects /uite different from #aking consciousness.
,his definition is not universally accepted and the #ord consciousness is used in a
variety of other #ays. *ome authors use the #ord only to refer to states of self0
consciousness, i.e. the consciousness that humans and some primates have of
themselves as agents. *ome use it to refer to the second0order mental states about
other mental states; so according to this definition, a pain #ould not be a conscious
state, but #orrying about a pain #ould be a conscious state. *ome use
5consciousness5 behavioristically to refer to any form of comple. intelligent
behavior. %t is, of course, open to anyone to use any #ord any#ay he likes, and #e
can al#ays redefine consciousness as a technical term. Conetheless, there is a
genuine phenomenon of consciousness in the ordinary sense, ho#ever #e choose
to name it7 and it is that phenomenon that % am trying to identify no#, because %
believe it is the proper target of the investigation.
Consciousness has distinctive features that #e need to e.plain. Because % believe
that some, not all, of the problems of consciousness are going to have a
neurobiological solution, #hat follo#s is a shopping list of #hat a neurobiological
account of consciousness should e.plain.
I%. "he &ssential 'eature of Consciousness# "he
Combination of (ualitativeness) Sub*ectivity and
+nity
Consciousness has three aspects that make it different from other biological
phenomena, and indeed different from other phenomena in the natural #orld.
,hese three aspects are /ualitativeness, sub-ectivity, and unity. % used to think that
for investigative purposes #e could treat them as three distinct features, but
because they are logically interrelated, % no# think it best to treat them together, as
different aspects of the same feature. ,hey are not separate because the first
implies the second, and the second implies the third. % discuss them in order.
(ualitativeness
8very conscious state has a certain /ualitative feel to it, and you can see this
clearly if you consider e.amples. ,he e.perience of tasting beer is very different
from hearing Beethoven+s Cinth *ymphony, and both of those have a different
/ualitative character from smelling a rose or seeing a sunset. ,hese e.amples
illustrate the different /ualitative features of conscious e.periences. One #ay to put
this point is to say that for every conscious e.perience there is something that it
feels like, or something that it is like to have that conscious e.perience. Cagel
919@;: made this point over t#o decades ago #hen he pointed out that if bats are
conscious, then there is something that 5it is like5 to be a bat. ,his distinguishes
consciousness from other features of the #orld, because in this sense, for a
nonconscious entity such as a car or a brick there is nothing that 5it is like5 to be
that entity. *ome philosophers describe this feature of consciousness #ith the #ord
/ualia, and they say there is a special problem of /ualia. % am reluctant to adopt
this usage, because it seems to imply that there are t#o separate problems, the
problem of consciousness and the problem of /ualia. But as % understand these
terms, 5/ualia5 is -ust a plural name for conscious states. Because 5consciousness5
and 5/ualia5 are coe.tensive, there seems no point in introducing a special term.
*ome people think that /ualia are characteristic only of perceptual e.periences,
such as seeing colors and having sensations such as pains, but that there is no
/ualitative character to thinking. $s % understand these terms, that is #rong. 8ven
conscious thinking has a /ualitative feel to it. ,here is something it is like to think
that t#o plus t#o e/uals four. ,here is no #ay to describe it e.cept by saying that it
is the character of thinking consciously 5t#o plus t#o e/uals four5. But if you
believe there is no /ualitative character to thinking that, then try to think the same
thought in a language you do not kno# #ell. %f % think in 3rench 5deu. et deu. fait
/uatre,5 % find that it feels /uite different. Or try thinking, more painfully, 5t#o plus
t#o e/uals one hundred eighty0seven.5 Once again % think you #ill agree that these
conscious thoughts have different characters. >o#ever, the point must be trivial7
that is, #hether or not conscious thoughts are /ualia must follo# from our
definition of /ualia. $s % am using the term, thoughts definitely are /ualia.
Sub*ectivity
Conscious states only e.ist #hen they are e.perienced by some human or animal
sub-ect. %n that sense, they are essentially sub-ective.
% used to treat sub-ectivity and /ualitativeness as distinct features, but it no#
seems to me that properly understood, /ualitativeness implies sub-ectivity, because
in order for there to be a /ualitative feel to some event, there must be some
sub-ect that e.periences the event. Co sub-ectivity, no e.perience. 8ven if more
than one sub-ect e.periences a similar phenomenon, say t#o people listening to the
same concert, all the same, the /ualitative e.perience can only e.ist as
e.perienced by some sub-ect or sub-ects. $nd even if the different token
e.periences are /ualitatively identical, that is they all e.emplify the same type,
nonetheless each token e.perience can only e.ist if the sub-ect of that e.perience
has it. Because conscious states are sub-ective in this sense, they have #hat % #ill
call a first0person ontology, as opposed to the third0person ontology of mountains
and molecules, #hich can e.ist even if no living creatures e.ist. *ub-ective
conscious states have a first0person ontology 95ontology5 here means mode of
e.istence: because they only e.ist #hen they are e.perienced by some human or
animal agent. ,hey are e.perienced by some 5%5 that has the e.perience, and it is
in that sense that they have a first0person ontology.
+nity
$ll conscious e.periences at any given point in an agent+s life come as part of one
unified conscious field. %f % am sitting at my desk looking out the #indo#, % do not
-ust see the sky above and the brook belo# shrouded by the trees, and at the same
time feel the pressure of my body against the chair, the shirt against my back, and
the aftertaste of coffee in my mouth, rather % e.perience all of these as part of a
single unified conscious field. ,his unity of any state of /ualitative sub-ectivity has
important conse/uences for a scientific study of consciousness. % say more about
them later on. $t present % -ust #ant to call attention to the fact that the unity is
already implicit in sub-ectivity and /ualitativeness for the follo#ing reason4 %f you
try to imagine that my conscious state is broken into 1@ parts, #hat you imagine is
not a single conscious sub-ect #ith 1@ different conscious states but rather 1@
different centers of consciousness. $ conscious state, in short, is by definition
unified, and the unity #ill follo# from the sub-ectivity and the /ualitativeness,
because there is no #ay you could have sub-ectivity and /ualitativeness e.cept #ith
that particular form of unity.
,here are t#o areas of current research #here the aspect of unity is especially
important. ,hese are first, the study of the split0brain patients by =a""aniga,
91998: and others 9=a""aniga, Bogen, and *perry 19D', 19D&:, and second, the
study of the binding problem by a number of contemporary researchers. ,he
interest of the split0brain patients is that both the anatomical and the behavioral
evidence suggest that in these patients there are t#o centers of consciousness that
after commissurotomy are communicating #ith each other only imperfectly. ,hey
seem to have, so to speak, t#o conscious minds inside one skull.
,he interest of the binding problem is that it looks like this problem might give us in
microcosm a #ay of studying the nature of consciousness, because -ust as the
visual system binds all of the different stimulus inputs into a single unified visual
percept, so the entire brain someho# unites all of the variety of our different
stimulus inputs into a single unified conscious e.perience. *everal researchers have
e.plored the role of synchroni"ed neuron firings in the range of ;(h" to account for
the capacity of different perceptual systems to bind the diverse stimuli of
anatomically distinct neurons into a single perceptual e.perience. 9?linas 199(,
?linas and are 1991, ?linas and 2ibary 199&, ?linas and 2ibary,199', *inger 199&,
1996, *inger and =ray, 1996,: 3or e.ample in the case of vision, anatomically
separate neurons speciali"ed for such things as line, angle and color all contribute
to a single, unified, conscious visual e.perience of an ob-ect. Crick 9199;: e.tended
the proposal for the binding problem to a general hypothesis about the CCC. >e put
for#ard a tentative hypothesis that the CCC consists of synchroni"ed neuron firings
in the general range of ;( >" in various net#orks in the thalamocortical system,
specifically in connections bet#een the thalamus and layers four and si. of the
corte..
,his kind of instantaneous unity has to be distinguished from the organi"ed
unification of conscious se/uences that #e get from short term or iconic memory.
3or nonpathological forms of consciousness at least some memory is essential in
order that the conscious se/uence across time can come in an organi"ed fashion.
3or e.ample, #hen % speak a sentence % have to be able to remember the beginning
of the sentence at the time % get to the end if % am to produce coherent speech.
1hereas instantaneous unity is essential to, and is part of, the definition of
consciousness, organi"ed unity across time is essential to the healthy functioning of
the conscious organism, but it is not necessary for the very e.istence of conscious
sub-ectivity.
,his combined feature of /ualitative, unified sub-ectivity is the essence of
consciousness and it, more than anything else, is #hat makes consciousness
different from other phenomena studied by the natural sciences. ,he problem is to
e.plain ho# brain processes, #hich are ob-ective third person biological, chemical
and electrical processes, produce sub-ective states of feeling and thinking. >o#
does the brain get us over the hump, so to speak, from events in the synaptic cleft
and the ion channels to conscious thoughts and feelingsB %f you take seriously this
combined feature as the target of e.planation, % believe you get a different sort of
research pro-ect from #hat is currently the most influential. Aost neurobiologists
take #hat % #ill call the building block approach4 3ind the CCC for specific elements
in the conscious field such as the e.perience of color, and then construct the #hole
field out of such building blocks. $nother approach, #hich % #ill call the unified field
approach, #ould take the research problem to be one of e.plaining ho# the brain
produces a unified field of sub-ectivity to start #ith. On the unified field approach,
there are no building blocks, rather there are -ust modifications of the already
e.isting field of /ualitative sub-ectivity. % say more about this later.
*ome philosophers and neuroscientists think #e can never have an e.planation of
sub-ectivity4 1e can never e.plain #hy #arm things feel #arm and red things look
red. ,o these skeptics there is a simple ans#er4 1e kno# it happens. 1e kno# that
brain processes cause all of our inner /ualitative, sub-ective thoughts and feelings.
Because #e kno# that it happens #e ought to try to figure out ho# it happens.
erhaps in the end #e #ill fail but #e cannot assume the impossibility of success
before #e try.
Aany philosophers and scientists also think that the sub-ectivity of conscious states
makes it impossible to have a strict science of consciousness. 3or, they argue, if
science is by definition ob-ective, and consciousness is by definition sub-ective, it
follo#s that there cannot be a science of consciousness. ,his argument is fallacious.
%t commits the fallacy of ambiguity over the terms ob-ective and sub-ective. >ere is
the ambiguity4 1e need to distinguish t#o different senses of the ob-ective0
sub-ective distinction. %n one sense, the epistemic sense 95epistemic5 here means
having to do #ith kno#ledge:, science is indeed ob-ective. *cientists seek truths
that are e/ually accessible to any competent observer and that are independent of
the feelings and attitudes of the e.perimenters in /uestion. $n e.ample of an
epistemically ob-ective claim #ould be 5Bill Clinton #eighs '1( pounds5. $n
e.ample of an epistemically sub-ective claim #ould be 5Bill Clinton is a good
president5. ,he first is ob-ective because its truth or falsity is settleable in a #ay
that is independent of the feelings and attitudes of the investigators. ,he second is
sub-ective because it is not so settleable. But there is another sense of the
ob-ective0sub-ective distinction, and that is the ontological sense 95ontological5 here
means having to do #ith e.istence:. *ome entities, such as pains, tickles, and
itches, have a sub-ective mode of e.istence, in the sense that they e.ist only as
e.perienced by a conscious sub-ect. Others, such as mountains, molecules and
tectonic plates have an ob-ective mode of e.istence, in the sense that their
e.istence does not depend on any consciousness. ,he point of making this
distinction is to call attention to the fact that the scientific re/uirement of epistemic
ob-ectivity does not preclude ontological sub-ectivity as a domain of investigation.
,here is no reason #hatever #hy #e cannot have an ob-ective science of pain, even
though pains only e.ist #hen they are felt by conscious agents. ,he ontological
sub-ectivity of the feeling of pain does not preclude an epistemically ob-ective
science of pain. ,hough many philosophers and neuroscientists are reluctant to
think of sub-ectivity as a proper domain of scientific investigation, in actual practice,
#e #ork on it all the time. $ny neurology te.tbook #ill contain e.tensive
discussions of the etiology and treatment of such ontologically sub-ective states as
pains and an.ieties.
%. Some ,ther 'eatures
,o keep this list short, % mention some other features of consciousness only briefly.
'eature -#Intentionality
Aost important, conscious states typically have 5intentionality,5 that property of
mental states by #hich they are directed at or about ob-ects and states of affairs in
the #orld. hilosophers use the #ord intentionality not -ust for 5intending5 in the
ordinary sense but for any mental phenomena at all that have referential content.
$ccording to this usage, beliefs, hopes, intentions, fears, desires and perceptions all
are intentional. *o if % have a belief, % must have a belief about something. %f % have
a normal visual e.perience, it must seem to me that % am actually seeing
something, etc. Cot all conscious states are intentional and not all intentionality is
conscious7 for e.ample, undirected an.iety lacks intentionality, and the beliefs a
man has even #hen he is asleep lack consciousness then and there. But % think it is
obvious that many of the important evolutionary functions of consciousness are
intentional4 3or e.ample, an animal has conscious feelings of hunger and thirst,
engages in conscious perceptual discriminations, embarks on conscious intentional
actions, and consciously recogni"es both friend and foe. $ll of these are conscious
intentional phenomena and all are essential for biological survival. $ general
neurobiological account of consciousness #ill e.plain the intentionality of conscious
states. 3or e.ample, an account of color vision #ill naturally e.plain the capacity of
agents to make color discriminations.
'eature .) "he $istinction !et/een Center and eriphery of
Attention.
%t is a remarkable fact that #ithin my conscious field at any given time % can shift
my attention at #ill from one aspect to another. *o for e.ample, right no# % am not
paying any attention to the pressure of the shoes on my feet or the feeling of the
shirt on my neck. But % can shift my attention to them any time % #ant. ,here is
already a fair amount of useful #ork done on attention.
'eature 0. All 1uman Conscious &xperiences Are in Some
2ood or ,ther.
,here is al#ays a certain flavor to one+s conscious states, al#ays an ans#er to the
/uestion 5>o# are you feelingB5. ,he moods do not necessarily have names. 2ight
no# % am not especially elated or annoyed, not ecstatic or depressed, not even -ust
blah. But all the same % #ill become acutely a#are of my mood if there is a
dramatic change, if % receive some e.tremely good or bad ne#s, for e.ample.
Aoods are not the same as emotions, though the mood #e are in #ill predispose us
to having certain emotions.
1e are, by the #ay, closer to having pharmacological control of moods #ith such
drugs as ro"ac than #e are to having control of other internal features of
consciousness.
'eature 3. All Conscious States Come to +s in the
leasure4+npleasure $imension
3or any total conscious e.perience there is al#ays an ans#er to the /uestion of
#hether it #as pleasant, painful, unpleasant, neutral, etc. ,he pleasureEunpleasure
feature is not the same as mood, though of course some moods are more pleasant
than others.
'eature 5. 6estalt Structure.
,he brain has a remarkable capacity to organi"e very degenerate perceptual stimuli
into coherent conscious perceptual forms. % can, for e.ample, recogni"e a face, or a
car, on the basis of very limited stimuli. ,he best kno#n e.amples of =estalt
structures come from the researches of the =estalt psychologists.
'eature 7. 'amiliarity
,here is in varying degrees a sense of familiarity that pervades our conscious
e.periences. 8ven if % see a house % have never seen before, % still recogni"e it as a
house7 it is of a form and structure that is familiar to me. *urrealist painters try to
break this sense of the familiarity and ordinariness of our e.periences, but even in
surrealist paintings the drooping #atch still looks like a #atch, and the three0
headed dog still looks like a dog.
One could continue this list, and % have done so in other #ritings 9*earle 199':. ,he
point no# is to get a minimal shopping list of the features that #e #ant a
neurobiology of consciousness to e.plain. %n order to look for a causal e.planation
#e need to kno# #hat the effects are that need e.planation. Before e.amining
some current research pro-ects, #e need to clear more of the ground.
%I. "he "raditional 2ind8!ody roblem and 1o/ to
Avoid It.
,he confusion about ob-ectivity and sub-ectivity % mentioned earlier is -ust the tip of
the iceberg of the traditional mind0body problem. ,hough ideally % think scientists
#ould be better off if they -ust ignored this problem, the fact is that they are as
much victims of the philosophical traditions as anyone else, and many scientists,
like many philosophers, are still in the grip of the traditional categories of mind and
body, mental and physical, dualism and materialism, etc. ,his is not the place for a
detailed discussion of the mind0body problem, but % need to say a fe# #ords about
it so that, in the discussion that follo#s, #e can avoid the confusions it has
engendered.
,he simplest form of the mind body problem is this4 1hat e.actly is the relation of
consciousness to the brainB ,here are t#o parts to this problem, a philosophical
part and a scientific part. % have already been assuming a simple solution to the
philosophical part. ,he solution, % believe, is consistent #ith everything #e kno#
about biology and about ho# the #orld #orks. %t is this4 Consciousness and other
sorts of mental phenomena are caused by neurobiological processes in the brain,
and they are reali"ed in the structure of the brain. %n a #ord, the conscious mind is
caused by brain processes and is itself a higher level feature of the brain.
,he philosophical part is relatively easy but the scientific part is much harder. >o#,
e.actly, do brain processes cause consciousness and ho#, e.actly, is consciousness
reali"ed in the brainB % #ant to be very clear about the philosophical part, because
it is not possible to approach the scientific /uestion intelligently if the philosophical
issues are unclear. Cotice t#o features of the philosophical solution. 3irst, the
relationship of brain mechanisms to consciousness is one of causation. rocesses in
the brain cause our conscious e.periences. *econd, this does not force us to any
kind of dualism because the form of causation is bottom0up, and the resulting effect
is simply a higher level feature of the brain itself, not a separate substance.
Consciousness is not like some fluid s/uirted out by the brain. $ conscious state is
rather a state that the brain is in. )ust as #ater can be in a li/uid or solid state
#ithout li/uidity and solidity being separate substances, so consciousness is a state
that the brain is in #ithout consciousness being a separate substance.
Cotice that % stated the philosophical solution #ithout using any of the traditional
categories of 5dualism,5 5monism,5 5materialism,5 and all the rest of it. 3rankly, %
think those categories are obsolete. But if #e accept those categories at face value,
then #e get the follo#ing picture4 Fou have a choice bet#een dualism and
materialism. $ccording to dualism, consciousness and other mental phenomena
e.ist in a different ontological realm altogether from the ordinary physical #orld of
physics, chemistry, and biology. $ccording to materialism consciousness as % have
described it does not e.ist. Ceither dualism nor materialism as traditionally
construed, allo#s us to get an ans#er to our /uestion. <ualism says that there are
t#o kinds of phenomena in the #orld, the mental and the physical7 materialism
says that there is only one, the material. <ualism ends up #ith an impossible
bifurcation of reality into t#o separate categories and thus makes it impossible to
e.plain the relation bet#een the mental and the physical. But materialism ends up
denying the e.istence of any irreducible sub-ective /ualitative states of sentience or
a#areness. %n short, dualism makes the problem insoluble7 materialism denies the
e.istence of any phenomenon to study, and hence of any problem.
On the vie# that % am proposing, #e should re-ect those categories altogether. 1e
kno# enough about ho# the #orld #orks to kno# that consciousness is a biological
phenomenon caused by brain processes and reali"ed in the structure of the brain. %t
is irreducible not because it is ineffable or mysterious, but because it has a first
person ontology, and therefore cannot be reduced to phenomena #ith a third
person ontology. ,he traditional mistake that people have made in both science and
philosophy has been to suppose that if #e re-ect dualism, as % believe #e must,
then #e have to embrace materialism. But on the vie# that % am putting for#ard,
materialism is -ust as confused as dualism because it denies the e.istence of
ontologically sub-ective consciousness in the first place. )ust to give it a name, the
resulting vie# that denies both dualism and materialism, % call biological naturalism.
%II. 1o/ $id We 6et Into "his 2ess? A 1istorical
$igression
3or a long time % thought scientists #ould be better off if they ignored the history of
the mind0body problem, but % no# think that unless you understand something
about the history, you #ill al#ays be in the grip of historical categories. %
discovered this #hen % #as debating people in artificial intelligence and found that
many of them #ere in the grip of <escartes, a philosopher many of them had not
even read.
1hat #e no# think of as the natural sciences did not really begin #ith $ncient
=reece. ,he =reeks had almost everything, and in particular they had the
#onderful idea of a 5theory5. ,he invention of the idea of a theory00a systematic set
of logically related propositions that attempt to e.plain the phenomena of some
domain00#as perhaps the greatest single achievement of =reek civili"ation.
>o#ever, they did not have the institutionali"ed practice of systematic observation
and e.periment. ,hat came only after the 2enaissance, especially in the 1@th
century. 1hen you combine systematic e.periment and testability #ith the idea of a
theory, you get the possibility of science as #e think of it today. But there #as a
feature of the seventeenth century, #hich #as a local accident and #hich is still
blocking our path. %t is that in the seventeenth century there #as a very serious
conflict bet#een science and religion, and it seemed that science #as a threat to
religion. art of the #ay that the apparent threat posed by science to orthodo.
Christianity #as deflected #as due to <escartes and =alileo. <escartes, in
particular, argued that reality divides into t#o kinds, the mental and the physical,
res cogitans and res extensa. <escartes made a useful division of the territory4
2eligion had the territory of the soul, and science could have material reality. But
this gave people the mistaken conception that science could only deal #ith
ob-ective third person phenomena, it could not deal #ith the inner /ualitative
sub-ective e.periences that make up our conscious life. ,his #as a perfectly
harmless move in the 1@th century because it kept the church authorities off the
backs of the scientists. 9%t #as only partly successful. <escartes, after all, had to
leave aris and go live in >olland #here there #as more tolerance, and =alileo had
to make his famous recantation to the church authorities of his heliocentric theory
of the planetary system.: >o#ever, this history has left us #ith a tradition and a
tendency not to think of consciousness as an appropriate sub-ect for the natural
sciences, in the #ay that #e think of disease, digestion, or tectonic plates as
sub-ects of the natural sciences. % urge us to overcome this reluctance, and in order
to overcome it #e need to overcome the historical tradition that made it seem
perfectly natural to avoid the topic of consciousness altogether in scientific
investigation.
%III. Summary ,f "he Argument "o "his oint
% am assuming that #e have established the follo#ing4 Consciousness is a biological
phenomenon like any other. %t consists of inner /ualitative sub-ective states of
perceiving, feeling and thinking. %ts essential feature is unified, /ualitative
sub-ectivity. Conscious states are caused by neurobiological processes in the brain,
and they are reali"ed in the structure of the brain. ,o say this is analogous to
saying that digestive processes are caused by chemical processes in the stomach
and the rest of the digestive tract, and that these processes are reali"ed in the
stomach and the digestive tract. Consciousness differs from other biological
phenomena in that it has a sub-ective or first person ontology. But ontological
sub-ectivity does not prevent us from having epistemic ob-ectivity. 1e can still have
an ob-ective science of consciousness. 1e abandon the traditional categories of
dualism and materialism, for the same reason #e abandon the categories of
phlogiston and vital spirits4 ,hey have no application to the real #orld.
I9. "he Scientific Study of Consciousness
>o#, then, should #e proceed in a scientific investigation of the phenomena
involvedB
*een from the outside it looks deceptively simple. ,here are three steps. 3irst, one
finds the neurobiological events that are correlated #ith consciousness 9the CCC:.
*econd, one tests to see that the correlation is a genuine causal relation. $nd third,
one tries to develop a theory, ideally in the form of a set of la#s, that #ould
formali"e the causal relationships.
,hese three steps are typical of the history of science. ,hink, for e.ample, of the
development of the germ theory of disease. 3irst #e find correlations bet#een brute
empirical phenomena. ,hen #e test the correlations for causality by manipulating
one variable and seeing ho# it affects the others. ,hen #e develop a theory of the
mechanisms involved and test the theory by further e.periment. 3or e.ample,
*emmel#eis in Gienna in the 18;(s found that #omen obstetric patients in
hospitals died more often from puerperal fever than did those #ho stayed at home.
*o he looked more closely and found that #omen e.amined by medical students
#ho had -ust come from the autopsy room #ithout #ashing their hands had an
e.ceptionally high rate of puerperal fever. >ere #as an empirical correlation. 1hen
he made these young doctors #ash their hands in chlorinated lime, the mortality
rate #ent #ay do#n. >e did not yet have the germ theory of disease, but he #as
moving in that direction. %n the study of consciousness #e appear to be in the early
*emmel#eis phase.
$t the time of this #riting #e are still looking for the CCC. *uppose, for e.ample,
that #e found, as 3rancis Crick once put for#ard as a tentative hypothesis, that the
neurobiological correlate of consciousness #as a set of neuron firings bet#een the
thalamus and the corte. layers ; and D, in the range of ;( >". ,hat #ould be step
one. $nd step t#o #ould be to manipulate the phenomena in /uestion to see if you
could sho# a causal relation. %deally, #e need to test for #hether the CCC in
/uestion is both necessary and sufficient for the e.istence of consciousness.
,o establish necessity, #e find out #hether a sub-ect #ho has the putative CCC
removed thereby loses consciousness7 and to establish sufficiency, #e find out
#hether an other#ise unconscious sub-ect can be brought to consciousness by
inducing the putative CCC. ure cases of causal sufficiency are rare in biology, and
#e usually have to understand the notion of sufficient conditions against a set of
background presuppositions, that is, #ithin a specific biological conte.t. ,hus our
sufficient conditions for consciousness #ould presumably only operate in a sub-ect
#ho #as alive, had his brain functioning at a certain level of activity, at a certain
appropriate temperature, etc. But #hat #e are trying to establish ideally is a proof
that the element is not -ust correlated #ith consciousness, but that it is both
causally necessary and sufficient, other things being e/ual, for the presence of
consciousness.
*een from the outsider+s point of vie#, that looks like the ideal #ay to proceed.
1hy has it not yet been doneB % do not kno#. %t turns out, for e.ample, that it is
very hard to find an e.act CCC, and the current investigative tools, most notably in
the form of positron emission tomagraphy scans, C$, scans, and functional
magnetic resonance imaging techni/ues, have not yet identified the CCC. ,here are
interesting differences bet#een the scans of conscious sub-ects and sleeping
sub-ects #ith 28A sleep, on the one hand, and slo# #ave sleeping sub-ects on the
other. But it is not easy to tell ho# much of the differences are related to
consciousness. ?ots of things are going on in both the conscious and the
unconscious sub-ects+ brains that have nothing to do #ith the production of
consciousness. =iven that a sub-ect is already conscious, you can get parts of his or
her brain to light up by getting him or her to perform various cognitive tasks such
as perception or memory. But that does not give you the difference bet#een being
conscious in general, and being totally unconscious. *o, to establish this first step,
#e still appear to be in an early a state of the technology of brain research. %n spite
of all of the hype surrounding the development of imaging techni/ues, #e still, as
far as % kno#, have not found a #ay to image the CCC.
1ith all this in mind, let us turn to some actual efforts at solving the problem of
consciousness.
9."he Standard Approach to Consciousness# "he
!uilding !loc: 2odel
Aost theorists tacitly adopt the building block theory of consciousness. ,he idea is
that any conscious field is made of its various parts4 the visual e.perience of red,
the taste of coffee, the feeling of the #ind coming in through the #indo#. %t seems
that if #e could figure out #hat makes even one building block conscious, #e #ould
have the key to the #hole structure. %f #e could, for e.ample, crack visual
consciousness, that #ould give us the key to all the other modalities. ,his vie# is
e.plicit in the #ork of Crick H !och 91998:. ,heir idea is that if #e could find the
CCC for vision, then #e could e.plain visual consciousness, and #e #ould then
kno# #hat to look for to find the CCC for hearing, and for the other modalities, and
if #e put all those together, #e #ould have the #hole conscious field.
,he strongest and most original statement % kno# of the building block theory is by
Bartels H Ieki 91998, Ieki H Bartels, 1998:. ,hey see the binding activity of the
brain not as one that generates a conscious e.perience that is unified, but rather
one that brings together a #hole lot of already conscious e.periences . $s they put
it 9Bartels H Ieki 19984 '&'@:, 5JCKonsciousness is not a unitary faculty, but.. it
consists of many micro0consciousnesses.5 Our field of consciousness is thus made
up of a lot of building blocks of microconsciousnesses. 5$ctivity at each stage or
node of a processing0perceptual system has a conscious correlate. Binding cellular
activity at different nodes is therefore not a process preceding or even facilitating
conscious e.perience, but rather bringing different conscious e.periences together5
9Bartels H Ieki 19984 '&&(:.
,here are at least three lines of research that are consistent #ith, and often used to
support, the building block theory.
;. !lindsight
Blindsight is the name given by the psychologist ?a#rence 1eiskrant" to the
phenomenon #hereby certain patients #ith damage to G1 can report incidents
occurring in their visual field even though they report no visual a#areness of the
stimulus. 3or e.ample, in the case of <B, the earliest patient studied, if an L or an
O #ere sho#n on a screen in that portion of <B+s visual field #here he #as blind,
the patient #hen asked #hat he sa#, #ould deny that he sa# anything. But if asked
to guess, he #ould guess correctly that it #as an L or an O. >is guesses #ere right
nearly all the time. 3urthermore, the sub-ects in these e.periments are usually
surprised at their results. 1hen the e.perimenter asked <B in an intervie# after
one e.periment, 5<id you kno# ho# #ell you had doneB5, <B ans#ered, 5Co, %
didn+t, because % couldn+t see anything. % couldn+t see a darn thing.5 91eiskrant"
198D4 ';:. ,his research has subse/uently been carried on #ith a number of other
patients, and blindsight is no# also e.perimentally induced in monkeys 9*toerig and
Co#ey, 199@:.
*ome researchers suppose that #e might use blindsight as the key to
understanding consciousness. ,he argument is the follo#ing4 %n the case of
blindsight, #e have a clear difference bet#een conscious vision and unconscious
information processing. %t seems that if #e could discover the physiological and
anatomical difference bet#een regular sight and blindsight, #e might have the key
to analy"ing consciousness, because #e #ould have a clear neurological distinction
bet#een the conscious and the unconscious cases.
-. !inocular Rivalry and 6estalt S/itching
One e.citing proposal for finding the CCC for vision is to study cases #here the
e.ternal stimulus is constant but #here the internal sub-ective e.perience varies.
,#o e.amples of this are the gestalt s#itch, #here the same figure, such as the
Ceckar cube, is perceived in t#o different #ays, and binocular rivalry, #here
different stimuli are presented to each eye but the visual e.perience at any instant
is of one or the other stimulus, not both. %n such cases the e.perimenter has a
chance to isolate a specific CCC for the visual e.perience, independently of the
neurological correlates of the retinal stimulus 9?ogothetis, 1998, ?ogothetis H
*chall, 1989:. ,he beauty of this research is that it seems to isolate a precise CCC
for a precise conscious e.perience. Because the e.ternal stimulus is constant and
there are 9at least: t#o different conscious e.periences $ and B, it seems there
must be some point in the neural path#ays #here one se/uence of neural events
causes e.perience $ and another point #here a second se/uence causes e.perience
B. 3ind those t#o points and you have found the precise CCCs for t#o different
building blocks of the #hole conscious field.
.. "he <eural Correlates of %ision
erhaps the most obvious #ay to look for the CCC is to track the neurobiological
causes of a specific perceptual modality such as vision. %n a recent article, Crick H
!och 91998: assume as a #orking hypothesis that only some specific types of
neurons #ill manifest the CCC. ,hey do not think that any of the CCC of vision are
in G1 91996:. ,he reason for thinking that G1 does not contain the CCCs is that G1
does not connect to the frontal lobes in such a #ay that #ould make G1 contribute
directly to the essential information processing aspect of visual perception. ,heir
idea is that the function of visual consciousness is to provide visual information
directly to the parts of the brain that organi"e voluntary motor output, including
speech. ,hus, because the information in G1 is recoded in subse/uent visual areas
and does not transmit directly to the frontal corte., they believe that G1 does not
correlate directly #ith visual consciousness.
9I. $oubts about the !uilding !loc: "heory
,he building block theory may be right but it has some #orrisome features. Aost
important, all the research done to identify the CCCs has been carried out #ith
sub-ects #ho are already conscious, independently of the CCC in /uestion. =oing
through the cases in order, the problem #ith the blindsight research as a method of
discovering the CCC is that the patients in /uestion only e.hibit blindsight if they
are already conscious. ,hat is, it is only in the case of fully conscious patients that
#e can elicit the evidence of information processing that #e get in the blindsight
e.amples. *o #e cannot investigate consciousness in general by studying the
difference bet#een the blindsight patient and the normally sighted patient, because
both patients are fully conscious. %t might turn out that #hat #e need in our theory
of consciousness is an e.planation of the conscious field that is essential to both
blindsight and normal vision or, for that matter, to any other sensory modality.
*imilar remarks apply to the binocular rivalry e.periments. $ll this research is
immensely valuable but it is not clear ho# it #ill give us an understanding of the
e.act differences bet#een the conscious brain and the unconscious brain, because
for both e.periences in binocular rivalry the brain is fully conscious.
*imilarly, Crick 9199D: and Crick H !och 91998: only investigated sub-ects #ho are
already conscious. 1hat one #ants to kno# is, ho# is it possible for the sub-ect to
be conscious at allB =iven that a sub-ect is conscious, his consciousness #ill be
modified by having a visual e.perience, but it does not follo# that the
consciousness is made up of various building blocks of #hich the visual e.perience
is -ust one.
% #ish to state my doubts precisely. ,here are 9at least: t#o possible hypotheses.
1. ,he building block theory4 ,he conscious field is made up of small components
that combine to form the field. ,o find the causal CCC for any component is to find
an element that is causally necessary and sufficient for that conscious e.perience.
>ence to find even one is, in an important sense, to crack the problem of
consciousness.
'. ,he unified field theory 9e.plained in more detail belo#:4 Conscious e.periences
come in unified fields. %n order to have a visual e.perience, a sub-ect has to be
conscious already and the e.perience is a modification of the field. Ceither
blindsight, binocular rivalry nor normal vision can give us a genuine causal CCC
because only already conscious sub-ects can have these e.periences.
%t is important to emphasi"e that both hypotheses are rival empirical hypotheses to
be settled by scientific research and not by philosophical argument. 1hy then do %
prefer hypothesis ' to hypothesis 1B ,he building block theory predicts that in a
totally unconscious patient, if the patient meets certain minimal physiological
conditions 9he is alive, the brain is functioning normally, he has the right
temperature, etc.:, and if you could trigger the CCC for say the e.perience of red,
then the unconscious sub-ect #ould suddenly have a conscious e.perience of red
and nothing else. One building block is as good as another. 2esearch may prove me
#rong, but on the basis of #hat little % kno# about the brain, % do not believe that
is possible. Only a brain that is already over the threshold of consciousness, that
already has a conscious field, can have a visual e.perience of red.
3urthermore on the multistage theory of Bartels H Ieki 91998, Ieki H Bartels
1998:, the microconsciousnesses are all capable of a separate and independent
e.istence. %t is not clear to me #hat this means. % kno# #hat it is like for me to
e.perience my current conscious field, but #ho e.periences all the tiny
microconsciousnessesB $nd #hat #ould it be like for each of them to e.ist
separatelyB
9II. !asal consciousness and a unified field theory
,here is another #ay to look at matters that implies another research approach.
%magine that you #ake from a dreamless sleep in a completely dark room. *o far
you have no coherent stream of thought and almost no perceptual stimulus. *ave
for the pressure of your body on the bed and the sense of the covers on top of your
body, you are receiving no outside sensory stimuli. $ll the same there must be a
difference in your brain bet#een the state of minimal #akefulness you are no# in
and the state of unconsciousness you #ere in before. ,hat difference is the CCC %
believe #e should be looking for. ,his state of #akefulness is basal or background
consciousness.
Co# you turn on the light, get up, move about, etc. 1hat happensB <o you create
ne# conscious statesB 1ell, in one sense you obviously do, because previously you
#ere not consciously a#are of visual stimuli and no# you are. But do the visual
e.periences stand to the #hole field of consciousness in the part #hole relationB
1ell, that is #hat nearly everybody thinks and #hat % used to think, but here is
another #ay of looking at it. ,hink of the visual e.perience of the table not as an
ob-ect in the conscious field the #ay the table is an ob-ect in the room, but think of
the e.perience as a modification of the conscious field, as a ne# form that the
unified field takes. $s ?linas and his colleagues put it, consciousness is 5modulated
rather than generated by the senses5 91998418;1:.
% #ant to avoid the part #hole metaphor but % also #ant to avoid the proscenium
metaphor. 1e should not think of my ne# e.periences as ne# actors on the stage
of consciousness but as ne# bumps or forms or features in the unified field of
consciousness. 1hat is the differenceB ,he proscenium metaphor gives us a
constant background stage #ith various actors on it. % think that is #rong. ,here is
-ust the unified conscious field, nothing else, and it takes different forms.
%f this is the right #ay to look at things 9and again this is a hypothesis on my part,
nothing more: then #e get a different sort of research pro-ect. ,here is no such
thing as a separate visual consciousness, so looking for the CCC for vision is
barking up the #rong tree. Only the already conscious sub-ect can have visual
e.periences, so the introduction of visual e.periences is not an introduction of
consciousness but a modification of a pree.isting consciousness.
,he research program that is implicit in the hypothesis of unified field consciousness
is that at some point #e need to investigate the general condition of the conscious
brain as opposed to the condition of the unconscious brain. 1e #ill not e.plain the
general phenomenon of unified /ualitative sub-ectivity by looking for specific local
CCCs. ,he important /uestion is not #hat the CCC for visual consciousness is, but
ho# does the visual system introduce visual e.periences into an already unified
conscious field, and ho# does the brain create that unified conscious field in the
first place. ,he problem becomes more specific. 1hat #e are trying to find is #hich
features of a system that is made up of a hundred billion discreet elements,
neurons, connected by synapses can produce a conscious field of the sort that %
have described. ,here is a perfectly ordinary sense in #hich consciousness is
unified and holistic, but the brain is not in that #ay unified and holistic. *o #hat #e
have to look for is some massive activity of the brain capable of producing a unified
holistic conscious e.perience. 3or reasons that #e no# kno# from lesion studies,
#e are unlikely to find this as a global property of the brain, and #e have very good
reason to believe that activity in the thalamocortical system is probably the place to
look for unified field consciousness. ,he #orking hypothesis #ould be that
consciousness is in large part locali"ed in the thalamocortical system, and that the
various other systems feed information to the thalamocortical system that produces
modifications corresponding to the various sensory modalities. ,o put it simply, % do
not believe #e #ill find visual consciousness in the visual system and auditory
consciousness in the auditory system. 1e #ill find a single, unified, conscious field
containing visual, auditory, and other aspects.
Cotice that if this hypothesis is right, it #ill solve the binding problem for
consciousness automatically. ,he production of any state of consciousness at all by
the brain is the production of a unified consciousness.
1e are tempted to think of our conscious field as made up of the various
components 0 visual, tactile, auditory, the stream of thought, etc. ,he approach
#hereby #e think of big things as being made up of little things has proved so
spectacularly successful in the rest of science that it is almost irresistible to us.
$tomic theory, the cellular theory in biology, and the germ theory of disease are all
e.amples. ,he urge to think of consciousness as like#ise made of smaller building
blocks is over#helming. But % think it may be #rong for consciousness. Aaybe #e
should think of consciousness holistically, and perhaps for consciousness #e can
make sense of the claim that 5the #hole is greater than the sum of the parts.5
%ndeed, maybe it is #rong to think of consciousness as made up parts at all. % #ant
to suggest that if #e think of consciousness holistically, then the aspects % have
mentioned so far, especially our original combination of sub-ectivity, /ualitativeness,
and unity all into one feature, #ill seem less mysterious. %nstead of thinking of my
current state of consciousness as made up of the various bits, the perception of the
computer screen, the sound of the brook outside, the shado#s cast by the evening
sun falling on the #all00#e should think of all of these as modifications, forms that
the underlying basal conscious field takes after my peripheral nerve endings have
been assaulted by the various e.ternal stimuli. ,he research implication of this is
that #e should look for consciousness as a feature of the brain emerging from the
activities of large masses of neurons, and #hich cannot be e.plained by the
activities of individual neurons. % am, in sum, urging that #e take the unified field
approach seriously as an alternative to the more common building block approach.
%ARIA"I,<S ,< "1& +<I'I&$ 'I&=$ "1&,R>
,he idea that one should investigate consciousness as a unified field is not ne# and
it goes back at at least as far as !ant+s doctrine of the transcendental unity of
apperception 9!ant, 1@8@:. %n neurobiology % have not found any contemporary
authors #ho state a clear distinction bet#een #hat % have been calling the building
block theory and the unified field theory but at least t#o lines of contemporary
research are consistent #ith the approach urged here, the #ork of ?linas and his
colleagues 9?linas, 199(, ?linas et al, 1998: and that of ,ononi, 8delman and
*porns 9,ononi H 8delman, 1998, ,ononi, 8delman H *porns 1998, ,ononi, *porns
H 8delman, 199':. On the vie# of ?linas and his colleagues 91998: #e should not
think of consciousness as produced by sensory inputs but rather as a functional
state of large portions of the brain, primarily the thalamocortical system, and #e
should think of sensory inputs serving to modulate a pree.isting consciousness
rather than creating consciousness ane#. On their vie# consciousness is an
5intrinsic5 state of the brain, not a response to sensory stimulus inputs. <reams are
of special interest to them, because in a dream the brain is conscious but unable to
perceive the e.ternal #orld through sensory inputs. ,hey believe the CCC is
synchroni"ed oscillatory activity in the thalamocartical system 919984 18;6:.
,ononi and 8delman have advanced #hat they call the dynamic core hypothesis
91998:. ,hey are struck by the fact that consciousness has t#o remarkable
properties, the unity mentioned earlier and the e.treme differentiation or
comple.ity #ithin any conscious field. ,his suggests to them that #e should not
look for consciousness in a specific sort of neuronal type, but rather in the activities
of large neuronal populations. ,hey seek the CCC for the unity of consciousness in
the rapid integration that is achieved through the reentry mechanisms of the
thalamocortical system. ,he idea they have is that in order to account for the
combination of integration and differentiation in any conscious field, they have to
identify large clusters of neurons that function together, that fire in a synchroni"ed
fashion. 3urthermore this cluster, #hich they call a functional cluster, should also
sho# a great deal of differentiation #ithin its component elements in order to
account for the different elements of consciousness. ,hey think that synchronous
firing among cortical regions bet#een the corte. and the thalamus is an indirect
indicator of this functional clustering. ,hen once such a functional cluster has been
identified, they #ish to investigate #hether or not it contains different activity
patterns of neuronal states #ithin it. ,he combination of functional clustering
together #ith differentiation they submit as the dynamic core hypothesis of
consciousness. ,hey believe a unified neural process of high comple.ity constitutes
a dynamic core. ,hey also believe the dynamic core is not spread over the brain but
is primarily in the thalamocortical regions, especially those involved in perceptual
categori"ation and containing reentry mechanisms of the sort that 8delman
discussed in his earlier books 91989, 199':. %n a ne# study, they and their
colleagues 9*rinivasan et al 1999: claim to find direct evidence of the role of
reentry mapping in the CCC. ?ike the adherents of the building block theory, they
seek such CCCs of consciousness as one can find in the studies of binocular rivalry.
$s % understand this vie#, it seems to combine features of both the building block
and the unified field approach.
9 Conclusion
%n my vie# the most important problem in the biological sciences today is the
problem of consciousness. % believe #e are no# at a point #here #e can address
this problem as a biological problem like any other. 3or decades research has been
impeded by t#o mistaken vie#s4 first, that consciousness is -ust a special sort of
computer program, a special soft#are in the hard#are of the brain7 and second that
consciousness #as -ust a matter of information processing. ,he right sort of
information processing00or on some vie#s any sort of information processing000
#ould be sufficient to guarantee consciousness. % have critici"ed these vie#s at
length else#here 9*earle 198(, 199', 199@: and do not repeat these criticisms
here. But it is important to remind ourselves ho# profoundly anti0biological these
vie#s are. On these vie#s brains do not really matter. 1e -ust happen to be
implemented in brains, but any hard#are that could carry the program or process
the information #ould do -ust as #ell. % believe, on the contrary, that understanding
the nature of consciousness crucially re/uires understanding ho# brain processes
cause and reali"e consciousness.. erhaps #hen #e understand ho# brains do that,
#e can build conscious artifacts using some nonbiological materials that duplicate,
and not merely simulate, the causal po#ers that brains have. But first #e need to
understand ho# brains do it.
1

1
% am indebted to many people for discussion of these issues. Cone of them is
responsible for any of my mistakes. % especially #ish to thank *amuel Barondes,
<ale Berger, 3rancis Crick, =erald 8delman, *usan =reenfield, )ennifer >udin, )ohn
!ihlstrom, )essica *amuels, <agmar *earle, 1olf *inger, Barry *mith, and =unther
*tent