PEOPLE VS.

GAMER (totality of circumstances test in a police line-up)

In People v. Verzosa,
[36]
the Court enumerated factors to be considered, following
thetotality of circumstances test, in order to resolve the admissibility of an out-of-
court identification of suspects,viz:
"...(1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the
crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention at that time; (3) the
accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of
certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the
length of time between the crime and the identification; and (6) the
suggestiveness of the identification procedure."
EXECUTIVE IMPOUNDMENT
DEFINITION:
This refers to a refusal by the President, for whatever reason, to spend funds made
available by Congress. It is the failure to spend or obligate budget authority of any
type (Notes: Impoundment of Funds, 86 Harvard Law Review 1505 [1973]).
ARGUMENT AGAINST EXECUTIVE IMPOUNDMENT:
Those who deny to the President the power to impound argue that once Congress
has set aside the fund for a specific purpose in an appropriations act, it becomes
mandatory on the part of the President to implement the project and to spend the
money appropriated therefor. The President has no discretion on the matter, for the
Constitution imposes on him the duty to faithfully execute the laws.
ARGUMENT FOR EXECUTIVE IMPOUNDMENT:
Proponents of impoundment have invoked at least three principal sources of the
authority of the President. Foremost is the authority to impound given to him either
expressly or impliedly by Congress. Second is the executive power drawn from the
Presidents role as Commander-in-Chief. Third is the Faithful Execution Clause.
The proponents insist that a faithful execution of the laws requires that the
President desist from implementing the law if doing so would prejudice public
interest. An example given is when through efficient and prudent management of a
project, substantial savings are made. In such a case, it is sheer folly to expect the
President to spend the entire amount budgeted in the law (Notes: Presidential
Impoundmenti Constitutional Theories and Political Realities, 61 Georgetown Law
J ournal 1295 [1973]; Notes Protecting the Fisc: Executive Impoundment and
Congressional Power, 82 Yale Law J ournal 1686 [1973]).
Note: In the General Appropriations Act, impoundment of funds is not allowed
except if there will be anunmanageable national government budget deficit.
ATONG PAGLAUM CASE (NEW PARAMETERS IN PARTY-LIST)
G.R. No. 203766 Political Law Constitutional Law Legislative Department
Party-List System
This case partially abandoned the rulings inAng Bagong Bayani vs
COMELEC andBANAT vs COMELEC.
Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by the Commission on
Elections in the May 2013 party-list elections for various reasons but primarily for
not being qualified as representatives for marginalized or underrepresented sectors.
Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari against COMELEC alleging
grave abuse of discretion on the part of COMELEC in disqualifying them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
disqualifying the said party-lists.
HELD: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases
of Ang Bagong Bayani andBANAT. However, the Supreme Court remanded the
cases back to the COMELEC as the Supreme Court now provides for new
guidelines which abandoned some principles established in the two aforestated
cases. The new guidelines are as follows:
I. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the following
parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national
parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral
parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not
need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any
marginalized and underrepresented sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register
under the party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district
elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in
legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only through its
sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral
wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party
through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be marginalized and
underrepresented or lacking in well-defined political constituencies. It is
enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of
their sector. The sectors that are marginalized and underrepresented include
labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack well-defined
political constituencies include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
marginalized and underrepresented must belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of
sectoral parties or organizations that lack well-defined political constituencies
must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the marginalized and underrepresented, or that
represent those who lack well-defined political constituencies, either must
belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their
respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations
must be bona-fide membersof such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified
if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one
nominee who remains qualified.
II. In theBANAT case, major political parties are disallowed, as has always been
the practice, from participating in the party-list elections. But, since theres really
no constitutional prohibition nor a statutory prohibition, major political parties can
now participate in the party-list systemprovided that they do so through their
bona fide sectoral wing (see parameter 3 above).
Allowing major political parties to participate, albeit indirectly, in the party-list
elections will encouragethem to work assiduously in extending their
constituencies to the marginalized and underrepresented and to those who lack
well-defined political constituencies.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission when they were drafting the party-list system provision
of the Constitution. The Commissioners deliberated that it was their intention to
include all parties into the party-list elections in order to develop a political system
which is pluralistic and multiparty. (In theBANAT case, J ustice Puno emphasized
that the will of the people should defeat the intent of the framers; and that the
intent of the people, in ratifying the 1987 Constitution, is that the party-list system
should be reserved for the marginalized sectors.)
III. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list system is NOT
RESERVED for the marginalized and underrepresented or for parties who lack
well-defined political constituencies. It is also for national or regional parties. It
is also for small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack well-defined
political constituencies. The common denominator however is that all of them
cannot, they do not have the machinery unlike major political parties, to field or
sponsor candidates in the legislative districts but they can acquire the needed votes
in a national election system like the party-list system of elections.
If the party-list system is only reserved for marginalizedrepresentation, then the
system itself unduly excludes other cause-oriented groups from running for a seat
in the lower house.
As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list representationshould not be
understood to include onlylabor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors
that by their nature areeconomically at the margins of society. It should be noted
that Section 5 of Republic Act 7941 includes, among others, in its provision for
sectoral representation groups of professionals, which are not per se economically
marginalized but are still qualified as marginalized, underrepresented, and do not
havewell-defined political constituencies as they areideologically marginalized.
OPERATIVE FACT DOCTRINE
Under the operative fact doctrine, the law is recognized as unconstitutional but the
effects of the unconstitutional law, prior to its declaration of nullity, may be left
undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play. In fact, the invocation of the
operative fact doctrine is an admission that the law is unconstitutional.
The "operative fact" doctrine realizes that in declaring a law or rule null and void,
undue harshness and resulting unfairness must be avoided.
[3]
In a labor case
involving the computation of holiday pay, the court held that it is "now almost the
end of 1991 . . and [t]o require various companies to reach back to 1975 now and
nullify acts done in good faith is unduly harsh.
Under the general rule, a void law or an administrative act cannot be the source of
legal rights or duties. However, the doctrine of operative fact is an exception to the
general rule. Under the doctrine, a judicial declaration of invalidity may not
necessarily eliminate all the effects and consequences of a void act prior to such
declaration.
Prior to the declaration of nullity, such challenged legislative or executive act must
have been in force and had to be complied with as they were presumed to be valid.
Only the courts can declare a law invalid, and without such declaration, taxpayers
would have had no other choice but to follow the existing rules or in this case the
practice of filing the judicial claim within the two-year period.
DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED POLITICAL AGENCY
CARPIO VS EXEC SEC
In 1990, Republic Act No. 6975 entitled AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE UNDER A REORGANIZED
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES was passed. Antonio Carpio, as a member of the bar
and a defender of the Constitution, assailed the constitutionality of the said law as
he averredthat it only interferes with the control power of the president.
He advances the view that RA 6975 weakened the National Police Commission
(NAPOLCOM) by limiting its power to administrative control over the PNP
thus, control remained with the Department Secretary under whom both the NPC
and the PNP were placed; that the system of letting local executives choose local
police heads also undermine the power of the president.
ISSUE: Whether or not the president abdicated its control power over the PNP and
NPC by virtue of RA 6975.
HELD: No. The President has control of all executive departments, bureaus, and
offices. This presidential power of control over the executive branch of
government extends over all executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the
lowliest clerk. Equally well accepted, as a corollary rule to the control powers of
the President, is the Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency. As the President
cannot be expected to exercise his control powers all at the same time and in
person, he will have to delegate some of them to his Cabinet members.
Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all
executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive
Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and
agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is
required by the Constitution or law to act in person on the exigencies of the
situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the
executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments,
performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the
Chief Executive.
Thus, and in short, the Presidents power of control is directly exercised by him
over the members of the Cabinet who, in turn, and by his authority, control the
bureaus and other offices under their respective jurisdictions in the executive
department.
Additionally, the circumstance that the NAPOLCOM and the PNP are placed
under the reorganized DILG is merely an administrative realignment that would
bolster a system of coordination and cooperation among the citizenry, local
executives and the integrated law enforcement agencies and public safety agencies
created under the assailed Act, the funding of the PNP being in large part
subsidized by the national government.
Under the doctrine of qualified political agency, department secretaries are alter
egos or assistants of the President and their acts are presumed to be those of the
latter unless disapproved or reprobated by him.
14
Thus, as a rule, an aggrieved
party affected by the decision of a cabinet secretary need not appeal to the OP and
may file a petition for certiorari directly in the Court of Appeals assailing the act of
the said secretary.
15
Section 1 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that, for a petition for certiorari
to prosper, petitioner must show (1) the public respondent acted without or in
excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction and (2) there is no appeal or a plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.
SENATE VS ERMITA
495 SCRA 170 Political Law Constitutional Law Legislative Branch
Question Hour Constitutionality of E.O. 464
In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North Rail Project as
well as the Garci tapes surfaced. This prompted the Senate to conduct a public
hearing to investigate the said anomalies particularly the alleged overpricing in the
NRP. Theinvestigating Senate committee issued invitations to certain department
heads and military officials to speak before the committee as resource persons.
Ermita submitted that he and some of the department heads cannot attend the said
hearing due to pressing matters that need immediate attention. AFP Chief of Staff
Senga likewise sent a similar letter. Drilon, the senate president, excepted the said
requests for they were sent belatedly and arrangements were already made and
scheduled. Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464 which took effect immediately.
EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of executive
departments who in the judgment of the department heads are covered by the
executive privilege; Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are
covered by the executive privilege; Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with
rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the judgment
of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege; Senior national
security officials who in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered
by the executive privilege; and Such other officers as may be determined by the
President, from appearing in such hearings conducted by Congress without first
securing the presidents approval.
The department heads and the military officers who were invited by the Senate
committee then invoked EO 464 to except themselves. Despite EO 464, the
scheduled hearing proceeded with only 2 military personnel attending. For defying
President Arroyos order barring military personnel from testifying before
legislative inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan
were relieved from their military posts and were made to face court martial
proceedings. EO 464s constitutionality was assailed for it is alleged that it
infringes on the rights and duties of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of
legislation and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 464 is constitutional.
HELD: The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. To determine the
validity of the provisions of EO 464, the SC sought to distinguish Section 21 from
Section 22 of Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution. The Congress power of inquiry is
expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution. Although
there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of
Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it
may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so
far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power
of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to
the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in
the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is
intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess
the requisite information which is not infrequently true recourse must be had to
others who do possess it.
Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question Hour. The Question Hour is
closely related with the legislative power, and it is precisely as a complement to or
a supplement of the Legislative Inquiry. The appearance of the members of
Cabinet would be very, very essential not only in the application of check and
balance but also, in effect, in aid of legislation. Section 22 refers only to Question
Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation,
under which anybody for that matter, may be summoned and if he refuses, he can
be held in contempt of the House. A distinction was thus made between inquiries
in aid of legislation and the question hour. While attendance was meant to be
discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of
legislation. Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary
to each other, should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of
Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for
legislation, while the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the
objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress oversight
function. Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of
executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their
basis in the principle of separation of powers.
While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot
frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands
for information. When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for
department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege.
They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one
executive official may be exempted from this power the President on whom
executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the
power of impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of the
executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government
which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom. The requirement then to secure
presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the
question hour, is valid on its face. For under Section 22, Article VI of the
Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the question hour is
discretionary on their part. Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of
department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such
instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry,
unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President
herself or by the Executive Secretary.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are
implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as
imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department
heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such
instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that
Congress may onlyrequest their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in
which Congress requires their appearance is in aid of legislation under Section
21, the appearance ismandatory for the same reasons stated inArnault.
NOTES: The SC ruled that Section 1 and Section 2a are valid. The rest
invalid.
On March 6, 2008, President Arroyo issued Memorandum Circular No. 151,
revoking Executive Order No. 464 and Memorandum Circular No. 108. She
advised executive officials and employees to follow and abide by the Constitution,
existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate v.
Ermita when they are invited to legislative inquiriesin aid of legislation.
ARAULLO VS AQUINO III
Political Law Constitutional Law Separation of Powers Fund
Realignment Constitutionality of the Disbursement Acceleration Program
Power of the Purse Executive Impoundment
When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the
sluggish growth of the economy. The World Bank advised that the economy
needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary Florencio Butch Abad then came up
with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP).
The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects.
DAP enables the Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects to priority
projects instead of waiting for next years appropriation. So what happens under
the DAP was that if a certain government project is being undertaken slowly by a
certain executive agency, the funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the
Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are declared as savings by the
Executive and said funds will then be reallotted to other priority projects. The
DAP program did work to stimulate the economy as economic growth was in fact
reported and portion of such growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted by the
Supreme Court).
Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General
Appropriations Act (GAA). Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriations made
by Congress in the GAA.
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator J inggoy Estrada made an expos claiming
that he, and other Senators, received Php50M from the President as an incentive
for voting in favor of the impeachment of then Chief J ustice Renato Corona.
Secretary Abad claimedthat the money was taken from the DAP but was disbursed
upon the request of the Senators.
This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not only
realign funds within the Executive. It turns out that some non-Executive projects
were also funded; to name a few: Php1.5B for the CPLA (Cordillera Peoples
Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front),
P700M for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M for certain Senators each, P10B for
Relocation Projects, etc.
This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of theBagong Alyansang
Makabayan, and several other concerned citizens to file various petitions with the
Supreme Court questioning the validity of the DAP. Among their contentions was:
DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides
that no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law.
Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly the GAA
(savings and augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the
Constitution (power of the President to augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive
Order 292 (power of the President to suspend expenditures and authority to use
savings, respectively).
Issues:
I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle no money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law (Sec. 29(1), Art.
VI, Constitution).
II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments by
the executive.
III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.
IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is
constitutional.
V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.
HELD:
I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was
merely a program by the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is
a program for prioritizing government spending. As such, it did not violate the
Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP
no additional funds were withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise, an appropriation
made by law would have been required. Funds, which were already appropriated
for by the GAA, were merely being realigned via the DAP.
II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds
refers to the Presidents power to refuse to spend appropriations or to retain
or deduct appropriations for whatever reason. Impoundment is actually
prohibited by the GAA unless there will be an unmanageable national government
budget deficit (which did not happen). Nevertheless, theres no impoundment in
the case at bar because whats involved in the DAP was the transfer of funds.
III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that
the President (and even the heads of the other branches of the government) are
allowed by the Constitution to make realignment of funds, however, such transfer
or realignment should only be made within their respective offices. Thus, no
cross-border transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the DAP, this was
violated because funds appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were being
transferred to the Legislative and other non-Executive agencies.
Further, transfers within their respective offices also contemplate realignment of
funds to an existing project in the GAA. Under the DAP, even though some
projects were within the Executive, these projects are non-existent insofar as the
GAA is concerned because no funds were appropriated to them in the GAA.
Although some of these projects may be legitimate, they are still non-existent
under the GAA because they were not provided for by the GAA. As such, transfer
to such projects is unconstitutional and is without legal basis.
On the issue of what are savings
These DAP transfers are not savings contrary to what was being declared by the
Executive. Under the definition of savings in the GAA, savings only occur,
among other instances, when there is an excess in the funding of a certain project
once it is completed, finally discontinued, or finally abandoned. The GAA does not
refer to savings as funds withdrawn from a slow moving project. Thus, since the
statutory definition of savings was not complied with under the DAP, there is no
basis at all for the transfers. Further, savings should only be declared at the end of
the fiscal year. But under the DAP, funds are already being withdrawn from certain
projects in the middle of the year and then being declared as savings by the
Executive particularly by the DBM.
IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source for
the DAP because under the law, such funds may only be used if there is a
certification from the National Treasurer to the effect that the revenue collections
have exceeded the revenue targets. In this case, no such certification was secured
before unprogrammed funds were used.
V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of an
act prior to it being declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is
applicable. The DAP has definitely helped stimulate the economy. It has funded
numerous projects. If the Executive is ordered to reverse all actions under the
DAP, then it may cause more harm than good. The DAP effects can no longer be
undone. The beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to return what they received
especially so that they relied on the validity of the DAP. However, the Doctrine of
Operative Fact may not be applicable to the authors, implementers, and proponents
of the DAP if it is so found in the appropriate tribunals (civil, criminal, or
administrative) that they have not acted in good faith.
ENROLLED BILL
78 Phil. 1 Political Law Journal Adoption of the Enrolled Bill Theory
Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The three senators were
suspended by senate due to election irregularities. The 8 representatives were not
allowed to take their seat in the lower House except in the election of the House
Speaker. They argued that some senators and House Reps were not considered in
determining the required vote (of each house) in order to pass the Resolution
(proposing amendments to the Constitution) which has been considered as an
enrolled bill by then. At the same time, the votes were already entered into the
J ournals of the respective House. As a result, the Resolution was passed but it
could have been otherwise were they allowed to vote. If these members of
Congress had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed
amendment would have been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either
branch of Congress. Petitioners filed or the prohibition of the furtherance of the
said resolution amending the constitution. Respondents argued that the SC cannot
take cognizance of the case because the Court is bound by the conclusiveness of
the enrolled bill or resolution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can take cognizance of the issue at bar. Whether
or not the said resolution was duly enacted by Congress.
HELD: As far as looking into the J ournals is concerned, even if both the journals
from each House and an authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the
disposal of the issue by the Court on the basis of the journals does not imply
rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as already stated, the due enactment of a
law may be proved in either of the two ways specified in section 313 of Act No.
190 as amended. The SC found in the journals no signs of irregularity in the
passage of the law and did not bother itself with considering the effects of an
authenticated copy if one had been introduced. It did not do what the opponents of
the rule of conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into the journals behind the
enrolled copy in order to determine the correctness of the latter, and rule such copy
out if the two, the journals and the copy, be found in conflict with each other. No
discrepancy appears to have been noted between the two documents and the court
did not say or so much as give to understand that if discrepancy existed it would
give greater weight to the journals, disregarding the explicit provision that duly
certified copies shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the
due enactment thereof.
**Enrolled Bill that which has been duly introduced, finally passed by both
houses, signed by the proper officers of each, approved by the president and filed
by the secretary of state.
Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190), as amended by Act No.
2210, provides: Official documents may be proved as follows: . . . (2) the
proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any legislatives body that may be
provided for in the Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of those
bodies or of either house thereof, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by
copies certified by the clerk of secretary, or printed by their order; Provided, That
in the case of Acts of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature,
when there is an existence of a copy signed by the presiding officers and
secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such
Acts and of the due enactment thereof.
The SC is bound by the contents of a duly authenticated resolution (enrolled
bill) by the legislature. In case of conflict, the contents of an enrolled bill shall
prevail over those of the journals.