1. 6 SCRA 6 Labor Law Labor Standards Coverage of the Social
Security Act Luzon Stevedoring Corporation vs SSS Luzon Stevedoring Corporation (LSC) is engaged in the business of stevedoring, lightering and towing in the cities of Iloilo and Bacolod. It owns, maintains and operates towboats, barges and a drdoc!. In "#$#, it carried in its parolls temporar emploees of ",%$& and &,$$& stevedores in the cities of Iloilo and Bacolod, respectivel, who were hired on rotation and on vessel'b' vessel basis. (he were paid dail with the understanding of being laid o) at the end of each da. *n the average, each stevedore wor!ed for "+ das during the ear. In *ctober "#,-, LSC petitioned to the SSS that the temporar emploees be e.empt from SSS contributions on the ground that the /wor! onl intermittentl and are not in a position to maintain membership in the Social Securit Sstem long enough to be full entitled to the law0s sic!ness, disabilit, death and retirement bene1ts2. 3nd that the law could not have intended them to be covered without en4oing the bene1ts of the program. SSS however denied LSC0s petition and it ordered LSC to pa bac! premiums. LSC countered stating that the compulsor coverage of the SSS contributions onl covers permanent emploees. LSC invo!ed Section # of the Social Securit 3ct as amended b 5epublic 3ct 6o. "%#& which states that an emploee must at least have been with the compan for si. months to be covered b the compulsor coverage. LSC also invo!ed Sec. 7 of the same law which de1nes emploment covered b the Social Securit 3ct and also provides e.emption therefrom. 8aragraph "- of that section would state that services b temporar emploees ma be e.cluded b regulations of the Social Securit Commission. (his is interpreted b LSC as a provision that Congress has delegated to the Social Securit Commission the issuance of regulations bearing on the e.emption of services performed b temporar emploees from social securit coverage. ISSUE: 9hether or not the temporar emploees are e.empt from the compulsor coverage. HELD: 6o. (he Social Securit 3ct was amended b 5epublic 3ct 6o. &,$7 on :une "7, "#,-. (he amendment broadened the coverage of the Social Securit Sstem, increased its bene1ts and liberalized the terms and conditions for their en4oment. Sections # and "- were made to read as follows; SEC. 9. Compulsory Coverage. Coverage in the System shall be compulsory upon all employees between the ages of sixteen and sixty, inclusive, and their employers . . .! SEC. "#. E$ective date of coverage. Compulsory coverage of the employer shall ta%e e$ect on the &rst day of his operation, and that of the employee on the date of his employment.! <liminated was the si. months0 service re=uirement. 9ithout such re=uirement, all emploees regardless of tenure, such as the emploees in =uestion, would =ualif for compulsor membership in the SSS> e.cept of course those classes of emploees contemplated in Section 7(4) of the Social Securit 3ct. 9ith such removal, it is the intent of Congress to broaden and include temporar wor!ers to the compulsor coverage. *n the other hand, in regards section 7, paragraph "- being invo!ed b LSC, no such regulation has been cited to buttress the claim for e.emption. 8erforce, no e.emption could be granted as there is no wa of telling whether or not the emploees in =uestion belong to a group or class designated b regulation of the Social Securit Commission as e.empt. . !o"#ete Constru$tion Co. v. So$ia# Se$urit% Co&&ission L'1()*+, -anuar% , 1.)/ 8oblete Construction Co. and ?omingo 8oblete, its president and general manager, appeal from the order of the Court of @irst Instance of 5izal dated Aa "#, "#,- dismissing Civil Case 6o. &-+# B an action for certiorari against the Social Securit Commission B hereinafter referred to as the Commission B and :udith 3siain B and dissolving the writ of preliminar in4unction issued therein. In a petition 1led with the Social Securit Commission on :anuar &%, "#,- (Case 6o. %7) :udith 3siain sought to recover from appellants the death bene1ts she would have been entitled to receive from the Social Securit Sstem had appellants B the emploers of her husband reported him to the Sstem for coverage prior to his death, as re=uired b law. 3ppellantsC motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the Commission had no 4urisdiction over the case, as appelleeCs husband was not covered b the Sstem, was denied and the Commission re=uired appellants to answer the claim. 6ot having done so, the Commission upon motion of appellee entered an order of default and set the date for the reception of appelleesC evidence. In view thereof, appellants 1led with the Court of @irst Instance of 5izal a petition for certiorari with in4unction (Civil Case 6o. &-+#'8) to en4oin the Commission from further proceedings in said case. (he Court issued a writ of preliminar in4unction restraining the Commission from proceeding with the case pending 1nal determination of the action for certiorari. Instead of 1ling an answer to the petition for certiorari, appellees moved to dismiss the case on the ground of lac! of 4urisdiction and improper venue. *ver appellantsC opposition, the lower court issued the order appealed from. 3ppellants now claim that the lower court erred in dismissing the case and in not ruling, after trial, that the Social Securit Commission has no 4urisdiction to tr and decide the petition 1led with it b :udith 3siain and her minor children, the sub4ect matter of which should have been submitted in an ordinar civil action before the regular courts. 9e 1nd the present appeal to be without merit."'wph(".)*t In ta!ing cognizance of the petition 1led b :udith 3siain (Case 6o. %7), the Social Securit Commission was e.ercising its =uasi'4udicial powers granted b Section $ (a) of 5epublic 3ct 6o. "",", as amended. <ven assuming, for the sa!e of argument, that the claim aforementioned was not within the 4urisdiction of the Commission, and that it would be proper to issue a writ of certiorari or in4unction to restrain it from hearing and deciding the same, a Court of @irst Instance has no 4urisdiction to issue either of said writs against the Commission. It must be observed that in accordance with the provisions of Section $, paragraphs (a) and (c) of 5epublic 3ct 6o. "",", as amended, the decisions of said Commission are reviewable both upon law and facts b the Court of 3ppeals, and that if the appeal from its decision is onl on =uestions of law, the review shall be made b Ds. It is clear from these provisions that the Commission, in e.ercising its =uasi'4udicial powers, ran!s with the 8ublic Service Commission and the Courts of @irst Instance. 3s the writs of In4unction, Certiorari and 8rohibition ma be issued onl b a superior court against an inferior court, board or oEcer e.ercising 4udicial functions, it necessaril follows that the Court of @irst Instance of 5izal, where appellants 1led their petition for certiorari, had no 4urisdiction to entertain the same. 9F<5<@*5<, the order appealed from is hereb aErmed with costs. 0. Case Tit#e: ALE1ANDE2 3. GATUS 4petitioner5 vs. SOCIAL SECU2IT6S6STE7 4respondent5 Date o8 De$ision: -anuar% ), *11G2 No.: 1(/(+ Topi$; Grounds and 5e=uisites for a ?isease of Sic!ness to be Compensable under the SSS Law and Implementing 5ules and 5egulations. Sub'(opicHs; (") Coronar 3rter ?isease a Compensable ?isease under the SSS Law. (&) Iuantum of <vidence to prove that the ?iseaseHSic!ness is Compensable. (J) 6ecessar 8art to 8rove the Compensabilit of the ?iseaseHSic!ness 9ACTS: Gatus wor!ed at the Central 3zucarera de (arlac for a period of J- ears. ?uring his emploment, he contracted disease and was diagnosed to be su)ering from Coronar 3rter ?isease (C3?); (riple Kessel and Dnstable 3ngina. Fis medical records showed him to be hpertensive for "- ears and a smo!er. Fe was given b the SSS the following <CHSSS 8ermanent 8artial ?isabilit (88?) bene1ts; (a) 7 monthl pensions e)ective September ", "##+and (b) + monthl pensions e)ective :anuar J, "##%. Fe became an SSS retirement pensioner on @ebruar ", &--&. Fowever, an SSS audit revealed the need to recover the <C bene1ts alread paid to him on the ground that his C3?, being attributed to his chronic smo!ing, was not wor!'related. Fe was noti1ed thereof through a letter dated :ul J", &--J. 8etitioner, believing he was entitled to such bene1ts, assailed the decision of the SSS. SSS denied the petition. Fe then elevated to the <CC ruled against the 8etitioner. @urther, C3 ruled that the 8etitioner is not entitled to the bene1ts under 8residential ?ecree 6o. ,&,. Fence, this 8etition. ISSUE:S: (") 9hether or 6ot the 8etitioner is entitled to the Bene1ts under 8residential ?ecree 6o.,&,. DECISION: (he Supreme Court held that the 8etitioner is not entitled to the bene1ts under 8residential ?ecree 6o. ,&, and upheld the ruling of the C3. In its decision, the Court mentioned of Section ", 5ule III of the 3mended 5ules on <mploees0 Compensation states that the sic!ness must be the result of an occupational disease listed thereon otherwise proof must be shown that the ris! of contracting the disease is increased b the wor!ing conditions. (he 8etitioner in this case failed to prove the compensabilit of his disease, thus, he was not able to prove with substantial evidence that indeed he is entitled to the bene1ts under 8? ,&,.(he burden of proof is thus on petitioner to show that an of the above conditions have been met in his case. (he re=uired proof is further discussed in *rtega v. Social Securit Commission ;(he re=uisite =uantum of proof in cases 1led before administrative or =uasi'4udicial bodies is neither proof beond reasonable doubt nor preponderance of evidence. In this tpe of cases, a fact ma be deemed established if it is supported b substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as ade=uate to 4ustif a conclusion. In this case, substantial evidence abounds. /. G.2. No. 1(0;/) 9e"ruar% , *11 -OSE 7A2CEL !ANLILIO, E2LINDA !ANLILIO, NICOLE 7O22IS and 7A2IO T.C2ISTO3AL, !etitioners ,vs. 2EGIONAL T2IAL COU2T, 32ANCH +1, CIT6 O9 7ANILA, represented "% HON. !2ESIDING -UDGEANTONIO 7. 2OSALES< !EO!LE O9 THE !HILI!!INES< and t=e SOCIAL SECU2IT6S6STE7, 2espondents. 9ACTS: :ose Aarcel 8anlilio, <rlinda 8anlilio, 6icole Aorris and Aarlo Cristobal (petitioners), as corporate oEcers of Silahis International Fotel, Inc. (SIFI), 1led with the 5egional (rial Court (5(C) of Aanila, Branch &+, a petition for Suspension of 8aments and 5ehabilitation. (he 5(C of Aanila, Branch &+, issued an *rder staing all claims against SIFI upon 1nding the petition suEcient in form and substance. 3t the time, however, of the 1ling of the petition for rehabilitation, there were a number of criminal charges pendingagainst petitioners in Branch $" of the 5(C of Aanila. (hese criminal charges were initiated b respondent Social Securit Sstem (SSS) and involved charges of <stafa. Conse=uentl, petitioners 1led with the 5(C of Aanila, Branch $", a Aanifestation and Aotion to Suspend 8roceedings. 8etitioners argued that the sta order issued b Branch &+ should also appl to the criminal charges pending in Branch $". 8etitioners, thus, praed that Branch $" suspend its proceedings until the petition for rehabilitation was 1nall resolved but Branch $" issued an *rder dening petitioners0 motion to suspend the proceedings. It ruled that the sta order issued b Branch &+ did not cover criminal proceedings. Branch $" then denied the motion for reconsideration 1led b petitioners. 8etitioners 1led a petition for certiorari with the C3 assailing the *rder of Branch $" but the C3 issued a ?ecision dening the petition. Fence petitioners 1led before the Supreme Court a petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE: 9hether or not the suspension of Lall claimsL as an incident to a corporate rehabilitation also includes thesuspension of criminal charges 1led against the corporate oEcers of the distressed corporation. 2ULING: 6o, the criminal charges are not included. (he Supreme Court ?<6I<? the petition and 3@@I5A<? the ?ecision of the Court of 3ppeals. (he 5egional (rial Court of Aanila, Branch $", was *5?<5<? to proceed with the criminal cases 1led against petitioners. In 5osario v. Co&+ (5osario), a case of recent vintage, the issue resolved b the Court was whether or not during the pendenc of rehabilitation proceedings, criminal charges for violation of Batas 8ambansa Bilang&& should be suspended and it was ruled that the 1ling of the case for violation of B.8. Blg. && is not a LclaimL that can be en4oined within the purview of 8.?. 6o. #-&'3. (rue, although conviction of the accused for the alleged crime could result in the restitution, reparation or indemni1cation of the private o)ended part for the damage or in4ur he sustained b reason of the felonious act of the accused, nevertheless, prosecution for violation of B.8. Blg. && is a criminal action. 3 criminal action has a dual purpose, namel, the punishment of the o)ender and indemnit to the o)ended part. (he dominant and primordial ob4ective of the criminal action is the punishment of the o)ender. (he civil action is merel incidental to and conse=uent to the conviction of the accused. (he reason for this is that criminal actions are primaril intended to vindicate an outrage against the sovereignt of the state and to impose the appropriate penalt for the vindication of the disturbance to the social order caused b the o)ender. *n the other hand, the action between the private complainant and the accused is intended solel to indemnif the former. (he rehabilitation of SIFI and the settlement of claims against the corporation is not a legal ground for the e.tinction of petitioners0 criminal liabilities. (here is no reason wh criminal proceedings should be suspended during corporate rehabilitation, more so, since the prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the o)ender in order to deter him and others from committing the same or similar o)ense, to isolate him from societ, reform and rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order. 3s correctl observed in 5osario, it would be absurd for one who has engaged in criminal conduct could escape punishment b the mere 1ling of a petition for rehabilitation b the corporation of which he is an oEcer. (he prosecution of the oEcers of the corporation has no bearing on the pending rehabilitation of the corporation, especiall since the are charged in their individual capacities. Such being the case, the purpose of the law for the issuance of the sta order is not compromised, since the appointed rehabilitation receiver can still full discharge his functions as mandated b law. +. 2epu"#i$ vs Asiapro Cooperative 4**(5 G.2. 1(1*1 9a$ts: 5espondent 3siapro, as a cooperative, is composed of owners'members. Dnder its b'laws, owners'members are of two categories, to wit; (") regular member, who is entitled to all the rights and privileges of membership> and (&)associate member, who has no right to vote and be voted upon and shall be entitled onl to such rights and privileges provided in its b'laws, Its primar ob4ectives are to provide savings and credit facilities and to develop other livelihood services for its owners' members. In the discharge of the aforesaid primar ob4ectives, respondent cooperative entered into several Service Contracts with Stan1lco ' a division of ?*L< 8hilippines, Inc. and a compan based in Bu!idnon. (he owners'members do not receive compensation or wages from the respondent cooperative. Instead, the receive a share in the service surplus which the respondent cooperative earns from di)erent areas of trade it engages in, such as the income derived from the said Service Contracts with Stan1lco. (he owners members get their income from the service surplus generated b the =ualit and amount of services the rendered, which is determined b the Board of ?irectors of the respondent cooperative. In order to en4o the bene1ts under the Social Securit Law of "##%, the owners' members of the respondent cooperative, who were assigned to Stan1lco re=uested the services of the latter to register them with petitioner SSS as self'emploed and to remit their contributions as such. 3lso, to compl with Section "#'3 of 5epublic 3ct 6o. "",",as amended b 5epublic 3ct 6o. 7&7&, the SSS contributions of the said owners'members were e=ual to the share of both the emploer and the emploee. *n &, September &--&, however, petitioner SSS through its Kice'8resident for Aindanao ?ivision, 3tt. <ddie 3. :ara, sent a letter to the respondent cooperative, addressed to its Chief <.ecutive *Ecer (C<*) and General Aanager Leo G. 8arma, informing the latter that based on the Service Contracts it e.ecuted with Stan1lco, respondent cooperative is actuall a manpower contractor suppling emploees to Stan1lco and for that reason, it is an emploer of its owners'members wor!ing with Stan1lco. (hus, respondent cooperative should register itself with petitioner SSS as an emploer and ma!e the corresponding report and remittance of premium contributions in accordance with the Social Securit Law of "##%.*n # *ctober &--&, respondent cooperative, through its counsel, sent a repl to petitioner SSSs letter asserting that it is not an emploer because its owners' members are the cooperative itself> hence, it cannot be its own emploer. 3gain, on &" *ctober &--& petitioner SSS sent a letter to respondent cooperative ordering the latter to register as an emploer and report its owners'members as emploees for compulsor coverage with the petitioner SSS. 5espondent cooperative continuousl ignored the demand of petitioner SSS. 3ccordingl, petitioner SSS, on "& :une &--J, 1led a 8etition before petitioner SSC against the respondent cooperative and Stan1lco praing that the respondent cooperative or, in the alternative, Stan1lco be directed to register as an emploer and to report respondent cooperatives owners'members as covered emploees under the compulsor coverage of SSS and to remit the necessar contributions in accordance with the Social Securit Law of "##%.(he same was doc!eted as SSC Case 6o. ,'"$$-%'-J. 5espondent cooperative 1led its 3nswer with Aotion to ?ismiss alleging that no emploer'emploee relationship e.ists between it and its owners'members, thus, petitioner SSC has no 4urisdiction over the respondent cooperative. Stan1lco, on the other hand, 1led an 3nswer with Cross'claim against the respondent cooperative. Issue: 9hether the petitioner SSC has 4urisdiction over the petition'complaint 1led before it b petitioner SSS against the respondent cooperative. He#d: 8etitioner SSC0s 4urisdiction is clearl stated in Section $ of 5epublic 3ct 6o. 7&7& as well as in Section", 5ule III of the "##% SSS 5evised 5ules of 8rocedure. Section $ of 5epublic 3ct 6o. 7&7& provides; S<C. $. Settlement of ?isputes. M (a) 3n dispute arising under this 3ct with respect to coverage ,bene1ts, contributions and penalties thereon or an other matter related thereto, shall be cognizable b the Commission, . . .. Similarl, Section ", 5ule III of the "##% SSS 5evised 5ules of 8rocedure states; Section ". :urisdiction. M 3n dispute arising under the Social Securit 3ct with respect to coverage, entitlement of bene1ts, collection and settlement of contributions and penalties thereon, or an other matter related thereto, shall be cognizable b the Commission after the SSS through its 8resident, Aanager or *Ecer'in'charge of the ?epartmentHBranchH5epresentative *Ece concerned had 1rst ta!en action thereon in writing. It is clear then from the aforesaid provisions that an issue regarding the compulsor coverage of the SSS is well within the e.clusive domain of the petitioner SSC. It is important to note, though, that the mandator coverage under the SSS Law is premised on the e.istence of an emploer'emploee relationship e.cept in cases of compulsor coverage of the self'emploed. In this case, the petition'complaint 1led b the petitioner SSS before the petitioner SSC against therespondent cooperative and Stan1lco alleges that the owners' members of the respondent cooperativeare sub4ect to the compulsor coverage of the SSS because the are emploees of the respondentcooperative. Conse=uentl, the respondent cooperative being the emploer of its owners'membersmust register as emploer and report its owners'members as covered members of the SSS and remitthe necessar premium contributions in accordance with the Social Securit Law of "##%. 3ccordingl,based on the aforesaid allegations in the petition'complaint 1led before the petitioner SSC, the caseclearl falls within its 4urisdiction. 3s previousl pointed out b this Court, an emploee' emploerrelationship actuall e.ists between the respondent cooperative and its owners'members. (he four elements in the four'fold test for the e.istence of an emploment relationship have been complied with. (he respondent cooperative must not be allowed to den its emploment relationship with its owners'members b invo!ing the =uestionable Service Contracts provision, when in actualit, it does e.ist. (he e.istence of an emploer'emploee relationship cannot be negated b e.pressl repudiating it in a contract, when the terms and surrounding circumstances show otherwise. (he emploment status of a person is de1ned and prescribed b law and not b what the parties sa it should be. (he =uestion involved here is whether an emploer'emploee relationship can e.ist between the cooperative and an owner'member. In fact, a closer loo! at Cooperative 5ural Ban! of ?avao Cit, Inc. will show that it actuall recognized that an owner'member of a cooperative can be its own emploee. It is settled that the contracting parties ma establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as the want, and their agreement would have the force of law between them. Fowever, the agreed terms and conditions must not be contrar to law, morals, customs, public polic or public order. (he Service Contract provision in =uestion must be struc! down for being contrar to law and public polic since it is apparentl being used b the respondent cooperative merel to circumvent the compulsor coverage of its emploees, who are also its owners'members, b the Social Securit Law. It bears stressing, too, that a cooperative ac=uires 4uridical personalit upon its registration with the Cooperative ?evelopment 3uthorit. It has its Board of ?irectors, which directs and supervises its business> meaning, its Board of ?irectors is the one in charge in the conduct and management of its a)airs. 9ith that, a cooperative can be li!ened to a corporation with a personalit separate and distinct from its owners'members. Conse=uentl, an owner'member of a cooperative can be an emploee of the latter and an emploer'emploee relationship can e.ist between them. In the present case, it is not disputed that the respondent cooperative had registered itself with the Cooperative ?evelopment 3uthorit, as evidenced b its Certi1cate of 5egistration 6o. -',&J'&+,-.In its b'laws, its Board of ?irectors directs, controls, and supervises the business and manages the propert of the respondent cooperative. Clearl then, the management of the a)airs of the respondent cooperative is vested in its Board of ?irectors and not in its owners' members as a whole. (herefore, it is completel logical that the respondent cooperative, as a 4uridical person represented b its Board of ?irectors, can enter into an emploment with its owners'members. In sum, having declared that there is an emploer'emploee relationship between the respondent cooperative and its owners'member, we conclude that the petitioner SSC has 4urisdiction over the petition'complaint 1led before it b the petitioner SSS. ). SSC vs 2iza# !ou#tr% G2 1)(*+* (his petition for certiorari challenges the ?ecision " dated &- September &--+ and 5esolution & dated # @ebruar &--$ of the Court of 3ppeals. (he instant case stemmed from a petition 1led b 3lberto 3ngeles (3ngeles) before the Social Securit Commission (SSC) to compel respondents 5izal 8oultr and Livestoc! 3ssociation, Inc. (5izal 8oultr) or BS? 3gro Industrial ?evelopment Corporation (BS? 3gro) to remit to the Social Securit Sstem (SSS) all contributions due for and in his behalf. 5espondents countered with a Aotion to ?ismiss J citing rulings of the 6ational Labor 5elations Commission (6L5C) and Court of 3ppeals regarding the absence of emploer'emploee relationship between 3ngeles and the respondents. 3s a brief bac!grounder, 3ngeles had earlier 1led a complaint for illegal dismissal against BS? 3gro andHor its owner, Ben4amin San ?iego (San ?iego). (he Labor 3rbiter initiall found that 3ngeles was an emploee and that he was illegall dismissed. *n appeal, however, the 6L5C reversed the Labor 3rbiter0s ?ecision and held that no emploer'emploee relationship e.isted between 3ngeles and respondents. (he ruling was anchored on the 1nding that the duties performed b 3ngeles, such as carpentr, plumbing, painting and electrical wor!s, were not independent and integral steps in the essential operations of the compan, which is engaged in the poultr business. + 3ngeles elevated the case to the Court of 3ppeals via petition for certiorari. (he appellate court aErmed the 6L5C ruling and upheld the absence of emploer'emploee relationship. $ 3ngeles moved for reconsideration but it was denied b the Court of 3ppeals. , 6o further appeal was underta!en, hence, an entr of 4udgment was made on &, Aa &--". % 3t an rate, the SSC did not ta!e into consideration the decision of the 6L5C. It denied respondents0 motion to dismiss in an *rder dated "# @ebruar &--&. (he SSC ratiocinated, thus; ?ecisions of the 6L5C and other tribunals on the issue of e.istence of emploer' emploee relationship between parties are not binding on the Commission. 3t most, such 1nding has onl a persuasive e)ect and does not constitute res 4udicata as a ground for dismissal of an action pending before Ds. 9hile it is true that the parties before the 6L5C and in this case are the same, the issues and sub4ect matter are entirel di)erent. (he labor case is for illegal dismissal with demand for bac!wages and other monetar claims, while the present action is for remittance of unpaid SSNSO contributions. In other words, although in both suits the respondents invo!e lac! of emploer'emploee relationship, the same does not proceed from identical causes of action as one is for violation of the Labor Code while the instant case is for violation of the SSNSO Law. Aoreover, the respondents0 arguments raising the absence of emploer'emploee relationship as a defense alread traverse the ver issues of the case at bar, i.e., the petitioner0s fact of emploment and entitlement to SSNSO coverage. Generall, factual matters should not weigh in resolving a motion to dismiss when it is based on the ground of failure to state a cause of action, but rather, merel the suEcienc or insuEcienci of the allegations in the complaint. . . .. In this respect, it must be observed that the petitioner ver categoricall set forth in his 8etition, that he was emploed b the respondent(s) from "#7$ to "##%. 7 3 subse=uent motion for reconsideration 1led b respondents was li!ewise denied on "" :une &--&. (he SSC reiterated that the principle of res 4udicata does not appl in this case because of the Labsence of the indispensable element of Pidentit of cause of action.0L # Dnfazed, respondents sought recourse before the Court of 3ppeals b wa of a petition for certiorari. (he Court of 3ppeals reversed the rulings of the SSC and held that there is a common issue between the cases before the SSC and in the 6L5C> and it is whether there e.isted an emploer'emploee relationship between 3ngeles and respondents. (hus, the case falls s=uarel under the principle of res 4udicata, particularl under the rule on conclusiveness of 4udgment, as enunciated in Smith Bell and Co. v. Court of 3ppeals. "- (he Court of 3ppeals disposed, thus; 9F<5<@*5<, the petition is G536(<?. (he *rder dated @ebruar "#, &--- and the 5esolution dated :une "", &--& rendered b public respondent Social Securit Commissoin in SSC Case 6o. #'"$&&$'-" are hereb 5<K<5S<? and S<( 3SI?< and the respondent commission is ordered to ?ISAISS Social Securit Commission Case 6o. #'"$&&$'-". "" 3fter the denial of their motion for reconsideration in a 5esolution "& dated # @ebruar &--$, petitioner 1led the instant petition. @or our consideration are the issues raised b petitioner, to wit; 9F<(F<5 *5 6*( (F< ?<CISI*6 *@ (F< 6L5C 36? (F< C*D5( *@ 388<3LS, @I6?I6G 6* <A8L*Q<5'<A8L*Q<< 5<L3(I*6SFI8, C*6S(I(D(<S 5<S :D?IC3(3 3S 3 5DL< *6 C*6CLDSIK<6<SS *@ :D?GA<6( 3S (* 85<CLD?< (F< 5<LI(IG3(I*6 *@ (F< ISSD< *@ <A8L*Q<5'<A8L*Q<< 5<L3(I*6SFI8 I6 3 SDBS<ID<6( C3S< @IL<? B<@*5< (F< 8<(I(I*6<5. 9F<(F<5 *5 6*( 5<S8*6?<6( C*D5( *@ 388<3LS A3Q *5?<5 *D(5IGF( (F< ?ISAISS3L *@ (F< SSC C3S< I6 (F< C<5(I*535I 85*C<<?I6GS B<@*5< I(. "J SSC maintains that the prior 4udgment rendered b the 6L5C and Court of 3ppeals, that no emploer'emploee relationship e.isted between the parties, does not have the force of res 4udicata b prior 4udgment or as a rule on the conclusiveness of 4udgment. It contends that the labor dispute and the SSC claim do not proceed from the same cause of action in that the action before SSC is for non'remittance of SSS contributions while the 6L5C case was for illegal dismissal. (he element of identit of parties is li!ewise unavailing in this case, according to SSC. 3side from SSS intervening, another emploer, 5izal 8oultr, was added as respondent in the case lodged before the SSC. (here is no showing that BS? 3gro and 5izal 8oultr refer to the same 4uridical entit. (hus, the 1nding of absence of emploer' emploee relationship between BS? 3gro and 3ngeles could not automaticall e.tend to 5izal 8oultr. Conse=uentl, SSC assails the order of dismissal of the case lodged before it. SSC also claims that the evidence submitted in the SSC case is di)erent from that adduced in the 6L5C case. 5ather than ordering the dismissal of the SSC case, the Court of 3ppeals should have allowed SSC to resolve the case on its merits b appling the Social Securit 3ct of "##%. 5espondents assert that the 1ndings of the 6L5C are conclusive upon the SSC under the principle of res 4udicata and in line with the ruling in Smith Bell v. Court of 3ppeals. 5espondents argue that there is substantiall an identit of parties in the 6L5C and SSC cases because 3ngeles himself, in his 8etition, treated 5izal 8oultr, BS? 3gro and San ?iego as one and the same entit. 5espondents oppose the view pro)ered b SSC that the evidence to prove the e.istence of emploer'emploee relationship obtaining before the 6L5C and SSS are entirel di)erent. 5espondents opine that the de1nition of an emploee alwas proceeds from the e.istence of an emploer'emploee relationship. In essence, the main issue to be resolved is whether res 4udicata applies so as to preclude the SSC from resolving anew the e.istence of emploer'emploee relationship, which issue was previousl determined in the 6L5C case. 5es 4udicata embraces two concepts; (") bar b prior 4udgment as enunciated in 5ule J#, Section +%(b) of the 5ules of Civil 8rocedure> and (&) conclusiveness of 4udgment in 5ule J#, Section +%(c). "+ (here is Lbar b prior 4udgmentL when, as between the 1rst case where the 4udgment was rendered and the second case that is sought to be barred, there is identit of parties, sub4ect matter, and causes of action. In this instance, the 4udgment in the 1rst case constitutes an absolute bar to the second action. "$ But where there is identit of parties in the 1rst and second cases, but no identit of causes of action, the 1rst 4udgment is conclusive onl as to those matters actuall and directl controverted and determined and not as to matters merel involved therein. (his is the concept of res 4udicata !nown as Lconclusiveness of 4udgment.L Stated di)erentl, an right, fact or matter in issue directl ad4udicated or necessaril involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which 4udgment is rendered on the merits is conclusivel settled b the 4udgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies, whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or sub4ect matter of the two actions is the same. ", "avvphi" (hus, if a particular point or =uestion is in issue in the second action, and the 4udgment will depend on the determination of that particular point or =uestion, a former 4udgment between the same parties or their privies will be 1nal and conclusive in the second if that same point or =uestion was in issue and ad4udicated in the 1rst suit. Identit of cause of action is not re=uired but merel identit of issue. "% (he elements of res 4udicata are; (") the 4udgment sought to bar the new action must be 1nal> (&) the decision must have been rendered b a court having 4urisdiction over the sub4ect matter and the parties> (J) the disposition of the case must be a 4udgment on the merits> and (+) there must be as between the 1rst and second action, identit of parties, sub4ect matter, and causes of action. Should identit of parties, sub4ect matter, and causes of action be shown in the two cases, then res 4udicata in its aspect as a Lbar b prior 4udgmentL would appl. If as between the two cases, onl identit of parties can be shown, but not identical causes of action, then res 4udicata as Lconclusiveness of 4udgmentL applies. "7 Keril, the principle of res 4udicata in the mode of Lconclusiveness of 4udgmentL applies in this case. (he 1rst element is present in this case. (he 6L5C ruling was aErmed b the Court of 3ppeals. It was a 4udicial aErmation through a decision dul promulgated and rendered 1nal and e.ecutor when no appeal was underta!en within the reglementar period. (he 4urisdiction of the 6L5C, which is a =uasi'4udicial bod, was undisputed. 6either can the 4urisdiction of the Court of 3ppeals over the 6L5C decision be the sub4ect of a dispute. (he 6L5C case was clearl decided on its merits> li!ewise on the merits was the aErmance of the 6L5C b the Court of 3ppeals. 9ith respect to the fourth element of identit of parties, we hold that there is substantial compliance. (he parties in SSC and 6L5C cases are not strictl identical. 5izal 8oultr was impleaded as additional respondent in the SSC case. :urisprudence however does not dictate absolute identit but onl substantial identit. "# (here is substantial identit of parties when there is a communit of interest between a part in the 1rst case and a part in the second case, even if the latter was not impleaded in the 1rst case. &- BS? 3gro, 5izal 8oultr and San ?iego were litigating under one and the same entit both before the 6L5C and the SSC. 3lthough 5izal 8oultr is not a part in the 6L5C case, there are numerous indications that all the while, 5izal 8oultr was also an emploer of 3ngeles together with BS? 3gro and San ?iego. 3ngeles admitted before the 6L5C that he was emploed b BS? 3gro and San ?iego from "#7$ until "##%. &" Fe made a similar claim in his 8etition before the SSC including as emploer 5izal 8oultr as respondent. && 3ngeles presented as evidence before the SSC his Identi1cation Card and a :ob *rder to prove his emploment in 5izal 8oultr. Fe clari1ed in his *pposition to the Aotion to ?ismiss &J 1led before SSC that he failed to adduce these as evidence before the 6L5C even if it would have proven his emploment with BS? 3gro. Aost signi1cantl, the three respondents, BS? 3gro, 5izal 8oultr and San ?iego, litigated as one entit before the SSC. (he were represented b one counsel and the submitted their pleadings as such one entit. Certainl, and at the ver least, a communit of interest e.ists among them. 9e therefore rule that there is substantial if not actual identit of parties both in the 6L5C and SSC cases. 3s previousl stated, an identit in the cause of action need not obtain in order to appl res 4udicata b Lconclusiveness of 4udgment.L 3n identit of issues would suEce. (he remittance of SSS contributions is mandated b Section &&(a) of the Social Securit 3ct of "##%, viz; S<C. &&. +emittance of Contributions. , (a) (he contributions imposed in the preceding Section shall be remitted to the SSS within the 1rst ten ("-) das of each calendar month following the month for which the are applicable or within such time as the Commission ma prescribe. <ver emploer re=uired to deduct and to remit such contributions shall be liable for their pament and if an contribution is not paid to the SSS as herein prescribed, he shall pa besides the contribution a penalt thereon of three percent (JR) per month from the date the contribution falls due until paid. . . .. (he mandator coverage under the Social Securit 3ct is premised on the e.istence of an emploer'emploee relationship. &+ (his is evident from Section #(a) which provides; S<C. #. Coverage. , (a) Coverage in the SSS shall be compulsor upon all emploees not over si.t (,-) ears of age and their emploers; -rovided, (hat in the case of domestic helpers, their monthl income shall not be less than *ne thousand pesos (8",---.--) a month . . .. Section 7(d) of the same law de1nes an emploee as an person who performs services for an emploer in which either or both mental or phsical e)orts are used and who receives compensation for such services, where there is an emploer'emploee relationship. (he illegal dismissal case before the 6L5C involved an in=uir into the e.istence or non'e.istence of an emploer'emploee relationship. (he ver same in=uir is needed in the SSC case. 3nd there was no indication therein that there is an essential conceptual di)erence between the de1nition of LemploeeL under the Labor Code and the Social Securit 3ct. In the instant case, therefore, res 4udicata in the concept of Lconclusiveness of 4udgmentL applies. (he 4udgment in the 6L5C case pertaining to a 1nding of an absence of emploer'emploee relationship between 3ngeles and respondents is conclusive on the SSC case. 3 case in point is Smith Bell and Co. v. Court of 3ppeals &$ which, contrar to SSC, is apt and proper reference. Smith Bell availed of the services of private respondents to transport cargoes from the pier to the companCs warehouse. Cases were 1led against Smith Bell, one for illegal dismissal before the 6L5C and the other one with the SSC, to direct Smith Bell to report all private respondents to the SSS for coverage. 9hile the SSC case was pending before the Court of 3ppeals, Smith Bell presented the resolution of the Supreme Court in G.5. 6o. L'++,&-, which aErmed the 6L5C, Secretar of Labor, and Court of 3ppeals0 1nding that no emploer' emploee relationship e.isted between the parties, to constitute as bar to the SSC case. 9e granted the petition of Smith Bell and ordered the dismissal of the case. 9e held that the controvers is s=uarel covered b the principle of res 4udicata, particularl under the rule on Lconclusiveness of 4udgment.L (herefore, the 4udgment in G.5. 6o. L'++,&- bars the SSC case, as the relief sought in the latter case is ine.tricabl related to the ruling in G.5. 6o. L'++,&- to the e)ect that private respondents are not emploees of Smith Bell. (he fairl recent case of Co v. 8eople, &, li!ewise applies to the present case. 3n information was 1led against Co b private respondent spouses who claim to be emploees of the former for violation of the Social Securit 3ct, speci1call for non'remittance of SSS contributions. <arlier, respondent spouses had 1led a labor case for illegal dismissal. (he 6L5C 1nall ruled that there was no emploer' emploee relationship between her and respondent spouses. Co then 1led a motion to =uash the information, arguing that the facts alleged in the Information did not constitute an o)ense because respondent spouses were not her emploees. In support of her motion, she cited the 6L5C ruling. (his Court applied Smith Bell and declared that the 1nal and e.ecutor 6L5C decision to the e)ect that respondent spouses were not the emploees of petitioner is a ruling binding in the case for violation of the Social Securit 3ct. (he Court further stated that the doctrine of Lconclusiveness of 4udgmentL also applies in criminal cases. &% 3ppling the rule on res 4udicata b Lconclusiveness of 4udgmentL in con4unction with the aforecited cases, the Court of 3ppeals aptl ruled, thus; In SSC Case 6o. #'"$&&$'-", private respondent 3ngeles is see!ing to compel herein petitioners to remit to the Social Securit Sstem (SSS) all contributions due for and in his behalf, whereas in 6L5C 6C5 C3 -"7-,,'## (6L5C 53B'IK'$'#-&7'#% 5I) private respondent praed for the declaration of his dismissal illegal. In SSC 6o. #'"$&&$'-", private respondent, in see!ing to enforce his alleged right to compulsor SSS coverage, alleged that he had been an emploee of petitioners> whereas to support his position in the labor case that he was illegall dismissed b petitioners BS? 3gro andHor Ben4amin San ?iego, he asserted that there was an emploer'emploee relationship e.isting between him and petitioners at the time of his dismissal in "##%. Simpl stated, the issue common to both cases is whether there e.isted an emploer'emploee relationship between private respondent and petitioners at the time of the acts complaint of were committed both in SSC Case 6o. #'"$&&$'-" and 6L5C 6C5 C3 -"7-,,'## (6L5C 53B'IK'$'#-&7'#%%'5I). (he issue of emploer'emploee relationship was laid to rest in C3 G5. S8. 6o. $$J7J, through this Court0s ?ecision dated *ctober &%, &--- which has long attained 1nalit. *ur aErmation of the 6L5C decision of Aa "7, "### was an ad4udication on the merits of the case. Considering the foregoing circumstances, the instant case falls s=uarel under the umbrage of res 4udicata, particularl, under the rule on conclusiveness of 4udgment. @ollowing this rule, as enunciated in Smith Bell and Co. and Carriaga, :r. cases, 9e hold that the relief sought in SSC Case 6o. #'"$&&$'-" is ine.tricabl related to *ur ruling in C3 G5 S8 6o. $$J7J to the e)ect that private respondent was not an emploee of petitioners. &7 (he 6L5C decision on the absence of emploer'emploee relationship being binding in the SSC case, we aErm the dismissal b Court of 3ppeals of the SSC case. 9F<5<@*5<, premises considered, the petition is ?<6I<?. (he Court of 3ppeals ?ecision dated &- September &--+, as well as its 5esolution dated # @ebruar &--$, is 3@@I5A<?. (. G.2. No. 1.+/1. !eop#e vs. La##i Nove&"er 0,*11 9ACTS: 5onnie 3ringo as!ed Lolita 8lando if she wants to wor! as restaurant entertainer in Aalasia, since Lolita is interested, she in=uired how she could appl. 5onnie brought Lolita to 6estor 5elampagos and Fad4a Lalli. (he latter accompanied Lolita and other women in Aalasia b boat from Samboanga to Sanda!an, Aalasia and then boarded a van going to Tota Tinabalu. (he were forced to wor! as prostitutes in pipen Club in Labuan, Aalasia. Lolita wor!ed as a prostitute from :une "+ to :ul 7, &--$. <ver night, a customer used her. She had at least one customer or more a night, and at most, she had around 1ve customers a night. (he all had se.ual intercourse with her. Lolita was saved b her brother'in'law who acted as a customer. ISSUE: Is Lalli, 5elampagos and 3ringo guilt of sndicated illegal recruitment and traEc!ing in personsU LA>S IN?OL?ED: Secs. , and % of 53 7-+ &3rt. "J (f) of the Labor Code 2ULING: It is clear that a person or entit engaged in recruitment and placement activities without the re=uisite authorit from the ?epartment of Labor and <mploment (?*L<), whether for pro1t or not, is engaged in illegal recruitment. (he 8hilippine *verseas <mploment 3dministration (8*<3), an agenc under ?*L< created b <* 6o. %#% to ta!e over the duties of the *verseas <mploment ?evelopment Board, issues the authorit to recruit under the Labor Code. (he commission of illegal recruitment b three or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another is deemed committed b a sndicate and constitutes economic sabotage, for which the penalt of life imprisonment and a 1ne of not less than V $--,--- but not more than V",---,--- shall be imposed. In this case, the trial court, as aErmed b the appellate court, found Lalli, 3ringo and 5elampagos to have conspired and confederated with one another to recruit and place Lolita for wor! in Aalasia, without a 8*<3 license. (he three elements of sndicated illegal recruitment are present in this case, in particular; (") the accused have no valid license or authorit re=uired b law to enable them to lawfull engage in the recruitment and placement of wor!ers> (&) the accused engaged in this activit of recruitment and placement b actuall recruiting, deploing and transporting Lolita to Aalasia> and (J) illegal recruitment was committed b three persons (3ringo, Lalli and 5elampagos), conspiring and confederating with one another. ;. G.2. No. 1./++ -une 10, *1 THE !EO!LE O9 THE !HILI!!INES, !#ainti@'Appe##ee, vs. NU292ASI2 HASHI7 % SA2A3AN a.A.a B92ANC:92ANS,B 7ADDUL -A7AD % 3UDIN 4AL5 a.A.a. B7ACD6,B a $ertain BTAS,B and a $ertain B-UN,B A$$used, 3E2NADETTE !ANSACALA a.A.a. BNeneng AEid,B A$$used'Appe##ant. *n appeal is the ?ecision " of the Court of 3ppeals (C3) in C3'G.5. C5'FC 6o. --,++'AI6 promulgated on &- :ul &-"-, which aErmed the conviction of herein accused'appellant Bernadette 8ansacala a.!.a 6eneng 3wid, together with co' accused 6urfrasir Fashim Saraban a.!.a L@ranzH@rans,L Aa!dul :amad Bu!in a.!.a. LAac!,L a certain L(asL and a certain L:unL for the crime of illegal recruitment as de1ned under Section , in relation to Section %(b) of 5epublic 3ct. 6o. (5.3.) 7-+& or the Aigrant 9or!ers and *verseas @ilipinos 3ct of "##$. (he @acts *n "- Aarch &--+, accused'appellant was charged as follows; & (hat on or about :une "", &--J and for sometime prior or subse=uent thereto, in the Cit of Samboanga, 8hilippines, and within the 4urisdiction of this Fonorable Court, the above'named accused, conspiring and confederating together, mutuall aiding and assisting with one another without having previousl obtained from the 8hilippine *verseas <mploment 3dministration, license or authorit to engage in the recruitment and deploment of overseas wor!ers, did then and there willfull NsicO, unlawfull and feloniousl, illegall recruit for a promised emploment abroad particularl in Brunei and Aalasia, thus causing and prompting the persons of BBB and 333 J to appl which emploment however did not materialize because in truth and in fact, the promised emploment is non'e.istent, in Wagrant violation of the above'mentioned law and causing damage and pre4udice to said complainants> further, the commission of the above stated o)ense tantamount to economic sabotage in that the same was committed b a sndicate. *nl accused'appellant and 6urfrasir Fashim Saraban were arrested, and both entered a plea of Lnot guiltL when arraigned. 8rivate complainants 333 and BBB, 8olice Chief Inspector 5onald 3Xonuevo, and police oEcers <dmond 5anel Killareal and 5enato 5abua dela 8eXa were presented b the prosecution to prove the following; *n "- :une &--J, accused'appellant approached 333, who was then doing her 4ob as a waitress at a stall in 8aseo de Samboanga, Buenavista, Samboanga Cit, to encourage 333 to wor! in Aalasia, as accused'appellant !new certain persons who would soon be leaving for that countr. *n the ne.t da, "" :une &--J, private complainant BBB was at her house in (alon' talon Loop, Samboanga Cit, when accused'appellant paid her a visit and invited her to wor! as a saleslad in Brunei. 3fter being assured that the prospective emploment was above board and that she would be well compensated, BBB accepted the invitation. (he da after, accused'appellant, together with co'accused Aa!dul 3mad Bu!in a.!.a. LAac!L (Aac!) and a certain L:un,L returned to the house of BBB. 3ccused' appellant informed BBB that the latter would be escorted to Aalasia b the two men, and that the would meet the ne.t da at ";-- p.m. at 8laza 8ershing, Samboanga Cit. *n "J :une &--J, BBB, Aac! and :un met as planned. (he proceeded to Shop'*' 5ama, where the met with co'accused 6urfrasir Fashim, a.!.a. L@ranzL (@ranz), who assured BBB that she would be easil hired because of her beaut and height. (he then agreed to meet at J;-- p.m. that same da at 8aseo de Samboanga. 3t 8aseo de Samboanga, BBB, accused'appellant, Aac!, and :un met with 333, a certain CCC (allegedl another recruit) and 3rlene (allegedl 3330s emploer). (hen at %;-- p.m. of that same da, the all proceeded to the wharf, where the met accused @ranz and a certain Crist, who was also allegedl invited b accused' appellant to wor! in Aalasia. (hereafter, 333, BBB, CCC, Crist, Aac! and :un boarded the AHK Grand @lora and were given pieces of paper containing a name. @ranz, accused'appellant Bernadette and a certain (iting did not board the boat. 3ccused'appellant informed private complainants and their companions that she and @ranz would follow and bring their passports. 9e =uote the ?ecision of the C3 to describe the 4ourne of the group after boarding the AHK @lora bound for Bongao, (awi'(awi, at "-;-- p.m.; + *n :une "+, &--J, the (BBB, 333, CCC, Crist, accused Aac!) and :un disembar!ed at Bongao, (awi'(awi, and then the proceeded to Sitang!ai, (awi' (awi where the staed for two das. *n :une ",, &--J, the went to 8undohan, which is a terminal going to Lahad ?atu, Sabah, Aalasia. *n :une "%, &--J, at ,;-- o0cloc! NsicO in the morningN,O the arrived at Lahad ?atu and soon thenafter NsicO the boarded a van going to Samporna, Aalasia where the met accused Aac!0s cousin named 8at. (he waited at Samporna until $;-- o0cloc! NsicO in the afternoon when accused @ranz and (ashN,O who was allegedl their 1nancierN,O arrived. 3ccused @ranz then distributed to 333, BBB, CCC and Crist their respective passports. (hereafter, the boarded a bus going to Tota Tinabalu, Aalasia, and the arrived thereat at %;-- o0cloc! NsicO in the morning of :une "7, &--J. Later, the boarded again a bus going to Ainumpo, Aalasia and then a barge going to Labuan, Aalasia where the staed at a hotel Nthe Classic FotelO for three nights or from the night of :une "7, &--J until :une &-, &--J. *n :une &", &--J, accused @ranz instructed BBB, 333, CCC and Crist to wear Lse. clothesL because the were going to meet their supposed boss named Bunso at Cape Imperial located at Labuan, Aalasia. 9hen the arrived at Cape Imperial, accused Aac! and :un tal!ed to Bunso but the failed to reach an agreement on the purported compensation of the four girls. So, accused Aac! and :un brought the girls to Golden Lotus Barber Salon (Salon for brevit) where the latter were introduced to a certain person named Aomm Cind, the alleged owner of the salon, and their purported manager Fa!o who was called Aomm Susan. (he prosecution also alleged that while the group was staing at the Classic Fotel in Labuan, BBB was forced on numerous occasions to have se.ual intercourse with @ranz at his bidding, even in the presence of other people. She followed his orders for fear that he would inWict phsical harm on her. 3t 1rst, private complainants were not aware of the circumstances surrounding their emploment at the Golden Lotus. It was onl after the agreed to sta there for emploment that the were forced to become se. wor!ers to earn mone and pa o) the debts the incurred from their travel from Samboanga Cit to Labuan, Aalasia. (hus, from &" :une &--J to "J :ul &--J, 333 and BBB wor!ed as prostituted women. <ach of the girls would be boo!ed to a customer for the whole night for J-- 5inggit at a certain hotel near the Golden Lotus. Aeanwhile, during the da, the would be hired b customers for a Lshort timeL for "$- 5inggit in one of the rooms of the Golden Lotus. (he girls were told that the would be made to pa a 1ne of "$- 5inggit if the refused to have se.ual intercourse with the customers. *n "& :ul &--J, BBB had a customer who was a law enforcer at Tota Tinabalu, Aalasia. She sought his help for her return to the 8hilippines, and he agreed. (he following da, on "J :ul &--J, the Golden Lotus was raided b the Immigration *Ecers of Tota Tinabalu, Aalasia, and the prostituted @ilipino women, including 333 and BBB, were detained at the Bala 8olis (8olice ?epartment) in Labuan until all the women were deported to the 8hilippines. (he defense, on the other hand, presented three witnesses; accused'appellant Bernadette, her common'law partner Aa4u4ie :aila Aisuari, and co'accused @ranz. 3ccording to accused'appellant, she and BBB were friends and neighbors in (alon' talon, Samboanga Cit. Sometime in 3pril &--J, when as!ed b BBB wh accused' appellant returned to the 8hilippines from Aalasia, the latter said that she had been made a prostituted woman in Aalasia. 3ccused'appellant denied having o)ered BBB a 4ob in Aalasia, a denial corroborated b Aa4u4ie :aila Aisuari. 3ccused'appellant also denied !nowing 333 and @ranz. She claimed that she onl met 333 when the latter, together with BBB, visited her in 4ail and o)ered to withdraw the case if accused'appellant would give them mone. Co'accused @ranz merel denied !nowing 333, BBB or accused'appellant. *n &% :une &--7, after trial on the merits, the 5egional (rial Court (5(C) of Samboanga Cit rendered a ?ecision, $ the dispositive portion of which states; , 9F<5<@*5<, the Court 1nds both accused 6D5@53SI5 F3SFIA S353B36 a.!.a L@536SH@53SL and B<563?<((< 836S3C3L3 a.!.a L6<6<6G 39I?L GDIL(Q B<Q*6? 5<3S*63BL< ?*DB( of the crime of ILL<G3L 5<C5DI(A<6( de1ned under Section , and penalized under Section %(b) of 5epublic 3ct 6o. 7-+& otherwise !nown as the LAigrant 9or!ers and *verseas @ilipinos 3ct of "##$L, as principals b direct participation, committed b a sndicate, against BBB and 333, and S<6(<6C<S each of said accused to su)er the penalt of LI@< IA85IS*6A<6( and to pa a 1ne of 8 ",---,---.-- each> % to pa each of the above victims 8 $-,---.-- as moral damages> 8 J--,---.-- as e.emplar damages, and to pa the costs. S* *5?<5<?. (he trial court considered that, in the course of the trial, the prosecution and the defense had entered into a stipulation that neither accused'appellant Bernadette nor @ranz had a license or an authorit to recruit or deplo wor!ers for overseas emploment. Aoreover, the trial court found that the crime was committed in conspirac b the accused and other persons. It painsta!ingl enumerated the overt acts of the accused'appellant showing her direct participation in the commission of the crime. (hese acts included inducing 333 and BBB to wor! in Aalasia> introducing Aac!, :un and @ranz to the victims> and escorting them to the wharf, where the victims boarded the vessel that too! them awa from their families and their countr and brought them to Aalasia, where M heretofore unbe!nownst to them M the were made to wor! as prostituted women. It further held that the credible and positive testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution prevailed over those of the defense of mere denial, absent an showing that the witnesses for the prosecution had an ill motive to falsel testif and implicate the accused in the commission of the crime charged. *n appeal, the C3 aErmed the 1ndings of fact of the trial court in the former0s assailed ?ecision, but modi1ed the award of damages, to wit; 7 9F<5<@*5<, the 3ppeal is ?ISAISS<?. (he assailed ?ecision dated :une &%, &--7 of the 5egional (rial Court, Branch ", of Samboanga Cit in Criminal Case 6o. "##&" is 3@@I5A<? with A*?I@IC3(I*6 that the amount of e.emplar damages in favor of the private complainants be reduced to 8 &$,---.-- each. S* *5?<5<?. In the present appeal, instead of 1ling a supplemental brief, both accused' appellant and the *Ece of the Solicitor General opted to adopt their respective Briefs 1led with the C3. (he appeal is unmeritorious. (o be convicted of the crime of illegal recruitment committed b a sndicate, the following elements must occur; # ". (he accused have no valid license or authorit re=uired b law to enable them to lawfull engage in the recruitment and placement of wor!ers. &. (he accused engaged in this activit of recruitment and placement b actuall recruiting, deploing and transporting. J. Illegal recruitment was committed b three persons conspiring and confederating with one another. 3s to the 1rst element, accused'appellant admitted that she did not have a valid license to recruit persons for overseas emploment, consistent with her defense that she did not engage in the recruitment of persons for emploment. 3nent the second element, both victims, 333 and BBB, narrated in great detail how the were induced b accused'appellant to accept an emploment opportunit, and how the were successfull transported from Samboanga Cit to Aalasia where the eventuall wor!ed as prostituted women. *n the third element, accused'appellant posits that the prosecution failed to prove that there were more than two persons involved in the alleged crime of illegal recruitment, since the trial court held onl two of the accused liable for the crime. (he prosecution, she alleges, failed to establish that the other accused Aac!, :un, and (as also had no license or authorit to recruit wor!ers for overseas emploment. In the recent case 8eople v. Lalli, "- we aErmed the trial court0s 1ndings in which & of the J accused were convicted of illegal recruitment committed b a sndicate, even though the third accused was at'large. In so ruling, we too! note of the fact that the victim would not have been able to go to Aalasia were it not for the concerted e)orts of the three accused. 9e held thus; @light in criminal law is the evading of the course of 4ustice b voluntaril withdrawing oneself in order to avoid arrest or detention or the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings. (he une.plained Wight of an accused person ma as a general rule be ta!en into consideration as evidence having a tendenc to establish his guilt. Clearl, in this case, the Wight of accused 5elampagos, who is still at'large, shows an indication of guilt in the crimes he has been charged. It is clear that through the concerted e)orts of 3ringo, Lalli and 5elampagos, Lolita was recruited and deploed to Aalasia to wor! as a prostitute. Such conspirac among 3ringo, Lalli and 5elampagos could be deduced from the manner in which the crime was perpetrated B each of the accused plaed a pivotal role in perpetrating the crime of illegal recruitment, and evinced a 4oint common purpose and design, concerted action and communit of interest. @or these reasons, this Court aErms the C3 ?ecision, aErming the 5(C ?ecision, declaring accused 5onnie 3ringo Aasion and Fad4a :arma Lalli 8urih guilt beond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal recruitment committed b a sndicate in Criminal Case 6o. &"#J-, with a penalt of life imprisonment and a 1ne of 8 $--,--- imposed on each of the accused. (<mphasis supplied.) In the case at bar, the prosecution was similarl able to establish that accused' appellant Bernadette and @ranz were not the onl ones who had conspired to bring the victims to Aalasia. It was also able to establish at the ver least, through the credible testimonies of the witnesses, that (") :un and Aac! were the escorts of the women to Aalasia> (&) a certain (ash was their 1nancier> (J) a certain Bunso negotiated with Aac! for the price the former would pa for the e.penses incurred in transporting the victims to Aalasia> and (+) Aomm Cind owned the prostitution house where the victims wor!ed. (he concerted e)orts of all these persons resulted in the oppression of the victims. Clearl, it was established beond reasonable doubt that accused'appellant, together with at least two other persons, came to an agreement to commit the felon and decided to commit it. It is not necessar to show that two or more persons met together and entered into an e.plicit agreement laing down the details of how an unlawful scheme or ob4ective is to be carried out. Conspirac ma be deduced from the mode and manner in which the o)ense was perpetrated> or from the acts of the accused evincing a 4oint or common purpose and design, concerted action and communit of interest. "" @indings of fact of the C3, when the aErm those of the trial court, are binding on this Court, unless the 1ndings of the trial and the appellate courts are palpabl unsupported b the evidence on record, or unless the 4udgment itself is based on a misapprehension of facts. "& Li!ewise, we have time and again ruled that mere denial cannot prevail over the positive testimon of a witness. 3 mere denial, 4ust li!e an alibi, is a self'serving negative evidence, which cannot be accorded greater evidentiar weight than the declarations of credible witnesses who testif on aErmative matters. 3s between a categorical testimon that has the ring of truth on the one hand and a bare denial on the other, the former is generall held to prevail. "J 9e, however, 1nd it proper to modif the amount of moral and e.emplar damages awarded b the C3. *n "& Aa &--J, Congress passed 5.3. #&-7 or the 3nti'(raEc!ing in 8ersons 3ct. (his law was approved on &, Aa &--J. Ironicall, onl a few das after, private complainants found themselves in a situation that this law had sought to prevent. In Lalli, we increased the amount of moral and e.emplar damages from 8 $-,--- to 8 $--,--- and from 8 $-,--- to 8 "--,---, respectivel, having convicted the accused therein of the crime of traEc!ing in persons. In so doing, we said; (he Civil Code describes moral damages in 3rticle &&"%; 3rt. &&"%. Aoral damages include phsical su)ering, mental anguish, fright, serious an.iet, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shoc!, social humiliation, and similar in4ur. (hough incapable of pecuniar computation, moral damages ma be recovered if the are the pro.imate result of the defendantCs wrongful act for omission. <.emplar damages, on the other hand, are awarded in addition to the pament of moral damages, b wa of e.ample or correction for the public good, as stated in the Civil Code; 3rt. &&&#. <.emplar or corrective damages are imposed, b wa of e.ample or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, li=uidated or compensator damages. 3rt. &&J-. In criminal o)enses, e.emplar damages as a part of the civil liabilit ma be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances.".wphi" Such damages are separate and distinct from 1nes and shall be paid to the o)ended part. (he pament of 8 $--,--- as moral damages and 8 "--,--- as e.emplar damages for the crime of (raEc!ing in 8ersons as a 8rostitute 1nds basis in 3rticle &&"# of the Civil Code, which states; 3rt. &&"#. Aoral damages ma be recovered in the following and analogous cases; (") 3 criminal o)ense resulting in phsical in4uries> (&) Iuasi'delicts causing phsical in4uries> (J) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts> (+) 3dulter or concubinage> ($) Illegal or arbitrar detention or arrest> (,) Illegal search> (%) Libel, slander or an other form of defamation> (7) Aalicious prosecution> (#) 3cts mentioned in 3rticle J-#> ("-) 3cts and actions referred to in 3rticles &", &,, &%, &7, &#, J-, J&, J+, and J$. (he parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in 6o. J of this article, ma also recover moral damages. (he spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters ma bring the action mentioned in 6o. # of this article, in the order named. (he criminal case of (raEc!ing in 8ersons as a 8rostitute is an analogous case to the crimes of seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts. In fact, it is worse. (o be traEc!ed as a prostitute without one0s consent and to be se.uall violated four to 1ve times a da b di)erent strangers is horrendous and atrocious. (here is no doubt that Lolita e.perienced phsical su)ering, mental anguish, fright, serious an.iet, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shoc!, and social humiliation when she was traEc!ed as a prostitute in Aalasia. Since the crime of (raEc!ing in 8ersons was aggravated, being committed b a sndicate, the award of e.emplar damages is li!ewise 4usti1ed. (<mphasis supplied.) 9e 1nd no legal impediment to increasing the award of moral and e.emplar damages in the case at bar.".wphi" 6either is there an logical reason wh we should di)erentiate between the victims herein and those in that case, when the circumstances are frighteningl similar. (o do so would be to sa that we discriminate one from the other, when all of these women have been the victims of unscrupulous people who capitalized on the povert of others. 9hile it is true that accused'appellant was not tried and convicted of the crime of traEc!ing in persons, this Court based its award of damages on the Civil Code, and not on the 3nti'(raEc!ing in 8ersons 3ct, as clearl e.plained in Lalli. 9F<5<@*5<, in view of the foregoing, the ?ecision of the Court of 3ppeals in C3' G.5. C5'FC 6o. --,++'AI6 dated &- :ul &-"- is hereb 3@@I5A<? with A*?I@IC3(I*6S. 3ccused'appellant Bernadette 8ansacala a.!.a. L6eneng 3widL is *5?<5<? to pa 333 and BBB the sum of 8 $--,--- each as moral damages and 8 "--,--- each as e.emplar damages and to pa the costs.
Cheri Difederico v. Rolm Company Siemens Rolm Communications, Inc. (Formerly Rolm Company) International Business MacHines Corporation Siemens Corporation, 201 F.3d 200, 3rd Cir. (2000)