G.R. No.

97169 May 10, 1993

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. TEOFILO KEMPIS, accused-appellant.

FACTS:
Teofilo Kempis, then member of the Phil Constabulary (PC) was initially charged with two counts of
murder for the stabbing of Antonio Miraflor and the shooting of Lolito Rivero.
In preparation for a general court martial proceedings, Sgt Samuel Rosales conducted an
investigation. In his Investigation Report to the Regional Inspector General, Sgt. Rosales
recommended that the case be referred to the Regional Judge Advocate for the latters opinion.
In convicting the accused, the trial court relied on the prosecutions version. It was alleged that at
about 3PM of September 15, 1988, Lolito Rivera was at his house. He had just butchered a pig and
was cooking lunch for his guests. Suddenly, appellant Kempis and a companion Wilfredo Bautista
arrived at the yard of Riveras house on a board a motorcycle both armed with armalite rifles.
Appellant directed Rivera to board the motorcycle, and when he refused, appellant successively fired
his armalite rifle at Rivera hitting the latters arm, chest and mouth.
On the other hand, the accuseds version discloses that the incident in question actually occurred on
September 16, 1988 not on September 15, 1988 as testified by Antonio Varona and as allegedly
borne out by Exhibit 1.

ISSUE: W/N the trial court erred when it took into account the portions of the Investigation Report in the
formulation of its conclusions when only a portion thereof was offered in evidence.

HELD: YES
We, of course, agree with the accused that since only a portion thereof, Exhibit "1", was offered in evidence,
the trial court should not have taken the rest into account in the formulation of its conclusions. Section 17,
Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 17. When part of transaction, writing of record given in evidence, the remainder
admissible. When part of an act, declaration, conversation, writing or record is given in
evidence by one party, the whole of the same subject may be inquired into by the other, and
when a detached act, declaration, conversation, writing or record is given in evidence, any
other act, declaration, conversation, writing or record necessary to its understanding may
also be given in evidence. (11a)
Thus, in order that the rest of the Investigation Report may have been considered by the trial court, the
prosecution should have offered the same in evidence or moved that the entire document be received in
evidence. It bears stressing at this point that the Report attached to the records of Criminal Case No. 841 is
only an uncertified plain copy which is actually annexed to an Order of the Provincial Prosecutor dated 31
March 1989. This Order was not identified or offered in evidence. How it found its way into the records of the
case was never explained. Hence, the trial court cannot even take judicial notice thereof. Nevertheless, stated
above, this error was of no consequence.


G.R. No. 75584 October 19, 1992
VICENTE PALO-PALO, petitioner,
vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ZOSIMA TAO and JUSTIN TAO, ABRAHAM PALALON and
AGRIPINA GADIANE, respondents.

FACTS:
In a complaint filed, petitioner Vicente Palo-palo sought to be allowed to exercise the right of
redemption or pre-emption granted to a tenant under RA 3844, as amended by RA 6389, over a
certain landholding. Situated in Negros Oriental.
The complaint alleged that petitioner started his tenancy over the landholding in 1949 when the
property was still owned by Zacarias Palacain; that the property was sold in 1965 to the spouses
Juston and Zosima Tano who recognized petitioners tenancy and continued with the arrangement of
sharing the harvest from the landholding; that the spouses Tano sold the property sometime in
October 1978 to herein respondent Abraham Palalon and Agripina Gadiane, who at first allowed
petitioner to cultivate the area until May 25, 1979, at which they plowed the farmholding and planted
it to corn, thus effectively dispossessing petitioner of the landholding.
RTC found in favor of respondent, declaring that the petitioner cannot avail himself of the right of
pre-emption of a tenant because he is not a tenant of the property. The finding was solely premised
on the ground that petitioner, as did respondents, offered in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale of
the property in favour of Palalon and Gadiane for which reason, so the trial court ruled, petitioner is
bound by the statement in said deed that the property is not tenanted.
Upon appeal, IAC affirmed the decision of the RTC re-echoing its resolution that petitioner is bound
by the statement in the deed of sale that the property is not tenanted.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: W/N the petitioner is bound by the statement in the deed of sale that the property is not tenanted.

HELD: NO

It is true that petitioner introduced the deed of sale whereby the spouses Tao sold the property to Abraham
Palalon and Agripina Gadiane, but this was done solely for the purpose of proving the fact of conveyance of
the landholding. This is clear from petitioner's "Memorandum of Exhibits and Offer of Evidence" where he
declared that he was submitting the deed of sale as his Exhibit "B" to show

. . . The transfer of the tenanted (emphasis supplied) land from the spouses Zocima Palacain
Tao and Juston Tao to the spouses Abraham Palalon and Agripina Gadiane for the
consideration of P1,850.00 which fact of conveyance entitled the plaintiff to exercise the right
of redemption. (p. 108, Original Record.)

Verily petitioner had to show the fact of transfer of the landholding, this being an essential requisite before he
can claim the right of pre-emption or redemption. And surely, petitioner cannot be bound by the statement
in the document to the effect that the property is not tenanted, for petitioner was not a party nor a
signatory in the transaction and the deed.