Category: LATEST SUPREME COURT CASES

WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION?

TO PROTECT THE INNOCENT FROM THE
EMBARRASSMENT, EXPENSE AND ANXIETY OF A
PUBLIC TRIAL.

PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IS ONLY STATUTORY NOT
CONSTITUTIONAL. THUS, IS IT NOT A PROCEDURAL RIGHT
ONLY?
IT IS A SUBSTANTIAL RIGHT AND A COMPONENT OF
DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE.

A preliminary investigation is not a casual affair. It is
conducted to protect the innocent from the embarrassment,
expense and anxiety of a public trial. While the right to have a
preliminary investigation before trial is statutory rather than
constitutional, it is a substantive right and a component of due
process in the administration of criminal justice.

WHAT IS THE RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS IN PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION?
IT MEANS TO ACCORD AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE
PRESENTATION OF RESPONDENTS SIDE WITH
REGARD TO THE ACCUSATION.

In the context of a preliminary investigation, the right to due
process of law entails the opportunity to be heard. It serves to
accord an opportunity for the presentation of the
respondents side with regard to the accusation. Afterwards,
the investigating officer shall decide whether the allegations
and defenses lead to a reasonable belief that a crime has been
committed, and that it was the respondent who committed it.
Otherwise, the investigating officer is bound to dismiss the
complaint.

WHAT IS THE ESSENCE OF DUE PROCESS?
IT IS REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD
AND SUBMIT EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF ONES
DEFENSE.

WHAT IS PROSCRIBED IN DUE PROCESS?
THE LACK OF OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD.

The essence of due process is reasonable opportunity to be
heard and submit evidence in support of ones defense.88
What is proscribed is lack of opportunity to be heard.89 Thus,
one who has been afforded a chance to present ones own
side of the story cannot claim denial of due process.90

CERTAIN RESPONDENTS CLAIMED THEY WERE DENIED DUE
PROCESS BECAUSE THEY WERE NOT FURNISHED
DOCUMENTS. IS THEIR CONTENTION CORRECT?
NO, BECAUSE THEY COULD NO LONGER BE FOUND
IN THEIR LAST KNOWN ADDRESSES.

WHAT IS THE RULE UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES?
AS LONG AS EFFORTS TO REACH A RESPONDENT
WERE MADE, AND HE WAS GIVEN AN
OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT COUNTERVAILING
EVIDENCE, THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
REMAINS VALID. THE RULE WAS PUT IN PLACE IN
ORDER TO FOIL UNDERHANDED ATTEMPTS OF A
RESPONDENT TO DELAY THE PROSECUTION OF
OFFENSES.

Section 3(d), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, allows Prosecutor
Vivero to resolve the complaint based on the evidence before
him if a respondent could not be subpoenaed. As long as
efforts to reach a respondent were made, and he was given an
opportunity to present countervailing evidence, the
preliminary investigation remains valid.100 The rule was put in
place in order to foil underhanded attempts of a respondent
to delay the prosecution of offenses.

OCAMPO CONTENDS THAT HE WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS
BECAUSE HE WAS NOT FURNISHED COPY OF THE
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT. IS HIS CONTENTION CORRECT?
NO. HIS INDICTMENT WAS BASED NOT ON THE
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT ALONE BUT ON THE
COLLECTIVE AFFIDAVITS OF SEVERAL OTHER
WITNESSES.

The OSG has asserted that the indictment of petitioner
Ocampo was based on the collective affidavits of several other
witnesses attesting to the allegation that he was a member of
the CPP/NPA/NDFP Central Committee, which had ordered
the launch of Operation VD.

OCAMPO ALLEGED THAT JUDGE ABANDO DID NOT COMPLY
WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT OF ARTICLE III,
SECTION 2 OF THE CONSTITUTION WHICH PROVIDES THAT
NO SEARCH WARRANT OR WARRANT OF ARREST SHALL
ISSUE EXCEPT UPON PROBABLE CAUSE TO BE DETERMINED
PERSONALLY BY THE JUDGE AFTER EXAMINATION UNDER
OATH OR AFFIRMATION OF THE COMPLAINANT AND THE
WITNESSES HE MAY PRODUCE.
THE JUDGE DID NOT CONDUCT ANY EXAMINATION OF
COMPLAINANT AND WITNESSES. IS HIS CONTENTION
CORRECT?
No. Sc has ruled that a hearing is not necessary
for the determination thereof. In fact, the judges
personal examination of the complainant and the
witnesses is not mandatory and indispensable for
determining the aptness of issuing a warrant of
arrest.

It is enough that the judge personally evaluates
the prosecutors report and supporting
documents showing the existence of probable
cause for the indictment and, on the basis thereof,
issue a warrant of arrest; or if, on the basis of his
evaluation, he finds no probable cause, to
disregard the prosecutors resolution and require
the submission of additional affidavits of witnesses
to aid him in determining its existence.

Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution provides
that no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce.

Petitioner Ocampo alleges that Judge Abando did not comply
with the requirements of the Constitution in finding the
existence of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of
arrest against petitioners.

PROBABLE CAUSE for the issuance of a warrant of arrest has
been defined as such facts and circumstances which would
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that
an offense has been committed by the person sought to be
arrested.

The judges personal examination of the complainant and the
witnesses is not mandatory and indispensable for determining
the aptness of issuing a warrant of arrest.

It is enough that the judge personally evaluates the
prosecutors report and supporting documents showing the
existence of probable cause for the indictment and, on the
basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or if, on the basis of
his evaluation, he finds no probable cause, to disregard the
prosecutors resolution and require the submission of
additional affidavits of witnesses to aid him in determining its
existence.

ECHANIS AND BAYLOSIS CLAIM THAT IF JUDGE ABANDO
HAVE PAINSTAKINGLY EXAMINED THE RECORDS THE JUDGE
WOULD HAVE DISMISSED THE INDICTMENT. BY NOT
DISMISSING THE INDICTMENT HE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION? ARE THEIR CONTENTION CORRECT?

NO.
THE DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE
ISSUANCE OF WARRANTS OF ARREST AGAINST PETITIONERS IS
ADDRESSED TO THE SOUND DISCRETION OF JUDGE ABANDO.

JUDGES ARE GIVEN WIDE LATITUDE IN ISSUANCE OF
WARRANTS OF ARREST.

THE TRIAL COURTS EXERCISE OF ITS JUDICIAL DISCRETION
SHOULD NOT, AS A GENERAL RULE, BE INTERFERED WITH IN
THE ABSENCE OF GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. INDEED,
CERTIORARI WILL NOT LIE TO CURE ERRORS IN THE TRIAL
COURTS APPRECIATION OF THE EVIDENCE OF THE PARTIES,
THE CONCLUSION OF FACTS IT REACHED BASED ON THE SAID
FINDINGS, AS WELL AS THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.

WHAT IS THE POLITICAL OFFENSE DOCTRINE?
UNDER THE POLITICAL OFFENSE DOCTRINE,
COMMON CRIMES, PERPETRATED IN
FURTHERANCE OF A POLITICAL OFFENSE, ARE
DIVESTED OF THEIR CHARACTER AS COMMON
OFFENSES AND ASSUME THE POLITICAL
COMPLEXION OF THE MAIN CRIME.

The political offense doctrine is not a ground to dismiss the
charge against petitioners prior to a determination by the trial
court that the murders were committed in furtherance of
rebellion.

Under the political offense doctrine, common crimes,
perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense, are divested
of their character as common offenses and assume the
political complexion of the main crime of which they are mere
ingredients, and, consequently, cannot be punished separately
from the principal offense, or complexed with the same, to
justify the imposition of a graver penalty.

Any ordinary act assumes a different nature by being
absorbed in the crime of rebellion. Thus, when a killing is
committed in furtherance of rebellion, the killing is not
homicide or murder. Rather, the killing assumes the political
complexion of rebellion as its mere ingredient and must be
prosecuted and punished as rebellion alone.

WHO HAS THE BURDEN TO PROVE POLITICAL MOTIVATION?

THE BURDEN MUST BE DISCHARGED BY THE DEFENSE SINCE
MOTIVE IS A STATE OF MIND WHICH ONLY THE ACCUSED
KNOWS.

STEPHEN, A WITNESS, WAS IN COURT WHEN WITNESS
KENNETH WAS TESTIFYING. RTC DID NOT ALLOW STEPHEN
TO TESTIFY BECAUSE HE ALREADY HEARD THE TESTIMONY
OF KENNETH. WAS RTC CORRECT?

NO, BECAUSE THERE WAS NO ORDER FOR EXCLUSION OF
OTHER WITNESSES DURING THE PRESENTATION OF
KENNETHS TESTIMONY.

There is nothing in the records of this case that would show
that there was an order of exclusion from the RTC, or that
there was any motion from respondents counsel to exclude
other witnesses from the courtroom prior to or even during
the presentation of the testimony of Kenneth. We are one
with the CA in finding that under such circumstances, there
was nothing to prevent Stephen from hearing the testimony
of Kenneth. Therefore, the RTC should have allowed Stephen
to testify for petitioners.

WHAT IS THE BASIS IN THE RULES FOR EXCLUSION OF
WITNESSES?


SECTION 15, RULE 132 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT
WHICH PROVIDES:

SEC. 15.Exclusion and separation of witnesses. On any trial
or hearing, the judge may exclude from the court any witness
not at the time under examination, so that he may not hear
the testimony of other witnesses.
The judge may also cause witnesses to be kept
separate and to be prevented from conversing with one
another until all shall have been examined.

WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF EXCLUDING WITNESSES FROM
THE COURTROOM?

TO ENSURE THAT THE WITNESSES TESTIFY TO THE TRUTH BY
PREVENTING THEM FROM BEING INFLUENCED BY THE
TESTIMONIES OF THE OTHERS.

Excluding future witnesses from the courtroom at the time
another witness is testifying, or ordering that these witnesses
be kept separate from one another, is primarily to prevent
them from conversing with one another. The purpose is to
ensure that the witnesses testify to the truth by preventing
them from being influenced by the testimonies of the others.
In other words, this measure is meant to prevent connivance
or collusion among witnesses. The efficacy of excluding or
separating witnesses has long been recognized as a means of
discouraging fabrication, inaccuracy, and collusion. However,
without any motion from the opposing party or order from
the court, there is nothing in the rules that prohibits a witness
from hearing the testimonies of other witnesses.

SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES:

WHAT ARE THE RULES ON PRESCRIPTIVE PERIODS FOR
CLAIMING REFUND OR CREDIT OF INPUT VAT?

THESE RULES ARE:

A. TWO-YEAR PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD

1. 1. IT IS ONLY THE ADMINISTRATIVE CLAIM THAT MUST BE
FILED WITHIN THE TWO-YEAR PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD. (AICHI)

2. THE PROPER RECKONING DATE FOR THE TWO-YEAR
PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD IS THE CLOSE OF THE TAXABLE
QUARTER WHEN THE RELEVANT SALES WERE MADE. (SAN
ROQUE)

1. 3. THE ONLY OTHER RULE IS THE ATLAS RULING, WHICH
APPLIED ONLY FROM 8 JUNE 2007 TO 12 SEPTEMBER 2008.
ATLAS STATES THAT THE TWO- YEAR PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD
FOR FILING A CLAIM FOR TAX REFUND OR CREDIT OF
UNUTILIZED INPUT VAT PAYMENTS SHOULD BE COUNTED
FROM THE DATE OF FILING OF THE VAT RETURN AND
PAYMENT OF THE TAX. (SAN ROQUE)

B. 120+30 DAY PERIOD

1. 1. THE TAXPAYER CAN FILE AN APPEAL IN ONE OF TWO
WAYS:

(1) FILE THE JUDICIAL CLAIM WITHIN THIRTY DAYS AFTER THE
COMMISSIONER DENIES THE CLAIM WITHIN THE 120-DAY
PERIOD, OR

(2) FILE THE JUDICIAL CLAIM WITHIN THIRTY DAYS FROM THE
EXPIRATION OF THE 120-DAY PERIOD IF THE COMMISSIONER
DOES NOT ACT WITHIN THE 120-DAY PERIOD.

1. 2. THE 30-DAY PERIOD ALWAYS APPLIES, WHETHER THERE
IS A DENIAL OR INACTION ON THE PART OF THE CIR.

1. 4. AS A GENERAL RULE, THE 3 0-DAY PERIOD TO APPEAL IS
BOTH MANDATORY AND JURISDICTIONAL. (AICHI AND SAN
ROQUE).

1. 5. AS AN EXCEPTION TO THE GENERAL RULE, PREMATURE
FILING IS ALLOWED ONLY IF FILED BETWEEN 10 DECEMBER
2003 AND 5 OCTOBER 2010, WHEN BIR RULING NO. DA-489-
03 WAS STILL IN FORCE. (SAN ROQUE).

1. 6. LATE FILING IS ABSOLUTELY PROHIBITED, EVEN
DURING THE TIME WHEN BIR RULING NO. DA-489-03 WAS IN
FORCE

IS THE OMBUDSMAN EMPOWERED TO FILE AN APPEAL OR
CERTIORARI FROM THE SANDIGANBAYAN TO THE SUPREME
COURT?

YES.
THE GENERAL RULE IS THAT ONLY THE SOLICITOR GENERAL
COULD FILE PETITIONS IN THE SUPREME COURT PURSUANT
TO THE ADMINSTRATIVE CODE.

BUT THERE ARE EXCEPTIONS: CASES ELEVATED TO THE
SANDIGANBAYAN AND FROM THE SANDIGANBAYAN TO THE
SUPREME COURT.

The contention of the respondents is grossly erroneous. That
only the Solicitor General may represent the People on appeal
or certiorari in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in
all criminal proceedings is the general rule, but the rule admits
the exception concerning all cases elevated to the
Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme
Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its special
prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Philippines,
except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14
and 14-A, issued in 1986.




Consequently, the filing of the petitions in these cases by the
Office of the Ombudsman, through the OSP, was authorized
by law.



WAS THERE GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN THE
SANDIGANBAYAN DISMISSED THE CASE FOR FINDING THAT
THERE HAD BEEN AN INORDINATE DELAY IN THE
RESOLUTION AGAINST RESPONDENTS?

THERE WAS NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. THE RIGHT TO
THE SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES IS ENSHRINED IN ARTICLE
III OF THE CONSTITUTION, WHICH DECLARES: SECTION 16.

ALL PERSONS SHALL HAVE THE RIGHT TO A SPEEDY
DISPOSITION OF THEIR CASES BEFORE ALL JUDICIAL,
QUASI-JUDICIAL, OR ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES.

WHAT IS A CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI?

IT IS AN INDEPENDENT ACTION BASED ON SPECIFIC
GROUNDS IN SECTION 1, RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT?

WHEN CAN SUCH ACTION PROSPER?

ONLY WHEN THE JURISDICTIONAL ERROR, OR THE GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION COMMITTED BY THE INFERIOR COURT OR
JUDGE IS ALLEGED AND PROVED TO EXIST

A special civil action for certiorari is an independent action
based on the specific grounds provided in Section 1, Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, and can prosper only the jurisdictional
error, or the grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction committed by the inferior court or judge
is alleged and proved to exist.

WHAT IS THE NATURE AND REACH OF THE REMEDY OF
CERTIORARI?

THE WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS A REMEDY NARROW IN
SCOPE AND INFLEXIBLE IN CHARACTER,
PURPOSE IS:
a. To keep an inferior court within the bounds of
its jurisdiction, or:

b. To prevent an inferior court from committing
such grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction, or:

c. To relieve parties from arbitrary acts of courts
(i.e., acts that courts have no power or
authority in law to perform).

IT IS NOT A GENERAL UTILITY TOOL IN THE LEGAL
WORKSHOP, AND CANNOT BE ISSUED TO CORRECT
EVERY ERROR COMMITTED BY A LOWER COURT.

In De las Santos v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, the
Court has expounded on the nature and reach of the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari, to wit:
SECTION 1. PETITION FOR CERTIORARI. WHEN ANY
TRIBUNAL, BOARD OR OFFICER EXERCISING JUDICIAL OR
QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS HAS ACTED WITHOUT OR IN
EXCESS OF ITS OR HIS JURISDICTION, OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION, AND THERE IS NO APPEAL, OR ANY PLAIN,
SPEEDY, AND ADEQUATE REMEDY IN THE ORDINARY COURSE
OF LAW, A PERSON AGGRIEVED THEREBY MAY FILE A VERIFIED
PETITION IN THE PROPER COURT, ALLEGING THE FACTS WITH
CERTAINTY AND PRAYING THAT JUDGMENT BE RENDERED
ANNULLING OR MODIFYING THE PROCEEDINGS OF SUCH
TRIBUNAL, BOARD OR OFFICER, AND GRANTING SUCH
INCIDENTAL RELIEFS AS LAW AND JUSTICE MAY REQUIRE.

THE PETITION SHALL BE ACCOMPANIED BY:
a. A certified true copy of the judgment,

b. Order or resolution subject thereof,

c. Copies of all pleadings and documents relevant
and pertinent thereto, and

d. a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as
provided in the third paragraph of section 3,
rule 46. (1 a)





PURSUANT TO SECTION 1, RULE 46, WHAT ARE THE TWO
REQUISITES FOR THE ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF CERTIORARI?

1. First, the petitioner must show that, the
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

2. Second the petitioner must show that there is
neither an appeal nor any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for
the purpose of amending or nullifying the
proceeding.



WHAT IS THE SOLE OFFICE OF THE WRIT OF CERTIORARI?

IT IS THE CORRECTION OF ERRORS OF JURISDICTION WHICH
INCLUDES THE COMMISSION OF GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION.

IS MERE ABUSE OF DISCRETION SUFFICIENT?

IT IS NOT ENOUGH. IT MUST BE GRAVE.

WHAT IS MEANT BY GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION?
IT MEANS EITHER THAT THE JUDICIAL OR QUASI-
JUDICIAL POWER WAS EXERCISED IN AN ARBITRARY OR
DESPOTIC MANNER BY REASON OF PASSION OR PERSONAL
HOSTILITY, OR THAT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE, TRIBUNAL OR
BOARD EVADED A POSITIVE DUTY, OR VIRTUALLY REFUSED TO
PERFORM THE DUTY ENJOINED OR TO ACT IN
CONTEMPLATION OF LAW, SUCH AS WHEN SUCH JUDGE,
TRIBUNAL OR BOARD EXERCISING JUDICIAL OR QUASI-
JUDICIAL POWERS ACTED IN A CAPRICIOUS OR WHIMSICAL
MANNER AS TO BE EQUIVALENT TO LACK OF JURISDICTION.

The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of
errors of jurisdiction, which includes the commission of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. In this
regard, mere abuse of discretion is not enough to warrant the
issuance of the writ.

The abuse of discretion must be grave, which means either
that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an:
a. arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, or that

b. the respondent judge, tribunal or board
evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to
perform the duty enjoined or to act in
contemplation of law,

c. such as when such judge, tribunal or board
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers
acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as
to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
(citations omitted)



THE SANDIGANBAYAN DISMISSED THE SUBJECT CASE OF
BRIBERY BECAUSE THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE AN
IMPORTANT ELEMENT: THAT A TRANSACTION OR CONTRACT
WAS INVOLVED AND THAT THE ACCUSED IN HIS OFFICIAL
CAPACITY HAS TO INTERVENE.

DID THE SANDIGANBAYAN COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION?

No. It followed a precedent ruling where the restrictive
meaning of the term transaction was applied. The three
cases cited by petitioner ombudsman were not relevant as
the definition of transaction was not an issue in said cases.

Further, laws creating, defining or punishing crimes and laws
imposing penalties and forfeitures are to be construed
strictly against the state or against the party seeking to
enforce them, and liberally against the party sought to be
charged.

DID THE PETITIONER SHOW GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
THAT WOULD WARRANT THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF
CERTIORARI PRAYED FOR?

THE SANDIGANBAYAN CORRECTLY APPLIED THE RESTRICTIVE
MEANING OF THE TERM TRANSACTION AS USED IN SECTION 3
(B) OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019 ADOPTED IN SORIANO, JR. V.
SANDIGANBAYAN.

In its questioned resolution dismissing Criminal Case No. SB-
08- CRM-0265, the Sandiganbayan relied on the ruling in
Soriano, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,81 in which the principal issue
was whether or not the preliminary investigation of a criminal
complaint conducted by petitioner Soriano, Jr., then a Fiscal,
was a contract or transaction as to bring the complaint
within the ambit of Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 3019,
which punished any public officer for * d+irectly or indirectly
requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or
benefit, for himself or for any other person, in connection with
any contract or transaction between the Government and any
other party, wherein the public officer in his official capacity
has to intervene under the law. The Soriano, Jr. Court ruled in
the negative, and pronounced:

It is obvious that the investigation conducted by the petitioner
was not a contract. Neither was it a transaction because this
term must be construed as analogous to the term which
precedes it. A transaction, like a contract, is one which
involves some consideration as in credit transactions and this
element (consideration) is absent in the investigation
conducted by the petitioner.



THE ALLEGED CRIME WAS COMMITTED SOMETIME IN
FEBRUARY 2001. CRIMINAL COMPLAINT WAS INITIATED IN
NOVEMBER 2002. IN NOVEMBER 2006 JOINT RESOLUTION
WAS ISSUED RECOMMENDING THE FILING OF
INFORMATION. IN APRIL 2008 SUCH RECOMMENDATION
WAS APPROVED.PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION TOOK FIVE
YEARS AND FIVE MONTHS.

WAS THERE GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN THE
SANDIGANBAYAN DISMISED THE CASE FOR BEING IN
VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT TO SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF
CASES?

NO.

It is clear from the foregoing that the office of the
ombudsman had taken an unusually long period of time just
to investigate the criminal complaint and to determine
whether to criminally charge the respondents in the
sandiganbayan.

Such long delay was inordinate and oppressive, and
constituted under the peculiar circumstances of the case an
outright violation of the respondents right under the
constitution to the speedy disposition of their cases.

THE OMBUDSMAN ARGUED THAT THE DELAY WAS
ATTRIBUTABLE TO A JUST CAUSE WHICH IS THE
RATIFICATION BY THE SENATE OF TREATIES WHICH ENABLED
THEM TO SECURE EVIDENCE. IS THEIR CONTENTION
CORRECT?

NO.

At no time should the progress and success of the
preliminary investigation of a criminal case be made
dependent upon the ratification of a treaty by the senate
that would provide to the prosecutorial arm of the state,
already powerful and overwhelming in terms of its
resources, an undue advantage unavailable at the time of
the investigation.

To allow the delay under those terms would definitely violate
fair play and nullify due process of law fair play, because
the field of contest between the accuser and the accused
should at all times be level; and due process of law, because
no less that our constitution guarantees the speedy
disposition of the case.


OMBUDSMAN ARGUES THAT THE FACT-FINDING
INVESTIGATION SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AS PART OF
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION. IS THEIR ARGUMENT
CORRECT?

No. The guarantee of speedy disposition under section 16 of
article iii of the constitution applies to all cases pending
before all judicial, quasi- judicial or administrative bodies.





SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:
Who has primary and exclusive jurisdiction over cases
involving the valuation of land, preliminary determination and
payment of just compensation, fixing and collection of lease
rentals, disturbance compensation, amortization payments,
and similar disputes concerning the functions of the lbp?
It is the DARAB

TO WHOM IS THE DARAB DECISION APPEALABLE?
IT IS APPEALABLE TO REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS DESIGNATED
AS SPECIAL AGRARIAN COURTS (SAC) WITHIN FIFTEEN (15)
DAYS FROM RECEIPT OF THE NOTICE THEREOF.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

IT SEEMS THAT APPEAL TO THE SAC WAS MADE LATE (55
DAYS FROM DATE OF THE DARAB DECISION. THE DATE OF
RECEIPT OF DARAB DECISION WAS NOT STATED.)

WAS THE APPEAL TO SAC STILL VALID?
YES.

The determination of the amount of just compensation by
the DARAB is merely a preliminary administrative
determination which is subject to challenge before the SACS
which have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all
petitions for the determination of just compensation under
section 57, r.a. no. 6657.

SINCE SAC STATUTORILY EXERCISES ORIGINAL AND EXCUSIVE
JURISDICTION OVER ALL PETITIONERS FOR THE THE
DETERMINATION OF JUST COMPENSATION TO LANDOWNERS,
IT CANNOT BE SAID THAT THE DECISION OF THE
ADJUDICATOR, IF NOT APPEALED TO THE SAC, WOULD BE
DEEMED FINAL AND EXECUTORY, UNDER ALL
CIRCUMSTANCES.

IN CERTAIN CASES, THE COURT HAS ADOPTED A POLICY OF
LIBERALLY ALLOWING PETITIONS FOR DETERMINATION OF
JUST COMPENSATION EVEN THOUGH THE PROCEDURE UNDER
DARAB RULES HAVE NOT BEEN STRICTLY FOLLOWED,
WHENEVER CIRCUMSTANCES SO WARRANT.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

THE LAND WAS ACQUIRED UNDER PD 27. WHEN RESPONDENT
FILED HIS PETITION WITH SAC, RA 6657 ALREADY TOOK
EFFECT (ON JUNE 15, 1988). WHICH WILL NOW BE APPLIED IN
DETERMINING JUST COMPENSATION? PD 27 OR RA 6657?
R.A. 6657
THE COURT HAS, IN SEVERAL CASES, FOR REASON OF EQUITY,
APPLIED R.A. NO. 6657 IN DETERMINING JUST
COMPENSATION FOR LANDS ACQUIRED UNDER P.D. NO. 27
AND BEFORE THE EFFECTIVITY OF R.A. NO. 6657.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

WHAT ARE THE FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED IN
DETERMINING JUST COMPENSATION TO THE LANDOWNER?
1. the cost of acquisition of the land;
2. the current value of like properties, its nature, actual
use and income,
3. the sworn valuation by the owner,
4. the tax declarations, and the assessment made by
government assessors shall be considered.

THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BENEFITS CONTRIBUTED BY THE
FARMERS AND THE FARMWORKERS AND BY THE
GOVERNMENT TO THE PROPERTY AS WELL AS THE NON-
PAYMENT OF TAXES OR LOANS SECURED FROM ANY
GOVERNMENT FINANCING INSTITUTION ON THE SAID LAND
SHALL BE CONSIDERED AS ADDITIONAL FACTORS TO
DETERMINE ITS VALUATION.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

WHERE THESE FACTORS CONSIDERED IN THIS INSTANT
CASE?
NO.
The sac based its determination of just compensation solely
on the opinion of the municipal assessor as to the current
market value of respondents land which was not supported
by any documentary evidence.


SUBJECT/S:
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION; NATURE OF NBI
INVESTIGATION; PROBABLE CAUSE; VALUE OF QUESTIONED
DOCUMENTS REPORT; REVIEW OF DOJ RULING.
DISPOSITIVE:

SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:
THE RESPONDENTS ARGUE THAT THEY WERE DENIED DUE
PROCESS BECAUSE THEY WERE NOT INFORMED BY THE DOJ
ABOUT THE PENDENCY OF PETITIONERS APPEAL. IS THEIR
CONTENTION CORRECT?
NO. By filing a motion for reconsideration,
respondents availed of their right to give their side. Any
previous defect is cured.


WHAT IS THE ESSENCE OF DUE PROCESS?
Simply the opportunity to be heard.
IS ABSENCE OF DUE NOTICE PROHIBITED?
NO. It is the lack of opportunity to be heard that is
prohibited.

WHEN IS THERE SUFFICIENT COMPLIANCE OF DUE PROCESS?
When a party is given a chance to be heard. For
example: through their motion for reconsideration.

The essence of due process is simply the opportunity
to be heard. What the law prohibits is not the absence of
previous notice but its absolute absence and lack of
opportunity to be heard. Sufficient compliance with the
requirements of due process exists when a party is given a
chance to be heard through his motion for reconsideration.
In the present case, we do not find it disputed that the
respondents filed with the Secretary of Justice a motion for
reconsideration of her resolution. Therefore, any initial defect
in due process, if any, was cured by the remedy the
respondents availed of.

RESPONDENTS ARGUE THAT THEY WERE DENIED DUE
PROCESS DURING THE NBI INVESTIGATION BECAUSE THEIR
SIDE WAS NOT TAKEN. IS THEIR ARGUMENT CORRECT?
NO. The NBI findings are merely recommendatory.
NBI is not a judicial or quasi judicial body. Their findings could
not prejudice the respondents. The same are submitted to the
prosecutor. And it is the prosecutor who rules on whether
respondents be charged in court.

On the respondents allegation that they were denied due
process during the NBI investigation, we stress that the
functions of this agency are merely investigatory and
informational in nature. It has no judicial or quasi-judicial
powers and is incapable of granting any relief to any party.

What is the nature of a QUESTIONED DOCUMENTS
REPORT?
It is inconclusive. It does not prevent respondents from
securing also their own separate documents
examination.

What then is the significance of a questioned documents
report?
Its significance is that, taken together with the other pieces of
evidence submitted by the parties during the preliminary
investigation, these evidence could be sufficient for purposes
of finding probable cause

TO ARRIVE AT A FINDING OF PROBABLE CAUSE WHAT
SHOULD BE DONE?
Ascertain that the elements of the crime charged are
present.

HOW ABOUT THE FACTS? WHAT FACTS ARE NEEDED?
Only facts sufficient to support a prima facie case.

Not absolute certainty. Only probability of guilt. More than
mere suspicion but less than evidence that would justify
conviction.

DID DOJ COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
RULING THAT THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE CONTRARY TO
THE FINDING OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR?
NO. Because the DOJ determined whether the elements of the
crime of falsification are present.

THE CITY PROSECUTOR RULED THAT THE NBI REPORT IS NOT
CORRECT BECAUSE EVEN BY THE USE OF ONES NAKED EYE
THE QUESTIONED SIGNATURES ARE SIMILAR TO THE
GENUINE SIGNATURES. WAS THE PROSECUTOR CORRECT?
NO. Such conclusion can only be made by the court in a full
blown trial. Not by the public prosecutor.

The validity and merits of a partys defense and accusation, as
well as admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better
ventilated during trial proper than at the preliminary
investigation level.

THE CA REVERSED THE RULING OF THE DOJ. WAS CA
CORRECT?
NO. Because the findings of the secretary of justice are not
subject to interference by the courts.

THE EXCEPTION IS:
1. When he acts with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction;
2. when he grossly misapprehends facts;
3. when he acts in a manner so patent and gross as to amount to
an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined by law; or
4. when he acts outside the contemplation of law.

IN THIS CASE THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE DID NOT GRAVELY
ABUSE THE EXERCISE OF HER DISCRETION IN REVERSING THE
FINDINGS OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR.

SUBJECT/S: NEPOTISM

WHAT IS NEPOTISM?
Nepotism is defined in section 59 of the administrative code
as an appointment issued in favor of a relative within the
third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of any of the
following:
(1) appointing authority;
(2) recommending authority;
(3) chief of the bureau or office; and
(4) person exercising immediate supervision over
the appointee.

ARE THERE EXCEPTIONS?
Yes, as follows:
a. persons employed in a confidential capacity;
b. teachers;
c. physicians; and
d. members of the armed forces of the
philippines.

CORTEZ WAS APPOINTED AT CHR AS INFORMATION OFFICER.
IS HER APPOINTMENT COVERED BY THE PROHIBITION ON
NEPOTISM?
YES. She is the daughter of CHR commissioner mallari. And she
is not covered by the exceptions.

RESPONDENT CORTES ARGUES THAT THE APPOINTING
AUTHORITY REFERRED TO IN SECTION 59 OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE CODE IS THE COMMISSION EN BANC AND
NOT THE INDIVIDUAL COMMISSIONERS WHO COMPOSE IT.
IS HER ARGUMENT CORRECT?

NO. To rule that the prohibition applies only to the
commission, and not to the individual members who compose
it, will render the prohibition meaningless. Apparently, the
commission en banc, which is a body created by fiction of law,
can never have relatives to speak of.

Further, if acts that cannot be legally done directly can be
done indirectly, then all laws would be illusory.

BUT COMMISSIONER MALLARI ABSTAINED FROM VOTING ON
HER APPOINTMENT. DID HIS ABSENTION NOT CURE THE
NEPOTISTIC CHARACTER OF THE APPOINTMENT?
NO because the evil sought to be avoided by the
prohibition still exists. His mere presence during the
deliberation for the appointment of her daughter
created an impression of influence and cast doubt on the
impartiality and neutrality of the commission en banc.

SUBJECT/S:
ILLEGAL DISMISSAL; NON-FORUM SHOPPING; QUITCLAIMS;
COMPANY POLICIES; (BRIEF TITLE: MIRANT ET AL. VS. CARO)

SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

RESPONDENT FAILED TO SUBSCRIBED THE VERIFICATION AND
CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING (ATTACHED TO
HIS PETITION TO C.A. BEFORE A NOTARY PUBLIC. C.A. DID NOT
DISMISS THE CASE. WAS C.A. CORRECT?

CA WAS CORRECT. In the field of labor protection, a liberal
stance towards the construction of the rules of procedure in
order to serve the ends of substantial justice.

This jurisdiction has adopted in the field of labor protection a
liberal stance towards the construction of the rules of
procedure in order to serve the ends of substantial justice.

This liberal construction in labor law emanates from the
mandate that the workingmans welfare should be the
primordial and paramount consideration.

Thus, if the rules of procedure will stunt courts from fulfilling
this mandate, the rules of procedure shall be relaxed if the
circumstances of a case warrant the exercise of such liberality.

If we sustain the argument of petitioners in the case at bar
that the petition for certiorari should have been dismissed
outright by the CA, the NLRC decision would have reached
finality and respondent would have lost his remedy and
denied his right to be protected against illegal dismissal under
the Labor Code, as amended.

PETITIONER COMPANYS POLICY STATES THAT IF AN
EMPLOYEE FAILED TO TAKE THE RANDOM DRUG TEST AS
SCHEDULED, SUCH FAILURE METES THE PENALTY OF
TERMINATION. RESPONDENT FAILED TO TAKE THE RANDOM
DRUG TEST. HE WAS DISMISSED. IS HIS DISMISSAL LEGAL?

NO. THERE WAS ILLEGAL DISMISSAL IN THE CASE AT
BAR. While the adoption and enforcement by
petitioner corporation of its anti-drugs policy is
recognized as a valid exercise of its management
prerogative as an employer, such exercise is not
absolute and unbridled.

While the adoption and enforcement by petitioner
corporation of its Anti-Drugs Policy is recognized as a valid
exercise of its management prerogative as an employer, such
exercise is not absolute and unbridled. Managerial
prerogatives are subject to limitations provided by law,
collective bargaining agreements, and the general principles of
fair play and justice.46 In the exercise of its management
prerogative, an employer must therefore ensure that the
policies, rules and regulations on work-related activities of the
employees must always be fair and reasonable and the
corresponding penalties, when prescribed, commensurate to
the offense involved and to the degree of the infraction.47
The Anti-Drugs Policy of Mirant fell short of these
requirements.

WAS PETITIONER CORPORATIONS SUBJECT ANTI-DRUGS
POLICY FAIR AND REASONABLE?

NO BECAUSE OF THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

FIRST. The policy was not clear on what constitutes
unjustified refusal when the subject drug policy prescribed
that an employees unjustified refusal to submit to a
random drug test shall be punishable by the penalty of
termination for the first offense.

SECOND. The penalty of termination imposed by petitioner
corporation upon respondent fell short of being reasonable.
Company policies and regulations are generally valid and
binding between the employer and the employee unless
shown to be grossly oppressive or contrary to law as in the
case at bar.

RESPONDENT ALREADY EXECUTED QUITCLAIM. DOES THIS
MAKE HIS CASE MOOT?

NO. Quitclaims executed by laborers are ineffective to bar
claims for the full measure of their legal rights, especially in
this case where the evidence on record shows that the
amount stated in the quitclaim exactly corresponds to the
amount claimed as unpaid wages by respondent under
annex a of his reply filed with the labor arbiter.

INDIVIDUAL PETITIONER BAUTISTA WAS HELD PERSONALLY
LIABLE BY CA. WAS THE DECISION CORRECT?

NO. CA DID NOT DISCUSS THE BASIS OF THE PERSONAL
LIABILITY OF PETITIONER BAUTISTA. BOARD OF DIRECTORS
WHO MAY ONLY BE HELD PERSONALLY LIABLE FOR DAMAGES
IF IT IS PROVEN THAT THEY ACTED WITH MALICE OR BAD
FAITH

A corporation has a personality separate and distinct from its
officers and board of directors who may only be held
personally liable for damages if it is proven that they acted
with malice or bad faith in the dismissal of an employee. 57

Absent any evidence on record that petitioner Bautista acted
maliciously or in bad faith in effecting the termination of
respondent, plus the apparent lack of allegation in the
pleadings of respondent that petitioner Bautista acted in such
manner, the doctrine of corporate fiction dictates that only
petitioner corporation should be held liable for the illegal
dismissal of respondent.


SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:
This action being in personam, service of summons on Vivencio was necessary for
respondent Fifth Sharia District Court to acquire jurisdiction over Vivencios
person.

xxxxxxxxxx

However, as discussed, respondent Fifth Sharia District Court has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the action, with Vivencio not being a Muslim. Therefore,
all the proceedings before respondent Sharia District Court, including the service
of summons on Vivencio, are void.

xxxxxxxxxx

We note that Vivencio filed directly with this court his petition for certiorari of
respondent Fifth Sharia District Courts decision. Under the judicial system in
Republic Act No. 9054,97 the Sharia Appellate Court has exclusive original
jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari of decisions of the Sharia District Courts.
He should have filed his petition for certiorari before the Sharia Appellate Court.

xxxxxxxxx

However, the Sharia Appellate Court is yet to be organized. Thus, we call for the
organization of the court system created under Republic Act No. 9054 to effectively
enforce the Muslim legal system in our country. After all, the Muslim legal system
a legal system complete with its own civil, criminal, commercial, political,
international, and religious laws98 is part of the law of the land,99 and Sharia
courts are part of the Philippine judicial system.100

xxxxxxxxxx

Moreover, priority should be given in organizing the Office of the Jurisconsult in
Islamic law. A Jurisconsult in Islamic law or Mufti is an officer with authority to
render legal opinions or fatawa110 on any questions relating to Muslim law.111
These legal opinions should be based on recognized authorities112 and must be
rendered in precise accordance with precedent.113 In the Philippines where only
Muslim personal laws are codified, a legal officer learned in the Quran and Hadiths
is necessary to assist this court as well as Sharia court judges in resolving disputes
not involving Muslim personal laws.

xxxxxxxxxx

All told, Sharia District Courts have jurisdiction over a real action only when the
parties involved are Muslims. Respondent Fifth Sharia District Court acted without
jurisdiction in taking cognizance of Roldan E. Malas action for recovery of
possession considering that Vivencio B. Villagracia is not a Muslim. Accordingly, the
proceedings in SDC Special Proceedings Case No. 07-200, including the judgment
rendered, are void.



SUBJECT: DELEGATION OF QUASI JUDICIAL POWER;
ESTOPPEL.

FACTS:

ON 18 MARCH 1986, ATTY. RAMIREZ AND ATTY. ABELLA,
PCGG AGENTS, ISSUED A SEQUESTRATION ORDER AGAINST
THE RESTHOUSE

WHETHER OR NOT THE MARCH 18, 1986 SEQUESTRATION
ORDER AGAINST PROPERTIES OF IMELDA IN LEYTE INCLUDING
THE RESTHOUSE AT OLOT. THEIR ORDER WAS NOT SIGNED BY
ANY PCGG COMMISSIONERS.

ISSUE:

IS THEIR ORDER VALID?

RULING:

NO. JUDICIAL OR QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS MAY NOT BE
DELEGATED. IN PCGG V. JUDGE PEA,
[1][17]
the court held that
the powers, functions and duties of the PCGG amount to the
exercise of quasi-judicial functions, and the exercise of such
functions cannot be delegated by the commission to its
representatives or subordinates or task forces because of the
well established principle that judicial or quasi-judicial
powers may not be delegated.

PETITIONER REPUBLIC ARGUES THAT MRS. MARCOS SHOULD
BE DEEMED ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING THE
SEQUESTRATION OF HER LOT RESTHOUSE BY HER ACTIONS IN
REGARD TO THE SAME.

BUT A VOID ORDER PRODUCES NO EFFECT AND CANNOT
BE VALIDATED UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL.

FOR THE SAME REASON, THE COURT CANNOT ACCEPT
PETITIONERS VIEW THAT MRS. MARCOS SHOULD HAVE FIRST
SOUGHT THE LIFTING OF THE SEQUESTRATION ORDER
THROUGH A MOTION TO QUASH FILED WITH THE PCGG.
BEING VOID, THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS THE POWER TO
STRIKE IT DOWN ON SIGHT.

Here, it is clear that the PCGG did not make a prior
determination of the existence of a prima facie case that
would warrant the sequestration of the Olot Resthouse. The
Republic presented no evidence before the Sandiganbayan
that shows differently. Nor did the Republic demonstrate that
the two PCGG representatives were given the quasi-judicial
authority to receive and consider evidence that would warrant
such a prima facie finding.

Parenthetically, the Republics supposed evidence does not
show how the Marcoses acquired the sequestered property,
what makes it ill-gotten wealth, and how former President
Marcos intervened in its acquisition. Taking the foregoing
view, the resolution of the issue surrounding the character of
the property sequestered whether or not it could prima
facie be considered ill-gotten should be necessary.

It is indubitable that under no circumstances can a
sequestration or freeze order be validly issued by one
not a Commissioner of the PCGG.

Even assuming arguendo that Atty. Ramirez had been given
prior authority by the PCGG to place Dio Island Resort under
sequestration, nevertheless, the sequestration order he issued
is still void since PCGG may not delegate its authority to
sequester to its representatives and subordinates, and any
such delegation is invalid and ineffective.

Under Executive Order Nos. 1 and 2, PCGG is the sole entity
primarily charged with the responsibility of recovering ill-
gotten wealth. x x x

The power to sequester, therefore, carries with it the corollary
duty to make a preliminary determination of whether there is
a reasonable basis for sequestering a property alleged to be
ill-gotten. After a careful evaluation of the evidence adduced,
the PCGG clearly has to use its own judgment in determining
the existence of a prima facie case.


THIS CASE IS ABOUT LEGAL PRESUMPTION OF MARRIAGE.
BIRTH CERTIFICATE STATING THAT ONES PARENTS WERE
MARRIED ESTABLISHES THE PRESUMPTION THAT INDEED
THEY WERE MARRIED.


FACTS:

RODOLFO DIED. HIS BROTHER FILED AT RTC PETITION FOR
ISSUANCE OF LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION. ANONUEVO ET
AL INTERVENED. THEY SAID THEIR MOTHER SYLVIA WAS
DAUGHTER OF ISABEL AND JOHN. BUT AT THE TIME OF
RODOLFOS DEATH, THEIR GRANDMOTHER ISABEL WAS THE
LAWFUL WIFE OF RODOLFO BASED ON A MARRIAGE
CERTIFICATE. RODOLFOS BROTHER OPPOSED THEIR
INTERVENTION BECAUSE THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE OF SYLVIA
STATES THAT ISABEL AND JOHN WERE MARRIED. THEREFORE
ISABELS MARRIAGE TO RODOLFO WAS NULL AND VOID.

ANONUEVO ET AL HOWEVER ARGUED THAT THE ENTRIES IN
THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE OF SYLVIA COULD NOT BE USED AS
PROOF THAT ISABEL AND JOHN WERE INDEED MARRIED.
FURTHER, SUCH STATEMENT OF MARRIAGE IN THE BIRTH
CERTIFICATE IS JUST TO SAVE FACE AND IS CUSTOMARY.

ISSUE:

CAN ANONUEVO ET AL INTERVENE?

RULING:

NO. THEY HAVE NO PERSONAL STANDING TO INTERVENE. THE
BIRTH CERTIFICATE OF SYLVIA WHICH SHOWS THAT ISABEL
AND JOHN WERE MARRIED IS SUFFICIENT PROOF THAT
INDEED THEY WERE MARRIED.
THEREFORE ISABELS MARRIAGE TO RODOLFO IS VOID SINCE
AT THAT TIME ISABEL WAS STILL MARRIED TO JOHN. BEING
NOT MARRIED TO RODOLFO, ISABEL AND HER DESCENDANTS
HAVE NO SHARE IN THE ESTATE OF RODOLFO.

WHILE A MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE IS CONSIDERED THE
PRIMARY EVIDENCE OF A MARITAL UNION, IT IS NOT
REGARDED AS THE SOLE AND EXCLUSIVE EVIDENCE OF
MARRIAGE.
[1][47]


JURISPRUDENCE TEACHES THAT THE FACT OF MARRIAGE MAY
BE PROVEN BY RELEVANT EVIDENCE OTHER THAN THE
MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE.
[2][48]
HENCE, EVEN A PERSONS
BIRTH CERTIFICATE MAY BE RECOGNIZED AS COMPETENT
EVIDENCE OF THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN HIS PARENTS. THE
REASON FACE SAVING/ CUSTOMARY IS WITHOUT MERIT.
THE COURT CANNOT TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF A FOLKWAY.
The ruling of the Court:

While a marriage certificate is considered the primary
evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as the sole and
exclusive evidence of marriage.
[3][47]


Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be
proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage
certificate.
[4][48]


Hence, even a persons birth certificate may be recognized as
competent evidence of the marriage between his
parents.
[5][49]


In the present case, the birth certificate of Sylvia precisely
serves as the competent evidence of marriage between Isabel
and John Desantis. As mentioned earlier, it contains the
following notable entries: (a) that Isabel and John Desantis
were married and (b) that Sylvia is their legitimate
child.
[6][50]
In clear and categorical language, Sylvias birth
certificate speaks of a subsisting marriage between Isabel and
John Desantis.

Pursuant to existing laws,
[7][51]
the foregoing entries are
accorded prima facie weight. They are presumed to be true.



DOCTRINE:
WHEN A TRUTH COMMISSION IS CREATED TO INVESTIGATE
ANOMALIES OF A SPECIFIC ADMINISTRATION, IT IS
VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.

FACTS:

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 1 WAS ISSUED BY PRESIDENT NOYNOY
AQUINO TO INVESTIGATE REPORTED CASES OF GRAFT AND
CORRUPTION OF THE PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION.

ISSUE:

IS THIS LEGAL?

RULING:

NO. IT IS VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE. THE
ARROYO ADMINISTRATION IS BUT JUST A MEMBER OF A
CLASS, THAT IS, A CLASS OF PAST ADMINISTRATIONS. IT IS
NOT A CLASS OF ITS OWN. NOT TO INCLUDE PAST
ADMINISTRATIONS SIMILARLY SITUATED CONSTITUTES
ARBITRARINESS WHICH THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
CANNOT SANCTION.

The ruling of the Court:
Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1
should be struck down as violative of the equal protection
clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission
is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the
reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous
administration
[1][87]
only. The intent to single out the previous
administration is plain, patent and manifest. Mention of it has
been made in at least three portions of the questioned
executive order. Specifically, these are:

In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo
administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class
of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to
include past administrations similarly situated constitutes
arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot
sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly
reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for
vindictiveness and selective retribution.

Though the OSG enumerates several differences between the
Arroyo administration and other past administrations, these
distinctions are not substantial enough to merit the restriction
of the investigation to the previous administration only.

The reports of widespread corruption in the Arroyo
administration cannot be taken as basis for distinguishing said
administration from earlier administrations which were also
blemished by similar widespread reports of impropriety. They
are not inherent in, and do not inure solely to, the Arroyo
administration. As Justice Isagani Cruz put it, Superficial
differences do not make for a valid classification.
[2][88]


The probability that there would be difficulty in unearthing
evidence or that the earlier reports involving the earlier
administrations were already inquired into is beside the point.
Obviously, deceased presidents and cases which have already
prescribed can no longer be the subjects of inquiry by the PTC.
Neither is the PTC expected to conduct simultaneous
investigations of previous administrations, given the bodys
limited time and resources. The law does not require the
impossible (Lex non cogit ad impossibilia).
[5][91]


Executive Order No. 1 suffers from arbitrary classification. The
PTC, to be true to its mandate of searching for the truth, must
not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at
least, have the authority to investigate all past
administrations.

Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in
appearance, yet, if applied and administered by public
authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as
practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations
between persons in similar circumstances, material to their
rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition
of the constitution. [Emphasis supplied]

To exclude the earlier administrations in the guise of
substantial distinctions would only confirm the petitioners
lament that the subject executive order is only an adventure
in partisan hostility.

To reiterate, in order for a classification to meet the
requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace
all persons who naturally belong to the class.
[10][96]
Such a
classification must not be based on existing circumstances
only, or so constituted as to preclude additions to the number
included within a class, but must be of such a nature as to
embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar
circumstances and conditions. Furthermore, all who are in
situations and circumstances which are relative to the
discriminatory legislation and which are indistinguishable from
those of the members of the class must be brought under the
influence of the law and treated by it in the same way as are
the members of the class.
[11][97]


But then again, it is important to remember this ethical
principle: The end does not justify the means. No
matter how noble and worthy of admiration the purpose
of an act, but if the means to be employed in
accomplishing it is simply irreconcilable with
constitutional parameters, then it cannot still be
allowed.
[22][108]


The Court cannot just turn a blind eye and simply let it pass. It
will continue to uphold the Constitution and its enshrined
principles.

The Constitution must ever remain supreme. All must bow to
the mandate of this law. Expediency must not be allowed to
sap its strength nor greed for power debase its
rectitude.
[23][109]


DOCTRINE: ALL CASES INVOLVING QUESTIONS ABOUT
SUBDIVISIONS AND CONDOMINIUMS ARE WITHIN THE
JUDRISDICTION OF HLURB.

DIGEST:

FACTS:

ABC AND DEVELOPER XYZ COMPANY ENTERED INTO
CONTRACT TO SELL. ABC FAILED TO PAY FULL AMORTIZATION
PAYMENT. XYZ FILED CASE AT HLURB AGAINST ABC. XYZ WON
THE CASE. HLURB ORDERED CANCELLATION OF CONTRACT TO
SELL, FORFEITURE OF AMORTIZATION PAYMENT,
FORCLOSURE OF ABCS CONDO UNITS AND GARNISHMENT OF
HIS BANK DEPOSITS. ABC FILED A CIVIL CASE AT RTC FOR
ISSUANCE OF TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION.

ISSUE:

DOES RTC HAVE JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE TO RESTRAIN
ENFORCEMENT OF HLURB DECISION.

RULING:

RTC HAS NO JURISDICTION. All cases involving questions on
subdivisions and condominiums are under the jurisdiction of
HLURB. The provisions of p.d. no. 957 were intended to
encompass all questions regarding subdivisions and
condominiums.

DOCTRINE:
DEMONSTRATIONS AND WORK BOYCOTTS IN VIOLATION OF
DOLE ORDER AFTER DOLE ASSUMES JURISDICTION
CONSTITUTES ILLEGAL STRIKE. UNION OFFICERS CAN BE
TERMINATED IF THEY PARTICIPATE IN ILLEGAL STRIKES. BUT
MERE MEMBERS CAN BE TERMINATED ONLY IF THEY
COMMIT ILLEGAL ACTS DURING SUCH STRIKES.

FACTS:

Xyz bank and abc labor union were renegotiating their cba.
Not being able to agree, abc labor union declared deadlock
and filed notice to strike. Dole assumed jurisdiction and issued
an order on the issues in dispute. Dissatisfiled with the order,
abc labor union filed a motion for reconsideration. While filing
such motion they staged demonstration at dole. They also did
not report to work for 3 days. Xyz bank terminated many of
those who participated in the strike. Employees affected filed
case for illegal dismissal before two arbiters. One arbiter
dismissed the complaint. Another arbiter ruled in favor of
employees. Nlrc ruled that the dismissal was illegal. Parties
appealed to the ca. Ca ruled that the dismissal was illegal. The
protest action staged by the employees before dole and their
walk out for 3 days was not a strike but an exercise of right to
express dissatisfaction of dole decision. Xyz bank filed petition
before the sc.
Issues:

The fundamental issues to be resolved in this controversy are:
(1) whether the protest rally and concerted work
abandonment/boycott staged by the respondents violated
the order dated january 18, 2000 of the secretary of labor;

(2) whether the respondents were validly terminated; and

(3) whether the respondents are entitled to separation pay
or financial assistance.

RULING:
The demonstration at dole and the 3 day boycott was in
violation of the order of dole.

Therefore, such constitutes an illegal strike. Once DOLE takes
over jurisdiction the same must not be allowed.

Not all employees can be terminated on same grounds.
a. Union officers can be terminated on the basis
of their being involved in illegal strikes.

b. Mere union members can be terminated only
if they commit ILLEGAL ACTS during the
strikes.

Union members who are due for reinstatement after they
joined the illegal strikes cannot claim backwages. But since
reinstatement is not possible anymore, they are entitled to
separation pay.


The foregoing shows that the law makes a
distinction between union officers and members. For
knowingly participating in an illegal strike or participating in
the commission of illegal acts during a strike, the law provides
that a UNION OFFICER may be terminated from
employment.

The law grants the employer the option of declaring a union
officer who participated in an illegal strike as having lost his
employment. It possesses the right and prerogative to
terminate the union officers from service.
[10][50]


However, a worker merely participating in an illegal strike may
not be terminated from employment. It is only when he
commits illegal acts during a strike that he may be declared to
have lost employment
status.
[11][51]


For the rest of the individual respondents who are union
members, the rule is that an ordinary striking worker cannot
be terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike. There
must be proof that he or she committed illegal acts during a
strike. In all cases, the striker must be identified.

However, the acts which were held to be prohibited activities
are the following:
e. where the strikers shouted slanderous and
scurrilous words against the owners of the
vessels;
f. where the strikers used unnecessary and
obscene language or epithets to prevent other
laborers to go to work, and circulated libelous
statements against the employer which show
actual malice;
g. where the protestors used abusive and
threatening language towards the patrons of a
place of business or against co-employees,
going beyond the mere attempt to persuade
customers to withdraw their patronage;
h. where the strikers formed a human cordon and
blocked all the ways and approaches to the
launches and vessels of the vicinity of the
workplace and perpetrated acts of violence and
coercion to prevent work from being
performed;
i. and where the strikers shook their fists and
threatened non-striking employees with bodily
harm if they persisted to proceed to the
workplace. x x x
[15][55]


ARE THESE DISMISSED EMPLOYEES ENTITLED TO
BACKWAGES AND SEPARATION PAY?
The award of backwages is a legal consequence of a
finding of illegal dismissal. Assuming that respondent-union
members have indeed reported back to work at the end of the
concerted mass actions, but were soon terminated by
petitioners who found their explanation unsatisfactory, they
are not entitled to backwages in view of the illegality of the
said strike


With respect to backwages, the principle of a FAIR
DAYS WAGE FOR A FAIR DAYS LABOR remains as the
basic factor in determining the award thereof.

If there is no work performed by the employee there can be
no wage or pay unless, of course, the laborer was able, willing
and ready to work but was illegally locked out, suspended or
dismissed or otherwise illegally prevented from working.
While it was found that respondents expressed their intention
to report back to work, the latter exception cannot apply in
this case.

As we stated earlier, the Labor Code protects an
ordinary, rank-and-file union member who participated in
such a strike from losing his job, provided that he did not
commit an illegal act during the strike.
[18][58]
Article 264 (e) of
the Labor Code, as amended, provides for such acts which are
generally prohibited during concerted actions such as
picketing:
No person engaged in picketing shall commit any act of
violence, coercion or intimidation or obstruct the free
ingress to or egress from the employers premises for
lawful purposes, or obstruct public thoroughfares.
(Emphasis supplied.)


DOCTRINE:
PURE OBLIGATION IS IMMEDIATELY DEMANDABLE.

FACTS:

XYZ WAS AN EMPLOYEE OF ABC INC. XYZ OBTAINED CAR
LOAN. LATER, XYZ WAS TERMINATED BY ABC INC. ABC INC
DEMANDED PAYMENT OF THE BALANCE OF THE CAR LOAN.
XYZ SAID THE LOAN IS NOT YET MATURE BECAUSE IT IS TO BE
PAID BY INSTALLMENT. ABC INC. FILED COLLECTION CASE AT
MTC. MTC RULED XYZ MUST PAY IMMEDIATELY THE BALANCE
BECAUSE SHE CAN NO LONGER AVAIL OF THE INSTALLMENT-
PAYMENT BENEFIT FOR EMPLOYEES OF ABC INC. ON APPEAL
RTC AFFIRMED MTC DECISION. HOWEVER, C.A. REVERSED
RTC DECISION ON THE GROUND THAT THE LOANS HAVE NOT
YET MATURED AND THUS ABC INC HAS NO CAUSE OF ACTION.

ISSUE:

WHETHER THE BALANCE OF THE LOAN IS IMMEDIATELY
DEMANDABLE.

RULING:

The obligation to pay the car loan is a pure obligation
because the promissory note does not specify a period.
When xyz ceased being an employee of abc inc, she can no
longer avail of the benefit of payment by installment.
Therefore, abc inc can demand immediate payment.

DOCTRINES:

1. RE TECHNICAL RULE MUST BE SET ASIDE FOR THE SAKE OF
JUSTICE;

2. A PERSON HOLDING THE POSITION OF CHAIRMAN AND
EVP/TREASURER IS A CORPORATE OFFICER AND THUS NOT
UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF NLRC.

FACTS:

Abc was elected chairman of xyz corp. He was also appointed
evp/treasurer reporting everyday, receiving salary and being
deducted SSS contribution, withholding tax, etc., just as
other employees. During a board meeting of xyz corp., he
was not appointed to any of these positions. He filed a case
for illegal dismissal, reinstatement, damages and attorneys
fees at nlrc. Respondents, instead of filing position paper
filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The labor
arbiter denied the motion to dismiss and ruled that he has
jurisdiction over the case. Respondents filed petition for
certiorari at c.a.. The later granted the petition and reversed
the ruling of the labor arbiter on the ground that abc was a
corporate officer and thus nlrc has no jurisdiction. Abc filed
petition for review at s.c.

ISSUES:

WHETHER OR NOT IT WAS PROPER FOR RESPONDENTS TO
FILE MOTION TO DISMISS AND WHEN DENIED TO ELEVATE
THE MATTER TO THE C.A.?

WHETHER OR NOT ABC WHO IS CHAIRMAN AND
EVP/TREASURER IS A CORPORATE OFFICER?


RULING:

The procedure followed by respondents was wrong.

Instead of filing a motion to dismiss, they should have filed a
position paper stating therein their ground for dismissal.
Also, their filing of petition for certiorari at c.a. on the denial
of their motion to dismiss was wrong.

The order of the labor arbiter is interlocutory and
therefore inappealable to c.a..

They should have filed an appeal with the commission, not
c.a. per nlrc rules. But s.c. said they would have to disregard
this procedural lapse. For to do so would result to injustice.
Why? Because if they follow strictly the rules, then they have
to disregard the c.a. decision for lack of jurisdiction and thus
the ruling of the labor arbiter would be upheld which is a
wrong ruling.

Abc who was elected chairman and evp/treasurer is a
corporate officer because the position of evp/treasurer is
provided for in the by-laws of xyz corp.

He was elected by the board of xyz corp to such position
according to the by-laws of said corporation.

Therefore, nlrc has no jurisdiction over his case.

The NLRC Rules are clear: the denial by the labor arbiter of the
motion to dismiss is not appealable because the denial is
merely an interlocutory order.

In Metro Drug v. Metro Drug Employees,
[1][27]
we definitively
stated that the denial of a motion to dismiss by a labor arbiter
is not immediately appealable.
[2][28]


DOCTRINE:
RE SALE OF COMPANY DONE IN BAD FAITH WILL NOT FREE
EMPLOYER FROM LIABILITY TO EMPLOYEE

FACTS:
Bus drivers Respondents ABC and DEF were told by their
employer Petitioner XYZ that the company is now sold to RST.
Respondents were given separation pay and other benefits.
Later, respondents learned that it was still XYZ operating the
company. Respondents filed a case for illegal dismissal. The
Labor Arbiter dismissed the case. NLRC reversed. CA affirmed
NLRC Decision. XYZ filed a Petition for Certiorari before the
Supreme Court

ISSUE:
Was there illegal dismissal.

RULING
Yes, there was illegal dismissal. The alleged sale or transfer of
ownership was done in bad faith. The sale or disposition must
be motivated by good faith as a condition for exemption from
liability.
[1][21]


Thus, where the change of ownership is done in bad faith, or
is used to defeat the rights of labor, the successor-employer
is deemed to have absorbed the employees and is held liable
for the transgressions of his or her predecessor.

Closure of business is the reversal of fortune of the employer
whereby there is a complete cessation of business operations
and/or an actual locking-up of the doors of the establishment,
usually due to financial losses. Closure of business, as an
authorized cause for termination of employment, aims to
prevent further financial drain upon an employer who can no
longer pay his employees since business has already
stopped.
[2][19]


Closure or cessation of operation of the establishment is an
authorized cause for terminating an employee, as provided in
Article 283 of the Labor Code, to wit:
Art. 283. Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel.
The employer may also terminate the employment of any
employee due to the installation of labor-saving devices,
redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or
cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking
unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the
provisions of this Title, by serving a written notice on the
workers and the Department of Labor and Employment at
least one (1) month before the intended date thereof. x x x.

In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of
closures or cessation of operations of establishment or
undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial
reverses:
d. the separation pay shall be equivalent to one
(1) month pay or to at least one-half (1/2)
month pay for every year of service, whichever
is higher.
e. A fraction of at least six (6) months shall be
considered one (1) whole year.

DOCTRINE:
RE CONSENT AND CONSIDERATION IN CONTRACTS

FACTS:
ABC needed from XYZ an original copy of a deed of
extrajudicial settlement. XYZ told ABC that he will sign only if
ABC will give him the additional money he promised as his
share in the estate in the amount of P1,000,000.00. XYZ
bargained until the reduced amount of P600,000.00 was
agreed. Since XYZ has no money at that time, he executed a
promissory note. When the due date came, XYZ refused to
pay. ABC sued. The defense of XYZ was there was no consent
since he was just forced to sign the promissory note and
there was no consideration. RTC ruled in favor of ABC. Court
of Appeals reversed the RTC decision on the ground that there
was indeed no consent and consideration in the execution of
the promissory note.

ISSUE: Was the promissory note void for lack of consent and
consideration?

RULING:
When XYZ signed the promissory note there was consent and
consideration.

As to the matter of consent, the Court ruled as follows:
Contracts are voidable where consent thereto is given through
mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence, or fraud. In
determining whether consent is vitiated by any of these
circumstances, courts are given a wide latitude in weighing
the facts or circumstances in a given case and in deciding in
favor of what they believe actually occurred, considering the
age, physical infirmity, intelligence, relationship, and conduct
of the parties at the time of the execution of the contract and
subsequent thereto, irrespective of whether the contract is in
a public or private writing.
[1][14]


Nowhere is it alleged that mistake, violence, fraud, or
intimidation attended the execution of the promissory note.
Still, respondent insists that she was forced into signing the
promissory note because petitioner would not sign the
document required by the BIR. In one case, the Court in
characterizing a similar argument by respondents therein
held that such allegation is tantamount to saying that the
other party exerted undue influence upon them.

However, the Court said that the fact that respondents were
forced to sign the documents does not amount to vitiated
consent.
[2][15]


There is undue influence when a person takes improper
advantage of his power over the will of another, depriving the
latter of a reasonable freedom of choice.
[3][16]
For undue
influence to be present, the influence exerted must have so
overpowered or subjugated the mind of a contracting party as
to destroy his free agency, making him express the will of
another rather than his own.
[4][17]


Respondent may have desperately needed petitioners
signature on the Deed, but there is no showing that she was
deprived of free agency when she signed the promissory note.

Contrary to the CAs findings, the situation did not amount to
intimidation that vitiated consent. There is intimidation when
one of the contracting parties is compelled to give his consent
by a reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and
grave evil upon his person or property, or upon the person or
property of his spouse, descendants, or ascendants.
[5][19]


Certainly, the payment of penalties for delayed payment of
taxes would not qualify as a reasonable and well-grounded
fear of an imminent and grave evil.
A contract is presumed to be supported by cause or
consideration.
[7][21]


ISSUE: Can an issue not ruled upon at the court below be
raised on appeal?

RULING: Yes. The rule that matters not taken up in the court
below cannot be raised on appeal is not without exception.

Courts may relax a procedural rule when compelling
reasons so warrant or when justice requires it.

What constitutes good and sufficient cause that would merit
suspension of the rules is discretionary upon the courts.
been proven present in this case.

THE LEGALITY OF PDAF (PRIORITY DEVELOPMENT
ASSISTANCE FUND), THE MALAMPAYA FUND AND THE
PRESIDENTIAL SOCIAL FUND.


WHAT IS THE DEFINITION OF PORK BARREL?

PORK BARREL SYSTEM IS THE COLLECTIVE BODY OF RULES
AND PRACTICES THAT GOVERN THE MANNER BY WHICH
LUMP-SUM, DISCRETIONARY FUNDS, PRIMARILY INTENDED
FOR LOCAL PROJECTS, ARE UTILIZED THROUGH THE
RESPECTIVE PARTICIPATIONS OF THE LEGISLATIVE AND
EXECUTIVE BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING ITS
MEMBERS.

WHAT ARE THE KINDS OF DISCRETIONARY FUNDS INVOLVED
IN PORK BARREL SYSTEM?

THERE ARE TWO KINDS:

FIRST, there is the congressional pork barrel which is a kind of
lump-sum, discretionary fund wherein legislators, either
individually or collectively organized into committees, are able
to effectively control certain aspects of the funds utilization
through various post-enactment measures and/or practices.

SECOND, there is the presidential pork barrel which is a kind
of lump-sum, discretionary fund which allows the president to
determine the manner of its utilization.

WHAT IS THE PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS?

The principle of separation of powers refers to the
constitutional demarcation of the three fundamental powers
of government.

To the legislative branch of government, through congress,
belongs the power to make laws; to the executive branch of
government, through the president, belongs the power to
enforce laws; and to the judicial branch of government,
through the court, belongs the power to interpret laws.

Because the three great powers have been, by constitutional
design, ordained in this respect, *e+ach department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere.

Thus, the legislature has no authority to execute or construe
the law, the executive has no authority to make or construe
the law, and the judiciary has no power to make or execute
the law.

AFTER APPROVAL OF THE GENERAL APPROPRIATIONS ACT,
WHAT HAPPENS TO THE LAW-MAKING ROLE OF CONGRESS?

Congress law-making role necessarily comes to an end and
from there the executives role of implementing the national
budget begins.

So as not to blur the constitutional boundaries between them,
congress must not concern itself with details for
implementation by the executive.

BUT CAN CONGRESS STILL EXERCISE OVERSIGHT FUNCTION
EVEN AFTER THE LAW WAS PASSED?

YES. But congress role must be confined to mere oversight.
Any postenactment-measure allowing legislator participation
beyond oversight is bereft of any constitutional basis and
hence, tantamount to impermissible interference and/or
assumption of executive functions.

WHAT IS THE SCOPE OF ITS OVERSIGHT FUNCTION?

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT MUST BE CONFINED TO THE
FOLLOWING:

(1) scrutiny based primarily on congress power of
appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in
connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to
appear before and be heard by either of its houses on any
matter pertaining to their departments and its power of
confirmation; and

(2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of
laws pursuant to the power of congress to conduct inquiries
in aid of legislation.

ANY ACTION OR STEP BEYOND THAT WILL UNDERMINE THE
SEPARATION OF POWERS GUARANTEED BY THE
CONSTITUTION.

THE 2013 PDAF GIVES AUTHORITY TO LEGISLATORS TO
IMPLEMENT CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE BUDGET. IS IT
LEGAL?

IT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT IS VIOLATIVE OF THE
SEPARATION OF POWERS PRINCIPLE.

Thus, for all the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby declares
the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other provisions of law
which similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-
enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of
the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative
of the separation of powers principle and thus
unconstitutional.

HOW ABOUT THE INFORMAL PRACTICES OF PARTICIPATING
IN THE EXECUTION OF THE BUDGET?

THEY MUST BE DEEMED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND
ACCORDED THE SAME UNCONSTITUTIONAL TREATMENT.

Corollary thereto, informal practices, through which
legislators have effectively intruded into the proper phases of
budget execution, must be deemed as acts of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and,
hence, accorded the same unconstitutional treatment.

WHY?

BECAUSE THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT WOULD BE DEPRIVED
OF WHAT THE CONSTITUTION HAS VESTED AS ITS OWN.

WHO EXERCISES LEGISLATIVE POWER?

ONLY CONGRESS.

THAT POWER SHALL BE VESTED IN THE CONGRESS OF THE
PHILIPPINES WHICH SHALL CONSIST OF A SENATE AND A
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, EXCEPT TO THE EXTENT
RESERVED TO THE PEOPLE BY THE PROVISION ON INITIATIVE
AND REFERENDUM.

BASED ON THIS PROVISION, IT IS CLEAR THAT ONLY
CONGRESS, ACTING AS A BICAMERAL BODY, AND THE PEOPLE,
THROUGH THE PROCESS OF INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM,
MAY CONSTITUTIONALLY WIELD LEGISLATIVE POWER AND NO
OTHER.

THIS PREMISE EMBODIES THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-
DELEGABILITY OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.

IS THERE ANY EXCEPTION TO THE NON-DELEGABILITY OF
LEGISLATIVE POWER?

YES. THEY ARE:

(A) delegated legislative power to local governments which,
by immemorial practice, are allowed to legislate on purely
local matters; and

(b) constitutionally-grafted exceptions such as the authority
of the president to, by law, exercise powers necessary and
proper to carry out a declared national policy in times of war
or other national emergency, or fix within specified limits, and
subject to such limitations and restrictions as congress may
impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and
wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the
framework of the national development program of the
government.

DOES THE 2013 PDAF VIOLATE THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-
DELEGABILITY OF LEGISLATIVE POWER?

YES. BECAUSE THE 2013 PDAF ARTICLE CONFERS POST-
ENACTMENT IDENTIFICATION AUTHORITY TO INDIVIDUAL
LEGISLATORS.

SAID LEGISLATORS ARE EFFECTIVELY ALLOWED TO
INDIVIDUALLY EXERCISE THE POWER OF APPROPRIATION,
WHICH AS SETTLED IN PHILCONSA IS LODGED IN
CONGRESS.

That the power to appropriate must be exercised only
through legislation is clear from Section 29(1), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution which states that: No money shall be paid
out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation
made by law.

To understand what constitutes an act of appropriation, the
Court, in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor
(Bengzon), held that the power of appropriation involves:

(a) the setting apart by law of a certain sum from
the public revenue for
(b) a specified purpose.

Essentially, under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators
are given a personal lump-sum fund from which they are able
to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a
specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also
determine.

As these two (2) acts comprise the exercise of the power of
appropriation as described in Bengzon, and given that the
2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators to perform
the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred
the power to legislate which the Constitution does not,
however, allow.

SINCE IT VIOLATES THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-DELEGABILITY OF
LEGISLATIVE POWER HOW IS THE LEGALITY OF THE 2013
PDAF CHARACTERIZED?

THE 2013 PDAF AND ALL OTHER FORMS OF CONGRESSIONAL
PORK BARREL WHICH CONTAIN SIMILAR LEGISLATIVE
IDENTIFICATION FEATURE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

Thus, keeping with the principle of non-delegability of
legislative power, the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF
Article, as well as all other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel
which contain the similar legislative identification feature as
herein discussed, as unconstitutional.

ARE THE THREE BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT ABSOLUTELY
INDEPENDENT OF EACH OTHER?

NO.

THE CONSTITUTION HAS ALSO PROVIDED FOR AN ELABORATE
SYSTEM OF CHECKS AND BALANCES TO SECURE
COORDINATION IN THE WORKINGS OF THE VARIOUS
DEPARTMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT.

GIVE AN EXAMPLE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL CHECK AND
BALANCE.

THE PRESIDENTS POWER TO VETO AN ITEM WRITTEN INTO
AN APPROPRIATION, REVENUE OR TARIFF BILL SUBMITTED TO
HIM BY CONGRESS FOR APPROVAL THROUGH A PROCESS
KNOWN AS BILL PRESENTMENT.

WHAT IS THE BASIS FOR THE PRESIDENTS VETO POWER?

IT IS FOUND IN SECTION 27(2), ARTICLE VI OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION WHICH READS AS FOLLOWS:

Sec. 27. x x x.

x x x x

(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular
item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but
the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does
not object.

BUT BY EXERCISING HIS VETO POWER IS THE PRESIDENT ALSO
PERFORMING LAW-MAKING FUNCTION?

YES.

IT IS A CHECK ON THE LEGISLATURE.

The former Organic Act and the present Constitution of the
Philippines make the Chief Executive an integral part of the
law-making power. His disapproval of a bill, commonly known
as a veto, is essentially a legislative act. The questions
presented to the mind of the Chief Executive are precisely the
same as those the legislature must determine in passing a bill,
except that his will be a broader point of view.

The Constitution is a limitation upon the power of the
legislative department of the government, but in this respect
it is a grant of power to the executive department. The
Legislature has the affirmative power to enact laws; the Chief
Executive has the negative power by the constitutional
exercise of which he may defeat the will of the Legislature.

HOW WILL THE PRESIDENT EXERCISE HIS VETO POWER
FUNCTION?

HE MAY NOT BE CONFINED TO RULES OF STRICT
CONSTRUCTION OR HAMPERED BY THE UNWISE
INTERFERENCE OF THE JUDICIARY.

The courts will indulge every intendment in favor of the
constitutionality of a veto [in the same manner] as they will
presume the constitutionality of an act as originally passed by
the Legislature.

WHAT IS THE JUSTIFICATION FOR THE PRESIDENTS VETO-
POWER?

THE JUSTIFICATION FOR THE PRESIDENTS ITEM-VETO POWER
RESTS ON A VARIETY OF POLICY GOALS SUCH AS TO PREVENT
LOG-ROLLING LEGISLATION, IMPOSE FISCAL RESTRICTIONS ON
THE LEGISLATURE, AS WELL AS TO FORTIFY THE EXECUTIVE
BRANCHS ROLE IN THE BUDGETARY PROCESS.

In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, the US
Supreme Court characterized the Presidents item-power as
a salutary check upon the legislative body, calculated to
guard the community against the effects of factions,
precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the public good,
which may happen to influence a majority of that body;
phrased differently, it is meant to increase the chances in
favor of the community against the passing of bad laws,
through haste, inadvertence, or design.

FOR THE PRESIDENT TO EXERCISE HIS ITEM-VETO POWER
WHAT IS NECESSARY?

THERE MUST EXIST A PROPER ITEM WHICH MAY BE THE
OBJECT OF THE VETO.

WHAT IS AN ITEM IN A BILL OR APPROPRIATION?

AN ITEM, AS DEFINED IN THE FIELD OF APPROPRIATIONS,
PERTAINS TO THE PARTICULARS, THE DETAILS, THE DISTINCT
AND SEVERABLE PARTS OF THE APPROPRIATION OR OF THE
BILL.

In the case of Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice of the Philippine
Islands, the US Supreme Court characterized an item of
appropriation as follows:

An ITEM OF AN APPROPRIATION BILL obviously means an
item which, in itself, is a specific appropriation of money, not
some general provision of law which happens to be put into
an appropriation bill. (Emphases supplied)

WHAT IS AN IMPORTANT CHARACTERISTIC OF AN
APPROPRIATION BILL?

IT MUST BE A SPECIFIC APPROPRIATION OF MONEY AND NOT
A GENERAL PROVISION PROVIDING FOR PARAMETERS OF
APPROPRIATION?

WHY MUST IT BE A SPECIFIC APPROPRIATION OF MONEY?

TO ENSURE THAT THE PRESIDENT IS ABLE TO EXERCISE HIS
POWER OF ITEM VETO.

On this premise, it may be concluded that an appropriation
bill, to ensure that the President may be able to exercise his
power of item veto, must contain specific appropriations of
money and not only general provisions which provide for
parameters of appropriation.

ASIDE FROM BEING A SPECIFIC APPROPRIATION OF MONEY
WHAT FURTHER CHARACTERIZES AN APPROPRIATION BILL?

IT MUST BE CHARACTERIZED BY SINGULAR
CORRESPONDENCE.

THIS MEANS IT MUST BE AN ALLOCATION FOR A SPECIFIED
SINGULAR AMOUNT FOR A SPECIFIED SINGULAR PURPOSE.

WHY MUST IT BE SO?

SO THE PRESIDENT WILL DISCERNABLY VETO THE SAME.

Further, it is significant to point out that an item of
appropriation must be an item characterized by singular
correspondence meaning an allocation of a specified
singular amount for a specified singular purpose, otherwise
known as a line-item. This treatment not only allows the
item to be consistent with its definition as a specific
appropriation of money but also ensures that the President
may discernibly veto the same.

ARE THE CALAMITY FUND, CONTINGENT FUND AND THE
INTELLIGENCE FUND CONSIDERED AS LINE-ITEM
APPROPRIATIONS?
YES BECAUSE THEY STATE A SPECIFIED AMOUNT FOR A
SPECIFIC PURPOSE.

MAY AN APPROPRIATION BE VALIDLY APPORTIONED INTO
COMPONENT PERCENTAGES?
YES, BUT EACH PERCENTAGE OR VALUE MUST BE
ALLOCATED FOR ITS OWN CORRESPONDING PURPOSE.

Likewise, it must be observed that an appropriation may be
validly apportioned into component percentages or values;
however, it is crucial that each percentage or value must be
allocated for its own corresponding purpose for such
component to be considered as a proper line-item.

MAY AN APPROPRIATION HAVE SEVERAL RELATED
PURPOSES?
YES PROVIDED THAT THESE PURPOSES ARE BY
ACCOUNTING AND BUDGETING PURPOSES CAN BE
CONSIDERED AS ONE PURPOSE.

ONE EXAMPLE IS THE MOOE (MAINTENANCE AND OTHER
OPERATING EXPENSES).

Moreover, as Justice Carpio correctly pointed out, a valid
appropriation may even have several related purposes that
are by accounting and budgeting practice considered as one
purpose, e.g., MOOE (maintenance and other operating
expenses), in which case the related purposes shall be
deemed sufficiently specific for the exercise of the
Presidents item veto power.

HOW ABOUT SPECIAL PURPOSE FUNDS AND DISCRETIONARY
FUNDS, ARE THEY VALID APPROPRIATIONS?

YES, AS LONG AS THEY FOLLOW THE RULE ON SINGULAR
CORRESPONDENCE AND SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF LAW AS
STATED BELOW.

REGARDING SPECIAL PURPOSE FUNDS, SECTION 25(4),
ARTICLE VI OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION REQUIRES THAT THE
SPECIAL APPROPRIATIONS BILL SHALL:

a. SPECIFY THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH IT IS INTENDED, AND;

b. SHALL BE SUPPORTED BY FUNDS ACTUALLY AVAILABLE AS
CERTIFIED BY THE NATIONAL TREASURER, OR TO BE RAISED
BY A CORRESPONDING REVENUE PROPOSAL THEREIN.

REGARDING DISCRETIONARY FUNDS, SECTION 25(6), ARTICLE
VI OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION REQUIRES THAT SAID FUNDS
SHALL:

A. BE DISBURSED ONLY FOR PUBLIC PURPOSES TO BE
SUPPORTED BY APPROPRIATE VOUCHERS AND;

B. SUBJECT TO SUCH GUIDELINES AS MAY BE PRESCRIBED BY
LAW.

HOW ABOUT APPROPRIATIONS WHICH MERELY PROVIDE FOR
A SINGULAR LUMP-SUM AMOUNT TO BE TAPPED AS A
SOURCE OF FUNDING FOR MULTIPLE PURPOSES. ARE THESE IN
ACCORD WITH THE CONSTITUTION?

NO, SINCE SUCH APPROPRIATION TYPE NECESSITATES THE
FURTHER DETERMINATION OF BOTH THE ACTUAL AMOUNT
TO BE EXPENDED AND THE ACTUAL PURPOSE OF THE
APPROPRIATION.

THE PRESIDENT HAS NO PROPER LINE-ITEM TO VETO.

ALSO, THE IMPLEMENTING AGENCY WOULD STILL HAVE TO
DETERMINE, BOTH THE ACTUAL AMOUNT TO BE EXPENDED
AND THE ACTUAL PURPOSE OF THE APPROPRIATION.

In contrast, what beckons constitutional infirmity are
appropriations which merely provide for a singular lump-sum
amount to be tapped as a source of funding for multiple
purposes. Since such appropriation type necessitates the
further determination of both the actual amount to be
expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation which
must still be chosen from the multiple purposes stated in the
law, it cannot be said that the appropriation law already
indicates a specific appropriation of money and hence,
without a proper line-item which the President may veto. As a
practical result, the President would then be faced with the
predicament of
either vetoing the entire appropriation if he finds some of its
purposes wasteful or undesirable, or approving the entire
appropriation so as not to hinder some of its legitimate
purposes. Finally, it may not be amiss to state
that such arrangement also raises non-delegability issues
considering that the implementing authority would still have
to determine, again, both the actual amount to be expended
and the actual purpose of the appropriation.

Since the foregoing determinations constitute the integral
aspects of the power to appropriate, the implementing
authority would, in effect, be exercising legislative
prerogatives in violation of the principle of non-delegability.

THE PDAF LUMP-SUM AMOUNT OF P24.79 BILLION WAS A
FUNDING SOURCE ALLOTTED FOR MULTIPLE PURPOSES OF
SPENDING, I.E., SCHOLARSHIPS, MEDICAL MISSIONS,
ASSISTANCE TO INDIGENTS, PRESERVATION OF HISTORICAL
MATERIALS, CONSTRUCTION OF ROADS, FLOOD CONTROL,
ETC. IS THIS CONSTITUTIONAL?
NO. BECAUSE IT LEAVES THE ACTUAL AMOUNTS AND
PURPOSES OF THE APPROPRIATION FOR FURTHER
DETERMINATION AND, THEREFORE, DOES NOT READILY
INDICATE A DISCERNIBLE ITEM WHICH MAY BE SUBJECT
TO THE PRESIDENTS POWER OF ITEM VETO.

This setup connotes that the appropriation law leaves the
actual amounts and purposes of the appropriation for further
determination and, therefore, does not readily indicate a
discernible item which may be subject to the Presidents
power of item veto.

In fact, on the accountability side, the same lump-sum
budgeting scheme has, as the CoA Chairperson relays,
limit*ed+ state auditors from obtaining relevant data and
information that would aid in more stringently auditing the
utilization of said Funds.216 Accordingly, she recommends
the adoption of a line by line budget or amount per
proposed program, activity or project, and per implementing
agency.

Hence, in view of the reasons above-stated, the Court finds
the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all Congressional Pork Barrel
Laws of similar operation, to be unconstitutional.

RESPONDENTS ARGUE THAT PDAF APPROPRIATION
PROVIDES FOR A GREATER DEGREE OF FLEXIBILITY TO
ACCOUNT FOR FUTURE CONTINGENCY. CAN THIS NOT
JUSTIFY THE PDAF?
NO. SUCH JUSTIFICATION CANNOT BE AN EXCUSE TO
DEFEAT WHAT THE CONSTITUTION REQUIRES.
UNCONSTITUTIONAL MEANDS DO NOT JUSTIFY
COMMENDABLE ENDS.

That such budgeting system provides for a greater degree of
flexibility to account for future contingencies cannot be an
excuse to defeat what the Constitution requires. Clearly, the
first and essential truth of the matter is that unconstitutional
means do not justify even commendable ends.

.


It cannot be denied that most government actions are
inspired with noble intentions, all geared towards the
betterment of the nation and its people. But then again, it is
important to remember this ethical principle:

The end does not justify the means. No matter how noble
and worthy of admiration the purpose of an act, but if the
means to be employed in accomplishing it is simply
irreconcilable with constitutional parameters, then it cannot
still be allowed. The Court cannot just turn a blind eye and
simply let it pass. It will continue to uphold the Constitution
and its enshrined principles.

The Constitution must ever remain supreme. All must bow to
the mandate of this law. Expediency must not be allowed to
sap its strength nor greed for power debase its rectitude.



PETITIONERS ARGUE THAT CERTAIN FEATURES OF PDAF HAS
AN ADVERSE EFFECT ON CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT. ARE
THEY CORRECT?

YES. THE CONDUCT OF OVERSIGHT WOULD BE TAINTED
AS LEGISLATORS WHO ARE VESTED WITH POST-
ENACTMENT AUTHORITY WOULD BE CHECKING ON
ACTIVITIES IN WHICH THEY THEMSELVES PARTICIPATE.

The Court agrees with petitioners that certain features
embedded in some forms of Congressional Pork Barrel, among
others the 2013 PDAF Article, has an effect on congressional
oversight.

The fact that individual legislators are given post-enactment
roles in the implementation of the budget makes it difficult for
them to become disinterested observers when scrutinizing,
investigating or monitoring the implementation of the
appropriation law.

To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted
as said legislators, who are vested with post-enactment
authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities in which
they themselves participate.

IS POST-ENACTMENT AUTHORIZATION UNDER PDAF
CONSTITUTIONAL?

NO.

THE POST-ENACTMENT AUTHORIZATION ALLOWED UNDER
PDAF IS AGAINST SECTION 14, ARTICLE VI OF THE
CONSTITUTION. THE LEGISLATORS WOULD NECESSARILY BE
ENGAGED IN ACTIVITIES FOR WHICH THEY COULD BE MADE
TO APPEAR BEFORE GOVERNMENT AGENCIES TO ACCOUNT
FOR THEIR PARTICIPATORY ACTS. APPEARING BEFORE THESE
AGENCIES, THEY COULD TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THEIR
POSITION AS LEGISLATORS.

Also, it must be pointed out that this very same concept of
postenactment authorization runs afoul of Section 14, Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that:

Sec. 14. No Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives may personally appear as counsel before any
court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-
judicial and other administrative bodies.

Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially
in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege
granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or
controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of
office.

He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the
Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be
called upon to act on account of his office.
(Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases
of project implementation a matter before another office of
government renders them susceptible to taking undue
advantage of their own office.

.

In sum, insofar as its post-enactment features dilute
congressional oversight and violate Section 14, Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution, thus impairing public accountability,
the 2013 PDAF Article and other forms of Congressional Pork
Barrel of similar nature are deemed as unconstitutional.

ONE PETITIONER SUBMITS THAT THE PORK BARREL SYSTEM
ENABLES POLITICIANS TO PERPETUATE THEMSELVES IN
POWER IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROHIBITION ON POLITICAL DYNASTIES. IS THIS VIEW
CORRECT?

NO.

THE COURT FINDS THE ABOVE-STATED ARGUMENT TO BE
LARGELY SPECULATIVE SINCE IT HAS NOT BEEN PROPERLY
DEMONSTRATED HOW THE PORK BARREL SYSTEM WOULD BE
ABLE TO PROPAGATE POLITICAL DYNASTIES.

PETITIONERS CONTEND THAT THE CONGRESSIONAL PORK
BARREL GOES AGAINST THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES
ON LOCAL AUTONOMY SINCE IT ALLOWS DISTRICT
REPRESENTATIVES, WHO ARE NATIONAL OFFICERS, TO
SUBSTITUTE THEIR JUDGMENTS IN UTILIZING PUBLIC FUNDS
FOR LOCAL DEVELOPMENT. IS THIS CONTENTION CORRECT?

YES.

THE LEGISLATOR CAN BYPASS THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT
UNIT AND INITIATE PROJECTS ON HIS OWN. SUCH SYSTEM
CONTRIBUTES LITTLE TO OVERALL DEVELOPMENT OF THE
DISTRICT AND WEAKENS INFRASTRUCTURE PLANNING
AND COORDINATION.

Philconsa described the 1994 CDF as an attempt to make
equal the unequal and that *i+t is also a recognition that
individual members of Congress, far more than the President
and their congressional colleagues, are likely to be
knowledgeable about the needs of their respective
constituents and the priority to be given each project.231
Drawing strength from this pronouncement, previous
legislators justified its existence by stating that the relatively
small projects implemented under [the Congressional Pork
Barrel] complement and link the national development goals
to the countryside and grassroots as well as to depressed
areas which are overlooked by central agencies which are
preoccupied with mega-projects.

Similarly, in his August 23, 2013 speech on the abolition of
PDAF and budgetary reforms, President Aquino mentioned
that the Congressional Pork Barrel was originally established
for a worthy goal, which is to enable the representatives to
identify projects for communities that the LGU concerned
cannot afford.

Notwithstanding these declarations, the Court, however, finds
an inherent defect in the system which actually belies the
avowed intention of making equal the unequal.

In particular, the Court observes that the gauge of PDAF and
CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of
office, without taking into account the specific interests and
peculiarities of the district the legislator represents. In this
regard, the allocation/division limits are clearly not based on
genuine parameters of equality, wherein economic or
geographic indicators have been taken into consideration. As a
result, a district representative of a highly-urbanized
metropolis gets the same amount of funding as a district
representative of a far-flung rural province which would be
relatively underdeveloped compared to the former. To add,
what rouses graver scrutiny is that even Senators and Party-
List Representatives and in some years, even the Vice-
President who do not represent any locality, receive funding
from the Congressional Pork Barrel as well. These certainly are
anathema to the Congressional Pork Barrels original intent
which is to make equal the unequal. Ultimately, the PDAF
and CDF had become personal funds under the effective
control of each legislator and given unto them on the sole
account of their office.

The Court also observes that this concept of legislator control
underlying the CDF and PDAF conflicts with the functions of
the various Local Development Councils (LDCs) which are
already legally mandated to assist the corresponding
sanggunian in setting the direction of economic and social
development, and coordinating development efforts within its
territorial jurisdiction.234 Considering that LDCs are
instrumentalities whose functions are essentially geared
towards managing local affairs, their programs, policies and
resolutions should not be overridden nor duplicated by
individual legislators, who are national officers that have no
law-making authority except only when acting as a body. The
undermining effect on local autonomy caused by the post-
enactment authority conferred to the latter was succinctly put
by petitioners in the following wise: With PDAF, a
Congressman can simply bypass the local development council
and initiate projects on his own, and even take sole credit for
its execution. Indeed, this type of personality-driven project
identification has not only contributed little to the overall
development of the district, but has even contributed to
further weakening infrastructure planning and coordination
efforts of the government.

Thus, insofar as individual legislators are authorized to
intervene in purely local matters and thereby subvert genuine
local autonomy, the PDAF Article as well as all ther similar
forms of Congressional Pork Barrel is deemed
unconstitutional.

PETITIONERS ARGUES THAT SECTION 8 OF PD 910 IS NOT AN
APPROPRIATION LAW SINCE THE PRIMARY AND SPECIFIC
PURPOSE OF PD 910 IS THE CREATION OF AN ENERGY
DEVELOPMENT BOARD AND SECTION 8 THEREOF ONLY
CREATED A SPECIAL FUND INCIDENTAL THERETO.

PETITIONERS ALSO ARGUES THAT SECTION 12 OF PD 1869 IS
NEITHER A VALID APPROPRIATIONS LAW SINCE THE
ALLOCATION OF THE PRESIDENTIAL SOCIAL FUND IS MERELY
INCIDENTAL TO THE PRIMARY AND SPECIFIC PURPOSE OF
PD 1869 WHICH IS THE AMENDMENT OF THE FRANCHISE AND
POWERS OF PAGCOR.

ARE THEIR CONTENTIONS CORRECT?

NO. APPROPRIATION NEED NOT BE THE PRIMARY PURPOSE
OF THE LAW IN ORDER FOR A VALID APPROPRIATION TO
EXIST. IF A DETERMINATE OR DETERMINABLE AMOUNT OF
MONEY IS ALLOCATED FOR A PARTICULAR PUBLIC PURPOSE,
THEN SUCH APPROPRIATION IS VALID.

Thus, based on the foregoing, the Court cannot sustain the
argument that the appropriation must be the primary and
specific purpose of the law in order for a valid appropriation
law to exist. To reiterate, if a legal provision designates a
determinate or determinable amount of money and allocates
the same for a particular public purpose, then the legislative
intent to appropriate becomes apparent and, hence, already
sufficient to satisfy the requirement of an appropriation
made by law under contemplation of the Constitution.

WHAT IS AN APPROPRIATION MADE BY LAW?

IT EXISTS WHEN WHEN A PROVISION OF LAW (A) SETS APART
A DETERMINATE OR DETERMINABLE AMOUNT OF MONEY
AND (B) ALLOCATES THE SAME FOR A PARTICULAR PUBLIC
PURPOSE.


An appropriation made by law under the contemplation of
Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution exists when a
provision of law (a) sets apart a determinate or determinable
amount of money and (b) allocates the same for a particular
public purpose. These two minimum designations of amount
and purpose stem from the very definition of the word
appropriation, which means to allot, assign, set apart or
apply to a particular use or purpose, and hence, if written
into the law, demonstrate that the legislative intent to
appropriate exists. As the Constitution does not provide or
prescribe any particular form of words or religious recitals in
which an authorization or appropriation by Congress shall be
made, except that it be made by law, an appropriation law
may according to Philconsa be detailed and as broad as
Congress wants it to be for as long as the intent to
appropriate may be gleaned from the same. As held in the
case of Guingona, Jr.: [T]here is no provision in our
Constitution that provides or prescribes any particular form of
words or religious recitals in which an authorization or
appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it be
made by law, such as precisely the authorization or
appropriation under the questioned presidential decrees.

In other words, in terms of time horizons, an appropriation
may be made impliedly (as by past but subsisting legislations)
as well as expressly for the current fiscal year (as by
enactment of laws by the present Congress), just as said
appropriation may be made in general as well as in specific
terms. The Congressional authorization may be embodied in
annual laws, such as a general appropriations act or in special
provisions of laws of general or special application which
appropriate public funds for specific public purposes, such as
the questioned decrees. An appropriation measure is
sufficient if the legislative intention clearly and certainly
appears from the
language employed (In re Continuing Appropriations, 32 P.
272), whether in the past or in the present. (Emphases and
underscoring supplied).

Likewise, as ruled by the US Supreme Court in State of Nevada
v. La Grave: To constitute an appropriation there must be
money placed in a fund applicable to the designated purpose.
The word appropriate means to allot, assign, set apart or
apply to a particular use or purpose.

An appropriation in the sense of the constitution means the
setting apart a portion of the public funds for a public
purpose. No particular form of words is necessary for the
purpose, if the intention to appropriate is plainly manifested.
(Emphases supplied)

IN THE LIGHT OF THE DEFINITION OF APPROPRIATION, WHAT
MAKES THE PDAF APPROPRIATION ILLEGAL?

IT IS THE INTERMEDIATE APPROPRIATIONS WHICH MAKE IT
ILLEGAL.
THESE INTERMEDIATE APPROPRIATIONS ARE THE ACTUAL
APPROPRIATIONS MEANT FOR ENFORCEMENT AND SINCE
THEY ARE MADE BY INDIVIDUAL LEGISLATORS AFTER THE
GAA IS PASSED, THEY OCCUR OUTSIDE THE LAW.

In this relation, it is apropos to note that the 2013 PDAF
Article cannot be properly deemed as a legal appropriation
under the said constitutional provision precisely because, as
earlier stated, it contains postenactment measures which
effectively create a system of intermediate appropriations.

These intermediate appropriations are the actual
appropriations meant for enforcement and since they are
made by individual legislators after the GAA is passed, they
occur outside the law. As such, the Court observes that the
real appropriation made under the 2013 PDAF Article is not
the P24.79 Billion allocated for the entire PDAF, but rather the
post-enactment determinations made by the individual
legislators which are, to repeat, occurrences outside of the
law. Irrefragably, the 2013 PDAF Article does not constitute an
appropriation made by law since it, in its truest sense, only
authorizes individual legislators to appropriate in violation of
the non-delegability principle as afore-discussed.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX


PETITIONERS ARGUE THAT SECTION 8 OF PD 910
CONSTITUTES AN UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE
POWER SINCE THE PHRASE AND FOR SUCH OTHER
PURPOSES AS MAY BE HEREAFTER DIRECTED BY THE
PRESIDENT GIVES THE PRESIDENT UNBRIDLED DISCRETION
TO DETERMINE FOR WHAT PURPOSE THE FUNDS WILL BE
USED. IS THEIR CONTENTION CORRECT?

YES.

THE APPROPRIATION LAW MUST CONTAIN ADEQUATE
LEGISLATIVE GUIDELINES IF THE SAME LAW DELEGATES
RULE-MAKING AUTHORITY TO THE EXECUTIVE. PD 910 DOES
NOT CONTAIN SUCH GUIDELINES.

The Court agrees with petitioners submissions. While the
designation of a determinate or determinable amount for a
particular public purpose is sufficient for a legal appropriation
to exist, the appropriation law must contain adequate
legislative guidelines if the same law delegates rule-making
authority to the Executive.

WHAT ARE THE PURPOSES OF THESE GUIDELINES?

EITHER (A) TO FILL UP UP THE DETAILS OF THE LAW FOR ITS
ENFORCEMENT, KNOWN AS SUPPLEMENTARY RULE-MAKING,
OR (B) TO ASCERTAIN FACTS TO BRING THE LAW INTO ACTUAL
OPERATION, REFERRED TO AS CONTINGENT RULE-MAKING.

. In relation thereto, it may exercise its rule-making
authority to greater particularize the guidelines for such
purpose of (a) filling up the details of the law for its
enforcement, known as supplementary rule-making, or (b)
ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual operation,
referred to as contingent rule-making.

WHAT ARE THE TESTS TO ENSURE THAT THE LEGISLATIVE
GUIDELINES FOR DELEGATED RULEMAKING ARE INDEED
ADEQUATE?

There are two fundamental tests: (a) the completeness test
and (b) the sufficient standard test.

WHAT IS THE COMPLETENESS TEST?
It means that the law is complete when it sets
forth therein the policy to be executed, carried
out or implemented by the delegate.

WHAT IS THE SUFFICIENT STANDARD TEST?
It means that a law lays down a sufficient
standard when it provides adequate guidelines or
limitations in the law to map out the boundaries
of the delegates authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot.


WHAT SHOULD CHARACTERIZE THE REQUIRED STANDARD?
The standard must:
a. specify the limits of the delegates authority,
b. announce the legislative policy, and
c. identify the conditions under which it is to be
implemented.



BASED ON THE ABOVE PRINCIPLES, HOW SHOULD SECTION 8
OF PD 910 BE VIEWED?
The phrase and for such other purposes as may
be hereafter directed by the president constitutes
an undue delegation of legislative power insofar
as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to
adequately determine the limits of the presidents
authority with respect to the purpose for which
the malampaya funds may be used.

As it reads, the said phrase gives the President wide latitude
to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may
direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate
public funds beyond the purview of the law.

RESPONDENT ARGUES THAT THE PHRASE PHRASE AND
FOR SUCH OTHER PURPOSES AS MAY BE HEREAFTER
DIRECTED BY THE PRESIDENT MAY BE CONFINED ONLY TO
ENERGY DEVELOPMENT AND EXPLOITATION PROGRAMS
AND PROJECTS OF THE GOVERNMENT BASED ON THE
PRINCIPLE OF EJUSDEM GENERIS. IS THIS CONTENTION
CORRECT?

NO, FOR THREE REASONS:
FIRST, the phrase energy resource development and
exploitation programs and projects of the governmentstates
a singular and general class and hence, cannot be treated as a
statutory reference of specific things from which the general
phrase for such other purposes may be limited;

SECOND, the said phrase also exhausts the class it represents,
namely energy development programs of the government;
and,

THIRD, the executive department has, in fact, used the
malampaya funds for non-energy related purposes under the
subject phrase, thereby contradicting respondents own
position that it is limited only to energy resource
development and exploitation programs and projects of the
government.

HOW ABOUT THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 12 OF PD
1869 AS AMENDED BY PD 1993? WHAT DOES IT PROVIDE?

IT PROVIDES THAT THE PRESIDENTIAL SOCIAL FUND MAY BE
USED FOR TWO PURPOSES:

[FIRST,] to finance the priority infrastructure development
projects and;

[SECOND,] to finance the restoration of damaged or
destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and
authorized by the office of the president of the philippines.

IS THE SECOND PURPOSE CONSTITUTIONAL?

YES.
The second indicated purpose adequately curtails the
authority of the president to spend the presidential social
fund only for restoration purposes which arise from
calamities.

IS THE FIRST PURPOSE CONSTITUTIONAL?

NO.
It gives the president carte blanche authority to use the same
fund for any infrastructure project he may so determine as a
priority. Verily, the law does not supply a definition of
priority infrastructure development projects and hence,
leaves the president without any guideline to construe the
same.

PETITIONER PRAY THAT THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY AND/OR
DBM BE ORDERED TO RELEASE TO COA AND THE PUBLIC THE
FOLLOWING:

(A) THE COMPLETE SCHEDULE/LIST OF LEGISLATORS WHO
HAVE AVAILED OF THEIR PDAF AND VILP FROM THE YEARS
2003 TO 2013, SPECIFYING THE USE OF THE FUNDS, THE
PROJECT OR ACTIVITY AND THE RECIPIENT ENTITIES OR
INDIVIDUALS, AND ALL PERTINENT DATA THERETO (PDAF USE
SCHEDULE/LIST);254 AND

(B) THE USE OF THE EXECUTIVES *LUMP-SUM,
DISCRETIONARY] FUNDS, INCLUDING THE PROCEEDS FROM
THE X X X MALAMPAYA FUND[S] [AND] REMITTANCES FROM
THE [PAGCOR] X X X FROM 2003 TO 2013, SPECIFYING THE X X
X PROJECT OR ACTIVITY AND THE RECIPIENT ENTITIES OR
INDIVIDUALS, AND ALL PERTINENT DATA THERETO255
(PRESIDENTIAL PORK USE REPORT).

PETITIONERS BASED THEIR REQUEST ON THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS THAT THE STATE ADOPTS AND
IMPLEMENTS A POLICY OF FULL PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF ALL
ITS TRANSACTIONS INVOLVING PUBLIC INTEREST AND THE
RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO INFORMATION ON MATTERS OF
PUBLIC CONCERN AND ACCESS TO OFFICIAL RECORDS AND
DOCUMENTS SHALL BE AFFORDED THE CITIZENS.

IS THEIR PRAYER PROPER?

NO.
Case law instructs that the proper remedy to invoke the
right to information is to file a petition for mandamus.

As explained in the case of Legaspi v. Civil Service
Commission:256 [W]hile the manner of examining public
records may be subject to reasonable regulation by the
government agency in custody thereof, the duty to disclose
the information of public concern, and to afford access to
public records cannot be discretionary on the part of said
agencies.

Certainly, its performance cannot be made contingent upon
the discretion of such agencies. Otherwise, the enjoyment of
the constitutional right may be rendered nugatory by any
whimsical exercise of agency discretion.

The constitutional duty, not being discretionary, its
performance may be compelled by a writ of mandamus in a
proper case.

WHAT IS THE DECISIVE QUESTION ON THE PROPRIETY OF
THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF MANDAMUS?
The question is whether the information sought
by the petitioner is within the ambit of the
constitutional guarantee.

DOES THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION INCLUDE THE RIGHT TO
COMPEL THE PREPARATION OF LISTS ABSTRACTS,
SUMMARIES AND THE LIKE?

NO AS RULED IN VALMONTE VS. BELMONTE.

WHAT IS ESSENTIAL IN A MANDAMUS CASE PRAYING FOR
CERTAIN DOCUMENTS AND RECORDS?
It is essential that the applicant has a well
defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing
demanded and that it is the imperative duty of
defendant to perform the act required.

IS THE REQUEST OF THE PETITIONERS FOR DOCUMENTS AND
RECORDS PROPER?
NO BECAUSE THEY FAILED TO ESTABLISH A WELL
DEFINED, CLEAR AND CERTAIN LEGAL RIGHTS TO
BE FURNISHED OF THE DOCUMENTS THEY
REQUESTED.


INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS.

SHOULD IT BE APPEALED WITHIN THE REGLAMENTARY
PERIOD OF 15 DAYS?
WHEN IS AN ORDER INTERLOCUTORY?
AN ORDER IS INTERLOCUTORY ORDER if it does not
terminate or finally dispose of the case because it
leaves something to be done by the court before
the case is finally decided on the merits (PEOPLE
VS. HEWALD, 105 PHIL 1297).

DOES AN INTERLOCUTORY ORDER BECOME FINAL AFTER 15
DAYS IF NO MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OR APPEAL IS
FILED?
NO.

An interlocutory order is always under the control of the
court and may be modified or rescinded upon sufficient
grounds shown at any time before final judgment.
Thus, an interlocutory order does not become final
within 15 days.

Only final orders i.e., those that finally dispose of a case,
leaving nothing more to be done by the court respecting the
merits of a case can become final and executory in the
sense of becoming unalterable through an appeal or review
proceeding.

The court stressed that interlocutory orders, on the other
hand i.e., those which resolve incidental motions or
collateral matters but do not put an end to the case never
become final in the sense of becoming unchangeable and
impervious to impugnation after expiration of the period
prescribed for taking an appeal from a final judgment.



WHAT IS MEANT BY THE PRECEPT OF JUDICIAL COURTESY?

It means that even if there is no writ of preliminary injunction
or temporary restraining order issued by a higher court, it
would be proper for a lower court or court of origin to
suspend its proceedings in view of a pending appeal or
petition for review in a higher court.

CITE AN EARLIER CASE WHEN THE PRECEPT OF JUDICIAL
COURTESY WAS APPLIED?

The supreme court has applied such doctrine. In that case the
court of appeals proceeded to act on certain incidences
despite the pendency of a petition for certiorari pending
before the supreme court. The supreme court ruled that while
sc has not issued a restraining order against ca to prevent it
from taking any action with regards to its resolutions it should
have refrained from ruling thereon because by doing so it
renders moot what was before the sc. Said the court:

Although this Court did not issue any restraining order
against the Intermediate Appellate Court to prevent it from
taking any action with regard to its resolutions respectively
granting respondents motion to expunge from the records
the petitioners motion to dismiss and denying the latters
motion to reconsider such order, upon learning of the
petition, the appellate court should have refrained from ruling
thereon because its jurisdiction was necessarily limited upon
the filing of a petition for certiorari with this Court questioning
the propriety of the issuance of the above-mentioned
resolutions.

Due respect for the Supreme Court and practical
and ethical considerations should have prompted
the appellate court to wait for the final
determination of the petition before taking
cognizance of the case and trying to render moot
exactly what was before this court.. . .

WHAT IS THE GENERAL RULE ON STAYING PROCEEDINGS IN
THE LOWER COURTS?
- Section 7 of rule 65 of the rules of court
provides the general rule that the mere
pendency of a special civil action for
certiorari commenced in relation to a
case pending before a lower court or
court of origin does not stay the
proceedings therein in the absence of a
writ of preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order.

IS THERE AN EXCEPTION TO THIS RULE?

YES, in case the PRECEPT OF JUDICIAL COURTESY APPLIES.

The supreme court ruled that even if there is no writ
of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order
issued by a higher court it is proper for the lower court to
suspend proceedings on the precept of judicial
Courtesy despite the provision of section 7 of rule 65. Said
the court:

There are of course instances where even if there is no writ of
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order issued
by a higher court, it would be proper for a lower court or court
of origin to suspend its proceedings on the precept of judicial
courtesy. As this Court explained in Eternal Gardens
Memorial Park v. Court of Appeals:[5]

..

This Court explained, however, that the rule on judicial
courtesy applies where there is a strong probability that
the issues before the higher court would be rendered moot
and moribund as a result of the continuation of the
proceedings in the lower court.

WHEN DOES THE RULE ON JUDICIAL COURTESY APPLIES?

WHERE THERE IS A STRONG PROBABILITY THAT THE ISSUES
BEFORE THE HIGHER COURT WOULD BE RENDERED MOOT
AND MORIBUND AS A RESULT OF THE CONTINUATION OF THE
PROCEEDINGS IN THE LOWER COURT [OR COURT OF
ORIGIN+.

DOES IT APPLY ALSO TO LABOR CASES?

YES. EVEN IN LABOR CASES WHERE DECISIONS ARE
IMMEDIATELY FINAL AND EXECUTORY, JUDICIAL COURTESY
WAS CONSIDERED APPLICABLE.
If a Labor Arbiter does not issue a writ of execution of the
NLRC order for the reinstatement of an employee even if
there is no restraining order, he could probably be merely
observing judicial courtesy, which is advisable if there is a
strong probability that the issues before the higher court
would be rendered moot and moribund as a result of the
continuation of the proceedings in the lower court.

In such a case, it is as if a temporary restraining
order was issued.

TO WHAT CATEGORY OF COURT DOES THE RULE ON JUDICIAL
COURTESY APPLIES?

It is based on the hierarchy of courts and applies only to
lower courts in instances where, even if there is no writ of
preliminary injunction or tro issued by a higher court, it
would be proper for a lower court to suspend its proceedings
for practical and ethical considerations.[35]

In other words, the principle of judicial courtesy applies
where there is a strong probability that the issues before the
higher court would be rendered moot and moribund as a
result of the continuation of the proceedings in the lower
court or court of origin.*36+

WHAT IS MEANT BY PROCURING CAUSE?

THE TERM PROCURING CAUSE REFERS TO A cause which
starts a series of events and results, without break in their
continuity, in the accomplishment of a brokers prime
objective of producing a purchaser who is ready, willing, and
able to buy on the owners terms.

THIS IS SIMILAR TO THE CONCEPT OF PROXIMATE CAUSE IN
TORTS, WITHOUT WHICH THE INJURY WOULD NOT HAVE
OCCURRED.

TO BE REGARDED AS THE PROCURING CAUSE OF A SALE, a
brokers efforts must have been the foundation of the
negotiations which subsequently resulted in a sale.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

TUSCAN REALTY WAS ENGAGED BY ORIENTAL PETROLEUM TO
LOOK FOR BUYERS FOR ITS CONDOMINIUM UNITS IN
CORINTHIAN PLAZA. TUSCAN INTRODUCED GATEWAY TO
ORIENTAL PETROLEUM AND A CONTRACT TO SELL WAS
EXECUTED. HOWEVER GATEWAY ASSIGNED ITS RIGHT UNDER
THE CONTRACT TO SELL IN FAVOR OF ANCHETA WHO
ULTIMATELY BOUGHT THE PROPERTY.

IS TUSCAN ENTITLED TO BROKERS COMMISSION?
YES.
BECAUSE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF PROCURING CAUSE.

It was on account of TUSCAN REALTYS effort that oriental
petroleum got connected to gateway, the prospective buyer,
resulting in the latter two entering into a contract to sell
involving the two condominium units.

Although gateway turned around and sold the condominium
units to ancheta, the fact is that such ultimate sale could not
have happened without gateways indispensable
intervention as intermediate buyer.

THE MACEDA LAW.
SUPPOSE I HAVE ALREADY PAID INTALLMENT PAYMENTS
FOR A HOUSE AND LOT BUT I CAN NO LONGER AFFORD TO
PAY THE FUTURE INSTALLMENTS, WHAT ARE MY RIGHTS?
- AN ACT TO PROVIDE PROTECTION TO
BUYERS OF REAL ESTATE ON
INSTALLMENT PAYMENTS.

WHAT IS THE NAME OF THE ACT?
- THE REALTY INSTALLMENT BUYER ACT
OR THE MACEDA LAW.


WHAT IS THE PUBLIC POLICY BEHIND THE MACEDA LAW?
- TO PROTECT buyers of real estate on
installment payments against
ONEROUS AND OPPRESSIVE
CONDITIONS.


WHAT ARE COVERED?
- All transactions or contracts involving
the SALE OR FINANCING of real estate
on installment payments, including
residential condominium apartments
where the buyer has paid at least two
years of instalments.


WHAT ARE NOT COVERED?
- Industrial lots, commercial buildings
and sales to tenants under republic act
numbered thirty-eight hundred forty-
four, as amended by republic act
numbered sixty-three hundred eighty-
nine.


SUPPOSE BUYER INDICATED ABOVE IS IN DEFAULT WHAT
ARE HIS RIGHTS?
- IF THE BUYER HAS PAID AT LEAST TWO
YEARS OF INSTALLMENTS HE HAS THE
FOLLOWING RIGHTS:

(A) To pay, without additional interest, the unpaid
installments due within the total grace period earned by him
which is hereby fixed at the rate of one month grace period
for every one year of installment payments made:

Provided, that this right shall be exercised by the buyer only
once in every five years of the life of the contract and its
extensions, if any.


(B) if the contract is canceled, the seller shall REFUND to the
buyer the cash surrender value of the payments on the
property equivalent to 50% of the total payments made, and,
after 5 years of installments, an additional 5% every year but
not to exceed ninety per cent of the total payments made:

Provided, that the actual cancellation of the contract shall
take place after thirty days from receipt by the buyer of the
notice of cancellation or the demand for rescission of the
contract by a notarial act and upon full payment of the CASH
SURRENDER value to the buyer.


SUPPOSE THE BUYER MADE DOWNPAYMENTS, DEPOSITS OR
OPTIONS. ARE THESE ALSO COVERED?
YES.

Down payments, deposits or options on the
contract shall be included in the computation of
the total number of installment payments made.


SUPPOSE THE BUYER PAID LESS THAN TWO YEARS
INSTALLMENT WHAT IS HIS RIGHT IN CASE HE COMMITS
DEFAULT?
- The seller shall give the buyer a grace
period of NOT LESS THAN 60 DAYS from
the date the installment became due.


SUPPOSE THE BUYER FAILS TO PAY THE INSTALLMENT DUE
AFTER THE GRACE PERIOD WHAT CAN THE SELLER DO?
- The seller may CANCEL the contract
AFTER 30 DAYS from receipt by the
buyer of the notice of cancellation or
the demand for rescission of the
contract by a notarial act.


CAN THE BUYER SELL OR ASSIGN HIS RIGHTS?
YES
- The buyer shall have the right to sell his
rights or assign the same to another
person or to reinstate the contract by
updating the account during the grace
period and before actual cancellation
of the contract.

The deed of sale or assignment shall be done by
notarial act.


CAN THE BUYER PAY IN ADVANCE THE INSTALLMENTS?
- YES. HE CAN PAY IN FULL. AND THE
FULL PAYMENT CAN BE ANNOTATED IN
THE CERTIFICATE OF TITLE.


WHEN IS SEPARATION PAY GIVEN IN LIEU OF
REINSTATEMENT?;
THE DOCTRINE OF STRAINED RELATIONS;
HOW MUCH SHOULD BE GIVEN AS SEPARATION PAY?



CAN THE SUPREME COURT DETERMINE THE APPLICABILITY
OF THE DOCTRINE OF STRAINED RELATIONS?
- As a general rule, NO because it is a
FACTUAL QUESTION.

- BUT IT CAN IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS
EQUITY JURISDICTION WHEN THE
FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE ARBITER
AND THE NLRC ARE CONFLICTING.

a. patent animosity existed;
b. refusal to be reinstated;
c. too much enmity had developed.

WHAT IS REALLY THE RULE: REINSTATEMENT OR
SEPARATION PAY?
- THE RULE IS REINSTATEMENT.


WHEN IS SEPARATION PAY APPLICABLE?
- WHEN THERE IS STRAINED
RELATIONS.


WHEN IS THERE STRAINED RELATIONS?
- When it is likely that, if reinstated, an
atmosphere of antipathy and
antagonism would be generated as to
adversely affect the efficiency and
productivity of the employee
concerned.
WHAT IS THE DOCTRINE OF STRAINED RELATIONS?
- Under this doctrine the payment of
separation pay is considered an
acceptable alternative to
reinstatement when the latter option is
no longer desirable or viable.


WHAT IS THE BENEFIT THAT CAN BE DERIVED FROM SUCH
DOCTRINE?
a. On one hand, such payment liberates the employee
from what could be a highly oppressive work
environment.
b. On the other hand, it releases the employer from the
grossly unpalatable obligation of maintaining in its
employ a worker it could no longer trust.


SUPPOSE THE EMPLOYEE ASKS FOR SEPARATION INSTEAD OF
REINSTATEMENT. CAN THE EMPLOYER INSISTS ON
REINSTATEMENT.
- NO. If the employee decides not to be
reinstated and demands for separation
pay, the DOCTRINE OF STRAINED
RELATIONS APPLIES.


HOW MUCH SHOULD BE THE SEPARATION PAY?
- If reinstatement is no longer feasible x
x x, SEPARATION PAY equivalent to ONE
MONTH SALARY FOR EVERY YEAR OF
SERVICE shall be awarded as an
alternative.


BUT IN THIS CASE THE CA AWARDED ONLY ONE HALF
MONTH PAY FOR EVERY YEAR OF SERVICE. SHALL IT BE
INCREASED TO ONE MONTH PER YEAR OF SERVICE?
- NO. Considering, however, that bides
did not question that portion of the ca
decision, the court is of the view that
he was satisfied.

WHEN IS THERE DISOBEDIENCE OF LAWFUL ORDER OF AN
EMPLOYER? DOES A TWO DAY NOTICE TO EXPLAIN REFUSAL
TO TAKE DRUG TEST CONSTITUTE DUE PROCESS? WHAT IS
THE LIABILITY FOR FAILURE TO OBSERVE DUE PROCESS
WHEN THERE IS SUBSTANTIVE GROUND TO DISMISS
AN EMPLOYEE?

SUBJECTS:
a. LEGAL DISMISSAL BUT DUE PROCESS WAS NOT
OBSERVED;
b. WILLFUL DISOBEDIENCE;
c. REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLAIN
MEANS AT LEAST FIVE DAYS NOTICE;
d. NOMINAL DAMAGE OF P30,000.00 IMPOSED
FOR VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS




WHAT IS FUNDAMENTAL IN VALIDLY DISMISSING AN
EMPLOYEE?
- THE EMPLOYER MUST OBSERVE BOTH
SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL
PROCESS.

WHAT IS SUBSTANTIVE PROCESS?
- THE TERMINATION MUST BE BASED ON
A JUST OR AUTHORIZED CAUSE.

WHAT IS PROCEDURAL PROCESS?
- THE DISMISSAL MUST BE EFFECTED
AFTER DUE NOTICE AND HEARING.


It is fundamental that in order to validly dismiss
an employee, the employer is required to observe
both substantive and procedural due process
the termination of employment must be based on
a just or authorized cause and the dismissal must
be effected after due notice and hearing.
[1][20]



THE CONCERNED EMPLOYEES REFUSED TO SUBMIT
THEMSELVES TO DRUG TEST. KINGSPOINT EXPRESSLY
DISMISSED THEM. WAS THERE JUST CAUSE?
- YES. There was WILLFUL
DISOBEDIENCE by the employees of
the lawful order of their employer.


WHEN IS THERE WILLFUL DISOBEDIENCE?

TWO ELEMENTS MUST CONCUR.
1. First, the employees assailed conduct must have been
WILLFUL, that is, characterized by a wrongful and
perverse attitude; and


2. SECOND, the order violated must have been reasonable,
lawful, made known to the employee, and must pertain
to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge.

Both elements are present in this case.

As to the first element, that at no point did the dismissed
employees deny Kingspoint Express claim that they refused to
comply with the directive for them to submit to a drug test or,
at the very least, explain their refusal gives rise to the
impression that their non-compliance is deliberate. The utter
lack of reason or justification for their insubordination
indicates that it was prompted by mere obstinacy, hence,
willful and warranting of dismissal.

As to the second element, no belabored and extensive
discussion is necessary to recognize the relevance of the
subject order in the performance of their functions as drivers
of Kingspoint Express. As the NLRC correctly pointed out,
drivers are indispensable to Kingspoint Express primary
business of rendering door-to-door delivery services. It is
common knowledge that the use of dangerous drugs has
adverse effects on driving abilities that may render the
dismissed employees incapable of performing their duties to
Kingspoint Express and acting against its interests, in addition
to the threat they pose to the public.

The existence of a single just cause is enough to
order their dismissal and it is now inconsequential
if the other charges against them do not merit
their dismissal from service.

KINGSPOINT EXPRESS REQUIRED THE EMPLOYEES TO
ANSWER WITHIN TWO DAYS THEIR REFUSAL TO SUBMIT TO
A DRUG TEST. WAS DUE PROCESS OBSERVED?
- NO. The Supreme Court construed
reasonable opportunity as a period
of at least five (5) calendar days from
receipt of the notice.


SINCE KINGSPOINT EXPRESS DID NOT FOLLOW DUE PROCESS
WHAT IS ITS LIABILITY?
- TO PAY NOMINAL DAMAGES OF
P30,000.00 PER EMPLOYEE except
those who did not appeal.


ARE TAX DECLARATIONS AND TAX PAYMENTS CONCLUSIVE
PROOF OF OWNERSHIP? CAN AN ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF
TITLE BE ATTACKED, REPEALED OR AMENDED? WHAT IS
ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION?

SUBJECT/S:
a. TAX DECLARATIONS AND TAX PAYMENTS NOT
CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE OF OWNERSHIP;
b. OCT IS IMPRESSED WITH PRESUMPTION OF
REGULARITY;
c. WHAT IS ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION?.

DIGEST:
PETITIONERS PURCHASED A FENCED PROPERTY WITH TAX
DECLARATION. LATER THEY DISCOVERED THAT PORTION OF
THE PROPERTY WAS INCLUDED IN THE PROPERTY OF
RESPONDENTS WHICH HAS AN ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF
TITLE (OCT). PETITIONERS THEN FILED A PETITION TO
CORRECT THE OCT.

THEIR PROOF CONSISTED OF TAX DECLARATIONS AND TAX
RECEIPTS? ARE THESE SUFFICIENT PROOFS?
- NO. THEY ARE NOT CONCLUSIVE. Well
settled is the rule that tax declarations
and receipts are not conclusive
evidence of ownership or of the right
to possess land when not supported by
any other evidence. The fact that the
disputed property may have been
declared for taxation purposes in the
names of the applicants for registration
or of their predecessors-in-interest
does not necessarily prove ownership.
THEY ARE MERELY INDICIA OF A CLAIM
OF OWNERSHIP.


CAN ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE (OCT) BE ATTACKED
AND REVISED OR AMENDED?
- THE OCT COVERING THE CONTESTED
LOT CARRIES WITH IT A PRESUMPTION
OF REGULARITY.

The petition to correct/cancel the OCT
can prosper only if petitioners are able
to present substantial evidence that a
portion of their lot was erroneously
covered by the patent.

Substantial evidence refers to such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.
[3][31]


The DARs issuance of an Emancipation Patent and the
corresponding OCT covering the contested lot carries with it a
presumption of regularity.
[4][30]


The Petition to correct/cancel Pablos Emancipation Patent
can prosper only if petitioners are able to present substantial
evidence that a portion of their lot was erroneously covered
by the patent.

Substantial evidence refers to such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.
[5][31]



WHAT IS ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION?
- ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION REQUIRES
PUBLIC, PEACEFUL, UNINTERRUPTED
AND ADVERSE POSSESSION OF THE
LAND IN THE CONCEPT OF AN OWNER.


WHAT IS SUPERVISION? WHAT IS CONTROL? WHAT IS THE
DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION? WHAT IS THE
PRINCIPLE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES?


SUBJECT/S:
1. MEANING OF SUPERVISION;
2. MEANING OF CONTROL;
3. PRIMARY JURISDICTION;
4. EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

PD NO. 1645 EXPRESSLY PROVIDES AUTHORITY TO NEA TO
EXERCISE SUPERVISION AND CONTROL OVER ELECTRIC
COOPRATIVES. WHAT DOES SUPERVISION MEAN?
- In administrative law, supervision
means OVERSEEING or the power or
authority of an officer to see that
subordinate officers perform their
duties.

If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill
them, the former may take such action
or step as prescribed by law to make
them perform their duties.
[2][6]

WHAT DOES CONTROL MEAN?
- Control, on the other hand, means the
power of an officer to ALTER OR
MODIFY OR NULLIFY or SET ASIDE what
a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former
for that of the latter.
[3][7]




A clear proof of such expanded powers is that, unlike P.D. No.
269, P.D. No. 1645 expressly provides for the authority of the
NEA to exercise supervision and control over electric
cooperatives.

In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the
power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate
officers perform their duties.
[4][5]


If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former may take
such action or step as prescribed by law to make them
perform their duties.
[5][6]


Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to
alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the
latter.
[6][7]







THE SAMAR ELECTRIC COOP BOARD ISSUED A RESOLUTION
BARRING RESPONDENT FROM PARTICIPATING IN MEETINGS.
RESPONDENT FILED CASE FOR PROHIBITION. RTC GRANTED
PROHIBITION. WAS RTC CORRECT?
- NO BECAUSE NEA HAS PRIMARY
JURISDICTION OF THE COOP.

- PD 1645 PROVIDES THAT NATIONAL
ELECTRIFICATION AUTHORITY has
supervision and control over the
ELECTRIC COOP.


WHAT IS THE DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION?
- It applies where a claim is originally
cognizable in the courts but under a
regulatory scheme such claim has been
placed within the jurisdiction of an
administrative body.

In such a case, the court may suspend
the judicial process pending referral of
the claim to the administrative body.

The court may also dismiss the case
without prejudice if the parties would
not be unfairly disadvantaged.


It may not be amiss to reiterate the prevailing rule that
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies where a claim is
originally cognizable in the courts and comes into play
whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of
issues which, under a regulatory scheme, has been placed
within the special competence of an administrative
agency.
[8][9]


In such a case, the court in which the claim is sought to be
enforced may suspend the judicial process pending referral of
such issues to the administrative body for its view or, if the
parties would not be unfairly disadvantaged, dismiss the case
without prejudice.
[9][10]


WHAT IS THE PRINCIPLE OF EXHAUSTION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES?
- If a remedy within the administrative
machinery can be resorted to by giving
the administrative officer every
opportunity to decide on a matter that
comes within his jurisdiction, then such
remedy must be exhausted first before
the courts power of judicial review can
be sought.
[10][12]




Corollary to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is the
principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

The Court, in a long line of cases,
[11][11]
has held that before a
party is allowed to seek the intervention of the courts, it is a
pre-condition that he avail himself of all administrative
processes afforded him.

Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can be
resorted to by giving the administrative officer every
opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his
jurisdiction, then such remedy must be exhausted first before
the courts power of judicial review can be sought.
[12][12]


The premature resort to the court is fatal to ones
cause of action

Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel, the case
may be dismissed for lack of cause of action.
[14][14]



WHAT ARE THE REASONS FOR THE DOCTRINE OF
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES?

1. The availment of administrative remedy entails lesser
expenses.

2. It provides for a speedier disposition of controversies.

3. it gives the administrative agency concerned every
opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the
case.
[16][17]





The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is
based on practical and legal reasons.
[17][15]


The availment of administrative remedy entails lesser
expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of
controversies.
[18][16]


Furthermore, the courts of justice, for reasons of comity and
convenience, will shy away from a dispute until the system of
administrative redress has been completed and complied
with, so as to give the administrative agency concerned every
opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the case.
[19][17]


WHAT ARE THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE APPLICATION OF THE
DOCTRINES OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION AND EXHAUSTION
OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES?

(A) Where there is estoppel on the part of the party
invoking the doctrine;
(B) Where the challenged administrative act is patently
illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction;
(C) Where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction
that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant;
(D) Where the amount involved is relatively so small as to
make the rule impractical and oppressive;
(E) Where the question involved is purely legal and will
ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice;
(F) Where judicial intervention is urgent;
(G) Where the application of the doctrine may cause great
and irreparable damage;
(H) Where the controverted acts violate due process;
(I) Where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies has been rendered moot;
(J) Where there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy;
(K) Where strong public interest is involved; and
(L) In Quo Warranto Proceedings.
[20][18]



Respondent, however, failed to show that the instant case
falls under any of the above-enumerated exceptions.

While respondent alleged in his Urgent Petition for Prohibition
that the subject resolution was issued with grave abuse of
discretion and in violation of his right to due process, mere
allegation of arbitrariness will not suffice to vest in the trial
court the power that has been specifically granted by law to
special government agencies.
[22][19]


Moreover, the issues raised in the petition for prohibition,
particularly the issue of whether or not there are valid
grounds to disallow respondent from attending SAMELCOs
Board meetings and to disqualify him from running for re-
election as a director of the said Board, are not purely legal
questions. Instead, they involve a determination of factual
matters which fall within the competence of the NEA to
ascertain.

WHAT OTHER GROUND FOR DENYING THE WRIT OF
PROHIBITION?


- One of the requisites for a writ of
prohibition to issue is that THERE IS NO
PLAIN, SPEEDY AND ADEQUATE
REMEDY IN THE ORDINARY COURSE OF
LAW.
[23][20]


Finally, the Court agrees with petitioners contention that
the availability of an administrative remedy via a complaint
filed before the NEA precludes respondent from filing a
petition for prohibition before the court.

It is settled that one of the requisites for a writ of prohibition
to issue is that there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law.
[24][20] In order that prohibition will lie, the
petitioner must first exhaust all administrative remedies.[25][21]
Thus, r
espondents
failure to file a complaint before the NEA prevents him from filing a petition for prohibition
before the RTC.


WHAT IS LEGAL COMPENSATION? WHAT ARE ITS
REQUISITES? HOW DOES IT TAKES EFFECT?

SUBJECT/S:
1. INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACTS;
2. LEGAL COMPENSATION;
3. UNJUST ENRICHMENT.






WHEN DOES LEGAL COMPENSATION TAKE PLACE?
- WHEN TWO PERSONS, IN THEIR OWN
RIGHT, ARE CREDITORS AND DEBTORS
OF EACH OTHER.


WHAT ARE THE REQUISITES OF LEGAL COMPENSATION?

IN ORDER THAT COMPENSATION MAY BE PROPER, IT IS
NECESSARY:
(1) That each one of the obligors be bound principally,
and that he be at the same time a principal creditor of
the other;

(2) That both debts consist in a sum of money, or if the
things due are consumable, they be of the same kind,
and also of the same quality if the latter has been
stated;

(3) That the two debts be due;

(4) That they be liquidated and demandable;

(5) That over neither of them there be any retention or
controversy, commenced by third persons and
communicated in due time to the debtor.


WHEN THESE REQUISITES ARE PRESENT, HOW DOES
COMPENSATION TAKES EFFECT.


- BY OPERATION OF LAW. It extinguishes
both debts to the concurrent amount
even though the creditors and debtors
are not aware of the compensation.


Set-off allowed

IITC ARGUES THERE IS NO LEGAL COMPENSATION BETWEEEN
IITC AND COEC BECAUSE THE SUBJECT ARE TREASURY BILLS
WITH DIFFERENT MATURITY DATES. IS IITC CORRECT?
- NO. The coec t-bills and the iitc t-bills
are both government securities which,
while having differing interest rates
and dates of maturity, have each been
assigned a certain face value to
determine their monetary equivalent.


Based on the foregoing, in order for compensation to be
valid, the five requisites mentioned in the abovequoted Article
1279 should be present, as in the case at bench. The lower
courts have already determined, to which this Court concurs,
that IITC acted as a principal in the purchase of treasury bills
from PDB and in the subsequent sale to COEC of the COEC T-
Bills. Thus, COEC and IITC are principal creditors of each other
in relation to the sale of the COEC T-Bills and IITC T-Bills,
respectively.

The second requisite only requires that the thing
be of the same kind and quality.

The COEC T-Bills and the IITC T-Bills are both government
securities which, while having differing interest rates and
dates of maturity, have each been assigned a certain face
value to determine their monetary equivalent.

In fact, in the Tripartite Agreement, the COEC-IITC Agreement
and in the memoranda of the parties, the parties recognized
the monetary value of the treasury bills in question, and, in
some instances, treated them as sums of money.
[9][53]
Thus,
they are of the same kind and are capable of being subject to
compensation.

WHAT IS THE LEGAL INTEREST RATE?

SUBJECT/S:
1. INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACTS;
2. LEGAL COMPENSATION;
3. UNJUST ENRICHMENT.

HOW MUCH IS THE INTEREST TO BE CHARGED AGAINST IITC
FOR ITS FAILURE TO DELIVER TREASURY BILLS BASED ON
AGREEMENT?
- Because the obligation arose from a
contract of sale and purchase of
government securities, and not from a
loan or forbearance of money, the
applicable interest rate is 6% from june
10, 1994, when iitc received the
demand letter from coec.
[1][60]


After the judgment becomes final and
executory, the legal interest rate
increases to 12% until the obligation is
satisfied.

Lastly, as regards the legal interest which should be imposed
on the award, the Court directs the attention of the parties to
the case of Eastern Shipping Lines v. Court of Appeals,
[2][58]


1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the
payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of
money, the interest due should be that which may have been
stipulated in writing.

Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest
from the time it is judicially demanded.

In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12%
per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or
extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of
Article 1169 of the Civil Code.

2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance
of money, is breached, an interest on the amount of damages
awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the
rate of 6% per annum.

No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated
claims or damages except when or until the demand can be
established with reasonable certainty.

Accordingly, where the demand is established with reasonable
certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the
claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil
Code) but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably
established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall
begin to run only from the date the judgment of the court is
made (at which time the quantification of damages may be
deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual
base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be
on the amount finally adjudged.

3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money
becomes final and executory, the rate of legal interest,
whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2,
above, shall be 12% per annum from such finality until its
satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then
an equivalent to a forbearance of credit.
[3][59]
(Emphases
supplied)


SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST-
1. INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACTS;
2. LEGAL COMPENSATION;
3. UNJUST ENRICHMENT.


THE CONTRACT EXPRESSLY STATES THAT IITC, AS PRINCIPAL
SOLD TREASURY BILLS TO COEC AND IITC AS PRINCIPAL
PURCHASED TREASURY BILLS FROM PDB. BUT IITC ARGUES
THAT IT WAS NOT A SELLER NOR BUYER BUT JUST A
CONDUIT. IS IITC CORRECT.
- NO. When the words of the documents
in question are clear and readily
understandable by any ordinary
reader, there is no need for the
interpretation or construction
thereof.
[1][34]





HOW SHOULD THE COURTS ENFORCE A CONTRACT?
- ACCORDING TO ITS EXPRESS TERMS,
interpretation being resorted to only
when such literal application is
impossible.
[2][36]


Thus, because the words of the documents in question are
clear and readily understandable by any ordinary reader,
there is no need for the interpretation or construction
thereof.
[3][34



WHAT IS A DERIVATIVE SUIT? WHAT IS AN INTRA-
CORPORATE DISPUTE? WHO IS AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY?
SUBJECT/S:
1. HOW JURISDICTION IS DETERMINED;
2. HLURB JURISDICTION;
3. INDISPENSABLE PARTY; DERIVATIVE SUIT;
4. EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY;
5. GIVING RESPECT AND FINALITY TO HLURB DECISION

IN THIS CASE CERTAIN CONDO OWNERS SUED THE
DEVELOPER AND SOUGHT TO INVALIDATE THE CONTRACT
BETWEEN THE DEVELOPER AND THE CONDOMINIUM
CORPORATION WHICH CONVERTED SOME SALEABLE UNITS
INTO COMMON AREAS. ONE GROUND RAISED WAS THAT
THE AGREEMENT WAS NOT DULY APPROVED BY THE
CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION.

HAS HLURB JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE?
- NO.
First, the condomium
corporation, an indispensable
party was not impleaded.

Second, this is a derivative suit.

WHAT IS A DERIVATIVE SUIT?
- IT IS A SUIT BY MEMBERS OF A
CORPORATION AGAINST THE
CORPORATION ITSELF. THIS FALLS
UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF SEC,
NOW WITH THE COURTS.


WHAT IS AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY?
- It is one who has such an interest in the
controversy or subject matter that a
final adjudication cannot be made, in
his absence, without injuring or
affecting that interest.[4][30]

WHAT HAPPENS IF AN INDISPENSABLE PART IS NOT
IMPLEADED?
- THE CASE MUST BE DISMISSED.


An indispensable party is defined as one who has such an
interest in the controversy or subject matter that a final
adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring
or affecting that interest.[5][30]

Under Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, parties in
interest without whom no final determination can be had of
an action shall be joined as plaintiffs or defendants.

If there is a failure to implead an indispensable party, any
judgment rendered would have no effectiveness. It is
precisely when an indispensable party is not before the
court (that) an action should be dismissed.

The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent
actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act,
not only as to the absent parties but even to those present.

The purpose of the rules on joinder of indispensable parties is
a complete determination of all issues not only between the
parties themselves, but also as regards other persons who
may be affected by the judgment.
A decision valid on its face cannot attain real finality where
there is want of indispensable parties.

The general rule with reference to the making of parties in a
civil action requires the joinder of all indispensable parties
under any and all conditions, their presence being a sine qua
non of the exercise of judicial power. (Borlasa v. Polistico, 47
Phil. 345, 348)

For this reason, our Supreme Court has held that when it
appears of record that there are other persons interested in
the subject matter of the litigation, who are not made parties
to the action, it is the duty of the court to suspend the trial
until such parties are made either plaintiffs or defendants.
(Pobre, et al. v. Blanco, 17 Phil. 156). x x x

Where the petition failed to join as party defendant the
person interested in sustaining the proceeding in the court,
the same should be dismissed. x x x When an indispensable
party is not before the court, the action should be dismissed.
(People, et al. v. Rodriguez, et al., G.R. Nos. L-14059-62,
September 30, 1959) (sic)

Parties in interest without whom no final determination can
be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or
defendants. (Sec. 7, Rule 3, Rules of Court).

The burden of procuring the presence of all indispensable
parties is on the plaintiff. (39 Amjur [sic] 885).

The evident purpose of the rule is to prevent the multiplicity
of suits by requiring the person arresting a right against the
defendant to include with him, either as co-plaintiffs or as co-
defendants, all persons standing in the same position, so that
the whole matter in dispute may be determined once and for
all in one litigation. (Palarca v. Baginsi, 38 Phil. 177, 178).

FOR A DERIVATIVE SUIT TO PROSPER, it is required that the
minority stockholder suing for and on behalf of the
corporation must allege in his complaint that he is suing on a
derivative cause of action on behalf of the corporation and
all other stockholders similarly situated who may wish to
join him in the suit.

It is a condition sine qua non that the corporation be
impleaded as a party because not only is the corporation an
indispensable party, but it is also the present rule that it
must be served with process.

The judgment must be made binding upon the corporation in
order that the corporation may get the benefit of the suit
and may not bring subsequent suit against the same
defendants for the same cause of action.

In other words, the corporation must be joined as party
because it is its cause of action that is being litigated and
because judgment must be a res adjudicata against it.




WHAT IS AN INTRACORPORATE CONTROVERSY?
- One which pertains to any of the
following relationships:
(1) between the corporation,
partnership or association and the
public;

(2) between the corporation,
partnership or association and the
state in so far as its franchise, permit or
license to operate is concerned;

(3) between the corporation,
partnership or association and its
stockholders, partners, members or
officers; and

(4) among the stockholders, partners or
associates themselves.[15][40]


IN CASE OF DISPUTE ON THE LEGALITY OF ASSESSMENT OF
CONDO DUES BY UNIT OWNERS AND THE CONDO
CORPORATION WHO HAS JURISDICTION?
- THE COURT.


Based on the foregoing definition, there is no doubt that the
controversy in this case is essentially intra-corporate in
character, for being between a condominium corporation and
its members-unit owners.
In the recent case an action involving the legality of
assessment dues against the condominium
owner/developer, the Court held that, the matter being an
intra-corporate dispute, the RTC had jurisdiction to hear the
same pursuant to R.A. No. 8799.

PETITIONER ARGUED THAT THE RESPONDENTS SHOULD
HAVE APPEALED FIRST TO THE HLURB BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS FOLLOWING THE RULE ON EXHAUSTION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY. IS THEIR CONTENTION CORRECT?
- NO. The circumstances prevailing
warranted a relaxation of the rule.
There are exeptions to the rule.

WHAT ARE THESE EXCEPTIONS?
(A) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking
the doctrine;

(b) where the challenged administrative act is patently
illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction;

(c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that
will irretrievably prejudice the complainant;

(d) where the amount involved is relatively so small as to
make the rule impractical and oppressive;

(e) where the question involved is purely legal and will
ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice;

(f) where judicial intervention is urgent;
(g) where the application of the doctrine may cause great
and irreparable damage;

(h) where the controverted acts violate due process;

(i) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies has been rendered moot;

(j) where there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy;

(k) where strong public interest is involved; and

(l) in quo warranto proceedings.[18][44] [underscoring
supplied]
IN THIS CASE THE CHALLEGED DECISION IS
PATENTLY ILLEGAL AND THE QUESTION INVOLVED
IS PURELY LEGAL.



There is a QUESTION OF LAW when the doubt or difference
arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, and
not as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts.

Said question at best could be resolved only tentatively by the
administrative authorities. The final decision on the matter
rests not with them but with the courts of justice. Exhaustion
of administrative remedies does not apply, because nothing of
an administrative nature is to be or can be done.
The issue does not require technical knowledge and
experience but one that would involve the interpretation and
application of law.

BUT THE HLURB DECISION MUST BE GIVEN RESPECT AND
FINALITY BECAUSE HLURB IS A SPECIALIZED AGENCY. IS THIS
CORRECT?
- NO. BECAUSE THE HLURB DECISION IS
PATENTLY ILLEGAL.

HOW JURISDICTION IS DETERMINED; HLURB JURISDICTION;
INDISPENSABLE PARTY; DERIVATIVE SUIT; EXHAUSTION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY; GIVING RESPECT AND FINALITY TO
HLURB DECISION


WHAT CONFERS JURISDICTION OVER A SUBJECT MATTER?
- IT IS THE LAW.


HOW IS JURISDICTION DETERMINED?
- BY THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE
COMPLAINT?

WHAT IS A COMPLAINT?
- A COMPLAINT COMPRISE A CONCISE
STATEMENT OF THE ULTIMATE FACTS
CONSTITUTING PLAINTIFFS CAUSE OF
ACTION.



IN DETERMINING JURISDICTION WHAT THEREFORE MUST BE
CONSIDERED?
THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE
COMPLAINT AND;

THE RELIEF SOUGHT.

IN THE CASE OF HLURB, WHAT DETERMINES JURISDICTION?
1. THE NATURE OF THE CAUSE OF
ACTION,
2. THE SUBJECT MATTER OR
PROPERTY INVOLVED AND
3. THE PARTIES.


Basic as a hornbook principle is that jurisdiction over the
subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined
by the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise
statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs
cause of action.

The nature of an action, as well as which court or body has
jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations
contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of
whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or
some of the claims asserted therein.

The averments in the complaint and the character of the
relief sought are the ones to be consulted. Once vested by
the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also remains
vested irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to
recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.[1][17]

Thus, it was ruled that the jurisdiction of the HLURB to hear
and decide cases is determined by the nature of the cause of
action, the subject matter or property involved and the
parties.


HOW DO YOU DETERMINE THE EXTENT TO WHICH AN
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY MAY EXERCISE ITS POWERS?
- Based on the PROVISIONS OF THE
STATUTE CREATING IT.

IN THE CASE OF HLURB, WHAT LAWS DETERMINE THE
EXTENT OF ITS POWERS TO HEAR CASES?
- PD 957 which granted HLURB exclusive
jurisdiction to regulate THE REAL
ESTATE TRADE AND BUSINESS.


THIS POWER WAS EXPANDED BY PD 1344 TO THE
FOLLOWING CASES:

(A) unsound real estate business practices;

(b) claims involving refund and any other claims filed by
subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project
owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and

(c) cases involving specific performance of contractual and
statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or
condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer,
broker or salesman.



LEGAL NOTE 0121: WHAT IS THE DEGREE OF DILIGENCE
REQUIRED OF BANKS?

SUBJECT:
1. PROXIMATE CAUSE;
2. SOLUTIO INDEBITI;
3. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE;
4. DUTY OF COLLECTING BANK;
5. DEGREE OF DILIGENCE REQUIRED OF BANKS.

PNB RECEIVED FOREIGN CHECKS. THE RULE REQUIRES A 15-
DAY CLEARING. BUT PNB ALLOWED THE CHECKS TO BE
CLEARED BEFORE THE END OF THE 15 DAY PERIOD? WHOSE
FAULT IS IT?
- FAULT OF PNB. PNBS disregard of its
preventive and protective measure
against the possibility of being
victimized by bad checks had brought
upon itself the injury of losing a
significant amount of money.


This Court already held that the payment of the amounts of
checks without previously clearing them with the drawee bank
especially so where the drawee bank is a foreign bank and the
amounts involved were large is contrary to normal or ordinary
banking practice.
[3][37]


Also, in Associated Bank v. Tan,
[4][38]
wherein the bank allowed
the withdrawal of the value of a check prior to its clearing, we
said that *b+efore the check shall have been cleared for
deposit, the collecting bank can only assume at its own risk
x x x that the check would be cleared and paid out.


WHAT KIND OF DILIGENCE IS REQUIRED OF BANKS?
- MORE THAN THAT OF A ROMAN PATER
FAMILIAS OR A GOOD FATHER OF A
FAMILY.
- THE HIGHEST DEGREE OF DILIGENCE IS
EXPECTED.
[5][39]



WHAT IS THE DUTY OF A COLLECTING BANK?
- With regard to collection or
encashment of checks, suffice it to say
that the law imposes on the collecting
bank the duty to scrutinize diligently
the checks deposited with it for the
purpose of determining their
genuineness and regularity.

- The collecting bank, being primarily
engaged in banking, holds itself out to
the public as the expert on this field,
and the law thus holds it to a high
standard of conduct.
[6][41]



PNB miserably failed to do its duty of exercising extraordinary
diligence and reasonable business prudence. The disregard of
its own banking policy amounts to gross negligence, which the
law defines as negligence characterized by the want of even
slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there
is duty to act, not inadvertently but wilfully and intentionally
with a conscious indifference to consequences in so far as
other persons may be affected.
[8][40]


With regard to collection or encashment of checks, suffice it to
say that the law imposes on the collecting bank the duty to
scrutinize diligently the checks deposited with it for the
purpose of determining their genuineness and regularity.

The collecting bank, being primarily engaged in banking,
holds itself out to the public as the expert on this field, and
the law thus holds it to a high standard of conduct.
[9][41]


A bank is expected to be an expert in banking procedures and
it has the necessary means to ascertain whether a check, local
or foreign, is sufficiently funded.


PNB OBLIGES CHEA TO RETURN THE MONEY UNDER THE
PRINCIPLE OF SOLUTION INDEBITI.


WHAT IS SOLUTION INDEBITI?
- IF SOMETHING IS RECEIVED WHEN
THERE IS NO RIGHT TO DEMAND IT,
AND IT WAS UNDULY DELIVERED
THROUGH MISTAKE, THE OBLIGATION
TO RETURN IT ARISES. (ART. 2154, CIVIL
CODE)

WHAT ARE THE REQUISITES OF SOLUTIO INDEBITI?

(A) That he who paid was not under obligation to do so;
and

(b) That the payment was made by reason of an essential
mistake of fact.
[10][43]


ARE SPOUSES CHEAH OBLIGATED TO RETURN THE MONEY
WITHDRAWN UNDER THE PRINCIPLE OF SOLUTIO INDEBITI?
- NO. In the first place, the gross
negligence of PNB can never be
equated with a mere mistake of fact,
which must be something excusable
and which requires the exercise of
prudence.

No recovery is due if the
mistake done is one of gross
negligence.



A STRANGER GAVE THE CHEAH SPOUSES A CHECK FOR
US$300,000.00. THEY WENT TO THE BANK AND DEPOSITED
IT. BEFORE THE 15 DAY CLEARING PERIOD THEY WERE
INFORMED BY PNB THAT THE CHECK HAS ALREADY BEEN
CLEARED. THEY WENT TO THE BANK AND ENCASHED IT.

ARE THEY LIABLE TO RETURN THE MONEY?
- YES, BECAUSE THEY ARE GUILTY OF
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.

Spouses Leah should have been more
diligent because the one who gave her
the check was a stranger.

Also, when the bank called her up and
inform her that the bank was cleared
before the 15 day period she should
have first verified the regularity of such
hasty clearance considering that if
something goes wrong with the
transaction, it is she and her husband
who would be put at risk and not the
accommodated party.



WHAT IS CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE?
- CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE IS
CONDUCT ON THE PART OF THE
INJURED PARTY, CONTRIBUTING AS A
LEGAL CAUSE TO THE HARM HE HAS
SUFFERED, WHICH FALLS BELOW THE
STANDARD TO WHICH HE IS REQUIRED
TO CONFORM FOR HIS OWN
PROTECTION.
[13][44]


The spouses Cheah are guilty of contributory
negligence and are bound to share the loss with the
bank


Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the
injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he
has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is
required to conform for his own protection.
[14][44]



WHEN IS SEPARATION PAY GIVEN TO AN EMPLOYEE DESPITE
HIS DISMISSAL FROM EMPLOYMENT?


CA AWARDED THE WORKERS SEPARATION PAY AS FORM OF
FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE. IS THIS VALID?
- NO. Separation pay may be given as a
form of financial assistance when a
worker is dismissed in cases such as:
a. the installation of labor-saving devices,
b. redundancy,
c. retrenchment to prevent losses,
d. closing or cessation of operation of the
establishment, or
e. in case the employee was found to
have been suffering from a disease
such that his continued employment is
prohibited by law.
[1][36]




WHY?
It is a statutory right defined as the amount that an
employee receives at the time of his severance from the
service and is designed to provide the employee with the
wherewithal during the period that he is looking for another
employment.
[2][37]


It is oriented towards the immediate future, the transitional
period the dismissed employee must undergo before
locating a replacement job.
[3][38]




HOW ABOUT IF THE CAUSES ARE JUST CAUSES?
- The employee is NOT ENTITLED to such
separation pay as form of financial
exception because LAWBREAKERS
SHOULD NOT BENEFIT FROM THEIR
ILLEGAL ACTS.






IS THIS RULE ABSOLUTE?
- No there in an exception. Where the
employee is validly dismissed for
causes other than serious misconduct
or those reflecting on his moral
character. The reason is social justice.


GIVE EXAMPLES WHEN SEPARATION PAY WAS GRANTED
DESPITE DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE?
The court applied social justice and equity
considerations in several cases to justify the award of financial
assistance.

In one case, the court declared the strike to be illegal for
failure to comply with the procedural requirements. It
likewise, sustained the dismissal of the union president for
participating in said illegal strike.

Considering, however, that his infraction is not so
reprehensible and unscrupulous as to warrant complete
disregard of his long years of service, and considering further
that he has no previous derogatory records, it granted
financial assistance to support him in the twilight of his life
after long years of service.
[6][47]


It likewise, awarded financial assistance in salavarria v. Letran
college
[9][50]
to the legally dismissed teacher for violation of
school policy because such infraction neither amounted to
serious misconduct nor reflected that of a morally depraved
person.




GIVE EXAMPLES WHEN SEPARATION PAY WAS NOT GIVEN.
When following the declaration that the strike staged
by the union members is illegal, the union officers and
members were considered validly dismissed from
employment for committing illegal acts during the illegal
strike.

The court affirmed the CAs conclusion that the commission of
illegal acts during the illegal strike constituted serious
misconduct.
[11][44]
hence, the award of separation pay to the
union officials and members was not sustained.
[12][45]


The Court refrained from awarding separation pay or financial
assistance to union officers and members who were separated
from service due to their participation in or commission of
illegal acts during the strike.

The strike was found to be illegal because of procedural
infirmities and for defiance of the secretary of labors
assumption order. Hence, we upheld the union officers
dismissal without granting financial assistance.

The union officers and members who participated in and
committed illegal acts during the illegal strike were deemed to
have lost their employment status and were not awarded
financial assistance.




The strikers open and willful defiance of the assumption
order of the secretary of labor constitute serious misconduct
and reflective of their moral character, hence, granting of
financial assistance to them cannot be justified.

Their participation in the unlawful and violent strike which
resulted in multiple deaths and extensive property damage
because it constitutes serious misconduct on their part.




Separation pay is a statutory right defined as the amount
that an employee receives at the time of his severance from
the service and is designed to provide the employee with the
wherewithal during the period that he is looking for another
employment.
[21][37]


It is oriented towards the immediate future, the transitional
period the dismissed employee must undergo before locating
a replacement job.










LEGALITY OF SC MINUTE RESOLUTIONS.

AGOY FILED A PETITION FOR REVIEW. THE SC DENIED IT BY A
MINUTE RESOLUTION. IS AN SC MINUTE RESOLUTION VALID?
- YES. It is an exercise of judicial
discretion and constitutes sound and
valid judicial practice.

WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF MINUTE RESOLUTIONS?
- FOR PROMPT DISPATCH OF THE
ACTIONS OF THE COURT.

WHAT IS ITS BASIS?
- SECTION 7 OF THE SC INTERNAL RULES.


Minute resolutions are issued for the prompt dispatch of the
actions of the Court. While they are the results of the
deliberations by the Justices of the Court, they are
promulgated by the Clerk of Court or his assistants whose duty
is to inform the parties of the action taken on their cases by
quoting verbatim the resolutions adopted by the Court.
[1][1]


Neither the Clerk of Court nor his assistants take part in the
deliberations of the case. They merely transmit the Courts
action in the form prescribed by its Internal Rules:

IS IT NECESSARY THAT THE JUSTICES SIGN MINUTE
RESOLUTIONS?
- No. THERE IS NO LAW OR RULE
REQUIRING THEM TO SIGN MINUTE
RESOLUTIONS. To require the justices
to sign all its resolutions respecting its
action on new cases would be
unreasonable and unnecessary.

No law or rule requires its members to sign minute resolutions
that deny due course to actions filed before it or the Chief
Justice to enter his certification on the same. The notices
quote the Courts actual resolutions denying due course to the
subject actions and these already state the required legal basis
for such denial. To require the Justices to sign all its
resolutions respecting its action on new cases would be
unreasonable and unnecessary.

AGOY ARGUES THAT THE CONSTITUTION REQUIRES EVERY
COURT TO STATE IN ITS DECISION CLEARLY AND DISTINCTLY
THE FACT AND THE LAW ON WHICH IT IS BASED AND
THEREFORE MINUTE RESOLUTION WHICH DOES NOT
DISCUSS THE LAW AND THE FACTS IS ILLEGAL.

IS HIS ARGUMENT CORRECT?
- No. The constitution also states that
denial of a petition for review may only
state the legal basis for such denial.
The sc minute resolution states the
legal basis for its denial.


Two. While the Constitution requires every court to state in
its decision clearly and distinctly the fact and the law on which
it is based, the Constitution requires the court, in denying due
course to a petition for review, merely to state the legal basis
for such denial.

With the promulgation of its Internal Rules, the Court
itself has defined the instances when cases are to be
adjudicated by decision, signed resolution, unsigned
resolution or minute resolution.
[4][4]


Among those instances when a minute resolution shall issue
is when the Court denies a petition filed under Rule 45 of the
[Rules of Court], citing as legal basis the absence of reversible
error committed in the challenged decision, resolution, or
order of the court below.
[5][5]
The minute resolutions in this
case complied with this requirement.

WHEN SC STATES IT DOES NOT FIND ANY REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN THE DECISION OF THE CA, SHOULD THE SC STILL FULLY
EXPLAIN ITS DENIAL?
- NO NEED BECAUSE IT WOULD BE
REDUNDANT. ITS DENIAL MEANS THAT
SC ADOPTS THE FINDINGS AND
CONCLUSIONS OF THE CA.


The Court has repeatedly said that minute resolutions
dismissing the actions filed before it constitute actual
adjudications on the merits.

AGOY SAID HIS MOTION WAS TO RESCIND THE MINUTE
RESOLUTION. SC WAS WRONG WHEN IT CONSIDERED HIS
MOTION AS A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.
- SC WAS JUSTIFIED BECAUSE AGOY IN
HIS MOTION TO RESCIND WAS ASKING
SC TO REVIEW THE MERITS OF HIS CASE
AGAIN.


Agoy questions the Courts act of treating his motion to
rescind as a motion for reconsideration, arguing that it had no
basis for doing so. But the Court was justified in its action
since his motion to rescind asked the Court to review the
merits of his case again.

RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN DIVORCE IN THE PHILIPPINES.

DIGEST:

ORLANDO, AN AMERICAN, WAS MARRIED TO FELICITAS. IN
THE U.S. ORLANDO DIVORCED FELICITAS AND MARRIED
MEROPE. WHEN ORLANDO DIED, MEROPE FILED INTESTATE
CASE PRAYING THAT SHE BE APPOINTED ADMINISTRATRIX.
LOUELLA, THE DAUGHTER OF ORLANDO OPPOSED ON THE
GROUND THAT MEROPE IS NOT A PARTY IN INTEREST
BECAUSE SHE WAS CHARGED WITH BIGAMY BY FELICITAS AS
MEROPE WAS MARRIED TO EUSEBIO BEFORE SHE MARRIED
ORLANDO. RTC RULED THAT MEROPE WAS NOT MARRIED TO
EUSEBIO BUT SINCE DIVORCE IS NOT RECOGNIZED IN THE
PHILIPPINES THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN ORLANDO AND
MEROPE WAS NOT VALID. MEROPE, NOT BEING MARRIED TO
ORLANDO, IS THEREFORE IS A DISINTERESTED PARTY. HER
INTESTATE CASE WAS DISMISSED. CA AFFIRMED.

ARE RTC AND CA CORRECT?
- NO. FOREIGN DIVORCE IS RECOGNIZED
IN THE PHILIPPINES BUT IT MUST BE
PROVEN.

TRIAL FIRST BE HELD TO DETERMINE
WHETHER SUCH FOREIGN DIVORCE
WAS VALIDLY OBTAINED. CASE
REMANDED TO RTC.

IS FOREIGN DIVORCE RECOGNIZED IN THE PHILIPPINES?
WHAT IS THE BASIS?
- YES. As ruled in van dorn v. Romillo,
jr.
[1][7]


Under the PRINCIPLES OF COMITY, our jurisdiction recognizes
a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality.

It is true that owing to the nationality principle, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorces[,] the same being considered contrary to
our concept of public policy and morality.

However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law.

In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private
respondent from the marriage from the standards of
American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.
xxx


WHAT IS NEEDED IN RECOGNIZING A FOREIGN DIVORCE?
- THE FACT OF DIVORCE MUST STILL
FIRST BE PROVEN.

Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary
value, the document must first be presented and admitted in
evidence.

A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree
itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the
judgment itself. The decree purports to be a written act or
record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign
country.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a
writing or document may be proven as a public or official
record of a foreign country by either:
(1) an official publication or
(2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having
legal custody of the document.

If the record is not kept in thePhilippines, such copy must be
(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept
and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the
Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no longer
bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian
citizenship in 1992. Naturalization is the legal act of adopting
an alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights
belonging to a citizen. Naturalized citizens, freed from the
protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of their
adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent
severed his allegiance to the Philippinesand the vinculum juris
that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.

Burden of Proving Australian Law

The burden of proof lies with the party who alleges the
existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or
defense of an action.


It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot
take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they
must be alleged and proved.

The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution,
and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be
resolved in the negative. (Emphasis supplied)

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document
may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign
country by either:
(1) an official publication or
(2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having
legal custody of the document.
If the record is not kept in thePhilippines, such copy must be:
(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept and
(b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

With regard to respondents marriage to Felicisimo allegedly
solemnized inCalifornia,U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of
the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the Family
Law Act of California which purportedly show that their
marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As stated
in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of
foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved.

Thus, it is imperative for the trial court to first determine the
validity of the divorce to ascertain the rightful party to be
issued the letters of administration over the estate of Orlando
B. Catalan.

LEGAL NOTE 0116: NOTES ON EVIDENCE: PRESUMPTION OF
INNOCENCE; BURDEN OF PROOF; PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE;
HEIRARCHY OF EVIDENCE; PROOF IN DISBARMENT; EQUIPOISE
DOCTRINE.


WHAT IS THE PRESUMPTION ABOUT ONE CHARGED WITH
CRIME?
- HE IS PRESUMED INNOCENT OF THE
CRIME 0R WRONGDOING.


IN THE CASE OF A LAWYER CHARGED WITH WRONGDOING
IN HIS CAPACITY AS LAWYER, WHAT IS THE PRESUMPTION
ABOUT HIM?
- That he is innocent and as lawyer he
performed his duties in accordance
with his oath.

An attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is
innocent of charges against him until the contrary is
proved, and that as an officer of the court, he is
presumed to have performed his duties in accordance
with his oath.
70



WHAT IS BURDEN OF PROOF?

THE DUTY TO PRESENT EVIDENCE.

THE DUTY OF A PARTY TO PRESENT EVIDENCE ON THE FACTS
IN ISSUE NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH HIS CLAIM OR DEFENSE BY
THE AMOUNT OF EVIDENCE REQUIRED BY LAW.


WHAT PROOF IS NECESSARY IN DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS?
- PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE. BUT
WHICH MUST BE CONVINCING AND
SATISFACTORY.

CONSIDERING THE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES OF THE
DISBARMENT OR SUSPENSION OF A MEMBER OF THE
BAR, THE COURT HAS CONSISTENTLY HELD THAT
CLEARLY PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE IS NECESSARY TO
JUSTIFY THE IMPOSITION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
PENALTY ON A MEMBER OF THE BAR.
74



GIVE THE HIERARCHY OF EVIDENCE?
a. First evidence beyond reasonable doubt,
b. Then clear and convincing evidence,
c. Then preponderant evidence,
d. Then substantial evidence.


WHAT IS MEANT BY PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE?
- MORE CONVINCING EVIDENCE.

- PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE means
that the evidence adduced by one side
is, as a whole, superior to or has
greater weight than that of the other.
75


- It means evidence which is more
convincing to the court as worthy of
belief than that which is offered in
opposition thereto.
76



WHAT SHOULD THE COURT CONSIDER IN DETERMINING
PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE?
- UNDER SECTION 1 OF RULE 133, IN
DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT
THERE IS PREPONDERANCE OF
EVIDENCE, THE COURT MAY CONSIDER
THE FOLLOWING:

(a) all the facts and circumstances of the case;

(b) the witnesses manner of testifying, their intelligence,
their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to
which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to
which they testify, the probability or improbability of
their testimony;

(c) the witnesses interest or want of interest, and also
their personal credibility so far as the same may
ultimately appear in the trial; and

(d) the number of witnesses, although it does not mean
that preponderance is necessarily with the greater
number.


WHAT DETERMINES WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY OF
EVIDENCE?
- THE EFFECT ON THE JUDGE.

Weight and sufficiency of evidence, under rule 133 of
the rules of court, is not determined mathematically
by the numerical superiority of the witnesses
testifying to a given fact.

It depends upon its practical effect in inducing belief
for the party on the judge trying the case.
72

SUPPOSE THE EVIDENCE ARE EVENLY BALANCED, HOW WILL
THE COURT RULE?
- BASED ON THE EQUIPOISE DOCTRINE.

When the evidence of the parties are evenly balanced
or there is doubt on which side the evidence
preponderates, the decision should be against the
party with the burden of proof, according to the
equipoise doctrine.
77



BURDEN OF PROOF, on the other hand, is defined in Section 1
of Rule 131 as the duty of a party to present evidence on the
facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by
the amount of evidence required by law.


PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE means that the evidence
adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has greater
weight than that of the other.
75


It means evidence which is more convincing to the court as
worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition
thereto.
76







HOW TO DETERMINE WHETHER A COMPLAINT STATES NO
CAUSE OF ACTION.

PETITIONER AND USTHI (UST HOSPITAL INC.) EXECUTED A
CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT CONTRACT. PETITIONER
DEMANDED PAYMENT. USTHI DID NOT PAY. USTHI WAS
DISSOLVED AND UNDER ITS CHARTER ITS ASSETS GO TO UST.
PETITIONER SUED UST AND USTHI. RTC DISMISSED THE CASE
AGAINST UST ON THE GROUND THAT UST HAS NO PRIVITY
WITH PETITIONER.
WAS RTC CORRECT?

No. In determining whether the complaint states a cause of
action only the allegations in the complaint must be
considered. Not evidentiary facts. Not legal conclusions from
whatever is alleged and whatever evidence is attached to the
complaint. Only the allegations in the complaint must be
considered.

The complaint alleged that:
(1) UST and USTHI are one and the same corporation;
(2) UST stands to benefit from the assets of USTHI by
virtue of the latters articles of incorporation;
(3) respondent controls the business of USTHI; and
(4) USTS officials have performed acts that may be
construed as an acknowledgement of respondents
liability to petitioner.
THESE ALLEGATIONS CLEARY IMPLEAD UST AND THE
ISSUES RAISED WOULD BE BEST RESOLVED AT THE
TRIAL.

It is settled that the existence of a cause of action is
determined by the allegations in the complaint. In
resolving a motion to dismiss based on the failure to
state a cause of action, only the facts alleged in the
complaint must be considered.

The test is whether the court can render a valid judgment on
the complaint based on the facts alleged and the prayer
asked for.


HOW DO YOU COMPUTE PENALTY FOR QUALIFIED THEFT?

ACCOUNTANT DEPOSITED CHECKS TO ACCOUNT OF VIVA AND
WITHDREW PROCEEDS, LIABLE FOR QUALIFIED THEFT, NOT
ESTAFA; COMPUTATION OF PENALTY FOR QUALIFIED THEFT;
PENALTY INCREASED TO RECLUSION PERPETUA FOR STOLEN
AMOUNT OF P797,187.85.

SUBJECT/DOCTRINE:
In the determination of the penalty for qualified theft, NOTE
IS TAKEN OF THE VALUE OF THE PROPERTY STOLEN, which is
P797,187.85 in this case. Since the value exceeds P22,000.00,
the basic penalty is prision mayor in its minimum and medium
periods to be imposed in the maximum period, that is, eight
(8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to ten (10) years of
prision mayor.

To determine the additional years of imprisonment to be
added to the basic penalty, the amount of P22,000.00 is
deducted from P797,187.85, which yields a remainder of
P775,187.85. This amount is then divided by P10,000.00,
disregarding any amount less than P10,000.00. The end result
is that 77 years should be added to the basic penalty.

However, the total imposable penalty for simple theft
should not exceed 20 years.

Thus, had petitioner committed simple theft, the penalty
would be 20 years of reclusion temporal. As the penalty for
qualified theft is two degrees higher, the trial court, as well as
the appellate court, should have imposed the penalty of
reclusion perpetua.

WHAT ARE THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE THAT THE
SUPREME COURT SHALL NOT REVIEW THE FINDINGS OF
FACTS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS?

SUBJECT/DOCTRINE/DIGEST:
THE ISSUE OF WHETHER PETITIONERS POSSESS THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY AS OWNERS, OR WHETHER THEY OCCUPY THE
SAME BY MERE TOLERANCE OF RESPONDENTS, IS A
QUESTION OF FACT.

IS THE RULING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS ON THIS MATTER
REVIEWABLE BY THE SUPREME COURT?
- ORDINARILY NO. BUT THERE ARE EXCEPTIONS AS
FOLLOWS:
(a) When the findings are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises, or conjectures;
(b) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd, or impossible;
(c) When there is grave abuse of discretion;
(d) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of
facts;
(e) When the findings of facts are conflicting;
(f) When in making its findings the CA went beyond the
issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the
admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;
(g) When the CAs findings are contrary to those by the
trial court;
(h) When the findings are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based;
(i) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in
the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed
by the respondent;
(j) When the findings of fact are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record; or
(k) When the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant
facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion.
15


WHAT IS ORDINARY ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION AND WHAT
IS EXTRA-ORDINARY ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION?


SUBJECT/DOCTRINE/DIGEST:





WHAT ARE THE 2 KINDS OF ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION?
- ORDINARY AND EXTRAORDINARY.


WHAT IS ORDINARY ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION?
- Ordinary acquisitive prescription
requires;
1. POSSESSION IN GOOD FAITH

2. WITH JUST TITLE FOR TEN (10)
YEARS.
17



WHAT IS EXTRAORDINARY ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION?

IT REQUIRES:

1. WITHOUT GOOD FAITH;

2. WITHOUT JUST TITLE;

3. UNINTERRUPTED ADVERSE POSSESSION FOR 30
YEARS.


WHAT IS POSSESSION IN GOOD FAITH?
- IT CONSISTS IN THE REASONABLE
BELIEF THAT THE PERSON FROM
WHOM THE THING IS RECEIVED HAS
BEEN THE OWNER THEREOF, AND
COULD TRANSMIT HIS OWNERSHIP.
19

WHEN IS THERE JUST TITLE?
- When an adverse claimant came into
possession of the property through one
of the modes recognized by law for the
acquisition of ownership or other real
rights, but the grantor was not the
owner or could not transmit any
right.
20


IS PETITIONER THE OWNER OF SUBJECT LAND BY ORDINARY
ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION?
- No, because he acknowledged that the
owner was another person who merely
tolerated his occupation of the
property.


Acts of possessory character executed due to license
or by mere tolerance of the owner are inadequate for
purposes of acquisitive prescription.
22



Possession, to constitute the foundation of a
prescriptive right, must be en CONCEPTO DE DUEO,
or, to use the common law equivalent of the term,
that possession should be adverse, if not, such
possessory acts, no matter how long, do not start the
running of the period of prescription.
23





CAN PETITIONERS POSSESSION OF SUBJECT PROPERTY BE
CONSIDERED EXTRAORDINARY ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION?
- NO. BECAUSE THEIR EARLIEST TAX
DECLARATION WAS IN 1974. FROM
SUCH DATE THE 30 YEAR PERIOD ENDS
IN 2004. BUT THE CASE WAS FILED IN
1996.


WHAT EVIDENCE IS REQUIRED IN ESTABLISHING
PRESCRIPTION?
- CLEAR, COMPLETE AND CONCLUSIVE.


PETITIONERS ATTACKED THE DUE EXECUTION AND
AUTHENTICITY OF THE DEED OF SALE OF RESPONDENTS IN
THEIR COMMENT TO RESPONDENTS PETITION FOR REVIEW
FILED AT CA. IS THIS PROPER.
- No. Points of law, theories, issues, and
arguments not adequately brought to
the attention of the trial court need not
be, and ordinarily will not be,
considered by a reviewing court.

- They cannot be raised for the first time
on appeal.


Finally, as to the issue of whether the due execution and
authenticity of the deed of sale upon which respondents
anchor their ownership were not proven, the Court notes that
petitioners did not raise this matter in their Answer as well as
in their Pre-Trial Brief.
To allow this would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play,
justice and due process.
27



SUPPOSE THE ISSUE OF DUE EXECUTION AND AUTHENTICITY
OF THE SUBJECT DEED OF SALE WAS PROPERLY RAISED, WILL
THE FINDINGS OF THE C.A. BE REVERSED?
- No. Because the deed of sale was
NOTARIZED.


WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF THE NOTARIZATION OF THE DEED OF
SALE?
- A notarized document has in its favor
the presumption of regularity, and to
overcome the same, there must be
evidence that is clear, convincing and
more than merely preponderant;
otherwise, the document should be
upheld.
29



As a notarized document, it has in its favor the presumption
of regularity and it carries the evidentiary weight conferred
upon it with respect to its due execution.

It is admissible in evidence without further proof of its
authenticity and is entitled to full faith and credit upon its
face.
28



THE THE ISSUE OF WHETHER PETITIONERS POSSESS THE
SUBJECT PROPERTY AS OWNERS, OR WHETHER THEY
OCCUPY THE SAME BY MERE TOLERANCE OF RESPONDENTS,
IS A QUESTION OF FACT. IS CA RULING ON THIS REVIEWABLE
BY THE SUPREME COURT?
- ORDINARILY NO. BUT THERE ARE
EXCEPTIONS AS FOLLOWS:

(a) When the findings are grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises, or conjectures;
(b) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd,
or impossible;
(c) When there is grave abuse of discretion;
(d) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of
facts;
(e) When the findings of facts are conflicting;
(f) When in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues
of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of
both the appellant and the appellee;
(g) When the CAs findings are contrary to those by the trial
court;
(h) When the findings are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based;
(i) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondent;
(j) When the findings of fact are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record; or
(k) When the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts
not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion.
15



WHAT IS A DRAGNET CLAUSE OR BLANKET CLAUSE IN A
CONTRACT? IS IT VALID?


WHAT DOES THE REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE PROVIDE?
- That it shall stand as security for any
subsequent promissory note or notes
either as a renewal of the former note,
as an extension thereof, or as a new
loan, or is given any other kind of
accommodations such as overdrafts,
letters of credit, acceptances and bills
of exchange, releases of import
shipments on trust receipts, etc.

- The same real estate mortgage likewise
expressly covered any and all other
obligations of the mortgagor to the
mortgagee of whatever kind and
nature whether such obligations have
been contracted before, during or after
the constitution of this mortgage.


IS SUGAR QUEDAN LOANS COVERED BY THE MORTGAGE?
- Yes. Because the contract plainly states
that all subsequent loans shall be
convered by the real estate mortgage.
The contract is clear and the court must
apply it literally. Only when the
contract is vague when the court must
interpret it.

Obligations arising from contracts have the force of
law between the contracting parties and should be
complied with in good faith.

When the terms of a contract are clear and leave no
doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties,
the literal meaning of its stipulations governs.

In such cases, courts have no authority to alter the contract
by construction or to make a new contract for the parties;

a courts duty is confined to the interpretation of the
contract the parties made for themselves without regard to
its wisdom or folly, as the court cannot supply material
stipulations or read into the contract words the contract
does not contain.

It is only when the contract is vague and ambiguous that
courts are permitted to resort to the interpretation of its
terms to determine the parties intent.
[2][41]



SUCH CLAUSE IN THE MORTGAGE (THAT IT SHALL STAND AS
SECURITY FOR ANY SUBSEQUENT LOAN) IS A BLANKET
CLAUSE OR DRAGNET CLAUSE. IS SUCH CLAUSE VALID?
- YES. A DRAGNET CLASUE IS
RECOGNIZED IN OUR JURISPRUDENCE.


SUPPOSE THERE IS A DRAGNET CLAUSE STATING THAT ALL
SUBSEQUENT LOANS WILL BE COVERED BY THE REAL ESTATE
MORTGAGE. A SUBSEQUENT LOAN WAS AVAILED. BUT A
SPECIAL SECURITY WAS GIVEN FOR SUCH LOAN. WILL THE
DRAGNET CLAUSE STILL APPLY?
- Yes according to the prudential bank
case stated below. But the special
security must be applied first. If
deficient then the real estate mortgage
shall apply.


DISGRACEFUL AND IMMORAL CONDUCT IN GOVERNMENT
SERVICE.


ESPELITA, A COURT INTERPRETER MAINTAINED AN ILLICIT
RELATIONSHIP WITH A CERTAIN MR. BANAAG EVIDENCED BY
BANK DEPOSIT SLIPS MADE BY THE LATTER IN FAVOR OF
ESPELITA. WHAT OFFENSE DID ESPELITA COMMIT?
- DISGRACEFUL AND IMMORAL
CONDUCT.

WHAT IS THE OFFENSE OF DISGRACEFUL AND IMMORAL
CONDUCT?
- It is an act which violates the basic
norm of decency, morality and
decorum abhorred and condemned by
the society and conduct which is
willful, flagrant or shameless, and
which shows a moral indifference to
the opinions of the good and
respectable members of the
community.

WHAT IS THE DEGREE OF SUCH OFFENSE?
- GRAVE.


WHAT IS THE PENALTY?
- Suspension from the service for six (6)
months and one (1) day to one (1) year
for the first offense, and dismissal for
the second offense.
27


WHAT IS THE DEGREE OF EVIDENCE APPLIED BY THE COURT?
- SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.


WHAT IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE?
- That amount of relevant evidence that
a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion, is
required.
33

WHEN IS THE STANDARD OF SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
SATISFIED?
- When there is reasonable ground to
believe that respondent is responsible
for the misconduct complained of,
even if such evidence might not be
overwhelming or even preponderant.
34


WHY SHOULD IMMORAL CONDUCT BE PENALIZED STRICTLY?
- Because the image of a court of justice
is mirrored in the conduct, official and
otherwise, of the personnel who work
thereat, from the judge to the lowest
of its personnel.

- Court employees have been enjoined
to adhere to the exacting standards of
morality and decency in their
professional and private conduct in
order to preserve the good name and
integrity of courts of justice.
35


BUT ESPELITA HAS ALREADY RESIGNED. WILL SHE STILL BE
SANCTIONED?

YES, BY PAYING FINE OF P50,000.00.. RESIGNATION SHOULD
NOT BE USED EITHER AS AN ESCAPE OR AS AN EASY WAY
OUT TO EVADE AN ADMINISTRATIVE SANCTION.



ON VAT (VALUE ADDED TAX)/ E-VAT.

LVM CONSTRUCTION WAS CONTRACTED BY DPWH TO
CONSTRUCT ROADS IN LEYTE. LVM SUBCONTRACTED THE
WORKS TO SEVERAL ENTITIES DUBBED AS JOINT VENTURE
REPRESENTED BY SANCHEZ CONSTRUCTION. THE
SUBCONTRACT AGREEMENT PROVIDES THAT THE JOINT
VENTURE SHALL ISSUE BIR-REGISTERED ORS. IT ALSO
ALLOWS LVM TO WITHOLD RETENTION AMOUNT OF 10%.
WHEN THE JOINT VENTURE ASKED FOR THE 10% RETAINED
AMOUNT, LVM REFUSED TO PAY BECAUSE PER ITS AUDITORS
THE VAT PAID BY LVM SHOULD HAVE BEEN DEDUCTED FROM
THE PAYMENTS MADE TO THE JOINT VENTURE.

IS LVM CORRECT?
- LVM CANNOT DEDUCT THE VAT FROM
THE RETENTION AMOUNT DUE THE
JOINT VENTURE BECAUSE THERE WAS
NO SUCH PROVISION IN THE SUB-
CONTRACT AGREEMENT.

- SUCH AGREEMENT CONSTITUTES THE
LAW BETWEEN THE PARTIES WHO ARE
BOUND BY ITS STIPULATIONS.


HOW SHALL STIPULATIONS IN THE CONTRACT BE APPLIED?


IF THE STIPULATIONS ARE COUCHED IN CLEAR AND PLAIN
LANGUAGE, THEY SHALL BE APPLIED ACCORDING TO THEIR
LITERAL TENOR.


WHAT ARE OTHER PROOFS WHICH SHOW THAT INDEED
THERE WAS NO AGREEMENT FOR DEDUCTING EVAT FROM
PAYMENTS TO THE JOINT VENTURE?


THE CONTEMPORANEOUS AND SUBSEQUENT ACTS OF LVM.
THE RECORD SHOWS THAT, EXCEPT FOR DEDUCTING SUMS
CORRESPONDING TO THE 10% RETENTION AGREED UPON, 9%
AS CONTINGENCY ON SUB-CONTRACT, 1% WITHHOLDING TAX
AND SUCH OTHER ITEMIZED MISCELLANEOUS EXPENSES, LVM
SETTLED THE JOINT VENTURES BILLING NOS. 1 TO 26
WITHOUT ANY MENTION OF DEDUCTIONS FOR THE E-VAT
PAYMENTS IT CLAIMS TO HAVE ADVANCED.
[1][27]
IT WAS, IN
FACT, ONLY ON 16 MAY 2001 THAT LVMS MANAGING
DIRECTOR, ANDRES C. LAO, APPRISED THE JOINT VENTURE IN
WRITING OF ITS INTENTION TO DEDUCT SAID PAYMENTS.



WHAT IS THE DUTY OF THE COURTS IN CONNECTION WITH
CONTRACTS?
- To give effect to the contract and to
enforce it to the letter.

- The rule is settled that they have no
authority to alter a contract by
construction or to make a new contract
for the parties; their duty is confined to
the interpretation of the one which the
parties have made for themselves,
without regard to its wisdom or folly.

- Courts cannot supply material
stipulations, read into the contract
words it does not contain
[7][31]
or, for
that matter, read into it any other
intention that would contradict its plain
import.
[8][32]



LVM ARGUES THAT SINCE THE JOINT VENTURE IS THE ONE
WHO ACTUALLY RENDERED SERVICES THEN IT IS THE ONE
OBLIGED TO PAY EVAT NOT LVM WHO JUST PAID THE JOINT
VENTURE. IS LVMS CONTENTION CORRECT?


NO. VAT IS IS A TAX ON TRANSACTIONS, IMPOSED AT EVERY
STAGE OF THE DISTRIBUTION PROCESS ON THE SALE, BARTER,
EXCHANGE OF GOODS OR PROPERTY, AND ON THE
PERFORMANCE OF SERVICES, EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF
PROFIT ATTRIBUTABLE THERETO. IT IS PAID BY LVM WHEN IT
RECEIVED PAYMENT FROM DPWH. LIKEWISE IT IS PAID BY THE
JOINT VENTURE WHEN IT RECEIVED MONEY FROM LVM.




WHAT IS VAT?
Vat is a uniform tax levied on every importation of
goods, whether or not in the course of trade or business, or
imposed on each sale, barter, exchange or lease of goods or
properties or on each rendition of services in the course of
trade or business.
[19][39]


It is a tax on transactions, imposed at every stage of the
distribution process on the sale, barter, exchange of goods or
property, and on the performance of services, even in the
absence of profit attributable thereto.
[20][40]


As an indirect tax that may be shifted or passed on to the
buyer, transferee or lessee of the goods, properties or
services, vat should be understood not in the context of the
person or entity that is primarily, directly and legally liable for
its payment, but in terms of its nature as a tax on
consumption.
[21][41]





LVM ARGUES THAT THE JOINT VENTURE ACTUALLY DID NOT
PAY THE VAT BECAUSE THEY USED THE ORS OF SANCHEZ.
NEITHER WAS THE JOINT VENTURE REGISTERED WITH SEC.
NOR HAS IT A BUSINESS PERMIT. IS LVM CORRECT?


NO. LVM WAS INFORMED ABOUT SUCH SCHEME. LVM
ACCEPTED THE ORS OF SANCHEZ. ASIDE FROM BEING
INDICATIVE OF ITS KNOWLEDGE OF THE FOREGOING
CIRCUMSTANCES, LVMS PREVIOUS UNQUALIFIED
ACCEPTANCE OF SAID OFFICIAL RECEIPTS SHOULD, CLEARLY,
BAR THE BELATED EXCEPTIONS IT NOW TAKES WITH RESPECT
THERETO. A PARTY, HAVING PERFORMED AFFIRMATIVE ACTS
UPON WHICH ANOTHER PERSON BASED HIS SUBSEQUENT
ACTIONS, CANNOT THEREAFTER REFUTE HIS ACTS OR RENEGE
ON THE EFFECTS OF THE SAME, TO THE PREJUDICE OF THE
LATTER.
[25][43]




WHO MUST PAY THE VAT? THE SELLER OR THE CONSUMER?
- Although the burden to pay an indirect
tax like vat can, admittedly, be passed
on to the purchaser of the goods or
services, it bears emphasizing that the
liability to pay the same remains with
the manufacturer or seller


WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A SPECIAL PROCEEDING
AND AN ORDINARY CIVIL ACTION?

IN 1996 ANTONIO CHING WAS STABBED TO DEATH. THE
SUSPECT WAS RAMON CHING, HIS ALLEGED SON. CRIMINAL
CASE WAS FILED AGAINST RAMON, WHO REMAINED AT
LARGE. ANTONIOS TWO COMMON LAW WIVES AND 2
CHILDREN OF ONE OF THE COMMON LAW WIFE FILED A CASE
AGAINST RAMON ALLEGING THAT RAMON BY FRAUD
TRANSFERRED PROPERTIES OF ANTONIO CHING TO HIS NAME
AND PRAYED FOR RECONVEYANCE AND ANNULMENT OF
TITLES WITH DAMAGES AND THAT RAMON BE DISINHERITED
AND PREVENTED FROM ACQUIRING OTHER PROPERTIES OF
THE LATE ANTONIO. LATER THEY AMENDED THEIR
COMPLAINT IMPLEADING METROBANK.


SPOUSE OF RAMON FILED A MOTION TO DISMISS ON THE
GROUND THAT THE RTC HANDLING THE CASE HAS NO
JURISDICTION BECAUSE THE ISSUES RAISED CAN ONLY BE
RESOLVED IN A SPECIAL PROCEEDING AND NOT IN AN
ORDINARY CIVIL ACTION. SOME ISSUES RAISED ARE: (a)
filiations with Antonio of Ramon, Jaime and Joseph; (b) rights
of common-law wives, Lucina and Mercedes, to be
considered as heirs of Antonio; AND (c) determination of the
extent of Antonios estate.


RTC DENIED THE MOTION. C.A. AFFIRMED RTC RULING. DOES
RTC HAVE JURISDICTION?


YES. RTC AND CA RULINGS ARE CORRECT. AN ACTION FOR
RECONVEYANCE AND ANNULMENT OF TITLE WITH DAMAGES
IS A CIVIL ACTION.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX


WHAT IS A SPECIAL PROCEEDING?


IT IS A REMEDY BY WHICH A PARTY SEEKS TO ESTABLISH A
STATUS, A RIGHT, OR A PARTICULAR FACT.

EXAMPLE: IT CONCERNS MATTERS RELATING TO THE
SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF A DECEASED PERSON. IT
REQUIRES THE APPLICATION OF SPECIFIC RULES AS PROVIDED
FOR IN THE RULES OF COURT.


XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX


HOW IS A SPECIAL PROCEEDING DISTINGUISHED FROM AN
ORDINARY CIVIL ACTION?


IN AN ORDINARY CIVIL ACTION, A PARTY SUES ANOTHER FOR
THE ENFORCEMENT OR PROTECTION OF A RIGHT, OR THE
PREVENTION OR REDRESS OF A WRONG. IN A SPECIAL
PROCEEDING THE PARTY SEEKS TO ESTABLISH A STATUS,
RIGHT OR A PARTICULAR FACT. TO INITIATE A SPECIAL
PROCEEDING, A PETITION AND NOT A COMPLAINT SHOULD BE
FILED.


An action for reconveyance and annulment of title with
damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to
settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as
advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of
the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly
requires the application of specific rules as provided for in the
Rules of Court.
[1][32]
A special proceeding is a remedy by which
a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular
fact.
[2][33]
It is distinguished from an ordinary civil action where
a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a
right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.
[3][34]
To initiate
a special proceeding, a petition and not a complaint should be
filed.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX


THE COMPLAINT SOUGHT THE DISINHERITANCE OF RAMON.
DOES THIS NOT MAKE THE COMPLAINT FALL UNDER SPECIAL
PROCEEDINGS?


NO. BECAUSE NO WILL OR ANY INSTRUMENT SUPPOSEDLY
EFFECTING THE DISPOSITION OF ANTONIOS ESTATE WAS
EVEN MENTIONED.


Under Article 916 of the NCC, disinheritance can be effected
only through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be
specified. This Court agrees with the RTC and the CA that
while the respondents in their Complaint and Amended
Complaint sought the disinheritance of Ramon, no will or any
instrument supposedly effecting the disposition of Antonios
estate was ever mentioned. Hence, despite the prayer for
Ramons disinheritance, Civil Case No. 02-105251 does not
partake of the nature of a special proceeding and does not call
for the probate courts exercise of its limited jurisdiction.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX


PETITIONER RAMON ARGUES THAT THE AMENDED
COMPLAINT SEEKS THE RELEASE OF CERTAIN DEPOSITS AT
METRO BANK IN FAVOR OF MERCEDES. THIS REQUIRES
DETERMINATION OF THE STATUS OF MERCEDES AS
ANTONIOS HEIR AND THEREFORE PROPER SUBJECT OF A
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS. IS RAMON CORRECT?


NO. AT ISSUE IS THE SIGNING BY MERCEDES OF AN
AGREEMENT AND WAIVER OVER THE DEPOSITS IN FAVOR OF
RAMON. SHE SAID SHE WAS DECEIVED BY RAMON.
THEREFORE THE PRAYER FOR THE RELEASE OF DEPOSITS WAS
BASED ON MERCEDES PRIOR POSESSION OF THE DEPOSITS. IT
IS NOT NECESSARY TO FIRST DECLARE HER AS HEIR.


XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX


RAMON ARGUES THAT IN HIS ANSWER HE STATED THAT
RESPONDENTS ALLEGATION THAT AN EXTRA-JUDICIAL
SETTLEMENT OF ANTONIOS ESTATE EXECUTED BY RAMON
AS WELL AS THE TCTS ISSUED ARE NULL AND VOID
REQUIRES THE DETERMINATION FIRST OF WHO ARE THE
HEIRS OF ANTONIO. SUCH ALLEGATION BY HIM IN HIS
ANSWER MAKES THE COMPLAINT ONE OF SPECIAL
PROCEEDINGS. IS RAMON CORRECT?
- NO. IT IS COMPLAINANTS AVERMENTS
AND NOT DEFENDANTS AVERMENTS
THAT DETERMINE JURISDICTION.
OTHERWISE, JURISDICTION WOULD
DEPEND ON THE WHIM OF DEFENDANT.

- RAMONS AVERMENT THAT A
RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUES RAISED
SHALL FIRST REQUIRE A DECLARATION
OF THE RESPONDENTS STATUS AS
HEIRS IS A MERE DEFENSE WHICH IS
NOT DETERMINATIVE OF WHICH COURT
SHALL PROPERLY EXERCISE
JURISDICTION.


The petitioners also argue that the prayers in the Amended
Complaint, seeking the release in favor of the respondents of
the CPPA under Metrobanks custody and the nullification of
the instruments subject of the complaint, necessarily require
the determination of the respondents status as Antonios
heirs.

It bears stressing that what the respondents prayed for was
that they be declared as the rightful owners of the CPPA which
was in Mercedes possession prior to the execution of the
Agreement and Waiver. The respondents also prayed for the
alternative relief of securing the issuance by the RTC of a hold
order relative to the CPPA to preserve Antonios deposits with
Metrobank during the pendency of the case. It can thus be
said that the respondents prayer relative to the CPPA was
premised on Mercedes prior possession of and their alleged
collective ownership of the same, and not on the declaration
of their status as Antonios heirs. Further, it also has to be
emphasized that the respondents were parties to the
execution of the Agreement
[4][35]
and Waiver
[5][36]
prayed to be
nullified. Hence, even without the necessity of being declared
as heirs of Antonio, the respondents have the standing to seek
for the nullification of the instruments in the light of their
claims that there was no consideration for their execution,
and that Ramon exercised undue influence and committed
fraud against them. Consequently, the respondents then
claimed that the Affidavit of Extra-Judicial Settlement of
Antonios estate executed by Ramon, and the TCTs issued
upon the authority of the said affidavit, are null and void as
well. Ramons averment that a resolution of the issues raised
shall first require a declaration of the respondents status as
heirs is a mere defense which is not determinative of which
court shall properly exercise jurisdiction.

In Marjorie Cadimas v. Marites Carrion and Gemma Hugo,
[6][37]

the Court declared:

It is an elementary rule of procedural law that
jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter is determined
by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether or
not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the
claims asserted therein. As a necessary consequence, the
jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend upon the
defenses set up in the answer or upon the motion to dismiss,
for otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would almost
entirely depend upon the defendant. What determines the
jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as
appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The
averments in the complaint and the character of the relief
sought are the matters to be consulted.

XXXXXXXXXXXX


IS THE STRATEGY OF THE HEIRS SOUND?


NO BECAUSE A SETTLEMENT PROCEEDING SHOULD STILL
FOLLOW. BUT THE RTC CANNOT BE RESTRAINED FROM
TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE COMPLAINT AND AMENDED
COMPLAINT.


The respondents resort to an ordinary civil action before the
RTC may not be strategically sound, because a settlement
proceeding should thereafter still follow, if their intent is to
recover from Ramon the properties alleged to have been
illegally transferred in his name. Be that as it may, the RTC, in
the exercise of its general jurisdiction, cannot be restrained
from taking cognizance of respondents Complaint and
Amended Complaint as the issues raised and the prayers
indicated therein are matters which need not be threshed out
in a special proceeding.


WHAT IS WRIT OF AMPARO? WHAT IS WRIT OF HABEAS
DATA?

SOURCE: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF
AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF NORIEL H.
RODRIGUEZ.


WHY WERE THE WRITS OF AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA
PROMULGATED?
TO ENSURE THE PROTECTION OF THE PEOPLES
RIGHTS TO LIFE, LIBERTY AND SECURITY.
[1][57]

THE RULES ON THESE WRITS WERE ISSUED IN LIGHT OF THE
ALARMING PREVALENCE OF EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS AND
ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCES.
[2][58]





XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX




WHEN DID THE WRIT OF AMPARO TOOK EFFECT?


24 OCTOBER 2007


WHEN DID THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA TOOK EFFECT?


2 FEBRUARY 2008.
[3][60]



WHAT IS THE WRIT OF AMPARO?
The writ of amparo is an extraordinary and
independent remedy that provides rapid judicial relief, as it
partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only
substantial evidence to make the appropriate interim and
permanent reliefs available to the petitioner.
[4][61]


It is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof
beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring
preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility
requiring substantial evidence that will require full and
exhaustive proceedings.
[5][62]


Rather, it serves both preventive and curative roles in
addressing the problem of extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances.
[6][63]

it is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity
in the commission of these offenses, and it is curative in that
it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators by
inevitably leading to subsequent investigation and action.
[7][64]



WHAT IS THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA?



Meanwhile, the writ of habeas data provides a judicial remedy
to protect a persons right to control information regarding
oneself, particularly in instances where such information is
being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve
unlawful ends.
[8][65]

As an independent and summary remedy to protect the right
to privacy especially the right to informational privacy
[9][66]


The proceedings for the issuance of the writ of habeas data
does not entail any finding of criminal, civil or administrative
culpability.

If the allegations in the petition are proven through
substantial evidence, then the court may

(a) grant access to the database or information;

(b) enjoin the act complained of; or

(c) in case the database or information contains erroneous
data or information, order its deletion, destruction or
rectification.
[10][67]


CAN THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW THE FINDINGS OF FACT
OF THE THE COURT OF APPEALS?

WHAT IS COVERED BY PETITION FOR REVIEW UNDER RULE
45?
- ONLY QUESTIONS OF LAW WHICH
MUST BE DISTINCTLY SET FORTH.



CAN THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW THE FINDINGS OF FACTS
OF THE COURT OF APPEALS?


AS A RULE, NO BECAUSE THE FINDINGS OF FACTS OF THE C.A.
ARE FINAL AND CONCLUSIVE.


XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX


BUT ARE THERE EXCEPTIONS TO THIS RULE?


YES. AS FOLLOWS:


(1) WHEN THE FINDINGS ARE GROUNDED ENTIRELY ON
SPECULATIONS, SURMISES OR CONJECTURES;


(2) WHEN THE INFERENCE MADE IS MANIFESTLY MISTAKEN,
ABSURD OR IMPOSSIBLE;


(3) WHEN THERE IS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION;


(4) WHEN THE JUDGMENT IS BASED ON A MISAPPREHENSION
OF FACTS;


(5) WHEN THE FINDINGS OF FACT ARE CONFLICTING;


(6) WHEN IN MAKING ITS FINDINGS THE COURT OF APPEALS
WENT BEYOND THE ISSUES OF THE CASE, OR ITS FINDINGS
ARE CONTRARY TO THE ADMISSIONS OF BOTH THE APPELLANT
AND THE APPELLEE;


(7) WHEN THE FINDINGS ARE CONTRARY TO THAT OF THE
TRIAL COURT;


(8) WHEN THE FINDINGS ARE CONCLUSIONS WITHOUT
CITATION OF SPECIFIC EVIDENCE ON WHICH THEY ARE BASED;


(9) WHEN THE FACTS SET FORTH IN THE PETITION AS WELL AS
IN THE PETITIONERS MAIN AND REPLY BRIEFS ARE NOT
DISPUTED BY THE RESPONDENT;


(10) WHEN THE FINDINGS OF FACT ARE PREMISED ON THE
SUPPOSED ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE AND CONTRADICTED BY
THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD; OR


(11) WHEN THE COURT OF APPEALS MANIFESTLY
OVERLOOKED CERTAIN RELEVANT FACTS NOT DISPUTED BY
THE PARTIES, WHICH, IF PROPERLY CONSIDERED, WOULD
JUSTIFY A DIFFERENT CONCLUSION.
18



The jurisdiction of the Court in cases brought before it from
the appellate court is limited to reviewing errors of law, and
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive upon
the Court since it is not the Courts function to analyze and
weigh the evidence all over again. Nevertheless, in several
cases, the Court enumerated the exceptions to the rule that
factual findings of the Court of Appeals are binding on the
Court: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference
made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when
there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is
based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of
fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court
of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings
are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the
appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to that of the trial
court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation
of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the
facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main
and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10)
when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record; or (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly
overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties,
which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion.
18




RULE OF PROCEDURE FOR SMALL CLAIMS CASES
AS AMENDED1

SECTION 1. Title.This Rule shall be known as The Rule of
Procedure for Small
Claims Cases.
SEC. 2. Scope.This Rule shall govern the procedure in
actions before the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts for payment of money where the value of the
claim does not exceed One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00) exclusive of interest and costs.

SEC. 4. Applicability.The Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall apply this Rule in all actions
which are:
(a) purely civil in nature where the claim or relief
prayed for by the plaintiff is solely for payment
or reimbursement of sum of money, and

(b) the civil aspect of criminal actions, either filed
before the institution of the criminal action, or
reserved upon the filing of the criminal action
in court, pursuant to Rule 111 of the Revised
Rules Of Criminal Procedure.

These claims or demands may be:
(a) For money owed under any of the following:
1. Contract of Lease;
2. Contract of Loan;
3. Contract of Services;
4. Contract ofSale; or
5. Contract of Mortgage;
(b) For damages arising from any of the following:
1. Fault or negligence;
2. Quasi-contract; or
3. Contract;

(c) The enforcement of a barangay amicable settlement or an
arbitration award involving a money claim covered by this
Rule pursuant to Sec. 417 1 SC En Banc Resolution dated
October 27, 2009 in A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC of Republic Act 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991.

SEC. 5. Commencement of Small Claims Action.A small
claims action is commenced by filing with the court an
accomplished and VERIFIED STATEMENT OF CLAIM (Form 1-
SCC) in duplicate, accompanied by a Certification of Non-
forum Shopping (Form 1-A, SCC), and two (2) duly certified
photocopies of the actionable document/s subject of the
claim, as well as the affidavits of witnesses and other evidence
to support the claim.

No evidence shall be allowed during the hearing which was
not attached to or submitted together with the Claim, unless
good cause is shown for the admission of additional evidence.

No formal pleading, other than the Statement of Claim
described in this Rule, is necessary to initiate a small claims
action.

NOTES ON ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT. WHEN RESORTED
TO. WHAT ARE THE GROUNDS.


WHEN IS REMEDY OF ANNULMENT RESORTED TO?
- WHEN THE ORDINARY REMEDIES OF
NEW TRIAL, APPEAL, PETITION FOR
RELIEF OR OTHER APPROPRIATE
REMEDIES ARE NO LONGER AVAILABLE
THROUGH NO FAULT OF THE
PETITIONER.



WHAT ARE THE GROUNDS FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT?
- EXTRINSIC FRAUD AND LACK OF
JURISDICTION.


WAS THE PROCEEDINGS THEN NULL AND VOID?
- YES BECAUSE THE REPUBLIC WAS NOT
VALIDLY SERVED WITH SUMMONS.

- THERE WAS THEREFORE LACK OF
JURISDICTION. BUT WITHOUT
PREJUDICE TO THE REFILING OF THE
CASE.
USING STRONG, HURTFUL AND TACTLESS LANGUAGE
AGAINST THE COURT CONSTITUTES DIRECT CONTEMPT.

LAWYERS HABAWEL AND MEDINA FILED PETITION AT RTC
MANDALUYONG FOR REFUND OF ALLEGED EXCESS TAXES
PAID BY THEIR CLIENT. RTC MANDALUYONG DENIED THE
PETITION. THEY FILED PETITION FOR REVIEW AT CTA WHICH
ALSO DENIED THEIR PETITION. THEY MOVED FOR
RECONSIDERATION. CTA DENIED BUT FOUND THEM GUILTY
OF DIRECT CONTEMPT FOR USING DEROGATORY, OFFENSIVE
AND DISRESPECTFULLY LANGUAGE WHEN THEY STATED IN
THEIR MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION THAT: it is gross
ignorance of the law for the Honorable Court to have held that
it has no jurisdiction over this instant petition; the grossness
of this Honorable Courts ignorance of the law is matched only
by the unequivocal expression of this Honorable Courts
jurisdiction over the instant case and this Court lacked the
understanding and respect for the doctrine of stare decisis.

ARE LAWYERS HABAWEL AND MEDINA GUILTY OF DIRECT
CONTEMPT?
- YES. THEY VIOLATED RULE 11.03 OF
THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY.
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates
all attorneys to observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts and to judicial officers and to insist on similar conduct
by others.



MAY AN ATTORNEY CRITICIZE A JUDGE?
- YES PROVIDED THE CRITICISM IS MADE
IN RESPECTFUL TERMS AND THROUGH
LEGITIMATE CHANNELS.
It is conceded that an attorney or any other person may
be critical of the courts and their judges provided the criticism
is made in respectful terms and through legitimate channels.
In that regard, we have long adhered to the sentiment aptly
given expression to in the leading case of In re: Almacen:
[1][25]


COURTS AND JUDGES ARE NOT SACROSANCT. They should
and expect critical evaluation of their performance. For like
the executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is
rooted in the soil of democratic society, nourished by the
periodic appraisal of the citizens whom it is expected to serve.

Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an
officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in properly
respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of
courts and judges.xxx

But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it
shall be bona fide, and shall not SPILL OVER THE WALLS OF
DECENCY AND PROPRIETY.

WHAT IS THE TEST TO DETERMINE WHETHER CRITICISM OF
THE COURT IS PROPER OR NOT?

THE TEST IS WHETHER OR NOT THE CRITICISM IS:
A) BONA FIDE OR DONE IN GOOD FAITH AND

B) DOES NOT SPILL OVER THE WALLS OF DECENCY AND
PROPRIETY.

WHY WERE SUCH STATEMENT CONTEMPTUOUS?
- BECAUSE THEY ARE EQUIVALENT TO A
MISBEHAVIOR COMMITTED IN THE
PRESENCE OF OR SO NEAR A COURT OR
JUDGE AS TO INTERRUPT THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.
[9][31]




WHAT WERE THE FAULTS OF THE LAWYERS IN MAKING SUCH
STATEMENTS?
- THEY OVERSTEPPED THE BOUNDS OF
PROPRIETY AS ATTORNEYS AND
DISREGARDED THEIR SWORN DUTY TO
RESPECT THE COURTS?

SUPPOSE A LAWYER MAKES IN HIS PLEADING AN
IMPUTATION OF GROSS IGNORANCE AGAINST A JUDGE,
HOW WOULD IT BE CONSIDERED?
- IT WOULD BE CONSIDERED DIRECT
CONTEMPT OF COURT, ESPECIALLY IN
THE ABSENCE OF ANY EVIDENCE.

BUT IT WAS NOT READ IN OPEN COURT?
- EVEN THOUGH. IT IS EQUIVALENT TO
MISBEHAVIOUR COMMITTED IN OPEN
COURT.

CAN THE COURT JUST SIMPLY CONDONE OR IGNORE THE
REMARKS?
- NO. EVEN IF OBVIOUSLY CORRECT.
EVEN IF THE STATEMENTS WERE USED
TO EXPLAIN THEIR CLIENTS POSITION
IN THE CASE.

IS THERE AN EXCEPTION TO THE RULE THAT STRONG,
TACTLESS AND HURTFUL LANGUAGE IS CONSIDERED
CONTEMPTUOUS?
- YES. IN ONE CASE THE SUPREME
COURT RULED THAT SNIDE REMARKS
OR SARCASTIC INNUENDOS MADE BY
COUNSELS ARE NOT CONSIDERED
CONTEMPTUOUS CONSIDERING THAT
UNFAVORABLE DECISION USUALLY
INCITE BITTER FEELINGS.

BUT WHY WAS THE COURT VERY STRICT AGAINST THE TWO
LAWYERS?
- BECAUSE IN THEIR COMPLIANCE THEY
WERE UNREPENTANT AND THEIR
LEGAL ARGUMENTS IN THEIR MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION WERE
WRONG.

WHAT LANGUAGE SHOULD AN ATTORNEY USE?
- FAIR AND TEMPERATE LANGUAGE.
HARSH AND INTEMPERATE LANGUAGE
HAS NO PLACE IN THE LEGAL
PROFESSION. ARGUMENTS MUST BE
WON THROUGH CIVILITY AND
FAIRNESS.

Eschew harsh and intemperate language that has no
place in the educated ranks of the Legal Profession.

The Bar should strive to win arguments through civility
and fairness, not by heated and acrimonious tone, as
the Court aptly instructed in Slade Perkins v.
Perkins,
[20][42]
to wit:

WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE POWER TO PUNISH
CONTEMPT OF COURT?
- IT IS EXERCISED ON THE PRESERVATIVE
NOT ON THE VINDICTIVE PRINCIPLE.
The power to punish contempt of court is exercised on
the preservative and not on the vindictive principle, and only
occasionally should a court invoke its inherent power to
punish contempt of court in order to retain that respect
without which the administration of justice must falter or
fail.

WAS THE PENALTY IMPOSED BY THE CTA PROPER?

NO. IT WAS EXCESSIVE AND VERGES ON THE VINDICTIVE.

Inasmuch as the circumstances indicate that the petitioners
tone of apology was probably feigned, for they did not relent
but continued to justify their contemptuous language, they do
not merit any leniency. Nonetheless, the penalty of
imprisonment for ten days and a fine of P2,000.00 is excessive
punishment of the direct contempt of court for using
contemptuous and offensive language and verges on the
vindictive. The Court foregoes the imprisonment.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

WHAT ARE THE SANCTIONS BASED ON PREVIOUS SUPREME
COURT DECISIONS?

NOT UNIFORM. THE SANCTION HAS RANGED FROM A
WARNING (TO BE MORE CIRCUMSPECT), A REPRIMAND WITH
STERN WARNING AGAINST A REPETITION OF THE
MISCONDUCT, A FINE OF P2,000.00, A FINE OF P5,000.00, AND
EVEN INDEFINITE SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW.



WHAT IS CAUSE OF ACTION? WHEN DOES A COMPLAINT
STATES A CAUSE OF ACTION?


THE CASE STORY:

Siblings corazon and gonzalo co-owned a real property. They
mortgaged the property to dbp. For failure to pay the loan,
dbp forclosed the mortgage. Corazon died. Her daughter
cristina found out that the property is already in the name of
dbp. She filed a case for reconveyance on the ground that dbp
and gonzalo connived so the property will be owned solely by
gonzalo. Her proofs: her mother was not informed of the
foreclosure and thus was deprived of her right to redeem;
gonzalo executed buy-back agreement with dbp over the
property. She asked for tro and injunction to prevent the sale
of the property at public auction. Dbp filed motion to dismiss
and opposed tro and injunction on the ground that there is no
cause of action because when cristina became heir the
property was already in the name of dbp. Rtc granted tro and
later injunction and denied motion to dismiss. Dpb moved for
recon. Rtc denied. Dbp filed an answer ad cautelam and also
filed petitions at ca re the tro, injunction and denial of motion
to dismiss. Ca denied petitions for being filed out of time. Ca
also denied the motion to dismiss for being moot because dbp
subsequently filed an answer.

WAS THE DENIAL OF THE MOTION TO DISMISS CORRECT?
- YES BUT NOT BECAUSE IT WAS MOOT
BUT BECAUSE ITS WAS WITHOUT
MERIT SINCE THE COMPLAINT OF
CRISTINA STATES A CAUSE OF ACTION.

Evidently, all the above elements of a cause of action are
alleged in the complaint:
(1) the legal right of the respondent over the subject
property foreclosed premised on the fact that she is
the sole heir of one of the owners who is entitled to
the right of redemption;
(2) the correlative obligation of defendant DBP, as the
foreclosing entity, to respect such right of redemption;
and
(3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of the
legal right, i.e., the act of DBP and its co-defendant
Zarate to cause the ostensible foreclosure of the
subject property and the subsequent execution of a
deed of conditional sale between the defendants even
prior to the lapse of redemption period to deprive
respondents mother of her right over the property.


WHAT IS CAUSE OF ACTION?
- A CAUSE OF ACTION IS THE ACT OR
OMISSION BY WHICH A PARTY
VIOLATES A RIGHT OF ANOTHER.
[1][24]


XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

WHEN DOES A COMPLAINT STATES A CAUSE OF ACTION?

WHEN IT CONTAINS THREE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS:

(1) A RIGHT IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF BY WHATEVER
MEANS AND WHATEVER LAW IT ARISES;

(2) THE CORRELATIVE OBLIGATION OF THE DEFENDANT TO
RESPECT SUCH RIGHT; AND

(3) THE ACT OR OMISSION OF THE DEFENDANT VIOLATES THE
RIGHT OF THE PLAINTIFF.

IF ANY OF THESE ELEMENTS IS ABSENT, THE COMPLAINT
BECOMES VULNERABLE TO A MOTION TO DISMISS ON THE
GROUND OF FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION.
[2][25]



CAN EMPLOYER CHANGE ASSIGNMENTS OF EMPLOYEES OR
TRANSFER THEM?
- YES. THE RIGHT OF EMPLOYEES TO
SECURITY OF TENURE DOES NOT GIVE
THEM VESTED RIGHT TO THEIR
POSITIONS.

Courts often decline to interfere in their legitimate
business decisions,
[2][37]
absent showing of illegality,
bad faith or arbitrariness.
]

CAN THE EMPLOYER PLACE EMPLOYEES ON FLOATING
STATUS?
- YES. OFF-DETAILING IS NOT
EQUIVALENT TO DISMISSAL SO LONG
AS SUCH STATUS DOES NOT CONTINUE
BEYOND A REASONABLE TIME.

- IT IS ONLY WHEN SUCH A FLOATING
STATUS LASTS FOR MORE THAN SIX
MONTHS THAT THE EMPLOYEE MAY BE
CONSIDERED TO HAVE BEEN
CONSTRUCTIVELY DISMISSED.
[4][39]


WILL COURTS INTERFERE IN THE BUSINESS DECISIONS OF
EMPLOYERS?
- COURTS ARE NOT INCLINED TO
INTERFERE IN THE LEGITIMATE
DECISIONS OF EMPLOYERS PROVIDED
THERE IS NO SHOWING OF ILLEGALITY,
BAD FAITH OR ARBITRARINESS.

SOME NOTES ON PLEDGE

CAN AN UNNOTARIZED PLEDGE BIND THIRD PARTIES?
- NO. UNDER ARTICLE 2096 OF THE CIVIL
CODE, *A+ PLEDGE SHALL NOT TAKE
EFFECT AGAINST THIRD PERSONS IF A
DESCRIPTION OF THE THING PLEDGED
AND THE DATE OF THE PLEDGE DO NOT
APPEAR IN A PUBLIC INSTRUMENT.



THE DEBTOR DELIVERS PROPERTY TO CREDITOR TO SECURE
AN OBLIGATION. CAN CREDITOR CLAIM OWNERSHIP OVER
THE PROPERTY?
- NO. THERE CAN BE NO TRANSFER OF
OWNERSHIP IF THE DELIVERY OF THE
PROPERTY TO THE CREDITOR IS BY
WAY OF SECURITY.
[1][54]




SUPPOSE THERE IS DOUBT AS TO WHETHER A TRANSACTION
IS ONE OF PLEDGE OR OF DACION EN PAGO, HOW SHOULD
THE DOUBT BE RESOLVED?
- IN CASE OF DOUBT AS TO WHETHER A
TRANSACTION IS ONE OF PLEDGE OR
DACION EN PAGO, THE PRESUMPTION
IS THAT IT IS A PLEDGE AS THIS
INVOLVES A LESSER TRANSMISSION OF
RIGHTS AND INTERESTS.
[2][55]



DOCUMENTARY STAMP TAX ON CERTIFICATES OF DEPOSIT
AND SPECIAL ACCOUNTS PLUS AND SIMILAR BANK
ACCOUNT

IS DOCUMENTARY STAMPT TAX APPLICABLE TO
CERTIFICATES OF DEPOSITS?
- YES. IT IS PAYABLE ON CERTIFICATES OF
DEPOSIT BEARING INTEREST AND
CERTIFICATES OF DEPOSITS DRAWING
INTEREST.


DST is imposed on certificates of deposit bearing interest


WHAT IS CERTIFICATE OF DEPOSIT?
- A certificate of deposit is defined as a
written acknowledgment by a bank or
banker of the receipt of a sum of
money on deposit which the bank or
banker promises to pay to the
depositor, to the order of the
depositor, or to some other person or
his order, whereby the relation of
debtor and creditor between the bank
and the depositor is created.
[1][34]





PETITIONER ARGUES THAT SPECIAL ACCOUNTS PLUS (SAP) IS
NOT A CERTIFICATE OF DEPOSIT BECAUSE IT IS PAYABLE ON
DEMAND. IS THIS ARGUMENT CORRECT.
- NO. WHILE IT IS PAYABLE ON
DEMAND, THE AMOUNT OF INTEREST
IS REDUCED AND/OR SUBJECT TO
PENALTIES. THERE IS A PERIOD
STIPULATED FOR HIGHER INTEREST.
PRECEDENT RULINGS EXIST.


BUT SAP (SPECIAL ACCOUNTS PLUS) IS EVIDENCED BY A
PASSBOOK AND NOT A CERTIFICATE OF DEPOSIT. IS IT STILL
SUBJECT TO DST?

YES. A DOCUMENT TO BE CONSIDERED A CERTIFICATE OF
DEPOSIT NEED NOT BE IN A SPECIFIC FORM.
[8][41]
THUS, A
PASSBOOK ISSUED BY A BANK QUALIFIES AS A CERTIFICATE OF
DEPOSIT DRAWING INTEREST BECAUSE IT IS CONSIDERED A
WRITTEN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT BY A BANK THAT IT HAS
ACCEPTED A DEPOSIT OF A SUM OF MONEY FROM A
DEPOSITOR.
[9][42]








AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN BECOMING
STATE WITNESS AND BEING UNDER THE WITNESS
PROTECTION PROGRAM.
Passion For Reason

Zaldy Ampatuans offer to testify in exchange for witness
protection conveniently confuses fundamental legal issues
and enables him to buy lifetime immunity from punishment
for the Maguindanao massacre.
The hocus-pocus is this: Ampatuan wants to testify on one
crime (election fraud) but buy immunity for another crime
(the massacre). That is not contemplated by the law, but I
share lawyer Harry Roques sense of just how Ampatuan plans
to do it.
There are two possible legal regimes for an accused who turns
his back on his cohorts and offers to testify in support of the
prosecution: on one hand, discharge of an accused to be a
state witness and, on the other, the Witness Protection
Program that provides sanctuary to a witness in fear of his
safety.
Notice that WPP applies both to the turncoat co-accused (the
state witness) and the bystander who merely saw it happen,
will speak out, but is afraid for his safety.

The first legal regime is the Discharge of accused to be state
witness under the Rules of Court. This operates as
acquittal and shall be a bar to future prosecution for the
same offense unless of course the accused does not deliver
on his promised testimony.

The second legal regime is the Witness Protection Program
or RA 6981 under which the witness is given security
protection for himself and his family, including housing and
allowances and other financial assistance.

Both legal regimes give immunity to the turncoat/state
witness only for the offense in which the testimony is given.


JURISPRUDENCE ON THE NLRC APPEAL BOND


PETITIONER WAS ADJUDGED LIABLE FOR ILLEGAL DISMISSAL.
IT FILED AN APPEAL WITH NLRC WITH MOTION TO REDUCE
BOND AND POSTED BOND OF P30K ON THE GROUND THAT IT
WAS UNDER RECEIVERSHIP. NLRC DENIED MOTION TO
REDUCE BOND AND REQUIRED PETITIONER TO POST P3M
BOND ON THE GROUND THAT THE BOND IS FIXED BY LAW.
WAS NLRC CORRECT?
- NO. UNDER THE NLRC RULES BOND
MAY BE REDUCED ON MERITORIOUS
GROUND AND UPON POSTING OF
BOND IN REASONABLE AMOUNT IN
RELATION TO THE MONETARY AWARD.

WHAT DOES THE LABOR CODE PROVIDES REGARDING
APPEAL BOND?
- In case of a judgment involving a
monetary award, an appeal by the
employer may be perfected only upon
the posting of a cash or surety bond
issued by a reputable bonding company
duly accredited by the Commission in
the amount equivalent to the monetary
award in the judgment appealed from.
(Emphasis supplied.)


WHAT ARE THE GUIDELINES FOR REDUCTION OF APPEAL
BOND?
[T]HE BOND REQUIREMENT ON APPEALS INVOLVING
MONETARY AWARDS HAS BEEN AND MAY BE RELAXED IN
MERITORIOUS CASES.

THESE CASES INCLUDE INSTANCES IN WHICH

(1) there was substantial compliance with the rules,

(2) surrounding facts and circumstances constitute
meritorious grounds to reduce the bond,

(3) a liberal interpretation of the requirement of an appeal
bond would serve the desired objective of resolving
controversies on the merits, or (4) the appellants, at the very
least, exhibited their willingness and/or good faith by
posting a partial bond during the reglementary period.

CONVERSELY THE REDUCTION OF THE BOND IS NOT
WARRANTED WHEN NO MERITORIOUS GROUND IS SHOWN
TO JUSTIFY THE SAME; THE APPELLANT ABSOLUTELY FAILED
TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENT OF POSTING A BOND,
EVEN IF PARTIAL; OR WHEN THE CIRCUMSTANCES SHOW THE
EMPLOYERS UNWILLINGNESS TO ENSURE THE SATISFACTION
OF ITS WORKERS VALID CLAIMS.
[4][29]



WAS THE MOTION TO REDUCE BOND FILED BY PETITIONER
MERITORIOUS?
- YES. THE DOCUMENTS PETITIONER
PRESENTED SHOW THAT IT IS UNDER
RECEIVERSHIP. ITS OFFICERS ARE
PROHIBITED BY SEC TO WITHRAW
FROM ITS FUNDS. SEC HAS FROZEN ITS
ASSETS. HOW THEN CAN IT RAISE THE
SUM OF P30M AS APPEAL BOND?

JURISPRUDENCE ON SWEETHEART DEFENSE IN THE CRIME
OF RAPE.

APPELLANT ARGUED THAT THEY WERE LOVERS. IS THIS
DEFENSE VALID?
- NO. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE ON RECORD
TO PROVE THIS.

BUT WITNESSES SAW THEM TOGETHER AND THAT THEY
WERE WRITING TO EACH OTHER. ARE THESE NOT SUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE?
- NO. THESE ARE NOT SUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE.




HOW WOULD SUCH ROMANTIC RELATIONSHIP BE PROVEN?
- INTIMACIES SUCH AS LOVING
CARESSES, CUDDLING, TENDER SMILES,
SWEET MURMURS OR ANY OTHER
AFFECTIONATE GESTURES THAT ONE
BESTOWS UPON HIS OR HER LOVER
WOULD HAVE BEEN SEEN.


FOR SWEETHEART DEFENSE TO BE CREDIBLE WHAT OTHER
PROOF MAY SUFFICE?
- SOME DOCUMENTARY OR OTHER
EVIDENCE OF RELATIONSHIP [SUCH AS
NOTES, GIFTS, PICTURES, MEMENTOS]
AND THE LIKE.
[5][37]


SUPPOSE APPELLANT AND THE ALLEGED VICTIM WERE
INDEED SWEETHEARTS, CAN THERE STILL BE RAPE?
- YES. A MAN CAN EMPLOY VIOLENCE
UPON HER FIANCEE ON THE PRETEXT
OF LOVE.


JURISPRUDENCE ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT

PETITIONERS WERE IN POSSESSION OF A PARCEL OF LAND
DECLARED AS MILITARY RESERVATION BY VIRTUE OF
PROCLAMATION NO. 80. PRIOR TO SUCH PROCLAMATION,
PETITIONERS HAD ALREADY TITLE TO THE LAND. THE
REPUBLIC FILED A CASE FOR RECOVERY OF POSSESSION.
PETITIONERS RAISE THE DEFENSE THAT THEY HAVE BEEN IN
POSSESSION FOR THE PERIOD REQUIRED AND THAT
PROCLAMATION NO. 80 STATES IT RESPECTS EXISTING
PRIVATE RIGHTS. RTC, WITHOUT HEARING, ISSUED A
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE REPUBLIC. CA
CONFIRMED. WAS THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPER?
- NO. PRIOR TO RENDERING A
SUMMARY JUDGMENT THERE MUST BE
MOTION AND HEARING. HERE, THERE
WAS NONE.

WHEN IS SUMMARY JUDGMENT PERMITTED?
- ONLY IF THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE
AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT AND [THE]
MOVING PARTY IS ENTITLED TO A
JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF
LAW.
[3][36]


- THE TEST OF THE PROPRIETY OF
RENDERING SUMMARY JUDGMENTS IS
THE EXISTENCE OF A GENUINE ISSUE OF
FACT,
[4][37]
AS DISTINGUISHED FROM A
SHAM, FICTITIOUS, CONTRIVED OR
FALSE CLAIM.
[5][38]


WHEN IS A FACTUAL ISSUE CONSIDERED AS SHAM?
- WHEN BY ITS NATURE IT IS EVIDENT
THAT IT CANNOT BE PROVEN OR IT IS
SUCH THAT THE PARTY TENDERING THE
SAME HAS NEITHER ANY SINCERE
INTENTION NOR ADEQUATE EVIDENCE
TO PROVE IT.
WHEN DO PARTIES USUALLY RAISE SHAM ISSUES?
- THIS USUALLY HAPPENS IN DENIALS
MADE BY DEFENDANTS MERELY FOR
THE SAKE OF HAVING AN ISSUE AND
THEREBY GAINING DELAY, TAKING
ADVANTAGE OF THE FACT THAT THEIR
ANSWERS ARE NOT UNDER OATH
ANYWAY.
[6][39]


HOW DOES A COURT DETERMINE THE GENUINESS OF THE
ISSUES AND PROPRIETY OF RENDERING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT?
- The court is obliged to carefully study
and appraise, not the tenor or contents
of the pleadings, but the facts alleged
under oath by the parties and/or their
witnesses in the affidavits that they
submitted with the motion and the
corresponding opposition.

- Thus, it is held that, even if the
pleadings on their face appear to raise
issues, a summary judgment is proper
so long as the affidavits, depositions,
and admissions presented by the
moving party show that such issues are
not genuine.
[7][40]





IN THIS CASE WHAT WAS THE ERROR OF THE COURT?
- THE COURT PRESUMED THAT THE
DEFENSES OF PETITIONERS CANNOT BE
PROVEN. THIS IS PREMATURE AND
UNFAIR. THE GUIDELINES ON
RENDERING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
WERE IGNORED BY THE TRIAL COURT
-
The sad result was a judgment based on nothing else but an
unwarranted assumption and a violation of petitioners due
process right to a trial where they can present their evidence
and prove their defense.

WHICH MOTIONS REQUIRE HEARING AND WHICH MOTIONS
NEED NOT BE HEARD?

CAN DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO
FILE ANSWER BE GRANTED WITHOUT HEARING?
- YES. IT IS ONE OF THOSE WHICH A
COURT CAN ACT UPON WITHOUT
PREJUDICING THE RIGHTS OF THE
OTHER PARTY.

WHAT IS THE PREVAILING DOCTRINE ON HEARING RE
MOTIONS?
. . . . . The prevailing doctrine in this jurisdiction is that a
motion without a notice of hearing addressed to the parties
is a MERE SCRAP OF PAPER.
[1][31]


WHAT IS THE REASON FOR REQUIRING A HEARING?
DUE PROCESS.
The logic for such a requirement is simple: a motion invariably
contains a prayer which the movant makes to the court, which
is usually in the interest of the adverse party to oppose. The
notice of hearing to the adverse party is therefore a form of
due process; it gives the other party the opportunity to
properly vent his opposition to the prayer of the movant

IS THE RULE REQUIRING NOTICE OF HEARING APPLICABLE TO
ALL MOTIONS?
- NO. THERE ARE MOTIONS WHICH MAY
BE HEARD EX PARTE AND THEY ARE
NON-CONTENTIOUS AND DO NOT AS A
RULE INVOLVE THE SUBSTANTIAL
RIGHTS OF THE OTHER PARTIES IN THE
SUIT.


NON-FORUM SHOPPING BASED ON CAUSAPIN CASE, JUNE
2011


WHAT IS THE PROVISION IN THE RULES ON NON-FORUM
SHOPPING?
- RULE 7, SECTION 5 OF THE RULES OF
COURT

SEC. 5. Certification against forum shopping. The plaintiff
or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or
other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a
sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed
therewith:
(a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed
any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or
quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no
such other action or claim is pending therein;

(b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete
statement of the present status thereof; and

(c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar
action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report
that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein
his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.

Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not
be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other
initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the
case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon
motion and after hearing.

The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with
any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect
contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding
administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or
his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum
shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal
with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as
a cause for administrative sanctions.




WAS THERE SUBSEQUENLTY A LIBERAL INTERPRETATION OF
THE RULE ON FORUM SHOPPING?

YES, IN CAVILE CASE.

The rule is that the certificate of non-forum shopping must
be signed by all the petitioners or plaintiffs in a case and the
signing by only one of them is insufficient.

However, the Court has also stressed that the rules on forum
shopping, which were designed to promote and facilitate the
orderly administration of justice, should not be interpreted
with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate
and legitimate objective. It does not thereby interdict
substantial compliance with its provisions under justifiable
circumstances.


WHAT IS THE RULE GOVERNING SECOND MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION IN ORDINARY COURTS?
RULE 2, RULE 15.
Sec. 2. Second motion for reconsideration.
No second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final
resolution by the same party shall be entertained. (n)

CAN A SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION BE
ENTERTAINED?
- GENERALLY, NO BECAUSE SECTION 2,
RULE 15 IS UNQUALIFIED.

WHEN CAN A SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION BE
ENTERTAINED?
THERE ARE TWO CONDITIONS:

- THERE MUST BE EXTRA ORDINARY PERSUASIVE
REASON.

- AN EXPRESS LEAVE HAS BEEN FIRST OBTAINED.

. . . and only for extraordinarily persuasive reasons and only
after an express leave has been first obtained may a second
motion for reconsideration be entertained.
[2][6]


WHY IS THAT SO?
- BECAUSE A SECOND MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION IS A RESTRICTIVE
PLEADING. OR THERE IS A RESTRICTIVE
POLICY AGAINST SECOND MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION.

WHAT IS THE RULE GOVERNING SECOND MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION IN THE SUPREME COURT?
SECTION 3, RULE 15 OF THE INTERNAL RULES OF THE
SUPREME COURT.
Section 3. Second motion for reconsideration. The Court shall
not entertain a second motion for reconsideration, and any
exception to this rule can only be granted in the higher
interest of justice by the Court en banc upon a vote of at least
two-thirds of its actual membership.

There is reconsideration in the higher interest of justice
when the assailed decision is not only legally erroneous, but is
likewise patently unjust and potentially capable of causing
unwarranted and irremediable injury or damage to the
parties. A second motion for reconsideration can only be
entertained before the ruling sought to be reconsidered
becomes final by operation of law or by the Courts
declaration.

In the Division, a vote of three Members shall be required to
elevate a second motion for reconsideration to the Court En
Banc.

WHAT IS THE FULL RULING ON THE ISSUE IN THE LEAGUE OF
CITIES VS COMELEC CASE?

NOTE: WHEN THE SC STATES THAT A DECISION IS ALREADY
FINAL NO SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION SHALL BE
ENTERTAINED.
We observe, too, that the prescription that a second motion
for reconsideration can only be entertained before the
ruling sought to be reconsidered becomes final by operation
of law or by the Courts declaration even renders the denial
of the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration more
compelling.

IN THE LEAGUE OF CITIES VS. COMELEC, PETITIONERS ARGUE
THAT A SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WAS
PREVIOUSLY ENTERTAINED. THEREFORE, THEIR MOTION FOR
ANOTHER RECONSIDERATION MUST BE ENTERTAINED. IS
THEIR CONTENTION CORRECT?
- NO. BECAUSE THE SC, WITH REGARDS
TO THE PREVIOUS SECOND MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION
UNANIMOUSLY DECLARED THAT THE
SECOND MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION WAS NOT A
PROHIBITED PLEADING. HERE THERE
WAS NO SUCH DECLARATION.


(REMEMBER: UNANIMOUS AND EN BANC DECLARATION
NEEDED. IT SEEMS THAT IF YOU MEET SUCH CONDITION EVEN
A 10
TH
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WILL STILL BE
ENTERTAINED? BASIC RULE IS HE WHO HAS THE POWER TO
CREATE HAS THE POWER TO DESTROY?)

LIABILITY OF THE EGISTERED OWNER OF A MOTOR VEHICLE
IN A VEHICULAR ACCIDENT INVOLVING SUCH VEHICLE.

AN OIL TANKER REGISTERED IN THE NAME OF BPI LEASING
AND LEASED AND OPERATED BY BG HAULER AND DRIVEN BY
ESTILLOSO HIT A PEDESTRIAN.

IS BPI LEASING LIABLE EVEN THOUGH THE OIL TANKER WAS
OPERATED BY BG HAULER?
Yes.
Bpi leasing, being the registered owner, is liable under the
LAW ON COMPULSORY VEHICLE REGISTRATION and
jurisprudence.

The policy behind the rule is to ENABLE THE VICTIM TO FIND
REDRESS BY THE EXPEDIENT RECOURSE OF IDENTIFYING THE
REGISTERED VEHICLE OWNER IN THE RECORDS OF THE LAND
TRANSPORTATION OFFICE.

In accordance with the law on compulsory motor vehicle
registration, this Court has consistently ruled that, with
respect to the public and third persons, the registered owner
of a motor vehicle is directly and primarily responsible for the
consequences of its operation regardless of who the actual
vehicle owner might be.
21


Well-settled is the rule that the registered owner of the
vehicle is liable for quasi-delicts resulting from its use. Thus,
even if the vehicle has already been sold, leased, or
transferred to another person at the time the vehicle figured
in an accident, the registered vehicle owner would still be
liable for damages caused by the accident.

The sale, transfer or lease of the vehicle, which is not
registered with the Land Transportation Office, will not bind
third persons aggrieved in an accident involving the vehicle.
The compulsory motor vehicle registration underscores the
importance of registering the vehicle in the name of the actual
owner.

The policy behind the rule is to enable the victim to find
redress by the expedient recourse of identifying the registered
vehicle owner in the records of the Land Transportation
Office. The registered owner can be reimbursed by the actual
owner, lessee or transferee who is known to him. Unlike the
registered owner, the innocent victim is not privy to the lease,
sale, transfer or encumbrance of the vehicle. Hence, the victim
should not be prejudiced by the failure to register such
transaction or encumbrance.

ACT REGULATING THE ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF
FINANCING COMPANIES.

SEC. 12. Liability of Lessors. Financing companies shall not
be liable for loss, damage or injury caused by a motor vehicle,
aircraft, vessel, equipment or other property leased to a third
person or entity except where the motor vehicle, aircraft,
vessel, equipment or other property is operated by the
financing company, its employees or agents at the time of the
loss, damage or injury.


Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, ATTORNEYS FEES
AND EXPENSES OF LITIGATION, other than judicial costs,
cannot be recovered, except:
(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;
(2) When the defendants act or omission has compelled
the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur
expenses to protect his interest;
(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the
plaintiff;
(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or
proceeding against the plaintiff;
(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad
faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiffs plainly valid,
just and demandable claim;
(6) In actions for legal support;
(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household
helpers, laborers and skilled workers;
(8) In actions for indemnity under workmens
compensation and employers liability laws;
(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising
from a crime;
(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;
(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and
equitable that attorneys fees and expenses of
litigation should be recovered.
In all cases, the attorneys fees and expenses of litigation must
be reasonable.

WHAT IS JUDICIAL COMPROMISE? WHAT ARE ITS EFFECTS?
- A JUDICIAL COMPROMISE IS A
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT INTENDED
TO RESOLVE A MATTER ALREADY
UNDER LITIGATION.

- IT HAS THE FORCE AND EFFECT OF A
JUDGMENT. IT HAS BECOME A
JUDGMENT THAT IS SUBJECT TO
EXECUTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
RULES.

It transcends its identity as a mere contract between
the parties, as it becomes a judgment that is subject
to execution in accordance with the Rules of Court.



WHAT IS A MOOT AND ACADEMIC CASE?
- IT IS A CASE THAT CEASES TO PRESENT
A JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY BY
VIRTUE OF SUPERVENING EVENTS, SO
THAT A DECLARATION THEREON
WOULD BE OF NO PRACTICAL USE OR
VALUE.
In such cases, there is no actual substantial relief to which
petitioner would be entitled to and which would be negated
by the dismissal of the petition.



WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF NOTARIZATION?
- ABSENT ANY CLEAR AND CONVINCING
PROOF TO THE CONTRARY, A
NOTARIZED DOCUMENT ENJOYS THE
PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY AND IS
CONCLUSIVE AS TO THE
TRUTHFULNESS OF ITS CONTENTS.
[1][42]


THE DEFINITION OF CAPITAL IN THE CONTEXT OF THE
LIMITATION AGAINST FOREIGN OWNERSHIP TO 40%.

The term capital should mean only shares of stock that can
vote in the election of directors. Under this new ruling, only
the voting shares will be counted, and non-voting preferred
shares will be excluded.

This aims to advance the framers original intent, namely, to
create a self-reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos. Since only the voting
shares can exercise control over a corporation, only such
shares should count.

HAT IS UNLAWFUL DETAINER? WHAT IS FORCIBLE ENTRY?
WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN UNLAWFUL DETAINER
AND FORCIBLE ENTRY?

- IN FORCIBLE ENTRY, ONE IS DEPRIVED
OF PHYSICAL POSSESSION OF ANY
LAND OR BUILDING BY MEANS OF
FORCE, INTIMIDATION, THREAT,
STRATEGY, OR STEALTH.

- IN UNLAWFUL DETAINER, ONE
UNLAWFULLY WITHHOLDS POSSESSION
THEREOF AFTER THE EXPIRATION OR
TERMINATION OF HIS RIGHT TO HOLD
POSSESSION UNDER ANY CONTRACT,
EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.

what determines the nature of an action as well as
which court has jurisdiction over it are the allegations
of the complaint and the character of the relief
sought.



Stealth,, is defined as any secret, sly, or clandestine act to
avoid discovery and to gain entrance into or remain within
residence of another without permission,
Strategy connotes the employment of machinations or
artifices to gain possession of the subject property.


WHAT IS REASONABLE DOUBT?
- THAT DOUBT ENGENDERED BY AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE WHOLE PROOF
AND AN INABILITY, AFTER SUCH AN
INVESTIGATION, TO LET THE MIND
REST EASY UPON THE CERTAINTY OF
GUILT.


An acquittal based on reasonable doubt will prosper
even though the appellants innocence may be
doubted, for a criminal conviction rests on the strength
of the evidence of the prosecution and not on the
weakness of the evidence of the defense. Suffice it to
say, a slightest doubt should be resolved in favor of
the accused.
[4][44]



DEFINE A TENANT.
R.A. No. 1199, otherwise known as the Agricultural Tenancy
Act of the Philippines, defines a tenant as a person who,
himself and with the aid available from within his immediate
farm household, cultivates the land belonging to, or
possessed by, another, with the latters consent for purposes
of production, sharing the produce with the landholder
under the share tenancy system, or paying the landholder a
price certain or ascertainable in produce or in money or
both, under a leasehold tenancy system.

WHAT ARE THE ELEMENTS IN A TENANCY RELATIONSHIP?
(1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant;
(2) the subject matter is agricultural land;
(3) there is consent between the parties;
(4) the purpose is agricultural production;
(5) there is personal cultivation by the tenant; and
(6) there is sharing of the harvests between the parties.

The presence of all of these elements must be proved
by substantial evidence.

RESPONDENTS ARGUED THAT THAT THERE WAS IMPLIED
TENANCY BECAUSE PASTOR ACCEPTED HIS SHARE OF THE
PRODUCTION FOR A CONSIDERABLE LENGTH OF TIME. TO
PROVE THEIR CONTENTION, RESPONDENTS PRESENTED THE
AFFIDAVITS EXECUTED BY THREE FARMERS FROM ADJOINING
LANDHOLDINGS, NAMELY SANTIAGO PACHECO,
[1][62]

APOLINARIO FRANCISCO,
[2][63]
AND DAMASO MATIAS,
[3][64]

STATING THAT THEY KNEW MACARIO TO BE A TENANT OF
PASTOR SINCE 1959 AND THAT MACARIO RELIGIOUSLY PAID
HIS SHARE OF THE PRODUCE TO PASTOR. ARE THESE THREE
AFFIDAVITS SUFFICIENT?
- NO. AFFIANTS FAILED TO PROVIDE
DETAILS PROVING THE ELEMENTS OF
TENANCY RELATIONS.

It has been repeatedly held that occupancy and cultivation of
an agricultural land will not ipso facto make one a de jure
tenant.
[4][70]


Independent and concrete evidence is necessary to prove
personal cultivation, sharing of harvest, or consent of the
landowner.
[5][71]


Substantial evidence necessary to establish the fact of sharing
cannot be satisfied by a mere scintilla of evidence; there must
be concrete evidence on record adequate to prove the
element of sharing.

To prove sharing of harvests, a receipt or any other credible
evidence must be presented, because self-serving statements
are inadequate.
[6][72]


Tenancy relationship cannot be presumed;
[7][73]
the elements
for its existence are explicit in law and cannot be done away
with by conjectures.
[8][74]
Leasehold relationship is not brought
about by the mere congruence of facts but, being a legal
relationship, the mutual will of the parties to that relationship
should be primordial.
[9][75]
For implied tenancy to arise it is
necessary that all the essential requisites of tenancy must be
present.
[10][76]

The affidavits executed by three of respondents neighbors
are insufficient to establish a finding of tenancy relationship
between Pastor and Macario. As correctly observed by the
estate of Pastor Samson, the affiants did not provide details
based on their personal knowledge as to how the crop-sharing
agreement was implemented, how much was given by
Macario to Pastor, when and where the payments were made,
or whether they have at any instance witnessed Pastor receive
his share of the harvest from Macario. Such failure is fatal to
respondents claim particularly since the respondents have
the burden of proving their affirmative allegation of
tenancy.
[11][77]
In fine, the conclusions of the RARAD, DARAB
and the CA respecting the existence of tenancy relationship
between Pastor and Macario are not supported by substantial
evidence on record.

BUT RARAB DARAB AND CA WERE UNANIMOUS IN RULING
THAT THERE WAS TENANCY RELATION. IS THEIR UNANIMOUS
DECISION NOT ENTITLED TO GREAT WEIGHT?
- NO, BECAUSE THERE WAS NO
CONCRETE EVIDENCE OR RECORD IN
SUPPORT OF SUCH RULING.

The question of whether there was an implied tenancy and
sharing are basically questions of fact and the findings of the
Court of Appeals and the Boards a quo are, generally, entitled
to respect and nondisturbance, as long as they are supported
by substantial evidence.
[13][67]


COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY

What is the doctrine of command responsibility?
- Command responsibility means the
responsibility of commanders for
crimes committed by subordinate
members of the armed forces or other
persons subject to their control in
international wars or domestic
conflicts.

On the basis of the text of Protocol I the ICRC Commentary
identified THREE CONDITIONS FOR COMMAND
RESPONSIBILITY:
(i) the person to be held responsible must be the
superior of the person or persons committing the
breach of the convention;

(ii) the superior must have known or had information
which should have enabled him to conclude that a
breach was being committed or was going to be
committed; and

(iii) the superior did not take all feasible measures within
his powers to prevent the breach.

The fact that any of the crimes within the
jurisdiction of the [Tribunal] was committed by a
subordinate does not relieve his superior of criminal
responsibility if he knew or had reason to know that
the subordinate was about to commit such acts or
had done so and the superior failed to take the
necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such
acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.





DOES DELIVERY OF CHECK CONSTITUTE PAYMENT?
- NO. THE DELIVERY OF A CHECK DOES
NOT OPERATE AS PAYMENT AND DOES
NOT DISCHARGE THE OBLIGATION
UNDER A JUDGMENT.
[1][46]


- THE DELIVERY OF A BILL OF EXCHANGE
ONLY PRODUCES THE FACT OF
PAYMENT WHEN THE BILL HAS BEEN
ENCASHED.

To discharge the burden to prove payment of her
subscription, she had to adduce evidence satisfactorily
proving that her payment by check was regarded as
payment under the law.

Payment is defined as the delivery of money.
[2][45]
Yet,
because a check is not money and only substitutes for
money, the delivery of a check does not operate as
payment and does not discharge the obligation under
a judgment.
[3][46]
The delivery of a bill of exchange only
produces the fact of payment when the bill has been
encashed.

Settled is the rule that payment must be made in legal
tender. A check is not legal tender and, therefore,
cannot constitute a valid tender of payment. Since a
negotiable instrument is only a substitute for money
and not money, the delivery of such an instrument
does not, by itself, operate as payment. Mere delivery
of checks does not discharge the obligation under a
judgment. The obligation is not extinguished and
remains suspended until the payment by commercial
document is actually realized.

WHAT IS THE TRUST FUND DOCTRINE?
The trust fund doctrine enunciates a

xxx rule that the property of a corporation is a trust fund for
the payment of creditors, but such property can be called a
trust fund only by way of analogy or metaphor.

As between the corporation itself and its creditors it is a
simple debtor.

As between its creditors and stockholders its assets are in
equity a fund for the payment of its debts.
[1][32]



It is established doctrine that subscriptions to the capital of a
corporation constitute a fund to which creditors have a right
to look for satisfaction of their claims and that the assignee in
insolvency can maintain an action upon any unpaid stock
subscription in order to realize assets for the payment of its
debts.

We clarify that the trust fund doctrine is not limited to
reaching the stockholders unpaid subscriptions. The scope of
the doctrine when the corporation is insolvent encompasses
not only the capital stock, but also other property and assets
generally regarded in equity as a trust fund for the payment of
corporate debts.
[5][36]
All assets and property belonging to the corporation
held in trust for the benefit of creditors that were
distributed or in the possession of the stockholders,
regardless of full payment of their subscriptions, may
be reached by the creditor in satisfaction of its claim.

WHAT IS PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION?
- A preliminary investigation is where
the public prosecutor merely
determines whether there is probable
cause or sufficient ground to engender
a well-founded belief that a crime has
been committed, and that the
respondent is probably guilty thereof
and should be held for trial.

In a preliminary investigation, a full and exhaustive
presentation of the parties evidence is not required, but only
such as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense
has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty
thereof.

Certainly, it does not involve the determination of whether or
not there is evidence beyond reasonable doubt pointing to the
guilt of the person.

Only prima facie evidence is required; or that which is, on its
face, good and sufficient to establish a given fact, or the group
or chain of facts constituting the partys claim or defense; and
which, if not rebutted or contradicted, will remain sufficient.
Therefore, matters of evidence, such as who are the
conspirators, are more appropriately presented and heard
during the trial.

WHAT ARE MORAL DAMAGES? HOW ARE MORAL DAMAGES
PROVEN? WHAT ARE NOMINAL DAMAGES?
WHAT IS THE RULE ON RECOVERY OF MORAL DAMAGES?
- RECOVERY IS MORE AN EXCEPTION
THAT THE RULE.

In prayers for moral damages, however, recovery is more an
exception rather than the rule.

WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF MORAL DAMAGES?
- TO COMPENSATE AND ALLEVIATE THE:
a. Physical suffering,
b. Mental anguish,
c. Fright,
d. Serious anxiety,
e. Besmirched reputation,
f. Wounded feelings,
g. Moral shock,
h. Social humiliation, and
i. Similar harm unjustly caused to a
person.

Moral damages are not meant to be punitive but are designed
to compensate and alleviate the physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar
harm unjustly caused to a person.

HOW DO YOU PROVE MORAL DAMAGES?
a. satisfactorily prove that he has suffered damages and
that the injury causing it has sprung from any of the cases
listed in Articles 2219
[19]
and 2220
[20]
of the Civil Code.

b. the damages must be shown to be the proximate result
of a wrongful act or omission.

c. The claimant must thus establish the factual basis of the
damages and its causal tie with the acts of the defendant.

In fine, an award of moral damages calls for the presentation
of:
1) evidence of besmirched reputation or physical, mental
or psychological suffering sustained by the claimant;
2) a culpable act or omission factually established;
3) proof that the wrongful act or omission of the
defendant is the proximate cause of the damages
sustained by the claimant; and
4) the proof that the act is predicated on any of the
instances expressed or envisioned by Article 2219 and
Article 2220 of the Civil Code.
[21]


IS MALICE OR BAD FAITH CRUCIAL IN CLAIM FOR MORAL
DAMAGES?
-YES.

WHAT IS MALICE?
Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional design
to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral
obliquity; it is different from the negative idea of negligence in
that malice or bad faith contemplates a state of mind
affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will.

SUPPOSE THERE IS NO MORAL DAMAGES BUT
NEVERTHELESS THE RIGHTS OF A PERSON (E.G. RIGHT TO
PEACEFUL ENJOYMENT OF HIS PROPERTY) IS VIOLATED?
WHAT DAMAGES SHOULD BE AWARDED TO HIM.
- NOMINAL DAMAGES THE PURPOSE OF
WHICH IS TO RECOGNIZE OR
VINDICATE THE VIOLATION OF HIS
RIGHTS.

Pecuniary loss or damage suffered by respondent
cannot be established as the records are bereft of any
factual evidence to establish the same.

Adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff which
has been violated or invaded by the may be vindicated
or recognized, and not for the purpose of
indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by
him.
[29]


WHEN WILL AN EMPLOYER BE HELD LIABLE FOR THE DEATH
OF ITS EMPLOYEE WHO DIED DUE TO AILMENT WHILE AT
WORK?

BLADIMIR BECAME SICK. HE REQUESTED THAT HE BE
BROUGHT TO TARLAC. INSTEAD HIS EMPLOYER BROUGHT
HIM TO A COMMUNITY HOSPITAL. THERE HE DIED. HIS
PARENTS FILED CASE FOR DAMAGES AGAINST THE EMPLOYER
OCEAN BUILDER.. RTC DISMISSED CASE. CA REVERSED ON THE
GROUND THAT OCEAN BUILDERS HAS NO FULL TIME NURSE,
VIOLATIVE OF THE LABOR CODE AND SHOULD HAVE
BROUGHT HIM TO A BETTER HOSPITAL.

IS OCEAN BUILDERS LIABLE FOR NEGLIGENCE?
- NO. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE HOW
MANY EMPLOYEES IT HAS. IF
PETITIONERS MANAGERS TESTIMONY
IS TRUE, IT HAD ONLY SEVEN REGULAR
EMPLOYEES AND 20 CONTRACTUAL
EMPLOYEES STILL SHORT OF THE
MINIMUM 50 WORKERS THAT AN
ESTABLISHMENT MUST HAVE FOR IT
TO BE REQUIRED TO HAVE A FULL-TIME
REGISTERED NURSE.

- ALSO, THE EMPLOYER HAS GIVEN
ADEQUATE AND IMMEDIATE MEDICAL
ASSISTANCE TO THE DECEASED
EMPLOYEE WHEN ITS MANAGER
ADVISED THE EMPLOYEE TO TAKE A 3-
DAY REST AND LATER BROUGHT HIM
TO THE NEAREST HOSPITAL.

WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THIS CASE?
- IT IS A CASE FOR DAMAGES BASED ON
TORTS, THE EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE
RELATIONSHIP BEING MERELY
INCIDENTAL.
SINCE THIS IS A CASE BASED ON TORTS WHAT ARE THE
ELEMENTS THAT MUST BE PRESENT.
THERE ARE THREE:
(1) DUTY;
(2) BREACH; AND
(3) INJURY AND PROXIMATE CAUSATION.

IN CASE OF AN EMERGENCY INVOLVING A SICK OR INJURED
EMPLOYEE, WHAT IS THE DUTY OF EMPLOYER?
- UNDER ART. 161 OF THE LABOR CODE,
THE EMPLOYER MUST PROVIDE ALL
THE NECESSARY ASSISTANCE TO
ENSURE ADEQUATE AND IMMEDIATE
MEDICAL AND DENTAL ATTENDANCE
AND TREATMENT.

WHAT MEDICAL SERVICES MUST THE EMPLOYER PROVIDE?
ART. 157 OF THE LABOR CODE PROVIDES:
Article 157. Emergency Medical and Dental Services. It
shall be the duty of every employer to furnish his employees
in any locality with free medical and dental attendance and
facilities consisting of:
(a) The services of a full-time registered nurse when the
number of employees exceeds fifty (50) but not more than
two hundred (200) except when the employer does not
maintain hazardous workplaces, in which case, the services of
a graduate first-aider shall be provided for the protection of
workers, where no registered nurse is available.

The Secretary of Labor and Employment shall provide
by appropriate regulations, the services that shall be
required where the number of employees does not
exceed fifty (50) and shall determine by appropriate
order, hazardous workplaces for purposes of this
Article;

(b) The services of a full-time registered nurse, a part-
time physician and dentist, and an emergency clinic, when the
number of employees exceeds two hundred (200) but not
more than three hundred (300); and

(c) The services of a full-time physician, dentist and a full-
time registered nurse as well as a dental clinic and an
infirmary or emergency hospital with one bed capacity for
every one hundred (100) employees when the number of
employees exceeds three hundred (300). (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

In the present case, there is no allegation that the company
premises are hazardous. Neither is there any allegation on
the number of employees the company has. If Haos
testimony
[1][4]
would be believed, the company had only seven
regular employees and 20 contractual employees still short
of the minimum 50 workers that an establishment must have
for it to be required to have a full-time registered nurse.

ONE OF THE ELEMENTS IN TORTS IS THAT NEGLIGENCE IS THE
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE DAMAGE. WHAT IS PROXIMATE
CAUSE?
- PROXIMATE CAUSE IS THAT WHICH, IN
NATURAL AND CONTINUOUS
SEQUENCE, UNBROKEN BY AN
EFFICIENT INTERVENING CAUSE,
PRODUCES INJURY, AND WITHOUT
WHICH, THE RESULT WOULD NOT HAVE
OCCURRED.
[2][5]


- AN INJURY OR DAMAGE IS
PROXIMATELY CAUSED BY AN ACT OR
FAILURE TO ACT, WHENEVER IT
APPEARS FROM THE EVIDENCE IN THE
CASE THAT THE ACT OR OMISSION
PLAYED A SUBSTANTIAL PART IN
BRINGING ABOUT OR ACTUALLY
CAUSING THE INJURY OR DAMAGE,
AND THAT THE INJURY OR DAMAGE
WAS EITHER A DIRECT RESULT OR A
REASONABLY PROBABLE
CONSEQUENCE OF THE ACT OR
OMISSION.
[3][6]




THERE ARE TWO DEATH CERTIFICATES. ONE IS DULY
REGISTERED AND THE OTHER IS NOT. WHICH IS MORE
CREDIBLE?
- THE REGISTERED ONE BECAUSE IT IS A
PUBLIC DOCUMENT AND THE ENTRIES
THEREIN ARE PRESUMED CORRECT.



CAN THE COURT OF APPEALS ADMIT NEW EVIDENCE IN A
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI?

Spouses marcelo obtained loan from lbc bank and mortgaged
their property. They failed to pay the loan. Lbc bank filed
extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings. Later lbc bank manager
milan executed an affidavit of consolidation and filed it with
the register of deeds. Marcelos title was cancelled and a new
title was issued in the name of lbc bank. The latter filed
petition for writ of possession. Marcelo spouses opposed on
ground that there is no evidence that milan was authorized to
execute an affidavit of consolidation. Rtc issued writ of
possession. Marcelo spoused filed with c.a. a special civil
action for certioari. C.a. reversed rtc decision. Lbc moved for
reconsideration attaching thereto a secretarys certificate
showing that milan has authority to execute an affidavit of
consolidation. C.a. reconsidered its decision and affirmed rtc
decision.

ISSUE: CAN ADMIT NEW EVIDENCE IN A CIVIL ACTION FOR
CERIORARI?
- YES.

PURSUANT TO SECTION 9 OF BATAS PAMBANSA BLG.
129, AS AMENDED, THE COURT OF APPEALS SHALL
HAVE THE POWER TO RECEIVE EVIDENCE AND
PERFORM ANY AND ALL ACTS NECESSARY TO
RESOLVE FACTUAL ISSUES RAISED IN CASES FALLING
WITHIN ITS ORIGINAL AND APPELLATE JURISDICTION.


WHY IS THE DECISION OF A TRIAL COURT ALWAYS
AFFIRMED?
- BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT HAS THE
UNIQUE ADVANTAGE OF MONITORING
AND OBSERVING AT CLOSE RANGE THE
ATTITUDE, CONDUCT AND
DEPORTMENT OF WITNESSES.
In contrast, the trial court has the unique advantage of
monitoring and observing at close range the attitude, conduct
and deportment of witnesses as they narrate their respective
testimonies before said court.

IN PLEADINGS, LAWYERS USUALLY CITE THE FACT THAT THE
TRIAL JUDGE HAS THE ADVANTAGE OF OBSERVING THE
DEMEANOR OF THE WITNESSES IN CONVINCING THE
APPELLATE COURT THAT THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT
MUST BE UPHELD.
IS THERE A SUAVE, MORE CONVINCING, AUTHORITATIVE,
AND POETIC WAY OF STATING THE ABOVE?
- YES. THE FOREIGN DECISION CITED IN
SUPPORT OF THE ABOVE WHICH READS:

To him (THE JUDGE) appears the furtive glance, the blush of
conscious shame, the hesitation, the sincere or the flippant
or sneering tone, the heat, the calmness, the yawn, the sigh,
the candor or lack of it, the scant or full realization of the
solemnity of an oath, the carriage and mien.

The brazen face of the liar, the glibness of the schooled
witness in reciting a lesson, or the itching overeagerness of
the swift witness, as well as the honest face of the truthful
one, are alone seen by him.

..Echoing a foreign courts observation, this Court
declared:
Truth does not always stalk boldly forth naked, but modest
withal, in a printed abstract in a court of last resort.

She oft hides in nooks and crannies visible only to the minds
eye of the judge who tries the case. To him appears the
furtive glance, the blush of conscious shame, the hesitation,
the sincere or the flippant or sneering tone, the heat, the
calmness, the yawn, the sigh, the candor or lack of it, the
scant or full realization of the solemnity of an oath, the
carriage and mien. The brazen face of the liar, the glibness of
the schooled witness in reciting a lesson, or the itching
overeagerness of the swift witness, as well as the honest face
of the truthful one, are alone seen by him.*15+ (PEOPLE V.
DELOVINO, 247 SCRA 637, 647 (1995).

ARE THERE EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE THAT THE DECISION
OF THE TRIAL COURT BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE THE JUDGE IS
ABLE TO OBSERVE THE DEMEANOR OF THE WITNESSES?
YES. THE EXCEPTIONS ARE AS FOLLOWS:
(A) when patent inconsistencies in the statements of
witnesses are ignored by the trial court;
(b) when the conclusions arrived at are clearly
unsupported by the evidence; and
(c) when the trial court ignored, misunderstood,
misinterpreted and/or misconstrued facts and
circumstances of substance which, if considered, will
alter the outcome of the case

INTERPRETATION OF AN INSTRUMENT.

CASE DIGEST:
Keraj marketing requested for a certification from bank of
commerce that it is arranging for a credit line. It intends to
submit such certification to goodman fielder as a requirement
for a distributorship agreement. The credit line will answer for
liabilities of keraj. Bank of commerce issued a certification that
keraj marketing has arranged for a credit line. When keraj
defaulted, goodman fielder filed collection case against bank
of commerce. Rtc and ca ruled against bank of commerce:
THAT IT IS LIABLE IN VIEW OF ITS CERTIFICATION.

IS BANK OF COMMERCE LIABLE?
- NO. IN INTERPRETING THE
CERTIFICATION THAT KERAJ
MARKETING HAS ARRANGED FOR A
CREDIT LINE, THE CIRCUMSTANCES
WHEN IT WAS ISSUED MUST BE
CONSIDERED. KERAJS LETTER-REQUEST
OF AUGUST 21, 2000 FOR
A CONDITIONAL CERTIFICATION
FROM ARAGON WAS GRANTED TWO
DAYS LATER WHEN ARAGON ISSUED
THE LETTER- CERTIFICATION
ADDRESSED TO RESPONDENT.
-
- WITHIN THAT PERIOD, IT COULD NOT
HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE FOR PETITIONER
TO EVEN PROCESS THE APPLICATION,
GIVEN THAT AMARNANI HAD NOT
EVEN COMPLIED WITH THE
REQUIREMENTS AS HE, HIMSELF,
INDICATED IN HIS LETTER-REQUEST TO
ARAGON TO PLEASE TELL *HIM+ THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE CREDIT LINE
SO *HE+ C*OULD+ APPLY.

- ALSO, GOODMAN FIELDER SHOULD
HAVE VERIFIED THE ISSUANCE OF SUCH
CREDIT LINE. THE DISTRIBUTORSHIP
AGREEMENT BETWEEN RESPONDENT
AND KERAJ WAS FORGED ON OCTOBER
2, 2000 OR 39 DAYS AFTER THE
ISSUANCE OF THE LETTER-
CERTIFICATION, LONG ENOUGH FOR
RESPONDENT TO VERIFY IF INDEED A
BANK GUARANTY WAS, TO ITS
IMPRESSION, GRANTED.

WHAT IS THE RULE ON INTERPRETATION OF AN
INSTRUMENT?
- THE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH IT
WAS MADE MUST BE CONSIDERED.



REQUIREMENTS FOR LAND TITLING (JUDICIAL
CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE) UNDER PD 1529.
FACTS:
On December 7, 2000, respondent Teodoro P. Rizalvo, Jr. filed
before the MTC of Bauang, La Union, acting as a land
registration court, an application for the registration
[3]
of a
parcel of land referred to in Survey Plan Psu-200706,
[4]
located
in Bauang, La Union and containing an area of 8,957 square
meters. Respondent alleged that he is the owner in fee simple
of the subject parcel of land, that he obtained title over the
land by virtue of a Deed of Transfer
[5]
dated December 31,
1962, and that he is currently in possession of the land. In
support of his claim, he presented, among others, Tax
Declaration No. 22206
[6]
for the year 1994 in his name, and
Proof of Payment
[7]
of real property taxes beginning in 1952
up to the time of filing of the application.

ISSUE:
Should his application be granted?

RULING:
No because Petitioner failed to prove that he and his
predecessor have been in possession of the land since 12
June 1945. Neither can be qualify under the 30-year
prescription period rule since the land was declared
alienable less than 30 years from the date of his application.

WHAT MUST AN APPLICANT FOR REGISTRATION OF TITLE
ESTABLISH?
UNDER SECTION 14 (1), APPLICANTS FOR REGISTRATION OF
TITLE MUST SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISH:
1. First, that the subject land forms part of the
disposable and alienable lands of the public domain;

2. second, that the applicant and his predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the same;

3. And third, that it is under a bona fide claim of
ownership since june 12, 1945, or earlier.

HOW DO YOU PROVE THAT THE SUBJECT LAND FORMS PART
OF THE DISPOSABLE AND ALIENABLE LAND?
- BY PRESENTING A CERTIFICATION AND
REPORT FROM THE DENR-CENRO
STATING THAT THE LAND IS
ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE.

HOW DO YOU PROVE THAT YOU AND YOUR PREDECESSOR
WERE IN OPEN, CONTINUOUS, EXCLUSIVE AND NOTORIOUS
POSSESSION AND OCCUPATION OF THE LAND IN QUESTION?
- BY TAX DECLARATIONS AND TAX
RECEIPTS. FOR NO ONE IN HIS RIGHT
MIND WOULD BE PAYING TAXES FOR A
PROPERTY THAT IS NOT IN HIS ACTUAL
OR CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION.
[28]






SINCE WHEN SHOULD YOU AND YOUR PREDECESSOR
POSSESS THE PROPERTY?
- SINCE 12 JUNE 1945 OR EARLIER
UNDER SECTION 14 (PAR. 1) OF PD
1525.

CAN POSSESSION BE LATER THAN THE PERIOD SINCE 12
JUNE 1945 OR EARLIER?
- YES, UNDER SECTION 14, PAR. 2 OF PD
1525. OCCUPATION MUST BE AT LEAST
30 YEARS AT THE TIME OF
APPLICATION PURSUANT TO THE
PRESCRIPTION PROVISION UNDER THE
CIVIL CODE.

- BUT THERE ARE TWO REQUIREMENTS:
(1) THE 3O YEAR PERIOD MUST BEGIN
FROM THE TIME THE LAND IS
DECLARED ALIENABLE; AND

- (2) THERE MUST BE A DECLARATION BY
THE DENR THAT THE SUBJECT LAND
IS NO LONGER INTENDED FOR PUBLIC
SERVICE OR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
NATIONAL WEALTH.

But given the fact that respondent and his predecessors-in-
interest had been in possession of the subject land since 1948,
is respondent nonetheless entitled to registration of title
under Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529? To this question we
likewise answer in the negative.
An applicant may be allowed to register land by means of
prescription under existing laws. The laws on prescription are
found in the Civil Code and jurisprudence.

It is well settled that prescription is one of the modes of
acquiring ownership and that properties classified as alienable
public land may be converted into private property by reason
of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty
years.
[30]


POINTS ON BACKWAGES, REINSTATEMENT, TRANSFER OF
WORK

VELASCO WAS FIRED BY PFIZER FOR UNAUTHORIZED DEALS
AND/OR DISCOUNTS IN MONEY OR SAMPLES AND OTHER
ACTS OF DISHONESTY. THE LABOR ARBITER RULED SHE WAS
ILLEGALLY DISMISSED. THE NLRC AFFIRMED. BUT THE CA
RULED THERE WAS NO ILLEGAL DISMISSAL BUT ORDERED
PAYMENT OF BACKWAGES FROM THE DATE VELASCO WAS
ORDERED REINSTATED TO THE DATE OF THE DECISION OF
THE CA. IS THE RULING CORRECT?
- YES. BACKWAGES SHOULD START
FROM THE DATE OF THE ORDER OF
REINSTATEMENT BECAUSE
REINSTATEMENT IS IMMEDIATELY
EXECUTORY WITHOUT NEED OF A
WRIT. THIS IS BASED ON ROQUERO V.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC.
[14]
WHICH
RULED:

The order of reinstatement is immediately executory. The
unjustified refusal of the employer to reinstate a dismissed
employee entitles him to payment of his salaries effective
from the time the employer failed to reinstate him despite the
issuance of a writ of execution. Unless there is a restraining
order issued, it is ministerial upon the Labor Arbiter to
implement the order of reinstatement. In the case at bar, no
restraining order was granted. Thus, it was mandatory on PAL
to actually reinstate Roquero or reinstate him in the payroll.
Having failed to do so, PAL must pay Roquero the salary he is
entitled to, as if he was reinstated, from the time of the
decision of the NLRC until the finality of the decision of the
Court.
[15]
(Emphases supplied.)

WHY SHOULD REINSTAMEMENT BE IMMEDIATELY
EXECUTORY?
- BECAUSE TO REQUIRE THE
APPLICATION FOR AND ISSUANCE OF A
WRIT OF EXECUTION WILL RENDER THE
EXECUTORY NATURE OF
REINSTATEMENT INEFFECTUAL
BECAUSE AN APPLICATION FOR AND
ISSUANCE OF WRIT COULD BE DELAYED
FOR NUMEROUS REASONS.

As far back as 1997 in the seminal case of Pioneer Texturizing
Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission,
[21]
the
Court held that an award or order of reinstatement is
immediately self-executory without the need for the issuance
of a writ of execution in accordance with the third paragraph
of Article 223
[22]
of the Labor Code. In that case, we discussed
in length the rationale for that doctrine, to wit:

The provision of Article 223 is clear that an award [by the
Labor Arbiter] for reinstatement shall be immediately
executory even pending appeal and the posting of a bond by
the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement.

WHEN PFIZER RECEIVED THE CA DECISION, IT IMMEDIATELY
DIRECTED RESPONDENT TO REPORT FOR WORK BUT
INFORMED RESPONDENT THAT INSTEAD OF WORKING IN
BAGUIO WHERE SHE WAS ASSIGNED, SHE WILL NOW WORK
IN THEIR MAIN OFFICE IN METRO MANILA. BUT
RESPONDENT WROTE BACK INFORMING PFIZER SHE WILL
NOT ANYMORE REPORT FOR WORK AND SHE WOULD
PREFER SEPARATION PAY.

IS THIS REASON NOW FOR PFIZER NOT TO PAY BACKWAGES?
- NO. BECAUSE THE EMPLOYER WAS
NOT ADMITTING HER BACK TO WORK
UNDER THE SAME TERMS AND
CONDITIONS PREVAILING PRIOR TO
HER DISMISSAL OR SEPARATION OR, AT
THE OPTION OF THE EMPLOYER,
MERELY REINSTATED IN THE PAYROLL.

To reiterate, under Article 223 of the Labor Code, an
employee entitled to reinstatement shall either be admitted
back to workunder the same terms and conditions prevailing
prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the
employer, merely reinstated in the payroll.
It is established in jurisprudence that reinstatement means
restoration to a state or condition from which one had been
removed or separated.

The person reinstated assumes the position he had occupied
prior to his dismissal.

Reinstatement presupposes that the previous position from
which one had been removed still exists, or that there is an
unfilled position which is substantially equivalent or of
similar nature as the one previously occupied by the
employee.
[25]


BUT MANAGEMENT HAS THE PREROGATIVE TO TRANSFER
AN EMPLOYEE FROM ONE OFFICE TO ANOTHER WITHIN THE
COMPANY. CAN THE TRANSFER OF RESPONDENT FROM
BAGUIO TO METRO MANILA BE VIEWED AS COVERED BY
THIS PREROGATIVE?
- SUCH TRANSFER MUST NOT BE A
DIMINUTION OF BENEFITS OR PENALY
AND MUST NOT BE MADE IN BAD
FAITH. IN THIS CASE SURELY THE
TRANSFER FROM BAGUIO TO METRO
MANILA OF RESPONDENT WHOSE
FAMILY IS BASED IN BAGUIO WILL
CAUSE HARDSHIP TO HER. AND THERE
IS NO JUSTIFICATION FOR HER
TRANSFER.

KEY ELEMENTS: NO DIMINUTION OF BENEFITS, MUST
NOT BE MADE IN BAD FAITH AND THERE MUST BE
JUSTIFICATION.

The Court is cognizant of the prerogative of management to
transfer an employee from one office to another within the
business establishment, provided that there is no demotion
in rank or diminution of his salary, benefits and other
privileges and the action is not motivated by discrimination,
made in bad faith, or effected as a form of punishment or
demotion without sufficient cause.
[26]


Likewise, the management prerogative to transfer personnel
must be exercised without grave abuse of discretion and
putting to mind the basic elements of justice and fair
play. There must be no showing that it is unnecessary,
inconvenient and prejudicial to the displaced employee.
[27]


BUT WILL RESPONDENTS LETTER SAYING SHE DOES NOT
WANT TO REPORT FOR WORK BE DEEMED PROOF THAT SHE
HAS NO INTENTION EVEN FROM THE BEGINNING TO RETURN
TO WORK.
- NO. TO RULE IN THE POSITIVE WOULD
OPEN THE GATEWAY TO ABUSE BY
EMPLOYERS.

- FORESEEABLY, AN EMPLOYER MAY
CIRCUMVENT THE IMMEDIATELY
ENFORCEABLE REINSTATEMENT ORDER
OF THE LABOR ARBITER BY CRAFTING
RETURN-TO-WORK DIRECTIVES THAT
ARE AMBIGUOUS OR MEANT TO BE
REJECTED BY THE EMPLOYEE AND THEN
DISCLAIM LIABILITY FOR BACKWAGES
DUE TO NON-REINSTATEMENT BY
CAPITALIZING ON THE EMPLOYEES
PURPORTED REFUSAL TO WORK.


PETITIONER CLAIMS THAT WHEN RESPONDENT WROTE
THEM THAT SHE NO LONGER WANTED TO RETURN TO WORK
ANYMORE, SHE IS DEEMED TO HAVE RESIGNED AND THUS
SHE CANNOT BE ENTITLED TO SEPARATION PAY FROM DATE
OF HER LETTER. IS THIS ARGUMENT CORRECT.
- NO. Respondents decision to claim
separation pay over reinstatement had
no legal effect, not only because THERE
WAS NO GENUINE COMPLIANCE BY
THE EMPLOYER TO THE RULE ON
REINSTATEMENT but also because the
EMPLOYER CHOSE NOT TO ACT ON
SAID CLAIM OF RESPONDENT.


In the event, however, that reinstatement is no longer
feasible, or if the employee decides not be reinstated, the
employer shall pay him separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement.

Such a rule is likewise observed in the case of a strained
employer-employee relationship or when the work or position
formerly held by the dismissed employee no longer exists.
In sum, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to:
(1) either reinstatement if viable or separation pay if
reinstatement is no longer viable, and
(2) backwages.

PFIZER ARGUES THAT THE GENUINO CASE IN LIEU OF THE
ROQUERO CASE BE APPLIED BECAUSE IT IS MORE JUST. IN
THE GENUINO CASE THE COURT SAID THERE SHOULD BE NO
BACKWAGES DESPITE REINSTATEMENT ORDER BECAUSE THE
DISMISSAL WAS ILLEGAL. IS THIS ARGUMENT CORRECT?
- NO THE GENUINO DOCTRINE WAS
ALREADY SUPPLANTED BY THE GARCIA
RULING. OTHERWISE, THE RULE THAT
REINSTATEMENT IS IMMEDIATELY
EXECUTORY CANNOT BE
IMPLEMENTED.


VIEW ON THE SANDIGANBAYANS DECISION APPROVING THE
PLEA BARGAINING AGREEMENT WITH GEN. CARLOS F.
GARCIA.


The rule says that the PLEA BARGAIN MAY BE OFFERED
EITHER AT THE ARRAIGNMENT (the familiar scene in
courtroom theater where the accused pleads Innocent or
Guilty), OR AT PRE-TRIAL (after arraignment but before
trial).

*T+he accused, with the consent of the offended party and
prosecutor, may be allowed to plead guilty to a lesser
offense.

MIDNIGHT APPOINTEE
National interest compels the President to make such
appointment for it is particularly during this crucial period
when national leaders are seeking fresh mandates from the
people that the Supreme Court, more than at any other time,
represents stability.

Hence, a full court is ideal to ensure not only due
deliberation on and careful consideration of issues but also
expeditious disposition of cases.

The possible fallouts or serious aftermath of allowing a
vacuum in the position of the Chief Justice may be greater
and riskier than the consequences or repercussions of
inaction.

IMPORTANT POINTS IN A MURDER CASE: DYING
DECLARATION, ALIBI, USE OF EXCESSIVE FORCE, MOTIVE OF
WITNESSES, PENALTIES, CRIME WHEN DECEASED WAS
PREGNANT, CIVIL INDEMNITY, MORAL DAMAGES, TEMPERATE
DAMAGES, EXEMPLARY DAMAGES.



WHY DO THE COURT GIVES GREAT WEIGHT TO THE TRIAL
COURTS EVALUATION OF THE TESTIMONY OF A WITNESS?
- BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT HAD THE
OPPORTUNITY TO OBSERVE THE FACIAL
EXPRESSION, GESTURE, AND TONE OF
VOICE OF A WITNESS WHILE
TESTIFYING, THUS, MAKING IT IN A
BETTER POSITION TO DETERMINE
WHETHER A WITNESS IS LYING OR
TELLING THE TRUTH.
[7]



WHAT ARE THE ELEMENTS OF A DYING DECLARATION?
-IN ORDER FOR A DYING DECLARATION TO BE HELD
ADMISSIBLE, FOUR REQUISITES MUST CONCUR:

a. First, the declaration must concern the cause and
surrounding circumstances of the declarants death;

b. Second, at the time the declaration was made, the
declarant must be under the consciousness of an
impending death;

c. Third, the declarant is competent as a witness; and

d. Fourth, the declaration must be offered in a criminal
case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the
declarant is the victim.
[27]


All the requisites for a dying declaration were sufficiently
met.

First, the statement of the deceased concerned the cause and
circumstances surrounding her death. When asked who
stabbed her, Analyn uttered the name of the appellant.
Further, as proven during trial, appellant was the only person
referred to as Digol in their place.

Second, the victim must have been fully aware that she was on
the brink of death, considering her bloodied condition and the
gaping wounds on her chest when Efren saw her. True, she
made no express statement showing that she was conscious
of her impending death, however, the degree and seriousness
of the wounds and the fact that death occurred shortly
afterwards may be considered as sufficient evidence that the
declaration was made by the victim with full realization that
she was in a dying condition.
[28]


Third, the declarant, at the time she uttered the dying
declaration, was competent as a witness.

Fourth, the victims statement was being offered in a criminal
prosecution for her murder.

Thus, Analyns condemnatory ante mortem statement naming
appellant as her assailant deserves full faith and credit and is
admissible in evidence as a dying declaration.

WHY IS THE DYING DECLARATION GIVEN CREDENCE?
The dying declaration is given credence, on the premise that
no one who knows of ones impending death will make a
careless and false accusation.
[29]


SUPPOSE FRIENDS AND RELATIVES SUPPORT THE DEFENSE
OF ALIBI. HOW WOULD THE COURT CONSIDER THEIR
TESTIMONIES?
- COURT GIVES THEIR TESTIMONIES LESS
PROBATIVE WEIGHT.

Further, the Court gives less probative weight to a defense of
alibi when it is corroborated by friends and relatives. One can
easily fabricate an alibi and ask friends and relatives to
corroborate it. When a defense witness is a relative of an
accused whose defense is alibi, courts have more reason to
view such testimony with skepticism.
[34]


In addition, positive identification destroys the defense of
alibi and renders it impotent, especially where such
identification is credible and categorical.

HOW WOULD MOTIVE ON THE PART OF WITNESSES BE
CONSIDERED BY THE COURT?
- IF THE WITNESSES HAVE NO IMPROPER
MOTIVE THEIR TESTIMONIES ARE
ENTITLED TO FULL FAITH AND CREDIT.

Where there is no evidence to indicate that the prosecution
witnesses were actuated by improper motive, the
presumption is that they were not so actuated and that their
testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit.

HOW IS ABUSE OF SUPERIORITY BE DETERMINED?
- Abuse of superiority is determined by
the excess of the aggressors natural
strength over that of the victim,
considering the position of both and
the employment of means to weaken
the defense, although not annulling it.

- The aggressor must have taken
advantage of his natural strength to
insure the commission of the crime.
[46]



WHAT IS THE PENALTY OF MURDER?
- RECLUSION PERPETUA TO DEATH.
The penalty of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code is reclusion perpetua to death.

Article 63 (2) of the same Code states that when the law
prescribes a penalty consisting of two indivisible penalties and
there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in
the commission of the crime, the lesser penalty shall be
imposed.


WHAT IS THE AWARD OF CIVIL INDEMNITY IN A MURDER
CASE?
- The award of civil indemnity is
mandatory and granted to the heirs of
the victim without need of proof other
than the commission of the
crime.
[51]
The Court affirms the award
of civil indemnity given by the trial court
and the CA in the amount of
PhP50,000.00.

WHAT IS THE AWARD OF MORAL DAMAGES IN A MURDER
CASE?
- Anent moral damages, the same are
mandatory in cases of murder, without
need of allegation and proof other than
the death of the victim.
[52]
The CA
correctly awarded moral damages in the
amount of PhP50,000.00 in view of the
violent death of the victim and the
resultant grief to her family.
[53]


SHOULD EXEMPLARY DAMAGES BE AWARDED?
- Further, the CA correctly awarded
exemplary damages. The award of
exemplary damages is warranted
because of the presence of the
qualifying aggravating circumstance of
abuse of superior strength in the
commission of the crime.
[54]


- The amount of PhP25,000.00 granted by
the trial court and the CA should,
however, be increased to PhP30,000.00
in line with current jurisprudence on the
matter.
[55]



WHEN IS TEMPERATE DAMAGES BE AWARDED?
- TEMPERATE DAMAGES MAY BE
AWARDED WHEN THE COURT FINDS
THAT SOME PECUNIARY LOSS HAS
BEEN SUFFERED BUT ITS AMOUNT
CANNOT, FROM THE NATURE OF THE
CASE, BE PROVED WITH CERTAINTY


IN THE CASE THE VICTIM WAS PREGNANT. WHAT SHOULD
HAVE BEEN THE CRIME?
- MURDER, DEFINED IN AND PENALIZED
UNDER ARTICLE 248 OF THE REVISED
PENAL CODE, COMPLEXED WITH
UNINTENTIONAL ABORTION, DEFINED
IN AND PENALIZED UNDER ARTICLE 257
OF THE SAME CODE.

HOW TO PROVE THAT LAND IS ALIENABLE OR DISPOSABLE.

UNION LEAF TOBACCO CORP FILED APPLICATIONS FOR LAND
REGISTRATION OF CERTAIN PARCELS OF LAND. HIS PROOF
THAT THE LANDS ARE ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE ARE
ADVANCE PLANS AND CONSOLIDATED PLANS WHICH ALL
NOTED THAT THE SUBJECT LANDS ARE INSIDE ALIENABLE
AND DISPOSABLE AREA AS PER PROJECT NO. 5-A, LC MAP NO.
2891.
[12]

ARE THE SURVEY PLANS SUFFICIENT PROOF THAT SUCH
PARCELS OF LAND ARE ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE.?
NO.
THE SUPREME COURT RULED:
The Advance Plans and Consolidated Plans are hardly the
competent pieces of evidence that the law requires. The
notation by a geodetic engineer on the survey plans that
properties are alienable and disposable does not suffice to
prove these lands classification.
[14]



x x x x [T]he applicant for registration must present a copy of
the original classification approved by the DENR
Secretaryand certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of
the official records.

These facts must be established to prove that the land is
alienable and disposable.

IF DOUBT EXISTS BETWEEN THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY
THE EMPLOYER AND THE EMPLOYEE, THE SCALES OF JUSTICE
MUST BE TILTED IN FAVOR OF THE EMPLOYEE.

STORY OF THE CASE:
SUMULONG DIRECTED ACCOUNTING MANAGER PACIA TO
PREPARE CHECK TO BPI. SHE PREPARED BUT AFTER MUCH
DELAY. THIS WAS REPEATED. PACIA EXPLAINED THAT SHE
DELAYED THE PREPARATION OF THE CHECKS BECAUSE AT
THAT TIME THERE WAS NO SUFFICIENT FUNDS FOR THE
CHECK. PACIA WAS DISMISSED. THE LABOR ARBITER RULED
THERE WAS NO ILLEGAL DISMISSAL. NLRC REVERSED. CA
CONFIRMED.

WAS THERE ILLEGAL DISMISSAL.?
- YES. WHILE THERE WAS DOUBT AS TO
WHO IS RIGHT, THAT DOUBT SHALL BE
RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF LABOR.

ONLY THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HAS CONTROL OVER
PROSECUTION OF CRIMES. STATE MUST BE REPRESENTED BY
OSG IN LITIGATION.

DIGEST:
MARK SENSING CAUSED IMPORTATION OF BET SLIPS AND
THERMAL PAPERS FOR PCSO BUT DID NOT PAY TAXES.
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS FILED A CRIMINAL CASE AGAINST
OFFICERS OF MARK SENSING. THE FISCAL FILED INFORMATION
AT CTA. DOJ REVERSED FISCALS RESOLUTION. CTA
WITHDREW INFORMATION UPON MOTION OF THE FISCAL.
CUSTOMS LAWYER FILED A MOTION FOR RECON. CTA NOTED
SUCH MOTION WITHOUT ACTION. CUSTOMS LAWYER FILED
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI BEFORE THE SC.

ISSUE: DID CTA COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION?
- NO. PETITION MUST BE DISMISSED
BECAUSE THE MOTION OF CUSTOMS
DOES NOT BEAR THE IMPRIMATUR OF
THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR. ALSO,
CUSTOMS IS NOT REPRESENTED BY THE
OSG.
The OSG shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its
agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in
any litigation, proceeding, investigation, or matter requiring
the services of lawyers.
[2][21]



TO WHOM DOES PROSECUTION OF CRIMES PERTAIN?
- It is well-settled that prosecution of
crimes pertains to the executive
department of the government whose
principal power and responsibility is to
insure that laws are faithfully executed.
Corollary to this power is the right to
prosecute violators.
[3][18]


CAN LAWYERS IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES PROSECUTE
CRIMES?
- YES, BUT THEY MUST BE DESIGNATED
AS SPECIAL PROSECUTORS. THEIR ROLE
IS MERELY TO ASSIST. THE PUBLIC
PROSECUTOR MUST STILL HAVE
CONTROL OVER THE CASE.


VOIDABLE CONTRACTS
WHEN IS A CONTRACT VOIDABLE?
- A contract where consent is given
through mistake, violence,
intimidation, undue influence, or fraud
is voidable.
[35]


HOW DOES THE COURT DETERMINE WHETHER CONSENT TO
A CONTRACT IS VITIATED?
In determining whether consent is vitiated by any of the
circumstances mentioned, courts are given a wide latitude in
weighing the facts or circumstances in a given case and in
deciding in their favor what they believe to have actually
occurred, considering the age, physical infirmity, intelligence,
relationship, and the conduct of the parties at the time of the
making of the contract and subsequent thereto, irrespective
of whether the contract is in public or private writing.
[36]


HOW WILL MISTAKE INVALIDATE CONSENT?
- It should refer to the substance of the
thing which is the object of the
contract, or those conditions which
have principally moved one or both
parties to enter the contract.
[37]


WHEN QUITCLAIM IS DECLARED VOID.

STORY OF THE CASE:
DPWH NEGOTIATED WITH THE HERNANDEZ FAMILY TO
PURCHASE PORTION OF THEIR LAND FOR EXPANSION OF SLEX.
PRICE OFFERED WITH P35.00 PER SQ.M. RAISED TO P70.00
PER SQ.M.. HERANDEZES DID NOT AGREE. DPWH FILED
EXPROPRIATION CASE. THE HERNANDEZES BY WAY OF LETTER
APPOINTED CECILIO TO REPRESENT THEM AND AS
COMPENSATION HE GETS 20% OF THE PRICE AND THE EXCESS
BEYOND THE PRICE OF P300.00 PER SQ.M. LATER THE
HERNANDEZES EXECUTED AN IRREVOCABLE SPA IN FAVOR OF
CECILIO. DURING THE PROCEEDINGS, CECILIO WAS
APPOINTED AS ONE OF THE COMMISSIONERS TO DETERMINE
JUST COMPENSATION. RTC FIXED THE PRICE AT P1,500.00 PER
SQ.M. SHARE OF CORNELIA HERNANDEZ WAS P7,321,500.00.
CORNELIA ASKED FOR AN ACCOUNTING. CECILIO, INSTEAD OF
GIVING AN ACCOUNTING GAVE CORNELIA CHECK FOR
P1,123,000.00 AND WAIVER AND QUITCLAIM. CORNELIA
SIGNED THE WAIVER AND QUITCLAIM AND RECEIVED THE
CHECK BECAUSE SHE BADLY NEEDED THE MONEY FOR
medical expenses due to her frail condition. SHE THEN FILED
THIS CASE AGAINST CECILIO FOR ANNULMENT OF QUITCLAIM
AND TO RECOVER HER JUST SHARE FROM CECILIO. RTC RULED
IN CORNELIAS FAVOR BECAUSE CECILIO WAS IN DEFAULT FOR
NOT FILING AN ANSWER ON TIME. CA REVERSED RTC
DECISION.

CAN THE QUITCLAIM EXECUTED BY CORNELIA BE ANNULLED
AND CAN CORNELIA RECOVER HER SHARE FROM CECILIO?
- THE QUITCLAIM CAN BE ANNULLED.
CONSENT TO THE QUITCLAIM IS
VITIATED BY THE CONDUCT OF THE
PARTIES AT THE TIME OF THE MAKING
OF THE CONTRACT AND SUBSEQUENT
THERETO.

- CORNELIA CANNOT BE SAID TO HAVE
VOLUNTARILY AGREED TO THE
QUITCLAIM BECAUSE SHE SIGNED THE
SAME ONLY BECAUSE OF HER
DESPERATE CONDITION.

CORNELIA CAN RECOVER HER SHARE. THE BASIS OF CECILIO
THAT HE IS ENTITLED TO THE BALANCE OF 83.07% OF
CORNELIAS SHARE ARE: THE LETTER-AGREEMENT, THE
QUITCLAIM AND THE SPA. CONSENT TO THE LETTER
AGREEMENT WAS GIVEN BY MISTAKE. THERE WAS NOTHING
IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES TO SHOW THAT CORNELIA COULD
HAVE AGREED TO PART WITH 83.07% OF HER SHARE AT
P1,500.00 PER SQ.M. THE QUITCLAIM WAS FRAUDULENT,
THEREFORE VOID. AS AGENT CECILIO SHOULD HAVE
PRESENTED AN ACCOUNTING AS REQUESTED BY HIS
PRINCIPAL. INSTEAD HE PRESENTED A QUITCLAIM. THE SPA IS
IMPROPER. FIRST, IT DID NOT SPECIFY THE COMPENSATION
OF CECILIO. SECOND IT WAS EXECUTED AFTER CECILIO WAS
APPOINTED AS COMMISSIONER. CECILIO COULD NOT HAVE
BEEN A HEARING OFFICER AND ACT FOR THE DEFENDANT AT
THE SAME TIME. CECILIO FOISTED FRAUD ON BOTH THE
COURT AND THE HERNANDEZES WHEN, AFTER HIS
APPOINTMENT AS COMMISSIONER, HE ACCEPTED THE
APPOINTMENT BY THE HERNANDEZES TO REPRESENT AND
SUE FOR THEM.

The relation of an agent to his principal is fiduciary and it is
elementary that in regard to property subject matter of the
agency, an agent is estopped from acquiring or asserting a title
adverse to that of the principal.

His position is analogous to that of a trustee and he cannot,
consistently with the principles of good faith, be allowed to
create in himself an interest in opposition to that of his
principal or cestui que trust.
[41]



CERTIFICATION ELECTION


WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF CERTIFICATION ELECTION
PROCEEDING?
- TO DETERMINE WHICH ORGANIZATION
WILL REPRESENT THE EMPLOYEES IN
THEIR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING WITH
THE EMPLOYER.

CAN THE EMPLOYER QUESTION THE LEGITIMACY OF THE
LABOR UNION IN SUCH PROCEEDINGS?
- NO. THE EMPLOYER IS A MERE
BYSTANDER.
-
- THE CHOICE OF THE EMPLOYEES
REPRESENTATIVE IS THE EXCLUSIVE
CONCERN OF THE EMPLOYEES AND THE
EMPLOYER CANNOT HAVE A PARTISAN
INTEREST THEREIN. IT CANNOT
THEREFORE INTERFERE WITH OR
OPPOSE THE PROCESS.

- ITS ONLY RIGHT IS TO BE NOTIFIED OR
INFORMED THEREOF.

The choice of their representative is the exclusive concern of
the employees; the employer cannot have any partisan
interest therein; it cannot interfere with, much less oppose,
the process by filing a motion to dismiss or an appeal from it;
not even a mere allegation that some employees participating
in a petition for certification election are actually managerial
employees will lend an employer legal personality to block the
certification election. The employers only right in the
proceeding is to be notified or informed thereof.

UNDER THE 1997 RULES WHAT ARE THE REQUISITES FOR
CREATION BY A NATIONAL FEDERATION OF A LOCAL
CHAPTER?
The then prevailing Section 1, Rule VI of the Implementing
Rules of Book V, as amended by D.O. No. 9, series of 1997,
provides:
Section 1. Chartering and creation of a local chapter A duly
registered federation or national union may directly create a
local/chapter by submitting to the Regional Office or to the
Bureau two (2) copies of the following:
(a) A charter certificate issued by the federation or
national union indicating the creation or establishment
of the local/chapter;
(b) The names of the local/chapters officers, their
addresses, and the principal office of the local/chapter;
and
(c) The local/chapters constitution and by-laws provided
that where the local/chapters constitution and by-
laws [are] the same as [those] of the federation or
national union, this fact shall be indicated accordingly.
All the foregoing supporting requirements shall be certified
under oath by the Secretary or the Treasurer of the
local/chapter and attested to by its President.

THE CHARTER CERTIFICATE WAS SUBMITTED BUT NOT UNDER
OATH? DOES THIS INVALIDATE THE REGISTRATION OF THE
LOCAL CHAPTER?
NO. SUCH CERTIFICATE IS PREPARED BY THE NATIONAL
UNION. IT WOULD NOT BE PROPER FOR THE LOCAL CHAPTER
TO CERTIFY ON A DOCUMENT IT DID NOT PREPARE.
THE EMPLOYER CONTENDS THAT THE LABOR UNION
CANNOT BE CONSIDERED LEGITIMATE BECAUSE IT HAS BOTH
RANK AND FILE AND SUPERVISORY EMPLOYEES. IS THE
EMPLOYER CORRECT?
- NO. UNDER THE PRESENT RULES, A
MIXTURE OF RANK AND FILE AND
SUPERVISORY EMPLOYEES IN A LABOR
UNION DOES NOT NULLIFY ITS LEGAL
PERSONALITY BECAUSE IT IS NO
LONGER A GROUND FOR
CANCELLATION OF THE REGISTRATION
OF A LABOR UNION.

Any mingling between supervisory and rank-and-file
employees in its membership cannot affect its legitimacy for
that is not among the grounds for cancellation of its
registration, unless such mingling was brought about by
misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under Article 239
of the Labor Code.

CAN THOSE HOLDING SUPERVISORY POSITIONS AND
SECURITY GUARDS JOIN THE RANK AND FILE LABOR UNION?
- NO. BUT THEY CAN FORM THEIR OWN UNION.

R.A. No. 6715 omitted specifying the exact effect any violation
of the prohibition [on the co-mingling of supervisory and rank-
and-file employees] would bring about on the legitimacy of a
labor organization.
It was the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 6715
(1989 Amended Omnibus Rules) which supplied the deficiency

WHAT IS GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW?


WHAT IS GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW?
To constitute gross ignorance of the law, it is not enough that
the subject decision, order or actuation of respondent judge in
the performance of her official duties is contrary to existing
law and jurisprudence but, most importantly, she must be
moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption.

Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or
improper considerations are sufficient defenses in which a
judge charged with ignorance of the law can find refuge.
29


CAN THE JUDGE MAKE AS AN EXCUSE THE INEFFICIENCY OF
HIS COURT PERSONNEL?
NO.
Judge De Vera would do well to keep in mind that *a+ judge
should organize and supervise the court personnel to ensure
the prompt and efficient dispatch of business, and require at
all times the observance of high standards of public service
and fidelity.
30


A judge cannot take refuge behind the inefficiency or
mismanagement by court personnel. Proper and efficient
court management is as much her responsibility.

She is the one directly responsible for the proper discharge of
her official functions.
31


CAN FILING AN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE AGAINST THE JUDGE
A REMEDY TO CORRECT AN ERRONEOUS ORDER OR
DECISION?
NO.
Complainants should also bear in mind that an administrative
complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every irregular or
erroneous order or decision issued by a judge where a judicial
remedy is available, such as a motion for reconsideration, an
appeal, or a petition for certiorari.

Disciplinary proceedings against a judge are not
complementary or suppletory to, nor a substitute for these
judicial remedies whether ordinary or extraordinary. For,
obviously, if subsequent developments prove the judges
challenged act to be correct, there would be no occasion to
proceed against her at all.

Besides, to hold a judge administratively accountable for every
erroneous ruling or decision rendered, assuming she
has erred, would be nothing short of harassment and would
make her position doubly unbearable.
32


DIRECT CONTEMPT; INDIRECT CONTEMPT AND SUSPENSION
IN LAW PRACTICE.


THE CASE

While judge blancaflor was handling an arson case. An
administrative case was filed against his driver awayan by
provincial prosecutor rodriguez on the ground that he was
involved in bribery to secure acquital of accused ami in the
arson case. A day before promulgation, trial fiscal tulali filed
ex parte manifestation withdrawing his appearance to avoid
any suspicion of collusion. He attached to his manifestation a
copy of the administrative complaint against awayan. Judge
blancaflor acquitted accused ami. The administrative case
against cawayan was withdrawn. Perhaps thinking that the
filing of the ex-parte manifestation by tulali and the filing of
the administrative case against his driver were intended to
smear him, judge blancaflor interviewed several witnesses.
Tulali was interviewed also. Rodrigues was summoned.
Rodriguez filed motion asking clarification as to why the judge
was conducting inquiries. Judge blancaflor then informed the
petitioners that he was proceeding against them for direct
contempt and violation of their oath of office on the basis of
tulalis ex-parte manifestation. After petitioners submitted
their position papers judge blancaflor issued a decision finding
them guilty of direct contempt and fined them p100,000.00
each and suspended them from practice of law indefinitely.
Also they have to make public apology under pain of arrest.


WAS THE DECISION OF THE JUDGE CORRECT?
- NO. THE FINDINGS OF THE JUDGE HAVE
NO FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS.
GRANTING THAT THERE WAS DIRECT
CONTEMPT. THE PENALTY WAS NOT IN
ACCORD WITH THE RULES. CONTEMPT
AND SUSPENSION ARE DIFFERENT
PROCEEDINGS AND MUST BE
SEPARATELY CONDUCTED. AND THE
GROUND FOR SUSPENSION IS NOT
AMONG THE GROUNDS PROVIDED FOR
UNDER THE RULES.

WHAT IS THE POWER TO PUNISH A PERSON IN CONTEMPT?
- IT IS A POWER INHERENT IN ALL
COURTS. ITS PURPOSE IS TO PRESERVE
ORDER IN JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AND
TO UPHOLD THE ORDERLY
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.

HOW WILL JUDGES EXERCISE SUCH POWER?
- They must exercise such power
judiciously and sparingly, with utmost
restraint, and with the end in view of
utilizing the same for correction and
preservation of the dignity of the court.

- Such power must be exercised on the
preservative, not the vindictive
principle; and on the corrective, not
the retaliatory idea of
punishment.
[6]
such power, being
drastic and extraordinary in its nature,
should not be resorted to unless
necessary in the interest of justice.
[7]


WHAT IS DIRECT CONTEMPT?
- Direct contempt is any misbehavior in the presence of or so
near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings
before the same, including:
- disrespect toward the court;
- offensive personalities toward others;
- refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness;
- refusal to subscribe an affidavit or deposition
when lawfully required to do so.
[8]



PETITIONERS FAULT THE JUDGE FOR NON-OBSERVANCE OF
DUE PROCESS IN THE CONTEMPT CASE BECAUSE NO
HEARINGS WERE CONDUCTED AND THEY WERE NOT GIVEN
THE OPPORTUNITY TO CONFRONT WITNESSES. ARE
PETITIONERS CORRECT?
NO.
It must be emphasized that direct contempt is adjudged and
punished summarily pursuant to Section 1, Rule 71 of the
Rules. Hence, hearings and opportunity to confront witnesses
are absolutely unnecessary.

WAS THE ALLEGED VILIFICATION CAMPAIGN DIRECT
CONTEMPT?
NO.
At most, it may constitute indirect contempt, as correctly
concluded by the OSG. For indirect contempt citation to
prosper, however, the requirements under Sections 3 and 4,
Rule 71 of the Rules must be satisfied, to wit:
Sec. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and
hearing. After a charge in writing has been filed, and an
opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon
within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be
heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the
following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:
x x x
(d) any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to
impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;
x x x.
Sec. 4. How proceedings commenced. Proceedings for
indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court
against which the contempt was committed by an order or
any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show
cause why he should not be punished for contempt.
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be
commenced by a verified petition with supporting particulars
and certified true copies of documents or papers involved
therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for
filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court
concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related
to a principal action pending in the court, the petition for
contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be
docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in its
discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge
and the principal action for joint hearing and decision.

IF IT WAS INDIRECT CONTEMPT WAS THERE A PROPER
PROCEEDING?
NONE.
In the present case, Judge Blancaflor failed to observe the
elementary procedure which requires written charge and due
hearing. There was no order issued to petitioners. Neither
was there any written or formal charge filed against them. In
fact, Rodriguez only learned of the contempt proceedings
upon his receipt of the July 30, 2009 Order, requiring him to
appear before the Court in order to clarify certain matters
contained in the said order. Tulali, on the other hand, only
learned of the proceedings when he was ordered to submit his
compliance to explain how he came in possession of the
administrative complaint against Awayan.

BUT PETITIONERS WERE AFFORDED THE OPPORTUNITY TO
FILE POSITION PAPERS. WAS DUE PROCESS OBSERVED?

NO.
The fact that petitioners were afforded the opportunity to file
their appropriate pleadings is not sufficient as the
proceedings ex-parte to hear the witnesses testimonies had
already been completed.

WAS THE JUDGE IMPARTIAL?
NO.
In the course of his investigation, Judge Blancaflor showed
that he no longer had the cold impartiality expected of a
magistrate.
As a public servant, a judge should perform his duties in
accordance with the dictates of his conscience and the light
that God has given him.

A judge should never allow himself to be moved by pride,
prejudice, passion, or pettiness in the performance of his
duties.

He should always bear in mind that the power of the court to
punish for contempt should be exercised for purposes that are
impersonal, because that power is intended as a safeguard
not for the judges as persons but for the functions that they
exercise.
[10]


CAN CONTEMPT AND SUSPENSION PROCEEDINGS BE
CONDUCTED IN ONE PROCEEDING?

NO.
Contempt and suspension proceedings are supposed to be
separate and distinct. They have different objects and
purposes for which different procedures have been
established. Judge Blancaflor should have conducted separate
proceedings

A contempt proceeding for misbehavior in court is designed to
vindicate the authority of the court; on the other hand, the
object of a disciplinary proceeding is to deal with the fitness of
the courts officer to continue in that office, to preserve and
protect the court and the public from the official ministrations
of persons unfit or unworthy to hold such office.

The principal purpose of the exercise of the power to cite for
contempt is to safeguard the functions of the court and should
thus be used sparingly on a preservative and not, on the
vindictive principle.

The principal purpose of the exercise of disciplinary authority
by the Supreme Court is to assure respect for orders of such
court by attorneys who, as much as judges, are responsible for
the orderly administration of justice.



DOES A JUDGE HAVE POWER TO SUSPEND AN ATTORNEY?
YES.

This Court is not unmindful of a judges power to suspend an
attorney from practice for just cause pursuant to Section 28,
Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.

WHAT IS THE REQUIREMENTS OF DUE PROCESS IN THE
REMOVAL OR SUSPENSION OF AN ATTORNEY?
- HE MUST HAVE FULL OPPORTUNITY TO
ANSWER THE CHARGES, TO PRODUCE
WITNESSES AND TO BE HEARD.

Judge Blancaflor, however, must be reminded that the
requirements of due process must be complied with, as
mandated under Section 30, Rule 138 of the same Rules which
specifically provides, viz:
Sec. 30. Attorney to be heard before removal or
suspension. No attorney shall be removed or suspended
from the practice of his profession, until he has had full
opportunity upon reasonable notice to answer the charges
against him, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to be
heard by himself or counsel. But if upon reasonable notice he
fails to appear and answer the accusation, the court may
proceed to determine the matter ex parte.
Indeed, a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any
misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in his moral
character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. His guilt,
however, cannot be presumed. It must indicate the dubious
character of the acts done, as well as the motivation thereof.
Furthermore, a disbarred lawyer must have been given full
opportunity upon reasonable notice to answer the charges
against him, produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to be
heard by himself and counsel.
[12]


AS APPLIED TO THE CASE, WAS DUE PROCESS OBSERVED?
NO.
In the case at bench, there was no prior and separate notice
issued to petitioners setting forth the facts constituting the
misconduct and requiring them, within a specified period from
receipt thereof, to show cause why they should not be
suspended from the practice of their profession. Neither were
they given full opportunity to defend themselves, to produce
evidence on their behalf and to be heard by themselves and
counsel. Undoubtedly, the suspension proceedings against
petitioners are null and void, having violated their right to due
process.

WHAT ARE THE GROUNDS FOR DISBARMENT OR SUSPENSION
OF A LAWYER?

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules enumerates the grounds for
disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar from his
office as attorney, to wit: (1) deceit, (2) malpractice, (3) gross
misconduct in office, (4) grossly immoral conduct, (5)
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, (6) violation of
the lawyers oath, (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order
of a superior court, and for (8) willfully appearing as an
attorney for a party without authority to do so.

WAS THE BASIS OF THE JUDGE IN SUSPENDING THE
PETITIONERS LEGAL?
NO.
Judge Blancaflor failed to show that the suspension was for
any of the foregoing grounds.


WHAT IS THE REMEDY IF THE JUDGE IN A CONTEMPT
PROCEEDING COMMITS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY
ISSUING AN ORDER WITHOUT LEGAL BASIS OR IN VIOLATION
OF DUE PROCESS?

PROHIBITION.

In fine, having established that Judge Blancaflor committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, petitioners are entitled to the remedy of
prohibition under Section 2, Rule 71 of the Rules on Contempt
which provides:
SEC. 2. Remedy therefrom. The person adjudged in direct
contempt by any court may not appeal therefrom, but may
avail himself of the remedies of certiorari or prohibition. The
execution of the judgment shall be suspended pending
resolution of such petition, provided such person files a bond
fixed by the court which rendered the judgment and
conditioned that he will abide by and perform the judgment
should the petition be decided against him.
Accordingly, an order of direct contempt is not immediately
executory or enforceable. The contemnor must be afforded a
reasonable remedy to extricate or purge himself of the
contempt. Where the person adjudged in direct contempt by
any court avails of the remedy of certiorari or prohibition, the
execution of the judgment shall be suspended pending
resolution of such petition provided the contemnor files a
bond fixed by the court which rendered the judgment and
conditioned that he will abide by and perform the judgment
should the petition be decided against him.
[13]

RIMER ON COURT JURISDICTION AND FILING FEES
SOURCE: HOME GUARANTY CORPORATION VS. R-II BUILDERS
INC., AND NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY (G.R. NO. 192649,
9 MARCH 2011, PEREZ, J.) SUBJECTS: JURISDICTION OF
COURTS, HOW DETERMINED; FILING FEES IN CONNECTION
WITH AMENDED COMPLAINT; CAN COURT WITHOUT
JURISDICTION RE-RAFFLE CASE TO ANOTHER COURT? (BRIEF
TITLE: HOME GUARANTY VS. R-11 BUILDERS ET AL.)

WHAT IS THE DEFINITION OF JURISDICTION?
JURISDICTION IS DEFINED AS THE AUTHORITY TO HEAR AND
DETERMINE A CAUSE OR THE RIGHT TO ACT IN A CASE.
[37]


HOW IS JURISDICTION OVER A SUBJECT MATTER
DETERMINED?
BY ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT, THE LAW AND RELIEF
BEING SOUGHT.
The rule is settled that a courts jurisdiction over the subject
matter is determined by the relevant allegations in the
complaint,
[39]
the law in effect when the action is filed,
[40]
and
the character of the relief sought irrespective of whether the
plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted.
[41]


HOW DOES COURT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER A CASE?
ONLY UPON PAYMENT OF THE PRESCRIBED FILING AND
DOCKET FEES.
Consistent with Section 1, Rule 141 of theRevised Rules of
Court which provides that the prescribed fees shall be paid in
full upon the filing of the pleading or other application which
initiates an action or proceeding, the well-entrenched rule is
to the effect that a court acquires jurisdiction over a case only
upon the payment of the prescribed filing and docket fees.
[42]


RTC, A DESIGNATED SPECIAL COMMERCIAL COURT, FOUND
OUT THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE SINCE RTC
SAID THE SUBJECT MATTER IS NOT INTRA-CORPORATE. IT
ORDERED A RERAFFLE OF THE CASE. IS RTC CORRECT?
NO. RTC SHOULD HAVE ORDERED THE DISMISSAL OF THE
COMPLAINT, SINCE A COURT WITHOUT JURISDICTION OVER
THE SUBJECT MATTER CANNOT TRANSFER THE CASE TO
ANOTHER COURT.
[51]
INSTEAD, IT SHOULD HAVE SIMPLY
ORDERED THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT, CONSIDERING
THAT THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES FOR WHICH HGC SOUGHT
HEARING INCLUDED ITS LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER THE
CASE.
A RE-RAFFLE WHICH CAUSES A TRANSFER OF THE CASE
INVOLVES COURTS WITH THE SAME SUBJECT
MATTER JURISDICTION; IT CANNOT INVOLVE COURTS WHICH
HAVE DIFFERENT JURISDICTIONS EXCLUSIVE OF THE
OTHER. MORE APT IN THIS CASE, A RE-RAFFLE OF A CASE
CANNOT CURE A JURISDICTIONAL DEFECT.
The record shows that R-II Builders original complaint dated
23 August 2005 was initially docketed as Civil Case No. 05-
113407 before Branch 24 of the Manila, a designated Special
Commercial Court.
[43]
With HGCs filing of a motion for a
preliminary hearing on the affirmative defenses asserted in its
answer
[44]
and R-II Builders filing of its Amended and
Supplemental Complaint dated 31 July 2007,
[45]
said court
issued an order dated 2 January 2008 ordering the re-raffle of
the case upon the finding that the same is not an intra-
corporate dispute.
[46]
In a clarificatory order dated 1 February
2008,
[47]
the same court significantly took cognizance of its
lack of jurisdiction over the case in the following wise:
At the outset, it must be stated that this Court is a
designated Special Commercial Court tasked to try and hear,
among others, intra-corporate controversies to the exclusion
of ordinary civil cases.
When the case was initially assigned to this Court, it
was classified as an intra-corporate case. However, in the
ensuing proceedings relative to the affirmative defences
raised by defendants, even the plaintiff conceded that the case
is not an intra-corporate controversy or even if it is, this Court
is without authority to hear the same as the parties are all
housed in Quezon City.
Thus, the more prudent course to take was for this
Court to declare that it does not have the authority to hear
the complaint it being an ordinary civil action. As to whether
it is personal or civil, this Court would rather leave the
resolution of the same to Branch 22 of this Court. (Italics
supplied).
We find that, having squarely raised the matter in its Rule 65
petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 111153,
[48]
HGC correctly faults the CA for not finding that
Branch 24 of the Manila RTC had no authority to order the
transfer of the case to respondent RTC.
[49]
Being outside the
jurisdiction of Special Commercial Courts, the rule is settled
that cases which are civil in nature, like the one commenced
by R-II Builders, should be threshed out in a regular
court.
[50]
With its acknowledged lack of jurisdiction over the
case, Branch 24 of the Manila RTC should have ordered the
dismissal of the complaint, since a court without subject
matter jurisdiction cannot transfer the case to another
court.
[51]
Instead, it should have simply ordered the dismissal
of the complaint, considering that the affirmative defenses for
which HGC sought hearing included its lack of jurisdiction over
the case.
Calleja v. Panday,
[52]
while on facts the other way
around, i.e., a branch of the RTC exercising jurisdiction over a
subject matter within the Special Commercial Courts
authority, dealt squarely with the issue:
Whether a branch of the Regional Trial Court which has no
jurisdiction to try and decide a case has authority to remand
the same to another co-equal Court in order to cure the
defects on venue and jurisdiction.
Calleja ruled on the issue, thus:
Such being the case, RTC Br. 58 did not have the requisite
authority or power to order the transfer of the case to
another branch of the Regional Trial Court. The only action
that RTC-Br. 58 could take on the matter was to dismiss the
petition for lack of jurisdiction.
Certainly, the pronouncement of Br. 24, the Special
Commercial Court, in its Joint Order of 2 January 2008 that the
case is not an intracorporate controversy, amplified in its
Order of 1 February 2008 that it does not have the authority
to hear the complaint it being an ordinary civil action is
incompatible with the directive for the re-raffle of the case
and to leave the resolution of the same to Branch 22 of this
Court. Such a directive is an exercise of authority over the
case, which authority it had in the same breath declared it did
not have. What compounds the jurisdictional error is the fact
that at the time of its surrender of jurisdiction, Br. 24 had
already acted on the case and had in fact, on 26 October 2005,
issued the writ of preliminary injunction sought by herein
respondent R-II Builders. At that point, there was absolutely
no reason which could justify a re-raffle of the case
considering that the order that was supposed to have caused
the re-raffle was not an inhibition of the judge but a
declaration of absence of jurisdiction. So faulty was the order
of re-raffle that it left the impression that its previously issued
preliminary injunction remained effective since the case from
which it issued was not dismissed but merely transferred to
another court. A re-raffle which causes a transfer of the case
involves courts with the same subject matter jurisdiction; it
cannot involve courts which have different jurisdictions
exclusive of the other. More apt in this case, a re-raffle of a
case cannot cure a jurisdictional defect.

R-2 BUILDERS FILED A COMPLAINT, THEN AN AMENDED AND
SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT. WHEN ASSESSMENT OF FILING
FEE WAS MADE, R-2 BUILDERS WITHREW ITS AMENDED AND
SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT AND FILED A SECOND AMENDED
COMPLAINT APPARENTLY TO AVOID PAYING HUGE FILING
FEES. IS THIS CORRECT?
NO BECAUSE IT IS CLEAR THAT THE INTENTION OF R-2
BUILDERS IS TO EVADE PAYMENT OF FILING FEES. DECISIONS
HAD BEEN CONSISTENTLY PREMISED ON THE WILLINGNESS OF
THE PARTY TO PAY THE CORRECT DOCKET FEES AND/OR
ABSENCE OF INTENTION TO EVADE PAYMENT OF THE
CORRECT DOCKET FEES. THIS CANNOT BE SAID OF R-II
BUILDERS WHICH NOT ONLY FAILED TO PAY THE CORRECT
DOCKET FEES FOR ITS ORIGINAL COMPLAINT AND AMENDED
AND SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT BUT ALSO CLEARLY EVADED
PAYMENT OF THE SAME BY FILING ITS SECOND AMENDED
COMPLAINT.
The importance of filing fees cannot be over-emphasized for
they are intended to take care of court expenses in the
handling of cases in terms of costs of supplies, use of
equipment, salaries and fringe benefits of personnel, and
others, computed as to man-hours used in the handling of
each case. The payment of said fees, therefore, cannot be
made dependent on the result of the action taken without
entailing tremendous losses to the government and to the
judiciary in particular.
[80]
For non-payment of the correct
docket fees which, for real actions, should be computed on
the basis of the assessed value of the property, or if there is
none, the estimated value thereof as alleged by the
claimant,
[81]
respondent RTC should have denied admission of
R-II Builders Second Amended Complaint and ordered the
dismissal of the case. Although a catena of decisions rendered
by this Court eschewed the application of the doctrine laid
down in the Manchester case,
[82]
said decisions had been
consistently premised on the willingness of the party to pay
the correct docket fees and/or absence of intention to evade
payment of the correct docket fees. This cannot be said of R-II
Builders which not only failed to pay the correct docket fees
for its original complaint and Amended and Supplemental
Complaint but also clearly evaded payment of the same by
filing its Second Amended Complaint.
By itself, the propriety of admitting R-II Builders Second
Amended Complaint is also cast in dubious light when viewed
through the prism of the general prohibition against
amendments intended to confer jurisdiction where none has
been acquired yet. Although the policy in this jurisdiction is to
the effect that amendments to pleadings are favored and
liberally allowed in the interest of justice, amendment is not
allowed where the court has no jurisdiction over the original
complaint and the purpose of the amendment is to confer
jurisdiction upon the court.
[83]
Hence, with jurisdiction over
the case yet to properly attach, HGC correctly fault the CA for
upholding respondent RTCs admission of R-II Builders Second
Amended Complaint despite non-payment of the docket fees
for its original complaint and Amended and Supplemental
Complaint as well as the clear intent to evade payment
thereof.
WHAT IS THE RULE ON FILING FEES?
JURISDICTION OVER ANY CASE IS ACQUIRED ONLY UPON
PAYMENT OF THE PRESCRIBED DOCKET FEE. THIS IS BOTH
MANDATORY AND JURISDICTIONAL. THE BASIS IS THE CASE OF
MANCHESTER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION VS. CA.
Applying the rule that a case is deemed filed only upon
payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of
filing in court in the landmark case of Manchester
Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
[76]
this Court
ruled that jurisdiction over any case is acquired only upon the
payment of the prescribed docket fee which is both
mandatory and jurisdictional.

WAS THERE A SUBSEQUENT RULING?
YES, IN THE CASE OF SUN INSURANCE OFFICE LTD VS.
ASUNCION, THE COURT RULED THAT IF THE COURT MAKES
AN AWARD NECESSITATING AN INCREASE IN FILING FEE SUCH
CORRESPONDING FILING FEE IS A LIEN ON THE JUDGMENT.
To temper said ruling (Manchester case) , the Court
subsequently issued the following guidelines in Sun Insurance
Office, Ltd. v. Hon. Maximiano Asuncion,
[77]
viz.:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or
appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the
prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction
over the subject matter or nature of the action. Where the
filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment
of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee
within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims,
third-party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be
considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed
therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee
within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by
the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the
prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a
claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has
been left for determination by the court, the additional filing
fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be
the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized
deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the
additional fee.
FORECLOSURE DUE TO NON-PAYMENT OF CONDO DUES IS AN
INTRA CORPORATE DISPUTE.
SOURCE: CHATEAU DE BAIE CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION
VS. SPS. RAYMOND AND MA. ROSARIO MORENO (G.R. NO.
186271, 23 FEBRUARY 2011, BRION, J.) SUBJECTS: QUESTIONS
ON ASSESSMENT OF CONDO DUES ARE INTRA-CORPORATE;
FORECLOSURE ALSO INTRA-CORPORATE. (BRIEF TITLE CHATEU
DE BAIE VS. SPS. MORENO)

SPOUSES MORENO FAILED TO PAY CONDO DUES TO CHATEAU
DE BAIE. THE LATTER FORECLOSED THEIR CONDOS. SPOUSES
MORENO FILED A CASE AT RTC FOR ACCOUNTING OF CONDO
DUES, ANNULMENT OF FORECLOSURE AND DAMAGES.
CHATEAU DE BAIE FILED MOTION TO DISMISS ON GROUND
THAT HLURB HAS JURISDICTION. WHICH HAS JURISDICTION?
THE RTC HAS JURISDICTION BECAUSE THE ISSUES RAISED ARE
INTRA-CORPORATE. SINCE THE EXTRAJUDICIAL SALE WAS
AUTHORIZED BY THE CONDOMINIUM CORPORATIONS BY-
LAWS AND WAS THE RESULT OF THE NONPAYMENT OF THE
ASSESSMENTS, THE LEGALITY OF THE FORECLOSURE WAS
NECESSARILY AN ISSUE WITHIN THE EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL
JURISDICTION OF THE SEC (NOW RTC).

WHAT IS QUESTION OF FACT? WHAT IS QUESTION OF LAW?


WHEN DOES QUESTION OF LAW ARISE?
WHEN THERE IS DOUBT AS TO WHAT THE LAW IS ON A
CERTAIN STATE OF FACTS. FOR A QUESTION TO BE ONE OF
LAW, THE SAME MUST NOT INVOLVE AN EXAMINATION OF
THE PROBATIVE VALUE OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE
LITIGANTS OR ANY OF THEM.
[63]


WHEN DOES QUESTON OF FACT ARISE?
WHEN THE DOUBT ARISES AS TO THE TRUTH OR FALSITY OF
THE ALLEGED FACTS.
As to the substantive issues raised in the instant petition, the
Court finds that, indeed, questions of fact are being invoked
by FAT KEE. A question of law arises when there is doubt as to
what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a
question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity
of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the same
must not involve an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the litigants or any of them.
[63]


WHAT MUST A PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI RAISE?
ONLY QUESTION OF LAW WHICH MUST BE DISTINCTLY SET
FORTH.

IS THERE AN EXCEPTION?
YES, AS WHEN THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE CA AND RTC
ARE CONFLICTING.
Rule 45, Section 1 of the Rules of Court dictates that a petition
for review on certiorari shall raise only questions of law,
which must be distinctly set forth.
[64]
This rule is, however,
subject to exceptions,
[65]
one of which is when the findings of
fact of the Court of Appeals and the RTC are conflicting.

HOW DOES IT APPLIES TO THE CASE ABOVE?
. . . Said exception applies to the instant case.
IN CASE A PARTY PREVAILS IN A CASE, IS HE AUTOMATICALLY
ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS FEES?
NO, IN VIEW OF THE POLICY THAT NO PREMIUM SHOULD BE
PLACED ON THE RIGHT TO LITIGATE.
. . . Being the exception rather than the rule,
[67]
attorneys fees
are not awarded every time a party prevails in a suit,
[68]
in
view of the policy that no premium should be placed on the
right to litigate.

X WAS COMPELLED TO LIGITAGE WITH THIRD PERSONS, IS HE
AUTOMATICALLY ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS FEES?
NO WHERE THERE IS NO SUFFICIENT SHOWING OF BAD FAITH.
. . . Even when a claimant is compelled to litigate with third
persons or to incur expenses to protect his rights, still
attorneys fees may not be awarded where, as here, no
sufficient showing of bad faith can be reflected in the partys
persistence in a case other than an erroneous conviction of
the righteousness of his cause.
[70]


WHEN CAN ATTORNEYS FEES BE RECOVERED?
WHERE THERE IS STIPULATION OR WHEN COVERED UNDER
ARTICLE 2208 OF THE CIVIL CODE.
. . . In the absence of stipulation, after all, the rule is settled
that there can be no recovery of attorneys fees and expenses
of litigation other than judicial costs except in the instances
enumerated under Article 2208 of the Civil Code.
[66]


IN THE CASE ABOVE, HOW DID THE COURT RESOLVED THE
ISSUE ON ATTORNEYS FEES?
For lack of sufficient showing of bad faith on the part of
Barretto, we find that the CA, finally, erred in granting
Oceaneerings claim for attorneys fees, albeit in the much
reduced sum of P30,000.00. In the absence of stipulation,
after all, the rule is settled that there can be no recovery of
attorneys fees and expenses of litigation other than judicial
costs except in the instances enumerated under Article 2208
of the Civil Code.
[66]
Being the exception rather than the
rule,
[67]
attorneys fees are not awarded every time a party
prevails in a suit,
[68]
in view of the policy that no premium
should be placed on the right to litigate.
[69]
Even when a
claimant is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur
expenses to protect his rights, still attorneys fees may not be
awarded where, as here, no sufficient showing of bad faith
can be reflected in the partys persistence in a case other than
an erroneous conviction of the righteousness of his cause.
[70]


HOW TO PROVE ACTUAL DAMAGES.


HOW DO YOUR PROVE ACTUAL DAMAGES?
BY PLEADING AND PROOF OF ACTUAL DAMAGES SUFFERED.
Conformably with the foregoing provision, the rule is long and
well settled that there must be pleading and proof of actual
damages suffered for the same to be recovered.
[43]


WHAT ARE THE ELEMENTS OF THE LOSS YOU HAVE TO
PROVE?
THERE ARE TWO ELEMENTS:
1.THE AMOUNT OF LOSS MUST BE CAPABLE OF PROOF;
2. IT MUST BE ACTUALLY PROVEN WITH REASONABLE DEGREE
OF CERTAINTY BY MEANS OF COMPETENT PROOF OR BEST
EVIDENCE AVAILABLE.
In addition to the fact that the amount of loss must be
capable of proof, it must also be actually proven with a
reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent
proof or the best evidence obtainable.
[44]


WHO HAS THE BURDEN OF PROOF OF DAMAGE SUFFERED?
THE PARTY CLAIMING THE SAME.
The burden of proof of the damage suffered is, consequently,
imposed on the party claiming the same
[45]
who should
adduce the best evidence available in support thereof, like
sales and delivery receipts, cash and check vouchers and other
pieces of documentary evidence of the same nature.

HOW ABOUT SELF-SERVING STATEMENTS OF ACCOUNT, ARE
THESE SUFFICIENT PROOF.
NO. THERE MUST BE CORROBORATIVE EVIDENCE.
In the absence of corroborative evidence, it has been held
that self-serving statements of account are not sufficient basis
for an award of actual damages.
[46]


IF COURT AWARDS ACTUAL DAMAGES, WHAT MUST IT STATE?
IT MUST STATE THE FACTUAL BASES BECAUSE ACTUAL
DAMAGES CANNOT BE PREDICATED ON FLIMSY, REMOTE,
SPECULATIVE AND INSUBSTANTIAL CASE.
Corollary to the principle that a claim for actual damages
cannot be predicated on flimsy, remote, speculative, and
insubstantial proof,
[47]
courts are, likewise, required to state
the factual bases of the award.
[48]


APPLIED TO THE CASE ABOVE, HOW DID THE COURT ARRIVED
AT THE AWARD FOR ACTUAL DAMAGES?
WHAT IS LACHES?

SOURCE: INSURANCE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
CORPORATION VS. SPOUSES VIDAL S. GREGORIO AND JULITA
GREGORIO (G.R. NO. 174104, 14 FEBRUARY 2011, PERALTA, J.)

IN 1968 SPOUSES GREGORIO MORTGAGED PARCELS OF LAND
TO INSURANCE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS CORP COVERED BY TAX
DECLARATION. IN 1969 THEY WERE FORECLOSED. IN 1996 IPIC
FILED DAMAGES AGAINST SPOUSES GROGORIO ON THE
GROUND THAT IN 1995 THEY DISCOVERED THAT THE SPOUSES
SOLD THE PROPERTIES TO THIRD PARTIES WHO HAVE THESE
LANDS TITLED.
ONE DEFENSE OF THE SPOUSES IS THAT IPIC IS GUILTY OF
LACHES. IS THIS DEFENSE VALID?
NO. THE SPOUSES ACTED IN BAD FAITH. IF DEFENSE OF
LACHES IS ALLOWED, IT WILL RESULT TO INJUSTICE.
SAID THE COURT:
It is significant to point out at this juncture that the overriding
consideration in the instant case is that petitioner was
deprived of the subject properties which it should have rightly
owned were it not for the fraud committed by respondents.
Hence, it would be the height of injustice if respondents
would be allowed to go scot-free simply because petitioner
relied in good faith on the formers false representations.
Besides, as earlier discussed, even in the exercise of due
diligence, petitioner could not have been expected to
immediately discover respondents fraudulent scheme


WHAT IS THE ESSENCE OF LACHES?
The essence of laches or stale demands is the failure or
neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to
do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should
have been done earlier, thus, giving rise to a presumption that
the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or
declined to assert it.
9


IS IT MERELY DUE TO LAPSE OF TIME?
NO. IT IS NOT CONCERNED WITH MERE LAPSE OF TIME.
It is not concerned with mere lapse of time; the fact of delay,
standing alone, being insufficient to constitute laches.
10


WHAT IS ITS PURPOSE?
NOT TO PENALIZE SLEEPING ON ONES RIGHTS BUT TO AVOID
RECOGNIZING A RIGHT WHEN TO DO SO WOULD RESULT IN A
CLEARLY UNFAIR SITUATION.
In addition, it is a rule of equity and applied not to penalize
neglect or sleeping on ones rights, but rather to avoid
recognizing a right when to do so would result in a clearly
unfair situation.
11


WHAT CONSTITUTES LACHES OR STALENESS OF DEMAND?
THERE IS NO ABSOLUTE RULE. IT DEPENDS ON EACH CASE.
There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or
staleness of demand; each case is to be determined according
to its particular circumstances.
12
Ultimately, the question
of laches is addressed to the sound discretion of the court.

WHAT IS THE BASIS THEN IN DETERMINING WHETHER THERE
IS LACHES?
EQUITABLE CONSIDERATIONS.
. . . being an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled
by equitable considerations.
13


BUT CAN IT BE USED AS DEFENSE?
YES, BUT IT CANNOT BE USED WHEN TO DO SO IT WOULD
RESULT TO INJUSTICE. limitations or the doctrine
of laches when to be so, a manifest wrong or injustice would
result.
15


It cannot be used to defeat justice or perpetrate fraud and
injustice.
14
It is the better rule that courts, under the principle
of equity, will not be guided or bound strictly by the statute of

JURISPRUDENCE ON IMPEACHMENT.

CONGRESS ARGUES THAT CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION
AGAINST IT IS NOT PROPER BECAUSE CONGRESS WAS NOT
EXERCISING A JUDICIAL, QUASI JUDICIAL, OR MINISTERIAL
FUNCTION. IT WAS EXERCISING A POLITICAL ACT WHICH IS
DISCRETIONARY IN NATURE. IS CONGRESS CORRECT?
NO. IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS ARE WITHIN THE AMBIT OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW. THE EXERCISE BY CONGRESS OF A POLITICAL
ACT MUST BE WITHIN STANDARDS WHICH COURT COULD SET
OR DEFINE.
These same arguments were raised in Francisco, Jr. v. House of
Representatives.
[18]
The argument that impeachment
proceedings are beyond the reach of judicial review was
debunked in this wise:
The major difference between the judicial power of the
Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court
is that while the power of judicial review is
only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is
discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine
Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in
the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it
was given an expanded definition to include the power to
correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any
government branch or instrumentality.
There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court
exercised the power of judicial review over congressional
action. Thus, inSantiago v. Guingona, Jr.,

this Court ruled that
it is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to
inquire whether the Senate or its officials committed a
violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion in
the exercise of their functions and prerogatives. In Taada v.
Angara, in seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on
the ground that it contravened the Constitution, it held that
the petition raises a justiciable controversy and that when an
action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have
infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in
fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. In Bondoc
v. Pineda, this Court declared null and void a resolution of the
House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination, and
rescinding the election, of a congressman as a member of the
House Electoral Tribunal for being violative of Section 17,
Article VI of the Constitution. In Coseteng v. Mitra, it held that
the resolution of whether the House representation in the
Commission on Appointments was based on proportional
representation of the political parties as provided in Section
18, Article VI of the Constitution is subject to judicial
review. In Daza v. Singson, it held that the act of the House of
Representatives in removing the petitioner from the
Commission on Appointments is subject to judicial
review. In Taada v. Cuenco, it held that although under the
Constitution, the legislative power is vested exclusively in
Congress, this does not detract from the power of the courts
to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of
Congress. In Angara v. Electoral Commission, it ruled that
confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any
member, irrespective of whether his election is contested, is
not essential before such member-elect may discharge the
duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National
Assembly.
Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention
that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment
proceedings would upset the system of checks and
balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a
whole and one section is not to be allowed to defeat
another. Both are integral components of the calibrated
system of independence and interdependence that insures
that no branch of government act beyond the powers
assigned to it by the Constitution.
[19]
(citations omitted; italics
in the original; underscoring supplied)

WHAT IS THE BASIS OF THIS JUDICIAL REVIEW OVER
CONGRESS?
IT IS BASED ON THE EXPANDED CERTIORARI JURISDICTION OF
THE SUPREME COURT: THAT THE SC HAS THE POWER TO
DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT THERE HAS BEEN A GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF ANY BRANCH OR
INSTRUMENTALITY OF THE GOVERNMENT.
Francisco characterizes the power of judicial review as a duty
which, as the expanded certiorari jurisdiction
[20]
of this Court
reflects, includes the power to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
[21]

In the present case, petitioner invokes the Courts expanded
certiorari jurisdiction, using the special civil actions of
certiorari and prohibition as procedural vehicles. The Court
finds it well-within its power to determine whether public
respondent committed a violation of the Constitution or
gravely abused its discretion in the exercise of its functions
and prerogatives that could translate as lack or excess of
jurisdiction, which would require corrective measures from
the Court.

IS THE SC ASCERTING ASCENDANCY OVER CONGRESS IN
VIOLATION OF THE PRINCIPLE THAT THEY ARE EQUAL?
IT IS SIMPLY UPHOLDING THE SUPREMACY OF THE
CONSTITUTION WHICH IS THE REPOSITORY OF THE SOVEREIGN
WILL.
Indubitably, the Court is not asserting its ascendancy over the
Legislature in this instance, but simply upholding the
supremacy of the Constitution as the repository of the
sovereign will.
[22]


CONGRESS ARGUES THAT THE CERTIORARI PETITION OF THE
OMBUDSMAN WAS PREMATURE OR NOT RIPE BECAUSE
CONGRESS HAS NOT YET DETERMINED THE SUFFICIENCY OF
FORM AND SUBSTANCE OF THE COMPLAINTS WHEN THE
CERTIORARI PETITION WAS FILED. IS CONGRESS CORRECT?
NO. THE ISSUE RAISED ON THE VALIDITY OF SIMULTANEOUS
REFERRAL OF THE COMPLAINTS AND THE ISSUE ON THE
PUBLICATION OF THE IMPEACHMENT RULES OF PROCEDURE
CALL FOR IMMEDIATE DETERMINATION.
Respondents do not seriously contest all the essential
requisites for the exercise of judicial review, as they only
assert that the petition is premature and not yet ripe for
adjudication since petitioner has at her disposal a plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the course of the proceedings
before public respondent. Public respondent argues that
when petitioner filed the present petition
[23]
on September 13,
2010, it had not gone beyond the determination of the
sufficiency of form and substance of the two complaints.
An aspect of the case-or-controversy requirement is the
requisite
of ripeness.
[24]
The question of ripeness is especially relevant
in light of the direct, adverse effect on an individual by the
challenged conduct.
[25]
In the present petition, there is no
doubt that questions on, inter alia, the validity of the
simultaneous referral of the two complaints and on the need
to publish as a mode of promulgating the Rules of Procedure
in Impeachment Proceedings of the House (Impeachment
Rules) present constitutional vagaries which call for
immediate interpretation.
The unusual act of simultaneously referring to public
respondent two impeachment complaints presents a novel
situation to invoke judicial power. Petitioner cannot thus be
considered to have acted prematurely when she took the cue
from the constitutional limitation that only one impeachment
proceeding should be initiated against an impeachable officer
within a period of one year.

OMBUDSMAN ARGUES THAT CONGRESS ACTED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION BECAUSE CONGRESS VIOLATED HER
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND CONGRESS VIOLATED THE ONE-
YEAR BAR PROVISION OF THE CONSTITUION. WAS HER RIGHT
TO DUE PROCESS VIOLATED?
PETITIONER SPECIFICALLY ARGUES THAT REP. NIEL TUPAS, JR.
WOULD BE BIAS BECAUSE HE AND HIS FATHER HAVE PENDING
CASES AT THE OMBUDSMAN. IS PETITIONER CORRECT?
NO. IN THE PROCEEDINGS, THERE IS HARDLY ANY INDICATION
OF BIAS. MERE SUSPICION OF PARTIALITY IS NOT SUFFICIENT.
ALSO, REP. TUPAS IS NOT THE WHOLE CONGRESS.
Petitioner alleges that public respondents chairperson,
Representative Niel Tupas, Jr. (Rep. Tupas), is the subject of an
investigation she is conducting, while his father, former Iloilo
Governor Niel Tupas, Sr., had been charged by her with
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before
the Sandiganbayan. To petitioner, the actions taken by her
office against Rep. Tupas and his father influenced the
proceedings taken by public respondent in such a way that
bias and vindictiveness played a big part in arriving at the
finding of sufficiency of form and substance of the complaints
against her.
The Court finds petitioners allegations of bias and
vindictiveness bereft of merit, there being hardly any
indication thereof. Mere suspicion of partiality does not
suffice.
[26]

The act of the head of a collegial body cannot be considered
as that of the entire body itself. So GMCR, Inc.
v. BellTelecommunications Phils.
[27]
teaches:
First. We hereby declare that the NTC is a collegial body
requiring a majority vote out of the three members of the
commission in order to validly decide a case or any incident
therein. Corollarily, the vote alone of the chairman of the
commission, as in this case, the vote of Commissioner
Kintanar, absent the required concurring vote coming from
the rest of the membership of the commission to at least
arrive at a majority decision, is not sufficient to legally render
an NTC order, resolution or decision.
Simply put, Commissioner Kintanar is not the National
Telecommunications Commission. He alone does not speak
and in behalf of the NTC. The NTC acts through a three-man
body x x x.
[28]


Even petitioners counsel conceded during the oral arguments
that there are no grounds to compel the inhibition of Rep.
Tupas.
PETITIONER ARGUES THAT THE PRECIPITATE HASTE OF
CONGRESS IN FINDING THE TWO COMPLAINTS SUFFICIENT IN
FORM AND SUBSTANCE IS AN INDICATION OF BIAS. IS
PETITIONER CORRECT?
NO. ABBREVIATED PACE IN THE CONDUCT OF PROCEEDINGS IS
NOT PER SE AN INDICATION OF BIAS.
Petitioner contends that the indecent and precipitate haste
of public respondent in finding the two complaints sufficient
in form and substance is a clear indication of bias, she pointing
out that it only took public respondent five minutes to arrive
thereat.

An abbreviated pace in the conduct of proceedings is not per
se an indication of bias, however. So Santos-Concio v.
Department of Justice
[31]
holds:
Speed in the conduct of proceedings by a judicial or quasi-
judicial officer cannot per se be instantly attributed to an
injudicious performance of functions. For ones prompt
dispatch may be anothers undue haste. The orderly
administration of justice remains as the paramount and
constant consideration, with particular regard of the
circumstances peculiar to each case.
The presumption of regularity includes the public officers
official actuations in all phases of work. Consistent with such
presumption, it was incumbent upon petitioners to present
contradictory evidence other than a mere tallying of days or
numerical calculation. This, petitioners failed to
discharge. The swift completion of the Investigating Panels
initial task cannot be relegated as shoddy or shady without
discounting the presumably regular performance of not just
one but five state prosecutors.
[32]
(italics in the original;
emphasis and underscoring supplied)

PETITIONER CONTENDS THAT SHE SHOULD HAVE BEEN
ALLOWED TO PARTICIPATION IN THE DETERMINATION OF
WHETHER THE COMPLAINTS ARE SUFFICIENT IN FORM AND
SUBSTANCE. SHE WAS ONLY ALLOWED TO PARTIFIPATE
LATER: TO FILE AN ANSWER AFTER SUFFICIENCY IN FORM AND
SUBSTANCE HAS BEEN DECLARED. IS PETITIONER CORRECT?
NO. THE IMPEACHMENT RULES HAVE TO BE FOLLOWED. THE
RULES STATE THAT HER PARTICIPATION STARTS WITH THE
FILING OF AN ANSWER.
Petitioner goes on to contend that her participation in the
determination of sufficiency of form and substance was
indispensable. As mandated by the Impeachment Rules,
however, and as, in fact, conceded by petitioners counsel, the
participation of the impeachable officer starts with the filing
of an answer.
Rule III(A) of the Impeachment Rules of the 15
th
Congress
reflects the impeachment procedure at the Committee-level,
particularly Section 5
[34]
which denotes that
petitioners initial participation in the impeachment
proceedings the opportunity to file an Answer
starts after the Committee on Justice finds the complaint
sufficient in form and substance. That the Committee refused
to accept petitioners motion for reconsideration from its
finding of sufficiency of form of the impeachment complaints
is apposite, conformably with the Impeachment Rules.

PETITIONER ARGUES THAT CONGRESS DID NOT FOLLOW
STANDARDS SET BY THE CONSTITUTION IN DETERMINING
SUFFICIENCY OF FORM AND SUBSTANCE. IS SHE CORRECT?
NO. THE STARDARDS ARE SET BY CONGRESS AND THE COURT
HAS TO RESPECT THEM AS THEY WERE PROMULGATED BY
CONGRESS IN LINE WITH ITS CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY. THERE IS
NO CONTRAVENTION OF THE MINIMUM CONSTITUTIONAL
GUIDELINES.
Petitioner further claims that public respondent failed to
ascertain the sufficiency of form and substance of the
complaints on the basis of the standards set by the
Constitution and its own Impeachment Rules.
[35]

The claim fails.
The determination of sufficiency of form and substance of an
impeachment complaint is an exponent of the express
constitutional grant of rule-making powers of the House of
Representatives which committed such determinative
function to public respondent. In the discharge of that power
and in the exercise of its discretion, the House has formulated
determinable standards as to the form and substance of an
impeachment complaint. Prudential considerations behoove
the Court to respect the compliance by the House of its duty
to effectively carry out the constitutional purpose, absent any
contravention of the minimum constitutional guidelines.

WHAT ARE THE STANDARDS SET BY CONGRESS ON
SUFFICIENCY OF FORM AND SUBSTANCE?
THERE MUST BE VERIFIED COMPLAINT OR RESOLUTION AND
THERE IS A RECITAL OF FACTS CONSTITUTING THE OFFENSE
CHARGED AND DETERMINATIVE OF THE JURISDICTION OF THE
COMMITTEE.
Contrary to petitioners position that the Impeachment Rules
do not provide for comprehensible standards in determining
the sufficiency of form and substance, the Impeachment Rules
are clear in echoing the constitutional requirements and
providing that there must be a verified complaint or
resolution,
[36]
and that the substance requirement is met if
there is a recital of facts constituting the offense charged and
determinative of the jurisdiction of the committee.
[37]


DOES THE CONSTITUTION REQUIRE THAT THERE MUST FIRST
BE A DETERMINATION OF SUFFICIENCY OF FORM AND
SUBSTANCE?
NO. THE REQUIREMENT IS ONLY IN THE IMPEACHMENT
RULES. THE CONSTITUTION ONLY REQUIRES A HEARING.
Notatu dignum is the fact that it is only in the
Impeachment Rules where a determination of sufficiency of
form and substance of an impeachment complaint is made
necessary. This requirement is not explicitly found in the
organic law, as Section 3(2), Article XI of the Constitution
basically merely requires a hearing.
[38]
In the discharge of its
constitutional duty, the House deemed that a finding of
sufficiency of form and substance in an impeachment
complaint is vital to effectively carry out the impeachment
process, hence, such additional requirement in the
Impeachment Rules.

PETITIONER WANTS THE SC TO LOOK INTO THE NARRATION
OF FACTS AND DETERMINE WHETHER THESE CONSTITUTE
PROPER IMPEACHMENT OFFENSES. CAN SC DO THAT?
NO. SUCH IS PURELY A POLITICAL QUESTION LEFT TO
CONGRESS.
Petitioner urges the Court to look into the narration of
facts constitutive of the offenses vis--vis her submissions
disclaiming the allegations in the complaints.
This the Court cannot do.
Francisco instructs that this issue would require the
Court to make a determination of what constitutes an
impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely
political question which the Constitution has left to the sound
discretion of the legislature. Such an intent is clear from the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. x x x x Clearly,
the issue calls upon this court to decide a non-justiciable
political question which is beyond the scope of its judicial
power*.+
[39]
Worse, petitioner urges the Court to make a
preliminary assessment of certain grounds raised, upon a
hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the complaints,
which involve matters of defense.

PETITIONER ALSO CONTENDS THAT HER RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS WAS VIOLATED BECAUSE THE IMPEACHMENT RULES
WERE PUBLISHED A DAY AFTER CONGRESS HAS ALREADY
RULED THAT THE COMPLAINTS WERE SUFFICIENT IN FORM. IS
PETITIONER CORRECT?
NO. THE CONSTITUTION STATES THAT THE RULES BE
PROMULGATED (MEANING MADE KNOWN) BY CONGRESS. IT
DOES NOT REQUIRE PUBLICATION OF THE RULES PRIOR TO
THEIR EFFECTIVITY. THERE IS DISTINCTION BETWEEN
PROMULGATION AND PUBLICATION. ALSO, THE RULES ARE
JUST PROCEDURAL. THEREFORE THEY COULD BE APPLIED
RETROACTIVELY.
ADDITIONAL NOTES ON VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION
ON NON-FORUM SHOPPING.
THE INTERVENORS FILED A COMPLAINT IN INTERVENTION
WITHOUT THE REQUISITE VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION
ON NON-FORUM SHOPPING. RTC DENIED COMPLAINT IN
INTERVENTION. INTERVENORS FILED MOTION FOR RECON
ATTACHING THERETO THE REQUISITE CERTIFICATION. DID
THIS CURED THE DEFECT?
YES. A DEFECT THEREIN DOES NOT NECESSARILY RENDER THE
PLEADING FATALLY DEFECTIVE. THE COURT MAY ORDER ITS
SUBMISSION OR CORRECTION, OR ACT ON THE PLEADING IF
THE ATTENDING CIRCUMSTANCES ARE SUCH THAT STRICT
COMPLIANCE WITH THE RULE MAY BE DISPENSED WITH IN
ORDER THAT THE ENDS OF JUSTICE MAY BE SERVED THEREBY.
At the outset, on the procedural aspect, contrary to
petitioners contention, the initial lack of the complaint-in-
intervention of the requisite verification and certification on
non-forum shopping was cured when the intervenors, in their
motion for reconsideration of the order denying the motion to
intervene, appended a complaint-in-intervention containing
the required verification and certificate of non-forum
shopping.
In the case of Altres v. Empleo,
[13]
this Court clarified, among
other things, that as to verification, non-compliance therewith
or a defect therein does not necessarily render the pleading
fatally defective. The court may order its submission or
correction, or act on the pleading if the attending
circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule
may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may
be served thereby. Further, a verification is
deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample
knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the
complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters
alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are
true and correct.
[14]

XXXXXXXXXXXX
Thus, considering that the intervenors in their motion for
reconsideration, appended a complaint-in-intervention with
the required verification and certificate of non-forum
shopping, the requirement of the Rule was substantially
complied with.
SUPPOSE THE REQUISITE VERIFICATION WAS NO SUBMITTED,
DOES SUBMISSION IN MOTION TO RECON ADEQUATE?
NO THE RULE ON CERTIFICATION ON NON-FORUM SHOPPING
IS DIFFERENT FROM THE RULE ON VERIFICATION.
Moreover, as to the certification against forum shopping, non-
compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in
verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent
submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need to
relax the Rules on the ground of substantial compliance or
presence of special circumstances or compelling reasons.
Also, the certification against forum shopping must be signed
by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case; otherwise, those
who did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case. Under
reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as when all
the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest and
invoke a common cause of action or defense, the signature of
only one of them in the certification against forum shopping
substantially complies with the Rule.
[15]


IMMUTABILITY OF JUDGMENT; EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE
THAT FINAL AND EXECUTORY JUDGMENTS ARE IMMUTABLE;
WHAT IS NUNC PRO TUNC JUDGMENT?

C.A. ISSUED CLARIFICATORY RESOLUTIONS IN CONNECTION
WITH A FINAL JUDGMENT IT PREVIOUSLY ISSUED. FILIPINAS
PALMOIL MOVED TO ANNUL THESE RESOLUTIONS. CAN
FILIPINAS PALMOIL LEGALLY DO THIS?
NO. A FINAL JUDGMENT IS UNALTERABLE AND IMMUTABLE.
THE CASE DOES NOT FALL UNDER ANY EXCEPTION.
As a general rule, final and executory judgments are
immutable and unalterable, except under these recognized
exceptions, to wit: (a) clerical errors; (b) nunc pro tunc entries
which cause no prejudice to any party; and (c) void
judgments.
[17]
What the CA rendered on December 10,
2004 was a nunc pro tunc order clarifying the decretal portion
of the August 29, 2002 Decision.

WHAT IS A NUNC PRO JUDGMENT?
IT IS ONE PLACING IN PROPER FORM THE JUDGMENT
RENDERED TO MAKE IT SPEAK THE TRUTH.
In Briones-Vazquez v. Court of Appeals,
[18]
nunc pro
tunc judgments have been defined and characterized as
follows:
The object of a judgment nunc pro tunc is not the rendering of
a new judgment and the ascertainment and determination of
new rights, but is one placing in proper form on the record,
the judgment that had been previously rendered, to make it
speak the truth, so as to make it show what the judicial action
really was, not to correct judicial errors, such as to render a
judgment which the court ought to have rendered, in place of
the one it did erroneously render, nor to supply nonaction by
the court, however erroneous the judgment may have
been.
[19]

WHAT DO THE PETIIONER REALLY WANT?
IT WANTS TO APPEAL ANEW THE MERITS OF THE ILLEGAL
DISMISSAL CASE FILED BY RESPONDENT.
By filing the instant petition for review with Us, petitioners
would like to appeal anew the merits of the illegal dismissal
case filed by respondent against petitioners raising the same
arguments which had long been passed upon and decided in
the August 29, 2002 CA Decision which had already attained
finality. As the CA said in denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration of the assailed December 10, 2004 Resolution,
to wit:
It is basic that once a decision becomes final and executory, it
is immutable and unalterable. Private respondents (herein
petitioners) motion for reconsideration seeks a modification
or reversal of this Courts August 29, 2002 decision, which has
long become final and executory, as in fact, it is already in
its execution stage. It may no longer be modified by this
Court or even by the Highest Court of the land.
It should be sufficiently clear to private respondents (herein
petitioners) that the December 10, 2004 Resolution was
issued merely to clarify a seeming ambiguity in the decision
but as stressed therein, it is neither an amendment nor a
rectification of a perceived error therein. The instant motion
for reconsideration has, therefore, no merit at all.
[20]

We find that petitioners action is merely a subterfuge to alter
or modify the final and executory Decision of the CA which we
cannot countenance without violating procedural rules and
jurisprudence.
DISCUSS THE RULE ON IMMUTABILITY OF JUDGMENT?
In Navarro v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company,
[21]
We
discussed the rule on immutability of judgment and said:
No other procedural law principle is indeed more
settled than that once a judgment becomes final, it is no
longer subject to change, revision, amendment or reversal,
except only for correction of clerical errors, or the making
of nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any
party, or where the judgment itself is void. The underlying
reason for the rule is two-fold: (1) to avoid delay in the
administration of justice and thus make orderly the discharge
of judicial business, and (2) to put judicial controversies to an
end, at the risk of occasional errors, inasmuch as controversies
cannot be allowed to drag on indefinitely and the rights and
obligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense for an
indefinite period of time. As the Court declared in Yau v.
Silverio,
Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere,
and it is essential to an effective and efficient administration
of justice that, once a judgment has become final, the winning
party be, not through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the
fruits of the verdict. Courts must therefore guard against any
scheme calculated to bring about that result. Constituted as
they are to put an end to controversies, courts should frown
upon any attempt to prolong them.
Indeed, just as a losing party has the right to file
an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also
has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution
of his case by the execution and satisfaction of the judgment.
Any attempt to thwart this rigid rule and deny the prevailing
litigant his right to savor the fruit of his victory must
immediately be struck down. Thus, in Heirs of Wenceslao
Samper v. Reciproco-Noble, we had occasion to emphasize the
significance of this rule, to wit:
It is an important fundamental principle in our
Judicial system that every litigation must come to an end x x x
Access to the courts is guaranteed. But there must be a limit
thereto. Once a litigants rights have been adjudicated in a
valid final judgment of a competent court, he should not be
granted an unbridled license to come back for another try. The
prevailing party should not be harassed by subsequent suits.
For, if endless litigations were to be encouraged, then
unscrupulous litigants will multiply in number to the
detriment of the administration of justice.
[2

FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS ON
APPELLANTS BRIEF WOULD LEAD TO DISMISSAL OF APPEAL.



CASE STORY:

IN A FORECLOSURE CASE PETITIONER FILED AN APPELLANTS
BRIEF BEFORE THE C.A. THE APPELLANTS BRIEF CONTAINED
ONLY THE FOLLOWING TOPICS: (1) PREFARATORY
STATEMENT; (2) STATEMENT OF FACTS AND ANTECEDENT
PROCEEDINGS; (3) PARTIES; (4) STATEMENT OF THE CASE; (5)
ISSUES; (6) ARGUMENTS/DISCUSSION; AND (7) PRAYER.

THE APPELLANTS BRIEF DID NOT HAVE THE FOLLOWING
ITEMS: (1) A SUBJECT INDEX OF THE MATTER IN THE BRIEF
WITH A DIGEST OF THE ARGUMENTS AND PAGE REFERENCES,
AND A TABLE OF CASES ALPHABETICALLY ARRANGED,
TEXTBOOKS AND STATUTES CITED WITH REFERENCES TO THE
PAGES WHERE THEY ARE CITED; (2) AN ASSIGNMENT OF
ERRORS; (3) ON THE AUTHORITIES CITED, REFERENCES TO THE
PAGE OF THE REPORT AT WHICH THE CASE BEGINS AND PAGE
OF THE REPORT ON WHICH THE CITATION IS FOUND; (4) PAGE
REFERENCES TO THE RECORD IN THE STATEMENT OF FACTS
AND STATEMENT OF THE CASE. RESPONDENT PRAYED FOR
DISMISSAL OF APPEAL.

PETITIONER CONTENDED THAT THAT THE ASSIGNMENT OF
ERRORS WERE ONLY DESIGNATED AS ISSUES IN THEIR
APPELLANTS BRIEF; AND ALTHOUGH THE DESIGNATION OF
THE ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR MAY VARY, THE SUBSTANCE
THEREOF REMAINS. MOREOVER, PETITIONERS STATED
THAT THE TEXTBOOKS AND STATUTES WERE CITED
IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE PORTION WHERE THEY ARE
QUOTED, WHICH IS MORE CONVENIENT AND FACILITATES
READY REFERENCE OF THE LEGAL AND JURISPRUDENTIAL
BASIS OF THE ARGUMENTS. THEY CLAIMED THAT THE
ABSENCE OF A SUBJECT INDEX DOES NOT SUBSTANTIALLY
DEVIATE FROM THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE RULES OF COURT,
BECAUSE ONE CAN EASILY GO OVER THE APPELLANTS BRIEF
AND CAN DESIGNATE THE PARTS WITH NOMINAL
PRUDENCE. THEY POINTED OUT THAT SECTION 6 OF THE
RULES OF COURT PROVIDES FOR A LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION
OF THE RULES IN ORDER TO PROMOTE THEIR OBJECTIVE OF
SECURING A JUST, SPEEDY AND INEXPENSIVE DISPOSITION OF
EVERY ACTION AND PROCEEDING.



WHAT IS THE ISSUE IN THE CASE ABOVE?
The main issue is whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in
dismissing petitioners appeal on the ground that their
Appellants Brief failed to comply with Section 13, Rule 44 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as the said brief did not have
a subject index, an assignment of errors, and page references
to the record in the Statement of Facts.
Petitioners argue that the absence of a subject index in their
Appellants Brief is not a material deviation from the
requirements of Section 13, Rule 44 of the 1997 Revised Rules
of Civil Procedure, and that each portion of the 12-page brief
was boldly designated to separate each portion.
Moreover, petitioners contend that while the assignment of
errors was not designated as such in their Appellants Brief,
the assignment of errors were clearly embodied in the
Issues thereof, which substantially complies with the rules.

IS FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS ON
APPELLANTS BRIEF A VALID CAUSE FOR DISMISSING AN
APPEAL?

YES. BECAUSE RIGHT TO APPEAL IS MERELY A STATUTORY
PRIVILEGE. THUS, AN APPEALING PARTY MUST STRICTLY
COMPLY WITH THE REQUISITES LAID DOWN IN THE RULES.
The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due
process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be
exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the
provisions of law.
[28]
An appeal being a purely statutory right,
an appealing party must strictly comply with the requisites laid
down in the Rules of Court.
[29]


WHAT ARE THE CONTENTS OF AN APPELLANTS BRIEF?
In regard to ordinary appealed cases to the Court of Appeals,
such as this case, Section 13, Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure provides for the contents of an Appellants Brief,
thus:
Sec. 13. Contents of appellants brief.The appellants brief
shall contain, in the order herein indicated, the following:
(a) A subject index of the matter in the brief with a digest
of the arguments and page references, and a table of cases
alphabetically arranged, textbooks and statutes cited with
references to the pages where they are cited;
(b) An assignment of errors intended to be urged, which
errors shall be separately, distinctly and concisely stated
without repetition and numbered consecutively;
(c) Under the heading Statement of the Case, a clear and
concise statement of the nature of the action, a summary of
the proceedings, the appealed rulings and orders of the court,
the nature of the judgment and any other matters necessary
to an understanding of the nature of the controversy, with
page references to the record;
(d) Under the heading Statement of Facts, a clear and
concise statement in a narrative form of the facts admitted by
both parties and of those in controversy, together with the
substance of the proof relating thereto in sufficient detail to
make it clearly intelligible, with page references to the record;
(e) A clear and concise statement of the issues of fact or
law to be submitted to the court for its judgment;
(f) Under the heading Argument, the appellants
arguments on each assignment of error with page references
to the record. The authorities relied upon shall be cited by the
page of the report at which the case begins and the page of
the report on which the citation is found;
(g) Under the heading Relief, a specification of the order
or judgment which the appellant seeks; and
(h) In cases not brought up by record on appeal, the
appellants brief shall contain, as an appendix, a copy of the
judgment or final order appealed from.

WHAT IS THE IMPORTANCE OF A SUBJECT INDEX?
In this case, the Appellants Brief of petitioners did not have a
subject index. The importance of a subject index should not
be underestimated. De Liano v. Court of Appeals
[30]
declared
that the subject index functions like a table of contents,
facilitating the review of appeals by providing ready
reference. It held that:
*t+he first requirement of an appellants brief is a subject
index. The index is intended to facilitate the review of appeals
by providing ready reference, functioning much like a table of
contents. Unlike in other jurisdictions, there is no limit on the
length of appeal briefs or appeal memoranda filed before
appellate courts. The danger of this is the very real possibility
that the reviewing tribunal will be swamped with voluminous
documents. This occurs even though the rules consistently
urge the parties to be brief or concise in the drafting of
pleadings, briefs, and other papers to be filed in court. The
subject index makes readily available at ones fingertips the
subject of the contents of the brief so that the need to thumb
through the brief page after page to locate a partys
arguments, or a particular citation, or whatever else needs to
be found and considered, is obviated.
[31]



IS ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS SAME AS STATEMENT OF ISSUES?

NO. AN ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS IS AN ENUMERATION BY
THE APPELLANT OF THE ERRORS ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN
COMMITTED BY THE TRIAL COURT FOR WHICH HE/SHE SEEKS
TO OBTAIN A REVERSAL OF THE JUDGMENT, WHILE THE
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PUTS FORTH THE QUESTIONS OF FACT
OR LAW TO BE RESOLVED BY THE APPELLATE COURT.
[33]

Moreover, the Appellants Brief had no assignment of errors,
but petitioners insist that it is embodied in the Issues of the
brief. The requirement under Section 13, Rule 44 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure for an assignment of errors in
paragraph (b) thereof is different from a statement of
the issues of fact or law in paragraph (e) thereof. The
statement of issues is not to be confused with the assignment
of errors, since they are not one and the same; otherwise, the
rules would not require a separate statement for each.
[32]
An
assignment of errors is an enumeration by the appellant of the
errors alleged to have been committed by the trial court for
which he/she seeks to obtain a reversal of the judgment, while
the statement of issues puts forth the questions of fact or law
to be resolved by the appellate court.
[33]

WHY SHOULD THE STATEMENT OF FACTS BE SUPPORTED BY
PAGE REFERENCES?
IF A STATEMENT OF FACT IS UNACCOMPANIED BY A PAGE
REFERENCE TO THE RECORD, IT MAY BE PRESUMED TO BE
WITHOUT SUPPORT IN THE RECORD AND MAY BE STRICKEN
OR DISREGARDED ALTOGETHER.
[34]

Further, the Court of Appeals found that the Statement of
Facts was not supported by page references to the record. De
Liano v. Court of Appeals held:
x x x The facts constitute the backbone of a legal argument;
they are determinative of the law and jurisprudence
applicable to the case, and consequently, will govern the
appropriate relief. Appellants should remember that the
Court of Appeals is empowered to review both questions of
law and of facts. Otherwise, where only a pure question of
law is involved, appeal would pertain to this Court. An
appellant, therefore, should take care to state the facts
accurately though it is permissible to present them in a
manner favorable to one party. x x x Facts which are
admitted require no further proof, whereas facts in dispute
must be backed by evidence. Relative thereto, the rule
specifically requires that ones statement of facts should be
supported by page references to the record. Indeed,
disobedience therewith has been punished by dismissal of the
appeal. Page references to the record are not an empty
requirement. If a statement of fact is unaccompanied by a
page reference to the record, it may be presumed to be
without support in the record and may be stricken or
disregarded altogether.
[34]

WHAT IS THE LEGAL BASIS FOR DISMISSING THE APPEAL IF
THE RULE ON APPELLANTS BRIEF IS NOT FOLLOWED
STRICTLY?
The assignment of errors and page references to the record in
the statement of facts are important in an Appellants Brief as
the absence thereof is a basis for the dismissal of an appeal
under Section 1 (f), Rule 50, of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, thus:
SECTION 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. An appeal may
be dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its own motion or on
that of the appellee, on the following grounds:
x x x x
(f ) Absence of specific assignment of errors in the appellants
brief, or of page references to the record as required in
section 13, paragraphs (a), (c), (d) and (f) of Rule 44.


PETITIONER PLEAD FOR LIBERALITY IN CONSTRUING THE
RULES. IS HE CORRECT.
NO. TO DISREGARD THE RULES IN THE GUISE OF LIBERAL
CONSTRUCTION WOULD BE TO DEFEAT THE PURPOSE OF THE
RULES WHICH IS THE PROPER AND PROMPT DISPOSITION OF
CASES.
Rules 44 and 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure are
designed for the proper and prompt disposition of cases
before the Court of Appeals.
[35]
Rules of procedure exist for a
noble purpose, and to disregard such rules in the guise of
liberal construction would be to defeat such purpose.
[36]
The
Court of Appeals noted in its Resolution denying petitioners
motion for reconsideration that despite ample opportunity,
petitioners never attempted to file an amended appellants
brief correcting the deficiencies of their brief, but obstinately
clung to their argument that their Appellants Brief
substantially complied with the rules. Such obstinacy is
incongruous with their plea for liberality in construing the
rules on appeal.
[37]

De Liano v. Court of Appeals held:
Some may argue that adherence to these formal requirements
serves but a meaningless purpose, that these may be ignored
with little risk in the smug certainty that liberality in the
application of procedural rules can always be relied upon to
remedy the infirmities. This misses the point. We are not
martinets; in appropriate instances, we are prepared to listen
to reason, and to give relief as the circumstances may
warrant. However, when the error relates to something so
elementary as to be inexcusable, our discretion becomes
nothing more than an exercise in frustration. It comes as an
unpleasant shock to us that the contents of an appellants
brief should still be raised as an issue now. There is nothing
arcane or novel about the provisions of Section 13, Rule 44.
The rule governing the contents of appellants briefs has
existed since the old Rules of Court, which took effect onJuly
1, 1940, as well as the Revised Rules of Court, which took
effect on January 1, 1964, until they were superseded by the
present 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The provisions were
substantially preserved, with few revisions.
[38]

DO YOU WANT TO FILE A CASE AGAINST A BANK IN ORDER TO
NULLIFY AN EXTRA-JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE? HERE ARE SOME
POINTERS.

SOURCE: METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY VS.
SPOUSES EDMUNDO MIRANDA AND JULIE MIRANDA (G.R. NO.
187917, 19 JANURY 2011, NACHURA, J.) SUBJECTS: WHEN
FORECLOSURE IS DECLARED NULL FOR LACK OF PUBLICATION;
EXORBITANT INTERESTS; WHEN COURT CAN INQUIRE INTO
EXTRAJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE. (BRIEF TITLE: METROBANK VS.
SPOUSES MIRANDA).
xx

CASE STORY:
SPOUSES MIRANDA OBTAINED LOAN FROM METROBANK.
THEY FAILED TO PAY. METROBANK FORECLOSED
EXTRAJUDICIALLY. SPOUSES MIRANDA FILED CASE TO ANNUL
FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS ON GROUND OF LACK OF
PUBLICATION AND EXCESS INTEREST PAYMENTS. RTC
ANNULLED THE FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS. CA AFFIRMED.
SC AFFIRMED.


WHAT ARE SOME GROUNDS THAT YOU MAY RAISE TO
NULLIFY AN EXTRAJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE?
LACK OF PUBLICATION, FAILURE OF BANK TO FURNISH YOU
WITH COPIES OF DOCUMENTS, TERMS AND CONDITIONS
AGREED WERE DIFFERENT FROM WHAT APPEARED IN THE
DOCUMENTS AND RIGHT TO FIX INTEREST WAS EXCLUSIVELY
GIVEN TO BANK.
Claiming that the extrajudicial foreclosure was void,
respondents filed a complaint for Nullification of the
Foreclosure Proceedings and Damages with Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order/Injunction with the RTC of
Santiago City. They alleged non-compliance with the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1079 and Act No. 3135,
particularly the publication requirement. Respondents further
asserted that Metrobank required them to sign blank
promissory notes and real estate mortgage, and that they
were not furnished with copies of these documents. Later,
they discovered that the terms and conditions of the
promissory notes and of the mortgage were entirely different
from what was represented to them by the bank. The right
to fix the interest rates, they added, was exclusively given
to the bank. Respondents, thus, prayed for the annulment of
the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings.

METROBANK QUESTIONS THE FINDINGS OF RTC AND CA THAT
THERE WAS NO PUBLICATION. CAN SC CORRECT THEIR
FINDINGS.
NO BECAUSE ONLY QUESTIONS OF LAW CAN BE RAISED
BEFORE SC.
Before us, Metrobank insists on the validity of the foreclosure
proceedings. Essentially, it argues that foreclosure
proceedings enjoy the presumption of regularity, and the
party alleging irregularity has the burden of proving his claim.
Metrobank asserts that, in this case, the presumption of
regularity was not disputed because respondents failed to
prove that the notice of sale was not published as required by
law.
At the outset, it must be stated that only questions of law may
be raised before this Court in a Petition for Review under Rule
45 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. This Court is not a
trier of facts, and it is not the function of this Court to
reexamine the evidence submitted by the parties.
It has been our consistent ruling that the question of
compliance or non-compliance with notice and publication
requirements of an extrajudicial foreclosure sale is a factual
issue, and the resolution thereof by the trial court is generally
binding on this Court. The matter of sufficiency of posting
and publication of a notice of foreclosure sale need not be
resolved by this Court, especially when the findings of the RTC
were sustained by the CA. Well-established is the rule that
factual findings of the CA are conclusive on the parties and
carry even more weight when the said court affirms the
factual findings of the trial court.
The unanimity of the CA and the trial court in their factual
ascertainment that there was non-compliance with the
publication requirement bars us from supplanting their
findings and substituting them with our own. Metrobank has
not shown that they are entitled to an exception to this rule. It
has not sufficiently demonstrated any special circumstances to
justify a factual review.

ON THE MATTER OF PUBLICATION, METRO BANK ARGUES
THAT RESPONDENT SPOUSES FAILED TO PROVE NON-
COMPLIANCE WITH THE PUBLICATION REQUIREMENT. IS
THEIR ARGUMENT CORRECT?
NO. NEGATIVE ALLEGATIONS NEED NOT BE PROVED IF THEY
CONSTITUTE A DENIAL OF THE EXISTENCE OF A DOCUMENT
POSSESSED BY THE OTHER PARTY.
Metrobank makes much ado of respondents failure to
present proof of non-compliance with the publication
requirement. It insists that respondents failed to discharge
the requisite burden of proof.
Apparently, Metrobank lost sight of our ruling in Spouses
Pulido v. CA, Sempio v. CA, and, recently, in Philippine Savings
Bank v. Spouses Dionisio Geronimo and Caridad Geronimo,
viz.:
While it may be true that the party alleging non-compliance
with the requisite publication has the burden of proof, still
negative allegations need not be proved even if essential to
ones cause of action or defense if they constitute a denial of
the existence of a document the custody of which belongs to
the other party.
It would have been a simple matter for Metrobank to rebut
the allegation of non-compliance by producing the required
proof of publication. Yet, Metrobank opted not to rebut the
allegation; it simply relied on the presumption of regularity in
the performance of official duty.

METROBANK RELIED ON THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY.
IS METROBANK CORRECT?
NO. BECAUSE IT DID NOT PRESENT ANY PROOF OF
PUBLICATION OF NOTICE OF SALE.
Unfortunately, Metrobanks reliance on the presumption of
regularity must fail because it did not present any proof of
publication of the notice of sale. As held by this Court in
Spouses Pulido v. Court of Appeals:
*P+etitioners reliance on the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties falls in the face of a serious
imputation on non-compliance. The presumption of
compliance with official duty is rebutted by failure to present
proof of posting.
Further, in Philippine Savings Bank v. Spouses Dionisio
Geronimo and Caridad Geronimo, this Court rejected a similar
contention, viz.:
Petitioners invocation of the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty on the part of Sheriff Castillo is
misplaced. While posting the notice of sale is part of a sheriffs
official functions, the actual publication of the notice of sale
cannot be considered as such, since this concerns the
publishers business. Simply put, the sheriff is incompetent to
prove that the notice of sale was actually published in a
newspaper of general circulation.
As correctly found by the RTC and the CA, the recordsof the
foreclosure proceedings lacked any proof of publication. This
explains why Metrobank could not present any proof of
publication.

WHAT IS THE OBJECT OF A NOTICE OF SALE?
TO SECURE BIDDERS AND PREVENT SACRIFICE SALE OF THE
SUBJECT PROPERTY.
We take this occasion to reiterate that the object of a notice
of sale is to inform the public of the nature and condition of
the property to be sold, and of the time, place, and terms of
the sale. Notices are given for the purpose of securing
bidders and preventing a sacrifice sale of the property.
The goal of the notice requirement is to achieve a reasonably
wide publicity of the auction sale. This is why publication in a
newspaper of general circulation is required. The Court has
previously taken judicial notice of the far-reaching effects of
publishing the notice of sale in a newspaper of general
circulation. Thus, the publication of the notice of sale was
held essential to the validity of foreclosure proceedings.In this
case, Metrobank failed to establish compliance with the
publication requirement. The RTC and the CA cannot,
therefore, be faulted for nullifying the foreclosure
proceedings.

CAN RTC TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE RECORDS OF THE
FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS WHICH IS ANOTHER CASE.
YES. COURTS HAVE ALSO TAKEN JUDICIAL NOTICE OF
PROCEEDINGS IN OTHER CASES THAT ARE CLOSELY
CONNECTED TO THE MATTER IN CONTROVERSY. THESE CASES
MAY BE SO CLOSELY INTERWOVEN, OR SO CLEARLY
INTERDEPENDENT, AS TO INVOKE A RULE OF JUDICIAL
NOTICE.
Metrobank next questions the authority of the RTC and the CA
to take cognizance of the records of the foreclosure
proceedings as basis for annulling the auction sale. It claims
that the trial court may not take judicial notice of the records
of proceedings in another case, unless the parties themselves
agreed to it. Metrobank asserts that it did not give its consent
to the trial courts examination of the records of the
extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings. Further, the RTC did not
even set a hearing for the purpose of declaring its intention to
take judicial notice of the records of the extrajudicial
proceedings, as required by Section 3of Rule 129. Metrobank,
thus, contends that the RTC exceeded its authority in taking
cognizance of the records of the extrajudicial proceedings.
We disagree.
As a rule, courts do not take judicial notice of the evidence
presented in other proceedings, even if these have been tried
or are pending in the same court or before the same judge.
This rule, however, is not absolute.
In Juaban v. Espina and G Holdings, Inc. v. National Mines
and Allied Workers Union Local 103 (NAMAWU), we held that,
in some instances, courts have also taken judicial notice of
proceedings in other cases that are closely connected to the
matter in controversy. These cases may be so closely
interwoven, or so clearly interdependent, as to invoke a rule
of judicial notice.
The RTC, therefore, acted well within its authority in taking
cognizance of the records of the extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings, and the CA cannot be faulted for sustaining the
RTC.

IN THE ABOVE CASE HOW WAS THE ISSUE OF OVERPAYMENT
OF INTEREST RAISED AND PROVEN?
Besides, we find nothing erroneous in this factual finding of
the RTC. As explained by the RTC in its decision:
[T]he Court notes that the original promissory notes
evidencing the various loans of the plaintiffs were not
presented in court by either party; they are needed to
determine the stipulated interest rate. The Court is thus left
to determine the same based on the testimony of the
plaintiffs that the agreed interest rate is 12% per annum;
amazingly, this was not denied or refuted by the [petitioner]
bank, in which case, 12% interest rate is applied at least for
the period beginning 1997 until 1999, when the loan was
renewed under the two (2) new promissory notes which
indicated a higher rate of interest of 17.250% per annum. As
mentioned above, the interest payments made by the
[respondents] were already admitted by [Metrobank] in its
answer to the complaint as well as in its comment to
*respondents+ formal offer of evidence, and such interest
payments are duly reflected and contained in the passbook
account of the *respondents+, Exhibit H, H-1 to H-10.
But, in order to determine whether [respondents+ account
has become past due or not, as the [petitioner] bank
represents, the Court deems it necessary to undertake some
mathematical computation the result of which would
decisively guide the Court to arrive at a rightful conclusion,
thus:
From the foregoing, it is evident that [respondents]
overpaid interests for the period of two (2) years, from May
1997 to June 1999, in the total amount of Php. 1,529,922.00.
Thus, the Court is convinced that it is just and equitable that
such an overpayment be construed as advance interest
payments which should be applied for the succeeding period
or year of their contract. Otherwise, [Metrobank] would
unjustly enrich itself at the expense of [respondents]. In such
a case, it was premature then for [Metrobank] to declare
*respondents+ account as past due, because at that juncture*,
respondents+ loan obligation was outstanding and in
declaring otherwise, *Metrobanks+ action was without basis
as there was no violation of their loan contract. Consequently,
it follows that the foreclosure proceedings subsequently held
on November 26, 2000 was without factual and legal basis,
too. For, indeed, when the foreclosure proceedings in
question was conducted, *respondents+ loan account with
[Metrobank], as it is said, was still outstanding, because
[respondents] were able to pay the interest due. Therefore,
the Court is again convinced that the nullification prayed for is
in order.

HOW SHOULD RIGHT TO FORECLOSE BE EXERCISED?
ACCORDING TO ITS CLEAR MANDATE. EVERY REQUIREMENT
OF LAW MUST BE COMPLIED WITH OR THE VALID EXERCISE OF
THE RIGHT WOULD END. THE EXERCISE OF A RIGHT ENDS
WHEN THE RIGHT DISAPPEARS, AND IT DISAPPEARS WHEN IT
IS ABUSED.
In fine, the right of a bank to foreclose a mortgage upon the
mortgagors failure to pay his obligation must be exercised
according to its clear mandate, and every requirement of the
law must be complied with, or the valid exercise of the right
would end. The exercise of a right ends when the right
disappears, and it disappears when it is abused especially to
the prejudice of others.
As further declared by this Court in Philippine Savings Bank v.
Spouses Dionisio Geronimo and Caridad Geronimo:
While the law recognizes the right of a bank to foreclose a
mortgage upon the mortgagors failure to pay his obligation, it
is imperative that such right be exercised according to its clear
mandate. Each and every requirement of the law must be
complied with, lest, the valid exercise of the right would end.
It must be remembered that the exercise of a right ends when
the right disappears, and it disappears when it is abused
especially to the prejudice of others.
SUFFICIENCY OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AS APPLIED TO
ABOVE CASE.
Be that as it may, even without these statements, petitioner
could still be convicted of the crime of Homicide. The
prosecution established his complicity in the crime through
circumstantial evidence, which were credible and sufficient,
and which led to the inescapable conclusion that petitioner
committed the said crime. Indeed, when considered in their
totality, the circumstances point to petitioner as the culprit.
IS DIRECT EVIDENCE THE ONLY SIFFICIENT BASIS FOR
CONVICTION.
NO.
Direct evidence of the commission of the crime charged is not
the only matrix wherefrom a court may draw its conclusions
and findings of guilt.

HOW CAN A WITNESS IDENTIFY AN ACCUSED WHEN HE DID
NOT SEE HIM COMMIT THE CRIME?
There are instances when, although a witness may not have
actually witnessed the commission of a crime, he may still be
able to positively identify a suspect or accused as the
perpetrator of a crime as when, for instance, the latter is the
person last seen with the victim immediately before and right
after the commission of the crime. This is the type of positive
identification, which forms part of circumstantial evidence. In
the absence of direct evidence, the prosecution may resort to
adducing circumstantial evidence to discharge its burden.

WHY IS CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE ADMISSIBLE?
Crimes are usually committed in secret and under condition
where concealment is highly probable. If direct evidence is
insisted upon under all circumstances, the guilt of vicious
felons who committed heinous crimes in secret or in secluded
places will be hard, if not well-nigh impossible, to prove.

WHEN CAN THERE BE A VERDICT OF CONVICTION BASED ON
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE?
Thus, there can be a verdict of conviction based on
circumstantial evidence when the circumstances proved form
an unbroken chain which leads to a fair and reasonable
conclusion pinpointing the accused, to the exclusion of all the
others, as the perpetrator of the crime.

WHAT ARE THE ESSENTIAL REQUISITES IN ORDER THAT
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE MAY BE SUFFICIENT TO
CONVICT?
However, in order that circumstantial evidence may be
sufficient to convict, the same must comply with these
essential requisites, viz.:
(a) there is more than one circumstance;
(b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and
(c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
WHAT IS CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION?
Custodial investigation refers to any questioning initiated by
law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way.
WHAT DOES CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION PRESUPPOSE?
This presupposes that he is suspected of having committed a
crime and that the investigator is trying to elicit information or
a confession from him.
WHEN DOES THE RULE ON CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION BEGIN
TO APPLY?
The rule begins to operate at once, as soon as the
investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved
crime, and direction is aimed upon a particular suspect who
has been taken into custody and to whom the police would
then direct interrogatory questions which tend to elicit
incriminating statements.
SUPPOSE THE SUSPECT WENT TO THE POLICE STATION AND
NARRATED EVENTS FREELY? IS HE CONSIDERED UNDER POLICE
INVESTIGATION?
No.
The assailed statements herein were spontaneously made by
petitioner and were not at all elicited through questioning. It
was established that petitioner, together with his cousin Fiscal
Jayona, personally went to the police station and voluntarily
made the statement that Leticia jumped out of his vehicle at
around 12:30 a.m. of September 9, 1992. The RTC and the CA
did not, therefore, err in holding that the constitutional
procedure for custodial investigation is not applicable in the
instant case.
PROBATIONARY EMPLOYMENT; CONSTRUCTIVE DISMISSAL;
BACKWAGES. (BRIEF TITLE: ROBINSONS GALLERIA VS. RACHEZ)
CASE DIGEST:
THE FACTS;
SANCHEZ WAS A PROBATIONARY EMPLOYEE. SHE
REPORTED LOSS OF P20K TO MANAGEMENT.
MANAGEMENT REPORTED MATTER TO POLICE.
SANCHEZ WAS JAILED FOR TWO WEEKS AND
CHARGED FOR QUALIFIED THEFT. SHE FILED CASE
FOR ILLEGAL DISMISSAL. LABOR ARBITER DISMISSED
COMPLAINT BUT ORDERED REINSTATEMENT. NLRC
RULED THAT THERE WAS CONSTRUCTIVE DISMISSAL
AND ORDERED REINSTATEMENT AND BACKWAGES.
CA AFFIRMED BUT RULED THAT SEPARATION PAY
WOULD BE PAID IN LIEU OF REINSTATEMENT.
THE ISSUE:
WHETHER THERE WAS ILLEGAL DIMISSAL. HOW
MUCH BACKWAGES SHOULD BE PAID.
THE RULING:
YES. SANCHEZ WAS NOT AFFORDED DUE PROCESS.
AS PROBATIONERY EMPLOYEE, SHE COULD BE
DISMISSED FOR JUST CAUSE, AUTHORIZED CAUSE OF
FOR FAILURE TO MEET THE STANDARDS SET. IF IT
WAS DUE TO JUST CAUSE SHE SHOULD HAVE BEEN
GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT HER SIDE.
POLICE INVESTIGATION CANNOT BE A SUBSTITUTE.
BACKWAGES SHALL BE COMPUTED FROM THE DATE
SHE WAS ILLEGALLY DISMISSED TO THE DATE HER
PROBATIONARY EMPLOYMENT ENDS.

OTHER LEGAL ISSUES:

WHEN IS THERE PROBATIONARY EMPLOYMENT?
There is probationary employment when the employee
upon his engagement is made to undergo a trial period during
which the employer determines his fitness to qualify for
regular employment based on reasonable standards made
known to him at the time of engagement.

DOES A PROBATIONARY EMPLOYEE ENJOY SECURITY OF
TENURE?
YES.
A probationary employee, like a regular employee,
enjoys Security of tenure.

WHAT ARE THE GROUNDS FOR TERMINATING A
PROBATIONARY EMPLOYEE.
THERE ARE THREE GROUNDS WHILE IN THE CASE OF REGULAR
EMPLOYEES, THERE ARE ONLY TWO GROUNDS.
However, in cases of probationary employment, aside from
just or authorized causes of termination, an additional ground
is provided under Article 281 of the Labor Code, i.e., the
probationary employee may also be terminated for failure to
qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable
standards made known by the employer to the employee at
the time of the engagement. Thus, the services of an
employee who has been engaged on probationary basis may
be terminated for any of the following: (1) a just or (2) an
authorized cause; and (3) when he fails to qualify as a regular
employee in accordance with reasonable standards prescribed
by the employer.

WHAT IS THE DUE PROCESS REQUIRED IN TERMINATING AN
EMPLOYEE?
Article 277(b) of the Labor Code mandates that subject
to the constitutional right of workers to security of tenure and
their right to be protected against dismissal, except for just
and authorized cause and without prejudice to the
requirement of notice under Article 283 of the same Code, the
employer shall furnish the worker, whose employment is
sought to be terminated, a written notice containing a
statement of the causes of termination, and shall afford the
latter ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself
with the assistance of a representative if he so desires, in
accordance with company rules and regulations pursuant to
the guidelines set by the Department of Labor and
Employment.

IN THE INSTANT CASE WAS THERE DUE PROCESS FOLLOWED?
NO.
In the instant case, based on the facts on record,
petitioners failed to accord respondent substantive and
procedural due process. The haphazard manner in the
investigation of the missing cash, which was left to the
determination of the police authorities and the Prosecutors
Office, left respondent with no choice but to cry foul.
Administrative investigation was not conducted by petitioner
Supermarket. On the same day that the missing money was
reported by respondent to her immediate superior, the
company already pre-judged her guilt without proper
investigation, and instantly reported her to the police as the
suspected thief, which resulted in her languishing in jail for
two weeks.

IS DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS MANDATORY? BUT THE
POLICE INVESTIGATOR HAS RULED THAT THERE WAS
PROBABLE CAUSE THAT QUALIFIED THEFT WAS COMMITTED.
As correctly pointed out by the NLRC, the due process
requirements under the Labor Code are mandatory and may
not be supplanted by police investigation or court
proceedings. The criminal aspect of the case is considered
independent of the administrative aspect. Thus, employers
should not rely solely on the findings of the Prosecutors
Office. They are mandated to conduct their own separate
investigation, and to accord the employee every opportunity
to defend himself. Furthermore, respondent was not
represented by counsel when she was strip-searched inside
the company premises or during the police investigation, and
in the preliminary investigation before the Prosecutors Office.

HOW WAS RESPONDENT DISMISSED?
SHE WAS CONSTRUCTIVELY DISMISSED.
Respondent was constructively dismissed by petitioner
Supermarket effective October 30, 1997. It was unreasonable
for petitioners to charge her with abandonment for not
reporting for work upon her release in jail. It would be the
height of callousness to expect her to return to work after
suffering in jail for two weeks. Work had been rendered
unreasonable, unlikely, and definitely impossible, considering
the treatment that was accorded respondent by petitioners.

WHAT IS THE BASIS FOR SEPARATION PAY IN LIEU OF
REINSTATEMENT?
As to respondents monetary claims, Article 279 of the
Labor Code provides that an employee who is unjustly
dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement
without loss of seniority rights and other privileges, to full
backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to other benefits or
their monetary equivalent computed from the time his
compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his
actual reinstatement. However, due to the strained relations
of the parties, the payment of separation pay has been
considered an acceptable alternative to reinstatement, when
the latter option is no longer desirable or viable. On the one
hand, such payment liberates the employee from what could
be a highly oppressive work environment. On the other, the
payment releases the employer from the grossly unpalatable
obligation of maintaining in its employ a worker it could no
longer trust.
Thus, as an illegally or constructively dismissed
employee, respondent is entitled to: (1) either reinstatement,
if viable, or separation pay, if reinstatement is no longer
viable; and (2) backwages. These two reliefs are separate and
distinct from each other and are awarded conjunctively.
In this case, since respondent was a probationary employee
at the time she was constructively dismissed by petitioners,
she is entitled to separation pay and backwages.
Reinstatement of respondent is no longer viable considering
the circumstances.

HOW MUCH BACKWAGES BE AWARDED TO RESPONDENT?
FROM THE TIME SHE WAS DISMISSED TO THE TIME HER
PROBATIONARY EMPLOYMENT ENDED.
However, the backwages that should be awarded to
respondent shall be reckoned from the time of her
constructive dismissal until the date of the termination of her
employment, i.e., from October 30, 1997 to March 14, 1998.
The computation should not cover the entire period from the
time her compensation was withheld up to the time of her
actual reinstatement. This is because respondent was a
probationary employee, and the lapse of her probationary
employment without her appointment as a regular employee
of petitioner Supermarket effectively severed the employer-
employee relationship between the parties.
In all cases involving employees engaged on
probationary basis, the employer shall make known to its
employees the standards under which they will qualify as
regular employees at the time of their engagement. Where no
standards are made known to an employee at the time, he
shall be deemed a regular employee, unless the job is self-
descriptive, like maid, cook, driver, or messenger. However,
the constitutional policy of providing full protection to labor is
not intended to oppress or destroy management. Naturally,
petitioner Supermarket cannot be expected to retain
respondent as a regular employee considering that she lost
P20,299.00 while acting as a cashier during the probationary
period. The rules on probationary employment should not be
used to exculpate a probationary employee who acts in a
manner contrary to basic knowledge and common sense, in
regard to which, there is no need to spell out a policy or
standard to be met.
WHAT ARE THE REQUIREMENTS OF CONSIGNATION? IS
SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE SUFFICIENT? AND OTHER MORE
ISSUES.
SOURCE: SOLEDAD DALTON VS. FGR REALTY AND
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, FELIX NG, NENITA NG, AND
FLORA R. DAYRIT OR FLORA REGNER (G.R. NO. 172577, 19
JANUARY 2011, CARPIO, J) SUBJECTS: CONSIGNATION;
FINDINGS OF COURT BINDING ON SC. (BRIEF TITLE: DALTON
VS. FGR REALTY)
CASE DIGEST:
FACTS:
DALTON WAS RENTING A PROPERTY OF DAYRIT. DAYRIT SOLD
THE PROPERTY TO FGR REALTY. FGR REALTY WANTED THE
LEASE TERMINATED AND SO DID NOT COLLECT RENTAL FROM
DALTON. DALTON, WITHOUT INFORMING FGR CONSIGNED
HIS RENTS TO RTC. AFTER CONSIGNATION, DALTON DID NOT
ALSO INFORM FGR. WHEN FGR LEARNED OF THE
CONSIGNATION HE WITHDREW THE RENTALS RESERVING HIS
RIGHT TO QUESTION CONSIGNATION. RTC ORDERED DALTON
TO VACATE BECAUSE DALTON DID NOT INFORM FGR REALTY
OF THE CONSIGNATION BEFORE AND AFTER THE SAME WAS
MADE. C.A. AFFIRMED.
ISSUE: WAS CONSIGNATION VALID?
NO. FGR DID NOT COMPLY STRICTLY WITH THE
REQUIREMENTS OF CONSIGNATION.
==================================
LEGAL NOTES:

DALTON ARGUES THAT THE ISSUE AS TO WHETHER
CONSIGNATION WAS VALID OR NOT IS ALREADY MOOT
BECAUSE FGR ALREADY WITHREW THE AMOUNT CONSIGNED.
IS HIS ARGUMENT VALID?
NO BECAUSE FGR EXPRESSLY RESERVED THE RIGHT TO
QUESTION THE VALIDITY OF THE CONSIGNATION.
SAID THE COURT:
The Court is not impressed. First, in withdrawing the
amounts consigned, Dayrit and FGR expressly reserved the
right to question the validity of the consignation. In
Riesenbeck v. Court of Appeals,
15
the Court held that:
A sensu contrario, when the creditors acceptance of the
money consigned is conditional and with reservations, he is
not deemed to have waived the claims he reserved against his
debtor. Thus, when the amount consigned does not cover the
entire obligation, the creditor may accept it, reserving his right
to the balance (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Phil., Vol. IV, 1973
Ed., p. 317, citing 3 Llerena 263). The same factual milieu
obtains here because the respondent creditor accepted with
reservation the amount consigned in court by the petitioner-
debtor. Therefore, the creditor is not barred from raising his
other claims, as he did in his answer with special defenses and
counterclaim against petitioner-debtor.
As respondent-creditors acceptance of the amount consigned
was with reservations, it did not completely extinguish the
entire indebtedness of the petitioner-debtor. It is apposite to
note here that consignation is completed at the time the
creditor accepts the same without objections, or, if he objects,
at the time the court declares that it has been validly made in
accordance with law.
16
(Emphasis supplied)

WHAT ARE THE REQUIREMENTS OF CONSIGNATION?.
RTC ENNUMERATED THEM, THUS:
The requisites of consignation are as follows:
1. The existence of a valid debt.
2. Valid prior tender, unless tender is excuse [sic];
3. Prior notice of consignation (before deposit)
4. Actual consignation (deposit);
5. Subsequent notice of consignation;

DALTON CLAIMS CONSIGNATION IS PROPER BECAUSE HE HAS
COMPLIED WITH OTHER REQUIREMENTS OF CONSIGNATION
AND THUS THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE. IS THIS
CORRECT?
NO. STRICT COMPLIANCE IS MANDATORY.
SAID THE COURT:
Second, compliance with the requisites of a valid consignation
is mandatory. Failure to comply strictly with any of the
requisites will render the consignation void. Substantial
compliance is not enough.
In Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. v. Toyota Bel-Air,
Inc.,
17
the Court enumerated the requisites of a valid
consignation: (1) a debt due; (2) the creditor to whom tender
of payment was made refused without just cause to accept
the payment, or the creditor was absent, unknown or
incapacitated, or several persons claimed the same right to
collect, or the title of the obligation was lost; (3) the person
interested in the performance of the obligation was given
notice before consignation was made; (4) the amount was
placed at the disposal of the court; and (5) the person
interested in the performance of the obligation was given
notice after the consignation was made.
Articles 1257 and 1258 of the Civil Code state, respectively:
Art. 1257. In order that the consignation of the thing due may
release the obligor, it must first be announced to the persons
interested in the fulfillment of the obligation.
The consignation shall be ineffectual if it is not made strictly in
consonance with the provisions which regulate payment.
Art. 1258. Consignation shall be made by depositing the things
due at the disposal of judicial authority, before whom the
tender of payment shall be proved, in a proper case, and the
announcement of the consignation in other cases.
The consignation having been made, the interested parties
shall also be notified thereof. (Emphasis supplied)
The giving of notice to the persons interested in the
performance of the obligation is mandatory. Failure to notify
the persons interested in the performance of the obligation
will render the consignation void. In Ramos v. Sarao,
18
the
Court held that, All interested parties are to be notified of the
consignation. Compliance with [this requisite] is mandatory.
19

In Valdellon v. Tengco,
20
the Court held that:
Under Art. 1257 of our Civil Code, in order that consignation
of the thing due may release the obligor, it must first be
announced to the persons interested in the fulfillment of the
obligation. The consignation shall be ineffectual if it is not
made strictly in consonance with the provisions which
regulate payment. In said Article 1258, it is further stated that
the consignation having been made, the interested party shall
also be notified thereof.
21
(Emphasis supplied)
In Soco v. Militante, et al.,
22
the Court held that:
We hold that the essential requisites of a valid consignation
must be complied with fully and strictly in accordance with the
law, Articles 1256 to 1261, New Civil Code. That these Articles
must be accorded a mandatory construction is clearly evident
and plain from the very language of the codal provisions
themselves which require absolute compliance with the
essential requisites therein provided. Substantial compliance
is not enough for that would render only a directory
construction to the law. The use of the words shall and
must which are imperative, operating to impose a duty
which may be enforced, positively indicate that all the
essential requisites of a valid consignation must be complied
with. The Civil Code Articles expressly and explicitly direct
what must be essentially done in order that consignation shall
be valid and effectual.
23
(Emphasis supplied)
DALTON SAID THE CA ERRED IN RULING SHE FAILED TO PAY
RENT. CAN SC REVIEW CA FINDINGS?
NO, BECAUSE FINDINGS OF FACTS OF LOWER COURTS ARE
BINDING ON SC.
Dalton claims that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that she
failed to pay rent. The Court is not impressed. Section 1, Rule
45 of the Rules of Court states that petitions for review on
certiorari shall raise only questions of law which must be
distinctly set forth. In Pagsibigan v. People,
24
the Court held
that:
A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
should cover only questions of law. Questions of fact are not
reviewable. A question of law exists when the doubt centers
on what the law is on a certain set of facts. A question of fact
exists when the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the
alleged facts.
There is a question of law if the issue raised is capable of being
resolved without need of reviewing the probative value of the
evidence. The issue to be resolved must be limited to
determining what the law is on a certain set of facts. Once the
issue invites a review of the evidence, the question posed is
one of fact.
25

Whether Dalton failed to pay rent is a question of fact. It is not
reviewable.
The factual findings of the lower courts are binding on the
Court. The exceptions to this rule are (1) when there is grave
abuse of discretion; (2) when the findings are grounded on
speculation; (3) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken; (4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the factual
findings are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals went
beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to
the admissions of the parties; (7) when the Court of Appeals
overlooked undisputed facts which, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion; (8) when the facts set
forth by the petitioner are not disputed by the respondent;
and (9) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are
premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by
the evidence on record.
26
Dalton did not show that any of
these circumstances is present.
HOW DO YOU DETERMINE WHETHER A COMPLAINT FOR
ILLEGAL DISMISSAL IS AN IN-TRACORPORATE
CONTROVERSY? IF INTRACORPORATE, RTC HAS JUDICDICTION.
IF NOT, NLRC HAS JURISDICTION.

YOU CONSIDER THE STATUS OR RELATIONSHIP OF THE
PARTIES AND THE NATURE OF THE QUESTION UNDER
CONTROVERSY.

THIS IS CALLED THE TWO-TIER TEST: THE RELATIONSHIP TEST
AND THE NATURE OF THE CONTROVERSY TEST.

SAID THE COURT:

The Court then combined the two tests and declared that
jurisdiction should be determined by considering not only the
status or relationship of the parties, but also the nature of the
question under controversy. This two-tier test was adopted in
the recent case of Speed Distribution Inc. v. Court of Appeals:

To determine whether a case involves an intra-corporate
controversy, and is to be heard and decided by the branches
of the RTC specifically designated by the Court to try and
decide such cases, two elements must concur: (a) the status or
relationship of the parties, and (2) the nature of the question
that is the subject of their controversy.
The first element requires that the controversy must arise out
of intra-corporate or partnership relations between any or all
of the parties and the corporation, partnership, or association
of which they are not stockholders, members or associates,
between any or all of them and the corporation, partnership
or association of which they are stockholders, members or
associates, respectively; and between such corporation,
partnership, or association and the State insofar as it concerns
the individual franchises. The second element requires that
the dispute among the parties be intrinsically connected with
the regulation of the corporation. If the nature of the
controversy involves matters that are purely civil in character,
necessarily, the case does not involve an intra-corporate
controversy. *Citations omitted.+
WHAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP TEST?

UNDER THIS TEST YOU CONSIDER THE INTRA-CORPORATE
RELATIONSHIP EXISTING BETWEEN OR AMONG THE PARTIES.
THE TYPES OF RELATIONSHIPS EMBRACED UNDER SECTION
5(B) X X X WERE AS FOLLOWS:

A) BETWEEN THE CORPORATION, PARTNERSHIP OR
ASSOCIATION AND THE PUBLIC;
B) BETWEEN THE CORPORATION, PARTNERSHIP OR
ASSOCIATION AND ITS STOCKHOLDERS, PARTNERS, MEMBERS
OR OFFICERS;
C) BETWEEN THE CORPORATION, PARTNERSHIP OR
ASSOCIATION AND THE STATE AS FAR AS ITS FRANCHISE,
PERMIT OR LICENSE TO OPERATE IS CONCERNED; AND
D) AMONG THE STOCKHOLDERS, PARTNERS OR
ASSOCIATES THEMSELVES.

THIS WAS THE TEST EARLIER FOLLOWED. THE COURT
DESCRIBED THIS AS FOLLOWS:
A review of relevant jurisprudence shows a development in
the Courts approach in classifying what constitutes an intra-
corporate controversy. Initially, the main consideration in
determining whether a dispute constitutes an intra-corporate
controversy was limited to a consideration of the intra-
corporate relationship existing between or among the parties.
The types of relationships embraced under Section 5(b) x x x
were as follows:
a) between the corporation, partnership or association
and the public;
b) between the corporation, partnership or association
and its stockholders, partners, members or officers;
c) between the corporation, partnership or
association and the State as far as its franchise, permit or
license to operate is concerned; and
d) among the stockholders, partners or associates
themselves.
The existence of any of the above intra-corporate relations
was sufficient to confer jurisdiction to the SEC (now the RTC),
regardless of the subject matter of the dispute. This came to
be known as the relationship test.
WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE QUESTION UNDER
CONTROVERSY TEST?

THE COURT DEFINES IT IN A 1984 CASE OF DMRC (BELOW) AS:
UNDER THE NATURE OF THE CONTROVERSY TEST, THE
INCIDENTS OF THAT RELATIONSHIP MUST ALSO BE
CONSIDERED FOR THE PURPOSE OF ASCERTAINING WHETHER
THE CONTROVERSY ITSELF IS INTRA-CORPORATE. THE
CONTROVERSY MUST NOT ONLY BE ROOTED IN THE
EXISTENCE OF AN INTRA-CORPORATE RELATIONSHIP, BUT
MUST AS WELL PERTAIN TO THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE
PARTIES CORRELATIVE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE
CORPORATION CODE AND THE INTERNAL AND INTRA-
CORPORATE REGULATORY RULES OF THE CORPORATION. IF
THE RELATIONSHIP AND ITS INCIDENTS ARE MERELY
INCIDENTAL TO THE CONTROVERSY OR IF THERE WILL STILL BE
CONFLICT EVEN IF THE RELATIONSHIP DOES NOT EXIST, THEN
NO INTRA-CORPORATE CONTROVERSY EXISTS.

EXCEPTION TO THE RULE THAT CONTRACTOR MUST FIRST
COMPLY WITH PD 1445 (GOVT AUDITING CODE) BEFORE IT
CAN BE PAID.
SOURCE: GREGORIO R. VIGILAR, SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH),
DPWH UNDERSECRETARIES TEODORO E. ENCARNACION AND
EDMUNDO E. ENCARNACION AND EDMUNDO V. MIR, DPWH
ASSISTANT SECRETARY JOEL L. ALTEA, DPWH REGIONAL
DIRECTOR VICENTE B. LOPEZ, DPWH DISTRICT ENGINEER
ANGELITO M. TWAO, FELIX A. DESIERTO OF THE TECHNICAL
WORKING GROUP VALIDATION AND AUDITING TEAM, AND
LEONARDO ALVARO, ROMEO N. SUPAN, VICTORINO C.
SANTOS OF THE DPWH PAMPANGA 2
ND
ENGINEERING
DISTRICT VS. ARNULFO D. AQUINO (G.R. No. 180388, 18
JANUARY 2011, SERENO, J.) SUBJECTS: EXCEPTION TO
EXHAUSTION OF ADMIN REMEDIES; GOVT IMMUNITY FROM
SUIT NOT APPLIED. (BRIEF TITLE: VIGILAR ET AL VS. AQUINO)
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

AQUINO FILED COLLECTION CASE AGAINST DPWH. DPWH
ARGUES THAT AQUINO FAILED TO COMPLY WITH PD 1445. IS
DPWH CORRECT?
NO.
SC RULED THAT EVEN IF AQUINO VIOLATED PD 1445, STILL
EQUITY AND PUBLIC INTEREST DEMAND THAT AQUINO BE
PAID.
Said the Court:
Secondly, in ordering the payment of the obligation due
respondent on a quantum meruit basis, the Court of Appeals
correctly relied on Royal Trust Corporation v. COA,
[2][10]
Eslao
v. COA,
[3][11]
Melchor v. COA,
[4][12]
EPG Construction Company
v. Vigilar,
[5][13]
and Department of Health v. C.V. Canchela &
Associates, Architects.
[6][14]
All these cases involved
government projects undertaken in violation of the relevant
laws, rules and regulations covering public bidding, budget
appropriations, and release of funds for the projects.
Consistently in these cases, this Court has held that the
contracts were void for failing to meet the requirements
mandated by law; public interest and equity, however, dictate
that the contractor should be compensated for services
rendered and work done.
Specifically, C.V. Canchela & Associates is similar to the case at
bar, in that the contracts involved in both cases failed to
comply with the relevant provisions of Presidential Decree No.
1445 and the Revised Administrative Code of 1987.
Nevertheless, (t)he illegality of the subject Agreements
proceeds, it bears emphasis, from an express declaration or
prohibition by law, not from any intrinsic illegality. As such,
the Agreements are not illegal per se, and the party claiming
thereunder may recover what had been paid or
delivered.
[7][15]

The government project involved in this case, the construction
of a dike, was completed way back on 9 July 1992. For almost
two decades, the public and the government benefitted from
the work done by respondent. Thus, the Court of Appeals was
correct in applying Eslao to the present case. In Eslao, this
Court stated:
the Court finds that the contractor should be duly
compensated for services rendered, which were for the
benefit of the general public. To deny the payment to the
contractor of the two buildings which are almost fully
completed and presently occupied by the university would be
to allow the government to unjustly enrich itself at the
expense of another. Justice and equity demand compensation
on the basis of quantum meruit. (Emphasis supplied.)
EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE THAT THE STATE CANNOT BE SUED
WITHOUT ITS CONSENT.
SOURCE: GREGORIO R. VIGILAR, SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH),
DPWH UNDERSECRETARIES TEODORO E. ENCARNACION AND
EDMUNDO E. ENCARNACION AND EDMUNDO V. MIR, DPWH
ASSISTANT SECRETARY JOEL L. ALTEA, DPWH REGIONAL
DIRECTOR VICENTE B. LOPEZ, DPWH DISTRICT ENGINEER
ANGELITO M. TWAO, FELIX A. DESIERTO OF THE TECHNICAL
WORKING GROUP VALIDATION AND AUDITING TEAM, AND
LEONARDO ALVARO, ROMEO N. SUPAN, VICTORINO C.
SANTOS OF THE DPWH PAMPANGA 2
ND
ENGINEERING
DISTRICT VS. ARNULFO D. AQUINO (G.R. No. 180388, 18
JANUARY 2011, SERENO, J.) SUBJECTS: EXCEPTION TO
EXHAUSTION OF ADMIN REMEDIES; GOVT IMMUNITY FROM
SUIT NOT APPLIED. (BRIEF TITLE: VIGILAR ET AL VS. AQUINO)
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

AQUINO SUED DPWH FOR COLLECTION. DPWH ARGUES THAT
THE STATE IS IMMUNED FROM SUIT. IS DPWH CORRECT?
NO.
SC RULED THAT THE DOCTRINE ON IMMUNITY FROM SUIT
CANNOT BE USED AS AN INSTRUMENT TO PERPETUATE
INJUSTICE.
Said the Court:
Neither can petitioners escape the obligation to compensate
respondent for services rendered and work done by invoking
the states immunity from suit. This Court has long
established in Ministerio v. CFI of Cebu,
[8][16]
and recently
reiterated in Heirs of Pidacan v. ATO,
[9][17]
that the doctrine of
governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an
instrument for perpetrating an injustice to a citizen. As this
Court enunciated in EPG Construction:
[10][18]

To our mind, it would be the apex of injustice and highly
inequitable to defeat respondents right to be duly
compensated for actual work performed and services
rendered, where both the government and the public have for
years received and accepted benefits from the project and
reaped the fruits of respondents honest toil and labor.

Under these circumstances, respondent may not validly
invoke the Royal Prerogative of Dishonesty and conveniently
hide under the States cloak of invincibility against suit,
considering that this principle yields to certain settled
exceptions. True enough, the rule, in any case, is not absolute
for it does not say that the state may not be sued under any
circumstance.

Although the Amigable and Ministerio cases generously
tackled the issue of the States immunity from suit vis a vis the
payment of just compensation for expropriated property, this
Court nonetheless finds the doctrine enunciated in the
aforementioned cases applicable to the instant controversy,
considering that the ends of justice would be subverted if we
were to uphold, in this particular instance, the States
immunity from suit.
To be sure, this Court as the staunch guardian of the
citizens rights and welfare cannot sanction an injustice so
patent on its face, and allow itself to be an instrument in the
perpetration thereof. Justice and equity sternly demand that
the States cloak of invincibility against suit be shred in this
particular instance, and that petitioners-contractors be duly
compensated on the basis of quantum meruit for
construction done on the public works housing project.
EXCEPTION TO THE RULE ON EXHAUSTION OF
ADMINSTRATIVE REMEDIES.
SOURCE: GREGORIO R. VIGILAR, SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH),
DPWH UNDERSECRETARIES TEODORO E. ENCARNACION AND
EDMUNDO E. ENCARNACION AND EDMUNDO V. MIR, DPWH
ASSISTANT SECRETARY JOEL L. ALTEA, DPWH REGIONAL
DIRECTOR VICENTE B. LOPEZ, DPWH DISTRICT ENGINEER
ANGELITO M. TWAO, FELIX A. DESIERTO OF THE TECHNICAL
WORKING GROUP VALIDATION AND AUDITING TEAM, AND
LEONARDO ALVARO, ROMEO N. SUPAN, VICTORINO C.
SANTOS OF THE DPWH PAMPANGA 2
ND
ENGINEERING
DISTRICT VS. ARNULFO D. AQUINO (G.R. No. 180388, 18
JANUARY 2011, SERENO, J.) SUBJECTS: EXCEPTION TO
EXHAUSTION OF ADMIN REMEDIES; GOVT IMMUNITY FROM
SUIT NOT APPLIED. (BRIEF TITLE: VIGILAR ET AL VS. AQUINO)
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

AQUINO SUED DPWH IN COURT FOR COLLECTION. DPWH
ARGUES THAT AQUINO SHOULD HAVE FIRST EXHAUSTED
ADMIN REMEDIES BY FILING ITS CLAIM AT COA. IS DPWH
CORRECT.
THE DEFENSE OF DPWH IS NOT CORRECT.
AQUINOS CASE FALSE UNDER THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE
ON EXHAUSTION OF ADMIN REMEDIES BECAUSE THERE IS
UNREASONABLE DELAY OR OFFICIAL INACTION THAT WILL
IRRETRIEVABLY PREJUDICE THE COMPLAINANT AND THE
QUESTION INVOLVED IS PURELY LEGAL AND WILL ULTIMATELY
HAVE TO BE DECIDED BY THE COURTS OF JUSTICE.
Said the Court:
Firstly, petitioners claim that the Complaint filed by
respondent before the Regional Trial Court was done without
exhausting administrative remedies. Petitioners aver that
respondent should have first filed a claim before the
Commission on Audit (COA) before going to the courts.
However, it has been established that the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies and the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction are not ironclad rules. In Republic of the
Philippines v. Lacap,
[1][9]
this Court enumerated the numerous
exceptions to these rules, namely: (a) where there is estoppel
on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the
challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to
lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or
official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the
complainant; (d) where the amount involved is relatively so
small as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e)
where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately
have to be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial
intervention is urgent; (g) where the application of the
doctrine may cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where
the controverted acts violate due process; (i) where the issue
of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been
rendered moot; (j) where there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy; (k) where strong public interest is involved;
and (l) in quo warranto proceedings. In the present case,
conditions (c) and (e) are present.
The government project contracted out to respondent was
completed almost two decades ago. To delay the proceedings
by remanding the case to the relevant government office or
agency will definitely prejudice respondent.
More importantly, the issues in the present case involve the
validity and the enforceability of the Contract of Agreement
entered into by the parties. These are questions purely of law
and clearly beyond the expertise of the Commission on Audit
or the DPWH. In Lacap, this Court said:
It does not involve an examination of the probative value of
the evidence presented by the parties. There is a question of
law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is
on a certain state of facts, and not as to the truth or the
falsehood of alleged facts. Said question at best could be
resolved only tentatively by the administrative authorities.
The final decision on the matter rests not with them but with
the courts of justice. Exhaustion of administrative remedies
does not apply, because nothing of an administrative nature is
to be or can be done. The issue does not require technical
knowledge and experience but one that would involve the
interpretation and application of law.
PRIMER FOR JUDGES RE DEADLINE FOR DECIDING/RESOLVING
CASES/MOTIONS.
SOURCE: OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR VS.
FORMER JUDGE LEONARDO L. LEONIDA, OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT BRANCH 27, STA. CRUZ, LAGUNA (A.M. NO. RTJ-
09-2198, 18 JANUARY 2011, CORONA, C.J) SUBJECT: FAILURE
OF JUDGE TO DECIDE CASES WITHIN THE REGLEMENTARY
PERIOD. (BRIEF TITLE: OCA VS. JUDGE LEONIDA)
x x

JUDGE LEONIDA FAILED TO RESOLVE MOTIONS IN TEN (10)
CIVIL CASES; DECIDE ELEVEN (11) CRIMINAL CASES, AND
TWENTY-SEVEN (27) CIVIL CASES IN BRANCH 27, AND TO
DECIDE NINETY-ONE (91) CRIMINAL CASES AND SIXTEEN (16)
CIVIL CASES IN BRANCH 74 WITHIN THE REGLEMENTARY
PERIOD. WHAT IS HIS OFFENSE AND PENALTY?

JUDGE LEONIDA IS GUILTY OF GROSS INCOMPETENCY AND
INEFFICIENCY. SC FINED HIM P50,000.00 PESOS TO BE
DEDUCTED FROM HIS RETIREMENT BENEFITS.

WHAT ARE THE EFFECTS OF THE FAILURE OF A JUDGE TO
DECIDE A CASE WITHIN THE REGLEMENTARY PERIOD?

IT DEPRIVES LITIGANT OF THE RIGHT TO SPEEDY DISPOSITION
OF HIS CASE;
IT MAGNIFIES COST OF SEEKING JUSTICE;
IT UNDERMINES PEOPLES FAITH AND CONFIDENCE IN THE
JUDICIARY; AND
IT LOWERS ITS STANDARDS AND BRINGS IT TO DISREPUTE.
Precedents have shown that the failure of a judge to decide a
case within the reglementary period warrants administrative
sanction. The Court treats such cases with utmost rigor for
any delay in the administration of justice; no matter how brief,
deprives the litigant of his right to a speedy disposition of his
case.
[1][14]
Not only does it magnify the cost of seeking justice;
it undermines the peoples faith and confidence in the
judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it to disrepute.
[2][15]


HOW LONG IS THE REGLEMENTARY PERIOD?

90 DAYS FROM DATE OF SUBMISSION.
No less than Section 15 (1), Article 8 of the 1987 Constitution
mandates that all cases or matters filed before all lower courts
shall be decided or resolved within three (3) months from the
date of submission. The prescribed period is a firm mandatory
rule for the efficient administration of justice and not merely
one for indulgent tweaking.

WHAT IS THE NATURE OF SUCH DEADLINE?

MANDATORY.
As a general principle, rules prescribing the time within which
certain acts must be done, or certain proceedings taken, are
considered absolutely indispensable to the prevention of
needless delays and for the orderly and speedy discharge of
judicial business. By their very nature, these rules are
regarded as mandatory.
[3][16]


WHAT IS THE BASIS?

THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ADMIN CIRCULAR
DATED 15 JANUARY 1999
In the same vein, Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct is emphatic in enjoining judges to administer justice
without delay by disposing of the courts business promptly
and deciding cases within the period prescribed by law.
Corollary to this, Administrative Circular No. 3-99 dated
January 15, 1999, requires all judges to scrupulously observe
the periods prescribed in the Constitution for deciding cases,
because failure to comply therewith violates the constitutional
right of the parties to speedy disposition of the cases.
[4][17]

Only in certain meritorious cases, that is, those involving
difficult questions of law or complex issues, may a longer
period to decide the case be allowed but only upon proper
application for extension of the period has been made by the
concerned judge.
[5][18]


IF JUDGE FAILS TO DECIDE WITHIN THE REQUIRED PERIOD,
WHAT IS HIS OFFENSE?

GROSS INEFFICIENCY.
The Court has always considered a judges delay in deciding
cases within the prescribed period of three months as gross
inefficiency.
[6][21]
Undue delay cannot be countenanced at a
time when the clogging of the court dockets is still the bane of
the judiciary. The raison d etre of courts lies not only in
properly dispensing justice but also in being able to do so
seasonably.
[7][22]


WHAT MUST JUDGES OBSERVE IN CONNECTION WITH SAID
DEADLINE?

EFFICIENCY WITH PROBITY.
The administration of justice demands that those who don
judicial robes be able to comply fully and faithfully with the
task set before them.
[8][24]
As frontline officials of the judiciary,
judges should, at all times, act with efficiency and with
probity. They are duty-bound not only to be faithful to the
law, but likewise to maintain professional competence. The
pursuit of excellence must be their guiding principle. This is
the least that judges can do to sustain the trust and
confidence which the public reposed on them and the
institution they represent.
WHAT IS THE ETHICAL STANDARD EXPECTED OF COURT
EMPLOYEES.

SOURCE: OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR VS.
CLAUDIO M. LOPEZ (A.M. NO. P-10-2788, 18 JANUARY 2011,
CORONA, C.J.) SUBJECT: QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE REQUIRED
IN ADMIN CASES; DEFINITION OF MISCONDUCT AND WHEN IT
IS GRAVE. (BRIEF TITLE: OCA VS. LOPEZ).
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - x
WHAT IS THE ETHICAL STANDARD EXPECTED OF COURT
EMPLOYEES?
GREATER MORAL RIGHTEOUSNESS AND UPRIGHTNESS.

Once again, we stress that court employees, from the
presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, being public servants in
an office dispensing justice, should always act with a high
degree of professionalism and responsibility. Their conduct
must not only be characterized by propriety and decorum, but
must also be in accordance with the law and court regulations.
No position demands greater moral righteousness and
uprightness from its holder than an office in the judiciary.
Court employees should be models of uprightness, fairness
and honesty to maintain the peoples respect and faith in the
judiciary. They should avoid any act or conduct that would
diminish public trust and confidence in the courts. Indeed,
those connected with dispensing justice bear a heavy burden
of responsibility.
11

WHAT IS MISCONDUCT?

The Court defines misconduct as a transgression of some
established and definite rule of action, more particularly,
unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer.
8


WHAT IS GRAVE MISCONDUCT?

The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional
elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or to
disregard established rules, which must be established by
substantial evidence.
9


As distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of
corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant
disregard of established rule, must be manifest in a charge of
grave misconduct.

WHAT IS CORRUPTION?

Corruption, as an element of grave misconduct, consists in the
act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and
wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some
benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and
the rights of others.

MUST GRAVE MISCONDUCT BE A CRIME?

No.

An act need not be tantamount to a crime for it to be
considered as grave misconduct as in fact, crimes involving
moral turpitude are treated as a separate ground for dismissal
under the Administrative Code.
10


We agree with the findings and recommendation of both the
Investigating Judge and the OCA that respondent committed
grave misconduct which, under Section 52 (A)(3), Rule IV of
the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases, is a grave offense
punishable by dismissal even for the first offense.

WHAT IS REQUIRED TO PROVE GRAVE MISCONDUCT.

Only substantial evidence is required.

As correctly pointed out by the Investigating Judge, to sustain
a finding of administrative culpability, only substantial
evidence is required. The present case is an administrative
case, not a criminal case, against respondent. Therefore, the
quantum of proof required is only substantial evidence.

WHAT IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE?

Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence
which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion. Evidence to support a conviction in a criminal
case is not necessary, and the dismissal of the criminal case
against the respondent in an administrative case is not a
ground for the dismissal of the administrative case. We
emphasize the well-settled rule that a criminal case is
different from an administrative case and each must be
disposed of according to the facts and the law applicable to
each case.
7

=============================================
=============================================
=============================================
ADDITIONAL NOTES (OCTOBER 2011 CASE):

SOURCE: MONICO K. IMPERIAL, JR. VS. GOVERNMENT
SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (G.R. NO. 191224, 04 OCTOBER
2011, BRION, J.) SUBJECTS: GRAVE MISCONDUCT; SIMPLE
MISCONDUCT, PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS; PENALTIES FOR
MISCONDUCT; EXAMPLES OF CLEAR DEFIANCE OF THE LAW
AND PROCEDURES (BRIEF TITLE: IMPERIAL VS. GSIS)

PETITIONER WAS ADJUDGED BY GSIS, SSC AND CA AS GUILTY
OF GRAVE MISCONDUCT? WAS THIS RULING CORRECT?

NO. NO SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE WAS ADDUCED TO SUPPORT
THE ELEMENTS OF CORRUPTION, CLEAR INTENT TO
VIOLATE THE LAW OR FLAGRANT DISREGARD OF
ESTABLISHED RULE THAT MUST BE PRESENT TO
CHARACTERIZE THE MISCONDUCT AS GRAVE.

PETITIONER ONLY COMMITTED SERIOUS LAPSE OF JUDGMENT
SUFFICIENT TO HOLD HIM LIABLE FOR SIMPLE MISCONDUCT.

Thus, the petitioners liability under the given facts only
involves simple misconduct. As Branch Manager of the GSIS
Naga Field Office, he is presumed to know all existing policies,
guidelines and procedures in carrying out the agencys
mandate in the area. By approving the loan applications of
eight GSIS Naga Field Office employees who did not fully meet
the required qualifications, he committed a serious lapse of
judgment sufficient to hold him liable for simple misconduct.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

BUT PETITIONER COMMITTED SUCH OFFENSE TWICE
ALREADY. CAN HE BE NOT CONSIDERED TO HAVE COMMITTED
FLAGRANT DISREGARD OF ESTABLISHED RULE?

NO. THERE MUST BE DELIBERATE DEFIANCE OF THE RULES.
THE CSCS FINDINGS ON THE PETITIONERS ACTIONS PRIOR TO
THE APPROVAL OF THE LOANS NEGATE THE PRESENCE OF ANY
INTENT ON THE PETITIONERS PART TO DELIBERATELY DEFY
THE POLICY OF THE GSIS. FIRST, GSIS BRANCH MANAGERS
HAVE BEEN GRANTED IN THE PAST THE AUTHORITY TO
APPROVE LOAN APPLICATIONS BEYOND THE PRESCRIBED
REQUIREMENTS OF GSIS; SECOND, THERE WAS A CUSTOMARY
LENIENT PRACTICE IN THE APPROVAL OF LOANS EXERCISED BY
SOME BRANCH MANAGERS NOTWITHSTANDING THE
EXISTING GSIS POLICY; AND THIRD, THE PETITIONER FIRST
SOUGHT THE APPROVAL OF HIS IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR
BEFORE ACTING ON THE LOAN APPLICATIONS. THESE
CIRCUMSTANCES RUN COUNTER TO THE CHARACTERISTIC
FLAGRANT DISREGARD OF THE RULES THAT GRAVE
MISCONDUCT REQUIRES.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

WHAT IS MISCONDUCT?

AN INTENTIONAL WRONGDOING OR A DELIBERATE
VIOLATION OF A RULE OF LAW OR STANDARD OF BEHAVIOR.

XXXXXXXXXXXXX

WHEN IS MISCONDUCT GRAVE?

A MISCONDUCT IS GRAVE WHERE THE ELEMENTS OF
CORRUPTION, CLEAR INTENT TO VIOLATE THE LAW OR
FLAGRANT DISREGARD OF ESTABLISHED RULE ARE
PRESENT.
[1][21]
OTHERWISE, A MISCONDUCT IS ONLY SIMPLE.

Misconduct has a legal and uniform definition. Misconduct has
been defined as an intentional wrongdoing or a deliberate
violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior, especially by
a government official.
[2][20]
A misconduct is grave where the
elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or
flagrant disregard of established rule are present.
[3][21]

Otherwise, a misconduct is only simple.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

GIVE EXAMPLES OF JURISPRUDENCE WHEN THERE HAS BEEN
OPEN DEFIANCE OF A CUSTOMARY RULE.

AS FOLLOWS:

Flagrant disregard of rules is a ground that jurisprudence has
already touched upon. It has been demonstrated, among
others, in the instances when there had been open defiance of
a customary rule;
[4][23]
in the repeated voluntary disregard of
established rules in the procurement of supplies;
[5][24]
in the
practice of illegally collecting fees more than what is
prescribed for delayed registration of marriages;
[6][25]
when
several violations or disregard of regulations governing the
collection of government funds were committed;
[7][26]
and
when the employee arrogated unto herself responsibilities
that were clearly beyond her given duties.
[8][27]
The common
denominator in these cases was the employees propensity to
ignore the rules as clearly manifested by his or her actions.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

WHAT IS THE PENALTY FOR SIMPLE MISCONDUCT?

SUSPENSION FOR ONE MONTH AND ONE DAY TO SIX MONTHS
FOR THE FIRST OFFENSE AND DISMISSAL FOR THE SECOND
OFFENSE.

XXXXXXXXXXXXX

BUT PETITIONER HAS COMMITTED THE OFFENSE TWICE. WHY
SHOULD HIS PENALTY BE NOT DISMISSAL?

BECAUSE IT IS NOT PROPORTIONATE TO THE NATURE AND
EFFECT OF HIS TRANSGRESSION.

The Revised Uniform Rules of the Civil Service (Civil Service
Rules) classifies simple misconduct as a less grave offense.
Under Section 52(B) (2), Rule IV of the Civil Service Rules, the
commission of simple misconduct is penalized by suspension
for one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months for the
first offense, and dismissal from the service for the second
offense. While records show that this is not the petitioners
first offense as he was previously suspended for one (1) year
for neglect of duty, we believe that his dismissal would be
disproportionate to the nature and effect of the transgression
he committed as the GSIS did not suffer any prejudice through
the loans he extended; these loans were for GSIS employees
and were duly paid for. Thus, for his second simple
misconduct, we impose on the petitioner the penalty of
suspension from the lapse of his preventive suspension by
GSIS up to the finality of this Decision.
HOW DO YOU PROVE ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF DANGEROUS
DRUGS.

SOURCE: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. CARLO MAGNO
AURE Y ARNALDO AND MELCHOR AUSTRIACO Y AGUILA (G.R.
NO. 185163, 17 JANUARY 2011, VELASCO, JR., J.) SUBJECTS:
ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF DANGEROUS DRUGS; ILLEGAL SALE
OF PROHIBITED DRUGS; ELEMENTS AND HOW PROVEN.
(SUBJECT: PEOPLE VS. AURE ET AL)
x-x

HOW DO YOU PROVE ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF DANGEROUS
DRUGS?

THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS ARE:

(1) THE ACCUSED IS IN POSSESSION OF AN ITEM OR OBJECT
WHICH IS IDENTIFIED TO BE A PROHIBITED DRUG;

(2) SUCH POSSESSION IS NOT AUTHORIZED BY LAW; AND

(3) THE ACCUSED FREELY AND CONSCIOUSLY POSSESSED THE
SAID DRUG.
[1][40]

Ruled the Supreme Court in the above-stated case:
As regards the charge of illegal possession of dangerous drugs
under Sec. 11, Art. II of RA 9165 against accused-appellant
Aure, We also find that the elements of the offense have been
established by the evidence of the prosecution.
The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs are: (1) the accused is in
possession of an item or object which is identified to be a
prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law;
and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said
drug.
[2][40]

In the instant case, a brown bag was found inside the car of
accused-appellant Aure. It yielded a plastic sachet of shabu
weighing 86.23 grams wrapped in red wrapping paper, small
plastic sachets, and an improvised plastic tooter. Considering
that during the sale to Bilason, it was from the same bag that
accused-appellant Austriaco took the sachet of shabu, per
order of accused-appellant Aure, the owner-possessor of said
bag and its contents is no other than accused-appellant Aure,
who has not shown any proof that he was duly authorized by
law to possess them or any evidence to rebut his animus
possidendi of the shabu found in his car during the buy-bust
operation.

Defense of denial is inherently weak

The sachet containing the dangerous drug was positively
identified by MADAC operative Bilason during the trial as the
very sachet with white crystalline substance sold and
delivered to him by accused-appellants. Thus, accused-
appellants denial is self-serving and has little weight in law. A
bare denial is an inherently weak defense,
[3][41]
and has been
invariably viewed by this Court with disfavor, for it can be
easily concocted but difficult to prove, and is a common
standard line of defense in most prosecutions arising from
violations of RA 9165.
[4][42]

Time and again, We have held that denials unsubstantiated
by convincing evidence are not enough to engender
reasonable doubt particularly where the prosecution presents
sufficiently telling proof of guilt.
[5][43]

In the absence of any intent on the part of the police
authorities to falsely impute such crime against the accused-
appellants, the presumption of regularity in the performance
of duty stands.
[6][44]
Especially here, where an astute analysis
of MADAC operative Bilasons testimony does not indicate any
inconsistency, contradiction, or fabrication.
HOW DO YOU PROVE ILLEGAL SALE OF PROHIBITED DRUGS?

In the prosecution for the crime of illegal sale of prohibited
drugs under Sec. 5, Art. II of RA 9165, the following elements
must concur:
(1) the identities of the buyer and seller, object, and
consideration;
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for it.
[1][36]

What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of
dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale
actually occurred, coupled with the presentation in court of
the substance seized as evidence.
[2][37]
In the instant case, all
these were sufficiently established by the prosecution.
IF CA DECISION AFFIRMING RTC DECISION BINDING ON SC?

YES, UNLESS CA DECISION IS TAINTED WITH ARBITRARINESS,
CAPRICIOUSNESS OR PALPABLE ERROR.
In deciding this appeal, this Court is guided by the legal
aphorism that factual findings of the CA, affirming those of the
trial court, are binding on this Court, unless there is a clear
showing that such findings are tainted with arbitrariness,
capriciousness, or palpable error.
[1][34]
As this Court held in
People v. Lusabio, Jr.:
[2][35]



All in all, we find the evidence of the prosecution to be more
credible than that adduced by accused-appellant. When it
comes to credibility, the trial courts assessment deserves
great weight, and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted
with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of
weight and influence. The reason is obvious. Having the full
opportunity to observe directly the witnesses deportment
and manner of testifying, the trial court is in a better position
than the appellate court to evaluate testimonial evidence
properly.
WHO ARE THE OFFICIALS OF THE COMPANY WHO CAN SIGN
THE VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION WITHOUT NEED OF A
BOARD RESOLUTION?
In sum, we have held that the following officials or employees
of the company can sign the verification and certification
without need of a board resolution: (1) the Chairperson of the
Board of Directors, (2) the President of a corporation, (3) the
General Manager or Acting General Manager, (4) Personnel
Officer, and (5) an Employment Specialist in a labor case.
WHAT ELEMENTS MUST BE PROVEN IN A PROSECUTION FOR
ILLEGAL SALE OF PROHIBITED DRUG.
The following must be proven under Section 5 of R.A. No.
9165:
(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and
the consideration;
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
All these require evidence that the sale transaction transpired,
coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti,
i.e., the body or substance of the crime that establishes that a
crime has actually been committed, as shown by presenting
the object of the illegal transaction.
[1][13]


WHAT IS THE PROCEDURE FOR SEIZURE AND CUSTODY OF
ILLEGAL DRUG?
Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 provides
such procedure:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control
of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence
of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department
of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a
copy thereof[.] (Emphasis supplied.)

WHAT IS RATIONALE FOR STRICT OBSERVANCE OF THIS
PROCEDURE:
The illegal drugs unique characteristic rendering it indistinct,
not readily identifiable and easily open to tampering,
alteration or substitution either by accident or otherwise.

IS NON-COMPLIANCE BY THE AUTHORITIES OF AFORESAID
SECTION 21 FATAL.
People v. Pringas
[2][16]
teaches that non-compliance by the
apprehending/buy-bust team with Section 21 is not
necessarily fatal. Its non-compliance will not automatically
render an accuseds arrest illegal or the items
seized/confiscated from him inadmissible.
What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the
same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused.
[3][17]

WHAT IS MEANT BY CHAIN OF CUSTODY?
Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1,
Series of 2002 defines chain of custody as follows:
Chain of Custody means the duly recorded authorized
movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled
chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or
laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to
safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such
record of movements and custody of seized item shall include
the identity and signature of the person who held temporary
custody of the seized item, the date and time when such
transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping
and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition[.]
[7][21]

Every link must be accounted fo
WHEN IS IT PROPER TO ISSUE AN INJUNCTIVE WRIT?
For an injunctive writ to issue, a clear showing of extreme
urgency to prevent irreparable injury and a clear and
unmistakable right to it must be proven by the party seeking
it.

WHAT IS THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF A PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION?
The primary objective of a preliminary injunction, whether
prohibitory or mandatory, is to preserve the status quo until
the merits of the case can be heard.
[1][5]

[T]he rule is well-entrenched that the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction rests upon the sound discretion of the
trial court. It bears reiterating that Section 4 of Rule 58 gives
generous latitude to the trial courts in this regard for the
reason that conflicting claims in an application for a
provisional writ more often than not involve a factual
determination which is not the function of appellate courts.
Hence, the exercise of sound judicial discretion by the trial
court in injunctive matters must not be interfered with except
when there is manifest abuse, which is wanting in the present
case.
[2][6]
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)

WHEN YOU RAISE GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AS GROUND
TO NULLIFY AN INJUNCTIVE WRIT WHAT MUST YOU PROVE?
You must prove that there is a capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment, equivalent to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Or the power must be exercised in an arbitrary
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must
be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.
[3][7]


WHAT IS THE JURISDICTIONAL FOUNDATION FOR THE
ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF INJUNCTION?
The jurisdictional foundation for the issuance of a writ of
injunction rests on:
- the existence of a cause of action;
- the probability of irreparable injury; and
- the prevention of multiplicity of suits.
RA 9474: AN ACT GOVERNING THE ESTABLISHMENT,
OPERATION AND REGULATION OF LENDING COMPANIES (22
MAY 2007)
Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of Representatives
of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. Title. This Act shall be known as the Lending
Company Regulation Act of 2007.
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy
of the State to regulate the establishment of lending
companies and to place their operation on a sound, efficient
and stable condition to derive the optimum advantages from
them as an additional source of credit; to prevent and
mitigate, as far as practicable, practices prejudicial to public
interest; and to lay down the minimum requirements and
standards under which they may be established and do
business.
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. For purposes of implementing
this Act, the following definitions shall apply:
(a) Lending Company shall refer to a corporation engaged in
granting loans from its own capital funds or from funds
sourced from not more than nineteen (19) persons. It shall not
be deemed to include banking institutions, investment houses,
savings and loan associations, financing companies,
pawnshops, insurance companies, cooperatives and other
credit institutions already regulated by law. The term shall be
synonymous with lending investors.
(b) Debtor shall refer to a borrower or person granted a loan
by the lending company.
(c) Quasi-Bank shall refer to a non-bank financial institution
authorized by the BSP to engage in quasi-banking functions
and to borrow funds from more than nineteen (19) lenders
through the issuance, endorsement or assignment with
recourse or acceptance of deposit substitutes as defined in
Section 95 of Republic Act No. 7653 (the :New Central Bank
Act:) for purposes of relending or purchasing of receivables
and other obligations.
(d) Subsidiary shall refer to a corporation more than fifty
percent (50%) of the voting stock of which is owned by a bank
or quasi-bank.
(e) Affiliate shall refer to a corporation, the voting stock of
which, to the extent of fifty percent (50%) or less, is owned by
a bank or quasi-bank which is related or linked to such
institution through common stockholders or such other
factors as may be determined by the Monetary Board of the
BSP.
(f) SEC shall refer to the Securities and Exchange Commission.
(g) BSP shall refer to the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.
SEC. 4. Form of Organization. A lending company shall be
established only as a corporation: Provided That existing
lending investors organized as single proprietorships or
partnerships shall be disallowed from engaging in the business
of granting loans to the public one year after the date of
effectivity of this Act.
No lending company shall conduct business unless granted an
authority to operate by the SEC.
SEC. 5. Capital. The minimum paid in capital of any lending
company which may be established after the effectivity of this
Act shall be One million pesos (P1,000,000.00): Provided,
however, That lending companies established and in
operation prior thereto shall comply with the minimum
capitalization required under the provisions of this Section
within such time as may be prescribed by the SEC which time
shall, in no case, be less than three years from the date of
effectivity of this Act and: Provided, further, That the SEC may
prescribe a higher minimum capitalization if warranted by
circumstances.
SEC. 6. Citizenship Requirements. Upon the effectivity of this
Act, at least a majority of the voting capital stock shall be
owned by citizens of the Philippines.
The percentage of foreign-owned voting stock in any lending
company existing prior to the effectivity of this Act, if such
percentage is in excess of forty-nine percent (49%) of the
voting stock, shall not be increased but may be reduced and,
once reduced, shall not be increased thereafter beyond forty-
nine percent (49%) of the voting stock of the lending
company. The percentage of foreign-owned voting stocks in
any lending company shall be determined by the citizenship of
the individual stockholders. In the case of corporations owning
shares in a lending company, the citizenship of the individual
owners of voting stock in such corporations shall be the basis
in the computation of the percentage.
No foreign national may be allowed to own stock unless the
country of which he is a national accords reciprocal rights to
Filipinos.
SEC. 7. Amount and Charges on Loans. A lending company
may grant loans in such amounts and reasonable interest
rates and charges as may be agreed upon between the lending
company and the debtor: Provided, That the agreement shall
be in compliance with the provisions of Republic Act No. 3765,
otherwise known as the Truth in Lending Act and Republic
Act 7394, otherwise known as the Consumer Act of the
Philippines: Provided, further, That the Monetary Board, in
consultation with the SEC and the industry, may prescribe
such interest rate as may be warranted by prevailing
economic and social conditions.
SEC. 8. Maintenance of Books of Accounts and Records.
Every lending company shall maintain books of accounts and
records as may be required by the SEC and prescribed by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue and other government agencies.
In case a lending company engages in other businesses, it shall
maintain separate books of accounts for these businesses.
The Manual of Accounts prescribed by the BSP for lending
investors shall continue to be adopted by lending companies
for uniform recording and reporting of their operations, until a
new Manual of Accounts shall have been prescribed by the
SEC.
It shall issue the appropriate instruments and documents to
the parties concerned to evidence its lending and borrowing
transactions.
SEC. 9. Authority of the SEC. The SEC is hereby authorized to:
(a) Create a new division or bureau within its control to
regulate and supervise the operations and activities of lending
companies in the country;
(b) Issue rules and regulations to implement the provisions
contained herein;
(c) Issue rules and regulations on, among other things,
minimum capitalization, uses of funds received, method of
marketing and distribution, maturity of funds received,
restrictions or outright prohibition of purchases or sales of
receivables with or without recourse basis;
(d) Require from lending companies reports of condition and
such other reports necessary to determine compliance with
the provisions of this Act;
(e) Exercise visitorial powers whenever deemed necessary;
and
(f) Impose such administrative sanctions including suspension
or revocation of the lending companys authority to operate
and the imposition of fines for violations of this Act and
regulations issued by the SEC in pursuance thereto.
SEC. 10. Implementing Rules and Regulations. ? Within three
months after the approval of this Act, the SEC shall
promulgate the necessary rules and regulations implementing
the provisions of this Act.
SEC. 11. Delineation of Authority between SEC and the BSP.
Lending companies shall be under the supervision and
regulation of the SEC: Provided, however, That lending
companies which are subsidiaries and affiliates of banks and
quasi-banks shall be subject to BSP supervision and
examination in accordance with Republic Act No. 7653:
Provider further, That the Monetary Board, after being
satisfied that there is reasonable ground to believe that a
lending company is being used as a conduit by a bank, quasi-
bank or their subsidiary/affiliate to circumvent or violate BSP
rules and regulations, may order an examination of the
lending companys books and accounts.
SEC. 12. Penalty. A fine of not less than Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00) and not more than Fifty thousand
pesos(P50,000.00) or imprisonment of not less than six
months but not more than ten (10) years or both, at the
discretion of the court, shall be imposed upon:
1. Any person who shall engage in the business of a lending
company without a validly subsisting authority to operate
from the SEC.
2. The president, treasurer and other officers of the
corporation, including the managing officer thereof, who shall
knowingly and willingly:
a. Engage in the business of a lending company without a
validly subsisting authority to operate from the SEC;
b. Hold themselves out to be a lending company, either
through advertisement in whatever form, whether in its
stationery, commercial paper, or other document, or through
other representations without authority;
c. Make use of a trade or firm name containing the words
lending company or lending investor or any other
designation that would give the public the impression that it is
engaged in the business of a lending company as defined in
this Act without authority; and
d. Violate the provisions of this Act.
3. Any officer, employee, or agent of a lending company who
shall:
a. Knowingly and willingly make any statement in any
application, report, or document required to be filed under
this Act, which statement is false or misleading with respect to
any material fact; and
b. Overvalue or aid in overvaluing any security for the purpose
of influencing in any way the action of the company in any
loan, or discounting line.
4. Any officer, employee or examiner of the SEC directly
charged with the implementation of this Act or of other
government agencies who shall commit, connive, aid, or assist
in the commission of acts enumerated under Subsections 1
and 2 of this Section.
ARE RETIREMENT BENEFITS SUBJECT TO TAX?

No, under certain conditions. These conditions are:

(i) There must be a reasonable private benefit plan and such
benefit plan must be approved by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue;

(ii) The retiring official or employees must have been in the
service of the same employer for at least ten (10) years and is
not less than fifty (50) years of age at the time of retirement;
and

(iii) The retiring official or employee shall not have previously
availed of the privilege under the retirement benefit plan of
the same or another employer.
SUPPOSE AN EMPLOYEE IS SEPARATED FROM THE SERVICE
FOR A CAUSE BEYOND HIS CONTROL, IS HIS SEPARATION PAY
SUBJECT TO TAX?

No. As provided under R.A. 4917:

Provided, finally, That in case of separation of an official or
employee from the service of the employer due to death,
sickness or other physical disability or for any cause beyond
the control of the said official or employee, any amount
received by him or by his heirs from the employer as a
consequence of such separation shall likewise be exempt as
hereinabove provided.
FOR RAPE UNDER ART. 266-A, PAR. 1(D) OF THE REVISED
PENAL CODE, WHAT IS THE PROPER CIVIL INDEMNITY AND
MORAL DAMAGES?

PhP 50,000 as civil indemnity and PhP 50,000 as moral
damages.

FOR RAPE THROUGH SEXUAL ASSAULT UNDER ART. 266-A,
PAR. 2 OF THE CODE WHAT IS THE PROPER CIVIL INDEMNITY
AND MORAL DAMAGES?

The award of damages should be PhP 30,000 as civil
indemnity and PhP 30,000 as moral damages.
[1][62]


CAN EXEMPLARY DAMAGES BE ALSO AWARED IN RAPE
THROUGH SEXUAL ASSAULT?

Yes. It must be noted that prior to the revised Rules of Court,
exemplary damages to be awarded must be proven although
not alleged in the Information. But under the revised Rules, it
appears that exemplary damages must be alleged in the
Information and proven.
Also known as punitive or vindictive damages, exemplary
or corrective damages are intended to serve as a deterrent to
serious wrong doings, and as a vindication of undue sufferings
and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured or a
punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct. These
terms are generally, but not always, used interchangeably. In
common law, there is preference in the use of exemplary
damages when the award is to account for injury to feelings
and for the sense of indignity and humiliation suffered by a
person as a result of an injury that has been maliciously and
wantonly inflicted, the theory being that there should be
compensation for the hurt caused by the highly reprehensible
conduct of the defendant associated with such
circumstances as willfulness, wantonness, malice, gross
negligence or recklessness, oppression, insult or fraud or gross
fraud that intensifies the injury. The terms punitive or
vindictive damages are often used to refer to those species of
damages that may be awarded against a person to punish him
for his outrageous conduct. In either case, these damages are
intended in good measure to deter the wrongdoer and others
like him from similar conduct in the future.

Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages, therefore, can
be awarded, not only in the presence of an aggravating
circumstance, but also where the circumstances of the case
show the highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the
offender.
WHAT DAMAGES CAN BE AWARDED IN IN CRIMINAL CASES
WHERE THE IMPOSABLE PENALTY FOR THE CRIME IS
RECLUSION PERPETUA OR DEATH?

As a rule, the Court awards three kinds of damages in these
types of criminal cases: civil indemnity and moral and
exemplary damages.

WHAT IS THE CONCEPT OF CIVIL INDEMNITY?

First, civil indemnity ex delicto is the indemnity authorized in
our criminal law for the offended party, in the amount
authorized by the prevailing judicial policy and apart from
other proven actual damages, which itself is equivalent to
actual or compensatory damages in civil law.
[1][21]
This award
stems from Art. 100 of the RPC which states, Every person
criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.
Civil liability ex delicto may come in the form of restitution,
reparation, and indemnification.
[2][22]
Restitution is defined as
the compensation for loss; it is full or partial compensation
paid by a criminal to a victim ordered as part of a criminal
sentence or as a condition for probation.
[3][23]
Likewise,
reparation and indemnification are similarly defined as the
compensation for an injury, wrong, loss, or damage
sustained.
[4][24]
Clearly, all of these correspond to actual or
compensatory damages defined under the Civil Code.
[5][25]


WHAT IS THE CONCEPT OF MORAL DAMAGES?

The second type of damages the Court awards are moral
damages, which are also compensatory in nature. Del Mundo
v. Court of Appeals explained the nature and purpose of moral
damages, viz:
Moral damages, upon the other hand, may be awarded to
compensate one for manifold injuries such as physical
suffering, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings and social humiliation. These
damages must be understood to be in the concept of grants,
not punitive or corrective in nature, calculated to compensate
the claimant for the injury suffered. Although incapable of
exactness and no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order
that moral damages may be awarded, the amount of
indemnity being left to the discretion of the court, it is
imperative, nevertheless, that (1) injury must have been
suffered by the claimant, and (2) such injury must have sprung
from any of the cases expressed in Article 2219
[6][27]
and
Article 2220
[7][28]
of the Civil Code.
exemplary damages may be awarded, not only in the presence
of an aggravating circumstance, but also where the
circumstances of the case show the highly reprehensible or
outrageous conduct of the offender,

IN ESSENCE WHAT IS THE SUB JUDICE RULE?
In essence, the sub judice rule restricts comments and
disclosures pertaining to pending judicial proceedings.

TO WHOM DOES IT APPLY?

The restriction applies not only to participants in the pending
case, i.e., to members of the bar and bench, and to litigants
and witnesses, but also to the public in general, which
necessarily includes the media.

WHAT IS THE LEGAL BASIS OF THE SUB JUDICE RULE?

Although the Rules of Court does not contain a specific
provision imposing the sub judice rule, it supports the
observance of the restriction by punishing its violation as
indirect contempt under Section 3(d) of Rule 71:
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and
hearing. x x x a person guilty of any of the following acts
may be punished for indirect contempt:
x x x x
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to
impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice[.]

WHAT IS THE USUAL DEFENSE OF PERSONS FACING CHARGES
FOR INDIRECT CONTEMPT FOR VIOLATION OF THE SUB JUDICE
RULE?
Persons facing charges for indirect contempt for violation of
the sub judice rule often invoke as defense their right to free
speech and claim that the citation for contempt constitutes a
form of impermissible subsequent punishment.

IS THIS A VALID DEFENSE?
We have long recognized in this jurisdiction that the freedom
of speech under Section 4, Article III of the Constitution is not
absolute. A very literal construction of the provision, as
espoused by US Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black,
[1][1]
may
lead to the disregard of other equally compelling
constitutional rights and principles. In Vicente v.
Majaducon,
[2][2]
this Court declared that *the freedom of
speech] needs on occasion to be adjusted to and
accommodated with the requirements of equally important
public interests such as the maintenance of the integrity of
courts and orderly functioning of the administration of
justice. Courts, both within and outside this jurisdiction,
have long grappled with the dilemma of balancing the publics
right to free speech and the governments duty to administer
fair and impartial justice. While the sub judice rule may be
considered as a curtailment of the right to free speech, it is
necessary to ensure the proper administration of justice and
the right of an accused to a fair trial.
[3][3]
Both these latter
concerns are equally paramount and cannot lightly be
disregarded.

IS THE SUB JUDICE RULE IMPOSED ON ALL FORMS OF SPEECH?
No. Only on publicized speech. The Constitution simply gives
the citizens the right to speech, not the right to unrestricted
publicized speech.

WHAT IS PUBLICIZED SPEECH?
Publicized speech should be understood to be limited to those
aired or printed in the various forms of media such as
television, radio, newspapers, magazines, and internet, and
excludes discussions, in public or in private, between and
among ordinary citizens.

IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS WHAT ARE PROHIBITED
PUBLICIZED SPEECH?
In so far as criminal proceedings are concerned, two classes of
publicized speech made during the pendency of the
proceedings can be considered as contemptuous:
first, comments on the merits of the case, and
second, intemperate and unreasonable comments on the
conduct of the courts with respect to the case.

WHAT IS MEANT BY COMMENTS ON THE MERITS OF THE
CASE?
Comments on the merits of the case may refer to the
credibility of witnesses, the character of the accused, the
soundness of the alibis offered, the relevance of the evidence
presented, and generally any other comment bearing on the
guilt or innocence of the accused.
[4][4]
The danger posed by
this class of speech is the undue influence it may directly exert
on the court in the resolution of the criminal case, or indirectly
through the public opinion it may generate against the
accused and the adverse impact this public opinion may have
during the trial. The significance of the sub judice rule is
highlighted in criminal cases, as the possibility of undue
influence prejudices the accuseds right to a fair trial. The
principal purpose of the sub judice rule is to preserve the
impartiality of the judicial system by protecting it from undue
influence.
[5][5]
Public opinion has no place in a criminal trial.
We ruled that
it is a traditional conviction of civilized society everywhere
that courts and juries, in the decision of issues of fact and law
should be immune from every extraneous influence; that facts
should be decided upon evidence produced in court; and that
the determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by
bias, prejudice or sympathies.
[6][6

WHAT IS MEANT BY COMMENT ON THE CONDUCT OF THE
COURTS WITH RESPECT TO THE CASE?
Comment on the conduct of the courts with respect to the
case becomes subject to a contempt proceeding when it is
intemperate, is contumacious, and unduly impairs upon the
dignity of the court. A comment that impairs of the dignity of
the court excites in the mind of the people a general
dissatisfaction with all judicial determinations, and indisposes
their minds to obey them*.+
[17][17]
If the speech tends to
undermine the confidence of the people in the honesty and
integrity of the court and its members, and lowers or degrades
the administration of justice, then the speech constitutes
contempt.
[18][18]
Unwarranted attacks on the dignity of the
courts cannot be disguised as free speech, for the exercise of
said right cannot be used to impair the independence and
efficiency of courts or public respect therefore and confidence
therein.
[19][19]
Without the sub judice rule and the contempt
power, the courts will be powerless to protect their integrity
and independence that are essential in the orderly and
effective dispensation and administration of justice.
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CYBER CRIME PREVENTION
ACT OF 2012 (BRIEF TITLE: DISINI ET AL. VS. DOJ)

DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, the Court DECLARES:

1. VOID for being UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

a. Section 4(c)(3) of Republic Act 10175 that penalizes posting
of unsolicited commercial communications;

b. Section 12 that authorizes the collection or recording of
traffic data in real-time; and

c. Section 19 of the same Act that authorizes the Department
of Justice to restrict or block access to suspected Computer
Data.

2. VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL:

a. Section 4(a)(1) that penalizes accessing a computer system
without right;

b. Section 4(a)(3) that penalizes data interference, including
transmission of viruses;

c. Section 4(a)(6) that penalizes cyber-squatting or acquiring
domain name over the internet in bad faith to the prejudice of
others;

d. Section 4(b)(3) that penalizes identity theft or the use or
misuse of identifying information belonging to another;

e. Section 4(c)(1) that penalizes cybersex or the lascivious
exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity for favor or
consideration;

f. Section 4(c)(2) that penalizes the production of child
pornography;

g. Section 6 that imposes penalties one degree higher when
crimes defined under the Revised Penal Code are committed
with the use of information and communications
technologies;

h. Section 8 that prescribes the penalties for cybercrimes;

i. Section 13 that permits law enforcement authorities to
require service providers to preserve traffic data and
subscriber information as well as specified content data for six
months;

j. Section 14 that authorizes the disclosure of computer data
under a court-issued warrant;

k. Section 15 that authorizes the search, seizure, and
examination of computer data under a court-issued warrant;

l. Section 17 that authorizes the destruction of previously
preserved computer data after the expiration of the
prescribed holding periods;

m. Section 20 that penalizes obstruction of justice in relation
to cybercrime investigations;

n. Section 24 that establishes a Cybercrime Investigation and
Coordinating Center (CICC);

o. Section 26(a) that defines the CICCs Powers and Functions;
and

p. Articles 353, 354, 361, and 362 of the Revised Penal Code
that penalizes libel.

Further, the Court DECLARES:

1. 1. Section 4(c)(4) that penalizes online libel as VALID and
CONSTITUTIONAL with respect to the original author of the
post; but VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL with respect to
others who simply receive the post and react to it; and

1. 2. Section 5 that penalizes aiding or abetting and attempt in
the commission of cybercrimes as VALID and
CONSTITUTIONAL only in relation to Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal
Access, Section 4(a)(2) on Illegal Interception, Section 4(a)(3)
on Data Interference, Section 4(a)(4) on System Interference,
Section 4(a)(5) on Misuse of Devices, Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-
squatting, Section 4(b)(1) on Computer-related Forgery,
Section 4(b)(2) on Computer-related Fraud, Section 4(b)(3) on
Computer-related Identity Theft, and Section 4(c)(1) on
Cybersex; but VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL with respect to
Sections 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography, 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited
Commercial Communications, and 4(c)(4) on online Libel.

Lastly, the Court RESOLVES to LEAVE THE DETERMINATION of
the correct application of Section 7 that authorizes
prosecution of the offender under both the Revised Penal
Code and Republic Act 10175 to actual cases, WITH THE
EXCEPTION of the crimes of:

1. Online libel as to which, charging the offender under both
Section 4(c)(4) of Republic Act 10175 and Article 353 of the
Revised Penal Code constitutes a violation of the proscription
against double jeopardy; as well as

1. 2. Child pornography committed online as to which,
charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(2) of Republic
Act 10175 and Republic Act 9775 or the Anti-Child
Pornography Act of 2009 also constitutes a violation of the
same proscription, and, in respect to these, is VOID and
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.