RUPERTA CANO VDA.

DE VIRAY and JESUS CARLO GERARD VIRAY vs SPOUSES

JOSE USI and AMELITA USI
G.R. No. 192486, November 21, 2012 (Nalisod kog connect sa topic. Kani ra gyuy
makaya. Peace. )
Facts: This case involves Lot 733 located in Brgy. Bebe Anac, Masantol, Pampanga
registered under the name of Ellen Mendoza married to Moses Mendoza.
* That on April 28, 1986, Geodetic Eng. Fajardo prepared a subdivision plan
(Fajardo plan) which was divided the said lot into six smaller parcels designated
as:
Lot 733-A,
Lot 733-B,
Lot 733-C,
Lot 733-D,
Lot 733-E, and
Lot 733-F.
* Mendoza executed 2 separate deed of sale:
1. Transferring lot 733-F to Jesus Viray (survived by Vda. De Viray herein
petitioner)
2. Transferring lot 733-A to Spouses Viray
* That time, the said Fajardo plan has not been officially approved by the Land
Management Bureau. Jesus Viray (survived by Vda. De Viray) and Spouses Viray
as purchasers did not annotate the conveying deed of sale.
* The aforementioned conveyances notwithstanding, Mendoza, Emerenciana M.
Vda. de Mallari (Vda. deMallari) and respondent spouses Jose Usi and Amelita T.
Usi (Sps. Usi or the Usis), as purported co-owners of Lot 733, executed a
Subdivision Agreement. Pursuant to this agreement which adopted, as base of
reference, the Land Management Bureau - approved subdivision plan prepared
by Geodetic Engineer Alfeo S. Galang (Galang Plan), Lot 733 was subdivided into
three lots: (take note dili ni same sa pagkadivide sa first)
1. Lot 733-A to Vda. Mallari
2. Lot 733-B to Spouses Usi
3. Lot 733-C to Ellen Mendoza
* As a result, there were overlapping transactions involving same property or
portions thereof which spawned to several suits and counter suits.
* In sum, of the six (6) cases filed. One of which is a forcible entry case which was
filed by late Jesus Viray against Spouses Usi and which was decided by the RTC in
favor of Viray wherein the court ordered the spouses to vacate the premises. The
spouses did not opt to appeal. On the other hand, an accion publiciana and/or
accion reivindicatoria was maintained by spouses Usi in order to seek for the
recovery of their possession to the subject property.
Issue (among others) : Whether or not the action by the respondents will
prosper.
Held: No because the action is barred by res judicata.
Notably, the Sps. Viray and Vda. de Viray, after peremptorily prevailing in their
cases supportive of their claim of ownership and possession of Lots 733-A and
733-F (Fajardo Plan), cannot now be deprived of their rights by the expediency of
the Sps. Usi maintaining, as here, an accion publiciana and/or accion
reivindicatoria, two of the three kinds of actions to recover possession of real
property. The third, accion interdictal, comprises two distinct causes of action,
namely forcible entry and unlawful detainer, the issue in both cases being limited
to the right to physical possession or possession de facto, independently of any
claim of ownership that either party may set forth in his or her pleadings, albeit
the court has the competence to delve into and resolve the issue of ownership
but only to address the issue of priority of possession. Both actions must be
brought within one year from the date of actual entry on the land, in case of
forcible entry, and from the date of last demand to vacate following the
expiration of the right to possess, in case of unlawful detainer. When the
dispossession or unlawful deprivation has lasted more than one year, one may
avail himself of accion publiciana to determine the better right of possession, or
possession de jure, of realty independently of title. On the other hand, accion
reivindicatoria is an action to recover ownership which necessarily includes
recovery of possession.
Now then, it is a hornbook rule that once a judgment becomes final and
executory, it may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is
meant to correct an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of
whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by
the highest court of the land, as what remains to be done is the purely ministerial
enforcement or execution of the judgment. Any attempt to reopen a close case
would offend the principle of res judicata.
The better right to possess and the right of ownership of Vda. de Viray (vice Jose
Viray) and the Sps. Viray over the disputed parcels of land cannot, by force of the
res judicata doctrine, be re-litigated thru actions to recover possession and
vindicate ownership filed by the Sps. Usi. The Court, in G.R. No. 122287 (Ellen P.
Mendoza and Jose and Amelita Usi v. Spouses Avelino Viray and Margarita
Masangcay and Jesus Carlo Gerard Viray), has in effect determined that the
conveyances and necessarily the transfers of ownership made to the Sps. Viray
and Vda. de Viray (vice Jose Viray) on April 29, 1986 were valid. This
determination operates as a bar to the Usis reivindicatory action to assail the
April 29, 1986 conveyances and precludes the relitigation between the same
parties of the settled issue of ownership and possession arising from ownership.



[G.R. No. 184253 : July 06, 2011]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH THE PHILIPPINE NAVY,
REPRESENTED BY CAPT. RUFO R. VILLANUEVA, SUBSTITUTED BY CAPT.
PANCRACIO O. ALFONSO, AND NOW BY CAPT. BENEDICTO G. SANCEDA PN,
PETITIONER
VS.
CPO MAGDALENO PERALTA PN (RET.), CPO ROMEO ESTALLO PN (RET.), CPO
ERNESTO RAQUION PN (RET.), MSGT SALVADOR RAGAS PM (RET.), MSGT
DOMINGO MALACAT PM (RET.), MSGT CONSTANTINO CANONIGO PM (RET.),
AND AMELIA MANGUBAT, RESPONDENTS. MSGT ALFREDO BANTOG PM (RET.),
MSGT RODOLFO VELASCO PM (RET.), AND NAVY ENLISTEDMEN HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION, INC., RESPONDENT-INTERVENORS
Respondents and Intervenors were awarded military quarters at the MEQ
(Military Enlisted Quarters) located inside the BNS (Bonifacio Naval Station) while
still in the active service.
Respondents and Intervenors entered into contracts of lease with the BNS
Commander for their occupation.
NEHAI (Navy Enlisted Homeowner's Association, Inc.) is composed of the
members of the Phil. Navy and Marines occupying the BNS Quarters.
Respondents and Intervenors continued to occupy their assigned quarters
even after their retirement.
March 1996: The BNS Commander, through letters, advised respondents
Estallo, Raquion and Raagas to vacate their respective quarters
NEHAI's counsel replied and informed the BNS Commander of their pending
Petition for a Declaratory Relief (in February 1996) and asked that the eviction be
deferred until the court has rendered a decision --- BNS Commander denied this.
Respondent filed a Complaint for Injunction with a prayer for the issuance of
Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order against the Phil. Navy
to forestall their ejectment.
Intervenors Bantog and Velasco joined respondents' cause.
NEHAI also acted as a representative of its members who have legal interest in
the subject matter.
Trial Court:
- Granted the Preliminary Injunction
- Held that BNS Commander cannot forcibly evict respondents without any court
order pursuant to RA 7279
- Added that the proper recourse of the BNS Commander was to file a complaint
for Unlawful Detainer against them
Court of Appeals:
- Affirmed the RTC
- Procedural due process dictates that petitioner resort to judicial processes to
question their right to occupy the leased quarters
- Ejectment suit is necessary to resolve the issue
Petitioner's Argument:
- Judicial action is not necessary to evict respondents and intervenors from the
leased military quarters because their contracts of lease have long expired and it
authorized petitioner to extrajudicially take over possession of the leased military
quarters after the expiration of their contracts [after retirement].
- Contractual stipulations must be respected being the law between the parties
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner has to file an ejectment suit before it may evict
respondents and intervenors
Held: NO
The occupancy by respondents and intervenors of the military quarters is
covered by contracts of lease
Since respondents and intervenors agreed to abide by the foregoing
regulations of the military facility, judicial action is no longer necessary to evict
respondents and intervenors from the military quarters. Respondents and
intervenors authorized petitioner to extrajudicially take over the possession of
the leased military housing quarters after their retirement.
- This is also in line with the policy of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
Philippine Navy to provide military quarters for the exclusive use of military
personnel who are in the active service.
BASIS:
One of these regulations is PN Housing Administration, which provides the
following rules:
6. Tenancy
x x x
g. The awardee shall be allowed to occupy military quarters until his retirement,
separation, reversion or discharge from the active service or unless sooner
terminated for cause or other authorized purposes. The termination of
occupancy shall be made in writing and with appropriate termination orders in
accordance with sub para 8 below.
h. Thirty (30) days before retirement/separation/reversion/discharge from the
service of the occupant, the Post Commander shall inform the occupant in a
formal letter that the quarters assigned to him shall be vacated immediately
upon retirement/separation. For valid reasons, a written request for extension,
not to exceed sixty (60) days, may be granted by PNHB upon the
recommendation of the Post/Station Commander. Positional Quarters shall be
vacated immediately upon relief from position.
x x x
l. Forcible eviction shall be instituted against military personnel who have
violated this Circular, Post regulations, conditions of the contract, shown
undesirable habits and traits of character, or have become security risks.[26]
There is also Standing Operation Procedure No. 6 regarding the forcible eviction
of tenants/occupants from military quarters which provides:
III. POLICIES:
x x x
b. Occupants of such quarters/similar structures/housing facilities shall, upon
their retirement, discharge and/or separation from the service, cease to be
entitled to the privilege of occupying such dwelling. They must, therefore, vacate
them within sixty (60) calendar days from the effective date of their retirement,
discharge and/or separation.
x x x
e. Occupants/tenants covered by paras b, c and/or d hereof who refuse to vacate
their quarters/similar structures/housing facilities shall be summarily forcibly
evicted.
IV. PROCEDURES:
x x x
d. Upon determination by the Executive committee that there is a ground for the
summary/forcible eviction of a tenant/occupant, the Committee, thru its
Chairman, will notify in writing the tenant/occupant concerned about the
violation. Said letter will be personally delivered by the Deputy TPMG and/or his
authorized representative to the concerned tenant/occupant.
e. If no positive action is taken by the tenant/occupant concerned to voluntarily
vacate the quarters within seven (7) days from receipt of the notice, the
Committee shall then summon the Post Engineer and Post MP to execute the
forcible eviction. (Emphasis supplied)
Republic of the Philippines, through the Philippine Navy, may extrajudicially
evict respondents from their military quarters



9. LARANO VS. CALENDACION
FACTS: Petitioner owns a parcel of Riceland. She executed a Contract to Sell in
favor of the respondents. Pending full payment of the purchase price, possession
of subject riceland was transferred to respondents subject to accounting and
delivery of the harvest to petitioner. Respondents failed to pay the installments
and to account for and deliver the harvest. Hence, petitioner sent respondents a
demand letter to vacate the riceland w/in 10 days from receipt thereof, but as her
demand went unheeded, she filed a complaint against respondents for unlawful
detainer before the MTC.
I: W/N the complaint is one for unlawful detainer.
H: No. Petitioner, as vendor, must comply with 2 requisites for the purpose of
bringing an ejectment suit: (a) there must be failure to pay the installment due or
comply with the conditions of the Contract to Sell; and (b) there must be demand
both to pay or to comply and vacate within the periods specified in Section 2 of
Rule 70, namely: 15 days in case of land and 5 days in case of buildings.
Both demands to pay installment due or adhere to the terms of the Contract to
Sell and to vacate are necessary to make the vendee deforciant in order that an
ejectment suit may be filed.
Thus, mere failure to pay the installment due or violation of the terms of the
Contract to Sell does not automatically render a person's possession unlawful.
Furthermore, the giving of such demand must be alleged in the complaint;
otherwise, the MTC cannot acquire jurisdiction over the case.
The court ruled that the allegations in the Complaint failed to constitute a case of
unlawful detainer. What is clear is that in the Complaint, petitioner alleged that
respondents had violated the terms of the Contract to Sell. However, the
Complaint failed to state that petitioner made demands upon respondents to
comply with the conditions of the contract the payment of the installments and
the accounting and delivery of the harvests from the subject riceland. The 10-day
period granted respondents to vacate even fell short of the 15-day period
mandated by law. When the complaint does not satisfy the jurisdictional
requirements of a valid cause for unlawful detainer, the MTC does not have
jurisdiction to hear the case.







MARGARITO SARONA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. FELIPE VILLEGAS and
RAMONA CARILLO, defendants-appellees.
FACTS:
Plaintiffs lodged with the Municipal Court of Padada, Davao, against defendants
as complaint, styled "Unlawful Detainer." They there aver that they are the
absolute owners and in possession of a parcel of land in Paligue, Padada.
That on April 1, 1958, defendants entered upon said land Lot "F" constructed their
residential house thereon and up to date remain in possession thereof,
unlawfully withholding the possession of the same from the plaintiffs. That the
reasonable rental for said Lot is P20.00 per month. That on December 28, 1962,
plaintiffs demanded of defendants to vacate the premises and to pay the rentals
in arrears but then defendants failed to do so; that defendants' possession thus
became clearly unlawful after said demand.
They asked that they be restored into possession, and that defendants be made
to pay rents, attorneys' fees, expenses of litigation, and costs.
Defendants met the complaint with a motion to dismiss on the sole ground of
lack of jurisdiction of the municipal court. They say that the case is one of forcible
entry, and the reglementary one-year period had elapsed before suit was started.
ISSUE:
Whether the present is a case of forcible entry or one of unlawful detainer.
HELD:
It is then too plain for argument that defendants entered the land on April 1, 1958
without plaintiffs' consent and permission; that plaintiff Margarito Sarona
"requested the defendants not to place the said house in the litigated area but
the defendants refused."
The findings of the municipal court itself may not be downgraded in the present
case. And this, for the reason that the complaint did not specifically state the
manner of entry of defendants into the land legal or illegal. Since the parties
went to trial on the merits, and it came to light that defendants' entry was illegal
at the inception, the municipal court should have dismissed the case. That court
cannot close its eyes to the truth revealed by plaintiffs' own evidence before it. A
court of limited jurisdiction, said municipal court, should not have proceeded to
render an on-the-merits judgment thereon.
Clearly, plaintiffs' case fits in the jurisprudential precept of forcible entry.
Because the entry is forcible. Long had it been made evident that in forcible entry
cases, no force is really necessary
In order to constitute the use of "force," as contemplated in this provision, the
trespasser does not have to institute a state of war. Nor is it even necessary that
he should use violence against the person of the party in possession. The act of
going on the property and excluding the lawful possessor therefrom necessarily
implies the exertion of force over the property, and this is all that is necessary.
Under the statute entering upon the premises by strategy or stealth is equally an
obnoxious as entering by force. The foundation of the action is really the forcible
exclusion of the original possessor by a person who has entered without right.
The words "by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth" include every
situation or condition under which one person can wrongfully enter upon real
property and exclude another, who has had prior possession, therefrom. If a
trespasser enters upon land in open daylight, under the very eyes of the person
already clothed with lawful possession, but without the consent of the latter, and
there plants himself and excludes such prior possessor from the property, the
action of forcible entry and detainer can unquestionably be maintained, even
though no force is used by the trespasser other than such as is necessarily
implied from the mere acts of planting himself on the ground and excluding the
other party.



[G.R. No. 127850. January 26, 1998]
MARIA ARCAL, et al. vs. COURT OF APPEALS
KAPUNAN, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a complaint for unlawful detainer before the MTC of Tanza, Cavite
against private respondents as defendants. Subject of the complaint was a 21,435
square meter parcel of land in Sta. Cruz de Malabon Estate Subdivision, Cavite
with title in the names of Maria, Josefina, Marciana and Marcelina Arcal. It was
alleged that defendants occupied the subject land thru plaintiffs implied
tolerance, or permission but without contract with plaintiffs. From the dates of
their occupancy, plaintiffs did not collect any single centavo from defendants,
nor the latter pay to plaintiffs any rental for their occupancy therein;
Meanwhile, Lucio Arvisu and substantially all defendants filed with RTC of Cavite,
a civil case for Annulment of Title, with Reconveyance and Damages against
Salud Arcal Arbolante, Marcelina Arcal (deseased), Maria Arcal, Josefina Arcal
and Marciana Arcal. The said complaint was ordered to be dismissed by the trial
court for failure to prosecute. An appeal was made to the Court and said appeal
was considered abandoned and dismissed.
With regard to the ejectment suit filed by plaintiffs, except Virgilio Arcal, MTC
rendered a favorable judgment in favor of plaintiffs ordering defendants among
others, to vacate the property in question and remove residential houses and
improvements introduced therein and return the possession thereof to plaintiffs.
On appeal with the RTC by defendants, the foregoing decision was reversed and
set aside, and the said complaint for ejectment was dismissed without prejudice
to the filing of the proper action after the prejudicial question is resolved in a fair
and adversary proceeding.
Several demands were made by plaintiffs for defendants to vacate the premises
in question, but they proved futile as they refused and failed, and still refuse and
fail to vacate the premises, to the damage and prejudice of plaintiffs.
Private respondents failed to file their answer, prompting petitioners to file a
motion to render judgment. MTC held that petitioners are registered owners of
the property and as much they have the right to enjoy possession thereof. On
appeal, RTC affirmed in toto the MTC's decision.
Private respondents filed a petition for review with CA. CA, ruled in favor of the
private respondents.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the complaint filed does not constitute an unlawful detainer suit.
(NO)
HELD:
CA made the conclusion that from the allegations in the complaint, it can be
gleaned that private respondents did not actually occupy the subject property
upon the tolerance of petitioners, as tolerance was withdrawn when demands
to vacate were made on private respondents prior to the commencement of the
ejectment case; therefore, unlawful detainer is not the proper remedy. The SC
disagreed with CA.
The rule is that possession by tolerance is lawful, but such possession becomes
unlawful upon demand to vacate made by the owner and the possessor by
tolerance refuses to comply with such demand. A person who occupies the land
of another at the latters tolerance or permission, without any contract between
them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon
demand, failing which, a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy
against him. The unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession is to be
counted from the date of the demand to vacate.
The filing of the first ejectments case signified that petitioners sought the ouster
of private respondents from
possession of the property. Proceeding in the case were suspended with the
filing for Annulment of Title with Reconveyance and Damages by Lucio Arvisu
and several of private respondents. The first ejectment case was eventually
dismissed and the judgment of dismissal attained finality. The ejectment case was
later resolved in favor of petitioners, but on appeal, the case was dismissed
without prejudice to the filing of the proper action after the prejudicial question
in the second case filed by Lucio Arvisu against petitioners.
Because of the pendency of the cases involving ownership, the proceedings in
the first ejectment case were suspended. Petitioner could not but await the
outcome of these case and preserve the status quo.
The rule is that a complaint for unlawful detainer must be filed within one year
from demand, demand being jurisdictional. This one-year period is counted from
the last demand. An unlawful detainer suit involves solely the issue of physical or
material possession over the property or possession de facto, that is who
between the plaintiff and the defendant has a better right to possess the
property in question. In the case at bar, petitioners complaint for unlawful
detainer was confined to recovery of de facto or physical possession of the
property and was resorted to after private respondents has indubitably failed in
their suit assailing petitioners right to ownership.




Tirona vs. Alejo
This petition for review assails the joint decision dated April 10, 1997, of the
Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Branch 172, in Civil Cases Nos. 5169-V-97 and
5093-V-97.
The factual background of this petition are culled from the records of the cases.
FACTS:
(1st case) Civil Case No. 5093-V-97
Herein petitioners sued private respondent Luis Nuez for ejectment before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Valenzue. Petitioners claimed to be owners of various
fishpond lots located at Coloong, Valenzuela. They alleged, among others that:
(1) private respondent Nuez, by means of force, stealth, or strategy, unlawfully
entered the said fishpond lots and occupied the same against their will, thereby
depriving them of possession of said fishponds;
(2) Nuez illegally occupied a house owned by and built on the lot of petitioner
Deo Dionisio; and
(3) Nuez unlawfully operated and used petitioners fishponds, despite their
demands to vacate the same.
Petitioners prayed that the court order Nuez to vacate Dionisios house;
surrender possession of the fishponds to them; remove all milkfish fingerlings at
his expense; and pay a monthly compensation of P29,000.00 from January 20,
1996 to the time he surrenders possession, with interest at twelve percent (12%)
yearly until fully paid.
Nuez admitted in his answer that petitioners owned the fishponds, but denied
the other allegations.
The MeTCs judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
defendant and all persons claiming rights under him. Nuez appealed said
decision to the RTC.
(2nd case) Civil Case No. 5169-V-97
Petitioners also instituted Civil Case for ejectment against private respondent
Juanito Ignacio. The allegations were essentially the same as those against
private respondent Nuez, except it is alleged that Ignacio also illegally
occupied the house constructed on the lot of, and belonging to the plaintiff
Spouses Ma. Paz D. Bautista and Cesar Bautista. Petitioners sought the same
relief prayed for.
Ignacio raised similar defenses as those offered by Nuez. And he also moved for
dismissal of the ejectment suit against him.
The MeTC dismissed the case against Juanito Ignacio. Ignacio appealed to the
RTC.
Since the two Civil Cases involved essentially the same parties, the same subject
matter, and the same issues, the cases were jointly heard.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the case at bar is an action for forcible entry.
RULING:
Yes. The Court held upon reading of the allegations in the complaints that
petitioners action was one for forcible entry, not unlawful detainer. The
distinctions between the two actions are:
(1) In an action for forcible entry, the plaintiff must allege and prove that he was
in prior physical possession of the premises until deprived thereof, while in illegal
detainer, the plaintiff need not have been in prior physical possession; and
(2) in forcible entry, the possession by the defendant is unlawful ab initio because
he acquires possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, while in
unlawful detainer, possession is originally lawful but becomes illegal by reason of
the termination of his right of possession under his contract with the plaintiff.
In pleadings filed in courts of special jurisdiction, the special facts giving the court
jurisdiction must be specially alleged and set out. Otherwise, the complaint is
demurrable.
Hence, in actions for forcible entry, two allegations are mandatory for the
municipal court to acquire jurisdiction: First, the plaintiff must allege his prior
physical possession of the property. Second, he must also allege that he was
deprived of his possession by any of the means provided for in Section 1, Rule 70
of the Rules of Court, namely: force, intimidation, threats, strategy, and stealth.
Recall that the complaints in Civil Cases Nos. 6632 and 6633 failed to allege prior
physical possession of the property on the part of petitioners. All that is alleged is
unlawful deprivation of their possession by private respondents. The deficiency is
fatal to petitioners actions before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Valenzuela.
Such bare allegation is insufficient for the MeTC to acquire jurisdiction.




G..R. No. 132424 May 2, 2006
SPOUSES BONIFACIO R. VALDEZ, JR. and VENIDA M. VALDEZ, Petitioners, vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES GABRIEL FABELLA and FRANCISCA
FABELLA, Respondents.
FACTS:
This case originated from a complaint for unlawful detainer filed by petitioners
Bonifacio and Venida Valdez against private respondents Gabriel and Francisca
Fabella before the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal. The complaint alleges
these material facts:
2. That plaintiffs are the registered owner[s] of a piece of residential lot
denominated as Lot [N]o. 3 Blk 19 located at Carolina Executive Village, Brgy. Sta.
Cruz, Antipolo, Rizal which [they] acquired from Carolina Realty, Inc. Sometime
[i]n November 1992 by virtue of Sales Contract, xerox copy of which is hereto
attached marked as Annex "A" and the xerox copy of the Torrens Certificate of
Title in her name marked as Annex "B";
3. That defendants, without any color of title whatsoever occupie[d] the said lot
by building their house in the said lot thereby depriving the herein plaintiffs
rightful possession thereof;
4. That for several times, plaintiffs orally asked the herein defendants to
peacefully surrender the premises to them, but the latter stubbornly refused to
vacate the lot they unlawfully occupied;
5. That despite plaintiffs referral of the matter to the Barangay, defendants still
refused to heed the plea of the former to surrender the lot peacefully;
X X X
In their answer, private respondents contended that the complaint failed to state
that petitioners had prior physical possession of the property or that they were
the lessors of the former. In the alternative, private respondents claimed
ownership over the land on the ground that they had been in open, continuous,
and adverse possession thereof for more than thirty years, as attested by an
ocular inspection report from the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources.
MTC RULING
The Municipal Trial Court (MTC) rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners,
ordering private respondents to vacate the property and to pay rent for the use
and occupation of the same plus attorneys fees.
RTC RULING
Private respondents appealed the MTCs decision to the Regional Trial Court
(RTC). The RTC, in a decision dated 8 January 1997, affirmed in toto the decision
of the MTC.
CA RULING
Undeterred, the private respondents filed a petition for review with the Court of
Appeals on 10 March 1997 questioning the decision of the RTC.
In a decision dated 22 April 1997, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the
decision of the RTC. It held that petitioners failed to make a case for unlawful
detainer because they failed to show that they had given the private respondents
the right to occupy the premises or that they had tolerated private respondents
possession of the same, which is a requirement in unlawful detainer cases.
ISSUE:WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT CLEARLY
MADE OUT A CASE FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER.
The petition is not meritorious.
Under existing law and jurisprudence, there are three kinds of actions available
to recover possession of real property: (a) accion interdictal; (b) accion
publiciana; and (c) accion reivindicatoria.6
Accion interdictal comprises two distinct causes of action, namely, forcible entry
(detentacion) and unlawful detainer (desahuico).7 In forcible entry, one is
deprived of physical possession of real property by means of force, intimidation,
strategy, threats, or stealth whereas in unlawful detainer, one illegally withholds
possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession
under any contract, express or implied.8 The two are distinguished from each
other in that in forcible entry, the possession of the defendant is illegal from the
beginning, and that the issue is which party has prior de facto possession while in
unlawful detainer, possession of the defendant is originally legal but became
illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess.9
The jurisdiction of these two actions, which are summary in nature, lies in the
proper municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court.10 Both actions must be
brought within one year from the date of actual entry on the land, in case of
forcible entry, and from the date of last demand, in case of unlawful detainer.11
The issue in said cases is the right to physical possession.
Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession which
should be brought in the proper regional trial court when dispossession has
lasted for more than one year.12 It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine
the better right of possession of realty independently of title.13 In other words, if
at the time of the filing of the complaint more than one year had elapsed since
defendant had turned plaintiff out of possession or defendants possession had
become illegal, the action will be, not one of the forcible entry or illegal detainer,
butan accion publiciana. On the other hand, accion reivindicatoria is an action to
recover ownership also brought in the proper regional trial court in an ordinary
civil proceeding.14
To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the plaintiffs
supposed acts of tolerance must have been present right from the start of the
possession which is later sought to be recovered.15 Otherwise, if the possession
was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would be an
improper remedy.16 As explained in Sarona v. Villegas17:
But even where possession preceding the suit is by tolerance of the owner, still,
distinction should be made.
If right at the incipiency defendants possession was with plaintiffs tolerance, we
do not doubt that the latter may require him to vacate the premises and sue
before the inferior court under Section 1 of Rule 70, within one year from the
date of the demand to vacate.
x x x x
A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word "tolerance" confirms
our view heretofore expressed that such tolerance must be present right from
the start of possession sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as
one of unlawful detainer - not of forcible entry. Indeed, to hold otherwise would
espouse a dangerous doctrine. And for two reasons: First. Forcible entry into the
land is an open challenge to the right of the possessor. Violation of that right
authorizes the speedy redress in the inferior court - provided for in the rules. If
one year from the forcible entry is allowed to lapse before suit is filed, then the
remedy ceases to be speedy; and the possessor is deemed to have waived his
right to seek relief in the inferior court. Second, if a forcible entry action in the
inferior court is allowed after the lapse of a number of years, then the result may
well be that no action of forcible entry can really prescribe. No matter how long
such defendant is in physical possession, plaintiff will merely make a demand,
bring suit in the inferior court upon a plea of tolerance to prevent prescription
to set in - and summarily throw him out of the land. Such a conclusion is
unreasonable. Especially if we bear in mind the postulates that proceedings of
forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary in nature, and that the one year
time-bar to suit is but in pursuance of the summary nature of the action.18
(Underlining supplied)
It is the nature of defendants entry into the land which determines the cause of
action, whether it is forcible entry or unlawful detainer. If the entry is illegal, then
the action which may be filed against the intruder is forcible entry. If, however,
the entry is legal but the possession thereafter becomes illegal, the case is
unlawful detainer.
The evidence revealed that the possession of defendant was illegal at the
inception and not merely tolerated as alleged in the complaint, considering that
defendant started to occupy the subject lot and then built a house thereon
without the permission and consent of petitioners and before them, their
mother. xxx Clearly, defendants entry into the land was effected clandestinely,
without the knowledge of the owners, consequently, it is categorized as
possession by stealth which is forcible entry. As explained in Sarona vs. Villegas,
cited in Muoz vs. Court ofAppeals [224 SCRA 216 (1992)] tolerance must be
present right from the start of possession sought to be recovered, to categorize
a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer not of forcible entry x x x.




ABAD VS. FARALLES
FACTS:
This case is about a) the need, when establishing the jurisdiction of the court over
an action for forcible entry, for plaintiff to allege in his complaint prior physical
possession of the property and b) the need for plaintiff to prove as well the fact
of such prior physical possession.
Petitioner Servillano Abad claims he and his wife, Dr. Estrella E. Gavilan-Abad,
bought a registered property from Teresita, Rommel, and Dennis Farrales. The
latter were the wife and sons, respectively, of the late brother of respondents
Oscar Farrales (Oscar) and Daisy Farrales-Villamayor (Daisy). Teresita operated a
boarding house on the property.
Because the Abads did not consider running the boarding house themselves,
they agreed to lease the property back to Teresita so she could continue with her
business. But, although the lease had a good start, Teresita suddenly abandoned
the boarding house, forcing the Abads to take over by engaging the services of
Bencio Duran, Teresita's helper, to oversee the boarding house business.
Dr. Abad went to the boarding house to have certain damage to some toilets
repaired. While she was attending to the matter, she also hired house painters to
give the boarding house fresh coat of paint. Oscar and Daisy came, accompanied
by two men, and forcibly took possession of the boarding house. Frightened, the
painters called the Abads who immediately sought police help. The Abads were
later appeased, however, when they learned that the intruders left the place.
Two days later, the day the Abads left for abroad, Oscar and Daisy forcibly
entered and took possession of the property once again. Because of this,
petitioner Servillano Abad (Abad) filed a complaint for forcible entry against the
two before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC). Oscar and Daisy vehemently
denied that they forcibly seized the place. They claimed ownership of it by
inheritance. They also claimed that they had been in possession of the same from
the time of their birth. That Oscar had been residing on the property since 1967 as
attested to by a March 31, 2003 certification issued by Barangay Bahay Toro.
While the defendants admitted that Daisy herself ceased to reside on the
property as early as 1986, they pointed out that she did not effectively give up
her possession. Oscar and Daisy further claimed that when their parents were still
alive, the latter mortgaged the property to a bank to secure a loan. After their
mother passed away, they decided to lease portions of the property to help pay
the loan. Daisy managed the operation of the boarding house. To bolster their
claim, Oscar and Daisy presented copies of rental receipts going back from 2001
to 2003. They would not have been able to lease the rooms unless they were in
possession. Further, Oscar and Daisy asked the MeTC to dismiss the action on the
ground of failure
of Abad to show that he and his wife enjoyed prior physical possession of the
property, an essential requisite in forcible entry cases. Abad's allegation that he
and his wife immediately leased the property after they bought it was proof that
they were never in possession of it for any length of time. The MeTC rendered a
decision in favor of Abad, stating that Oscar and Daisy could not acquire
ownership of the property since it was registered. And, as owner, Abad was
entitled to possession. Disagreeing with the MeTC, Oscar and Daisy went up to
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City. The RTC affirmed the decision of
the MeTC in its totality. It held that Oscar and Daisy could no longer impugn the
jurisdiction of the MeTC over the action since they raised the ground of Abad's
failure to allege prior physical possession in his complaint for the first time on
appeal. Besides, said the RTC, since the complaint alleged that Servillano owned
the property, it may be presumed that he also had prior possession of it. No
evidence to the contrary having been presented, the presumption stood.
Undaunted, Oscar and Daisy filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals
(CA). The CA rendered a decision, annulling the decisions and orders of both the
MeTC and the RTC on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The CA pointed out that
Abad merely alleged in his complaint that he leased the property to Teresita after
he and his wife bought the same and that, thereafter, Oscar and Daisy forcibly
entered the same. Since Abad did not make the jurisdictional averment of prior
physical possession, the MeTC did not acquire jurisdiction over his action.
Further, Oscar and Daisy ably proved actual possession from 1967 through the
barangay certification. Since the MeTC had no jurisdiction over the case, all the
proceedings in the case were void. Abad moved for reconsideration but the CA
denied the same, hence, in the present petition for review.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not Abad sufficiently alleged in his complaint the
jurisdictional fact of prior physical possession of the disputed property to vest
the MeTC with jurisdiction over his action; and 2. In the affirmative, whether or
not Abad sufficiently proved that he enjoyed prior physical possession of the
property in question.
HELD:
AS TO THE FIRST ISSUE
Yes, Abad sufficiently alleges in his complaint the jurisdictional fact of prior
physical possession of the disputed property to vest the MeTC with jurisdiction
over his action. Two allegations are indispensable in actions for forcible entry to
enable first level courts to acquire jurisdiction over them: first, that the plaintiff
had prior physical possession of
the property; and, second, that the defendant deprived him of such possession
by means of force, intimidation, threats, strategy, or stealth. There is no question
that Abad made an allegation in his complaint that Oscar and Daisy forcibly
entered the subject property. The only issue is with respect to his allegation,
citing such property as one "of which they have complete physical and material
possession of the same until deprived thereof." Abad argues that this
substantially alleges plaintiffs prior physical possession of the property before
the dispossession, sufficient to confer on the MeTC jurisdiction over the action.
The Court agrees. The plaintiff in a forcible entry suit is not required to use in his
allegations the exact terminology employed by the rules. It is enough that the
facts set up in the complaint show that dispossession took place under the
required conditions. It is of course not enough that the allegations of the
complaint make out a case for forcible entry. The plaintiff must also be able to
prove his allegations. He has to prove that he had prior physical possession for
this gives him the security that entitles him to remain in the property until a
person with a better right lawfully ejects him. Here, evidently, the Abads did not
take physical possession of the property after buying the same since they
immediately rented it to Teresita who had already been using the property as a
boarding house. Abad claims that their renting it to Teresita was an act of
ownership that amounted to their acquiring full physical possession of the same.
But the Abad's lease agreement with Teresita began only in September 2002.
Oscar and Daisy, on the other hand, have proved that they had been renting
spaces in the property as early as 2001 as evidenced by receipts that they issued
to their lessees. This was long before they supposedly entered the property,
using force, in 2002. Of course, Abad pointed out that the cited receipts covered
rents in a place called "D's Condominium" in Sampaloc, Manila, and were only
made to appear through handwritten notations that they were issued for rooms
in the property subject of the suit. But a close examination of the receipts shows
that "D's Condominium" was just the name that Daisy employed in her business
of renting rooms. The receipts did not necessarily describe another place. Indeed,
they provided blank spaces for describing as the subject of rent the property
subject of this case. And, except for Abad's bare claim that Teresita and his sons
had long been in possession before they sold it to him and his wife, he offered no
evidence to show that this was in fact the case.
AS THE SECOND ISSUE
Abad failed to prove that he enjoyed prior physical possession of the property in
question.
Finally, Abad argued that with the title to the property in his name, he has in his
favor the right to the actual, physical, exclusive, continuous, and peaceful
possession of the same. He pointed out that his possession de facto began from
the time of the signing and notarization of the deed of absolute sale, becoming
de jure once the title was issued in his name.
It is of course true that a property owner has the right to exercise the attributes
of ownership, one of which is the right to possess the property. But Abad is
missing the point. He is referring to possession flowing from ownership which is
not in issue in this case. Possession in forcible entry cases means nothing more
than physical possession or possession de facto, not legal possession in the sense
contemplated in civil law. Only prior physical possession, not title, is the issue. For
these reasons, the Court finds that Servillano utterly failed to prove prior physical
possession in his favor. The absence of prior physical possession by the plaintiff
in a forcible entry warrants the dismissal of the complaint.




Quinagoran v CA and Heirs of Juan dela Cruz
Facts: The heirs of Juan dela Cruz filed a Complaint for Recovery of Portion of
Registered Land with Compensation and Damages against Quinagoran before
the RTC Cagayan. They alleged that they are the co-owners of a parcel of land at
Centro, Piat, Cagayan, which they inherited from the late Juan dela Cruz.
Quinagoran started occupying a house on portion of the property, by tolerance
of the heirs. The heirs asked petitioner to remove the house as they planned to
construct a commercial building on the property but petitioner refused, claiming
ownership over the lot.The heirs prayed for the reconveyance and surrender of
the disputed lot and to be paid the amount of P5,000 monthly until the property
is vacated.
Quinagoran filed a Motion to Dismiss claiming that the RTC has no jurisdiction
over the case under RA 7691, which expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction
of the MTC to include all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein which does not exceed P20,000. He argued that
since the lot which he owns adjacent to the contested property has an assessed
value of P1,730 the assessed value of the lot under controversy would not be
more than the said amount.
The RTC denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss on the basis that the action is
accion publicciana and therefore, its jurisdiction lies in the RTC, regardless of the
value of the property. The CA affirmed decision of the RTC.
Issue: WON the RTC has jurisdiction over all cases of recovery of possession
regardless of the value of the property involved.
Held: NO. Jurisdiction lies in the MTC.
The doctrine that all cases of recovery of possession or accion publiciana lies with
the RTC regardless of the value of the property -- no longer holds true. As things
now stand, a distinction must be made between those properties the assessed
value of which is below P20,000 if outside Metro Manila; and P50,000, if within.
RA 7691, which amended BP 129, and which was already in effect when
respondents filed their complaint with the RTC in 1994, expressly provides:
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction:
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to or possession of, real property, or
any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds
Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where
such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except for forcible entry
into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is
conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
In Atuel v. Valdez, the Court likewise expressly stated that:
Jurisdiction over an accion publiciana is vested in a court of general jurisdiction.
Specifically, the regional trial court exercises exclusive original jurisdiction in all
civil actions which involve x x x possession of real property. However, if the
assessed value of the real property involved does not exceed P50,000 in Metro
Manila, and P20,000 outside of Metro Manila, the municipal trial court exercises
jurisdiction over actions to recover possession of real property.
Issue: Whether the complaint must allege the assessed value of the property
involved
Held: Yes. The Court has already held that a complaint must allege the assessed
value of the real property subject of the complaint or the interest thereon to
determine which court has jurisdiction over the action. This is because the nature
of the action and which court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the
same is determined by the material allegations of the complaint, the type of relief
prayed for by the plaintiff and the law in effect when the action is filed,
irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to some or all of the claims
asserted therein
In the case at bar, however, nowhere in said complaint was the assessed value of
the subject property ever mentioned. There is therefore no showing on the face
of the complaint that the RTC has exclusive jurisdiction over the action of the
respondents. Absent any allegation in the complaint of the assessed value of the
property, it cannot be determined whether the RTC or the MTC has original and
exclusive jurisdiction over the petitioner's action. The courts cannot take judicial
notice of the assessed or market value of the land.
Considering that the respondents failed to allege in their complaint the assessed
value of the subject property, the RTC seriously erred in denying the motion to
dismiss. Consequently, all proceedings in the RTC are null and void. The CA also
erred in affirming the RTC.



Marciano Serdoncillo vs Sps. Fidel and Evelyn Benolirao, Meliton Carisima and
CA
This petition for review assails the decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 14,
1994 in CA G.R. CV No. 39251 1 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City, (Branch 108) in Civil Case No. 7785, dated June 30, 1992
directing herein petitioner to demolish and remove all illegal structures which she
constructed in front of the subject lot, to vacate the said property and right of
way, and return possession thereof to the respondents.
Facts: Petitioner is a tenant in the disputed land. In an action to recover
possession filed by the private respondents as purchaser of aforesaid property
before the RTC, petitioner was ordered to vacate the premises and to demolish
all the improvements he constructed thereon. On appeal, petitioner assailed the
jurisdiction of the RTC on the ground that the action filed should have been
unlawful detainer or forcible entry of which the MTC has exclusive jurisdiction.
This predicated on the fact that the final demand was made on November 20,
1990 and the action was filed December 13, 1990, thus, the one-year period has
not yet elapsed. The Court of Appeals deciding in favor of the pruvate
respondents, hence, petitioner instituted this action.
Issue: whether the action to recover possession filed by private respondents is
accion publiciana cognizable by the RTC or, unlawful detainer or forcible entry
cognizable by MTC.
Held: The allegations in the complaint are of the nature of accion publiciana of
which the RTC has jurisdiction. The averments of the complaint clearly show that
private respondents clearly set up title to themselves, as being the absolute
owner of the disputed premises by virtue of their Transfer Certificates of Title
and pray that petitioner be ejected therefrom. There is nothing in the complaint
alleging any of the means of dispossession that would constitute forcible entry,
nor is there any assertion of petitioner's posession which was originally lawful
but ceased to be so upon the expiration of the right to possess. It does not allege
whether the entry is legal or illegal. The action therefore is neither on of forcible
entry nor unlawful detainer but essentially involves a dispute relative to
ownership of land alledgedly encroached upon by petitioner. It is immaterial
whether or not the complaint was instituted one month from the date of last
demand or a year thereafter.



Case No. 11 Antonio vs. Geronimo
Facts:
-alexander Catalos (respondent) filed a complaint for unlawful detainer before
the MTC of Antipolo. He alleged that he was the owner of 4 parcels of land
situated at Mayamot, Antipolo Rizal. And the petitioners were occupying the said
properties.
- Catalos claimed that he allowed petitioners to occupy portions of his land
without requiring them to pay rent, on the condition that the latter would
immediately vacate the same in the event that the former would need the
premises.
- However, when Catalos did notify petitioners of his need to use the premises,
petitioners refused to vacate the land even after demand.
- The complaint was resolved in favor of private respondent.
- Private respondent filed a motion for issuance of a writ of demolition. The lower
court granted the motion and directed the issuance of a writ of demolition
- Lately, the sangguniang bayan of Antipolo passed a resolution authorizing the
Mayor of the town to acquire thru expropriation or purchase the subject
properties for public purposes/ socialized housing. Though the writ of demolition
had not yet been fully implemented, the demolition proceeded despite said
resolutions of Sangguniang Bayan.
-petitioners filed a motion to stay, invoking the commonwealth Act No. 538 in
asking respondent judge to suspend the action for ejectment in view of the
announced expropriation of subject properties.
- The motion was denied . Respondent judge reasoned out that no action for
expropriation had yet been filed in court and that petitioners had not complied
with Commonwealth Act No. 538 in paying the current rents.
- On the basis of this factual backdrop, petitioners filed the present petition for
certiorari under Rule 65. Petitioners seek to set aside the Order denying their
motion to stay execution and to enjoin respondents from continuing with the
demolition of their homes. They likewise pray for the issuance of writs of
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order.
Issue:
Whether or not a resolution for expropriation by a local government unit can
suspend the writ of execution and demolition in an ejectment case.
Held:
NO. In actions for ejectment, the general rule is if judgment is rendered against
the defendant, it is immediately executory. Such judgment, however, may be
stayed by the defendant only by: (a) perfecting an appeal; (b) filing a
supersedeas bond; and (c) making a periodic deposit of the rental or the
reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the property during the
pendency of the appeal. These requisites must concur. Thus, even if the
defendant had appealed and filed a supersedeas bond but failed to pay the
accruing rentals, the appellate court could, upon motion of the plaintiff with
notice to the defendant, and upon proof of such failure, order the immediate
execution of the appealed decision without prejudice to the appeal taking its
course. Such deposit, like the supersedeas bond, is a mandatory requirement;
hence, if it is not complied with, execution will issue as a matter of right.
Jurisprudence is replete with cases which provide for the exceptions to the rule
cited above. These are the existence of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence which prevented the defendant from making the monthly deposit, or
the occurrence of supervening events which have brought about a material
change in the situation of the parties and would make the execution inequitable
or where there is compelling urgency for the execution because it is not justified
by the prevailing circumstances.
Furthermore, The fundamental precept that underlies this case is that
expropriation has no binding legal effect unless a formal expropriation
proceeding has been instituted.
the Sangguniang Bayan, being a local legislative body, may exercise the power to
expropriate private properties, subject to the following requisites, all of which
must concur:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local
chief executive, in behalf of the local government unit, to exercise the power of
eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private
property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare,
or for the benefit of the poor and the landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III
of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the
property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.
In the instant case, no ordinance was passed by the Sangguniang Bayan of
Antipolo.
It in instead were resolutions and it was emphasized in previous decisions that a
local government unit cannot authorize an expropriation of private property
through a mere resolutions of its lawmaking body. These Resolutions cannot
partake of a supervening event so as to suspend the writ of execution in the
ejectment proceedings. As to the suspension of ejectmet proceedings, the
commonwealth act no. 538 applies only to cases where there exist actual
expropriation proceedings.



Bengzon v Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Digest
G.R. No. 89914 November 20, 1991
Facts:
1. Petitioner was one of the defendants in a civil case filed by the government
with the Sandiganbayan for the alleged anomalous sale of Kokoy Romoaldez of
several government corporations to the group of Lopa, a brother-in-law of Pres.
Aquino.
2. By virtue of a privilege speech made by Sen. Enrile urging the Senate to look
into the transactions, an investigation was conducted by the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee. Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa were subpoenaed by the Committee to
appear before it and testify on "what they know" regarding the "sale of thirty-six
(36) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez."
3. At the hearing, Lopa declined to testify on the ground that his testimony may
"unduly prejudice" the defendants in civil case before the Sandiganbayan.
4. Petitioner filed for a TRO and/or injunctive relief claiming that the inquiry was
beyond the jurisdiction of the Senate. He contended that the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee acted in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose. One of the
defendants in the case before the Sandiganbayan, Sandejas, filed with the Court
of motion for intervention. The Court granted it and required the respondent
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to comment on the petition in intervention.
ISSUE: W/N the Blue Ribbon inquiry was in aid of legislation
NO.
1. There appears to be no intended legislation involved. The purpose of the
inquiry to be conducted is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of
Congress, it was conducted to find out whether or not the relatives of President
Aquino, particularly Mr. Lopa had violated RA 3019 in connection with the alleged
sale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to
the Lopa Group.
2. The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation
is not absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the Constitution. As
provided therein, the investigation must be "in aid of legislation in accordance
with its duly published rules of procedure" and that "the rights of persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected." It follows then that
the rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the
right to due process and the right not to be compelled to testify against one's
self.
3. The civil case was already filed in the Sandiganbayan and for the Committee to
probe and inquire into the same justiciable controversy would be an
encroachment into the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction that had already
earlier set in. The issue sought to be investigated has already been pre-empted by
the Sandiganbayan. To allow the inquiry to continue would not only pose the
possibility of conflicting judgments between the legislative committee and a
judicial tribunal.
4. Finally, a congressional committees right to inquire is subject to all relevant
limitations placed by the Constitution on governmental action including the
relevant limitations of the Bill of Rights. One of these rights is the right of an
individual to against self-incrimination. The right to remain silent is extended to
respondents in administrative investigations but only if it partakes of the nature
of a criminal proceeding or analogous to a criminal proceeding. Hence, the
petitioners may not be compelled by respondent Committee to appear, testify
and produce evidence before it only because the inquiry is not in aid of legislation
and if pursued would be violative of the principle of separation of powers
between the legislative and the judicial departments of the government as
ordained by the Constitution.




BANK OF THE PHILIPPINEISLANDS v LABOR ARBITER RODERICK JOSEPH
CALANZA, SHERIFF ENRICO Y. PAREDES, AMELIA ENRIQUEZ, and REMO L. SIA,
Facts: Enriquez and Sia were the branch manager and the assistant branch
manager, respectively, of Bacolod-Singcang Branch of BPI. On 2003 they were
dismissed from employment on grounds of breach of trust and confidence and
dishonesty. The following day, they filed separate complaints for illegal dismissal
against petitioner before the (NLRC),
Executive LA Danilo C. Acosta rendered a decision finding that Enriquez and Sia
had been illegally dismissed from employment. Hence were reinstated in
petitioners payroll.
Petitioner appealed then NLRC ruled that petitioner had just cause to terminate
Enriquez and Sia. Hence, it reversed and set aside the LA decision and, although it
dismissed the complaint, it ordered petitioner to give the dismissed employees
financial assistance.
Enriquez and Sia elevated the matter to the (CA), but failed to obtain a favorable
decision. On . The case eventually reached this Court.
During the pendency of the petition before this Court, Enriquez and Sia filed a
Motion for Partial Execution[6] of the LA decision claimed that the reinstatement
aspect of the LA decision was immediately executory during the entire period
that the case was on appeal.
LA Calanza granted Enriquez and Sias motion, upon service of the writ, Sheriff
Paredes served on petitioner a notice of sale of a parcel of land owned by
petitioner to satisfy its obligation.
Petitioner immediately filed an Urgent Petition for Injunction with prayer for the
issuance (TRO) and/or WPI with the NLRC and issued the TRO.
Disappointed with the conduct of LA Calanza petitioner instituted the present
petition for indirect contempt.
Issue: Do the acts of respondents Enriquez and Sia in filing a motion for partial
execution; of LA Calanza in granting the writ of execution and applying or not
applying established jurisprudence; and of Sheriff Paredes in serving the notice of
sale of the real property owned by petitioner guilty of indirect contempt?
Held: NO.Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the court by acting in
opposition to its authority, justice, and dignity. It signifies not only a willful
disregard or disobedience of the courts order. It is a defiance of the authority,
justice, or dignity of the court which tends to bring the authority and
administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice party-
litigants or their witnesses during litigation.
We find that their motion for partial execution was a bona fide attempt to
implement what they might have genuinely believed they were entitled to in
accordance with existing laws and jurisprudence.[22] This is especially true in the
instant case where the means of livelihood of the dismissed employees was at
stake. Any man in such an uncertain and economically threatened condition
would be expected to take whatever measures are available to ensure a means
of sustenance for himself and his family. Clearly, Enriquez and Sia were merely
pursuing a claim which they honestly believed was due them. Their act is far from
being contumacious.
On the other hand, LA Calanza, the erroneous issuance of the writ of execution
by LA Calanza can only be deemed grave abuse of discretion which is more
properly the subject of a petition for certiorari and not a petition for indirect
contempt. No one who is called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the
process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment.
Finally, Sheriff Paredes, in serving the notice of sale, was only performing his duty
pursuant to the writ of execution. No matter how erroneous the writ was, it was
issued by LA Calanza and was addressed to him as the sheriff, commanding him
to collect from petitioner the amount due Enriquez and Sia. Thus, any act
performed by Sheriff Paredes pursuant to the aforesaid writ cannot be
considered contemptuous. At the time of the service of the notice of sale, there
was no order from any court or tribunal restraining him from enforcing the writ.
It was ministerial duty for him to implement it.
To be considered contemptuous, an act must be clearly contrary to or prohibited
by the order of the court or tribunal. A person cannot, for disobedience, be
punished for contempt unless the act which is forbidden or required to be done
is clearly and exactly defined, so that there can be no reasonable doubt or
uncertainty as to what specific act or thing is forbidden or required.[30]
Dismissed for lack of merit.


Siy vs. NLRC
GR 158971, August 25, 2005
FACTS:
This case originated from a complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of
holiday pay and holiday premium pay filed by Embang against Siy and Philippine
Agri Trading Center. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Embang. The decision
thrice-affirmed: first by the NLRC; then by the CA; and finally by the Supreme
Court.
In accordance with the rules of procedure of the NLRC, Embangs counsel filed a
motion for the issuance of a writ of execution dated February 16, 2004 before the
labor arbiter. Subsequently, Atty. Quevedo entered his appearance for the
petitioner and filed a comment to the motion for writ of execution. He alleged
that Embang rejected the various offers of reinstatement extended to her by
petitioner; hence, she should be entitled to backwages only up to September 29,
2000, the date of the promulgation of the labor arbiters decision.
Finding that his office was never informed by petitioner and Philippine Agri
Trading Center of any intention on their part to reinstate Embang to her former
position, the labor arbiter issued an order dated July 30, 2004, granting the
February 16, 2004 motion and directing that a writ of execution be issued.
Atty. Quevedo refused to be deterred. He filed an appeal with the NLRC on
August 12, 2004.
Pending the resolution of the appeal, Embang filed the instant motion to cite
Atty. Quevedo in contempt of court.
ISSUE: W/N Atty. Frederico P. Quevedo is in contempt of court.
HELD: YES.
Contempt of court is disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its
authority, justice and dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or
disobedience of the courts orders but also conduct tending to bring the
authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or, in some
manner, to impede the due administration of justice.[ Under the Rules of Court,
contempt is classified into either direct or indirect contempt. Direct contempt is
committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to obstruct or
interrupt the proceedings before the same. Indirect contempt is one not
committed in the presence of a court. It is an act done at a distance which tends
to belittle, degrade, obstruct or embarrass the court and justice.[
Atty. Quevedo should be sanctioned for indirect contempt. Indirect contempt is
committed by a person who commits the following acts, among others:
disobedience or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order or judgment of a
court;] any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or
proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt;[ and any improper
conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade the
administration of justice.[
We denied with finality the petitioners petition for review on certiorari almost
two years ago. But the decision of the labor arbiter (affirmed with modification
by the NLRC and upheld by the CA and this Court) remains unsatisfied up to now
because of Atty. Quevedos sly maneuvers on behalf of his client.
Once a case is decided with finality, the controversy is settled and the matter is
laid to rest. The prevailing party is entitled to enjoy the fruits of his victory while
the other party is obliged to respect the courts verdict and to comply with it. We
reiterate our pronouncement in Sacdalan v. Court of Appeals:
well-settled is the principle that a decision that has acquired finality becomes
immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect even if
the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and
whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of
the land.
The reason for this is that litigation must end and terminate sometime and
somewhere, and it is essential to an effective and efficient administration of
justice that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not
deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must guard against any scheme
calculated to bring about that result and must frown upon any attempt to
prolong the controversies.


LORENZO SHIPPING v DISTRIBUTION MANAGEMENT (DMAP)
FACTS
* a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with prayer for preliminary
mandatory injunction or temporary restraining order was filed to challenge the
constitutionality of EO 213, Memorandum Circular 153, and the Letter-Resolution
dated June 4, 2001, which deregulated shipping rates in effect increased costs by
up to 20%.
* Court denied DMAPs petition for review on certiorari "for petitioners failure
to: (a) take the appeal within the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days in
accordance with Section 2, Rule 45 in relation to Section 5(a), Rule 56, in view of
the foregoing denial of petitioners' motion for extension of time to file the
petition; and (b) pay the deposit for sheriff's fee and clerk's commission in the
total amount of P202.00 in accordance with Sections 2 and 3, Rule 45 in relation
to Section [c], Rule 56 and paragraph 1 of Revised Circular No. 1-88 of this Court."
* DMAP held a general membership meeting (GMM) on the occasion of which
DMAP publicly circulated the Sea Transport Update, which is reproduced as
follows:
* SEA TRANSPORT UPDATE
Oct. 2002 GMM
20% GRI RATE INCREASE ISSUE
1. The Motion for Reconsideration filed with the Supreme Court was denied
based on technicalities and not on the legal issue DMAP presented.
Small technical matter which should not be a cause for denial (like the amount of
filing fee lacking & failure to indicate date of receipt of court resolution)
> Some technical matters that could cause denial
- Failure to file on time and to file necessary pleadings
- Failure to provide copies to respondents.
> Legal issue DMAP presented
- Public Service Act
- Regulated or Deregulated
- MC 153
- Supreme Court ruling issued in one month only, normal lead time is at least 3 to
6 months.
WHAT TO EXPECT?
1. Liners will pressure members to pay the 20% GRI
WHAT TO DO?
1. As advised by DMAP counsel, use the following arguments:
- DMAP case was denied based on technicalities and not on merits of the case
- Court of Appeals has ruled that computation of reasonableness of freight is not
under their jurisdiction but with MARINA
- DSA's argument that DMAP's case prematurely (sic) file (sic) as there is a
pending case filed before MARINA.
- Therefore, DSA & DMAP will be going back to MARINA for resolution
2. Meantime, DMAP members enjoined not to pay until resolved by MARINA
3. However, continue collaboration with liners so shipping service may not suffer
NEXT MOVE
Another group (most likely consumers) or any party will file the same case and
may be using the same arguments. (emphasis supplied)
* Petitioners brought this special civil action for contempt against the
respondents, insisting that the publication of the Sea Transport Update
constituted indirect contempt of court for patently, unjustly and baselessly
insinuating that the petitioners were privy to some illegal act, and, worse, that
the publication unfairly debased the Supreme Court by making "scurrilous,
malicious, tasteless, and baseless innuendo" to the effect that the Supreme Court
had allowed itself to be influenced by the petitioners as to lead the respondents
to conclude that the "Supreme Court ruling issued in one month only, normal
lead time is at least 3 to 6 months." They averred that the respondents purpose,
taken in the context of the entire publication, was to "defy the decision, for it
was based on technicalities, and the Supreme Court was influenced!"
* Respondents denied any intention to malign, discredit, or criticize the Court.
They explained that their statement that the "Supreme Court ruling issued in one
month time only, normal lead time is at least three to six months" was not per se
contemptuous, because the normal and appropriate time frame for the
resolution of petitions by the Court was either less than a month, if the petition
was to be denied on technicality, and more or less from three to six months, if
the petition was to be given due course; that what made the petitioners describe
the statement as contemptuous was not the real or actual intention of the
author but rather the petitioners false, malicious, scurrilous and tasteless
insinuations and interpretation; and that the petitioners, not being themselves
present during the GMM, had no basis to assert that the DMAPs presentor, the
author of the material, or any of the speakers during the GMM had any evil
intention or made any malicious insinuations
Issue
* WON the statements contained in the Sea Transport Update constitute or
amount to indirect contempt of court?
Ruling
* NO. Utterances in Sea Transport Update, Not Contemptuous
The petitioners did not sufficiently show how the respondents publication of the
Sea Transport Update constituted any of the acts punishable as indirect
contempt of court under Section 3 of Rule 71, supra.
The petitioners mere allegation, that "said publication unfairly debases the
Supreme Court because of the scurrilous, malicious, tasteless, and baseless
innuendo therein that the Court allowed itself to be influenced by the petitioners
as concocted in the evil minds of the respondents thus leading said respondents
to unjustly conclude: Supreme Court ruling issued in one month only, normal lead
time is at least 3 to 6 months," was insufficient, without more, to sustain the
charge of indirect contempt.
The test for criticizing a judges decision is, therefore, whether or not the
criticism is bona fide or done in good faith, and does not spill over the walls of
decency and propriety. Viewed through the prism of the test, the Sea Transport
Update was not disrespectful, abusive, or slanderous, and did not spill over the
walls of decency and propriety. Thereby, the respondents were not guilty of
indirect contempt of court. In this regard, then, we need to remind that the
power to punish for contempt of court is exercised on the preservative and not
on the vindictive principle, and only occasionally should a court invoke its
inherent power in order to retain that respect without which the administration
of justice must falter or fail. As judges we ought to exercise our power to punish
contempt judiciously and sparingly, with utmost restraint, and with the end in
view of utilizing the power for the correction and preservation of the dignity of
the Court, not for retaliation or vindictiveness






DICUSSIONS FROM THE BOOK: (the case gave several distinctions on contempt.)
Contempt of Court: Concept and Classes
Contempt of court has been defined as a willful disregard or disobedience of a public authority. In its broad sense, contempt is a disregard of, or disobedience to, the rules or
orders of a legislative or judicial body or an interruption of its proceedings by disorderly behavior or insolent language in its presence or so near thereto as to disturb its
proceedings or to impair the respect due to such a body. In its restricted and more usual sense, contempt comprehends a despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of a
court. The phrase contempt of court is generic, embracing within its legal signification a variety of different acts.


The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts, and need not be specifically granted by statute. It lies at the core of the administration of a judicial system.
Indeed, there ought to be no question that courts have the power by virtue of their very creation to impose silence, respect, and decorum in their presence, submission to their
lawful mandates, and to preserve themselves and their officers from the approach and insults of pollution. The power to punish for contempt essentially exists for the
preservation of order in judicial proceedings and for the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the courts, and, consequently, for the due administration of
justice. The reason behind the power to punish for contempt is that respect of the courts guarantees the stability of their institution; without such guarantee, the institution of
the courts would be resting on a very shaky foundation.
direct contempt indirect contempt
committed in the presence of or so near the judge as to obstruct him in the administration of justice consists of willful disobedience of
the lawful process or order of the
court
Contempt of court is of two kinds, namely: direct contempt, which is committed in the presence of or so near the judge as to obstruct him in the administration of justice; and
constructive or indirect contempt, which consists of willful disobedience of the lawful process or order of the court.
Plainly, therefore, the word summary with respect to the punishment for contempt refers not to the timing of the action with reference to the offense but to the procedure
that dispenses with the formality, delay, and digression that result from the issuance of process, service of complaint and answer, holding hearings, taking evidence, listening to
arguments, awaiting briefs, submission of findings, and all that goes with a conventional court trial.
A distinction between in-court contempts, which disrupt court proceedings and for which a hearing and formal presentation of evidence are dispensed with, and out-of-court
contempts, which require normal adversary procedures, is drawn for the purpose of prescribing what procedures must attend the exercise of a courts authority to deal with
contempt. The distinction does not limit the ability of courts to initiate contempt prosecutions to the summary punishment of in-court contempts that interfere with the
judicial process.
The court may proceed upon its own knowledge of the facts without further proof and without issue or trial in any form to punish a contempt committed directly under its eye
or within its view. But there must be adequate facts to support a summary order for contempt in the presence of the court. The exercise of the summary power to imprison for
contempt is a delicate one and care is needed to avoid arbitrary or oppressive conclusions. The reason for the extraordinary power to punish criminal contempt in summary
proceedings is that the necessities of the administration of justice require such summary dealing with obstructions to it, being a mode of vindicating the majesty of the law, in
its active manifestation, against obstruction and outrage.



Proceedings for contempt are sui generis, in nature criminal, but may be resorted to in civil as well as criminal actions, and independently of any action. They are of two
classes, the criminal or punitive, and the civil or remedial.
In general, the character of the contempt of whether it is criminal or civil is determined by the nature of the contempt involved, regardless of the cause in which the contempt
arose, and by the relief sought or dominant purpose.

criminal or punitive civil or remedial
consists in conduct that is directed against the authority and dignity of a court or of
a judge acting judicially, as in unlawfully assailing or discrediting the authority and
dignity of the court or judge, or in doing a duly forbidden act
consists in the failure to do something ordered to be done by a court or judge in a
civil case for the benefit of the opposing party therein
purpose is primarily punishment purpose is primarily compensatory or remedial
dominant purpose is to vindicate the dignity and authority of the court, and to
protect the interests of the general public
dominant purpose is to enforce compliance with an order of a court for the benefit of
a party in whose favor the order runs
vindicate the dignity of the courts protect, preserve, and enforce the rights of private parties and compel obedience to
orders, judgments and decrees made to enforce such rights
Misbehaviour means something more than adverse comment or disrespect. There is no question that in contempt the intent goes to the gravamen of the offense.
Thus, the good faith, or lack of it, of the alleged contemnor should be considered. Where the act complained of is ambiguous or does not clearly show on its face that it is
contempt, and is one which, if the party is acting in good faith, is within his rights, the presence or absence of a contumacious intent is, in some instances, held to be
determinative of its character. A person should not be condemned for contempt where he contends for what he believes to be right and in good faith institutes proceedings for
the purpose, however erroneous may be his conclusion as to his rights. To constitute contempt, the act must be done wilfully and for an illegitimate or improper purpose.
Unfounded accusations or allegations or words tending to embarrass the court or to bring it into disrepute have no place in a pleading. Their employment serves no useful
purpose. On the contrary, they constitute direct contempt of court or contempt in facie curiae and, when committed by a lawyer, a violation of the lawyers oath and a
transgression of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Punishment is generally summary and immediate, and no process or evidence is necessary because the act is committed in
facie curiae.
The inherent power of courts to punish contempt of court committed in the presence of the courts without further proof of
facts and without aid of a trial is not open to question, considering that this power is essential to preserve their authority and
to prevent the administration of justice from falling into disrepute; such summary conviction and punishment accord with due
process of law
There is authority for the view, however, that an act, to constitute direct contempt punishable by summary proceeding, need
not be committed in the immediate presence of the court, if it tends to obstruct justice or to interfere with the actions of the
court in the courtroom itself
Contemptuous acts committed out of the presence of the court, if admitted by the contemnor in open court, may be
punished summarily as a direct contempt, although it is advisable to proceed by requiring the person charged to appear and
show cause why he should not be punished when the judge is without personal knowledge of the misbehavior and is informed
of it only by a confession of the contemnor or by testimony under oath of other persons
Requires proceedings less summary
than the first. The proceedings for
the punishment of the contumacious
act committed outside the personal
knowledge of the judge generally
need the observance of all the
elements of due process of law, that
is, notice, written charges, and an
opportunity to deny and to defend
such charges before guilt is adjudged
and sentence imposed