De Jesu Christo Servatore Part III by Faustus Socinus (Trans. Alan Gomes)

FAUSTUS SOCINUS
DE JESU CHRISTO SERVATORE, PART III

Translated by
BY
ALAN W. GOMES
De Jesu Christo Servatore (Part III) Alan W. Gomes, Translator Page 2
DE JESU CHRISTO SERVATORE: PART III

[220]A Disputation Concerning Jesus Christ the
Savior
[220]A Disputation Concerning Jesus Christ
the Savior
Pars Tertia
Part Three
In qua rationes, & testimonia explicantur, quibus
evincitur, falsam esse sententiam istam, quod
Christus morte sua Deo, sive eius iustitiae pro
peccatis nostris satisfecerit. & reliquum
argumentum quoddam ad eam confirmandam ab
Adversario allatum abunde refellitur.
Part three presents arguments and evidence
that disprove the idea that Christ, by his
death, made satisfaction for our sins to God or
to his justice. It also thoroughly refutes a re-
maining argument which my opponent ad-
vanced to confirm his view.
Ais igitur:
You, Covetus, state:
Covetus:

Cum autem diceres non opus fuisse, ut Christi
morte deo pro peccatis nostris satisfieret addebas
te idcirco hoc asserere, quia in Deo satis esset
misericordiae ad nos absque ulla satisfactione
salvandos.
When you [Socinus] stated that it was
unnecessary to satisfy God for our sins by the
death of Christ, you also made the corre-
sponding claim that the mercy of God is suffi-
cient to save us, without satisfaction.
Socinus:
I say in response:
Ego ver & id ea de caussa tunc asserui, & nunc
idem eadem prorsus ratione assero. Neque in
Deum meum ade iniurius umquam ero, ut mihi
peccata mea, nulla vera pro ipsis satisfactione
accepta, condonare eum aut noluisse, aut iur
non potuisse, vel per somnium quidem, cogitare
ausim: ne dum, ut vos facitis, constanter
affirmare.
I certainly did make such a claim for the
reason you stated, and I will now reaffirm my
claim for precisely the same reason. I never
could imagine myself so misrepresenting God
as to suppose that either (1) he would be
unwilling to forgive my sins without first
receiving literal
1
satisfaction for them, or that
(2) justice would not allow him to do so. I
would not dare to say this, as you say so dog-
matically.
Sed, ut assertionis meae veritas magis elucescat,
probandum prim erit, potuisse Deum iur nobis
peccata nostra ignoscere, nulla vera pro ipsis
satisfactione ab ulla persona, ulloque modo
To make the truth of my assertion crystal
clear, I shall prove first of all that God could
be just in overlooking our sins without
receiving literal satisfaction for themby
anyone or in any way. Then, I will show that
accepta. Deinde, id facere eum voluisse,
demonstrabitur. Quo facto, planum postrem
faciam, non potuisse Christum vel sua morte, vel
alia ratione divinae iustitiae pro peccatis [221]
nostris satisfacere. Et ita, quae duo mea
sententia continet, & tu, a veritate alienissima
esse, te ostendisse credebas, Christum pro
peccatis nostris divinae iustitiae non satisfecisse,
&, ut satisfieret, opus non fuisse, ea verissima
esse, Deo bene favente, constabit.
this is precisely what he wished to do. Final-
ly, I will show plainly that Christ could not
make satisfaction for our sins [221] to divine
justiceeither by his death or by another
way. And so, God willing, I will establish
that the two elements which my view con-
tains, and which you believe you have shown
to be farthest from the truth, are in fact quite
true: (1) that Christ did not make satisfaction
for our sins to divine justice, and (2) that it
was not necessary for him to do so.
Chapter I
Chapter I
Deum iur potuisse nobis condonare peccata
nostra, nulla pro ipsis vera satisfactione accepta.
God was able to be quite just in forgiving our sins
without first receiving literal satisfaction for them.
Deum nobis ignoscere iur potuisse, nulla pro
peccatis nostris vera satisfactione accepta, ex eo
constare potest, qud delicta nostra ea tenus nos
Deo obnoxios reddunt, utque pro ipsis ei satisfiat,
requirere videri possunt quatenus offensae sunt
maiestatis ipsius; ita ut peccatis, vera pro ipsis
satisfactione non accepta, Deum ignoscere, nihil
aliud fit, qum eum de iure suo remitere.
Unicuique autem de iure suo, quantum velit,
remittere licet. Deus igitur, vera pro ipsis
satisfactione non accepta, peccata nobis
condonare iur potuit.
The following argument shows that God
could pardon us justly without first receiving
literal satisfaction for our sins. Our transgres-
sions, in so far as they are an offense to God's
majesty, render us liable to God for punish-
ment, and seem to require satisfaction.
Consequently, for God to overlook sins
without receiving literal satisfaction is simply
for him to forgo his own right to punish. But
anyone can yield up as much of his own right
as he pleases. Therefore, God had the right to
forgive us our sins without first receiving
literal satisfaction for them.
Quocirca Deus, in hominib. vel puniendis, vel
absolvendis, non tamquam iudex aliquis
statuendus est, qui de alieno iure agat, cuique
non liceat a legum praescripto recedere; sed
tamquam dominus & princeps, cuius sola
voluntas, cum de ipsius iure tantm agatur, om-
nium rerum lex est, & perfectissima norma. Qud
si quilibet homo iur potest iniurias sibi illatas
liber condonare, & quamvis maxim possit, eas
tamen minim ulcisci; nec solm id facere iur
potest, sed etiam ob eam ipsam caussam
laudibus ad caelum tollitur: An eo iure & potestate
God, in either punishing or acquitting people,
should not be likened to a judge who acts ac-
cording to an external legal authority, and
who may not deviate from the letter of the
law. No, God should be considered a Lord
and supreme Leader, whose will alone is law
in everything and is the absolutely perfect
standard when only his right is at stake.
Now, if a human being can be just in exacting
the highest degree of revenge for wrongs
suffered but yet may choose not to exact any,
we not only say he has the right to forgo re-
venge but we even praise him to the skies for
Deum privare audebimus, nosque infandi
sacrilegii reos constituere non exhorrescemus?
doing so! If we allow people to do this, we
dare not deprive God of that right and power.
We shudder at the thought of committing
such an abominable sacrilege!
Quis est, qui nesciat, delicta nostra, debita sive
aes alienum, quod cum Deo contraxerimus, in
divinis litteris appellari, & propterea Deum,
tamquam creditorem nostrum, nos autem,
tamquam eius debitores, peccatorum nostrorum
respectu, constitui? Atqui, nullus est creditor, qui
debitori suo vel debiti partem, vel universum debi-
tum, nulla satisfactione accepta, condonare
summo iure non possit. Quae est igitur inscitia,
ne dicam amentia, existimare, Deum nisi illi plen
satisfiat, delictorum nostrorum debita nobis
remittere iur non posse?
Everybody knows that the Scriptures call our
transgressions debts or money we owe to
someone else. We have contracted this debt
with God: God is our creditor and we are his
debtors by virtue of our sins. But every
creditor has the absolute right to forgive the
debtor his debteither in whole or in part
without receiving satisfaction. Surely nobody
is so ignorant, not to say mindless, to think
that God cannot justly remit our debts with-
out first receiving full satisfaction.
At dices, opus est, ut Deus iustitiae suae satisfieri
curet, cui ipse, nisi semetipsum quodammodo
abneget, renunciare non potest. [222] Iam in
principio huius responsionis meae satis ostendi,
iustitiam istam, cui vos satisfaciendum omnino
esse contenditis, in Deo non residere, sed
effectum esse voluntatis ipsius. Cum enim Deus
peccatores punit, ut digno aliquo nomine hoc eius
opus appellemus, iustiti tunc eum uti dicimus;
quemadmodum, cum alicui nocenti parcit, eum
misericordi usum fuisse, dicit scriptura. Quare
non opus est, ut isti iustitiae Deus vel satisfieri
curet, vel renunciet.
You might counter that God must take care to
satisfy his justice, because God cannot re-
nounce his justice without somehow being
untrue to himself. [222] I have already shown
in the beginning of my response that the sort
of justice, which you claim must be com-
pletely satisfied, is not an essential property
of God; it is merely an effect of his will.
2
The
reason we say that God exercises justice
when he punishes sinners is so that we might
call his action by a worthy name. Likewise,
when he spares someone who is guilty, the
Scriptures say that he exercises mercy.
Concerning this punitive justice, God may
either satisfy it or not as he sees fit.
Quod autem iustitia ista in Deo non resideat,
praeter ea, quae supr a me disputata sunt, ex
eo maxim apparere potest, qud, si ea in Deo
resideret, numquam is, ne minimum quidem
delictum, cuiquam condonaret. Nihil enim
umquam facit aut facere potest Deus, quod
qualitatibus, quae in ipso resident, adversetur.
Exempli caus, cum in Deo sapientia, & aequitas
resideat, nihil umquam insipienter, nihil iniqu
Consider this additional argument. The fact
that God forgives shows that this punitive
justice is not one of his essential attributes. If
it were, he could never forgive anyone even
of the least infraction. This is because God
does not and cannot commit any act that is
contrary to his essential properties. Take
wisdom and fairness as an example. Since
wisdom and fairness are essential properties
of God, he neither does nor can do anything
facit, aut facere potest. Ista iustitia, quae, ut
supra visum fuit, in sacris litteris non iustitia, sed
severitas, aut vindicta, aut aliis eiusmodi
nominibus nuncupatur, ista, inquam, quatenus
misericordiae opponitur, nihil aliud est, qum
punire delicta. Sed punire delicta, & delicta
condonare, invicem prorsus adversantur. Ergo, si
ea iustitia in Deo residet, hoc est, si in Deo aliqua
proprietas est, quae omnino quaecumque
hominum delicta, sive resipiscentium, sive non
resipiscentium, exact puniri velit (talis est enim
ea iustitia, de qua agimus, quam vos in Deo
residere commenti estis) numquam is cuiquam
vel parcit, vel parcere potest.
either foolish or unfair. As was seen above,
this punitive justice, which is not properly
called justice in the sacred writings but se-
verity or vengeance or other names of this
sort, in so far as it opposes mercy, is simply
the punishment of transgressions. But pun-
ishment and forgiveness are exact opposites.
Therefore, your view holds that the justice
that characterizes God (i.e., as an attribute)
demands that everyone (penitent or not) must
be thoroughly punished for all his sins. Your
view forces us to conclude that God would
never spare anyone nor be able to do so.
Nam quod magistri vestri excogitarunt, puniri per
hanc iustitiam delictum posse, etiamsi delinquens
ipse non puniatur, id, ut infr apparebit, & ab hac,
& ab omni iustitia alienissimum est.
Your teachers have tried to evade the force of
this conclusion by saying that, with this kind
of justice, a sin can be punished even if the
individual sinner is not. I will show clearly
that such a notion is quite alien not only to
this kind of justice but to any kind.
Caeterm, si dixeris, eadem ratione probari
posse, misericordiam in Deo non residere, Nam
si ea in Deo resideret, is nemini umquam poenam
irrogaret, cum misericordia nihil aliud fit, qum
delinquentibus ignoscere. Respondebo, ut supra
quoque leviter attigi, verisimum esse, misericordi-
am, quatenus isti iustitiae, hoc est severitati &
vindictae opponitur, in Deo non residere, sed
effectum esse voluntatis eius. Cum igitur sacrae
litterae testantur, Deum misericordem esse, nihil
aliud sibi volunt, qum Deum saepissime, &
facillim peccata condonare; si tamen de miseri-
cordia hac loquuntur. nam alia est misericordia
divina, cuius in sacris [223] litteris secundum
veterem translationem saepe fit mentio, quae
bonitas potis appellari debet, & latiorem habet
significationem. Omnem enim Dei beneficentiam
complectitur: sive in peccatis condonandis, sive in
alio quovis beneficio hominibus dando ab ipso
You might turn the argument on me and say,
By your line of reasoning, one could equally
prove that mercy is not one of God's essential
properties. If it were, God could never inflict
a penalty on anyone. Besides, on your
reckoning mercy is simply God's decision to
pardon sinners. I would respond, as I have
also done to a certain extent above, that the
sort of mercy that is the counterpart to the
punitive justice (i.e., severity or ven-
geance) under consideration certainly is not
one of God's essential properties but is just an
effect of his will. When the sacred writings
testify that God is mercifulassuming, of
course, that they are speaking of the kind of
mercy that opposes justicethey only wish to
convey that God forgives sins frequently and
willingly. Now, there is another sort of divine
mercy, which we often see mentioned in the
Old Testament. This sort of mercy has a
broader signification and ought rather to be
exerceatur.
called kindness. [223] This latter kind of
mercy includes every kindness of God,
whether involving the forgiveness of sins or
in giving to people any other kindness.
Patet praeterea, nec iustitiam, nec misericordiam,
de quibus loquimur, in Deo residere, ex eo, qud
legimus, Deum tardum esse ad iram, & multum
miseratione, Exo. 34. v. 6. Num. 14. v. 18. Quod
manifest indicat, haec duo, effecta esse
voluntatis eius, quorum unum ab altero
magnitudine superetur, & simul stare nequeant, &
terminata sint; cum ea, quae ver in Deo resi-
dent, nullum terminum habeant, & simul omnia
stare possint, & inter se, magnitudinis respectu,
sint prorsus aequalia. Hinc manifestum fit, quam
graviter errent illi, qui Dei hanc tum iustitiam, tum
misericordiam infinitam esse affirmant.
The Scriptures saying that God is slow to
anger and great in mercy (Ex. 34:6; Num.
14:18) make it clear that neither the justice nor
mercy now under consideration are essential
properties of God. These Scriptures plainly
show that these two qualities are effects of his
will, and that one is exceeded in greatness by
the other. They are unable to stand together
and are limited. In contrast, those properties
that are truly essential to God have no limit,
can coexist among themselves, and are quite
equal quantitatively. This truth reveals the
serious error of those who assert that both the
justice and the mercy of God are infinite.
Quod enim ad iustitiam attinet, vocabuli specie
decepti non vident, se nihil aliud dicere, qum Dei
severitatem atque iram infinitam esse, contra
apertissima sanctarum litterarum testimonia;
quae, ut mod diximus, Deum tardum ad iram
esse praedicant. Ea iustitia divina, quae nullum
terminum habet, non haec est, de qua loquimur,
sed ea, quae sola, ut supr visum fuit, hoc
praeclaro Iustitiae nomine apud sacros scriptores
insignitur, & alio nomine Rectitudo & aequitas
nuncupari potest. Haec ver in Deo residet, & in
omnibus eius operibus valde conspicua est,
atque huius solius vi, ut postea videbimus, etiam
si nullam aliam probationem haberemus,
humanum istud commentum satisfactionis Iesu
Christi penitus detegeretur atque evanesceret.
First of all, consider justice. Those who
wrongly take the word literally do not see
that they are really saying that the severity or
wrath of God is infinite, which contradicts the
plain scriptural evidence. This evidence, as
we have already said, proclaims that God is
slow to anger. The kind of divine justice that
has no limit is not the kind about which we
have been speaking. We have already seen
above that it is only fairness or uprightness
that the biblical writers explicitly label jus-
tice: this justice is truly unlimited, is one of
God's essential properties and is amply visi-
ble in all his works. On the strength of this
fact aloneeven if I had no other proofthat
human fiction of the satisfaction of Jesus
Christ is thoroughly exposed for what it is
and evaporates into thin air.
Quod autem attinet ad misericordiam, hoc est
peccatorum condonationem, quomodo eam
infinitam esse affirmare audent, cum ex supra
dictis locis, & ex universa scriptura constet, Deum
e non semper uti, sed non rar vindictam &
Consider mercy (that is, the forgiveness of
sins). How dare my opponents assert that his
mercy is infinite? The passages cited above,
as well as the entire Scriptures, establish that
God does not always exercise mercy but not
infrequently employs vengeance and severity.
severitatem exercere? Verm propterea ita foed
sunt lapsi, qud eos diversos tantm divinae
voluntatis effectus, non autem proprietates
aliquas, esse non animadverterunt, & utramque in
Deo residere, persuasum habuerunt. Sed
quanam ratione id sibi persuadere potuerunt,
cum, ut diximus, altera alteram tollat?
My opponents make such a terrible mistake
because they are convinced that vengeance
and mercy are essential to God. They do not
perceive that vengeance and mercy are only
different effects of the divine will and not
actual properties. It is hard to imagine how
they rationally can convince themselves of it
when, as we have said, vengeance and mercy
cancel each other out.
At hoc negant ipsi, & in salute nobis per Christum
parata utramque perfect Deum exercuisse,
contendunt. Istud qum non mod falsum, sed
etiam ridiculum [224] fit, ex iis, quae postea
dicentur, claris apparebit. Interim dicant,
obsecro, cum Deus sontes punit, praesertim ver,
cum eis ne tempus quidem, ut poenitentiam
agere possint, concedit, concedit, cuius rei in
vetere testamento permulta exempla extant,
qua'nam misericordia erga illos utitur? Qud si
Deus multa facit, in quibus ne vestigium quidem
istius misericordiae apparet, quamvis &
misericors, & miserator in sanctis litteris passim
appelletur, An non multa eum facere dicendum
est, in quibus nullo pacto istam iustitiam exerceat,
ad quam tardus admodum esse ubique
praedicatur?
Their response is to deny that the one
destroys the other, and to argue that God
perfectly exercises both vengeance and mercy
in the salvation provided us through Christ. I
will show later that this argument is not only
false but also absurd. [224] For now, I would
like to know how they can say that God exer-
cises mercy when he punishes the guilty
particularly in those instances when he does
not give them a chance to repent (and there
are many such examples in the Old Testa-
ment). We must say, in spite of the fact that
God is called compassionate and the
merciful one throughout Holy Scripture, that
there are many occasions on which God does
employ that justice which the Bible says he is
slow to exercise and in which one finds no
trace of his mercy.
Concludendum igitur est, nullam in Deo iustitiam
esse, quae omnino (ut vestra opinion fert)
peccatum puniri debere dictet, & cui ipse
renunciare non possit; sicut nulla in eo est miseri-
cordia, quae peccatoribus ignoscendum esse
omnino statuat, & cui voluntas divina obsequi
quodammodo debeat. Quae cum ita se habeant,
satis constare potest, nihil esse, propter quod
Deus liber, cui velit, nulla satisfactione accepta,
peccata iur condonare non possit, non mins,
qum eum, qui deliquit, pro suo arbitratu punire.
Consequently, there is no justice in God that,
as you think, dictates that sin must be pun-
ished thoroughly and that God has no choice
but to do so. Likewise, there is no mercy in
God that compels him to forgive sinners, in a
certain way forcing the divine will to comply.
Therefore, there is nothing to stop God from
granting forgiveness of sins, without satisfac-
tion, to whomever he wants. He can forgive
the guilty quite as freely and justly as he can
punish them.
Vidit hanc veritatem Wolf. Musculus, & eam in
suis locis communibus ita explicuit, ut integrum
Wolfgang Musculus sees the truth of this, and
writes accordingly in his Common Places.
3
It is
locum huc transferre non solm propter
doctissimi viri apud vos non levem auctoritatem,
sed etiam, quia melis illius, qum meis ipsius
verbis tota res patefiet, mihi grave non fuerit. Sic
igitur scribit:
no trouble for me to cite the entire passage
here, not only because of the considerable
weight of authority this learned man carries
in your circles, but especially because he
states it better than I could. Musculus states:
Si Deus tantm iustus est iudex, & non simul
misericors, vel si sic iustus est, ut sine detrimento
iustitiae suae misericors esse nequeat, si sic
inquam iudiciariae iustitiae obstrictus est, ut non
liceat ipsi, quorum vult misereri, & a peccatis
absolvere reos, quod tamen permultos sibi
principes & magistratus liber permittere
videmus, consequitur inania esse, quaecunque in
sacris scripturis de gratia & misericordia Dei
leguntur, nec tantum illi potestatis esse in ipsius
creaturas, quantum est homini in suos subditos,
im minus, qum est figulo in suum lutum. Qua
re quid potest magis impium cogitari?
Everything the Holy Scriptures say about God's
grace and mercy would be in vain if God is only a
just judge, and not at the same time merciful; or if
he is just in such a way that he could not be mer-
ciful without threatening his justice; or if he is
obligated by a legal justice which does not permit
him to acquit the guilty and be merciful to whom
he willseven though rulers and magistrates can
do so! God would have less power over his own
creatures than a human being has over his sub-
jects. In fact, he would have less power than a pot-
ter has over his clay. A greater impiety is hard to
imagine.
Si ver sic Iustus est Deus, ut simul fit &
misericors, sicque punit sontes, ut simul quorum
vult liber ac licit misereatur, peccatoresque a
peccatis absolvat, nec queat ob eiusmodi miseri-
cordiam gloria & encomio iustitiae privari.
On the other hand, if God is just, such that he is at
the same time also merciful, and if he punishes the
guilty while at the same time freely and rightfully
showing mercy to those whom he wishes, forgiving
sinners their sins, such mercy does not diminish
the praise and glory of his justice.
Quid aliud consequitur, qum duplicem illi esse
thronum, iudicii unum, gratiae alterum. Et ad
thronum iudicii pertinere, quando iustificat iustum,
& condemnat impium. Ad alterum ver, qui
gratiae est, referendum esse, quando impium non
condemnat, quod iust facere poterat, sed
misericorditer [225] a reatu peccatorum absolvit,
& iustificat?
In other words, God operates from, if you will, a
double throne: the one of justice, the other of grace.
He rules from his throne of justice when he
justifies the just and condemns the wicked. But he
operates from the throne of grace when he does not
condemn the impious person, even though he
justly could have done so, but instead mercifully
[225] absolves him from guilt and justifies him.
Hactenus Musculus, qui lict alioqui vobiscum
sentiat, tamen veritatis vi, quae aliqua ex parte
omnibus non prorsus aut stupiditate, aut
improbitate excaecatis semper affulget, victus
atque compulsus, & haec & alia non pauca, dum
iustificationis & remissionis peccatorum
Now, I admit that Musculus is in essential
agreement with your position. But up to this
point he is compelled to submit to the
strength of this truth. (And the truth, after all,
always shines at least to some extent on all
who are not totally blinded either by
senselessness or by their own depravity.)
argumentum tractat, praeclar scripta reliquit,
quae vestram istam satisfactionem non
mediocriter labefactant.
When Musculus writes about justification and
the remission of sins, he plainly leaves in
many statements that significantly weaken
the doctrine of satisfaction.
Mirum autem videri potest, Vos, cum de hominis
iustificatione agitur, istius divinae iustitiae, quae
iustitia in sacris litteris non appellatur, nec Dei
qualitas est, seu proprietas, nec in ipso ullo pacto
residere potest, tantam rationem haberi velle;
cum autem divinae providentiae &
praedestinationis argumentum tractatis, illius,
quae verissim divina iustitia est, & in Deo
perpetu residet, atque inter admirabiles eius
proprietates numerari debet, rectitudinis, inquam,
& aequitatis, non re tantm, quod semper facitis,
sed interdum etiam verbis ipsis, aut nullam aut
perexiguam rationem habere: & tandem ad
inperscrutabile Dei consilium confugere;
tamquam si de sententia vestra alioqui
manifestissim constaret, & ii, qui adversus vos
disputant, veritati divinae humanis rationibus
reluctari apert conarentur, vel etiam ad
sacrarum litterarum testimonia, quae in medium
affertis, nihil aliud responderent, nisi ea divinae
iustitiae adversari.
Moreover, it is astonishing that when the
doctrine of justification is under discussion
you consider the argument from the
(punitive) divine justice to be so weighty. But
that kind of justice is not called justice in
the Bible, nor is it a quality or property of
God, nor is it an essential characteristic of him
in any way. On the other hand, when you are
discussing divine providence and predes-
tination, you take little or no account of that
uprightness or fairness which genuinely is
God's attribute of divine justice and which we
ought to list with his other admirable prop-
erties. You fail to take notice of this attribute
not only in fact (as you always fail to do), but
even expressly: you finally abandon the argu-
ment and take refuge in the inscrutable
counsel of God. Even if in other respects your
opinion should appear to be manifestly true,
and even if those who dispute against you are
shown to be struggling against the divine
truth with mere human arguments, they
could still defeat you with but this reply to
the Scriptures that you have presented: They
are in opposition to divine justice.
Ita fit, ut utrobique, contraria lict ratione, humani
generis hosti illi inexorabili atque indefesso arma
validissima ad omnem pietatem, pietatis nescio
cuius praetextu, penitus exterminandam
imprudentes subministretis. sed haec uberis,
Deo volente, alio tempore, alia fortasse
occasione oblata. Nunc ad rem ipsam.
And so, for admittedly opposite reasons, you
unknowingly supply the most powerful
weapons to that inexorable and indefatigable
enemy of humanity, so that he might
thoroughly banish all piety. And you do this
on the pretext of so-called piety! I shall go
into more detail on these matters, God
willing, at another time. But now to the mat-
ter at hand.
Quae a me hucusque dicta sunt, satis planum
facere possunt, qum frivola fit ea ratio, quam te,
mecum hac de re disputantem, attulisse memini,
What I have said so far shows how worthless
your argument is, which, as I recall, runs as
follows: In order for God to be just, he must
punish the sins of the guilty with the exact
ut probares, necesse esse, si Deus iustus futurus
fit, ut delinquentium peccata exact puniat; quia
scilicet iustitia omnino requirat, ut suum cuique
tribuatur, delinquentibus autem punitio debeatur.
punishment they deserve. Since each person
should get what he deserves, justice certainly
demands that punishment is owed to the
guilty.
Falsum est enim delinquentibus punitionem
deberi eo sensu, in quem locutio ista hoc loco
accipienda est. Delinquentes optimo quidem iure
puniuntur. Verm ea punitio non ipsis, sed Reip.
debetur. Cum igitur iudex nocentem absolvit, non
[226] ideo (quod ad hanc sui cuique tributionem
attinet) iniust agit, quia illi, quod eius est, non
tribuat, sed quia Reip. suum non tribuit, cuius
interest sontes puniri, & eam ob caussam, ut
puniantur lege cavit; atque ea ratione ius illud
punitionis eorum sibi acquisivit; quo a nemine
sine iniuria privari potest.
But it is simply not true that punishment is
owed to the guiltyat least not in the sense
in which the word owed should be under-
stood in this kind of discussion. No doubt the
guilty are punished quite justly. But to be
precise, punishment is not owed to the guilty
person but to the state. Therefore, in terms of
giving to everyone what he has coming to
him, the judge who lets the guilty person off
the hook is not [226] unjust for failing to give
the criminal what he deserves, but for failing
to give the state what it deserves. Since it is
the state's business to punish the guilty, the
judge must be certain to uphold the law by
punishing them. By the same token, the
judge's authority to punish cannot be denied
him without injustice.
At ver, si ipsa Resp. ei iuri renunciare velit, & eo
seipsam privare, cum sibi ipsi nemo iniuriam
facere possit, nulli iniuriam facit. Et idcirco, quod
ad hoc attinet, ut suum cuique tribuatur, nisi alius
quispiam praeterea laedatur, nihil iniustum
committit. Quare nec Deus iniustum aliquid
facere censendus est, si sibi ipsi, dum
delinquentibus, id est, contra suam legem
committentibus parcit, quod suum est, non tribuit.
Nemini enim praeterea quicquam adimit.
On the other hand, if the state itself should
wish to forgo and deprive itself of its right to
enforce the law, it does nothing unjust to any-
one. After all, no one can do anything unjust
to himself. Consequently, in terms of giving
everyone his due, the state commits no injus-
tice in forgiving unless some third party is
harmed in the process. Likewise, God should
not be regarded as unjust if he foregoes his
rights, i.e., if he pardons people who break his
law, especially since no third party is harmed
in the transaction.
Hoc namque sibi vult sententia illa, Suum cuique
tribuendum esse: Nempe, nulli non dandum,
quod ad ipsum pertinet, & ad eius commodum,
atque utilitatem spectat. Neque ea sententia
mala, aut poenas complectitur, quae iur alicui
debeantur: nisi quatenus ad alterius commodum
aut utilitatem spectent, & illius iuris sint. Atque
hinc est, qud satius est nocentem absolvere,
Your opinion insists that everyone should get
his deserts. I shall grant you this much: no
one should be deprived of his due if it has his
best interests and advantage in view. But my
opinion does not require evils or punishments
that might be justly inflicted on someone,
except in so far as they look to the interest or
advantage of another, and they are that
qum innocentem condemnare. In innocentis
enim condemnatione non solm Resp. laeditur,
cuius non mins interest, innocentes absolvi,
qum nocentes puniri, sed praeterea etiam ipse
innocens, qui, nisi absolvatur, iure suo privatur, &
gravi iniuria afflicitur.
person's right. For this reason it is better to
forgive the guilty than to condemn the inno-
cent. For in the condemnation of the innocent
person two parties are harmed. Not only is
the state injured, which is more concerned
that the innocent be acquitted than that the
guilty be punished, but also the innocent
person is injured, because the person has been
deprived of his rights and has been dealt a
harsh injustice.
At in nocentis
4
absolutione sola Resp. laeditur,
nec ipse nocens iure suo aliquo privatur, aut ulla
iniuria afflicitur. Alioqui si sententiam illam aliter
interpretaremur nec debita remitti, nec iniuriae
condonari iur possent. Quae tamen qui faciunt,
tantum abest, ut iniustitiae accusentur, ut potis
eo nomine aequitatis & iustitiae laudem
consequantur; quamvis leges extent, quibus &
debitor, quod debet, solvere cogitur, &, qui
iniuriam fecit, ad eam pensandam adigitur.
On the other hand, in acquitting the guilty,
only one party is wronged: the state. Certain-
ly the guilty person is not deprived of his
rights and is not oppressed by any injustice.
If we do not admit this, then debts could
never be remitted, nor could wrongs be for-
given justly. But the fact of the matter is, not
only is it inconsistent to charge with injustice
those who forgive and remit debts, but they
should be praised as fair and just for doing so.
They are just, even though laws are still in
effect by which a debtor is compelled to pay
off his debt,
5
and by which someone who
commits a crime is compelled to make
compensation for it.
Cum tamen contra leges committere, sive ab
ipsarum praescripto discedere, alioquin iniustum
plan fit. Ex quo apparet, non posse ulla ratione
Deum in hominum delictis, nulla satisfactione
accepta, condonandis iniustum videri, etiamsi
concederetur, in ipso iustitiam quandam esse,
tamquam legem aliquam, quae statuat,
delinquentes, id est, adversus ipsius voluntatem
aliquid perpetrantes, puniendos esse. Eiusmodi
enim legi, cum universa [227] ipsius Dei vis, nec
ullius praeterea respiciat, is parere non necesse
haberet; nisi Deo mins, qum hominibus,
concedere velimus.
And yet, in another sense it is certainly unjust
to break the laws or to deviate from their
mandates. While God can in no way appear
unjust in forgiving transgressions without
satisfaction, we must admit that, in a sense,
there would be a certain justice in demanding
satisfaction. It is almost as if there were an-
other law, so to speak, demanding that the
guilty who violate his will ought to be pun-
ished. But God is not subject to a law of this
kind. The [227] power of God himself is
universal and is not dependent on anything.
To deny this is to attribute less power to God
than to human beings.
Itaque, quemadmodum homines, quatenus de
iure suo decedunt, quamvis lex ab illis faciat,
Just as human beings can deviate from the au-
thority of laws of their own making without
being accused of breaking the law, so it is
contra legem committere non dicuntur; sic Deus,
quatenus de iure suo dimittit, etiamsi lex extaret,
quae ab ipso faceret, non tamen contra legem
committere dici posset. Qud si Deus, cum
peccata, nulla prorsus satisfactione accepta,
condonat, nec contra legem committere, nec
alicui iniuriam facere potest: ipsa luce clarius est,
eum in eiusmodi condonatione nihil, quod
iniustum fit, facere censendum esse.
with God. Without being said to break the
law, God can abandon, on his own authority,
his right to punish. This is true even though
he himself instituted the law and it is still on
the books. Therefore, in light of the fact that
God neither breaks the law nor harms anyone
when he forgives sins without complete satis-
faction, it is obvious that he is not committing
any injustice.
Possunt fortasse principes, & respublicae, non
iudices tantm, in nocentis absolutione aliquid
iniustum committere, quia, dum de iure suo
decedunt, vel privatum aliquem simul laedant
cuius intersit, istum nocentem puniri, vel legem
infringant, quae non ipsorum ius tantm respiciat,
sed etiam ipsius Dei; qui idcirco eos gladio
armavit, ut ministri eius sint ad ultionem
maleficorum. Haec autem in Deo liberalissim
peccata condonante omnino non sunt. nam de
ipsius iure tantm agitur, ut iam abunde
explicatum est.
Perhaps rulers and states, not to mention
judges, can commit injustice when they acquit
the guilty. First of all, in deviating from their
own right to punish, they sometimes harm a
third party, who is concerned that the guilty
person be punished. The third party is de-
prived of his rights. Secondly, they can
commit injustice by undermining the law's
authority,
6
which is not their authority alone
but is particularly the authority of God
himself. It is God who arms them with the
sword and makes them his executioners of
vengeance against evil doers. But God com-
mits neither of these wrongs when he gra-
ciously forgives sins. That is because his
forgiveness has to do with his authority alone,
as we have already explained thoroughly.
Potuit igitur Deus peccata nobis iur ignoscere,
nulla a quoquam pro ipsis satisfactione accepta.
Immo id adeo iur facere potuit, ut quodammodo
debuerit, id est, aliter facere non potuerit; non
mod quia aequum & rectum esse videtur, ut
resipiscentibus delicta liberaliter condonentur
(neque enim, ut supr dictum est, nobis non
resipiscentibus peccata ignovit Deus) a
rectitudine autem & aequitate nullum Dei opus
recedere potest; verm etiam, idque mult magis,
quia Deus, ut mox videbimus, resipiscentibus
liberaliter veniam dare, ab ipso fer mundi
exordio, & instituit, & tacita quadam lege sanciuit;
adversus quam legem, cum iam per eam alteri
We must conclude that God could be quite
just in forgiving our sins without having first
received satisfaction for them from anyone.
Indeed, his forgiveness was so just that we
might even go so far as to say that in some
sense he is even obligated to forgive; that is to
say, he could hardly have done otherwise.
For one thing, it seems only fair and right that
the transgressions of those who repent should
be forgiven freely; God cannot fall short of
uprightness in anything he does. (Of course,
as I mentioned above, God does not forgive
the sins of the impenitent.) But an even
stronger reason for saying that God is obli-
gated to forgive is that, as we shall presently
see, God has ordained and decreed almost
ius quaesitum esset, iniustum fuisset, ut ipse
Deus deinde aliquid commisisset.
from the beginning of the world an implicit
law which states that he will graciously
pardon the penitent. After making such a
decree it would have been unjust for God to
go back on it, since from that point on the
right of another person would have been pro-
cured through that law.
Et cert, quamvis revera nulla fit rectitudo sive
aequitas, quae resipiscentibus veniam dari
omnino postulet, & ob eam rem, ut supr dictum
fuit, sola Dei voluntas condonationis delictorum
quam ab ipso consequimur caussa fit; Tamen
posteaquam decretum est a Deo, ut
resipiscentibus venia detur, iustum est, ut tanta
ipsius benignitate ii, qui ver resipiscunt, non
defraudentur.
It is true that, in an absolute sense, upright-
ness and fairness do not actually force God to
pardon the penitent. God's will alone is the
cause of such pardon, which we obtain from
him alone. Nevertheless, once God has
decreed that he will show mercy to the
penitent, it is only right that those who do
genuinely repent should not be cheated of his
great kindness.
itaque singularis & inaudita Dei liberalitas, quam
[228] nobiscum per Christum exercuit non in eo
praecipu conspicitur, qud nobis resipiscentibus
peccata condonare voluerit; idem enim & antea
decreverat, & saepissime praestiterat; sed in eo
potissimm apparet, quod, ingentibus propositis
praemiis, nos in peccatis penitus demersos ad
poenitentiam revocare summa ope, ut ita dicam,
nisi fuerit; quemadmodum per ea, quae supr
dicta sunt, patere potest, & per ea, quae infr
fortasse dicentur, claris patebit.
And so the extraordinary, unheard of
graciousness of God, [228] which he has be-
stowed on us through Christ, is not seen pri-
marily in his decision to forgive the penitent.
That is because he both decreed to forgive
and frequently did in fact forgive even before
Christ. But the extraordinary graciousness is
especially apparent in the fact that God has
put out the greatest effort to bring us sinners,
thoroughly sunk in sin, to repentance by
promising us vast rewards. The examples al-
ready given make this evident, and it will be-
come even more clear from the examples to
follow.
Cumque iam satis probatum videatur, potuisse
Deum iur, nulla vera pro peccatis nostris
satisfactione accepta, ea nobis condonare; qud
id facere voluerit, iam demonstrare aggrediamur.
Now that we have demonstrated sufficiently
that God could be quite just in forgiving our
sins without receiving literal satisfaction for
them, we will next show that it was indeed
his will to do so.
Chapter II
Chapter II
Deum voluisse nobis peccata nostra condonare,
nulla pro ipsis vera satisfactione accepta.
God was in fact willing to forgive us our sins,
without having first received literal satisfaction for
them.
Ut, quod probandum sumpsimus, apertis
constare possit, operae pretium fuerit ostendere,
etiam ante salutem nobis per Christum partam,
de qua nostra instituta est disputatio, nulla
accepta vera satisfactione, Deum delinquentibus
peccata liberalissim condonare consueuisse.
Dixi autem, Vera satisfactione, propterea qud
dubium non est, quin Deus in iis, quibus peccata
condonavit, semper aliquid requisierit, quod
fortasse satisfactionis loco fuisse dici potest;
praesertim, cum certum fit, ea ratione divinae
voluntati ab eo, cui peccata condonata fuere, ea
in parte plen fuisse satisfactum. Et antequam
huius antiquissimae liberalitatis divinae testimonia
proferam, quid in iis, in quos eam exercuit,
requisierit Deus, breviter exponendum censeo.
To prove my case clearly, it is worth pointing
out that God was accustomed to forgive trans-
gressors their sins graciously, apart from any
literal satisfaction, even before Christ came to
provide the salvation that I am discussing. I
said literal satisfaction because God no
doubt has always demanded something from
people whom he has forgiven. Perhaps we
could even go so far as to say that this some-
thing takes the place of satisfaction. This is
especially so because it is certain that this is
partly the way that the person who has been
forgiven of his sins has fully satisfied the
divine will. But before I go on to cite evidence
of this ancient divine graciousness, I would
first like to explain briefly just what God has
required of those who have experienced it.
Vitae puritatem & innocentiam in iis semper
requisivit Deus, quibus peccata ignoscere voluit.
Hanc ver vel iam praesentem, dum errata
committuntur, vel ipsa subsequentem. Totam
rem dicam apertis.
God has always demanded purity and
innocence of life from those he has forgiven.
When a person makes mistakes, God
demands that this purity already typify his
life (even though at that particular moment
the person falls short) or, if purity is not al-
ready characteristic of his life, that it become
so. Let me clarify what I mean by this.
Duplex est genus delinquentium: Unum eorum,
qui, ut supr visum est, interdum quidem
labuntur, atque delinquunt, nulli tamen delicto
sive peccato sunt mancipati; sed vitam universam
ad divinam sibi praescriptam normam dirigunt,
atque componunt: Alterum eorum, qui vel multis,
vel uni tantm vitio sunt dediti; ade ut, ad Dei
voluntatem se conformare, dici non possint. Illis
pro benignitate sua non imputat Deus errata illa,
in quae nonnumquam [229] prolabuntur, quia iam
pur & innocenter vivuunt. His ver non imputat
delicta, quibus sunt obnoxii, si resipiscant; quia
deinceps pur & innocenter vivuunt. Sic in
utrisque vitae puritas & innocentia quaedam
caussa est, ut Deus illis clementer ac benign
There are two kinds of transgressors. As we
saw above, one kind is a person who makes
mistakes now and then. Even though such a
person occasionally fails, this person is not
habitually given to sinning; the general tenor
of this person's life conforms to the divine
standard. But the other kind of transgressor is
habitually given to sinning, be it one partic-
ular sin or many. This person sins to such an
extent that he cannot be described as conform-
ing to the divine will. God, because he is
kind, does not hold the first type of sinner ac-
countable for the faults which he sometimes
[229] commits, since this person is living a
pure and innocent life. In the case of the
second type of sinner, he will not hold him ac-
countable for transgressions if the person re-
peccata condonet.
pents and follows up this repentance with a
pure and blameless life. So in each case a
pure and blameless life is the cause of God's
merciful and kind forgiveness.
Hac autem ea fides continetur, sine qua fieri non
potest, ut quis Deo placeat, de qua auctor
epistolae ad Hebraeos capite 11. v 6. Quomodo
enim vitam suam ad Dei normam perpetu diriget
ille, qui vel Deum esse non credat, vel eorum, qui
ipsum quaerunt, benignum remuneratorem eum
esse, non sibi persuadeat? Haec est illa
obedientia, quae nos Deo gratos efficit; cuius
spiritus in quocunque fuerit, eum, pro admirabili
Dei benignitate, coram ipso iustum & inculpatum
reddit. Nam quid aliud est pur & innocenter
vivere, qum Dei voluntati obedire, eiusque dicto
audientem esse.
A blameless life involves the kind of faith a
person must have before that person can
please God. The writer to the Hebrews
discusses this faith in chapter 11 and verse 6.
Certainly no one can direct his life continually
to God's standard unless he both believes that
God exists, and that he generously rewards
those who seek him. This kind of obedience
makes us pleasing to God. God's spirit dwells
in such a person, and God, out of his won-
derful kindness, pronounces this person just
and blameless in his presence. Living inno-
cently and purely is simply obeying God's
will and paying attention to his word.
Sed iam huius divinae bonitatis, etiam citra
Christum, exempla ac testimonia proferamus.
Abel ab ipso Christo iustus fuisse dicitur, Matth.
23. v 35. & alibi, qud iustus esset, testatum
fuisse traditur, Heb. 11. v 4. Atqui nemo iustus
esse potest, cui delicta a Deo non condonentur.
Quare, aut Abelem nihil umquam deliquisse
dicendum est quod nemo affirmare audebit, aut illi
a Deo, quidquid deliquerat, condonatum fuisse.
Let me now present evidence and examples of
the divine kindness which God exercised even
before the time of Christ. Christ himself
called Abel just (Matt. 23:35) and Hebrews
11:4 likewise testifies to the same fact. But no
one whose faults are not pardoned by God
can be just. There are only two possibilities:
either we must say that Abel never sinned at
all, or that he did sin but God forgave him.
Since no one will dare affirm the first option
we are forced to conclude the latter.
Cur ver illi delicta condonata fuisse dicemus?
Num propterea quia Iesus Christus pro ipsis
divinae iustitiae olim satisfacturus erat, & hoc ipse
Abel credebat? Nihil mins. Explicans enim
auctor ille ad Heb eam fidem, propter quam &
ipse Abel iustus habitus a Deo fuerat, & Enochus
Deo placuerat: eam iis, quae iam diximus,
contineri dicit; nempe, ut Deus esse credatur, &
praemia rependere iis, qui ipsius sunt studiosi.
Credidit igitur Abel, non mod Deum esse, sed
eos etiam, quo ipsi obedirent, larg remunerari.
But on what basis shall we say that God
forgave Abel's sins? Was it because Jesus
Christ would someday make satisfaction to
divine justice for them, and that Abel put his
faith in this future event? Not at all. The
writer to the Hebrews explains the faith
which made God consider Abel just, and
which also made Enoch pleasing to God. He
describes that faith as comprising the ele-
ments we have already stated: a belief that
God exists, and that he rewards those who
follow him diligently. Abel not only believed
that God exists, but that he plentifully
rewards people to cause them to obey him.
Atque hinc factum est, ut ad eius voluntatem
vitam suam componeret, ade ut, quemadmodum
testatur Iohannes, eius opera iusta essent, I. Ioh.
3. v 12. Itaque divina benignitate, cum is pur &
innocenter viveret, quicquid deliquit, ei
liberalissim condonatum fuit; & iustus atque
inculpatus coram ipso Deo est habitus.
The result is that anyone who conforms his
life to the will of God will have works that are
righteous, just as John states in 1 Jn. 3:12. If a
person with a pure and innocent lifestyle fails,
God will graciously forgive him. God regards
such a person as just and blameless.
Demonstratur hoc apertissim per ea, quae ad
Cainum Deus locutus fuisse in sacra historia
perhibetur. Cui aegr admodum ferenti, qud
ipse Deus ad Abelem, [230] & ad oblationem eius
respexisset, ad se ver & ad oblationem suam
non respexisset: inquit Deus, Ut quid succensa
est ira tibi? & ut quid concidit vultus tuus?
Nonne, si bene feceris, erit acceptatio? (seu
remissio, sive etiam elatio) Gen. 4. v 7. Ex quibus
verbis, quamquam vari ab interpretibus
explicatis, manifest apparet, non alia potissimm
ratione Abelem Deo carum fuisse, nisi quia eius
opera erant iusta; Cainum ver minim, quia eius
opera, ut idem Iohannes ait, mala erant:
The truth of my statement is clearly shown in
the words God said to Cain, which are record-
ed in the sacred history. Cain was vexed at
God, because God looked favorably on Abel
[230] and his offering, but looked unfavorably
on Cain and his offering. God said, Why has
your wrath been kindled? And why has your
countenance fallen? If you do well, will there not
be approval (or forgiveness or lifting up)?
(Gen. 4:7). From these words, which are
admittedly explained variously by different
interpreters, it is obvious that Abel was dear
to God simply because his works were righ-
teous. Conversely, Cain was not at all dear to
God because his works were evil, as the
Apostle John also confirms.
Et simul de ea divina liberalitate, de qua agimus,
liquid constat; cum Deus Caino benefacienti, ac
resipiscenti veniam delictorum sponte offerat,
atque promittat: nullius prorsus verae
satisfactionis, quam pro ipsis accepturus esset,
vel mentione facta, vel ratione habita, sed
tantummodo aequitatis cuiusdam, quae divinam
naturam summopere deceat; ut scilicet Deus iis,
qui vel matur, vel seris, pur & innocenter
vivunt, omnium delictorum veniam largiatur,
eosque caros habeat. Quocirca per
interrogationem ea sententia exprimitur: Nonne, si
bene feceris, & c. quasi hos natura ipsa omnes
doceat, videlicet, Deum liberaliter peccata
resipiscentibus condonare. Ut nihil fer magis
impium excogitari possit, qum sentire, a Deo
At the same time, the divine graciousness
clearly shows that God will forgive those who
are innocent and blameless. When God will-
ingly offers and promises forgiveness of sins
to Cain if he mends his ways and repents, he
makes absolutely no mention of any literal
satisfaction he is going to receive for Cain's
sins. All that is mentioned is a kind of fair-
ness, which is exceedingly fitting to the divine
nature. God certainly holds dear those who
transgress, and lavishly pardons them their
transgressions if they, sooner or later, live
purely and innocently. The thought is ex-
pressed through the question, If you do well,
etc. It is as if nature itself teaches that God
freely forgives the penitent. One can scarcely
imagine a greater impiety than to think that
peccata non remitti, nisi pro ipsis illi plen
satisfiat.
God cannot remit sins unless a person makes
full satisfaction for them to him.
Ex hac sola Caini, & Abelis historia, iis adiunctis,
quae a Christo, & eius discipulis de utroque dicta
sunt, perspicuum est, ea vera esse, quae paullo
ante diximus; nempe, Deum prorsus gratuit
peccata semper remisisse. In iis autem, quibus
delicta aut ignoscat aut ignoturus fit, vitae
puritatem & innocentiam requirere, vel iam
praesentem; ut in Abele, vel ipsa delicta
subsequentem, ut in Caino. Quod autem de
Abele dictum est, eum iustum fuisse, idem de
innumerabilibus aliis scriptum extat. Ex quo
apert colligitur, eos, qui pur & innocenter
vivunt, divina benignitate delictorum gratuitam
veniam consequi. Neque enim, ut mod
dicebamus, aliter iusti appellari potuissent.
Based solely on this narrative of Cain and
Abel, coupled with the pertinent statements of
Christ and his disciples, what we said a bit
earlier is shown clearly to be true: God has al-
ways remitted sins without any cost. Howev-
er, God always requires a pure and blameless
life from those whom he does forgive or will
forgive. This blameless life must either al-
ready be present, as in the case of Abel, or by
repentance follow those transgressions, as in
the case of Cain. Moreover, Abel is not the
only one to be called just; the same is
written about countless others. From the
foregoing we can conclude that those who
live purely and innocently receive the free
pardon of transgressions from the divine
kindness. If this were not so, as we already
mentioned, they could not be called righteous.
Nam iustum in sacris litteris eum intelligi, qui pur
& innocenter vixerit, quemadmodum iniustum, qui
impur & flagitios, non autem, qui pro suis
peccatis Deo a Christo aut aliquando satisfactum
iri, aut iam satisfactum fuisse crediderit, neque ex
eo, qud quis ita credat, vitae innocentiam &
puritatem proficisci; partim per se manifestum est,
partim, ut spero, antequam huic responsioni
finem [231] imponam, evidentissim
demonstrabitur. Nunc alia testimonia huius
divinae beneficentiae commemoremus.
While the foregoing argument is to some
extent self-evident, I hope to demonstrate
plainly before I [231] finish this response that,
according to the Scriptures, one who lives
purely and innocently is deemed just, while
one who lives impurely and shamefully is
considered unjust. Being deemed just has
nothing to do with believing that God would
at some point make satisfaction for our sins
by Christ, or that such satisfaction has already
been made. Nor does innocence and purity of
life somehow arise from a belief in such satis-
faction. But now let us consider other exam-
ples of this divine kindness.
Scriptum est a Petro, qud tempore Noe, cum ab
ipso arca extrueretur, Dei patientia expectabat, 1
Pet. 3. v 20. Cur autem Deus expectare soleat, id
est, punitionem impiis decretam differre, docet
idem Petrus cum ait, Non tardat Dominus
promissum, ut quidam tarditatem existimant; sed
patienter agit erga nos, nolens aliquos perire, sed
Peter wrote that God was waiting patiently
while Noah was building the ark (1 Pet. 3:20).
Peter teaches us why it is God's practice to
wait, that is, delay the punishment which he
has decreed for the impious: God is not slow
concerning his promise, as some regard slowness;
but he acts patiently toward us, not willing that
omnes ad poenitentiam reverti, 2. Pet. 3. v 9.
Expectabat igitur Deus; & patienter hominum
scelera centum & viginti illis annis, quibus arca
extructa fuit, ideo tulit, ut mundus resipisceret,
atque ea ratione non periret.
any should perish, but that all should be brought
back to repentance (2 Pet. 3:9). God waited to
see if they would repent, and patiently
tolerated the sins of people for the one
hundred and twenty years during which the
ark was constructed. He was giving the
world a chance to repent and avoid
destruction.
Quamvis enim iam sententia eius perdendi lata
esset: revocare tamen atque recindere solet
Deus, propter supervenientem poenitentiam, &
vitae correctionem sententias iam a se latas de
puniendis & perdendis delinquentibus; ut mox
latis differemus. Ergo, si mundus resipuisset, ei
Deus diluvium non immisisset; sed hominum
delictis gratuit pro liberalitate sua eximia
pepercisset.
Even where God has already handed down
his sentence of destruction, he is nevertheless
accustomed to revoke and rescind such
sentences in light of an subsequent penitence
and reformation of life. We soon will show
this in more detail. Therefore, had the world
repented, God would not have sent the flood.
Had they repented, he would have forgiven
them their transgressions freely because of his
exceptional generosity.
Porr autem non satis habuit Deus hac ratione,
qua diximus, clementissimum se ab ipso ferme
orbe condito delinquentibus praebere; sed sub
ipsa Lege voluit etiam tantae suae beneficentiae
populum disert admoneri.
God did not feel it was sufficient to reveal that
he is merciful to transgressors simply with
examples like the above, i.e., taken from his
early dealings with the human race, almost
from the very foundation of the world. In-
deed, he wanted to clearly remind the people
under the law of his great kindness.
Nam, tametsi in ipsa Lege ferenda, in ipsoque
foedere sanciendo, non nisi quibusdam levioribus
delictis, ut supra visum est, expiatoria sacrificia
constituisset, caetera ver graviora severe puniri,
& vindicari praecepisset;
Even in setting down the law and in ratifying
the covenant, he established expiatory sacri-
fices for certain less serious transgressions (as
we saw above), while at the same time he
determined heavy punishment for other more
grave offenses.
tamen, praeter eas sententias, quas saepius
luculentissim populo inculcari voluit, se videlicet
tardum ad iram esse, & multum misericordi, tan-
dem, ut Moses populum, postquam illi, nisi a
simulacrorum cultu se impollutum conservasset,
dispersionem inter populos, & multa alia mala
minatus fuerat, ad hunc modum alloqueretur,
effecit: Cum fuerit tibi angustia, invenerintque te
omnia ista in novissimis diebus; si reversus fueris
Nevertheless, besides those concepts which he
wanted impressed frequently and indelibly on
the people (e.g., that he is slow to wrath and
abundant in mercy), God wanted to impress
some other facts on them as well. After
threatening the Israelites with exile among the
nations and many other evils if they should
fail to keep themselves undefiled from wor-
shipping images, God had Moses exhort the
people in this way: When distress befalls you
ad Iehovam Deum tuum, & parueris voci eius,
quia Deus misericors est Iehova Deus tuus, non
derelinquet te; nec disperdet te; nec obliviscetur
pacti patrum tuorum, de quo iuravit illis, Deut. 4. v
30. Et rursus cap. 30. in ipso initio: Erit autem,
cum evenerint tibi omnia verba haec, benedictio,
& maledictio, quas proposui tibi, & reduxeris ad
cor tuum in cunctis gentibus, ad quas expulerit te
Iehova Deus tuus, & conversus fueris ad Iehovam
Deum tuum, [232] obedierisque voci eius per
omnia, ut ego praecipio tibi hodie, tu & filii tui toto
corde tuo, & tota anima tua; tum reducet Iehova
Deus tuus captivitatem tuam, & miserebitur tui, &
conversus congregabit te de cunctis populis, ad
quos disperserit te Iehova Deus tuus, & c.
and all those evils have come upon you in the latter
days: if you return to Jehovah your God and are
ready to obey his voice, because Jehovah your God
is a merciful God, he will not forsake you, neither
will he destroy you, nor will he forget the covenant
of your fathers, about which he swore to them
(Deut. 4:30). And again, in the beginning of
chapter 30, he states, Moreover, it will come
about that when everything mentioned in these
words comes upon youthe blessing and the
curse, which I have set before youand you have
recalled them to your heart among all the nations,
to which Jehovah your God has driven you, and
you have returned to Jehovah your God, [232] and
you have been obedient to his voice in all things
that I command you today, you and your children,
with all your heart and with all your soul, then
Jehovah God will bring you back home from your
captivity, and he will be merciful to you, and he
will return and gather you from all the peoples, to
whom Jehovah your God has scattered you, etc.
Promittit igitur Moses populo, si, postquam Deus
eum, propter ipsorum delicta inter gentes
dispersisset, & captivum duci voluisset,
poenitentiam suorum delictorum egisset, &
conversus ad ipsum Deum fuisset, futurum, ut
Deus ipsorum misereretur, & captivitate eos
liberaret, & sic eis delicta condonaret. Hoc
autem, & id, quod superioribus illis sententiis
continebatur, cumulatissim praestitit Deus; ut
universa Sacra Historia docet, in qua
animadvertere licet, qud neque illico, cum
populus peccasset, eum Deus puniebat, neque
tam graviter, ut is meritus fuerat; &
quandocunque populus ad frugem redibat, vel
suorum delictorum intestino dolore tangebatur,
Deus ab ipsis puniendis cessabat, & errata,
quantumvis gravia, illis condonabat.
Therefore, Moses promised the people that if
they repented of their sins and returned to
God, even after God willed their captivity and
dispersed them among the nations because of
their transgressions, God would show them
compassion, free them from their captivity,
and thereby forgive their transgressions. The
entire sacred history shows how God abun-
dantly fulfilled this promise and the others al-
ready discussed. It should be observed in this
connection that when the people sinned, God
did not punish them immediately, nor as
severely as they deserved. And whenever the
people sought to mend their ways, or were
moved to heart-felt sorrow for their transgres-
sions, God stopped punishing them and
forgave them their mistakes, however serious.
Atque huius rei, praeter historiam ipsam, multa
alia apertissima testimonia habemus; praecipu
ver eam ad Deum Levitarum orationem, quae
We have many clear examples of the scenario
we have just envisioned, even beyond the
narrative already mentioned. The primary
est 9 cap. Nehem. In qua & copiosissim &
dilucidissim utrumque commemoratur;
praesertim ver, quod attinet ad sententias illas
de divina misericordia, in illis verbis: Ipsi ver, &
patres nostri superb egerunt, & induraverunt
cervicem suam; nec audierunt praecepta tua.
Immo renuerunt audire; neque recordati sunt
mirabilium tuorum, quae feceras cum eis.
Induraveruntque cervicem suam; ac conversi
sunt, ut reverterentur ad servitutem suam, cum
rebellione sua. Tu tamen Deus veniarum,
clemens & misericors, longanimis & multae
misericordiae non dereliquisti eos, & c. Quod
ver pertinet ad id etiam, quod Moses promiserat,
in illis verbis,
7
Irritaverunt itaque, & rebellaverunt
contra te; ac proiecerunt legem tuam post corpus
suum. Prophetas quoque tuos occiderunt, qui
testificabantur contra eos, ut converterent eos ad
te; & fecerunt convitia magna. Itaque tradidisti
eos in manum hostium suorum, & afflixerunt eos,
ac in tempore afflictionis clamaverunt ad te; & tu
de caelo audisti; atque, secundum miserationes
tuas multas, dedisti eis salvatores, qui
servaverunt eos de manu hostium suorum. Cum
ver esset illis quies, reversi sunt ad faciendum
malum contra te. Idcirco dereliquisti eos in manu
inimicorum suorum, qui dominati sunt eis.
Conversi autem rursum clamaverunt ad te. & tu
de caelo exaudisti; atque eruisti eos, secundum
miserationes tuas multis temporibus. Quid [233]
potuit apertius dici, ut sciremus, Dei voluntatem
esse, ut peccata poenitentibus condonentur, & id
revera ab ipso praestari?
example is the Levites' prayer to God, re-
counted in Nehemiah 9. While this prayer
details abundantly and plainly both pun-
ishing and forgiving, it is the divine mercy
that is particularly clear: But they and our
fathers behaved proudly, and they stiffened their
necks; nor did they listen to your commandments.
On the contrary, they refused to hear; neither were
they mindful of your wonderful works that you did
in their midst. But they stiffened their necks, and
they turned back, so that they should return to
their slavery with their rebellion. But you are a
God who pardons, gracious and merciful, patient
and full of kindness; you have not forsaken them,
etc. But the punitive sanctions, of which Mo-
ses had forewarned, are detailed in these
words: And so they incited you and rebelled
against you; and they threw away your law behind
their backs. And they also killed your prophets,
who were testifying against them, that they [the
prophets] should bring them back to you; and they
committed great blasphemy. So you handed them
over into the hand of their enemies, and they
afflicted them, and in the time of affliction they
cried out to you; and you heard from heaven, and
so according to your great compassion you gave
them saviors, who saved them from the hand of
their enemies. But after they had rest, they went
back to doing evil against you. Therefore, you
abandoned them to the hand of their enemies, who
ruled over them. But returning, they again cried
out to you, and you heard from heaven; and many
times according your mercy you delivered them.
8

It [233] could not be stated more clearly for
our information that God wants to forgive the
penitent of their sins and will truly do so.
Beatus, inquit David, cui dimissa est
praevaricatio, cui tectum est peccatum. Beatus
homo, cui non imputat Iehova iniquitatem, nec est
in spiritu eius dolus, Psal. 32. Illis ergo Deus
peccata condonat, & iniquitates non imputat, quo-
rum in spiritu non est dolus; id est, ut plerique
interpretantur, qui syncero corde ad Deum
David says, Blessed is the one to whom
transgression has been forgiven and whose sin has
been covered. Blessed is the one to whom Jehovah
does not impute iniquity, and in whose spirit there
is no guile (Ps. 32). From this passage we see
that God forgives sins and does not impute
iniquities to the guileless in spirit. Most un-
derstand these to be people who have turned
convertuntur. Propterea paulo inferis subiungit,
Peccatum [igitur] meum notum feci tibi; &
iniquitatem meam non operui. Dixi, Confitebor
adversum me praevaricationes meas Iehovae. &
tu dimisisti iniquitatem peccata mei.
to God with a sincere heart. A little later
David adds, Therefore I made known my sin to
you and I did not hide my iniquity. I said, I will
confess against myself my transgressions to
Jehovah. And you forgave the iniquity of my
sin.
Omitto ea, quae plenissim & apertissim hac de
re scripta sunt apud Ezechielem cap. 18 & 33,
quippe quae pervulgatissima sint. Ea tamen ut
paulo diligentis relegas, tibi amanter consulo; &
illud praesertim, quod v 19. cap. 33. legitur,
accurat perpendas: cum aversus fuerit impius ab
impietate sua, & fecerit iudicium, & iustitiam,
propter ipsa vivet. Ade autem verum est, Deum
poenitentibus peccata non imputare, ut,
quemadmodum antea attigimus, etiamsi iam
sententiam tulerit contra delinquentes, & eos
perdere constituerit, si tamen illi suorum scelerum
poenitentiam agant, ipsum quoque iam latae
sententiae poeniteat; ita ut eam revocet ac
rescindat, & eos iterum in gratiam recipiat.
I will not take time to discuss those statements
which are fully and clearly written on this
subject in chapters 18 and 33 of Ezekiel, since
they are common knowledge. However, I do
advise you lovingly to carefully reconsider
those statements again, and especially chapter
33 and verse 19: When the wicked person turns
from his wickedness, and does what is lawful and
just, he will thereby live. It is certainly true
that God does not impute the guilt of sins to
the penitent, even in those instances where,
before their repentance, he had determined to
destroy them. If they repent of their wicked
deeds, God also will repent of the sentence he
had already laid down. When they repent,
God will revoke and rescind the decision to
destroy them and will receive them again into
his favor.
Cuius rei praeter tritissima illa regis Ezechiae, &
Ninivitarum exempla, & alia, quae afferri possent,
illustre admodum testimonium habemus in rege
Achabo.
There are many familiar examples of God
withdrawing his sentence of destruction. The
cases of King Hezekiah and of Nineveh are
the most well-known. But a very clear ex-
ample is King Ahab.
Constituerat Deus, ipso Achabo vivente, tum
ipsum, tum eius domum universam propter ipsius
scelera, potissimm autem propter idololatriam,
funditus delere. Et ob eam caussam Eliae
praeceperat, ut ungeret Iehu in regem Israelis;
cuius opera ad id perficiendum uti volebat, I Reg.
19. v 16. Postea ver qum sceleribus suis illud
addidit, ut Nabothi vineam, quam concupierat,
post ipsius Nabothi caedem, fraude & iussu
Iezabelis uxoris suae, crudelissim perpetratam,
possidendam invaderet, id, quod iam antea
Because of Ahab's wickedness in general and
his idolatry in particular, God determined to
destroy both Ahab and his household during
Ahab's lifetime. Consequently, God in-
structed Elijah to anoint Jehu as king of Israel,
and God was going to use Jehu as a tool to
execute his sentence (1 Kgs. 19:16). After-
ward, Ahab added to his guilt by taking pos-
session of Naboth's vineyard, which he had
coveted, after Naboth was killed through the
deception of Ahab's wife Jezebel and at her
command.
decreverat Deus,
illi etiam per Eliam denunciat his verbis, Ecce ego
adduco super te malum, & auferam post te; &
succidam de Achab mingentem ad parietem, &
clausum, & derelictum in Israele. Dabo quoque
domum tuam, sicut domum Ieroboam filii Nabat,
& sicut domum Baasa filii Achiae propter
irritationem, qua irritasti, & qud peccare fecisti
Israelem, I Reg. 21. v 21, & 22.
God, through Elijah, served Ahab notice of
the punishment he had determined: Behold, I
am bringing evil upon you and I shall take away
your posterity after you; and I shall cut off from
Ahab the man who urinates against the wall, and
the bond or free in Israel. And I will also make
your house as the house of Jeroboam the son of
Nabat, and as the house of Baasha the son of
Ahijah, because of the provocation with which you
have provoked me and because you made Israel
sin (1 Kgs. 21:21-22).
Haec audiens [234] Achabus, ut scriptum est
ibidem v. 27. scidit vestimenta sua; & sacco
indutus, ieiunauit: & alia signa poenitentiae, seu
potis formidationis irae divinae, dedit, & se
coram Deo deiecit. Quo viso, Deus ita Eliam
alloquitur: Vidisti ne, qud humiliaverit se Achab a
facie mea? Propterea quod humiliavit se a facie
mea, non inducam malum in diebus eius. In
diebus filii eius inducam malum super domum
eius.
On hearing these threats, [234] Ahab tore his
garments, put on sackcloth, and fasted (v. 27).
He also performed other acts of penitence (or,
to be more precise, acts motivated by fear of
divine retribution) and cast himself down on
the ground before God. When God saw this,
he remarked to Elijah, See how Ahab has hum-
bled himself before Me. Because he has humbled
himself, I will not bring the evil to pass during his
lifetime. I will bring the evil on his house in the
days of his son.
Hinc factum est, ut non Elias, quemadmodum
antea iussum a Deo fuerat, vivente Achabo, sed
Elisaeus, post Achabi mortem, Iehu in regem
Israelis inungi curaverit; ut habes 2 Reg. in initio 9
cap. cui Iehu, per ipsum id fieri debere,
denunciatur, quod Elias Achabo, Dei iussu,
comminatus fuerat, & sine dubio, ipso Achabo
vivente, nisi se coram Deo deiecisset, perfectum
fuisset. Num, putas, Achabus idololatra, &
impurus homo pro suis sceleribus divinae iustitiae
a Christo satisfactum iri credidit, aut quovis alio
modo istius satisfactionis particeps fuit, atque ea
ratione poenam illam iam sibi iur decretam
effugit?
And so it happened that it was not Elijah
(during Ahab's lifetime) but Elisha (after
Ahab had died) who carried out the original
threat and anointed Jehu king of Israel. In the
beginning of 2 Kings 9, Elisha recounts to
Jehu the punishment with which Elijah, at
God's command, had threatened Ahab; Jehu
is told that he will be the one to carry it out.
There is no doubt that if Ahab had not
humbled himself before God, this punishment
would have happened in Ahab's own lifetime.
Did the impure and idolatrous Ahab, do you
suppose, believe that he escaped his justly de-
creed punishment because Christ would make
satisfaction to divine justice for his transgres-
sions, or that he was in some other way a
beneficiary of that satisfaction?
Adde huc exemplum Roboami & Israelitarum se
Add to this the example of Rehoboam and the
Deo summittentium. Ob quam caussam Deus,
contra qum paullo ante comminatus per
prophetam Semeiam illis fuerat, eos non perdidit,
2 Par. 12. Qud si Deus propter delinquentis non
veram poenitentiam, sed poenae formidinem, &
coram ipsius maiestate externam demissionem,
sententiam iam adversus illum latam revocare
solet, quid eum facere consueuisse dicendum
est, cum is, qui deliquit, ex animo delictorum
poenitentiam agit, ade ut resipiscat, & in
posterum pur & innocenter vivat?
Israelites humbling themselves before God. It
is for this very same reason that he did not
destroy them, even though a little earlier he
had threatened them through the prophet
Shemaiah (2 Chr. 12). If God is accustomed to
revoke a sentence of judgment already
decreed against someone who does not
genuinely repent, but who merely puts on an
outward show of humility in the presence of
his majesty, how much more will God do for
someone who genuinely repents from the
heart, turning from evil and living purely and
innocently henceforth?
Nec ver tantummodo huius suae admirabilis
benignitatis haec nobis clarissima specimina
saepius dedit Deus, sed id se perpetu facturum,
per Hieremiam vatem non obscur contestatus
est. Repente, inquit, loquar adversus gentem
[aliquam] & adversus regnum, ut evellam, &
confringam, & perdam. Sin autem convertatur
gens ipsa a malo suo, contra quod locutus sum,
poenitebit me mali, quod cogitaveram facere ei,
Hier. 18. Ubi rectissim in magis Roberti
Stephani bibliis annotatum est, Id est mutabo
sententiam, ne affligam eos, ut constitueram.
Apud Ezechielem ver cap. 33. v 14. ita scriptum
est, Cum dixero impio, Moriendo moreris, &
aversus fuerit a peccato suo, feceritque iudicium,
& iustitiam, & c. vivendo vivet, & non morietur.
omnia peccata eius, quae peccavit, non
commemorabuntur ei, Iudicium, & iustitiam fecit;
[235] vivendo vivet.
Not only does God give us these plain
examples of his marvelous kindness, but he
also tells us clearly through the prophet Jer-
emiah that he always will forgive in such
cases. Suddenly, God says, I shall speak
against a nation and against a kingdom, that I
should pluck out, break into pieces, and destroy it.
But if that nation turns from its evil, against
which I have decreed destruction, I will repent of
the evil which I had thought to do to it (Jer. 18).
Robert Stephanus, in his Large Bible,
9
quite
rightly explains the passage as follows: That
is, I will change my sentence and I will not injure
them as I had determined. Furthermore,
Ezekiel 33:14 states, When I have said to the
wicked person, You will surely die, but he then
turns from his sin and does what is lawful and
right, etc., he will surely live and not die. He will
not be held accountable for any of the sins which he
committed; he has done that which is lawful and
right; [235] he shall surely live.
Nam qud non pauci, ne Deus, scilicet, mutabilis
esse dicatur, miris modis haec, & eiusmodi alia
divina oracula depravant; in eo cert deploranda
est eorum tam crassa inscitia, qui non
animadvertant, in eiusmodi sententiae, suae
revocatione ac rescissione non ipsum Deum, sed
hominem mutari, Dei decreto immutabili usque
permanente: Quod nimirum est, obstinat in
So that it should not be said that God is
mutable, quite a few people in astonishing
ways distort these and other divine threats of
punishment which God later rescinds. The
crass ignorance of those who hold such a posi-
tion is truly lamentable. They do not see that
in these instances it is not God himself who
changes when he revokes and rescinds the
sentence, but rather it is human beings who
peccatis perseverantibus, nec se coram ipsius
maiestate demittentibus graves poenas pro
meritis irrogare; poenitentibus ver & ipsius opem
implorantibus benignissim veniam dare. Quod
etiamsi a Deo statutum non fuisset, non idcirco
tamen is mutabilis dici posset, cum sententiam
praedicta ratione revocat. Homo enim, ut
diximus, is est, qui mutatur: & divinae mutandae
sententiae caussam praebet. Mutabilis autem est
is, non qui sententiam mutat, sed qui sine caussa
mutat. Qui autem ob caussam mutat, tantum
abest, ut mutabilis dici possit, ut non mod
prudens, sed etiam in officio suo constans
habeatur; & nisi mutaverit, imprudentiae, & stultae
pervicaciae crimen incurrat.
change; God's immutable decree remains con-
stant. No doubt he inflicts severe and de-
served penalties on those who stubbornly
persist in sin and do not humble themselves
before his divine majesty. But he kindly par-
dons the penitent, who rely on his power to
help them. Although God has not made a
determination to punish, he cannot be called
mutable when, based on a principle he stated
beforehand, he commutes a sentence. More-
over, as we said, the human being is the one
who changed, and this change provides the
basis for the change in the divine sentence.
Note also that changing a sentence per se does
not make one mutable, but changing it
without a reason does. The one who changes
his sentence for a reason is hardly mutable: he
should be considered not only wise but even
steadfast in his duty! In fact, if he did not
change he could be charged with ignorance
and foolish stubbornness.
Atque haec pauca de innumerabilibus, quae ante
Christum divinae misericordiae, qua poenitentes
liberalissim a poenis ipsorum delictis debitis
eximuntur, apertissima exempla & testimonia
extant, protulisse sat fuerit.
And so, out of the countless examples I could
have given, these few stand out as crystal
clear proof of divine mercy before the coming
of Christ. It is by this mercy that the penitent
are forgiven freely of the penalties they owe
for their transgressions.
Nunc an eandem hanc liberalitatem per Christum
nobiscum exercere Deus nec ne voluerit,
accurat dispiciendum nobis est. Et primm
cert, nisi velimus, Deum eo tempore, quod in
divinis litteris gratiae, seu favoris & benignitatis
appellatur, restrictiorem fuisse, qum eo, quod
prae illo severitatis, atque irae appellari potest;
concludendum prorsus videtur, in salute nobis
divina providentia per Christum parta, nullam
veram pro delictis nostris satisfactionem a
quoquam accipere Deum voluisse, sed
liberalissim ea universa poenitentibus nobis ac
resipiscentibus condonasse. Et quamquam haec
sola ratio satis superque esse potest ad veritatem
Now we must consider carefully whether God
wanted to exercise this same graciousness
toward us through Christ. In the first place,
we must certainly affirm that he did, unless
we are prepared to say that God was more
severe in the time after the coming of Christ,
which the Scriptures call a time of grace and
favor, than in the time before his coming,
which may be called a time of sternness and
wrath. We absolutely must conclude that
God, in the salvation provided to us through
Christ by God's providence, wanted no literal
satisfaction for our transgressions. Rather, he
freely and completely forgave all of us who
were penitent and turned from our sins. Even
hanc unicuique demonstrandam; videamus
tamen, numquid praeterea alia sint, quae ipsam &
confirmandi, & omnibus persuadendi vim
habeant.
though this argument alone should be more
than adequate to demonstrate this truth to
anyone, we will nevertheless consider other
arguments which are weighty enough to
prove it and to convince all.
Considerandum igitur deinde est, quid se
facturum per Christum Deus promiserit, & quid
novum illud foedus, quod nobiscum [236] per
ipsum sancire decreverat, contenturum foret.
The next issue we should consider is what
God promised he would do through Christ,
i.e., the contents of the new covenant, which
he declared he would ratify with us through
him. [236]
Verba luculentissima, quae hac de re apud
Hieremiam leguntur, supr & vidimus & aliqua ex
parte alicubi examinavimus: cum diceremus, ex
ipsis constare, in foedere hoc eam vim fuisse, ut
in humanis mentibus divinae legi parendi &
voluntas & vires per ipsum gignerentur, quod
satis est ad erratorum veniam plenissimam
consequendam. Id quod etiam ex ipsis Dei apud
Prophetam verbis, & ex eorum ordine constare
potest. Praecedit enim in ipsis legis divinae in
cordibus inscriptio remissionem peccatorum.
Atque idem est, ac si dictum fuisset: Postquam
lex divina in hominis corde inscripta foret,
consecuturam ea de caussa peccatorum
remissionem; quemadmodum superis ostensum
est. Ubi etiam dictum a nobis fuit, idem esse
hanc divinae legis in mentibus nostris
inscriptionem, quod est poenitentia &
resipiscentia. Quae si mod adsit, Deum pro
ingenti bonitate sua, nulla vera satisfactione
accepta, nobis peccata remittere voluisse in novo
foedere, quod nobiscum per Christum percutere
dignatus est, constanter affirmo, & nunc
potissimm contendo.
We have already noted and partially
considered Jeremiah's impressive words on
this issue. We said that these words establish
that the new covenant had the power to
implant in peoples' minds both the desire and
the ability to carry out the divine law, and
that this obedience results in the full pardon
of our mistakes. God's actual words through
the prophet establish this, as well as the flow
of the argument. The discussion about the
divine law in the heart comes before the dis-
cussion of the remission of sins. It is as if it
said, After the divine law is written in the
heart of a person, the remission of sins will
follow as a result, just as we proved above.
This is why we said earlier that the writing of
God's law in our minds is tantamount to peni-
tence and turning away from sin. If such
repentance is present, I unflinchingly main-
tain and strongly urge that God, out of his
vast kindness and without receiving literal
satisfaction, was expressing his desire to for-
give us our sins under the new covenant,
which he deigned to conclude with us
through Christ.
Id quod verissimum esse vel ex illis divini illius
oraculi verbis constare potest: Quia propitius ero
iniquitati eorum; & peccati eorum non recordabor
amplis. Quomodo enim propitius fuisset Deus
iniquitatibus nostris, si cum eas nobis, nulla
The truth of this assertion is established from
the following divine declaration: Because I
will be propitious toward their iniquity, and I shall
not remember their sin any longer. I ask, in
what sense would God be propitious toward
our iniquities if, when he could have remitted
satisfactione interveniente, remittere posset, pro
ipsis sibi plenissim satisfieri curasset? aut quo-
modo peccatorum nostrorum non recordatus
fuisset, si ab humana natura in Christo ipsorum
omnium tam rigid & exact poenas repetiisset?
Vel potis quid mirum est, eum iniquitates nostras
nobis non imputare, & peccatorum nostrorum non
amplis recordari, si iam ei uberrim satisfactum
pro sceleribus nostris fuit, & iam eorum ita
recordatus est, ut ne minimum quidem impunitum
reliquerit? Quaenam haec est ipsius, quam
tantopere praedicat, munificentia ac liberalitas, si
de iure suo ne tantillum quidem remittere voluit?
them without an intervening satisfaction, he
should instead decide to receive complete sat-
isfaction for them? Indeed, he would not
have forgotten our sins if he inflexibly de-
manded to receive an exact recompense by in-
flicting the penalties for those sins on Christ's
human nature. What is even more amazing is
how he could not impute or remember our
sins any longer if he had to remember even
the least of our sins in order to make full
satisfaction by punishing them. It is certainly
a strange sort of generosity which God so
greatly declares if he will not abandon his
right to punish one whit.
At dices, munificentissimum & liberalissimum in
eo Deum fuisse, qud eum nos ipsos plectere
iur posset, noluit tamen; sed, nobis impunitis
dimissis, filium suum pro nobis gravissim
percusit. Primm dico, munificentiam &
liberalitatem istam fortasse constituram, si, ut
delicta nostra aliquo modo punirentur, necesse
[237] fuisset. Verm, cum, ut paullo ante
probatum fuit, nihil impediret, quo mins Deus ea
impunita relinqueret, tantum abest, ut ea non in
nobis, sed in alio punivisse munificum & liberale
opus censendum fit, ut & sordidum & illiberale
potis dici debeat.
You might respond that God shows the
greatest generosity because even though he
could have justly punished us he nevertheless
chose not to: leaving us unpunished, he
severely struck down his own son in our
place. But I say first of all that this type of
generosity on God's part perhaps could be
established only if we presuppose the
necessity [237] of punishing our trans-
gressions in some other way. However, we
showed earlier that there was nothing to keep
God from leaving our sins unpunished. In
fact, if God transferred our punishment to
another person, he would not be generous
and gracious. Rather, he would deserve to be
called base and miserly.
Perinde est enim, ac si rex aliquis, cum permultos
ex suis subiectis graviter sibi obaeratos haberet,
a quibus, nisi funditus eos perdere vellet, suum
repetere non posset; ut & ipsos conservaret, &,
quod sibi deberetur, reciperet, aliquem in suo reg-
no divitem, nihil ipsi debentem, ad omnem
pecuniam sibi ab illis debitam dissolvendam
adigeret, aut, ut eam solveret, vel curaret, vel
pateretur. Quis non regem istum tenacem &
avarum esse dicat, qui, cum subditis debitoribus
suis debitas sibi pecunias condonare liberaliter
Consider the following analogy. It is just as if
a certain king had many subjects who were
deeply indebted to him. If the king were to
demand his money from these subjects he
would ruin them. So the king devises a plan
both to save his subjects and to recoup the
money they owe him. The king forces a
certain rich man in his kingdom, who owes
him nothing, to pay him all the money his
subjects owe him. The rich man must come
up with the money or be liable for the debt.
Everyone would certainly agree that a king
posset, eas ab eo, qui nihil ipsi debeat, repetierit?
Praesertim ver si ita dives fit, ut e pecuniarum
summa nihil indigeat, & interim se debitoribus illis
universum debitum remisisse iactet?
who could have freely forgiven the money
owed him by his subjects but instead extorts it
from someone who owes him nothing is
miserly and covetous. He would be all the
more stingy and covetous if he were so
wealthy that he did not even need the money.
And meanwhile, he boasts to the debtors that
he has forgiven their entire debt!
Qu magis autem is, in quo punienda nostra
delicta essent, Deo carus foret, e magis
eiusmodi facinus reprehendendum omnino
videretur. Quid enim indignius, qum eum, qui
tibi carissimus sit, nulla necessitate, supplicio
teterrimo afficere, ab eoque immerente poenas
eorum delictorum reposcere, quae iur prorsus
condonari poterant?
The degree of heinousness in God's punishing
a substitute for our sins is in direct proportion
to the degree to which God holds him dear.
Nothing is more disgraceful than needlessly
harming with a hideous punishment someone
who is precious to you. And nothing is more
disgraceful than demanding from that
innocent person, as though it were a rightful
claim, the penalties for other peoples' trans-
gressions, which God could have justly
forgiven outright.
Praeterea non is est munificus & liberalis, qui
caussa est, ut aliquis beneficio vel maximo
afficiatur: sed, qui de suo donat atque largitur.
Non satis est, si erga debitorem meum liberalem
me extitisse iur affirmare velim, illum, me id
curante, quod mihi debebat non solvisse, &
propter me id commodum sensisse, sed necesse
est, ut ego id, quod mihi ab ipso debebatur,
recipere noluerim, & eam pecuniae summam ita
illi largitus fuerim, ut me ipsum e volens
privaverim. Quocirca, si is quidem non solverit,
ego tamen, quod mihi debebatur, receperim;
quacumque tandem ratione id factum fuerit, nulla
caussa est, cur munificentiae & liberalitatis
nomine commendari possim.
Besides, a person is not generous simply
because he causes a great benefit to be
bestowed on someone. A person is generous
only if that person gives freely what belongs
to him. If I want to say that I am gracious to-
ward my debtor, it is not enough for me
simply to absolve the debtor of the debt so
that the debtor will perceive it as a favor I
have done to him. The only way I can say
meaningfully that I am gracious toward my
debtor is to stop worrying about the debt, for-
give it, and forget about receiving remunera-
tion for it. To be gracious I must refuse to re-
ceive the money the debtor owes me. This
means I will have given the debtor that sum
of money and willingly deprived myself of it.
Consequently, even if the debtor does not pay
me what he owes, there is no reason to
commend me as generous if I somehow
receive payment for the debt, however that
payment may take place.
Postrem non omnino ab eo, quod nos Deo
We would not be altogether free from paying
God what we owe him if God were concerned
debebamus, persolvendo immunes fuimus, si a
Christo id sibi solvi curavit Deus; cum, ut paullo
ante attigimus, ab humana natura nostra in ipso
Christo illud debitum exegerit. Nec ver scriptum
dumtaxat reperimus, [238] erga nos Deum
benignum & largum per Christum extiturum, sed
erga ipsum humanum genus. Angeli enim,
Christo nato, hominibus simpliciter & absolut
benevolentiam, divinam scilicet, praedicant, &
annunciant. Luc. 2. v. 14.
to have Christ pay it. This is true if God
demanded payment of the debt through our
human nature in Christ himself. The Bible
does not specifically say [238] that God is
going to be kind and generous toward us
through Christ, but toward the human race it-
self. Evidently, at the birth of Christ the an-
gels proclaimed in simple and absolute terms
that God would be kind toward human
beings (Lk. 2:14).
Numquid autem, quod se facturum Deus pollicitus
fuerat, an reipsa praestiterit, dubitamus? Nonne
ipsius Iesu Christi praecursor, qui Domini vias
paratum venit, ut apud Lucam cap. 1. v. 77.
scriptum est, eius promissae salutis scientiae
dandae destinatus fuit, Nempe, populo remissa
esse peccata propter viscera misericordiae Dei
nostri? Quis hc satisfactionem ullam
intervenisse vel sominare quidem potest? Nonne
idem ipse postea, qua ratione hanc, sol Dei
misericordi partam nobis, peccatorum
remissionem reipsa consequeremur, luculenter
expressit, cum, ut poenitentiam agerent, quia
regnum caelorum appropinquaret, populo
denunciabat, Matth. 3 v 2. & baptismum
poenitentiae in remissionem peccatorum
praedicabat, Mar. 1. v 4, Luc. 3. v 3? Nihil igitur
praeter poenitentiam nostram extra seipsum
requisivit Deus, ut peccatorum remissionem nobis
in novo foedere oblatam consequeremur.
We should not doubt that God would fulfill
his promise. The forerunner of Christ himself,
who prepared the Lord's path, was appointed
to give the knowledge of his promised salva-
tion (Lk. 4:77). Specifically, the message of
salvation is that people's sins are forgiven on
account of God's heart-felt mercy. Who could
imagine satisfaction having anything to do
with this? Later, John the Baptist splendidly
explained how we were to actually attain the
remission of sins, provided for us solely from
God's mercy. He explained this when, to en-
courage them to repent, he told the people
that the kingdom of heaven was drawing near
(Matt. 3:2) and preached the baptism of repen-
tance for the remission of sins (Mk. 1:4; Lk.
3:3). Therefore, God himself seeks nothing
over and beyond our repentance, through
which we obtain the remission of sins offered
to us in the new covenant.
Nam qud Baptista populum ad Christum
rejiciebat, atque, ut in eum crederent, monebat, ut
evangelistae omnes express commemorant, &
disert scriptum est Act. 19. v 5, id non eam vim
habet, quasi, praeter poenitentiam aliud in Christo
reperturi essent, quod ad delictorum veniam a
deo impetrandam requireretur. Sed ideo ad
Christum cunctos rejiciebat Iohannes, atque ut in
eum crederent, praecipiebat,
John the Baptist was directing the people to
believe in Christ, and was warning them that
his own baptism did not have the power to
forgive sins. John did not want the people to
think that beyond penitence they could find
anything in Christ which would be required
of them in order to receive forgiveness from
God. All the Gospel writers distinctly recall
this, and it is clearly written in Acts 19:5 as
well. Therefore, John was directing everyone
to Christ. So John admonished them in
several ways, to encourage them to believe in
him.
Primm, ut quaenam poenitentia illa esse
deberet, exactis ab ipso docerentur; id est, ut
qualem, peccatis relictis, vitam in posterum
instituere deberent, optim nossent. Neque enim
ipse Iohannes absolutissimam illam Christianae
vitae rationem, quae potissima pars poenitentiae
nostrae est, populum docuit, sed Christo ipsi id
muneris reservatum fuit.
First of all, he admonished them to learn more
precisely from Christ what makes up the
repentance that God requires. In other words,
they should learn well what kind of life they
ought to live after they have abandoned their
sins. John himself did not teach the people
the details of the perfect Christian way of life,
which is the principal part of our repentance;
that teaching office was reserved for Christ
himself.
Deinde, ut, quidnam ea peccatorum remissio
esset, apert cognoscerent, &, ubi, quanti esset,
agnovissent, mult alacris, qum antea, ut eam
consequi possent, poenitentiam agerent, ac
resipiscerent. Siquidem Baptista vitae immortalis
ac beatissimae, quae in ea peccatorum
remissione continebatur, nusquam express
meminit. [239] Sed hac in parte caeteris, qui
ipsum antecesserant, prophetis similis, tectis ver-
bis ea de re, cuius in vetere foedere sanciendo
Moses nullam mentionem fecerat, locutus est.
Christus enim is futurus erat, qui tantam lucem
primus mundo inferret.
Next, John was admonishing them to
recognize plainly of what the remission of
sins consists, to repent and, having ac-
knowledged the greatness of that remission,
actually to experience it much more readily
than before. Indeed, the Baptist himself no-
where explicitly mentions eternal life or the
highest blessedness, which the remission of
sins entails. [239] On the subject of remission,
the Baptist was just like the other prophets
who preceded him, speaking with veiled
allusions. Moses also had said nothing of it in
ratifying the old covenant. Christ would be
the first one to shed such great light on this
subject.
Praeterea, ut, quod ipse tantummodo
annunciabat, ita prorsus se habere ex Christo
intelligerent. Ut enim supra abunde
demonstratum fuit, Christus non solm
resipiscentibus atque innocenter deinceps
viventibus veniam peccatorum datum iri
praedicavit; sed id verissimum esse, multipliciter
& apertissim docuit, & confirmavit.
Additionally, the Baptist was admonishing
them to understand that what he was simply
announcing was realized completely for them
in Christ. For we thoroughly demonstrated
above that Christ did not merely state that
those who repent and live blamelessly there-
after would be forgiven their sins: he repeat-
edly taught it to be absolutely true and
affirmed it with the greatest possible clarity.
Postremo, ut, quemadmodum ipse Baptista ait,
non aqu tantm abluerentur, sed spiritu quoque
sancto perfunderentur.
Finally, just as John himself used to say, he
used to admonish them to be filled with the
holy spirit and not merely washed with water.
Poterant quidem, ut reipsa compertum fuit, ad
Iohannis praedicationem poenitentiam delictorum
agere, sed, ut in ea vitae innocentia, quam vera
poenitentia necessari secum coniunctam habet,
& sic in ipsa poenitentia ad finem usque
perseverarent, sine qua perseverantia
peccatorum remissio illa, id est, vera salus
contingere non potest, Matth. 10 v 22, Heb. 3 v 6,
& 14, id spiritus sancti, quem ii, qui in Christum
credidissent, eique nomen dedissent, adepturi
erant, Ioh. 7 v 39, Act. 2. v 38, munus atque opus
erat futurum. Cuius vi ea, quae nobis
resipiscentibus Deus per Christum promisit, in
cordibus nostris ade inscribuntur, & imprimuntur,
ut tanta bona consequendi firma spe sustentati,
ne ipsius quidem mortis formidine ab ea vitae
sanctitate demoveamur.
The people certainly were able to repent of
their transgressions in response to John's
preaching; this is shown by the very fact that
they did repent. But the gift and work of the
holy spirit was yet future, which gift they
who had believed in Christ and dedicated
themselves to him would receive (Jn. 7:39;
Acts 2:38). It was through this gift that they
would persevere in the blameless life which is
connected necessarily with genuine penitence.
And through this gift they would continue in
penitence to the end of their lives; apart from
such perseverance no remission (i.e., true
salvation) can take place (Matt. 10:22; Heb.
3:6, 14). It is through the power of the holy
spirit that the promises of God through Christ
to those of us who repent are written on our
hearts. They are written and impressed on
our hearts to such an extent that we who are
sustained with the steadfast hope of attaining
such good promises are not moved away
(even by the fear of death) from leading a holy
life.
At ver in Christum credere, nihil aliud esse,
qum Deo ad ipsius Christi normam &
praescriptum obedientem se praebere, idque
faciendo ab ipso Christo vitae sempiternae
coronam expectare, infr, Deo adjutore a nobis
planissimum fiet. Quod autem ea peccatorum
remissio, quam nobis Christus attulit, poenitenti,
& vitae emendatione, propter Dei misericordiam,
nobis comparetur, ex iis evidenter apparet, quae
in Actis apostolicis in hanc sententiam passim
scripta sunt. Praesertim ver cap. 3. v 19, & 26,
& cap. 5. v 31, & cap. 11. v 18, & cap. 17. v 30, &
cap. 26. v 20. praeter alia innumerabilia
testimonia, quae tum apud Evangelistas, tum
apud Paulum, & reliquos divinos scriptores eius
rei extare, certum est.
To believe in Christ is simply to present
ourselves to God as obedient to Christ's own
standard and rule. Through this obedience
we can expect to receive the everlasting crown
of life from Christ himself. I will make this
quite plain in what follows, God willing. We
receive the remission of sins, which Christ
provided for us through God's mercy, by
penitence and a changed life. We see this
plainly throughout the book of Acts, particu-
larly in 3:19, 26; 5:31; 11:18; 17:30 and 26:20
not to mention countless other passages on
this subject in the Gospels, Paul and else-
where.
Manifestum est igitur, in salute per Christum parta
Deo clementissimo visum fuisse, nulla vera
It is therefore quite clear that the merciful God
is pleased to forgive freely our sins in the
satisfactione pro peccatis nostris [240] accepta,
ea nobis liberalissim condonare; nec aliud a
nobis requisivisse, qum poenitentiam, & vitae
correctionem: non quidem quamlibet, sed eam,
quam nobis, ipso mandante, praescripsit
Christus.
salvation provided through Christ, without
any literal satisfaction. [240] All that God re-
quires is repentance and emendation of life:
not any sort of life, mind you, but the life
which Christ, by his own command, ordained
for us.
Unde etiam factum est, ut alicubi poenitentiae
express addita fuerit fides in Dominum Iesum, ut
Act. 20. v 21. non quia, praeter ipsam
poenitentiam, fides in Christum, tamquam aliquid
amplius, quod huc pertineat, in nobis efficiens, ad
peccatorum remissionem consequendam
requiratur (alioqui quomodo alibi soli poenitentiae
peccatorum remissionis adeptio tribueretur?) sed
quia, non nisi per fidem in Christum ista
poenitentia contingit. Qud si satisfactionis
alicuius vi nobis delictorum venia parta fuisset,
fals, eam poenitenti nobis comparari, scriptum
esset. Poenitentia enim, etiamsi nulla satisfactio
intervenerit, nihilominus tamen omnibus numeris
absoluta esse potest; neque ab ulla satisfactione,
sive ab illius vel constantissima opinione vel
etiam certa notitia aut proficiscitur, aut vires
sumit: immo cum ea ade nihil commune habet,
ut illius opinione ipsa labefactari, & convelli
facillim possit. Sed de his latis postea
disputabimus. Nunc alia divinae huius, de qua
sermonem instituimus, liberalitatis argumenta
exponamus.
We also find in some texts that faith in the
Lord Jesus is expressly linked to penitence, as
in Acts 20:21. But this should not be
construed to mean that faith in Christ,
working in us, is a requirement for obtaining
forgiveness, as a requirement in addition to
and beyond repentance. If faith were
something more, the Scriptures could not
elsewhere attribute remission to penitence
alone. Rather, faith and repentance are linked
because that penitence is only reached by way
of faith in Christ. Now, if the pardon of
transgressions had been provided to us
through the efficacy of satisfaction, then the
written statement that it is provided to us
through penitence is false. For indeed, all
without exception can repent, even without
any satisfaction entering into the picture. The
satisfaction itself does not cause penitence,
nor does one's belief (or even steadfast convic-
tion) in satisfaction result in penitence, nor
does it give penitence any effectiveness. On
the contrary, penitence has nothing whatever
to do with satisfaction. In fact, penitence is
actually weakened and easily destroyed by
belief in satisfaction. We will dispute about
these issues in more detail later. In the mean-
time, we will advance other arguments for the
divine graciousness, which is the subject of
the present discussion.
Verm quid praeterea requirimus, cum & inter
omnes constet, & ubique scriptum fit, nos per
Christum a Deo peccatorum remissionem
accepisse? Quid magis remissioni contrarium,
qum vera & plena satisfactio?
Since everyone agrees and the Bible ev-
erywhere states that we have received the
remission of sins from God through Christ,
what further proof do we need? Nothing is
more contrary to remission than literal and
complete satisfaction.
Nam, si dicas, invicem quidem pugnare
remissionem, & plenam satisfactionem: sed tunc
demum, cum satisfactio ab eo ipso proficisci
debet, qui remissionem consequuturus est: posse
autem eiusdem debiti remissionem, pro quo plen
satisfactum fuerit, tunc consistere, cum uni
remittitur, alius ver pro eo satisfacit, nihil dixeris.
Neque enim illi remittitur, pro quo est, qui plen
satisfaciat. Nam quid opus est remissione, aut
quomodo ea consistere potest, ubi nullum est
debitum? Atqui debitum nullum est amplis, ubi
iam plen pro ipso satisfactum est.
Perhaps you will agree that, in general,
remission and full satisfaction are contra-
dictory, since satisfaction is owed by the very
person seeking remission. But then you will
add that remission of the same debt for which
a full satisfaction will have been made can
take place where the satisfaction is made by
one person and the remission is given to
another. But such an argument does not hold
up. Nothing is remitted to the debtor because
of satisfaction that someone makes in his
place. There is no need for remission
indeed, remission is an impossibilitywhere
the debt no longer exists. There is certainly
no longer any debt where satisfaction already
was made fully for it.
Sed inquies fortasse, in salute nobis per Christum
parta remissionem non sequi, sed antecedere
ipsam satisfactionem. Primm istud sententiae
vestrae plan adversatur. Vultis enim, ideo nobis
a Deo remissa peccata fuisse, quia Christus pro
eis plenissim [241] divinae iustitiae satisfecerit;
& ita satisfactionem reipsa remissioni praecedere
affirmatis. Deinde edem recidimus. Si enim
debitum iam remissum est, nullus est satisfactioni
locus.
Perhaps you might try to evade the force of
the above argument by saying that remission
takes place before and not after satisfaction in
the salvation provided to us through Christ.
First of all, such an argument clearly opposes
your own position. Your view assumes that
the reason God remits our sins is that Christ
made a full [241] satisfaction to divine justice
for them, thereby affirming that satisfaction
actually precedes remission. But even if you
could somehow put remission before
satisfaction, I would simply direct you back to
my earlier argument. If the debt has already
been remitted, there is no place for satisfac-
tion.
Dices, eodem tempore utrumque peractum
fuisse. Hoc rursus nihil est. Quae enim
impediunt, quominus alterum alteri praecedat,
illudque subsequatur, eadem utrumque simul fieri
vetant. Nam qu, obsecro, eodem tempore &
remitti debitum, & pro eo satisfieri potest, si, dum
pro eo satisfit, exigitur, dum ver remittitur,
condonatur?
You might then try to solve the problem by
saying that both remission and satisfaction
were thoroughly accomplished at the same
time. But again, such an argument ac-
complishes nothing. The same obstacles
which prevent the one from preceding or fol-
lowing the other also prevent both of them
from arising at the same time. I submit that a
debt cannot both be remitted and be satisfied
at the very same time if the debt is exacted
while satisfaction is made for it, but is
forgiven while it is remitted.
Nec ver est, qud quis rursus hc dicat, non
eidem condonari, a quo exigitur.
Animadvertendum namque est, non posse
debitum exigi, nisi ab eo, qui debet. Potest
quidem alius pro alio satisfacere: sed interim non
ab eo, qui pro alio satisfacit, sed ab eo, pro quo
satisfit, debitum exigitur. Quamvis enim non ipse
debitor, sed qui pro eo satisfacit, pecuniam
numeret; ea tamen pecunia, quae antea
satisfacientis fuerat, non iam ipsius, sed debitoris
esse censetur. Atque idem est, ac si pris debitor
a satisfaciente pro ipso ea pecunia plenissimo
iure donatus fuisset: deinde ipsemet proprio
nomine eam numerasset, ac suo creditori
solvisset.
Nor does it help matters to say that the one
who is forgiven is not the same as the one
from whom the debt is demanded. The pay-
ment of a debt can only be demanded from
the one who owes it. Although one person
certainly can make satisfaction for another, it
is still the original debtor who is responsible
for the debt and not the person who is paying
it in the debtor's place. For although it is not
the debtor himself but someone else who pays
the money, nevertheless the money which for-
merly belonged to the other person is now
considered no longer his but the debtor's. It is
the same as if that other person hands the
debtor money (which was fully that person's
to give), and then the debtor, reckoning the
money to be his own, turns around and pays
off the creditor.
At enim dices, Christum in se universum debitum
nostrum transtulisse: & ita non a nobis, sed ab
ipso id, quod nos debebamus, iure optimo
exactum fuisse, nos ver liberatos esse. Iam ista
ratione non eodem tempore satisfactio, &
remissio peracta esset. Nam simul atque
istiusmodi translatio debiti fit, quam Novationem
iurisconsulti appellant, liberatur prior debitor.
Creditori ver non antea satisfit, qum is, qui in
se debitum transtulit, ipsi pecuniam numeret.
Nec tamen istc ulla debiti remissio intervenisset.
Ut enim debitum remittatur, non satis est,
debitorem, quamvis ipse nihil solverit, liberari; sed
necesse est, obligationem illam sola creditoris
benignitate omnino extingui: ita ut iam nec ipse
debitor, nec alius eius loco substitutus, creditori
quidquam debeat. Si enim alius eius debitum in
se transtulerit, non remissum debitum, sed
commutatus debitor dicetur.
But you might say that Christ transferred all
our debt over to himself, so that, with perfect
justice, we were free from the debt (i.e., the
debt was no longer demanded from us) but it
was demanded from him. That argument still
does not allow remission and satisfaction to
take place at the same time. For such a trans-
ference of a debt which at the same time frees
the original debtor is what lawyers call a no-
vation. The creditor is not satisfied until he
has received his money from the person who
has transferred the debt to himself. Nev-
ertheless, there is no remission of the debt in
all of this. Remission of a debt requires more
than simply releasing a debtor who has not
paid any of his own money. Remission re-
quires that the obligation be abolished com-
pletely through the sheer kindness of the
creditor. In that case, neither the debtor nor
another substituted in his place owe the credi-
tor anything. If someone else has transferred
the debt to himself, the debt is not remitted
but the debtor is simply changed.
Neque ver dixeris, debitum quidem simpliciter
remissum non fuisse: illi tamen remissum esse,
qui prior debeat. Non enim illi remissum est
debitum: sed ab ipso in alium translatum. Nam, si
illi remissum fuisset, illud, ut ipse liberaretur, in
alium transferri nec debuisset, nec potuisset.
It will do you no good to add the qualification
that the debt is not simply remitted but is only
remitted to the person who previously owed
it. In this case the debt is not remitted to the
person but is simply transferred to someone
else. If the debtor had the debt remitted so
that he was freed from the obligation to pay it,
the debt neither should be nor could be trans-
ferred to someone else.
Aliud [242] autem est, ut mod attigimus, a debito
liberari, aliud sibi debitum remitti. Liberatio,
propter solutionem ab ipso etiam debitore factam
saepissim debitori contingit. Remissio, non nisi
propter creditoris liberalitatem, nulla solutione
interveniente, debitori obvenire potest. In
remissione enim, ut nomen ipsum apert indicat,
creditoris liberalitas necessari requiritur; quae
nulla est omnino, ubi creditor (quacumque ratione
id fiat) universum id, quod sibi debebatur, recipit.
Id quod communi etiam ac perpetuo loquendi &
scribendi usu manifestissim comprobatur. Ut
non satis rect ipse locutus fuerim, cum saepius
dixi, Deum, nulla vera satisfactione accepta,
nobis peccata remisisse. Quasi satisfactio vera
un cum remissione consistere possit. Sed,
quando vos eas simul stare posse commenti
estis, ut disputationi amplior locus esset, & res
tota diligentis examinaretur, serviendum hac in
parte vestris commentis fuit.
As we just said, it is [242] one thing to be
freed from a debt and another to receive
remission of it. A debtor is usually released
from a debt by a payment the actual debtor
makes. A debtor cannot receive remission
apart from the generosity of the creditor, with
no payment intervening. The very word re-
mission clearly indicates that the generosity
of the creditor necessarily is required. This
generosity is altogether absent when the cred-
itor, for whatever reason, receives the full
amount he is owed. The common and con-
sistent use of the word remission, both in
speech and in writing, proves this. This being
the case, I was not quite accurate those many
times I said that God could forgive our sins
without receiving literal satisfaction for them:
such a statement implies that it is even within
the realm of possibility for satisfaction and
remission to coexist. But you falsely claimed
that remission and satisfaction could stand
together, so that, by giving this argument a
significant place in this disputation and by
carefully considering the entire matter, you
could more easily prove your claims.
Remissio igitur necessari duas partes habet.
Una est, qud is, qui debet, ea obligatione
solvitur: Altera, qud is, cui debetur, sibi satisfieri
non vult. Utravis harum partium desit, remissio
nulla est. Adde, qud ipsemet Deus in hac
peccatorum remissione, ut non mult ante visum
Remission necessarily has two aspects. One is
that the person who owes the debt is forgiven
of the obligation. The other aspect is that the
creditor willingly forgoes satisfaction of the
debt. There is no remission without each of
these two aspects. Couple with this the fact
that God himself, as we saw just a bit earlier,
est, se munificentissimum & liberalissimum fuisse
praedicat. Qua ver divina, & long
praeclarissima laude impi & sacrileg eum
spoliat quisquis, ut pro peccatis nostris iustitiae
suae plen satisfieret, eum curasse, affirmare ac
contendere audet.
declares that he was liberal and generous in
the remission of sins. Anyone who dares to
assert and contend that God was concerned
about receiving full satisfaction to his justice
for our sins impiously and blasphemously
robs him of a truly divine quality which is an
outstanding ground for praising him.
Iubet Christus, ut quod nobis ab iis, qui nos
offenderunt, debetur, illis remittamus, in illa
praesertim similitudine seu parabola, quae
habetur Matth. 18. ubi scriptum est, regem
quendam, cui maxima pecuniarum summa a
quodam ex suis servis debebatur, qui solvendo
non erat, cum pris iussisset, ipsum, & uxorem
eius, ac liberos un cum omnibus, quae
possidebat, venundari, eius precibus postea
commotum, debitum illi remisisse. Accidit, ut
servus ille deinde, cum unum ex conservis suis
invenisset, qui ipsi exiguam summam debebat,
eius precibus adduci non potuerit, ut illi tempus
aliquod ad solvendum concederet: sed eum in
carcerem coniecerit, donec solvisset debitum.
Quo audito, Rex sic eum allocutus est, Serve
nequam, omne debitum dimisi tibi, quoniam
rogasti me. [243] Nonne oportuit & te misereri
conservi tui, sicut & ego tui misertus sum? Mox
eum tortoribus tradi iubet, quoad redderet
universum debitum. Quibus dictis, subiungit
Christus, Sic & pater meus caelestis faciet vobis,
si non remiseritis unusquisque fratri suo ex
cordibus vestris delicta illorum.
Christ commands us to forgive those who
offend us whatever they owe us. This is
particularly found in that metaphor or par-
able in Matthew 18. Here it is written that a
king was owed a large sum of money by one
of his servants, who was incapable of paying
it. At first the king commanded that the
debtor should be sold, together with his wife,
children, and everything he owned. But after-
wards, the king was greatly moved by the
man's entreaties, and remitted his debt. Later,
that servant ran into one of his fellow ser-
vants, who owed him a small sum. The
fellow servant begged to be given some time
to come up with the money. But the servant
was unmoved, and had his fellow servant cast
into prison until he paid the debt. When the
king got wind of this, he said to the servant:
You good for nothing servant! I forgave your
entire debt because you begged me to do so. [243]
You should have shown mercy to your fellow ser-
vant, just as I had mercy on you. Then he com-
manded that he be handed over to the torturers,
until he paid back the entire debt. After this,
Christ adds, So likewise shall my heavenly
Father do to you, if each one of you will not forgive
his brother their
10
trespasses from your hearts.
Primm igitur considerandum est, in hac parabola
nullam mentionem fieri satisfactionis, quam rex
ille a quoquam pro servo, cui debitum remiserat,
aut acceperit, aut requisierit. Quod satis
demonstrare videtur, Deum similiter pro nobis,
quibus peccata remittit, nullam satisfactionem a
quoquam vel accepisse, vel requisivisse.
The first truth we should note is that there is
no mention in this parable of satisfaction
which that king received or sought from
anyone on behalf of the servant to whom he
forgave the debt. This fact sufficiently
demonstrates that God likewise has not
received or sought satisfaction from anyone,
on behalf of those whose sins he remits.
Deinde observandum est, nos hc tacit in
offensis condonandis idem facere iuberi, quod
fecit Deus. Atqui, si Deus pro delictis nostris a
Christo, utpote homine, ut nos sumus, sibi
satisfieri voluit; nemo nostrm iur reprehendi
posset, mod offensas in iis ipsis, qui nos
offendissent, non ulcisceremur, si interim ab
eorum vel propinquis vel amicis illarum poenas
repeteremus.
Next, we should note that this parable
implicitly commands us to act the same as
God does in forgiving wrongs. However, if
God had wanted satisfaction for our trans-
gressions by Christ, seeing that it would be
from a human being as we ourselves are, we
could never justly be reproved for taking
revenge, provided that we do not take the
vengeance on the very people who offend us,
but on their relatives or friends instead.
Si rex ille, servo, qui ipsi eam maximam pecuniae
summam debebat, dimisso, ab alio eam sibi reddi
curasset: quomodo illi exprobrare deinde
potuisset, qud ei ipse universum debitum
remisisset, is ver conservo suo remittere
noluisset? Nonne a servo illo audire debuisset,
Quid tu mihi debiti remissionem exprobras, cum
tibi abunde pro universo eo, quod tibi debebam,
satisfactum fuerit? aut cur mihi obiicis, qud a
conservo meo, id quod meum erat, repetere
voluerim, cum tu ab alio, quod ego tibi debebam,
repetieris? nam ego quoque, si alium
invenissem, qui mihi pro illo satisfecisset,
libentissim illum dimisissem. Cur enim, illius
maximo incommodo, quod mihi debebatur,
extorquere curassem, cum & eius ingente
commodo, & promptissim meum recipere
possem?
What if the king we mentioned earlier had,
after forgiving the servant who owed him the
money, sought to be repaid the sum by
someone else? How could he later blame the
servant on the basis that he remitted his entire
debt, while the servant was unwilling to do so
for his fellow servant? The servant could
answer in response, Why are you holding
me liable for the remission of my debt when
you have already received satisfaction for all
of it? And why do you blame me for trying to
make my fellow servant pay what he owes me
when you made someone else pay what I
owed you? I too would have been very glad
to forgive my fellow servant if I could have
found someone else to pay me the money on
his behalf. I have no interest in obtaining my
money by force and in harming him if I could
readily receive my money in a way that bene-
fits him also.
Paulus itidem, ut alibi vidimus, monet nos, ut
imitatores Dei simus: & quemadmodum is per
Christum peccata nobis condonavit, sic nos
invicem condonemus. Qud si Deus ita per
Christum nobis peccata condonavit, ut interim ab
ipso Christo eorum poenas repetierit, quid vetat,
quo minus nos, ex Pauli praescripto, Deum
imitati, pro offensis proximi nostri non quidem ab
ipso, sed ab alio quopiam, ut mod dicebamus,
nobis satisfieri curemus?
Likewise Paul, as we saw earlier, warns us to
be imitators of God. We should forgive one
another just as God forgave us our sins
through Christ. But if God forgave our sins
through Christ in such a way that he at the
same time sought punishment for them
through Christ, what is to stop us from
seeking satisfaction for the offenses of our
neighborgranted that we seek the retribu-
tion not from the neighbor himself but from
someone else, as we just mentioned? After
all, we would be imitating God as Paul com-
manded!
Quamobrem, cum certissimum fit, nobis non
licere a quoquam, [244] sive is fit, qui offenderit,
sive alius quispiam, poenas offensarum repetere;
certissimum quoque esse debet, Deum a nemine,
& porr neque a Christo ipso, peccatorum,
quorum nobis veniam concedit, poenas
expetiisse; nisi eos, qui ver Christiani sunt,
mult, qum Deus ipse fit, & clementiores &
liberaliores in iniuriis non ulciscendis, & offensis
condonandis esse velimus.
Since there is no doubt that we may not exact
revenge on anyone when we are wronged
[244] either from the very person who
wronged us or from anybody elsewe must
conclude that God also did not seek
retribution from anyone, including Christ, for
those sins he has forgiven. If we fail to admit
this, we are forced to conclude that genuine
Christians who do not take vengeance but for-
give when they are wronged are far more
merciful and gracious than God himself!
Qud ad iniurias condonandas aegr admodum
adducimur, non ea potissimm caussa est, qud
scilicet ei, qui nos iniuri affecit, commodum,
quod illi ex iniuriae condonatione obvenire possit,
invideamus; sed quod, dum iniurias condonamus,
nobismetipsis aliquid adimere putamus,
nosquemetipsos laedere nobis videmur. Quare,
cum, Dei exemplo, quo nobis per Christum
iniurias & offensas omnes condonaverit, idem nos
quoque facere iubeamur; necesse est, ut Deus
per Christum non solm in nos hoc beneficium
contulerit, qud a peccatorum poena liberati, &
tanto commodo affecti simus: sed etiam, sibi ipsi,
quod sibi debebatur, ademerit, & seipsum quo-
dammodo laeserit. Id quod plan falsum est, si
ab ipso Christo, quidquid illi nos debebamus,
abundanter ei persolutum fuit.
As for the fact that we often withhold forgive-
ness, our unforgiving attitude does not
primarily arise because we envy the
advantages which may accrue from that
forgiveness to the one who wronged us. We
do not like to forgive because we think that
when we forgive we deprive and hurt
ourselves. Consequently, since we are
commanded to follow the example of God,
who forgave us all our offenses through
Christ, it necessarily follows that God through
Christ not only should confer the kindness of
freeing us from sin's penalties and providing
us with such a great benefit: he should also
forgo his right to collect what he is owed,
thereby harming himself, as it were. But God
has certainly not deprived himself in any way
if he collected our debt from Christ himself.
Hinc perspicuum fit, id quod scriptum est, Deum
nobis per Christum peccata condonasse, non
eam vim habere, quasi propter ipsum Christum,
qui pro nobis satisfecerit, eam condonationem a
Deo consequuti simus; sed a Christo Dei nomine
nobis peccatorum condonationem allatam fuisse
per ea verba intelligi debere; ut Paulus ipse ele-
ganter explicat, cum id, quod uno in loco dixerat,
Sicut & Deus in Christo donavit vobis, Eph. 4. v
32. in alio ita extulit, Sicut & Christus donavit vo-
From the preceding argument, the proper
understanding of the biblical statement that
God forgives our sins through Christ becomes
quite plain. This statement does not mean
that God grants us forgiveness on account of
Christ himself, who has made satisfaction for
us. Rather, we should understand the
statement that God forgave our sins through
Christ to mean that Christ brought about the
forgiveness of sins in the name of God. Paul
himself nicely expresses this idea when he
bis, Col. 3. v 13. quemadmodum iam supr
alicubi ostendimus.
says, Just as God in Christ forgave you (Eph.
3:32) and again declares, Just as even Christ
forgave you (Col. 3:13). This is the same
conclusion we reached in our earlier discus-
sion.
Ubi etiam perpendenda vis est verbi Donandi seu
Condonandi, quod in Graeco est . Quod
verbum liberalitatem eius, de quo dicitur,
evidenter ob oculos ponit; nec aliter usurpari
potest, qum si is, de quo effertur, de suo iure
remiserit, & commodo suo, ut alii gratificaretur,
seipsum privaverit. Utitur eo verbo idem
Apostolus hac ipsa de re ad eosdem Col.
scribens cap. 2. v 13. inquiens, Et vos, cum
essetis mortui in delictis, & praeputio carnis
vestrae, convivificavit cum illo, donans vobis
omnia delicta. Vide, quantum absit spiritus sancti
sensus ab opinione vestra. Vos dicitis, Deum per
Christum iustitiae suae pro [245] omnibus
peccatis nostris satisfieri voluisse. Spiritus autem
sanctus, qui per os Pauli loquebatur, aperte
testatus est, Deum per Christum omnia delicta
nobis condonasse. Condonare, & satisfactionem
accipere, non magis simul stare possunt, qum
dies & nox, lux & tenebrae.
We ought to consider carefully the signifi-
cance of the word forgiving or pardon-
ing. This word is (charizesthai) in the
Greek. Charizesthai clearly highlights the gra-
ciousness of the person about whom it is spo-
ken. The person who is described by this
word is someone who will yield his own right
and advantage, depriving himself in order to
do a favor for someone else; the word cannot
be understood otherwise. The Apostle Paul
employs that word in that same sense when
he says, And you, when you were dead in trans-
gressions and in the uncircumcision of your flesh,
he made you alive together with him, forgiving you
all your transgressions (Col. 2:13). Just look at
how far your view departs from the meaning
intended by the holy spirit! You maintain that
God wished to receive satisfaction to his
justice for [245] all our sins. But the holy
spirit, speaking through Paul, clearly indi-
cates that God has forgiven all our sins
through Christ. To forgive and to receive
satisfaction are no more able to be juxtaposed
than day and night, light and darkness.
Qud, si quis dicat, satisfactionem & condo-
nationem simul stare posse; cum uni condonatur,
ab alio autem satisfit; hc repetenda sunt ea, quae
paulo ante de remissione diximus; atque adden-
dum, qud, si eiusdem debiti remissio &
satisfactio nullo modo un consistere queunt, ut
me satis demonstrasse confido, aliquant mins
eiusdem delicti condonatio & satisfactio ullo modo
simul stare poterunt; cum verbum Condonare sive
aliquant magis liberalitatem sonet, qum verbum
Remittere sive .
If someone should respond that satisfaction
and forgiveness can coexist when the person
forgiven and the one making satisfaction are
different, I would simply call attention to
what I said a little earlier on the subject of
remission. Let me also add that if remission
and satisfaction of the same debt can in no
way coexist, as I firmly believe I have proven,
then forgiveness and satisfaction of the same
transgression are even less capable of being
aligned. This is because the verb to forgive
or (charizesthai) indicates even greater
graciousness than the verb to remit or
(apheinai).
Sed ad eandem debiti, & solutionis translationem
redeo. Audivi enim interdum aliquos dicentes, in
ea solutione, quam pro nobis Christus fecit, Dei
liberalitatem maximam apparere, cum ipsemet
Deus id dederit, quod sibi solvi curavit. Ut enim
creditor ille maxima liberalitate usus fuisse
dicendus esset, qui debitori suo, sive alii, qui pro
eo satisfaceret, tantam pecuniam donasset,
quanta ad debitum dissolvendum opus fuisset; sic
Deus maxim liberalis dicendus est, qui istud
idem, quod Christus ei pro nobis solvit, ipsi
Christo donavit: immo ipsum Christum, quem illi
quodammodo pro debitorum nostrorum
satisfactione nos ipsi dedisse dici possumus, is
pris nobis dedit; ut ex illis Pauli verbis colligitur:
Quomodo non etiam cum illo omnia nobis
donavit? Rom. 8. v 32. Atque hinc etiam
inferunt, iure debita nostra nobis remisisse Deum
dici posse, quamvis ista solutio intervenerit; cum
revera neque nos aliquid, quod nostrum esset, illi
dederimus: nec ipse aliquid, quod ante
solutionem non habuisset, receperit.
But let me return to the subject of payment
and transferring debts. I have sometimes
heard people say that God's greatest gener-
osity is evident in the payment Christ made
for us, since God himself provided the pay-
ment he wished to receive. According to this
argument, one can say that the creditor exer-
cises the greatest generosity if he provides
enough money to pay off the debt. He may
provide it either to the debtor or to someone
else who should make satisfaction for him.
On this reckoning, we should declare God to
be especially generous, since God provided
Christ with the very payment which Christ
gave to God on our behalf. Indeed, God first
gave us Christ, whom in a sense we paid back
to God for the satisfaction of our debts. They
derive this from Paul's statement in Romans
8:32: Moreover, how has he not given with him
all things? From this line of argument they
conclude that God can be said to have been
quite just in remitting our debts; it is a remis-
sion even though a payment took place before
we were forgiven. It is a remission because
we have not really given God anything which
belonged to us, nor did God receive anything
which he did not already have before the pay-
ment.
Verm, qui haec dicunt, multa non animadvertunt.
Primm enim non vident, eiusmodi liberalitates, ut
supr a nobis dictum est, non exerceri, nisi cum
aliter fieri non potest. Nam quis umquam debitori
suo, aut cuipiam alii in hunc finem public
pecuniam donat, ut eadem sibi pro eius debiti
satisfactione solvatur, nisi aliqua de caussa
solutionem intervenire necesse fit? Alioqui enim
cur inutili illo circuitu utendum esset: cum simplici
debiti remissione, [246] & debitorem liberare, &
largitatem suam ostendere creditor posset?
Atqui, ut, quod nos Deo debebamus, illi
But those who advance the above argument
fail to observe its many problems. First of all,
they fail to note, as we said above, that the
sort of generosity for which they argue could
only be employed if no other way of
accomplishing the same effect were possible.
No one would publicly give the money to the
debtor or to anyone else, only to have the very
same money returned to him for the satisfac-
tion of the debt, unless there was some
necessity for a payment to intervene before
forgiving the debt. Otherwise, why would
the creditor take such a useless, roundabout
solveretur, nulla prorsus necessitas fuit,
quemadmodum a nobis demonstratum est.
way when the creditor could both [246] have
absolved the debtor and have shown gener-
osity by a simple remission of the debt? But,
as we have already demonstrated, it was
absolutely unnecessary for God to be paid
what we owed him.
Deinde non considerant, liberalitatem quidem
exercuisse creditorem istum: non tamen in ipso
debito remittendo, sed in pecunia donanda, qua
debitum dissolveretur, nec rect umquam dicetur,
eum debitori debitum remisisse; quamvis
rectissim dicatur, eum erga ipsum apprime
liberalem fuisse, quippe, qui ipsi de suo pecuniam
donaverit, unde id, quod debeat, solvere posset.
Debiti enim remissio, ut diximus, (Quatenus
scilicet remissum est) omnem penitus solutionem
excludit. Quod si secus esset, creditor iste
duplicis liberalitatis nomine commendandus foret.
Primm, quod pecuniam donasset; deinde, qud
debitum remisisset. Id quod manifest falsum
est; cum is unica tantm liberalitate fuerit usus:
nempe, qud de suo, ut debiti solutio fieret,
pecuniam largitus est.
Next, they fail to consider that their creditor is
generous because he provided the money by
which the debt is discharged, not because this
creditor remitted the debt itself. It is quite
incorrect to say that the debt has been
remitted to the debtor in such a situation,
even though it is certainly accurate to say that
the person who gave the debtor his own mon-
ey to pay off the debt was exceedingly gra-
cious toward that debtor. We have already
noted that remission of a debt, to be true re-
mission, thoroughly excludes all payment. If
this were not so, we would have to praise the
creditor for having exercised double gener-
osity. First, we would have to commend him
for providing the money. Then we would
have to commend the creditor for remitting
the debt. But this is plainly false, since the
creditor has in reality only employed a single
act of generosity in giving his own money to
pay the debt.
Quo fit praeterea, ut ingens inter creditorem
istum, & Deum nobis peccata remittentem
discrimen appareat; quod tamen isti non animad-
verterunt. Duplex enim omnino liberalitas Dei in
nostrorum peccatorum remissione conspicitur:
Una, qud gratuit nobis tantum debitum
remiserit, deque suo iure decedere sua sponte
voluerit: Altera, qud, ut nos tam insignis
munificentiae fructum percipere possemus,
unigenitum filium suum nobis largitus est: per
quem ea ratione qua supr a nobis dilucid &
copios ostensum fuit, liberationem ab aeterna
morte, & sempiternae vitae possessionem, quibus
gratuita haec delictorum nostrorum remissio
Additionally, there is a corollary that they fail
to observe, in which a significant difference
emerges between their creditor and God who
remits our sins. In the case of God's forgiving
our sins, a double act of generosity is evident.
His generosity first of all is seen in freely
remitting to us such a great debt and in his
willingness not to press his right. Next, his
generosity is evident in giving his only
begotten son, in order that we might reap
11

the benefit of God's amazing generosity. As
we have shown above clearly and at great
length, it is through Christ that we attain free-
dom from eternal death
12
and the possession
of eternal life; this gracious remission of our
continetur, re ipsa consequeremur.
transgressions entails both of these benefits.
13

Dedisse igitur nobis Christum Deus dicitur, non
quia eum ita nostrum fecerit, ut nos deinde pro
debiti nostri solutione illum ipsi dare potuerimus;
sed quia illum nostri causs acerbissimae morti
tradidit; & ita, seipsum quodammodo graviter
laedens, ut nos maximo beneficio afficeret, eum
(ut ita dicam) impendere, ac profundere non
dubitavit.
Therefore, when it is said that God gave
Christ to us, we should not take this to mean
that Christ is ours in the sense that we can
give Christ back to God for the payment of
our debt. Christ is given to us in the sense
that God delivered him over to the most bitter
of deaths for our sakes. And so, God did not,
as it were, hesitate to imperil and sacrifice
him, doing himself harm in the process. He
did this to present us with the greatest benefit.
Quod ex supra dicto Pauli ad Rom. loco clar
liquet. Iis enim verbis quae recitavimus, haec
praecedunt: Qui etiam proprio filio non pepercit;
sed pro nobis omnibus tradidit illum. Nobis ergo
Christum Deus donavit, quia illum pro nobis
tradidit; nimirum in mortem, ut & omnes in eius
loci explanatione sentiunt, & a [247] Theodoro
Beza prae caeteris animadversum fuit; qui
propterea in sua Latina interpretatione ea verba,
in mortem, addenda putaverat.
The truth of this is evident from the passage
in Paul's letter to the Romans, which we
considered above. Before the words we have
already considered, the text reads, He who did
not even spare his own son, but delivered him up
for us all. This shows that God gave Christ to
us because he delivered him up to death for
us. (Of course, delivered up here means
delivered up to death, as everyone will
agree. Theodore Beza especially noted this,
[247] thinking it proper to add the words to
death to his Latin translation.)
Quomodo autem pro nobis Deus Christum in
mortem tradiderit, declarat id, quod scriptum est
apud Iohannem, cap 3. v. 16. Sic Deus dilexit
mundum, ut filium suum unigenitum daret; ut
omnis, qui credit in eum non pereat, sed habeat
vitam aeternam. Non igitur, ut aes nostrum
alienum, quod peccando contraxeramus, ipsius
Christi solutione dissolveretur, donatus est nobis
Christus a Deo: sed, ut eius verbis fidem
habentes, alterius summae divinae liberalitatis
participes fieremus.
Likewise, John 3:16 tells us in what sense God
delivered up Christ to death for us: For God
so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten
son; so that all who believe in him should not
perish, but have eternal life. God, therefore,
did not give Christ to us so that we could use
Christ as the payment to discharge the debt
we incurred by sinning. Rather, God gave us
Christ so that, having faith in Christ's prom-
ises, we should partake in the ultimate gener-
osity of another (i.e., God).
Quocirca vix dici potest, quant iniuri Deum
afficiant, qui eum alter istarum liberalitatum,
quas divini scriptores vehementissim
admirantur, & miris modis praedicant, quantum in
ipsis est, spoliare non verentur. Quod cert
One can scarcely express how greatly God is
wronged by those who are not afraid to
deprive him of the first category of gener-
osity,
14
even though the sacred writers were
awestruck by it and, as well as they could, de-
clared it in amazing terms. Anyone who
faciunt, quicumque, ut sibi satisfieret, Deum nobis
Christum donasse volunt. Perit enim omnino, ut
dictum est, hac ratione ipsius peccatorum
remissionis liberalitas.
holds that God gave Christ for us in order to
make satisfaction is certainly guilty of this.
We have already noted that generosity is alto-
gether lacking in such a remission.
Sed & altera vel minuitur, vel cert obscuratur;
etiamsi, vera satisfactione non interveniente, nos
a delictorum nostrorum debito liberari non
potuisse velimus. Quid mirum namque dicet
aliquis, si Deus Christum eiusque vitam pro nobis
profudit, cum,
15
ut quod suum erat, recipere
posset, ab ipso id factum fuerit? Sin autem, ut
demonstratum fuit, isto aere alieno sine ulla
satisfactione liberari nos poteramus; haec Christi
a Deo, ut sibi satisfieret, nobis facta donatio, id
est, in mortem traditio, insignis immanitas potis
atque saevitia, ut supr attigimus, qum
liberalitas, appellanda est. Quid enim caussae
fuit, ut in istum finem filium suum
innocentissimum Deus, tam dira & execrabili
morte affici voluerit, cum satisfactione ista nihil
opus esset?
But even the second category of generosity
16

is either lessened or at least obscured. It is ob-
scured even if we grant that we could not
have been freed from the debt of our trans-
gressions unless satisfaction had taken place.
For there is nothing particularly wonderful
about God sacrificing Christ and his life for us
if he did it with the intention of receiving back
what was his. But if, as we showed, we could
have been freed from that debt without any
satisfaction, this gift of Christ which God pro-
vided for us (i.e., handing him over to death)
in order to make satisfaction to himself should
be called an act of sheer cruelty and violence
rather than generosity. If satisfaction were
unnecessary, God would have had no reason
to want to afflict his completely innocent son
with such a terrible and accursed death.
Ita & utraque liberalitas perit, & pro benignissimo
& munificentissimo Deo, immanem & sordidum,
suprema cum impietate nefandoque sacrilegio,
nobis confingimus. At ver, si, non ut sibi
satisfieret, sed ut nos ipsius ingente peccatorum
remissionis beneficio frui possemus, Deum pro-
prio filio non pepercisse, & quamvis ab omni
prorsus scelere immunem, tamquam
scelestissimum hominem, detestabili inprimis
atque atroci morti eum tradi voluisse, statuamus;
non mod utraque liberalitas constat: sed posteri-
or haec & seipsam in clarissimam lucem profert,
& priorem illam mirabiliter illustrat, [248] atque
commendat. Nam, ut a nobis abunde explicatum
fuit, eiusmodi Iesu Christi morte non
interveniente, gratuita illa peccatorum condonatio,
quam non sine praecedente eximia quadam
obedientia nobis re ipsa obtingere voluit Deus,
The end result of your view is that both
classes of generosity are lost, and we blas-
phemously replace a kind and liberal God
with a savage and vile one of our own in-
vention. But if we establish that (1) the
purpose of God's not sparing his own son was
not to receive satisfaction, but so that we
could enjoy the enormous benefit of the
remission of sins; and (2) God was willing to
deliver him up, in spite of his complete inno-
cence, to an especially abominable and
horrible death (just as if he were a wicked
person), then we do more than simply estab-
lish God's double generosity. In this case
we portray the second mode of generosity in
the clearest light, while we wonderfully illus-
trate and commend [248] the first mode. For,
as we have already thoroughly explained, that
gracious forgiveness of sins would have been
completely empty and worthless apart from
inanis omnino & vana fuisset.
the death of Christ: God did not want to
bestow forgiveness on us before a certain
exceptional obedience occurred first.
17

Ex iis, quae hactenus dicta sunt, perspici potest,
qum hallucinentur illi, qui [e.g., Dantes Aligerius,
& alii], cum negare non auderent, Deum potuisse
ea ratione nostra peccata delere, si nulla vera pro
ipsis satisfactione a quoquam accepta, nobis ea
condonasset, satisfactionem tamen & veram &
plenam intervenire eum voluisse dixerunt, ut
maior quaedam ipsius, in proprio scilicet filio
dando, qui pro ipsis satisfaceret, liberalitas
appareret. Quasi ver (ut caetera quae huic
sententiae apert refragantur, non repetam) non
eadem proprii filii dandi liberalitas mult magis
conspicua esset futura, si nulla vera satisfactio
intervenisset.
From what we have said so far we can see
how empty is the talk of Dante Alighieri and
others. While they dare not deny that God
could have wiped away our sins by forgiving
them to us without having received a literal
satisfaction for them from anybody, they
argue nonetheless that he wanted literal and
complete satisfaction. They say he wanted
satisfaction in order to demonstrate his great-
er generosity in giving his own son who made
satisfaction for our sins. So that I do not have
to repeat my other arguments that oppose this
view, I will simply point out that they speak
as if the same generosity of God in giving his
own son would not have been all the more
evident if no satisfaction would have taken
place!
Satis iam me demonstrasse arbitror, Deum per
Christum voluisse nobis peccatorum absolut
gratuitam veniam dare; nec, qud sibi ab ipso
Christo pro eis satisfieri voluerit, posse sine maxi-
ma eius divini numinis offensione cogitari, nedum,
ut a vobis fit, pro certo affirmari.
As far as I am concerned, I have already suffi-
ciently demonstrated that God wanted to
grant the pardon of our sins out of sheer
grace. I have also shown that it cannot be
thought, without doing the greatest harm to
his divine majesty, that God wanted to receive
for himself satisfaction for those sins from
Christ. This cannot be thought, much less
certainly affirmed (as you do).
Et profecto, nisi aliud tantae divinae beneficentiae
argumentum haberemus, id satis nobis esse
deberet, qud, Deus sine ulla iustitiae suae
imminutione id facere potuit. Quare, cum sanctae
& novi, & veteris foederis litterae, Deum in salute
nobis per Christum comparanda beneficentiss-
imum & liberalissimum fuisse, non loquantur
mod, verm etiam personent; indignissimum
plan fuit id de Deo non existimare, quod in
hominibus ipsis videmus: qui saepius & de suo
iure multum dimittunt, & absque compensatione
Indeed, unless we have other evidence of such
divine kindness, we ought to be satisfied that
God could freely forgive without diminishing
his justice. Since the holy writings of both the
new and old covenants do not merely
mention but even trumpet God's kindness
and generosity in providing our salvation
through Christ, we certainly demean God
when we do not regard him as generous as
human beings. For human beings often forgo
their right to punish and forgive wrongs with-
out receiving any compensation whatsoever.
ulla iniurias condonant.
Nam quod plerique eorum, qui imprudentes tant
contumelia divinam misericordiam affecerunt,
dicere sunt soliti, nempe Deum idcirco a Christo
delictorum nostrorum poenas repetere voluisse,
ut inde, quanto is odio peccatum prosequatur,
apert intelligere possemus, qui, ut illud puniret,
ne proprio quidem carissimoque filio pepercisset,
sed, eum miserabili morte excruciandum &
necandum tradidisset atque hac ratione curasset,
ut a peccando in posterum retraheremur; hoc,
inquam, prorsus nihil est. Satis enim, se odio
peccatum prosequi, [249] ostendit Deus, cum nisi
resipiscamus, & peccatis relictis, iustitiae
deinceps studeamus, nos graviter punit, atque
aeternae morti mancipatos relinquit. Satis item
nos a peccando retrahere curat cum vitam suam
corrigentibus aeternae beatitatis praemium
proponit, quo praemio omnium, quae humana
mens excogitare potest, maximo &
praestantissimo, quodque non vehementissim
expetere nullo modo possumus, si quis non
movetur, & ita a peccando cessat, desperandum
omnino est de resipiscentia illius.
Many rash individuals often expound the
divine mercy outrageously, by saying that
God sought the penalties of our transgres-
sions from Christ in order to help us grasp
clearly his hatred toward sin. They say that
God did not spare his own dear son but
handed him over to be tortured and killed in a
wretched death, in order to restrain us from
sinning. But this argument is altogether with-
out substance. For God sufficiently demon-
strates his [249] hatred of sin when he
severely punishes and abandons us to eternal
death if we do not repent, forsake our sins
and thereafter strive after righteousness.
Likewise, his concern with restraining us from
sin is evident through his promise to reward
with eternal blessedness those who amend
their lives; eternal life is the greatest and best
reward imaginable by the human mind. But
no one can make strong demands for such re-
ward unless he is moved to stop sinning.
Certainly we ought to give up all hope of re-
pentance for anyone who is not moved by
such a great promise.
Praeterea, an non ex ipsa morte Christi, citra
omnem peccatorum nostrorum punitionem,
quantum Deus peccatum oderit, apertissim
constat, cum, ut illud in nobis extingueret, &
aboleret, atque ea ratione, qua supr expositum
fuit, nos ad vitae sanctimoniam traduceret,
carissimum & innocentissimum filium tam atroci,
& detestabili morti tradere voluerit?
Besides, leaving aside the entire punishment
of our sins, God demonstrates from the very
death of Christ how much he hates sin. He
demonstrates this in that he was willing to
hand over his dear and innocent son to such a
horrible and abominable death, in order to
abolish sin in us and (as explained above) to
lead us to holiness of life.
Ad haec, si Deo illud, quod isti dicunt, propositum
fuisset, cert eam peccatorum nostrorum
punitionem nobis manifestissim apparere
voluisset. Sed nec umquam id disertis verbis a
sacris scriptoribus dictum fuisse invenimus, quod
tamen & saepissime, & disertissim fieri
In this connection, if God had really proposed
to demonstrate his hatred of sin in the way
my opponents imagine, he certainly would
have wanted the punishment for our sins to
be made crystal clear to us. Yet we never find
the sacred writers explicitly saying that our
sins were punished in Christ, even though we
debuerat, nec, si ubique clarissimis verbis
testatum reperiremus, sic tamen rem se habere,
nobis compertum esset: etiamsi, quaecumque
Christum fecisse, aut illi obvenisse narratur, vel
ipsi vidissemus, vel firmiter verissima esse
crederemus. Nihil enim omnino est, quod nobis,
ne leviter quidem, suadere possit, Dominum
Iesum, dum crucis mortem innocentissimus subiit,
universas poenas nostris peccatis debitas
pertulisse, sive in ipso delicta nostra fuisse
punita; ut mox planissimum fiet.
would have expected them to say it frequently
and clearly. But even if we did find it every-
where declared in the most explicit terms, we
still could not arrive at their conclusion with
certaintyeven if we ourselves had seen or
firmly believed to be quite true those things
which Christ is said to have done or are said
to have happened to him. For there is nothing
which can persuade us easily that the Lord
Jesus endured all the penalties we deserved
for our sins, or that our transgressions were
punished in him, when he (in all innocence)
endured the death on the cross. (The truth of
this will become more clear in the discussion
that will follow.)
At ver, qud nobis non resipiscentibus veniam
peccatorum daturus Deus non fit, resipiscentibus
autem sempiternam felicitatem per Christum
largiri velit (quod, ut paulo ante diximus, satis
ostendit, Deum & peccatum odisse, &, ne
peccemus, curare) id & passim & luculentissim
in divinis monimentis scriptum extat; idemque
verissimum esse, nisi propria iniquitate
impediamur, facillim persuademur; partim quia id
rationi maxim consentaneum est: partim quia, si
Dominum Iesum ex mortuis a Deo excitatum
fuisse credimus, & ipsius in coelum translati nomi-
ne ac potestate innumerabilia miranda opera
fuisse patrata, eius rei ex qua felicitas ista nostra
pendet ac necessari proficiscitur, [250] iam ipsa
effecta conspicimus.
It stands clearly written everywhere in the
divine records that God will not pardon the
sins of those who are unwilling to repent. No,
God wishes to grant eternal happiness
through Christ. This is sufficient to show, as
we said earlier, that God both hated sin and
was concerned that we should not sin. Only
those who are hindered by their own wicked-
ness will be unconvinced of this fact. We will
be persuaded partly because this truth is quite
consonant with reason. We will also be per-
suaded because, if we believe that the Lord
Jesus was raised from the dead and countless
marvelous works took place in the name and
power of him who was translated into heav-
en, we already see the effects of this event on
which our eternal happiness depends and
from which it necessarily originates. [250]
Sic nimirum Deus benignissimus & sapien-
tissimus liberationem a peccatis nostris, &
salutem nostram aeternam per Christum
procuravit, ut, quicumque ea, quae Christus dixit
& fecit, passus & adeptus est, vel viderit, vel
firmiter crediderit, eum tanta bona consequi
prorsus fit necessarium: & porr de iis non
dubitare, quae ad ea consequenda scire omnino
oporteat; non mod quia ipse Deus dixerit: Verm
Undoubtedly, the way the kind and wise God
effected the liberation from our sins and our
eternal salvation through Christ was that only
the person who understands and firmly be-
lieves in what Christ said and did, suffered
and achieved, should obtain such good re-
wards. He should not doubt these facts,
which he needs to know in order to appro-
priate them: not only because God himself
etiam, quia eorum veritas per se, quoad eius fieri
potest, appareat. Immo inde potissimm Deus,
se ea locutum fuisse constare voluit, qud vera
esse deprehenderentur. Nam qud nihilominus
plerique ea, quae de Christo narrantur, non ver
credunt, licet maxim se credere profiteantur; id,
ut mod innuimus, ab ipsorum malitia
proficiscitur, & idcirco Deus non credentes iur
plectit, quemadmodum infr, ipso volente,
dilucid explicabitur.
said them, but even because their truth is to
some extent self-evident. Indeed, God espe-
cially wanted to establish that he had made
these statements because they are manifestly
true. For there are very many who do not
genuinely believe those facts which are said
about Christ, even though they make great
claims to believe in them. As we just indi-
cated, their unbelief arises from their wicked-
ness. For this reason God justly punishes
unbelievers, as, God willing, I will explain
clearly.
Nunc, cum Deum in salute nobis per Christum
comparanda a nostris peccatis, nulla pro ipsis
vera satisfactione accepta, nos absolvere & iur
potuisse, & voluisse, evidenter, ut spero,
probatum fuerit; qud Christus pro peccatis
nostris divinae iustitiae satisfacere non potuerit,
quemadmodum polliciti sumus, demonstrare
aggrediamur.
I hope I have proven that God was able to be
quite just in forgiving our sins without having
received literal satisfaction for them, and also
that he in fact willed to do so in providing sal-
vation for us through Christ. We will now
keep our promise to demonstrate that Christ
could not have made satisfaction to divine
justice for our sins.
Chapter III
Chapter III
Nobis non pereuntibus, divinae iustitiae pro
peccatis nostris nullo modo satisfieri potuisse.
It was absolutely impossible for satisfaction to be
made to divine justice for the sins of us, who are
not perishing.
Primm igitur, ut id magis perspicuum fiat, nobis
non pereuntibus, divinae iustitiae pro peccatis
nostris nullo modo satisfieri potuisse,
ostendemus. Deinde de ipsius Christi persona,
quid scilicet in hoc singulariter praestare potuerit,
diligenter inquirendo, separatim agemus.
To establish my case plainly, I will demon-
strate first of all that it was absolutely impos-
sible for satisfaction to be made to divine
justice for the sins of us, who are not
perishing. Then, under a separate heading,
we will examine thoroughly the case of
Christ's person, considering what he, as an
individual, would have been able to legally
undertake for us in this matter.
Si Deus aut non potuisset, aut noluisset citra
veram aliquam pro delictis nostris satisfactionem
nobis ignoscere, nos ipsi omnino ei satisfacere
debuissemus. Neque enim aliquid Deo
debebamus, quod alius, qui scilicet non
deliquisset, & ita nihil ipse divinae iustitiae
Had God been either unable or unwilling to
forgive us without literal satisfaction for our
transgressions, then the obligation to make
satisfaction would have been ours alone.
What we owed to God was not a debt that
someone else that had not transgressedand
deberet, pro nobis praestare posset. Poena
peccato ipsius Dei voluntate constituta aeterna
mors est; quae, cum corporalis poena fit, a
nemine, praeterquam ab eo ipso, qui peccavit
praestari [251] potest.
thus owed nothing to divine justicecould
take upon himself in our place. God chose to
establish eternal death as the penalty for sin.
But eternal death is a punishment relating to
the body, and [251] as such cannot be endured
by anyone besides the sinner himself.
Pecuniariae quidem poenae, unius delicto debitae
ab alio praestari queunt. Unius enim pecunia
alterius effici potest. Et, cum quis in se alterius
pecuniariam poenam transfert, perinde censetur,
ac si delinquenti eam pecuniam plenissimo iure
donasset; quod & facere poterat, idemque
prorsus effectus consecutus fuisset. At mors
unius, sive alia quaecumque corporis vexatio
alterius effici non potest. neque umquam vel
lege, vel consuetudine receptum fuit, ut poenam,
quam quis corpore luere teneatur, alius, quisquis
tandem ille fit, pro eo pendere possit.
Admittedly, monetary penalties due for the
fault of one person can be assumed legally by
another person. This is because one person's
money is just as effective as another's. When
a person transfers the monetary penalty of
another to himself, it is regarded as if that
person had given that money, quite justly, to
the transgressor. That person certainly would
have had every right to give the money to the
transgressor, and the end result would have
been exactly the same. But death or any other
corporal punishment of one person cannot be
undertaken legally by another. Neither law
nor custom has ever permitted one, whom-
ever he might be, to endure corporal punish-
ment for someone else.
Solent aliquando homines ira & vindictae libidine
excaecati in innocentes quoque saevire: maxim
ver, cum eum, qui ipsos laesit, vel quia eorum
manus effugerit, vel quamcunque aliam ob
caussam ulcisci nequeunt. Sed qud, nocente
ipso, consult ac sponte, incolumi dimisso, in
innocentem aliquem tantummodo saeviant: id
prorsus numquam vel factum est, vel fiet. Quod
si homines, quantumvis barbari & truculenti, de
innocentibus, nocentium loco, ipsis nocentibus
sponte dimissis, poenas non sumunt; an non hinc
manifestissimum est, id non mod ab omni iustitia
alienissimum esse, sed plus quam immane ac
ferinum censeri debere?
Blinded by anger and lust for revenge, people
occasionally brutalize the innocent also. This
happens especially when, for whatever
reason, they cannot take revenge on the one
who harmed them (e.g., the person may have
eluded them). But it never has happened, nor
ever will, that someone sends away the cul-
prit and takes out revenge on some innocent
person instead. If human beings, however
uncivilized and savage, do not willingly
release the guilty only to punish the innocent
in their place, then it is quite obvious that
such action is not only completely opposed to
any standard of justice: it is worse than
inhuman and savage.
Quare, si velimus, Deum delictorum nostrorum
poenas sibi persolvi voluisse, cum nos maxim
punire posset, necesse est etiam, ut dicamus, a
nobis ipsis qui peccaveramus eas repetisse: non
Consequently, if we wish to affirm that God
wanted to exact punishment for our sins in a
situation in which he was perfectly able to do
so, we must also say that he would have
autem ab alio quopiam, qui nihil deliquerit. sin
mins, & a vera iustitia, hoc est a rectitudine &
aequitate penitus discessit, & alteri illi iustitiae,
quae vindicta & severitas proprio nomine appellari
debet, nequaquam adhaesit; ac denique id fecit,
quod homo immanissimus facere horreret.
demanded those penalties from us as the ones
who sinned and not from some altogether
innocent person. Had God not demanded the
punishment from us, he would have
completely departed from justice properly so
called, i.e., from uprightness and fairness.
Not only that, but he would not have
exercised that other kind of justice, which is
more properly called vengeance and
harshness. In short, he would have be-
haved in a way which would make the most
savage human being cringe.
Consueverunt ii, qui eiusmodi turpissimum scelus
Deo attribuere sunt ausi, exemplo quodam nescio
cuius regis aut legislatoris (Zaleuci Locrensis
opinor) hoc facinus defendere; qui, cum ipsius
filius delictum quodpiam commisisset, propter
quod, lege ab ipso patre lata, utroque oculo
privandus erat: ne filium caecum haberet, &
interim, scilicet, legi satisfieret: sibi unum, filio
item unum oculum eruit.
Those who dare to attribute the most base
wickedness of this kind to God like to defend
this villainy by using the example of a certain
king or legislator named, if my memory
serves me, Zaleucus of the Locrians. He
established a law which stipulated that a
particular crime should be punished by
gouging out both of the offender's eyes.
When his own son committed this crime, the
ruler tore out one of his own eyes and one eye
from his son. In this way he thought he could
satisfy the demands of the law and at the
same time avoid blinding his son.
18

Factum istud pro exemplo nulla ratione adduci
meruit. Primm quia dignissimum vituperatione
censendum est; deinde quia cum eo, de quo
agimus, minim conferendum videtur.
This deed does not even merit consideration
as an example. For one thing, it should be re-
garded as reprehensible. Not only that, but it
has little affinity with what we are discussing.
Dignissimum quod vituperetur, est factum istud,
propterea [252] quod, dum pater & nocenti filio
parcere, & legi simul satisfacere curat, neutrum
facit; quippe qui filium foed mutilet, legem
autem, quae illum utroque oculo, non altero
tantm, privari iubebat, apert infringat, cui malo
dum, sibiipsi alterum oculum effodiendo, mederi
se putat, in seipsum stult crudelis est. Atque e
magis culpandus esse apparet, qud non simplici
imprudentia, sed immoderato ac caeco
potissimm filii amore absurdissimam &
The deed is deserving of censure [252]
because while the father sought both to avoid
injuring his guilty son and to satisfy the law,
he in fact did neither. Indeed, this father who
cruelly maimed his son clearly broke the law,
which decreed that the offender should be
deprived of both eyes, not just one. Mean-
while, the father thinks that he rights this
wrong situation by inflicting foolish cruelty
on himself: he gouges out the other eye from
himself. He would seem to be all the more
blameworthy because he was not merely
iniquissimam legi satisfaciendi rationem
excogitaverit, & amplexus fuerit; dignus, qui tunc
quidem tantae intemperantiae & iniquitatis
gravissimas poenas lueret: nisi, sibiipsi suae
stultitiae satis gravem poenam eum inflixisse,
statuamus: nunc autem (si mod non haec fabula
potis est, qum historia) apud posteros mal
audiat, & eius nomen inter crudeles & impotentes
atque ade temerarios principes, & populorum
iudices censeatur.
imprudent but was driven by an immoderate
and blind love for his son when he contrived
and adopted this utterly ridiculous and
wicked way of satisfying the law. He certain-
ly deserved to pay at that time the severest
penalties for such intemperance and iniquity;
perhaps we might think he inflicted a suffi-
ciently serious penalty on himself for his fool-
ishness. But now, assuming that this story is
not just pure fiction, he should be held in ill
repute among his posterity, and he should be
numbered with the cruel, violent and
thoughtless rulers and national judges.
Sed, ut demus facinus istud laudari, aut saltem
excusari posse, quid hoc ad disputationem
nostram? Hic enim & nocens ipse sui sceleris ex
parte poenas dedit, & is, qui eiusmodi puniendi
rationem adinvenit, non in alios innocentes, sed in
seipsum, quamquam innocentem, saeviit, & ade
coniunctus cum nocente erat, ut ipse nocens eam
poenae partem, quam iste, sua sponte elegit,
subiisse videatur.
But there is no point in praising, or at least
excusing, this villainy, since it has nothing
whatever to do with our disputation. In this
example, the guilty party endured part of the
penalty for his own crime, while the ruler
who devised this method of punishing did
not take violent action against other innocent
people but against himself, even though he
was innocent. The ruler was involved with
the guilty person to the extent that the guilty
person himself openly endured the same part
of the punishment as the ruler volunteered to
undergo.
At in eo, de quo quaerimus, neque homines, qui
deliquerunt, ull poen afficiuntur, nec Deus ipse,
qui istam vestram peccata hominum puniendi
rationem adinvenit, in seipsum ver, sed in
hominem innocentissimum saeviit, nec homo ille
innocens ade nocentibus hominibus coniunctus
erat, ut ipsimet poenas illas subiisse dici possint.
Quae enim coniunctio inter Christum, & caeteros
homines, quod ad carnem attinet, & quatenus
homines sunt, esse comperitur, quae non eadem
inter ipsos singulos reperiatur? Quemadmodum
igitur, quod unus homo in corpore suo patitur, alii
homines pati nequaquam dici possunt, sic neque
ea, quae Christus in suo corpore mala sustinuit,
nos ulla ratione sustinuisse videri possumus.
But the situation is completely different in the
doctrine we are investigating. There, the indi-
viduals who transgressed are not afflicted
with any penalty. Nor did God himself,
whom you say devised this way of punishing
sin, take violent action against himself: he
harmed an innocent man instead. Nor was
this innocent man associated with the guilty
in such a way that the guilty can be said to
have undergone those penalties. For what
connection is there between Christ and other
human beings that does not also exist be-
tween any two people in physical terms and
in so far as they are all human beings? There-
fore, just as others can by no means be said to
suffer what one person suffers in his own
body, neither can we be regarded as having
borne those evils which Christ bore in his
body.
Sed iam, inepto hoc exemplo valere iusso,
caetera, quae ad huius rei explicationem faciunt,
afferamus.
But now, having bid this silly example
farewell, let us consider other examples which
they adduce to explain this position.
Nam praeter id, quod rationis lumen, quo Deus
nos donavit, apert ostendit, non debere nec
posse corporalem poenam quam unus debeat, ab
alio persolvi, [253] id quod omnium gentium, ac
saeculorum legibus, & consuetudinibus perpetuo
& maximo consensu comprobatum est; ipse Deus
verbo suo idem apertissim nos docuit: &
seipsum ab hac eadem aequitate non recedere
testatus est.
The light of reason, with which God has
presented us, clearly shows that the bodily
punishment which one person owes neither
can nor should be paid by another person.
[253] This is shown in the laws, the consistent
customs, and the significant consensus of all
nations and periods of history. God himself
has clearly taught us the identical principle in
his word. And he has testified to the fact that
he himself does not fall short of this same
standard of fairness.
Notissima sunt ea quae apud Ezechielem ipse
loquitur cap. 18. ubi multis verbis perspicu
declarat, se nolle iniquitates filiorum in patribus,
nec patrum in filiis punire, si filii similes patrum
scelestorum non fuerint. ac demum ita concludit:
Anima, quae peccaverit, ipsa morietur. Filius non
portabit iniquitatem patris; neque pater portabit
iniquitatem filii, iustitia iusti super eum erit; &
impietas impii super eum erit. Quam sententiam
disert in ipsa quoque lege Mosis scriptam
legimus Deut. cap. 24. v 16. idque etiam testatur
auctor 2. lib. Regum cap. 14.
The best known passage on this subject is
Ezekiel 18. Here he states plainly and in
detail that he is unwilling to punish the
iniquities of the sons in the fathers, nor will he
punish the iniquities of the fathers in the sons
if the sons have not been wicked as their
fathers were wicked. He concludes: The soul
which sins will die. The son will not bear the iniq-
uity of the father; neither will the father bear the
iniquity of the son: the righteousness of the righ-
teous will be upon him, and the wickedness of the
wicked will be upon him. This same principle
appears also in the Mosaic law (Deut. 24:16)
as well as in 2 Kgs. 14.
Filius, qui patri coniunctissima persona est, ade
ut non mod eius pars quaedam, sed alter idem
dici possit, non debet, ex Dei sententia, ipsius
patris scelerum poenas luere, nec vicissim pater
filii; & non pudet nos affirmare, eundem Deum,
sui ipsius quodammodo oblitum, adversus
omnem aequitatem, ab homine uno caeterorum
hominum, quibuscum nullam praeterea
coniunctionem habuit, nisi qud homo erat,
The son is the person most closely connected
with his father. In fact, he is so closely related
that he can not only be called a part of him,
but can even be called the father's alter ego.
And yet, according to God's view, the son
ought not to pay the penalties for the crimes
of his father nor, in turn, the father for the
son. We should be ashamed to say that this
same God, in opposition to all fairness, forgot
himself, as it were, and demanded the com-
iniquitatis poenas perfect exegisse? Quid vel
absurdius, vel iniquius, ob eamque rem, cum de
Deo loquamur, magis impium & detestandum
excogitari potuit?
plete penalty for iniquities from one human
being out of all other human beings, with
whom this one person has no other connec-
tion except that this person, like them, is a
human being. Nothing more foolish or
wickednot to mention impious and
abominable, since we are talking about God
could be contrived!
Is, qui omnis aequitatis & rectitudinis fons est,
cuiusque omnia opera aequissima & rectissima
perpetu sunt, tam iniquum & pravum facinus
contra suum ipsius decretum admiserit? Cuius si
rationem diligentissim inquiras, nullam omnino
reperies. Ut hc non summae iniquitatis tantm &
pravitatis, suprema cum impietate, Deus
accusetur; sed extremae quoque inscitiae
(horresco, dum haec proferre, veritatis
patefaciendae, & divinae gloriae vindicandae
studio, compellor) ac fatuitatis
19
perturpissimam
atque indignissimam blasphemiam &
contumeliam insimuletur.
God, who is the source of all fairness and up-
rightness, who always does what is fair and
upright, could never commit such a perverse
and vicious crime against his very own
decree. Try as you might, you will never be
able to find the logic in this. The effect is to
accuse God not only of the height of
wickedness and viciousness, together with the
greatest impiety, but also of gross ignorance
and foolishness, as well as with shameful
blasphemy and reproach. (I shudder to speak
in this way, but I am compelled by my pas-
sion for exposing the truth and for vindicating
the divine glory.)
Si enim misericordiam erga humanum genus
exercere, & bonitatem ac liberalitatem suam no-
bis commendare voluit Deus; cur prorsus gratuit,
ut quidem potuit, scelera hominibus non
condonavit? Sin vindictam & severitatem suam in
iniuriis ulciscendis, & delictis puniendis, quam
iustitiam mins propri, ut dixi, appellamus, ad sui
nominis gloriam ostendere statuit; cur non eos
ipsos ulcisci, & supplicio afficere aggressus [254]
est, qui deliquerant, & eius maiestatem, quantum
in ipsis fuerat, minuerant? Quaenam vindicta, aut
peccati punitio est haec, eos, qui peccaverunt,
impunitos dimittere, eum ver, qui nihil mali fecit,
gravissimis poenis subiicere?
If God wished to exercise mercy toward the
human race and to commend his goodness
and generosity to us, why would he not
forgive people their wicked deeds without
any cost, as indeed he was able to do? But if
he really wanted bring glory to his name by
demonstrating his vengeance and harshness
in avenging wrongs and punishing
transgressions (which, as I pointed out, is not
justice in the proper sense of the term), why
did he not avenge and punish the very ones
[254] who had transgressed, who did their
best to diminish his majesty? For what kind
of vengeance or punishment of sin is it, to
send away those who sinned without punish-
ment, while at the same time subjecting one
who committed no wrong to the most severe
punishments?
At utramque proprietatem suam, inquies, mi-
You might argue that God wanted to exercise
each of his attributes, viz. mercy and justice,
sericordiam scilicet, & iustitiam simul execere, &
nobis commendare voluit Deus. In eo enim, qud
in nobis ipsis delicta nostra non punit, misericors
apparet. In eo autem, qud illa nihilominus
plectit, iustus esse ostenditur.
at the same time and to commend them both
to us. On the one hand, he appears merciful
in that he does not exact the punishment for
our transgressions from us. On the other
hand, he is shown to be just, because he
nevertheless punishes our sins.
Iam ver, si velis, ut magistri vestri dicere solent,
perfect Deum erga nos hac ratione &
misericordiam, & iustitiam istam exercuisse: id, ut
in initio fer huius responsionis a me dictum fuit,
plan falsum est, nec fieri ullo modo potuit.
Perfecta enim misericordia requirit, ut omnino
delinquenti ignoscatur: perfecta autem ista
iustitia, ut idem ipse, qui deliquit, debit poen
puniatur. Alicui omnino ignosci, & eundem debit
poen puniti, haec duo, inquam, ut ea, quae
invicem prorsus repugnant, nullo modo simul
consistere possunt.
If you wish to affirm, as your teachers are
accustomed to do, that God has perfectly
exercised that punitive justice and mercy
toward us in this fashion, I say that this is not
only patently false but even impossible, as I
demonstrated toward the beginning of this
response. This is because perfect mercy
demands that the one who is guilty should be
forgiven completely. But perfect punitive
justice demands that the very same person
who transgressed should be punished with
the due penalty. It is impossible and contra-
dictory for someone to be completely forgiven
and at the same time punished with the de-
served penalty.
Quid qud, si ita res se habet, ut vos dicitis,
neutr perfect usus est? Misericordi quidem
perfect non est usus. Quia, cum posset, si
voluisset, delictorum nostrorum poenas minim
reposcere, debitas sibi persolvi voluit. Iustitiam
ver illam perfect cert non exercuit; cum non in
ipsis delinquentibus, sed in alio quopiam peccata
puniverit.
If what you say is true, how is it that God em-
ploys neither property perfectly? He certainly
did not exercise perfect mercy, since he could
have chosen to forgo completely his demand
to punish our transgressions, but nevertheless
insisted on receiving payment for our debts.
Similarly, he certainly did not exercise puni-
tive justice perfectly, since he did not punish
the very ones who were guilty of sin but
someone else.
Sin autem non perfect, sed aliqua ex parte
utramque eum exercuisse dicas, istud quoque
falsum est. Immo ver neutra ullo modo est usus.
Misericordia enim, quae Dei est propria, ipsius
munificentia & liberalitate maxim constat. Nam
nec tantopere in sanctis litteris commendaretur,
nec nobis imitanda proponeretur, nisi summam
Dei munificentiam liberalitatemque contineret.
Hinc fit, ut remissio illa liberalissima totius debiti,
de qua in parabola regis creditoris agitur, quam
Perhaps you will say that he exercises each
property, but not perfectly; he only partially
employs each. That too is false. The fact is, he
employs neither. The kind of mercy that is an
attribute of God consists entirely of his gener-
osity and graciousness. The Bible would not
commend his mercy so greatly nor offer it for
our imitation unless it comprised the greatest
generosity and graciousness of God. From
this we see that the gracious remission of an
entire debt is simply called mercy in the
supr exposuimus, ibidem misericordia simpliciter
appelletur.
parable of the king who was a creditor, which
we expounded earlier.
Atqui, ut iam dictum fuit, si Deus nostrorum
delictorum poenas sibi persolvi curavit, etsi nos
ipsis liberati fuerimus, tamen nulla prorsus
liberalitate est usus; & ita nullo modo eam, quae
ipsius propria est, misericordiam exercuit. A
iustitia autem illa, de qua loquimur, penitus abfuit.
Nam de iustitia illa, ut vidimus, [255] scriptum est,
Anima, quae peccaverit, ipsa morietur.
As we remarked earlier, if God had been con-
cerned about receiving payment for our trans-
gressions, he has not at all shown generosity,
even if he will have freed us ourselves from
the penalty. In such a case he has in no way
exercised his attribute of mercy. Moreover, he
has been entirely lacking in punitive justice,
about which we are speaking. For concerning
that justice, as we saw, [255] it was written,
The soul which has sinned will die.
Breviter severitas & vindicta (haec enim, ut
saepius dictum fuit, ea iustitia est, de qua hoc
loco agimus) nulla ratione patitur, ut is, qui
deliquit, vel iniuriam fecit, plan impunitus &
inultus dimittatur. Constituere autem Dei iustitiam
quandam, quae delicta quidem puniat, non tamen
in eo qui deliquit, sed in alio quopiam, supremam,
ut demonstratum est, iniustitiam, hoc est,
iniquitatem & pravitatem continet. Ita fit, ut
scelera nostra in alio, qui non deliquerit, a Deo
punita fuisse, non mod eius perfectam
misericordiam, perfectamque iustitiam istam
nobis nec ostendat, neque commendet: sed etiam
utramque funditus convellat: & praeterea omni
vera iustitia, id est, aequitate ac rectitudine ipsum
Deum spoliet, eique universam sapientiam
adimat.
In short, severity and vengeance (and as I
have often remarked, it is really about the
avenging type of justice that we are treating
here) are not at all experienced, since the one
who is guilty or committed the wrong clearly
is sent away unpunished and unavenged. Be-
sides, as we demonstrated earlier, it is the
height of injustice (and in fact iniquity and vi-
ciousness) to establish a justice in God which
indeed exacts punishment for transgressions
but from someone other than the guilty party.
For God to have punished someone who was
not guilty with the punishment we deserved
does not merely fail to show or commend to
us his perfect mercy or his punitive justice: it
utterly destroys both. In addition, it robs God
himself of all genuine justice, i.e., of fairness
and uprightness. It also deprives him of his
universal wisdom.
Sed aliam etiam ob caussam, nobis non
pereuntibus, divinae iustitiae ver pro peccatis
nostris satisfieri nullo pacto poterat. Vera enim
satisfactio est plena debiti persolutio.
Unusquisque autem nostrm mortem aeternam
divinae isti iustitiae debebat. Unusquisque igitur
nostrm, nisi nos ipsi id facere volebamus, alium
habere debuisset, qui pro ipso mortem aeternam
subiret.
There is yet another reason why it was utterly
impossible for us, who are not perishing, to
make genuine satisfaction to divine justice for
our sins. Literal satisfaction is complete pay-
ment of a debt. But each one of us owed an
eternal death to that divine justice. Therefore,
unless we ourselves wanted to undergo
eternal death, each one of us would need to
come up with our own unique substitute to
undergo eternal death.
Verm id qu fieri poterat, cum omnibus
hominibus generatim, si Deus summo iure uti
voluisset, aeterna mors subeunda esset? Quo-
modo enim potest quis eam corporalem poenam,
praesertim ver mortem pro alio solvere, quam
ipsemet debeat? Unum autem quempiam, qui
morti aeternae, utpote qui nihil deliquisset,
minim obnoxius inventus fuerit, pro omnibus
satisfacere potuisse, plan ridiculum est cogitare,
nedum afferere.
But such an arrangement could not work,
since all people in general are obliged to
suffer eternal deathassuming that God
wished to press his utmost rights. For it is
impossible for someone to pay a bodily pen-
alty, and especially death, for another person
when that person is obliged to pay the penalty
for himself. Besides, it is obviously absurd to
imagine (much less to use as an argument!)
that someone who was completely innocent
and therefore hardly liable to eternal death
could have made satisfaction for all.
Nam perinde est, ac si quis diceret, unum, qui
nihil ipse debeat, & centum tantummodo aureos
nummos habeat, quos dare possit, pro
innumerabilibus aliis, qui singuli aureos nummos
centum debeant, posse satisfacere; cum vix pro
uno tantm ver satisfaciendi habeat facultatem.
Nemo enim plus, qum unam mortem aeternam
subire potest, eamque pro alio pendere. Unus
igitur aliquis tantm ex omnibus fortasse hac
ratione servari poterat, & pro ipsius delictis
divinae iustitiae satisfieri. Caeteris omnino in
aeternum pereundum erat, si sibi pro illorum
peccatis ver satisfieri Deus voluisset.
It is just as if someone should say that a
person who owes nothing and also possesses
only one hundred gold coins could make
satisfaction for countless others, each of
whom owe one hundred gold coins. That per-
son would scarcely have the resources to
make genuine satisfaction for a single individ-
ual. For no one can endure more than one
eternal death and suffer it for another. We
must conclude that some one person only
from among all could perhaps be saved and
have satisfaction made for his transgressions
to divine justice in this way. Conversely, as-
suming that God wanted to receive literal
satisfaction to himself for their sins, the rest
ought altogether to perish forever.
Quare, cum vos affirmatis, necesse esse, ut
divinae iustitiae pro hominum erratis, [256] &
sceleribus satisfiat; nihil aliud revera dicitis, nisi,
fieri non posse, ut omnes homines generatim in
aeternum non pereant, cum nec alius pro alio,
corporales poenas, qualis aeterna mors est, quae
nostris peccatis debetur, solvere ullo modo possit;
nec si maxim rei natura hoc pateretur, id reipsa
possit fieri; cum omnes generatim peccaverimus,
& totidem reperire necesse esset innocentissimos
homines, qui mortem aeternam subirent, quot ii
sunt, pro quorum delictis satisfaciendum esset.
Consequently, since you maintain that it is
necessary for satisfaction to be made to divine
justice for the faults [256] and wicked deeds of
humans, you are in effect saying that all
people generally must perish forever. This is
because it is absolutely impossible for one
person to pay bodily punishments, like the
eternal death we owe for our sins, for
someone else. Even if such a substitution
were inherently possible, the satisfaction for
which you contend still could not occur. All
in general have sinned, which would require
as many innocent individuals to undergo
eternal death as there are people who need to
have satisfaction made for their sins.
Sed quoniam vos, ut supr observatum est,
duplicem divinae iustitiae pro peccatis nostris
satisfaciendi modum commenti estis, & utrumque
in salute, quam nobis Christus peperit, agnosci
vultis, unum omnium poenarum solutione, quas
nos pendere tenebamur, alterum omnium eorum
praestatione, quae Dei lex nos facere iubet
(quamquam, ut dictum fuit, tu in hac disputatione
nostra, primum illum modum agnoscere
tantummodo videris) cum de uno visum fit,
videamus & de altero; si tamen pris eos invicem
pugnare, vel alterutrum saltem supervacaneum
esse, ostenderimus.
As we noted earlier, you have contrived a
twofold way of making satisfaction to divine
justice for our sins. The first way consists of
the payment of all the penalties that we were
bound to pay. The other consists of meeting
all the requirements that God's law enjoins on
us. You wish each way to be recognized in
the salvation Christ has provided for us (yet
you seem to limit your consideration to the
former in this particular disputation). There-
fore, when I consider one way I should con-
sider the other way also, since in fact I have
previously shown that these two ways oppose
one another, or at least that one of the two is
superfluous.
Pugnant sine dubio haec duo inter se, Pro aliquo
satisfacere, id omne faciendo, quod is facere
debuerat, & Pro eodem satisfacere, omnes
poenas subeundo, quas is, propter delicta sua,
subire tenetur. Nam, si is omnia fecisse
censeatur, quae facere debuerat, fieri non potest,
ut pro ipso quidquam poenae nomine solvatur.
Ubi enim nullum delictum, ibi nulla poena.
Rursus, si quicquid ille poenae nomine debebat,
persolvatur, iam pro innocente non habetur. Ubi
enim poenae persolutio, ibi noxia fit necesse est.
Supervacaneum autem alterutrum saltem esse,
hoc pacto demonstratur.
There is no doubt that the following oppose
one another: to make satisfaction for someone
by performing all the requirements that were
enjoined on that person and making satis-
faction for that same person by enduring all
the penalties that he should have undergone
because of his sins. If the person is regarded
as having met the requirements enjoined on
him, then the payment of a penalty for that
person is ruled out. Where there is no trans-
gression, there is no penalty. On the other
hand, if a penalty that incurred a debt which
the person owed was paid, that person was
not at the same time regarded as innocent.
Where there is the payment of a penalty there
is necessarily guilt. In this way, one of the
two is shown to be, at the very least, superflu-
ous.
Nam si delictorum poena penditur, quid attinet
eum, pro quo penditur, innocentem haberi? Vel,
si innocens habetur, quid opus est pro ipsius
delictis quidquam poenae nomine solvere? An
non utrumvis istorum per se eum liberat, & ipsius
errata prorsus delet?
If a person's transgressions have been paid,
why should that person be regarded as
innocent? Or, if the person is regarded as
innocent, why should that person again pay
something called a penalty for his trans-
gressions? Either of these two methods, in
and of themselves, would completely blot out
the person's mistakes, thereby freeing the per-
son.
Neque enim est, qud aliquis dicat, ut divinae
iustitiae satisfiat, non satis esse mala non facere,
nisi etiam bona fiant; atque ob eam rem non satis
fuisse mala, quae feceramus, deleri, nisi etiam
bona fecisse censeremur. Siquidem non mins
vera, qum vulgata, est distinctio seu partitio illa
peccatorum: nempe alia peccata esse
commissionis, alia ver omissionis. Ex quo
intelligendum est, si poenae pro [257] omnibus
peccatis nostris persolutae fuere, non mins pro
bonis, quae non fecimus, qum pro malis, quae
fecimus, persolutum fuisse, & ita Legi, & porr
iustitiae Dei, plenissim pro nobis fuisse
satisfactum. Et quia eadem partitio in nostris
iustitiis (quas scriptura appellat) adhiberi potest
(quaedam enim sunt iustitiae commissionis, cum
scilicet bona facimus, quaedam ver omissionis,
cum mala vitamus) cert, si omnes Legis iustitias
fecisse censemur: non bona tantm omnia
fecisse, quae Lex iubet, sed ab omnibus malis,
quae vetat, abstinuisse, & ita divinae iustitiae
absolut satisfecisse, existimandi sumus. Satis
autem fuisse, ut nos iusti haberemur, peccata
nostra deleri, id apertissim demonstrat; qud in
compluribus sanctarum litterarum locis
peccatorum remissione universam salutem
nostram contineri, si non disertis verbis, at
20

reipsa scriptum extat.
Now, someone might try to qualify the
argument as follows. Satisfaction to divine
justice requires more than simply refraining
from doing evil deeds. For satisfaction to be
effective, good deeds must be performed as
well. This means that simply blotting out the
evil deeds which we have done is insufficient,
unless we are also regarded as having done
good deeds. That distinction or division of
sins is as true as it is well known: some sins
are of commission while others are of omis-
sion. Consequently, if the penalties for [257]
all our sins were paid, they were paid no less
for the good deeds which we did not do than
for the evil deeds which we did do. Thus, a
complete satisfaction was made for us to the
law and, in turn, to God's justice. This same
division can certainly be applied to our righ-
teous deeds, as the Scripture calls them. For
some righteous deeds are deeds of commis-
sion, namely, when we do good deeds. But in
shunning evil we perform a righteous deed of
omission. If we are to be regarded as having
fulfilled the entire righteousness of the law,
we must be reckoned both as having done all
the good deeds that the law commands and as
having abstained from all the evil deeds that
it forbids. In this way, we are regarded as
having made complete satisfaction to divine
justice. But the truth of the matter is, all we
need in order to be considered righteous is to
have our sins blotted out. This is quite clear
from the fact that many passages of Scripture
plainly teach that our entire salvation is com-
posed of remission. Even if the passages do
not say this in so many words, they teach it in
fact.
Nec ver alia ratione duarum istarum
satisfactionum repugnantiam negare potestis, vel
alterutram supervacaneam fuisse, non confiteri,
qum si poenas, quae pro nobis persolutae fuere,
You might employ yet another futile
argument to avoid having to admit that these
two kinds of satisfaction contradict one an-
other, or that one of the two is superfluous.
ad praeterita tantm delicta respicere dicatis:
iustitiae autem, hoc est, perfectae divinorum
mandatorum conservationis imputationem, ad
futura; ita ut, quae ante fidem delicta
commisimus, compensatione Christi sanguinis
obliterata fuerint: quae ver post fidem, eiusmodi
Christi absolutae obedientiae imputatione. Id
quod non a veritate tantm, sed a sententia
quoque vestra qum longissim abest. Verm
hac de re, cum de ista imputatione separatim
agemus, aliquid enucleatis a nobis dicetur.
Nunc, istum alterum pro nobis satisfaciendi
modum ideo similiter plan commentitium esse,
demonstremus, quia ne existere quidem ulla
ratione potuerit.
You might say, The penalties, which were
paid for us, have only past transgressions in
view, while the imputation of righteousness
that is, the imputation of the perfect ob-
servance of the divine commandmentsis
with respect to future transgressions. From
this it follows that the transgressions which
we committed before coming to faith are blot-
ted out by the blood of Christ in exchange,
while those committed after coming to faith
are removed by the imputation of Christ's
absolute obedience. Such a view is not only
farthest from the truth, but even from your
own position! When I treat the doctrine of
imputation in a separate work, however, I will
say something more straightforward about
that subject. For now, I will show that the
other method of making satisfaction is
similarly a fabrication, because it cannot in
any way take place.
Iam si, ut antea ostendimus, nemo corporales
poenas pro alio pendere potest, nec etiam pro
alio id, quod is omnino facere tenetur, quisquam
praestare poterit. Par enim est utrobique ratio,
nec magis unius factum alterius fieri potest, qum
unius mors, aut corporis vexatio, alterius esse. Et
quemadmodum in poenis corporalibus infligendis
non ipsa mors, aut corporis vexatio, simpliciter
quaeritur, sed cuiusdam certi hominis mors, aut
corporis vexatio; sic in factis ex legis praescripto
praestandis non ipsum factum simpliciter
quaeritur, sed uniuscuiusque, qui legi illi obnoxius
[258] fit, proprium factum.
If, as I have already shown, bodily punish-
ments cannot be paid for someone else, then
neither can anyone perform for another a
deed which that other person is bound to do.
The reason is alike in both instances: the deed
of one cannot become the deed of another,
any more than the death or bodily ill
treatment of one can be that of another. And
just as in inflicting bodily punishments it is
not death or bodily affliction per se which is
simply sought, but the bodily affliction or
death of a particular person, so in performing
deeds required by law it is not simply the
deed itself which is sought, but the particular
deed of someone who is obliged [258] to fulfill
that law.
Nam, quid magis ridiculum dici potest, qum, si
quis, exempli grati, lege iubente, in publico
convivio modestus esse debeat: ubi ipse plan
immodestus fuerit, alium, qui modestiam
conservaverit, pro ipso modestum esse posse,
ade ut ipse, quantumvis immodestus, pro
Consider the following utterly ridiculous
example. Suppose someone who ought to be
orderly at a public banquet, as prescribed by
law, conducts himself in a disorderly way
instead. Can another person, who conducted
himself with propriety at the banquet, be
modesto habeatur: & ita legi plen satisfactum
esse? Ita nihil magis ridiculum excogitari potest,
qum, si quis dicat, unius iustitiam alterius, qui
plan iniustus fuerit, iustitiam censeri.
orderly for that unruly man? Can that rowdy
individual, however disorderly, be considered
orderly, and thus be regarded as having fully
satisfied the law? We would be hard pressed
to say anything more ridiculous than that the
righteousness of one person is regarded as the
righteousness of someone who was clearly
unrighteous.
Parcere quidem Deus multis iniustis propter
paucos iustos consuevit; ut colligitur ex verbis
ipsius cum Abrahamo loquentis paullo ante
destructionem Sodomae; ne scilicet un cum
impiis pios quoque perdat, aut puniat. Non tamen
idcirco iniustos, iustorum causs, iustos esse
censet. Sicut enim impietas impii super eum erit,
sic iustitia iusti super eum futura est, inquit, ut
vidimus, ipse Deus apud Ezechielem.
Now, God indeed is accustomed to spare
many unrighteous people on account of a few
righteous ones. This is implied from God's
conversation with Abraham shortly before the
destruction of Sodom. God evidently would
not destroy or punish the godly together with
the wicked. But it does not follow from this
that he regards the unrighteous as righteous
on account of the righteous. We noted that
God himself says in Ezekiel that, just as the
wicked person will be responsible for his own
impiety, even so the just person will be re-
sponsible for his own righteousness.
Sed finge, unius iustitiam, alterius censeri posse;
num unius tantm iustitia innumerabilium esse
censebitur? Iisdem igitur rationibus quibus
poenas nostris sceleribus debitas persolvi non
potuisse ostendimus, etiamsi alium pro alio
poenas corporales pendere posse concederetur,
concludendum similiter est, non potuisse nos ob
alienam iustitiam iustos a Deo haberi, etiamsi rei
natura pateretur, ut unius iustitia alterius censeri
posset; atque e magis, qud potest quidem
homo quispiam nihil poenarum debere, nimirum si
innocentissimus fit; sed nullus homo iustissimus
esse non tenetur, & divinae voluntati
perfectissim obedire. Neminem autem pro alio
praestare posse, quod ipsemet facere teneatur,
sensu ipso communi id apert docente, alibi
afferuimus.
Imagine for a moment that the righteousness
of one person can be regarded as the righ-
teousness of another. Will the righteousness
of only one person be regarded as the righ-
teousness of countless people? The same ar-
guments which we used to show that the
penalties owed for our evil deeds could not be
paid, even if it were admitted that someone
could suffer bodily punishments for another,
are likewise applicable here. We could not be
reckoned as righteous by God because of the
righteousness of someone else, even if it were
inherently possible for the righteousness of
one to be regarded as the righteousness of an-
other. These arguments have even greater
force here, since it is conceivable that a person
could be completely innocent and owe
nothing of the penalty. But there is no person
who is not bound to be righteous and to obey
perfectly the divine will. Common sense
clearly teaches what we have treated else-
where, viz. that no one can undertake an ob-
ligation for someone else that the one who
would undertake it is already bound to do.
Chapter IV
Chapter IV
Christum, poenarum, quas nos, ex lege Dei,
subire tenebamur, solutione, divinae iustitiae pro
nobis satisfacere non potuisse.
Christ was not able to make satisfaction to divine
justice for us by payment of the penalties that the
law of God obliged us to undergo.
Cum igitur demonstratum fuerit, neque poenarum,
quas propter delicta nostra ex lege Dei subire
tenebamur, solutione, nec eorum, quae eadem
lex nos facere iubet, praestatione, pro nobis
divinae iustitiae satisfieri potuisse, certum esse
potest, Iesum Christum neutrum fecisse, nisi ea,
quae fieri nequeunt, facta fuisse velimus, & ita
falsum omnino illud esse ostenditur, quod vos
affirmatis, [259] Iesum Christum pro nostris
peccatis Deo plenissim satisfecisse.
Once we have shown that satisfaction to
divine justice on our behalf could not take
place either (1) by a payment of the penalties
that the law of God obliged us to undergo on
account of our transgressions, or (2) by legally
undertaking those requirements that the law
commands us to fulfill, then there will be no
doubt that Jesus Christ did neither one
unless we are prepared to say that he did the
impossible. In this way, your assertion that
Jesus Christ made full satisfaction to God for
our sins is shown to be completely false. [259]
Nam, si quis dicat, in Iesu Christi persona
quaedam singularia reperiri, ob quae id per eum
fieri potuerit, quod alioqui nullo pacto fieri
potuisse concedatur; is in maximo errore
versatur. Nam quae fieri suapte natura nullo
modo possunt, a nemine umquam fiunt, ne a Deo
quidem ipso. Atqui eiusmodi, saltem ex parte,
sunt ea, quae in utraque illa satisfactione facta
fuisse necesse esset. Nec enim natura patitur, ut
unius corporalis poena pro alio pendatur, vel
unius factum pro alio praestetur; cum nec
corporalis poena, nec factum unius, alterius fieri
possit.
Perhaps someone will argue that because the
person of Christ has some unique char-
acteristics, he can do what admittedly could
not otherwise happen. But such an assertion
is greatly in error. For whatever is inherently
impossible can never occur by the agency of
anyone, not even by God himself. Both
aspects of satisfaction require impossible ac-
tions of this sort, at least in part. The nature
of the case does not allow the bodily pun-
ishment of one person to be suffered by
another, nor the deed of one person to be per-
formed by another. Neither the bodily
punishment nor the deed of one person can
become the deed or punishment of another.
Cui ipsius rei naturae additum est, ut vidimus, Dei
decretum; quod non veram tantm eiusmodi
satisfactionem, quam rei natura penitus
refugiebat, sed pro vera a Deo habitam quoque
excludit. Hoc autem dico propter nonnullos, qui
Besides the inherent impossibility is the
decree of God, as we have already seen.
God's decree not only rules out literal sat-
isfaction of this kind, which the nature of the
case thoroughly shuns, but also rules out sat-
isfaction regarded by God as if it were literal.
non veram quidem satisfactionem pro peccatis
nostris, sed pro vera a Deo habitam, ex Christi
persona fluxisse contendunt. Cuius sententiae
quidam ex praecipuis magistris vestris fuisse
videntur; ut postea exponemus.
I mention this because of some who maintain
that a non-literal satisfaction flows from the
person of Christ, which satisfaction God
regards as literal. Some of your main teachers
appear to have held this view, as I will show
later.
Certum igitur esto, nulla ratione fieri potuisse, ut
Christus vel corporales poenas quas ipsi subire
debebamus, pro nobis persolverit, vel ea, quae
ipsi facere tenebamur, pro nobis praestiterit.
Therefore, you ought to have no doubt that it
was impossible for Christ to pay the bodily
punishments that we ourselves were obliged
to endure, or for him to perform in our place
those deeds that we ourselves were obliged to
do.
Sed, ut veritas magis adhuc perspici queat,
demus naturam rei istiusmodi satisfactionibus non
repugnare, & nihilominus tamen Iesum Christum
eas peragere non potuisse, ostendamus.
To make the truth of the foregoing even more
clear, let us grant that both methods of
satisfaction, which we have been discussing,
are not inherently impossible. Even with this
concession, we will show that Jesus Christ still
could not have accomplished what was re-
quired.
Iam dictum est (ut de poenis persolvendis primm
agamus) poenam, quam unusquisque nostrum
propter delicta sua pendere tenebatur, mortem
aeternam esse. Hanc profect Christus non
subiit, &, si eam subiisset, universa salutis
nostrae, & liberationis a peccatorum poena spes,
& ratio funditus eversa fuisset. Immo, si iam
Christus non resurrexisset, vana, ut inquit Paulus,
esset Evangelii praedicatio, & nos adhuc
essemus in peccatis nostris. Et tamen, si idcirco
nos servasset Christus, qud poenas nostris
peccatis debitas ipse sustinuisset, & nobis eius
rei fides, quoad eius fieri poterat, facienda fuisset:
eum numquam resurgere, sed in morte perpetu
manere oportuisset.
Considering the payment of penalties first, we
already noted that the penalty each of us was
to endure for our transgressions is eternal
death. Christ did not literally endure this.
But if he had, our entire salvation, together
with the hope and basis of our liberation from
sin's penalty, would have been completely
demolished. Had Christ not yet been raised,
the preaching of the gospel is vain, as Paul
says, and we are still in our sins. If Christ
saved us by enduring the penalties we de-
served for our sins, and if we ought to
exercise faith in this fact to the utmost limits
possible, then he should never have arisen but
have remained in death continually.
Nam, si quis dicat, ideo necesse fuisset, ut is
resurgeret, & in morte nequaquam remaneret, ut
pro nobis mortem, a qua nos liberandi eramus,
vinceret & superaret; [260] iam ista ab hac
satisfactione diversa admodum est nos servandi
Someone might counter that it was necessary
for him to rise and not remain in death, so
that he could conquer death for us, thereby
freeing us from it. [260] But such a way of sal-
vation has no affinity with your doctrine of
satisfaction, and in fact completely over-
ratio, & eam penitus convellit. Haec enim
satisfactio, in eo, qui nos servaturus est,
aeternam mortem, Ista autem nos servandi ratio
aeternam vitam requirit. Praeterea quid opus
fuerat, mortem pro nobis, per resurrectionem
Christi a mortuis, superari, si peccatis nostris per
ipsam mortem omnibus prorsus absolitis atque
deletis, nobis mors iam dominari non poterat?
Aculeus, inquit apostolus, mortis, peccatum, I.
Cor. 15. v 56. Itaque, si peccatum auferas, mors
aculeo, & veneno caret, neque nos iam laedere
potest.
throws it! Your doctrine of satisfaction
requires that the one who would save us must
endure eternal death, while this other way of
saving us (i.e., through the resurrection) re-
quires eternal life. Besides, it would be un-
necessary for death to be conquered for us
through Christ's resurrection if death lost its
hold over us when all our sins were com-
pletely absolved and wiped away through
Christ's death. The sting of death, says the
Apostle, is sin (1 Cor. 15:56). If you take away
sin, death lacks its sting and poison; it can
harm us no longer.
Qud si rursus aliquis dixerit, hac ratione neque
etiam, si remissionem illam peccatorum, nulla
vera satisfactione interveniente, admittamus,
necesse fuisse, ut Christus resurgeret, cum satis
esset, per remissionem sublata fuisse omnia
peccata nostra; Respondeo, ideo necesse fuisset,
ut Christus resurgeret, & in morte non remaneret,
ut nos immortalitatis inde firmam spem
concipientes, ab iniquitatibus nostris ad Deum ea
ratione, qua ipse Christus iusserat,
converteremur; sine qua conversione nulla est
revera peccatorum remissio, sed remissionis
tantm oblatio. At satisfactio, etiam Christo non
resurgente, perfecta fuisset.
Now, someone might try to turn the
argument on me and say that if we allow the
remission of sins without literal satisfaction,
we could have been saved simply through
remission, without any need for Christs
resurrection. My response is that it was neces-
sary for Christ to rise and not remain in death
so that his resurrection, by firmly instilling in
us the hope of immortality, should cause us to
turn from our sins to God in the way in which
Christ himself commanded. Without such a
conversion there is no real remission of sins,
but only the offering of remission. On the
other hand, satisfaction would indeed have
been perfected had Christ not arisen.
Sed inquies, satisfactionem quidem, citra Christi
resurrectionem, fuisse peractam, sed non
imputari debuisse, nisi iis, qui peractam fuisse
credidissent: Ut autem id crederetur,
resurrectione, quae Christi potentiam declararet,
hoc est, vim satisfaciendi ipsum habuisse,
ostenderet, opus fuisse. Ast ego contr: Si
satisfactio iam peracta erat, quid oportebat eam
peractam fuisse credere? Numquid, si aliquis pro
me creditori meo satisfecerit, & pecuniam reipsa
meo nomine solverit, quam repetere iam non
possit, neque solutum, neque satisfactum erit, nisi
pris ego id verum esse credam? Sed hac de re
You might try to argue that satisfaction itself
was accomplished apart from Christ's res-
urrection, but that it should only be imputed
to those who believe that it was accomplished.
In order to bring about this belief, the
resurrection was necessary to show that
Christ had the power to make satisfaction.
But I say the opposite: If satisfaction had
already been accomplished, why was it nec-
essary to believe that it was accomplished? If
someone has made satisfaction for me to my
creditor, actually paying the money to him in
my name, the creditor can no longer demand
payment. If satisfaction through payment
infr suo loco explicatis differemus.
was made for the debt, the payment and satis-
faction does not depend on my first believing
it is true. But let us postpone a more ordered
treatment of this subject to its proper place be-
low.
Praeterea, quo'nam modo ex Christi resurrectione
consistit, eum satisfecisse, sive satisfaciendi vim
habuisse? Num quia per resurrectionem
declaratus fuerit aeternus Deus, eiusdemque cum
patre substantiae? Atqui primm istud nullam
potis satisfaciendi vim in ipso fuisse demonstrat,
ut postea videbimus, deinde falsum est, Christum,
per resurrectionem, Deum aeternum declaratum
esse. Poterat enim purus homo resurgere, ut
nobis, quicumque ipsi Christo [261]
obediverimus, in ultimo illo die eveniet; qui lict
puri homines simus, a mortuis ad aeternam
beatamque vitam nihilominus resurgemus.
Besides, in what way does the fact that Christ
made satisfaction or had the power to do so
depend on his resurrection? Is it because the
resurrection declared him to be eternal God,
consubstantial with the Father? Aside from
the fact that the resurrection actually shows
that he has no power to make satisfaction, as
we shall see later, Christ was not declared to
be eternal God through the resurrection. A
mere human being was able to rise from the
dead, just as we mere human beings, who
have been obedient to Christ himself, [261]
will likewise rise from the dead on the last
day to eternal and blessed life.
Si dixeris, Christum sua ipsius virtute atque
potentia semetipsum in vitam revocasse, nos
autem ipsius Christi vi in vitam revocandos esse.
Istud prorsus nihil est. Nemini enim ea de re
quidquam constare potest ex ipsa resurrectione.
Nam, etiamsi resurrectionis nomine universam
simul potestatem intelligamus, quam, resurgendo,
& caelos ipsos conscendendo, adeptus est; non
tamen ex eo, ipsum propria vi semet a mortuis
excitasse, constat. Ut enim supremam illam
potestatem, quemadmodum ante ostendimus, ut
homo accepit (neque ver aliter, ut ibi diximus,
accipere poterat, siquidem ea vera & propria
potestatis acceptio fuit, quippe obedientiae
praemium, non autem figurata & impropria, &
qualis in Deum ipsum cadere potest, ut legitur in
Apoc. cap. 4 v 11.) Sic, ut resurgeret illi, ut
homini, datum fuisse, nisi aliud appareat, omnino
dicendum videtur. Quid qud scriptura passim
testatur, eum a Deo, & alicubi a Deo patre, ex
mortuis excitatum fuisse?
You might counter by saying that Christ
brought himself back to life by his own
power, while we are brought back to life by
Christ's own power. Such an assertion is
without substance; the resurrection proves
nothing of the sort. Even if we associate with
the term resurrection the concept of
universal power, which he obtained by rising
from the dead and ascending to heaven, this
still does not prove that Christ raised himself
from the dead by his own power. For since he
received that supreme power as a human be-
ing, just as we showed earlier, we should
affirmapart from clear evidence to the
contrarythat it was granted him as a human
being to rise from the dead. (As we stated
earlier, in order for his reception of that su-
preme powerindeed, the reward of obedi-
enceto have been a genuine and literal rath-
er than a figurative and metaphorical recep-
tion like that which God could receive [Rev.
4:11], he could only have received it as a hu-
man being.) Consequently, the Scriptures
frequently declare that he was made alive
from the dead by God, or by God the Fa-
ther.
Tametsi enim Christus ipse dicit, Potestatem
habeo ponendi animam meam, & potestatem
habeo iterum sumendi eam; & alibi Solvite
templum hoc, & in tribus diebus excitabo illud;
non debent hi pauci, &, ut ex circumstantiis
manifestum est, figurati loquendi modi aliquid
diversum nobis suadere ab eo, quod ex multis,
iisque maxim propriis, apertissim docemur.
Praesertim ver, cum de nobis quoque dictum fit,
qud si propter Christum animam perdiderimus,
eam inveniemus Matth. 10. 39. & eam
vivificabimus, sive, ut est in graeco, vivam
gignemus, Luc. 17. v 33. & alibi scriptum extet,
eos, qui Christo credunt, & iam ex Deo nati sunt,
potestatem habere, ut fiant filii Dei, id est, ad
immortalitatem, & beatam vitam resurgant. Tunc
enim ver filii Dei erunt, idque alia ratione, qum
antea essent. Sunt, inquit Christus, filii Dei, quia
filii resurrectionis sunt. Luc. 20 v. 36.
Although Christ himself says, I have the power
of laying down my life and the power of taking it
up again, and Destroy this temple, and in three
days I shall raise it up, these few and, as the
context shows, figurative passages should not
lead us to conclusions contrary to what many
passages, particularly the literal ones, plainly
teach. Note especially the texts that say that if
we lose our life for Christ's sake we will find it
(Matt. 10:39), and that we will make it alive
or, as it reads in the Greek, we will bring it
forth alive (Lk. 17:33). Another passage states
that those who believe in Christ and have
already been born of God have the power to
become the sons of God, that is, to rise again
to immortality and to a blessed life. For it is
then that they will truly be sons of God in a
way they were not sons formerly. They are,
says Christ, sons of God, because they are sons of
the resurrection (Lk. 20:36).
Huiusmodi autem prosopopoeiis, in hoc
potissimm resurrectionis negotio, ex ipsa
loquendi consuetudine & quadam quasi neces-
sitate, frequenter admodum utuntur divinae
litterae. Sed haec , ut dicitur.
The Scriptures often employ personifications
like this, particularly when talking about the
resurrection. It is not only customary but
almost necessary to speak this way about the
resurrection. But this is (hodou
parergon) (i.e., a brief way of describing a
subject), as it is called.
Neque enim, utrm Christus propria vi seipsum
ab inferis excitaverit, nec ne excitaverit, hic
quaerendum est; sed utrm ex ipsa resurrectione
id nobis constare [262] possit, inspiciendum.
Satis autem me demonstrasse confido, ex ipsa
resurrectione id nobis neutiquam constare; & ita
nullam caussam esse, cur ex ipsa resurrectione
Christus aeternus Deus appareat, atque ea
ratione pro peccatis nostris satisfaciendi vim
habuisse constet.
The question before us is not whether Christ
raised himself from hell by his own power,
nor whether he rose from the dead. The real
issue is whether or not the resurrection itself
is able to prove it [262] to us. I believe I have
sufficiently demonstrated that the resur-
rection cannot establish this in any way.
There is no reason Christ should appear to be
eternal God from the resurrection, thereby
showing that he had the power to make satis-
faction for our sins.
Adde, quod non mod aeternus Deus ex
resurrectione ipsa non apparet Christus, sed
etiam ex ea sola nec necessari nec verisimiliter
concluditur, in ipso Christo, antequam resurgeret,
aliquid fuisse, quod in nobis, si eum imitati
fuerimus, non fit; cum nos quoque & resurrecturi
simus, & in aeternum regnaturi, Apoc. 22. v 5, &
quae praeter illa, quae nos umquam adepturi
fimus, consecutus est Christus, ea omnia homini
nobis quod ad ipsam naturam attinet non
excellentiori, si voluisset, dare potuerit Deus.
Moreover, besides the fact that Christ is not
shown to be eternal God from the resurrec-
tion, there is no necessary or even probable
reason to suppose from the resurrection alone
that Christ, before he arose, had some quality
that we do not, if we try to copy him. After
all, we too will rise again and reign forever
(Rev. 22:5). Beyond those rewards that we
could ever obtain, God was able to give, if he
had wished, all those rewards to a man no
better than us in terms of his nature.
Aliunde, qum ex ipsa resurrectione, ea, quibus
nos maxim antecessit Christus, dum adhuc
mortalis fuit, quaeque ipsius propria fuere, apert
constant; si mod ea credimus, quae de ipso
homines divinissimi litteris mandarunt. Nec ver
huic nostrae sententiae repugnant ea verba Pauli
de ipso Christo, qui definitus (quod alii vertunt
declaratus) est filius Dei in potentia secundum
spiritum sanctificationis (seu sanctitatis) ex
resurrectione mortuorum, & c. Rom. 1. v. 4.
From another angle than from the resurrec-
tion, it is obvious that Christ possessed while
yet mortal all those characteristics in which he
especially excels usif we take the biblical
authors at their word. Paul's words about
Christ in Romans 1:4 do not contradict my
view. This passage reads, who was appointed
(which others interpret as declared) the son of
God in power, according to the spirit of sanctifica-
tion (or, of holiness), from the resurrection of the
dead. . . .
quasi in illis dicatur, Christum per resurrectionem
apparuisse aeternum Dei filium, eiusdemque cum
patre substantiae sive essentiae; vel saltem talem
Dei filium, cum adhuc mortalis esset, qualis nullus
homo umquam fuit aut futurus est. Non enim
agitur ibi de patefactione alicuius rei, quae antea
esset, sed de constitutione eius, quae nondum
erat. Nam, quoad Christus immortalis factus non
est, filius quidem Dei erat, sed non omnino, nec
ea ratione, qua postea fuit.
Some think this passage teaches that through
the resurrection Christ showed himself to be
the eternal son God, of the same substance or
essence with the Father. Or they say we must
conclude at the very least that he was the son
of God, while yet mortal, in a unique way,
such as no other person ever was or would be.
But this passage is not talking about the
revelation of some already existent truth
about Christ, but about a change in his con-
dition which had not been true before.
Although even while yet mortal Christ was
the son of God, he was not yet completely the
son of God, nor God's son in the way he
would be after the resurrection.
Hinc Paulus ea secundi psalmi verba, Ego hodie
genui te, de Christi resurrectione interpretatur,
Act. 13. v. 33. Tunc enim ver & absolut
Paul here applies the words of the second
psalm, Today I have begotten you, to Christ's
resurrection (Acts 13:33). Christ was truly
constitutus est Christus Dei filius, cum
immortalitatem supremamque illam potestatem
est adeptus, quam Paulus, ut mos est sacrorum
scriptorum, Resurrectionis nomine intelligit.
and completely constituted the son of God at
the resurrection, when he attained supreme
immortality and that power which Paul,
typical of the biblical writers, understands by
the term resurrection.
Hanc autem verborum Pauli sententiam esse,
declarat manifest participium . Siquidem
verbum ut ego quidem arbitror, nusquam
(quidquid aliis visum fuerit) patefacere significat,
aut declarare, nisi verbum Declarandi in eum sen-
sum accipias, quo aliquando bonis latinitatis
auctoribus prolatum [263] fuit, cum scribunt,
exempli grati, aliquem fuisse declaratum
consulem, id est, constitutum & definitum, sive
creatum. Quamquam verbum ipsum Patefaciendi
seu Revelandi in sacris litteris in hunc eundem
sensum, in quem verbum in illis Pauli verbis
accipi debere contendo, non rar figurat
accipitur. Veluti, cum idem Paulus dicit,
revelandam esse erga nos gloriam, Rom. 8. v. 18.
quod idem est, ac si dixisset, nobis esse dandam
gloriam; non tamen, tamquam eadem ipsa iam
ver esset, sed adhuc patefacta non fuisset.
The participle (horisthentos) plainly
shows that this is the sense of Paul's words.
In my opinion, the word (horidz ) never
signifies to reveal or to declare, regard-
less of what others may say. The only way
one can take the word to mean to declare is
to understand the verb declare in the sense
that some of the better Latin authors [263] use
the term. For example, they might say that a
consul was declared, meaning that he was
constituted, appointed or created. Never-
theless, the verb disclose or reveal is not
uncommonly taken figuratively in the holy
Scriptures in the same sense as I maintain is
the proper understanding of Paul's use of
(horidz ) in the passage just cited. For in-
stance, when Paul speaks of the glory to be
revealed toward us (Rom. 8:18), the meaning
is the same as if he had said, the glory to be
given to us. It is not as if the glory was
already in existence but simply not yet
revealed.
Nec enim alia ratione ea ipsa gloria iam antea
fuisse dici poterit, qum Dei destinatione. Atque
hoc sensu, Iesum Christum per resurrectionem
patefactum Dei filium fuisse affirmare possumus.
quia scilicet iam ab ipso initio, immo antequam
mundus fieret, beatissimae immortalitati a Deo
destinatus fuerat, Ioh. 17. v. 5.
The only sense in which that glory existed be-
forehand is in the counsel of God. It is in this
sense that we can affirm Jesus Christ to have
been revealed to be the son of God through
the resurrection. He had evidently been
appointed by God to blessed immortality
from the very beginning, even before the
world was in existence (Jn. 17:5).
Relinquitur igitur, supervacaneam & inutilem
prorsus fuisse Christi resurrectionem ad peccata
nostra per poenarum solutionem delenda; &
proinde, si per eiusmodi satisfactionem omnia
peccata nostra deleta fuerunt, mal locutum
fuisse Paulum, qui ait, Si Christus non resurrexit,
Consequently, Christ's resurrection was un-
necessary and worthless for the purpose of
wiping away our sins through the payment of
penalties. Likewise, if all our sins were wiped
away through some kind of satisfaction, Paul
misstated himself when he said that if Christ
had not been raised then we are still in our
nos adhuc esse in peccatis nostris. Nam, si Iesu
Christi resurrectio ipsius Christi in satisfaciendo,
id est, poenis, nostris delictis debitis,
persolvendis, vim aliquam nobis non commendat,
quid aliud efficit, qum ut, satisfactionem istam ab
ipso peractam non fuisse, demonstret, cum ex ea
manifestissimum fit, ipsum mortem aeternam,
quae poena delictorum nostrorum erat, divinae
iustitiae minim persolvisse, immo ex diverso
sempiterna vita donatum fuisse?
sins. If the resurrection of Jesus Christ does
not commend to us his power to make
satisfaction (i.e., of paying the penalties owed
for our transgressions) it can only show that
he did not accomplish satisfaction. It is
evident from the resurrection that he did not
pay the price of eternal death, which was the
punishment for our sins, to divine justice.
Quite the contrary: he was given eternal life.
Caeterm, si quis adhuc dicat, ideo Iesu Christi
resurrectionem in hac per poenae solutionem
iustificatione nostra maximum momentum habere,
quia per ipsam ea vera esse demonstrentur, quae
ipse dixerat, dixisse autem, se poenas universas
nostris peccatis debitas persoluturum;
Respondeo, neque Christum id umquam dixisse,
ut ex iis, quae supr disputata sunt, perspicuum
esse potest, & clarius, ut spero, inferis
ostendemus: neque, si maxim dixisset,
resurrectionem id ea ratione comprobaturum
fuisse, quam nos hoc loco quaerimus.
Someone might say in response that the
reason why the resurrection of Jesus Christ is
greatly important to our justification through
the payment of a penalty is that the resurrec-
tion proves the truth of Christ's promise to
pay the entire penalty owed for our sins. I
reply that Christ never said that he was going
to pay the entire penalties owed for our sins,
as I have shown above (and as I trust I will
show more clearly in what follows). But even
if he had said it, the resurrection would not
prove it in the way we are seeking here.
Non enim generalem istam comprobandi
rationem quaerimus, quia scilicet eum, qui dixit,
eiusmodi esse appareat, ut nulla in re mentiri
possit; sed singularem quandam, [264] qua id
nominatim, quod comprobandum est, per
caussas aut effecta propria ita se habere
demonstretur. ade ut, quemadmodum non
mult ante dictum est, non mod quia, Deum
ipsum dixisse, appareat, id verum esse constet;
sed etiam, quia verum esse appareat, id Deum
dixisse, nobis, sicut facere iubemur, cert
persuadeamus.
We are not seeking a general sort of proof,
based simply on showing that the person who
made the statement is the kind of person who
always tells the truth. We are after a certain
unique kind of proof, [264] in which the fact
to be demonstrated is expressly proven
through its own causes or effects. As we said
a little earlier, the kind of proof we seek is
self-authenticating to the extent that the truth
is not only established because God himself
certainly said it, but we also convince
ourselves (as we are commanded to do) that
God said it because it is certainly true.
Is enim, ut ibi attigimus, benignissimo &
sapientissimo Deo nostro fuit in salute nobis per
Christum comparanda scopus propositus, ut
quaecumque is, ipsius nomine, nobis
As we treated earlier, this was the goal which
our most kind and wise God promised in
providing us salvation through Christ,
namely, that whatever he should announce to
us in his name should be established as true,
annunciaret, reipsa, quatenus fieri poterat, ex iis,
quae Christus facturus, passurus, & adepturus
erat, per rerum caussas vel effectus proprios
verissima esse constaret. Quid autem ipsi
caussae persolutionis poenarum, quas divinae
iustitiae nos deberemus, magis repugnans
excogitari potest, qum resurrectio illius, qui eam
persolutionem peragere debuerit, cum per
resurrectionem aeterna mors penitus destruatur,
quae ad poenas illas persolvendas omnino
requiritur?
as much as possible, from the causes or
particular effects of whatever Christ was
going to do, suffer and obtain. Now, nothing
is more contrary to the cause of paying the
penalties which we owed to divine justice
than the resurrection of the one who will have
been obliged to make that payment. After all:
the eternal death which is requisite for paying
the penalty is utterly vanquished through the
resurrection.
Itaque, ut ad propositum tandem revertamur,
fatendum est, cum mors aeterna peccatis nostris
deberetur, eamque minim Christus subierit, nec
subire potuerit, quidquid ille passus est, vel pati
potuit, poenam peccatis nostris debitam non
continere: & ob eam rem nullo modo potuisse
eum poenas delictorum nostrorum iustitiae
divinae persolvere.
And so, returning at last to our subject, we
must admit that since eternal death was owed
for our sins, and since Christ hardly
experienced that, nor could he have done so,
whatever he did suffer or could have suffered
did not entail paying the penalties we
deserved for our sins. Consequently, we must
also admit that he could not have paid to
divine justice the penalties for our transgres-
sions.
Sed finge, Christum eas poenas subiisse, quas
quivis ex hominibus propter sua scelera subire
tenebatur; quid hoc erit ad veram plenamque
satisfactionem pro peccatis omnium? Quis
umquam, ut iam dictum est, audivit, solvendo,
quod unus debet, pro infinitis satisfieri, qui idem
singuli debeant?
Yet, if one supposes that Christ did undergo
those penalties which anyone from the human
race was bound to undergo on account of his
evil deeds, this still will not be a literal and
complete satisfaction for the sins of all. As we
already pointed out, who has ever heard of
paying the amount which one person owes in
order to make satisfaction for countless indi-
viduals, each of whom owe the same amount?
Video, quid ad hoc & ad ea simul omnia, quae
hactenus disputavi de Christo, qui omnes poenas
peccatis nostris debitas persolvere non potuerit,
sis responsurus. Dices enim, quae a me dicta
sunt, verissima & solidissima futura esse, si
Christus purus homo fuisset. Nunc, cum idem
Christus, qui homo fuit, Deus quoque fuerit, isque
verus atque aeternus, eiusdemque cum patre, ut
substantiae, sic dignitatis, virtutis atque potentiae:
falsa, & inania in eius persona esse, quaecumque
I can anticipate your response to this and to
all of my other assertions in this disputation,
where I have denied that Christ was able to
pay all the penalties deserved for our sins.
You will say that my assertions would be
valid if Christ had been a mere human being.
But you will argue that Christ, besides being a
human, was also true and eternal God,
consubstantial with the Father and thus of the
same dignity, excellence and power. There-
fore, you will say that all the arguments I
a me contra hanc poenarum persolutione
peractam satisfactionem fuerunt allata.
have raised against a satisfaction accom-
plished by the payment of penalties are false
and ineffective in the case of the person of
Christ.
Quamvis enim nec Christus ea passus fuerit,
quae quivis nostrm, divina iustitia ita postulante,
[265] pati tenebatur, nec eadem, quae ab infinitis
corpore pendi debebant, ab ipso solo persolvi
potuerint; tamen personae dignitatem, & vim
infinitam, quam in omnibus eius utpote aeterni
Dei, actionibus, aut perpessionibus reperiri
necesse est, utrique huic malo mederi.
Dignitatem enim personae efficere, ut quae
passus est Christus, lict per se mult iis minora,
quae quilibet nostrm pati debebat, eiusdem
tamen, sive etiam maioris pretii censeantur. Ut in
viro principe tantidem aestimabitur levis poena,
aut, pluris etiam, qum in homine plebeio
gravissima; & quod in hoc, perpetuo exilio, aut
carcere multabitur: in illo, temporario puniri sat
fuerit. Vim autem illam infinitam & eiusdem rei
caussam esse, & praeterea efficere, ut, quae
Christus, lict solus, suo corpore persolvit, idem
pondus habeant, aut maius etiam, qum si, quod
singuli debebamus, unusquisque per se proprio
corpore solvisset.
You will admit that Christ did not suffer what
divine justice required any one of us to suffer,
[265] and admit that he could not single-
handedly pay precisely what countless indi-
viduals ought to have suffered bodily. But
then you will add that the dignity of his
person and the infinite power which is found
in all that he did and suffered, in as much as
these are the actions or sufferings of eternal
God, supplement each of these deficiencies.
You will argue that even though Christ's suf-
ferings were in themselves much less than
what we were obliged to suffer, the dignity of
his person causes them to be regarded as of
the same or even of greater value. A light
punishment experienced by an eminent
person is reckoned as of equal or even greater
value than the severe punishment of an ordi-
nary person. And so in this case, whereas an
ordinary person would be punished with
never ending banishment or imprisonment, it
is adequate for the eminent person to receive
a temporary punishment. Christ's infinite
power is responsible for this result, and also
makes it possible for the sufferings that Christ
single-handedly paid in his body to have the
same or even greater weight than if each of us
had paid in our bodies what we individually
owed.
Vides, quibus philosophicis inventis vobis opus fit,
ut istam vestram satisfactionem defendere
possitis. Atqui ea, si placet, paullo diligentius
examinemus.
Look at the philosophical fabrications you
have contrived to defend your doctrine of
satisfaction! Let us investigate these fabrica-
tions a bit more carefully, if you are willing.
Quod igitur ad personae dignitatem attinet,
Primm mihi valde suspectum est, quod pro
concesso sumitur, principis scilicet viri levem
poenam eiusdem pretii esse, cuius gravissimam
Regarding those arguments based on the
dignity of the person, I find the proposition
which you take for granted to be highly
suspect, namely that the light punishment of
hominis plebeii: quinimmo crediderim, iniustam
esse eam legem, quae idem delictum in viro
principe leviter puniat, in plebeio autem homine
gravissim. Quare, cum Christus, ut vos dictis,
omnia delicta nostra in seipsum susceperit, ac si
ipsemet ea omnia perpetrasset; non video,
quomodo iustitiae divinae satisfieri potuerit, nisi
eas omnes poenas ipse sustinuerit, quas nos
pendere ex divina lege tenebamur. Nullum est
personarum discrimen apud Deum tunc etiam,
cum eius misericordiae locus relinquitur. Quid
tandem erit, cum de poena irroganda ex iustitiae
seu potis severitatis absolutissimae praescripto
agitur?
an eminent person is of the same value as the
most severe punishment of a common per-
son. On the contrary: I would regard as
unjust a law that avenges the same crime
more lightly on an eminent person than it
does on a common one. Since you say that
Christ took upon himself all our transgres-
sions just as if he himself had committed them
all, I do not see how he could satisfy divine
justice without bearing all the penalties that
the divine law demanded that we suffer.
There is no distinction of persons with God,
particularly when there is no room left for
him to exercise his mercy. What else do we
have here but partiality, since it is a question
of imposing a penalty by the rule of justice, or
rather, of absolute severity?
Sed, ne longis protrahatur haec disputatio,
concedamus, personae dignitate poenae
aestimationem augeri. Num ita augetur, ut
quidvis dignissima persona poenarum det,
poenas quantumlibet graves, quas mins digna
vel etiam indignissima persona subire tenetur,
omnino aequet? Numquid, si vir princeps unius
horulae aut dieculae exilio vel carcere multetur,
idem erit, ac si homo plebeius perpetuo exilio aut
carcere multatus fuisset? [266] Quid, si princeps
ille vir ideo brevissimae illi poenae subiiciatur, ut
postmodum ad supremam gloriam, & ea,
21
quam
antea habebat, infinitis partibus maiorem,
evehatur? Poenae, ut vos eas appellatis, quas
nostrm caussa pertulit Christus, quamvis per se
gravissimae existimari debeant, tamen, si cum iis
comparentur, quas nos meriti eramus, mult sunt
leviores, qum unius diei aut horae exilium, si
cum perpetuo exilio comparetur. Brevissimum
exilium, exilium est; nec a perpetuo differt, nisi
temporis longinquitate.
So as not to belabor the point, let us admit
that the valuation of the penalty increases
with the dignity of the person. Is the value so
increased that, no matter what percentage of
the penalty the worthy person gives, it is com-
pletely equivalent, regardless of how serious
the punishment would have been if endured
by a less worthy or even a worthless person?
If an eminent person is punished with banish-
ment or imprisonment for a mere hour or day,
is that the same as if an ordinary person had
been punished with unending banishment or
imprisonment? [266] What if that eminent
man were subjected to this brief punishment
in order to be raised afterwards to the highest
glory, infinitely greater than he had before?
The so-called punishments that Christ
endured for our sakes, however serious in
themselves, are nonetheless relatively much
less serious in comparison with what we de-
served to endure than the banishment of a
day or an hour is in comparison to continual
banishment. The most brief banishment is
nonetheless a banishment. It differs not by an
endless duration but only by a duration of
time.
Poenae autem, quas Christus subiit, non
longinquitate temporis tantm ab iis, quas nobis
iur infligere potuisset Deus, differunt, sed etiam
qualitate. Quamvis enim non defuerint, qui,
Christum damnatorum poenas passum fuisse,
affirmare sint ausi, explosa tamen est sententia
ista; merit quidem, cum propter alia multa, quae
ad eam refellendam afferri solent, tum maxim
propter hoc, qud de divina gratia & auxilio
desperatio, quae propria damnatorum est poena,
qum longissim semper a Christo abfuit.
Conquestus quidem est Christus, se a Deo
derelictum fuisse, sed non propterea id fecit, qud
vel minimum de eius ope & benignitate
desperaret. id enim vel cogitare quidem maxim
impium censeri debet. Verm ita locutus est
Christus, ut ad opem sibi ferendam, hoc est ad
liberationem a cruciatibus, & morte dandam
Deum adduceret.
But the punishments that Christ endured not
only differ in terms of duration from what
God could have justly inflicted on us, but they
are also qualitatively different. Even though
there are those who dare to affirm that Christ
suffered the penalties of the damned, that
view should be rejected. Besides the many
usual arguments employed against such an
idea, we should reject it especially because
Christ did not at all experience the despairing
of divine grace and help, which is the proper
penalty of the damned. Christ indeed com-
plained loudly that he had been abandoned
by God, but this was not because he even
slightly despaired of God's power to help or
of his kindness. To even think such a thought
is the height of blasphemy! No, Christ spoke
in this way to influence God to come to his
aid, that is, to grant him freedom from his
torments and from death.
quod si quis rect percipere velit, legat psalmum
22. unde ea verba Christi de Deo conquerentis
sumpta sunt. Ubi sub Davidis, qui in magna
aliqua calamitate constitutus erat, persona, qum
ex animo Christus in media morte, mediisque
cruciatibus Deo confideret, eiusque opem iam
iam praesentem intueretur, apertissim
explicatur. Id quod ipse Christus abundantissim
verbis suis comprobavit, cum non solm moriens
in manus patris commendavit, sive deposuit
spiritum suum: sed etiam, iam cruci affixus, latroni
eius misericordiam & benignitatem imploranti, &
se in paradiso omnino futurum dixit, & illi eandem
felicitatem constanter polliceri non dubitavit.
Anyone who would understand the matter
correctly should read Psalm 22, from which
Christ's words of complaint about God are
cited. Christ here speaks under the cover of
David, who had been in some great distress.
It is evident from Christ's words that he was
trusting in God from his heart, in the midst of
his tortures and death, and was contemplat-
ing his already present help. Christ himself
amply proved this by his words. First of all,
he commended or entrusted his spirit into the
hands of the Father while he was dying. But
also, while still affixed to the cross, he said to
the thief who was beseeching his mercy and
kindness that he (Christ) was certainly going
to be in paradise, and he did not hesitate to
promise that same happiness to the thief.
Poenae igitur, quas Christus sustinuit, nullam
habent ad poenas, quas nos pendere tenebamur,
proportionem. Et cert si finiti ad infinitum, ut dici
solet, nulla est proportio, quae'nam poenarum
Therefore, the penalties that Christ endured
are not in proportion to the penalties that we
were obliged to endure. And certainly if, as
the saying goes, there is no proportion be-
Christi, quae tempore finitae fuere, ad poenas
nostris peccatis debitas [267] numquam tempore
finiendas proportio esse potest?
tween the finite and the infinite, there is no
proportion between Christ's punishments,
limited as they were in time, to the [267] never
ending punishments we owed for our sins.
Post poenas autem illas, eiusmodi gloriam, ob
eas ipsas poenas, est Christus consecutus, quam
nec antea homo ille revera habuerat umquam,
nec humana mens capere, aut lingua satis
exprimere queat. Ut, etiamsi ea, quae passus est
Christus, poenae nomine passus esset, poenae
tamen simpliciter appellari non deberent, sed
potis labores praemia antecedentes.
Besides, after those punishments and because
of them, Christ obtained a kind of glory which
that human being truly did not have before,
which the human mind cannot grasp or
words adequately express. Even though
Christ's sufferings are called punishment,
they should not simply be called punishments
but are more properly called the hardships
before the rewards.
Quid ergo hc personae dignitas efficere potuit,
cum non modo nulla fit Christi poenarum ad
poenas nostris delictis debitas proportio, sed,
quas vos dicitis Christi poenas, non ver &
propri sint poenae?
Therefore, the dignity of the person can be of
no help here, since not only was there no pro-
portion between the penalties of Christ and
the penalties we deserved for our sins, but
also because the sufferings you call the
punishments of Christ are not punishments in
a literal and proper sense.
Qud si, quod ad proportionem attinet, dicas
nullam similiter esse nostri ad Christum
proportionem, quippe cum nos puri homines
simus, ipse ver etiam aeternus Deus, & ob eam
rem velis, quamlibet, levissimam Christi poenam
cuilibet nostrm gravissimae aequiparari posse;
Respondeo, si id verum esset, non opus futurum
fuisse, ut Christus tot acerbos cruciatus, & tam
diram mortem sustineret: & Deum iniustitiae, aut
immanitatis a vobis tacit insimulari, qui, cum,
levissim aliqu poen de Christo sumpt, suae
iustitiae plen satisfacere posset, ipsum tam
atrociter excarnificari voluerit, sed hac de re
iterum videndum erit.
You might counter this argument by again
drawing upon the dissimilarity between
Christ and us, saying that Christ, being
eternal God, is completely different than us
mere humans. And for that reason you
would contend that however light the punish-
ments of Christ, they are reckoned as equiva-
lent to our punishments, however heavy. I
say in response that if your contention were
true, Christ need not have suffered such bitter
tortures and such a horrible death. Even
though God could have made full satisfaction
to his justice by exacting some extremely light
penalty from Christ, he wished to cruelly
torment him instead. You have, in effect, ac-
cused God of injustice and savagery. But we
will have more to say about this issue later.
Satis, ut arbitror, demonstratum est, Iesu Christi
personae dignitatem efficere non potuisse, ut,
quamvis ipse eadem minim passus fuerit, quae
I believe I have sufficiently shown that the
dignity of Jesus Christ's person could not
cause his sufferings, which were less than the
penalties we should have suffered, to be re-
unus ex nobis pati tenebatur, quae tamen passus
est, tanti aestimentur, ut pretium illorum aequent.
Nunc de vi illa quam Adversarii afferunt, infinita,
eorundem, quae passus est Christus dispiciamus.
garded as of equivalent value to what each
one of us was bound to suffer. Now let us
turn our attention to the question of the
supposed infinite power of Christ's sufferings,
which my opponents have brought forward
as evidence.
Certum est nulla alia ratione posse vim istam
infinitam iis, quae passus est Christus attribui, nisi
quia aeternus Deus sit. Sed Christus non potuit,
quatenus aeternus Deus, quidquam pati. Ergo ad
infinitam vim eius perpessionibus tribuendam nihil
momenti habet, qud Christus aeternus Deus fit.
Neque enim satis est, Christum, qui passus fuit,
aeternum Deum fuisse: nisi etiam, quatenus Deus
aeternus est, fuerit passus.
The only basis on which to ascribe infinite
power to Christ's sufferings would be that he
is eternal God. But Christ, in so far as he was
eternal God, could not experience any suffer-
ing. Therefore, the fact that Christ is eternal
God cannot bestow his infinite power to the
sufferings. To give infinite power to the suf-
ferings it is not enough simply for Christ to be
eternal God: he must also suffer in so far as he
is eternal God.
Aiunt sacrarum litterarum plerique interpretes, sic
Christum ex humana divinaque natura constare,
ut homo ex corpore, & animo constat. Et
quemadmodum in homine alias esse corporis
actiones, alias animi, agnoscimus, Sic ipsi in
Christo alias humanae naturae actiones, alias
[268] divinae agnoscunt. Compertum est autem,
quamvis idem homo, constans ex animo & corpo-
re, sit, qui aliquid agit, aliam tamen vim esse
actionum corporis, aliam actionum animi: &
multas corporis actiones sive operationes, quia
omnino corporis propriae sunt, nihil prorsus ab
animo sive mente mutari, nec ulla vi magis
praeditas censeri, qum si ab animante animo &
mente destituto, eadem fieri contingat. Nam qua
maiore, obsecro, vi praedita per se est in homine,
exempli caus, cibi & potionis sumptio, qum in
reliquis animantibus?
Many biblical expositors say that Christ was
composed of a divine and human nature, just
as a human being is composed of body and
soul. And just as in the case of a human being
we acknowledge that some operations are of
the body and others of the soul, even so these
commentators acknowledge some operations
in Christ to be of the human nature and others
[268] of the divine nature. Although the same
individual, consisting of body and soul, is the
one who performs an action, nevertheless the
power behind the actions of the body is one
thing, and the power of the soul's actions is
another. Many actions or operations of the
body, because they are completely peculiar to
the body, cannot be influenced at all by the
soul or mind. Nor can such operations of the
body be regarded as furnished with any
greater power than if that same action could
take place apart from a thinking soul and
mind. Now I ask, for the sake of example,
what greater power does the consumption of
food and drink provide, per se, to humans
than it provides to any other living creature?
Quod autem de actionibus Christi, respectu
Drawing again upon the analogy of the
actions of Christ's divine and human natures
divinae & humanae naturae, per comparationem
animi & corporis humani, diximus: idem de
passionibus (quas vocant) omnino dicendum est.
Immo mult magis, cum animi quidem passiones
non mins, qum corporis dentur: divinae autem
naturae passiones nullae penitus dari possint,
sed humanae naturae tantum. Quocirca, si
plaga, puta, hominis corpori inflicta, nullam per se
vim maiorem habere potest, qum si eadem
bestiae alicui inflicta fuisset, mult magis quicquid
passus est Christus nullam maiorem vim per se
habere potest, quam si quilibet purus homo idem
passus esset.
with the relationship between body and soul
in a human being, we must arrive at the same
conclusion concerning the so-called pas-
sion. In the case of Christ's passion the con-
clusion is all the more forceful, since while
both the body and the soul can suffer, the
divine nature cannot suffer at all; only the hu-
man nature can suffer. If a blow, inflicted on
the body of a human being, has no greater
power per se than if that same blow had been
inflicted on some beast, it is much more true
that whatever Christ suffered could have in
itself no greater power than if some mere man
had experienced the identical suffering.
Qud si non per se, sed ex personae dignitate
Christi perpessiones aestimari velis; iam perso-
nae dignitatem eam vim, qua ad satisfactionem
istam peragendam opus fuisset, iis, quae passus
est Christus, conciliare non potuisse, probatum
fuit. In homine si corpus affligitur, animus quoque
persaepe afflictatur. at divina natura ex naturae
humanae afflictionibus nec afflictari, nec angi, nec
commoveri, nec denique ullo modo ipsarum parti-
ceps ver esse potest.
If you would base the value of Christ's
sufferings on the dignity of his person and not
on their intrinsic worth, I have already shown
that the dignity of the person could not effect
the power required to make satisfaction based
on what Christ suffered. If the body of a
human being is injured, the soul is often
injured along with it. But the divine nature
cannot be injured, troubled or disturbed by
the afflictions of the human nature, nor can it
be genuinely involved in such disturbances in
any way.
Vos ipsi divinam naturam in Christo non aliter,
qum per communicationem idiomatum passam
fuisse confitemini. Nec enim usque ade vos
opinio ista satisfactionis excaecavit, ut divinam
naturam ver pati non potuisse, non perspicu
cernatis. Ergo per communicationem quoque
idiomatum, non autem ver, vis illa infinita, quam
ex divina natura proficisci arbitramini, Christi
perpessionibus inerit; & ita non ver sed per
idiomatum communicationem (si mod id alioqui
fieri potuit) divinae iustitiae poenas nostris
peccatis debitas exsolvit Christus.
You yourself admit that Christ's divine nature
suffered only through the communication of
attributes. Apparently your doctrine of satis-
faction has not blinded you to such an extent
that you cannot clearly see that the divine na-
ture cannot literally suffer. Therefore, that
infinite power which you claim is supplied by
the divine nature does not literally belong to
Christ's sufferings through the commu-
nication of attributes, either. And so, Christ
did not pay the deserved penalties for our
sins to divine justice in a literal sense but only
through the communication of attributes (as-
suming, for the moment, that such payment
were possible in other respects).
Haec est scilicet, egregia salutis nobis per
Christum partae ratio, quam nobis commentis
estis; ut non ver, sed per quendam loquendi
modum, a poenis [269] delictorum nostrorum
liberati simus. Et cert, nisi aliam salutis nostrae
rationem ineamus, quemadmodum si ea vis
perpessionum Christi ex divina natura proficisci
debuit, verbotenus tantm divinae iustitiae id,
quod nos illi debebamus, persolutum est, re
autem ipsa nihil solutum fuit; sic verbotenus
tantm servabimur: re autem ipsa in aeternum
condemnabimur.
Here, then, is the excellent way of salvation
through Christ, which you have fabricated for
us: we have not literally been freed from the
penalties [269] of our sins, but we have only
been freed in a manner of speaking! If the
power of Christ's sufferings is derived from
his divine nature, then the penalties we owed
to divine justice were paid in name only,
meaning that in reality nothing was paid.
This means that, unless we come up with
another way of being saved, we will be saved
in name only, while in reality we will be
eternally condemned!
Adhaec fingamus, si placet, divinam naturam in
Christo ver passam fuisse, num, obsecro, quia
divina natura, hoc est, Deus infinitae virtutis est,
idcirco quaecumque in ipso fiunt, infinitae sunt
virtutis? Sic enim plerique ex vestris argumentari
solent. Maxima omnino est in ista ratiocinatione
fallacia.
Suppose, if you will, that the divine nature in
Christ truly suffered. Simply because the
divine naturethat is, Godis of infinite
worth, it does not follow that whatever opera-
tions are immanent in him
22
are likewise of
infinite worth. Even though this is how many
of your number like to reason, this assump-
tion is the greatest fallacy in this whole line of
argument.
Perinde est enim, ac si quis diceret, quia Deus
infinit sapiens est, idcirco quaecumque in ipso
fiunt, habent sapientiam infinitam. Ex quo
concludi posset, (si mod Deum ipsum in Christo
ver passum fuisse velimus) Christi perpessiones
non infinita virtute tantm sed infinita quoque
sapientia praeditas esse. Quo nihil ineptis dic-
tum excogitari potest. Nec ver in ipsas Christi
perpessiones, magis qum sapientia, cadere
potest ea virtus, seu vis eius generis, cuius illa
est, quam in Deo infinitam esse omnes
confitemur,
It is just as if someone should say that because
God is infinitely wise, whatever operations
are immanent in him possess infinite wisdom.
From this we could conclude (assuming that
God himself truly suffered in Christ) that
Christ's sufferings are not only endowed with
infinite worth, but also with infinite wisdom.
But a more ridiculous statement is hard to
imagine. Worth or power of the type that we
all admit to be infinite in God could not occur
in Christ's sufferings any more than wisdom
could.
&, si caderet, non id efficeretur, quod quaerimus.
Non enim quaerimus, ut ea, quae Christus
passus est, omnia possint, quemadmodum Deus
omnia potest (haec est enim vis illa Dei infinita)
sed ut infiniti sint pretii. Alia igitur argumentatione
utendum est: hac, videlicet; Deus infiniti pretii est:
Even if infinite worth or power could occur in
Christ's sufferings, it would still not effect
what we are after. For the question here is not
whether Christ's sufferings can accomplish
everything, just as God can do everything (for
that is what we mean when we speak of God's
Christi igitur perpessiones, utpote in ipso Deo
factae, infiniti pretii sunt. Sed rursus haec
argumentatio nullius ipsa pretii est. Posset
fortassis huiusmodi ratiocinatio aliquod pondus
habere, in iis, quae perpetu & naturaliter in re
insunt, Sed in iis, quae circa rem versantur, & ad
tempus & adsunt, & absunt, quales sunt
passiones, levissima censenda est.
infinite power). Rather, the question is
whether Christ's sufferings possess unlimited
value. Consequently, your argument ought to
run as follows: God is of infinite value.
Therefore, Christ's sufferings, in as much as
experienced by God himself, are of infinite
value. But again, this argumentation itself is
of no value. Reasoning of this sort might
carry some weight when applied to properties
that continuously and naturally inhere in an
object. But such argumentation is worthless
when applied to transitory properties, since
they are present at one time and absent at
another. Sufferings fall into this category.
Si aliquas alias in Deum passiones revera cadere
constaret, exemplo id in ipso Deo planissimum
fieret. Sed quando exemplo uti non possumus,
similitudine utamur. Videmus igitur Dei
operationes, quantumvis maximi, non tamen
infiniti pretii esse. Operationis autem nomine non
ipsum operandi actum, sed opus ipsum intelligo;
quemadmodum in hac quaestione nostra
Passionis nomine non ipsum patiendi affectum,
sed id, quod persona patitur, intelligendum est.
Quaerimus [270] enim, an ea, quae passus est
Christus infiniti pretii sint. Iam ver, si Dei opera
universa singulatim consideremus, nullum ex
ipsis est, quantumvis magni pretii, quod infiniti sit.
Nam neque angeli ipsi infiniti pretii censeri
debent, prescriptos enim quosdam fines, ac
terminos habent eorum, propter quae pretiosi (ut
ita dicam) habendi sunt. Nec infinitatem pretii
aliquam in re ulla comperies, praeterqum in ipso
Deo, & in iis, quae in ipso naturaliter (si ita loqui
fas est) & perpetu insunt. Quocirca, etiamsi
Passionis nomine hoc loco ipsum patiendi af-
fectum intelligere vellemus, passiones divinas
nihilominus infiniti pretii non esse, concludendum
foret. Is enim affectus nec perpetu, nec
naturaliter ullo modo in Deo inesse potest.
If one would try to prove that some other
sufferings truly take place in God, the stron-
gest form of proof would come from an exam-
ple in God himself. But when we cannot give
an example we employ a comparison. For
example, the works of God, however great,
are still not of infinite value. By the term
work I do not understand the very act of
working, but the work itself. Even so, in the
question before us, the term passion should
not be understood to refer to the feeling of
suffering itself, but that which the person suf-
fers. The question here [270] is whether
Christ's sufferings are of infinite worth. If we
consider all of God's works one by one, we
will find that none of them are of infinite
worth, however valuable they may be. Even
the angels are not of infinite worth, since they
have certain ordained ends and limits, from
which they derive their value, as it were. It is
only in God himself, and in whatever
naturally and continually inheres in him (if
one can speak in this way about God) that
you will find infinite value. Therefore, even if
we wish to understand the term passion in
this context to refer to the very feeling of suf-
fering, we still could not conclude that the di-
vine passions are of infinite value. That is
because such sufferings do not inhere in God
either continually or naturally.
Sed fingamus praetera, non solm divinam
naturam ver pati potuisse, verm etiam infiniti
pretii eius perpessiones esse. Nonne & id quo-
que, quod unusquisquenostrm propter delicta
sua pati tenebatur, infinitum quiddam erat?
Nonne mortem aeternam, & sic tempore
numquam finiendam poenam, quilibet ex nobis
pendere tenebatur? Et, si ad summum illud ius
divinae severitatis, ut hc faciendum videtur,
potis qum ad praescriptam legem rem
revocare, atque expendere velimus, nonne
poenam, ut tempore non definitam, sic pretio
infinitam pendere tenemur, cum Deum rem infiniti
pretii offenderimus?
But now let us suppose that not only could
the divine nature literally suffer, but even that
its sufferings are of infinite value. Is it not al-
so true that each of us was bound to offer
infinite suffering for our transgressions? Each
of us was obliged to pay eternal death, which
is a never ending punishment. If, as seems to
be the case here, the standard of punishment
should be the highest legal right of divine
rigor rather than the prescribed law, then we
are bound to pay a penalty of unlimited time
and value, since the God whom we have
offended is of infinite worth.
Qud si infinitatem temporis cui iur obnoxii non
essemus, quippe quorum delicta temporaria
fuissent, loco infinitatis pretii, quam debebamus,
sed solvendo non eramus, in unoquoque nostrm
successisse dicamus; cur vicissim pretii
infinitatem pro temporis infinitate, si ab hoc reatu
per poenarum solutionem ab alio pro nobis
faciendam liberandi sumus, unusquisque
nostrm, quando per se non potest, per alium
solvere non teneretur?
Perhaps we might say that the infinity of time
which could not rightly be demanded of us
(since our transgressions were only tem-
porary) takes the place of the infinite price
which each of us owed but were unable to
pay. Assuming that we may be freed from
our guilt through payment made by someone
else on our behalf, why was not each one of us
bound to pay an infinity of price in place of an
infinity of time through someone else, to the
degree that we could not do so on our own?
Infinitas igitur pretii, quae in Christi
perpessionibus, quia divina natura passa fuisset,
reperiri posset, pro uno quopiam persolvi
potuisset, & unus tantummodo ex nobis, eius vi,
mortis aeternae reatu liberari. Siquidem, ut
dictum est, quilibet ex nobis per se eam pretii
infinitatem debebat. Quare totidem pretii
poenarum infinitates existere opus fuisset, quot
nos omnes sumus, non unicam tantm, si omnes,
id per alium solvendo, quod nos debebamus, eo
nexu liberandi fuissemus. [271]
In that case, then, the infinite value which is
allegedly found in Christ's sufferings, because
the divine nature suffered, could have paid
for one person at most. And so, only one of
us could have been freed from our liability to
eternal death by his power. This conclusion is
true if, as it was said, any of us were liable, on
our own, to pay an infinite price. Conse-
quently, it would be necessary for there to be
just as many prices of infinite value paid as
there are people for whom a payment is to be
made. Just one infinite price would not be
enough if all of us are to be freed from our
liability through a transaction based on a pay-
ment made through another for what we our-
selves were owing. [271]
Iam ver, si rursus, ratione lict apert
reclamante, fingas, infinitatem pretii, quam Christi
perpessionibus divina natura conciliet, tantam
esse, ut pro omnibus pretii poenarum infinitatibus,
quae a nobis persolvi debuissent, satis censeri
debeat; necesse est etiam, ut fingas, quamlibet
Christi perpessionem idem efficere potuisse. id
quod aliqui etiam ex Doctoribus scholasticis (quos
vocant) confinxere, dicentes, unicam Iesu Christi
sanguinis guttam ad humanum genus
redimendum satis superque futuram fuisse.
Quod si verum est, non video, ut paullo ante dixi,
quomodo Deus aut inscitiae, aut immanitatis
excusari queat; qui, cum nobis, qum levissim
Christum affligendo, salutem dare posset, eum
tam dirae atque execrabili morti, quam gravissima
& innumerabilia mala antecesserunt, subiicere
sponte voluerit.
Now, you might assume, quite contrary to
reason, that we should regard the infinite
value which accrues to the sufferings of Christ
through the divine nature as sufficient to
cover all of the infinities of punishment which
each of us ought to have paid. But then you
must also assume that any suffering of Christ
could bring about this same effect. Some of
the so-called Scholastic doctors have
contrived just such a doctrine. They say that
one drop of Christ's blood would be suffi-
cientand more than sufficientto redeem
the human race. But if that is true, I fail to see,
as I remarked recently, how God could escape
the charge of either ignorance or savageness.
After all: when he could have given salvation
by subjecting Christ to only minimal suffer-
ing, he chose instead to inflict a horrible and
accursed death on him, which came after
serious and innumerable evils.
Nam quod aliqui ex vobis aiunt, ex firma Dei
voluntate, sine sanguinis effusione nullam
remissionem fieri, & decretum hoc divinum nullo
pacto mutari posse; id primm, ut mox videbimus,
falsissimum est. Deinde etiamsi verum esset,
necesse quidem fuisset, Christum mori, atque
ade cruenta morte (id enim sibi vult sanguinis
effusio) sed, ut tam detestabili mortis genere
occideretur, ut perpetu, dum vixit, tot malis
undique circundaretur, ut ante ipsam mortem tot
gravissimis animi angustiis premeretur, denique,
ut moriens, prae supplicii atrocitate, se a Deo
derelictum fuisse, magna voce clamare
compelleretur; haec ver fieri nihil prorsus
cogebat.
Some of you argue that, on the basis of God's
unshakable will, there can be no remission
without the shedding of blood; this divine
decree cannot be changed.
23
First of all, as we
shall soon see, the notion that God cannot
remit sins without the shedding of blood is
absolutely false. Second, if this axiom were
true, then it would have indeed been nec-
essary not only for Christ to die but even to
die a bloody death; the shedding of blood
obviously requires a bloody death. But the
whole time he lived he was surrounded by
evil from all sides, so that even before the
death itself he was oppressed with intense
distress of soul. And while dying, in the face
of such a barbarous punishment, he was
forced to cry out with a loud voice that he had
been abandoned by God. Such cruelty was
completely uncalled for.
Sed falsissimum est, ut diximus, Deum
decrevisse, ut sine sanguinis effusione nulla fieret
remissio. Quod enim ab auctore ad Heb.
scriptum est, sine sanguinis effusione non fieri
remissionem, ex qua sola sacrarum litterarum
sententia illud axioma isti excerpere potuerunt,
non eam vim habet, quam ipsi putant. Neque
enim voluit dicere scriptor ille divinus, Deum
peccatum nullum remittere, nisi sanguinis effusio
fiat: sed, ut ex ipso verborum contextu valde
perspicuum est, in lege Mosis nullam peccatorum
expiationem concedi, in qua sanguinis effusio non
interveniat. ut hac in parte per Christum factam
peccatorum nostrorum expiationem illis Mosaicis
similem esse ostenderet: & illas, tamquam
umbram, hanc ver, tamquam corpus, fuisse
declararet.
In any case, it is absolutely false, as we said,
that God decreed that remission cannot occur
without the shedding of blood. It is true that
the writer to the Hebrews states that without
the shedding of blood no remission can take
place, and it is from this sentence alone of
holy Scripture that they can deduce their axi-
om. But this text does not have the meaning
they suppose. That divinely inspired writer
did not wish to say that God remits no sin
unless the shedding of blood occurs. The
context makes it quite clear: under the law of
Moses, expiation of sins cannot take place un-
less the shedding of blood occurs first. To this
extent, then, the writer shows that the expia-
tion of our sins made thorough Christ is
similar to those of the Mosaic law: he is
declaring that, just as those Mosaic expiations
were the shadow, Christ's is the substance.
Atqui, ut supr lat explicatum fuit, expiationes
illae ignorantiis tantummodo, & levioribus
quibusdam [272] peccatis decretae erat.
Graviora autem delicta (quae quidem
remittebantur) nulla sanguinis effusione
interveniente, poenitentia & vitae emendatione,
propter ingentem Dei benignitatem, expiabantur.
As we explained extensively above, the
Mosaic expiations were decreed only for
certain inadvertent and less serious [272] sins.
However, more serious transgressions, which
indeed were remitted, required penitence and
emendation of life. God remitted these more
serious offenses out of his vast kindness, with-
out previous shedding of blood.
Adde, qud hoc ipsum decretum, qud scilicet
sine sanguinis effusione nulla peccatorum
remissio fieret (si mod res ita se haberet) satis
ostenderet, in Christi singulis perpessionibus,
propter divinam naturam, vim infinitam ad peccata
expianda, id est, pro ipsis satisfaciendum
nequaquam fuisse. Cur enim, si quaelibet Christi
perpessio istam vim habitura erat, id decrevisset
Deus, & carissimum filium, sine necessitate ulla,
cruentae morti obiecisset?
Besides, assuming for the moment that God
did decree that there is no remission apart
from the shedding of blood, such a decree
would be proof positive that the individual
sufferings of Christ did not at all possess infi-
nite power from the divine nature for
expiating (i.e., making satisfaction for) sins. If
any suffering of Christ would possess infinite
power, there would have been no reason for
God to have made such a decree, thereby un-
necessarily exposing his most dear son to a
bloody death.
quandoquidem caeteras sanguinis ad peccata
expianda effusiones a Christi sanguinis effusione,
The other instances of shedding blood to
expiate sins must depend on Christ's shed-
per quam solam ver universa ab orbe condito
peccata expiata fuisse contenditis, omnino,
tamquam umbram, a corpore pendre necesse
est: non autem ipsam ab illis ullo pacto. Itaque
manifestum est, non mod cum rei ipsius natura
pugnare, sed ab omni verisimilitudine penitus
abesse, ut natura divina eam Christi
perpessionibus vim aut tribuerit, aut tribuere
potuerit, quae ad divinae iustitiae pro peccatis
nostris satisfaciendum opus fuerat.
ding of blood, just as the shadow depends on
the reality. You say that through him alone
were all sins truly expiated, from the founda-
tion of the world. But the reality does not
depend on the shadows in any way. There-
fore, it is plain that not only is it inherently
impossible, but it is also improbable that the
divine nature either bestowed or could be-
stow the kind of power on Christ's sufferings
which would be necessary to make satisfac-
tion for our sins to divine justice.
Sed age, concedamus, non solm divinam
naturam pati potuisse, & ob eam rem Christi
perpessiones infiniti pretii fuisse, verm etiam ita
infiniti pretii fuisse, ut ab omnibus nobis, qui
singuli infinitatem aliquam poenarum debebamus,
exigendas poenas aequare, ac superare
potuerint; quid tandem efficietur? Cert, ut pro
nobis satisfiat, istud adhuc satis non est.
But, very well, let us not only grant that the
divine nature could suffer, thereby making
Christ's sufferings of infinite value, but also
that they were of such an infinite value that
they could be equal or even greater than the
infinite penalties which each one of us were
individually bound to pay. What good will
this do? He still could not make satisfaction
for us.
Nam tametsi, ut error vester manifestis
appareat, vobis in hac disputatione id, quod
evidentissim falsum est, concessi, posse scilicet
unum pro alio poenas corporales pendere;
animadvertendum est tamen eum qui pro alio
poenas corporales solvat, eiusdem saltem gene-
ris, & naturae, cuius ille est, pro quo eas solvit,
esse debere. Id quod san in confesso est; & ob
eam ipsam caussam, ut Christus, qui pro nobis
corporales poenas, ut vos putatis soluturus erat,
verus esset homo, necesse fuisse, vos ipsi
contenditis. Cum autem dicimus, eum, qui pro
alio poenas corporales solvat, eiusdem naturae
esse debere, cuius ille est, pro quo eas solvit,
certum est, id per seipsum satis non esse, nisi
etiam, quatenus eiusdem naturae est, eas omnes
exsolvat. [273] Nihil ergo ad istam satisfactionem
pertinet, qud divina natura in Christo aliqua
ratione passa fuerit. Non enim a natura divina
ullo modo, sed ab humana tantm divinae
I will go ahead and grant you in this disputa-
tion what is plainly false, in order to bring
your error into greater relief: I will grant you
that one person could pay bodily punish-
ments for another. Even conceding this, it
must still be admitted that the one who pays
bodily penalties for another must at least be of
the same kind and nature as the one for
whom that person pays those penalties. You
yourself acknowledge this quite correctly, and
use this truth to argue that Christ had to have
been a real human being in order to pay, as
you think, the bodily penalties for us. But it is
not enough simply for the person to be of the
same nature as the one for whom that person
pays. That person must also offer the pay-
ment in so far as he is of the same nature.
[273] Consequently, even if the divine nature
in Christ could suffer somehow, it could not
contribute toward satisfaction. Satisfaction to
divine justice had to be made by the human
nature alone, not by the divine nature in any
iustitiae satisfaciendum erat.
way.
Quod etiam valere videtur ad vim illam
excludendam, quam naturam divinam, cum
interim ipsa nihil prorsus pateretur, humanae
naturae perpessionibus dedisse opinati estis. Si
enim ea infinita vis non ab ipsa humana natura
proficiscitur, sed a divina illius perpessionibus
tribuitur: non video, quomodo divinae iustitiae
satisfieri potuerit; quae non tantm, ut natura
humana ipsa satisfaciat, requirit: sed etiam, ut
satisfactionis vis ab humana natura proveniat,
postulare omnino videtur.
This fact would seem to rule out the power
which you allege that the divine nature
(which itself experienced no suffering) be-
stowed on the sufferings of the human nature.
For if that infinite power does not arise from
the human nature but is bestowed on the
sufferings by his divine nature, I fail to see
how satisfaction could have been made to di-
vine justice. Divine justice not only requires
that human nature itself should make satisfac-
tion, but divine justice also utterly demands
that the power of satisfaction should come
from human nature.
Similitudine aliqua res melis explicabitur. Si quis
ob aliquod delictum oneri alicui propriis humeris
vehendo ex lege destinatus fit: non satisfiet legi,
si is propriis quidem humeris onus impositum
habeat: sed, dum ipsum vehit, alius fit, qui vel ipsi
oneri manum admoveat, vel ipsum istum, qui
vehit, interim aliqua ratione fulciat, eique
auxilietur. Sic, cum humanae naturae nostrorum
delictorum poenae subeundae essent: non est
divinae legi, quae id statuit, satisfactum, si
humana quidem natura eas subiit, interim tamen,
ut eas ferre posset, a divina iugiter sustentata, &
confirmata fuit. Sed neque etiam legi satisfactum
revera fuerit, si is, qui onus ferre debet, alicuius
cibi, aut potionis mirabilis virtutis sumptione, vel
alia quapiam nova & adventicia ratione mirific
roboretur.
An analogy will clarify this. Suppose the law
requires someone to carry a burden on his
own shoulders as punishment for some
infraction of the law. If the person indeed has
the burden placed on his shoulders but at the
same time receives help from another person
who comes along and lends assistance, either
by bearing some of the weight or by offering
support in any way, then satisfaction is not
made to the law. Likewise, if the human
nature indeed suffered but was at the same
time continually sustained by the divine
nature so that it could bear the punishment,
then satisfaction was not made to the divine
law, which determined the penalties to be en-
dured by the human nature. Nor will satis-
faction have genuinely been made to the law
if the one who should bear the burden is
helped extraordinarily by consuming some
food or drink that produces superhuman
strength, or by any other source introduced
from without.
Lex enim, quae poenam illam decrevit, quaenam
soleant vires hominis esse, diligenter expendit; &
illis eiusmodi onus ferendum dedit, quod, prout
delicti gravitas requirere est visa, hominem, quem
punire voluit, affligere posset. Quae vires si
The law that decreed the punishment careful-
ly takes into account the typical strength of a
human being, and metes out punishment to
harm the offender as the seriousness of the
crime warrants. If the offender's strength is
mirum in modum augeantur, iam eam afflictionem
non sentiet homo ille, quam lex ipsum sentire
voluit. Et idcirco iustus iudex numquam permittet,
ut delinquens eo pacto, quo dictum est, roboretur
& fulciatur. Quin etiam, si contigerit, eum, qui
deliquerit, tantis viribus praeditum esse, quae
consuetas & communes aliorum hominum vires
long superent, ade ut onus vehendum, quod
caeteris gravissimum esse soleat, illi non
admodum grave futurum fit: quando vires illius
minuere non potest, seu potis non debet: onus
augebit, & legis non verba, sed mentem
spectabit; quae, ut is, qui deliquisset, tamquam
[274] sui delicti poenam, illius oneris gravitatem
maximam experiretur, cavere voluit.
miraculously increased, then the offender
does not yet feel the affliction that the law
intends. Consequently, a fair judge would
never allow a guilty person to be strength-
ened and supported in this way. But suppose
that the transgressor is furnished with ex-
traordinary strength that far and away ex-
ceeds the strength people typically possess, so
that the burden which is heavy for everyone
else is not particularly heavy for this
individual. Since the force of the burden
cannotor rather, should notbe dimin-
ished, the fair judge, complying with the spirit
of the law rather than its letter, will increase
the burden. The judge will do this because
the intent of the law is that the transgressor
should experience the weight of the burden
that the transgression demands. [274]
Cautum est lege divina, ut humana natura (sic
enim ut vestris commentis meum sermonem
accommodem, & praesenti disputationi inserviam,
loquendum est) propter sua in Deum delicta
quibusdam certis poenis subiiciatur, quas illi
long gravissimas esse voluit, & delictorum
gravitati non absimiles. Si haec humana natura
aliqua nova atque adventicia ratione ita roboretur,
ut eas poenas mult, vel aliquant etiam leviores
experiatur, qum legis propositum fuit, ipsi legi
neutiquam satisfactum erit. Atqui hoc in Christo
evenisse si vera est sententia vestra, necesse
est. Nam, cum poenae naturae humanae delictis
decretae ei mortem aeternam conciliare deberent,
& ita qum gravissim fieri poterat, ipsam
affligere, in Christo tamen, quem universas has
poenas perpessum esse vultis,
The divine law provides that human nature,
on account of its sins against God, was subject
to certain definite penalties, whose weight he
wanted human nature to feel to the full, just
as the transgressions call for. (I have
expressed myself in this way, accommodating
myself to your fabrications, simply to advance
the present argument.) If this human nature
is strengthened from a source outside itself, so
that it experienced the punishment much
lessor even somewhat lessthan the law
required, the human nature will not have
made satisfaction to the law in any way. But
your view demands that Christ experienced
less punishment than our sins required. The
penalty decreed against the transgressions of
human nature was eternal death. Even
though this human nature ought to have been
afflicted with this extremely serious penalty,
Christ nevertheless did not experience this in
any waynotwithstanding your assertion
that he endured all the penalties for our trans-
gressions.
propter divinae, ut vobis placet, naturae opem,
On account of the help of the divine nature,
quae ipsi naturae humanae nova & adventicia
obvenerit, tantum abest, ut mortem aeternam
humanae naturae conciliaverint, ut ea post terti-
um diem, ex quo poenas illas exsolvit, ad
aeternam vitam summa & ineffabili cum gloria, ac
potestate coniunctam evecta fuerit.
coming from without, the human nature not
only failed to experience eternal death but
was even raised after paying a penalty for
three days. It was raised to eternal life and
granted the highest and unspeakable glory
and power.
Itaque statuendum prorsus videtur, humanam
naturam in Christo, si poenas, quas homines legi
divinae debebant, eam persolvere potuisse
velimus, a nulla re alia, praeterquam a se ipsa,
vires id praestandi sumpsisse. Quod cum falsum
esse, vos ipsi fateamini: falsum etiam erit,
humanam Christi naturam propter ea, quae passa
est, aut pati potuit, divinae iustitiae pro peccatis
nostris aut satisfecisse, aut satisfacere potuisse;
etiamsi a divina natura ita vel adiuvari, vel fulciri
potuerit ut poenas nostris peccatis debitas, quas
aliter pendere nequivisset, universas sustinuerit.
And so, we have proven conclusively that if
we try to argue that Christ's human nature
could pay the penalties that people were
owing to the divine law, the power to make
that payment could only arise from Christ's
human nature itself. But you yourself admit
that Christ's human nature neither did nor
could make satisfaction for our sins to divine
justice based on what it did or could suffer.
(However, you do argue that the divine na-
ture could enable it to endure all the deserved
penalties for our sins, which it could not
otherwise bear.)
Verm demus postrem, naturam humanam non
vi propria sua, sed quam aliunde mutuata fuerit,
poenas nostrorum delictorum divinae iustitiae
persolvere potuisse, quis umquam, qui rem ipsam
vel leviter expenderit, affirmare audebit, a divina
natura eam vim proficisci potuisse, & divinae
naturae ope eam solutionem factam fuisse: cum
ipsa divina natura, hoc est, ipse Deus is sit, cui
satisfaciendum erat?
Finally, let us grant that the human nature
could pay the penalties of our transgressions
to divine justice, not in its own strength but
through a transformation from without. No
one who gave the matter a moment's thought
would ever dare affirm that the payment
could arise from the divine nature and with
its help. After all: the divine nature itself
that is, Godis the one to be satisfied.
At dicitis, ut coniici potest, animadvertendum
esse, aliam in [275] ipsa essentia divina perso-
nam patris esse, aliam personam Filii; & Patri
potuisse a Filio satisfieri, seu ut satisfieret, vim
suppeditari: nec tamen aliquid, quod satisfactioni
per solutionem faciendae adversetur; committi.
But presumably you say that we must take
into account that the Father and the son are
each distinct persons in the divine essence.
[275] Accordingly, you say that satisfaction
could be made by the son to the Father, or
that he could be given the power to make
satisfaction. You say, nevertheless, that this
does not entail any action which opposes
satisfaction made through payment.
Sed dicite, obsecro, nonne ipsius filii personae
non minus, qum patris, satisfaciendum fuisse
But do you not also affirm that the person of
the son himself is entitled to receive satisfac-
tion, no less than the person of the Father?
affirmatis? Si filius patri satisfacit, hoc est, quod
illi debetur, solvit: quis ipsi filio, quod ipsi debetur,
dabit?
Now, if the son made satisfaction to the
Fatherthat is, if he paid what was owed to
himthen who will give the son what was
owed to him?
Respondebitis, ut arbitror, si patri satisfactum fuit,
filio quoque satisfactum esse; cum eadem sit
utriusque voluntas. Istaec responsio futilis plan
est. Cum enim de vera & plena, ut hc cert fit,
satisfactione agitur, voluntatis ratio non habetur,
sed rei ipsius, & ad iuris rigorem, non autem ad
eius, cui satisfaciendum est, animum, cuncta
referuntur & examinantur.
I suspect that you will reply as follows:
satisfaction made to the Father is also made to
the son, since they both have the same will.
But such a response is obviously futile. In the
case of literal and complete satisfaction, such
as we are contemplating here, no consid-
eration is given to the will, but to the matter
itself. The punishment is determined and
considered according to the rigor of the law,
not according to the intent of the one who is
to receive satisfaction.
Nec ver, re ipsa inspecta, & iuris rigore servato,
si satisfactum est patri, filio quoque necessari
satisfactum erit. Nam quomodo patri a filio
quidquam ullo pacto solvi potuisset, si quod unius
aut est, aut fit, alterius reipsa esse necesse foret?
Numquid ea quidem, quae pater accipit, continu
filii revera fiunt; quae ver filius habet, non item
continu patris revera sunt? Profect, si istud,
quod vobis ipsis falsissimum videri non dubito,
verum esset: non potuisset filius patri quidquam
revera solvere. Etenim quae solutio esse revera
potest, cum is, qui solvit, id ipsum, quod solvit,
statim ipso iure, & ex rei natura, necessari
recipit?
Besides, when the matter itself is considered
and the rigor of the law taken seriously, it
does not necessarily follow that the son
receives satisfaction along with the Father.
The son could have paid nothing at all to the
Father if whatever is or becomes the posses-
sion of one necessarily is in fact the possession
of the other. The son always truly possessed
whatever the Father receives. And whatever
the son has is always in turn the continual
property of the Father. Indeed, if what I am
sure you yourselves regard as completely
false were in fact true, then the son could not
have genuinely paid anything to the Father.
No payment can truly exist when the one who
makes the payment gives the very payment
which one necessarily receives immediately
by actual right and from the nature of the
case.
At ver quis deinde ambigere queat, filium patri
nihil dare posse: cum quidquid filius habet, patris
revera sit, & ipse Christus disert dixerit, Joh. 17,
10 omnia, quae sua erant, patris esse? An non
ex ipsa disciplina vestra, hoc est Dei essentiam
non distinguere, sed partiri: si, praeter perso-
narum proprietates, aliquid unam personam
No one could dispute, then, that the son could
not give anything to the Father, since
whatever the son has also truly belongs to the
Father. Christ himself said that all things that
were his are the Father's (Jn. 17:10). If you
would have it that one person in the Godhead
has something, besides the personal property
that the other does not have, then you are
habere velitis, quod alia non habeat? Filii autem
personam proprietates suas patris personae pro
peccatorum nostrorum satisfactione soluisse, cui
umquam in mentem venire poterit?
dividing rather than distinguishing God's es-
sence, contrary to your own teaching. Be-
sides, no one would ever think that the person
of the son handed over in payment his own
personal property to the person of the Father
in satisfaction for our sins.
Qud si dixeris filii personam non solvisse, sed
solutioni vim dedisse; hoc, quantum pertinet ad
satisfactionem, quam ipsa quoque filii persona
accipere debebat, nihil efficit. Nam sive filii per-
sona patri aliquid solverit, sive solutioni vim
dederit, ipsi, ut modo ostendimus, nihil ver
solutum fuit. & ita, nisi, filii personae satisfieri non
oportuisse, dicatis: iustitiae divinae pro peccatis
nostris plen per poenarum [276] solutionem
satisfactum non fuisse, confitendum vobis est.
Now, you might say that the person of the son
has not made payment, but has given the
efficacy to the payment. But this, in so far as
it pertains to satisfaction which the son him-
self should also receive, accomplishes
nothing. If the person of the son will have
either paid something to the Father or have
given efficacy to the payment, then, as we just
demonstrated, nothing was really paid to him.
Therefore, unless you say that it was unneces-
sary for the person of the son to make satis-
faction, you are forced to admit that full
satisfaction was not made by paying the
penalties [276] for our sins to divine justice.
Quantum ver ad satisfactionem, quam persona
patris accipere debuerat: non solm proprietates
suas solvere filius non potuit: sed nec etiam
proprietatibus solutioni vim ullam dare. verm, ut
ex ipsa essentia divina ea vis profecta fuerit,
necesse est, id est, ex ea re, quam eandem
numero in persona patris esse, vos ipsi affirmatis.
Quod san absurdissimum, atque ade
impossibile censeri debet; ut scilicet vis sibi per
alterius solutionem satisfaciendi ex seipso, aut
cert ex eo, quod idem numero sibi totum insit,
proficiscatur.
But now consider the satisfaction that the
person of the Father ought to receive. Not
only was the son unable to pay his personal
property, but he could not give any efficacy to
the payment by that property, either. Yet, in
order for the power to arise from the divine
essence, it is necessary that you yourself
affirm that the essence of the Father must be
numerically identical with the essence of the
person of the Son.
24
But this leads to absurdi-
ties and impossibilities. For example, the
power of making satisfaction must arise from
himself and to himself through the payment
made by another. Or if the efficacy does not
arise from oneself, it certainly arises from that
which contains in itself the numerically
identical thing.
Quare concludendum est, illud ipsum, quod vos
ad istam vestram satisfactionem stabiliendam
potissimm afferre soletis, & sine quo eam
funditus corruere arbitramini, quod scilicet
With this in mind, consider the argument that
you frequently offer to establish your doctrine
of satisfaction: that Christ is eternal God and
Jehovah himself, our only God. Without this
argument you believe your doctrine is thor-
Christus aeternus Deus & ipse Iehova unicus
Deus noster fuerit, non mod ad eam
confirmandam quidquam momenti habere non
posse, sed ipsam potis penitus convellere.
Qud enim is, cui satisfaciendum erat, sibi ipsi
satisfecerit, aut, sibi ipsi satisfaciendi, vim dederit,
sive, qud ei, cui satisfaciendum fuerat, ade
coniuncta persona, ut omnia prorsus, ex quibus
satisfaciendi vis proficisci potuit, cum ipso
communia habeat, idem praestiterit, id neque ex
tot, neque ex parte ullo modo fieri potest.
oughly ruined. But not only is this argument
ineffectual in confirming your theory, but it
even overturns your theory completely! That
is because this argument assumes actions that
are utterly impossible, either in whole or in
part. It assumes that he, to whom satisfaction
ought to have been made, will have made
satisfaction to himself. Or, it assumes that he
gave himself the power to make satisfaction.
Or, it assumes that the person making satis-
faction was so joined to the person who ought
to receive satisfaction that he was possessing
absolutely all things in common with him,
from which the power of making satisfaction
to him could arise.
Separatam enim penitus satisfacientis, sive illius,
cuius ope satisfactio peragitur, personam ab eo,
cui satis fit, esse oportet: aut saltem ita
disiunctam, ut aliquid proprium habeat, ex quo
satisfactio vim sumere, ac perfici queat. Atque
haec omnia sensus ipse communis quemlibet
apert docet; ade ut si, Christum pro nobis Deo
omnes peccatorum nostrorum poenas exsolvisse,
perseverare velitis, alterum ex duobus vobis
faciendum omnino fit, Aut negandum, ipsum
Christum aeternum Deum & Iehovam esse, Aut,
quatenus aeternum Deum & Iehovam, ad
solutionem istam faciendam nullo prorsus modo
concurrisse.
It is necessary for the person making satis-
faction, or the person who helps accomplish
satisfaction, to be absolutely distinct from the
one who is to receive satisfaction. At the very
least, the one making satisfaction should be
separate enough to have some possession of
his own from which satisfaction can receive or
effect power. Common sense itself clearly
teaches this, so that if you insist on saying that
Christ paid all the penalties for our sins to
God on our behalf, you are forced to choose
between one of the following conclusions: (1)
you must deny that Christ himself is eternal
God and Jehovah, or (2) you must affirm that
the extent to which he was eternal God and
Jehovah could not coincide with making that
payment.
Sed, cum iam satis abunde demonstratum fuerit,
in Christi persona nihil esse, aut fuisse, quod per
poenarum, quas nos debebamus, solutionem
divinae iustitiae pro nobis satisfacere potuerit;
nunc neque etiam per eorum, quae nos facere
debebamus, praestationem id fieri ab ipso
potuisse ostendamus. [277]
I have already shown more than adequately
that there was nothing in the person of Christ
that will have been able to make satisfaction
for us to divine justice through the payment
of the penalties that we owed. Now I will
show that he could not make satisfaction by
legally performing the obligations that we
ourselves were bound to do. [277]
Chapter V
Chapter V
Christum eorum, quae nos ex lege Dei facere
debebamus, praestatione, divinae iustitiae pro
nobis satisfacere non potuisse.
Christ could not make satisfaction for us to divine
justice by legally undertaking those duties that
God's law obliged us to do.
Iam ver manifestum est, Christum quia homo
natus fuerat, & quidem, ut inquit Paulus, factus
sub Lege, legi divinae, ei inquam, quae aeterna &
immutabilis est, servandae, non mins, qum
caeteri homines, obnoxium fuisse. Alioqui
potuisset Christus aeternam Dei legem negligere,
sive etiam universam, si voluisset infringere; quod
impium est vel cogitare.
I have already shown that Christ, because he
was a human being, made under the law (as
Paul says), was obliged to obey the eternal
and unchangeable divine law no less than
other human beings. If this were not so,
Christ could have disregarded the eternal law
of God, or he could have even broken all of its
precepts if he had wished! But such a thought
is too impious even to imagine!
Immo, ut supr alicubi explicatum fuit, nisi ipse
Christus legi divinae servandae obnoxius fuisset,
ut ex Pauli verbis colligitur, non potuisset iis, qui
ei legi servandae obnoxii sunt, opem ferre, & eos
ad immortalitatis firmam spem traducere. Non
differebat igitur, hac quidem in parte, Christus,
quando homo natus erat, a caeteris hominibus.
Quocirca nec etiam pro aliis, magis qum quilibet
alius homo, legem divinam conservando,
satisfacere potuit, quippe qui ipse eam servare
omnino deberet.
Earlier, we showed quite the opposite: unless
Christ himself were obliged to obey the divine
law, as Paul's words imply, he could not assist
those who are obliged to serve the law, nor
could he lead them to the firm hope of im-
mortality. Therefore Christ, because he was
born a human being, was certainly no differ-
ent in this respect than other human beings.
And since he himself was obliged to keep the
divine law, he was no more able than any
other human being to make satisfaction for
others by obeying it.
Qud si dicas, ipsum, antequam homo fieret legi
divinae servandae subiectum non fuisse, & ob
eam rem, cum homo fieri voluerit, & ita seipsum
huic iugo sponte submittere, non perinde ac de
caeteris hominibus, hac etiam in parte de ipso
iudicandum esse; Animadvertendum est,
istiusmodi suiipsius submissionem non efficere,
quin Christus non mins, qum caeteri, postquam
homo natus fuit, legem divinam servare teneretur:
sed arguere duntaxat, deberi illi aliquid, sive
etiam multum, propterea qud, cum liber esset,
se tanto oneri ferendo obligare voluerit.
Now, you might say that before he became a
human being he was not obliged to obey the
divine law, and therefore, since he freely
chose to submit himself to this yoke by be-
coming a human being, he should not be
judged as other humans; he is in a class by
himself. I say in response that this kind of
submission on his part could not free him,
any more than anyone else, from his
obligation to obey the law after he was born a
human. Rather, his submission declares that
he owed considerableor at least some
obedience to the law, since when he was free
he willingly obliged himself to carry such a
burden.
Hoc autem quid ad alios pertinet? An non satis
But how does this relate to others? His
superque ista suiipsius spontanea submissio
suam mercedem accepit, cum a Deo ita elatus
fuit, ut datum fit illi nomen ade supra omne no-
men, ut in Iesu nomine omne genu flectatur
caelestium, terrestrium, & infernorum? quod
san & istius (ut quidem vos Apostoli verba
interpretamini) suiipsius submissionis, &
praeterea obedientiae usque ad mortem crucis,
praemium fuisse, ex Paulo liquet, Philip. 2 v. 6. &
c. Quid qud ne sibiipsi quidem Christum aliquid
meruisse, ulla firma ratione ex eo Pauli loco colligi
potest?
voluntary submission certainly received its
adequate (and more than adequate) recom-
pense: he was exalted by God, being given the
name above every name, that at the name of
Jesus every knee of heaven, earth and hell
should bow. Paul makes it exceedingly clear
(Phil. 2:6 ff.) that God gave him this reward
not only for his voluntary submission (which
is how you interpret the Apostle's words) but
also for obedience to the point of death on the
cross. One cannot reasonably infer from this
passage of Paul that Christ did not indeed
merit a reward for himself.
Iohannes cert Calvinus, qui, Christum sibiipsi
meruisse, contra Lombardum, & Scholasticos
[278] apert negat, ad ea Pauli verba ad hunc
modum respondet: Praeposter ver huc trahunt
Pauli testimonium. Propterea exaltavit ipsum
pater, & dedit illi nomen, & c. Quibus enim meritis
assequi potuit homo, ut iudex esset mundi, caput
angelorum, atque ut potiretur summo Dei imperio,
atque in eo resideret maiestas illa, cuius
millesimam partem cunctae hominum, &
angelorum virtutes attingere nequeunt? Sed
facilis & plena solutio est, Paulum illic non
disserere de caussa exaltationis, sed
consequentiam duntaxat ostendere, ut nobis esse
exemplo. non omnino alius voluit, qum quod
alibi dicitur, oportuisse Christum pati & ita intrare
in gloriam Patris. Hactenus Calvinus. At ver, si
sibi ipsi Christus non meruit, quomodo aliis mereri
potuit?
John Calvin certainly denies that Christ
merited reward for himself. In rebutting
Lombard and the Scholastics [278] he
responds as follows to Paul's words: But they
have perversely interpreted Paul's testimony,
Therefore the Father exalted him and gave him the
name, etc. For by what merits could a man attain
that he should be judge of the world, the head of
angels, that he should possess the supreme govern-
ment of God, and that such majesty should reside
in him, of which all the virtues of men and angels
cannot attain one thousandth part? But the solu-
tion is easy and complete: Paul is not discussing
here the cause of exaltation, but only shows the
result as an example to us. The meaning is not
altogether different than what is said elsewhere,
that Christ should suffer and thus enter into the
glory of the Father. So much for Calvin. But if
Christ did not merit reward for himself, how
could he merit it for others?
Si dicas, Christum ideo sibi non meruisse, quia, ut
ibidem paullo superis idem Calvinus ait, non
opus fuerit, unicum Dei filium descendere, ut sibi
acquireret quidquam novi: sed nobis meruisse,
quibus multum novi acquiri potuerit;
You might say the following in response:
Christ did not merit reward for himself be-
cause, as Calvin himself says in the context
preceding the passage that you cited, the
unique son of God did not have to come
down to obtain something he did not already
have. But he gained merit for us, obtaining
for us much we did not already have.
Iam tibi respondet ipse Calvinus, qui, ut audisti,
negat, Christum sibiipsi, etiam ut homini
meruisse. nam profect, ut homini, sibi multum
acquirere poterat, ut reipsa acquisivit;
quemadmodum & inter omnes constat, &
universa scriptura apertissim testatur. Quod ni
esset, omnis nostrae aeternae salutis spes, quam
per ipsum Christum concepimus, funditus
concideret, atque interiret; ut supr abundanter
expositum, & demonstratum fuit.
Calvin himself has already responded to you.
As you have just heard, he denies that Christ
gained merit for himself as a human being.
Indeed, he had been able to acquire consider-
able merit for himself as a human being, as he
in fact did acquire. Everyone knows this, and
the entire Bible bears witness to this fact.
Were this not so, our entire hope of eternal
salvation, which we have received through
Christ, would be utterly demolished, as we
thoroughly explained and proved above.
At enim dices, Christum quidem, ut hominem, sibi
non meruisse, & hoc esse quod ait Calvinus: Sed,
ut homini, meruisse, lict ut Deo non meruerit:
neque id a Calvino negari.
You will respond that Christ indeed, as a
human being, did not gain merit for himself,
and that this is Calvin's meaning. But you
will add that Calvin did not rule out that he
gained merit for himself in his role as a
human being, even though he did not gain
merit for himself as God.
Immo id satis apert a Calvino negatur, cum
negat, ipsum sibi meruisse, & Scholasticos, qui id
afferebant, reprehendit. Nam, quacumque
ratione sibi Christus meritus fuisset, iniusta
omnino esset eius reprehensio. Verm illi satis
fuit, ostendisse, Christum nec, ut, Deum Deo,
nec, ut hominem homini, sibi aliquid mereri
potuisse; nimirum quia pro concesso tacit
sumpsit, fieri non posse, ut altera natura alteri
quidquam mereatur. Nec san iniuri.
Calvin rules out this interpretation with
sufficient clarity when he denies that Christ
gained merit for himself, and censures the
Scholastics who taught that he did. Calvin's
censure would have been completely unwar-
ranted if Christ could have merited reward
for himself in any way at all. He felt that it
was enough to show that Christ could not
merit reward for himself as God for God, or
as man for man. Calvin just takes it for
granted that one nature could not merit
reward for the other. And rightfully so.
Nam neque alteri mereri, quisquam revera potest;
nec divina natura (qud enim humana divinae
nihil mereri potuisset, nullam dubitationem
habebat) etiamsi id fieri alioqui posset, quidquam
cuiquam umquam meretur; quippe quae ipsa fit,
quae donet, atque largiatur, seu mavis, meritis, si
qua sunt, dignam mercedem det. [279]
No one can truly merit reward for another.
Nor, even if it were possible for one person to
gain merit for another, could the divine
nature ever merit reward for anyone, since the
divine nature functions as that which gives
and lavishes, or, if you prefer, as that which
gives a suitable reward for any so-called mer-
its. (Of course, Calvin had no doubt that the
human nature could not have merited reward
for the divine.) [279]
Ex iam dictis apparet, Christum nobis nihil omnino
(si de vero merito loquamur) vel meruisse, vel
mereri potuisse. Nam si velitis, eum ut hominem,
seu vi humanae naturae id praestitisse; falsum
illud ex eo deprehendetur, qud humana natura
ne sibi ipsi quidem quidquam mereri potuit:
nedum aliis fit merita; quippe quae sibi a Deo
iniuncta facere teneretur.
It is evident from what has already been said
that Christ either did not or could not merit
anything for usassuming that we are
speaking of genuine merit. If you contend
that he accrued merit for us as a human being,
or in the power of his human nature, that is
shown to be false from the fact that the
human nature could not merit any reward for
itself, much less merit reward for others.
After all: the human nature is bound to per-
form all that God has enjoined on it.
Nihil autem Christus fecit, quod ipsi a Deo
iniunctum non fuisset. Si enim de legis divinae
conservatione loquamur; ea ipsi, quia homo erat,
ut mod dicebamus, non mins, qum caeteris
hominibus, ipso iure iniuncta fuerat. Sin ad ea
respicere velimus, quae singulariter praeter id,
quod Lex omnibus peraequ mandat, dum adhuc
mortalis esset, praestitit; ea similiter illi a Deo
fuerant iniuncta. Hinc etiam tantopere eius
obedientia celebratur: & usque ad mortem crucis
obediens fuisse dicitur. Nullus siquidem
obedientiae locus esse potest, ubi nullum est
iussum.
Christ did nothing that God had not
commanded him to do. If we are talking
about observing the divine law, everything
Christ did was enjoined on him by that very
law. Because he was a human being, he was
obliged to keep the law no less than other hu-
man beings. If we should consider the unique
deeds he performed, while yet mortal, over
and beyond what the law requires of every-
one, even these unique deeds had been
enjoined on him by God. We greatly praise
his obedience by saying that he was obedient
even to the point of death on the cross. But
obedience is not possible where there is no
commandment.
Hinc ipse, se de caelo descendisse dixit, non ut
voluntatem suam faceret, sed voluntatem eius,
qui ipsum miserat, Ioh. 6. v 38. & apud eundem
Iohannem cap. 4. v 34. ait, cibum suum esse, ut
faciat voluntatem illius, qui ipsum misit, & eius
opus perficiat. Cap. autem 10 v 18 se mandatum
accepisse a patre ait, ut animam suam poneret,
iterum ipsam accepturus. Propterea, ut apud
eundem Euangelistam ad finem cap. 14. scriptum
extat, cum se in manus peccatorum, ut
occideretur, tradi permittere vellet, & ob eam rem
in eum locum secedere, ubi Iudas Iscariota, unus
ex eius discipulis, ipsum proditurus erat:
discipulos reliquos alloquens, sic ait: Sed ut
cognoscat mundus, quia diligo patrem, & sicut
In John 6:38 he himself said that he descended
from heaven to do the will of the one who
sent him, not to do his own will. And also in
John 4:34 he says that his food is to do the will
of the one who sent him, and to accomplish
his work. In 10:18 he says that he received a
commandment from the Father, that he
should lay down his life and take it back
again. Consequently, at the end of John 14,
when he was ready to let himself be betrayed
into the hands of sinners to be killed, and for
that reason wanted to go to the location where
Judas Iscariot, one of his disciples, was going
to betray him, he said the following to his
other disciples: But so that the world should
know that I love the Father and just as the Father
mandatum dedit mihi pater, sic facio; surgite,
eamus hinc.
gave a commandment to me, even so I do. Arise,
let us go from here.
Qud si dicatis, eum, ut Deum, & vi naturae
divinae nobis meruisse; istud ridiculum plan est,
cum, ut dictum fuit, Deus seu natura divina non
mereatur; sed donet, ac largiatur; & meritis, si qua
sunt, digna praemia rependat.
If you argue that he gained merit for us as
God and in the power of the divine nature,
that would be ridiculous. As we said, God, or
the divine nature, does not merit but bestows,
paying deserved rewards for any so-called
merits.
Nam si naturam ipsam divinam nobis mereri non
posse fateamini quidem: sed tamen humanae
naturae vim, ut nobis mereretur, dedisse
contendatis; ade frivolum hoc est, ut refutatione
non indigeat.
If you admit that the divine nature could not
merit for us, but nevertheless argue that
power was given to the human nature so that
it should merit for us, such an argument is so
utterly worthless that it does not even deserve
refutation.
Etenim quid potest, quaeso, divina natura
humanae tribuere praeter id, qud perfectissim
Dei mandata conservet? At nulla tanta perfectio
conservationis mandatorum Dei excogitari potest,
quam is, cui mandatum est, praestare non
debeat. [280] Sed ubi debitum est, ibi nullum
verum & proprium meritum, & quale in hac
disputatione intelligi necesse est, intervenire
potest.
25

Tell me: what can the divine nature bestow on
the human nature besides that it should
observe God's commandments perfectly?
One cannot imagine any degree of perfection
in observing God's commandments that is
more than what the person so commanded is
required to perform. [280] But where there is
obligation there is no genuine and proper
merit. (And genuine merit is the kind about
which we are concerned in this disputation.)
Caeterm, si a vobis Christum non dividi dicatis,
nec in iis, quae Christus fecit, ab humana divinam
naturam distingui; sed omnia eius opera, ut ab
humanae, & divinae naturae concreto facta
considerari; hoc item, quod ad vim obedientiae
Christi pertinet, valde frivolum est. Nam adhuc
inquirendum relinquitur, undenam tanta vis, quam
vos illi tribuitis, proficisci potuerit; praesertim cum
ipsa natura divina non magis obedire possit,
qum perpessiones experiri. Et cum ab humana
natura, cuius proprium est obedire, neque per se,
neque divinae naturae ope ea provenire possit;
concludendum est, Christi obedientiam eiusmodi
vi prorsus carere.
You might argue that you do not divide the
person of Christ, so that you do not
distinguish some actions as of the divine
nature and others as of the human nature.
You would say that all of his works should be
regarded as having been performed in the
concretion of the divine and human na-
tures. This line of defense is also worthless,
because you are applying it to the efficacy of
Christ's obedience. It still does not answer the
question of from where such power could
arise, particularly since the divine nature can
no more obey than it can experience suffering.
On the other hand, the power could not arise
from the human naturethe characteristic of
which is to obeyeither of itself or with the
help of the divine nature. It must be conclud-
ed that the obedience of Christ was com-
pletely lacking in power of this sort.
Iam si totum quidem Christum nobis meruisse
affirmetis: non tamen propter ipsius obedientiae
vim, sed propter dignitatem personae, quae eam
obedientiam praestitit; Dico, nullius personae
tantam dignitatem esse posse, quae, si obedire
teneatur, e qud obedierit, vel aliis, vel etiam
sibiipsi, aliquid ver & propri mereri possit.
You might then claim that the entire Christ
indeed gained merit for us, but not on account
of the efficacy of his obedience itself, but
because of the dignity of the person who
accomplished that obedience. I would then
respond that no person can be of such great
dignity that, if he is bound to render
obedience, he can truly and properly gain
merit, either for himself or others.
Potest quidem mins ver & propri aliquis
mereri, quia aliquid fecerit, quamvis id facere
teneretur: sed non tamen propter personae
dignitatem aliquam, sed propter promissionem,
quae praecesserit. Atque hac ratione & sibiipsi, &
nobis meruisse Christum, ut supr alibi attigimus,
rect dici potest.
In a less literal and proper sense, someone can
be said to have gained merit as a result of
having accomplished some task, even though
obliged to do it. But such merit is not based
on the dignity of the person, but on a promise
given beforehand. In this sense, one can
rightly affirm that Christ gained merit, both
for himself and for us, as we discussed earlier.
Cum enim Deus, ut ibi explicatum fuit, &
decrevisset, & promisisset, si Christus animam
suam, ut opus, quod ei mandaverat, perageret,
profudisset, futurum, ut & ipse, & quicumque ei
obtemperassent, aeternam salutem
adipiscerentur, ac praeterea ipsemet eam
salutem sibi obedientibus dandi potestatem
consequeretur; cert, postquam Christus animam
suam, munus sibi a Deo patre iniunctum
perficiendo, profudit: dignus fuit, qui ad tantam
dignitatem & potentiam eveheretur: & merit
nobis, qui illi obedimus, salutis aeternae,
quemadmodum scriptum est caussa extitit. Aliud
meriti genus ex Iesu Christi obedientia vel
profectum fuisse, vel proficisci potuisse, neque
usquam legitur, & omnibus tam divinis, qum
humanis rationibus plan adversatur.
In that earlier discussion we noted that God
had both decreed and promised that if Christ
should pour out his life in accomplishing the
work which God commanded him to do, both
Christ himself and all who conform their lives
to him will obtain eternal salvation. And be-
yond this, Christ himself would receive the
power of bestowing that salvation to those
who obey him. After Christ poured out his
life in fulfilling the office God the Father
enjoined on him, he certainly was worthy to
be elevated to such dignity and power, and
rightly appears as the cause of eternal salva-
tion for us who obey him, just as it is written.
We do not find it written anywhere that some
other kind of merit either did or could arise
from the obedience of Jesus Christ. Such a
notion is opposed both by divine and human
reasons.
Iam ver, quamvis, dum de Christi meritis
disseruimus, satis probatum videatur, non
It seems, then, that we have already suffi-
ciently proven that however much we talk
about Christ's merits, he was unable to make
potuisse ipsum pro nobis satisfacere, ea [281]
praestando, quae nos facere tenebamur; ut
tamen idem magis perspicuum fiat, ad ipsam rem,
eius propriis vocabulis, & loquendi modis utentes,
qum brevissim examinandam revertamur.
satisfaction for us by [281] performing those
duties that we were bound to do. Never-
theless, to make this truth even more plain, let
us again consider this subject briefly, using
words and modes of speech characteristic of
this kind of discussion.
Conclusum a nobis fuerat, non potuisse Christum
divinae iustitiae id praestare, quod nos facere
tenebamur: propterea qud ipsemet, quia homo
erat, divinae legi servandae obnoxius esset. Sed
quid erit, etiamsi demus id quod evidenter
falsissimum est, Iesum scilicet Christum legi
divinae servandae subiectum non fuisse? Nonne
supr ratione probatum est, quemadmodum unica
tantummodo ea legis divinae conservatio fuit,
quam Christus praestitit, sic pro uno tantm eam
praestari potuisse?
We had concluded earlier that Christ could
not perform for divine justice what we our-
selves were bound to do, since Christ himself,
because he was a human being, was obliged
to obey the divine law. But even if we grant
what is plainly false, namely, that Jesus Christ
was not subject to obey the divine law, noth-
ing will be accomplished to advance your
argument. We showed earlier through the
use of reason that, just as the obedience which
Christ performed to the divine law was
simply the particular obedience of a sole
individual, even so he could have performed
it in the place of but one person.
Quid ver habet Christi persona, quod unicam
duntaxat legis divinae conservationem pro
innumerabilibus valere faciat? Satis ut arbitror, a
nobis demonstratum est, neque propter divinae
naturae vim, neque propter ipsius personae
dignitatem potuisse divinae legis conservationem
illam, ne aliquant quidem perfectiorem esse
qum ipsa lex, & Deus requirat. Tantum abest, ut
innumerabilium loco esse potuerit.
What does the person of Christ possess that
makes his merely sole observance of the
divine law efficacious for countless
individuals? In my opinion, I have suffi-
ciently demonstrated that Christ's observance
of the divine law could not be so greateither
through the power of the divine nature or the
dignity of the personas to exceed the
perfection that God's law demands. His obe-
dience could hardly take the place of what
countless individuals were obliged to do.
Adde qud, ut unius factum alterius esse
censeatur (si mod, ut diximus, id alioqui fieri
posset) non satis esset, aliquem id fecisse, quod
facere non tenebatur; nisi etiam pro illo, qui, cum
idem facere teneretur, non fecerat, se id
praestare velle antea dixisset: ac praeterea is, cui
factum illud quodammodo dandum erat, eius loco
id (ut dicitur) acceptasset; praesertim ver si is,
qui illud praestitit, egregii sui facinoris ingentem
alioqui mercedem accepisset. Atqui nusquam
Additionally, in order for the deed of one
person to be regarded as the deed of another
(assuming, as we said, that such a substitution
were possible in other respects), it is not
enough simply for someone to have done
what they were not obliged to do. It is also re-
quired that they declare beforehand that they
wanted to do it for the other person who had
not performed the deed, even though that
other person was obliged to do so. It is also
not enough for the one who is somehow
scriptum reperies, vel Christum, postquam id
protestatus esset, nostrm loco divinam legem
servare aggressum fuisse, vel Deum pro legis
suae conservatione, quam nos ipsi praestare
debebamus, a Christo praestitam eiusdem legis
conservationem acceptasse; & cuiuscumque
operis, quantumvis praestantissimi, quod Christus
patravit, cumulatissimam mercedem, citra istam
pro nobis satisfactionem, eum recepisse,
testatissimum habemus.
going to be the beneficiary of that deed to
have received it as performed in his stead (as
the saying goes), particularly if the one who
performed it received in other respects an
enormous reward for his distinguished deed.
But you will not find it written anywhere that
Christ attempted to obey the divine law in our
place after saying that he would do so. Nor is
it written that God received Christ's ob-
servance of the law in place of the observance
of his law which we ourselves were obliged to
perform. We have the plain attestation that
whatever work Christ performed, however
excellent, received the most massive reward
possible, quite apart from any satisfaction for
us.
Itaque perspicuum est, in Christi persona nihil
fuisse, quod satisfactionem pro peccatis nostris
eorum, quae nos facere debueramus
praestatione peragere potuerit.
It is clear that there was nothing in the person
of Christ by which he could have made satis-
faction for our sins through performing the
works that we ourselves were bound to do.
Chapter VI
Chapter VI
Concluditur ex supr disputatis, Christum non
potuisse divinae iustitiae [282] pro peccatis
nostris satisfacere; idque amplis confirmatur;
atque ostenditur, vera & propria Christi merita ex
Adversariorum sententia statui; quae cum Dei
gratia manifest pugnant.
From the issues disputed above, the conclusion is
reached that Christ could not make satisfaction for
our sins to divine justice. [282] This conclusion is
established more than adequately. Furthermore, it
is shown that the view of my opponents entails
that Christ gained literal and proper merits. But it
is also shown that such merits are in flat oppo-
sition to the grace of God.
Ex iis, quae hactenus dicta sunt, tandem apparet,
nullo modo potuisse Christum pro peccatis nostris
divinae iustitiae satisfacere: non modo quia rei
ipsius natura id nulla prorsus ratione ferre potest,
ita ut inter ea, quae plan impossibilia sunt,
numerari debeat: verum etiam, quia etiamsi id
alioqui per se fieri aliquo pacto posset, ea tamen,
quae ad id peragendum necessari requirerentur,
eiusmodi sunt ut ne in ipso quidem Christo
reperiri potuerint, omnia lict in eo fuerint, quae
esse potuerunt. Praeterqum qud nonnulla in
From what we have discussed thus far, it is
finally evident that Christ could not in any
way make satisfaction for our sins to divine
justice. First of all, such satisfaction is utterly
impossible by the very nature of the case. We
should classify Christ's satisfaction with all
other impossible occurrences. But even if
satisfaction were inherently possible in
general, Christ could not meet the conditions
requisite for accomplishing this satisfaction,
even granting that he could meet any requir-
ement that is possible to meet. (This does not
ipso reperta sunt, quae eiusmodi satisfactionem
penitus excludant.
even take into account the fact that some of
the characteristics that we do find in Christ
thoroughly exclude satisfaction of this sort.)
Quare nequeo satis mirari, quid iis in mentem
venerit, qui nobis primi istam satisfactionem
fabricarunt; cum ea, quae fieri non posse apert
constat, divinis etiam oraculis, ea facta fuisse, in
speciem disert attestantibus, nequaquam
admittantur (& idcirco sacra verba, in alium
sensum, qum ipsa sonant, per inusitatos etiam
tropos, quandoque explicantur) nedum tunc pro
compertis & plane veris affirmentur, atque aliis
obtrudantur, cum ne verbum quidem in universis
sacris litteris de ipsis extet.
I cannot fathom how those who first
concocted this doctrine of satisfaction for us
could have ever come up with it. After all:
since it postulates occurrences that clearly
could never happen, we cannot affirm that
they occurred, even with seemingly direct
biblical evidence that they occurred. (And for
that reason they often explain the sacred
words of Scripture erroneously, through
strange renderings.) How much less, then,
should these occurrences be dogmatically af-
firmed as certain and true, and foisted upon
others, since holy Scripture says absolutely
nothing about them.
Nam si vel unus saltem locus inveniretur, in quo
satisfactionis pro peccatis nostris Deo per
Christum exhibitae mentio fieret: excusandi
fortasse viderentur. Ego quidem, etiamsi non
semel, sed saepe id in sacris monimentis
scriptum extaret: non idcirco tamen ita rem
prorsus se habere crederem, ut vos opinamini.
Cum enim id omnino fieri non possit, non secus
atque in multis aliis scripturae testimoniis un
cum caeteris omnibus facio, aliqua, quae mins
incommoda videretur, interpretatione adhibita,
eum sensum ex eiusmodi verbis elicerem qui &
sibi ipsi constaret, & perpetuo eiusdem scripturae
tenori non adversaretur.
If one could adduce even a single passage that
mentions satisfaction, set forth for our sins,
that Christ offered to God, then perhaps they
could be excused for holding the view. But as
far as I am concerned, even if I found it writ-
ten in the Bible not once but often, I would
still not believe the doctrine in the way that
you do. Since satisfaction could in no way
occur, I would do what everyone else does in
the case of many other passages of Scripture: I
would suggest an alternative interpretation
that is less disagreeable to those passages,
which seem to teach satisfaction. In that way
I would produce an interpretation of those
passages which is both internally consistent
and which agrees with the general tenor of
Scripture.
Caveant tamen imperiti, ne, quibusdam Gallicis &
Italicis interpretationibus decepti, de satisfactione
ista eo in loco scriptum esse sibi persuadeant,
ubi, cum de Christo sit sermo, vulgata Latina
editio habet, ut repropitiaret peccata populi Heb.
2. v. 17. Quem locum auctores illarum
interpretationum non veriti sunt perinde vertere,
The untrained should be careful not to be de-
ceived by certain French and Italian transla-
tions of the Bible, from which they might
convince themselves of the doctrine of satis-
faction based on that passage about Christ in
Hebrews 2:17. The Latin Vulgate reads, in
order that he might make propitiation for the
sins of the people. The authors of these
quasi scriptum fuisset, ut satisfaceret, sive, Ad
satisfaciendum pro [283] peccatis populi, cum
tamen in Graeco scriptum sit
. Qud, ut omnes norunt, nihil aliud sibi vult,
qum, Ut expiaret, sive Ad expiandum peccata
populi. Atqui supra, & quid Expiare peccata
significet, abundanter explicatum est: & quae eius
loci sententia sit, apert expositum; ac de
satisfactione ulla ibi mentionem non fieri,
evidenter demonstratum.
French and Italian translations were not afraid
to twist this passage to read, so that he
should make satisfaction, or to make satis-
faction for [283] the sins of the people. They
put forth this rendering in spite of the fact
that the Greek reads,
(eis to hilaskesthai tas hamartias tou laou). As ev-
erybody knows, the meaning is simply, so
that he might make expiation, or to expiate
the sins of the people. We gave a detailed
discussion above of what it means to expiate
sins, and we also expounded on the meaning
of this particular passage. There we clearly
showed that the text does not mention
satisfaction at all.
Quam igitur, ut ad propositum redeam, spem
salutis habere possumus, si per satisfactionem,
quam Deus a Christo pro peccatis nostris
acceperit, eam nobis contingere dicamus, cum ea
satisfactio fieri nullo modo potuerit? Dicesne,
satisfieri quidem ver pro peccatis nostris Deo
non potuisse, sed tamen ea, quae fecit, & passus
est Christus, plenissimae satisfactionis loco a
Deo fuisse ducta? At istud pugnat cum eo, quod
tute disertis verbis affirmas: Christum scilicet
divinae iustitiae pro peccatis nostris plen
absolutissim satisfecisse. Atque hoc, ut scis,
illud est, de quo inter nos potissimm contenditur.
Returning to our subject, since satisfaction is
impossible, how could we have any hope of
salvation if we say that we obtain salvation
through satisfaction, which God received for
our sins from Christ? Perhaps you will re-
spond that Christ indeed could not make
literal satisfaction for our sins to God, but
God, nevertheless, regarded what Christ did
do and suffer as taking the place of complete
satisfaction. But such a theory opposes what
you yourself affirm: namely, that Christ made
complete satisfaction to divine justice for our
sins. And this, as you well know, is the main
bone of contention between us.
Qud nisi ita sentires, caeteris, quibuscum, ut
arbitror, tibi convenire putas, adversareris.
Istorum enim plerique; plenissimam ac
perfectissimam pro peccatis nostris
satisfactionem ex iis, quae fecit, & passus est
Christus, non quidem propter Dei acceptationem,
sed propter ipsorum Christi operum, ipsarumque
perpessionum propriam vim, profectam fuisse, &
volunt, & acriter contendunt. Non defuerunt
tamen ex vestris ipsis, ut animadvertere potui, qui
aliquant perspicaciores, cum viderent, veram
istam & propria virtute cumulatissimam
Unless you adopt the view that God accepted
Christ's sufferings in place of satisfaction, you
are in opposition to others, whom, I am con-
vinced, you regard as on your side. Now,
there certainly are many individuals who
both desire to affirm and sharply contend that
a complete and perfect satisfaction for our
sins arose from what Christ did and suffered.
They deny that satisfaction arises from God's
acceptation, basing satisfaction on Christ's
very works and on the inherent power of his
actual sufferings. Nevertheless, I have ob-
served that some of your number are occa-
satisfactionem defendi non posse, ad alteram
illam sententiam deflexerint;
26
& ideo satisfecisse
Christum crediderint, quia Deus ita decreverit, &
ipsius obedientiam pro satisfactione acceptaverit:
non autem quia illa per se vim satisfaciendi
habuerit.
sionally more acute, recognizing that literal
and absolutely perfect satisfaction based on its
inherent power is indefensible. Consequent-
ly, they turn aside to the acceptation theory.
27

Accordingly, they believe that Christ made
satisfaction because God decreed it to be satis-
faction. God accepted Christ's obedience in
place of satisfaction, but not because this obe-
dience has the power to make satisfaction per
se.
Inter quos praecipu esse videtur Iohannes
Calvinus; qui hac de re scribens, haec verba
protulit, Quum ergo de Christi merito agitur, non
statuitur in eo principium: Sed conscendimus ad
Dei ordinationem, quae prima caussa est: quia
mero beneplacito mediatorem statuit, qui nobis
salutem acquireret. Et paullo post, Christus non
nisi ex Dei beneplacito quicquam mereri potuit,
sed quia ad hoc destinatus fuit, ut iram Dei suo
sacrificio placaret, suaque obedientia deleret
transgressiones nostras. In summa quando ex
sola Dei gratia (quae hunc nobis constituit salutis
modum) dependet meritum Christi, [284] non mi-
nus apt, qum illa, humanis omnibus iustitiis
opponitur.
Chief among those of this opinion appears to
be John Calvin. When writing about this
subject he states, Therefore, when the merit of
Christ is under discussion, the basis is not estab-
lished in him. Rather, we ascend to the ordination
of God, which is the first cause, because he ap-
pointed the mediator by his mere good pleasure to
obtain salvation for us. And a little later he
says, Christ could not gain any merit apart from
God's good pleasure. He had been appointed to this
work, so that he might placate God's wrath by his
sacrifice and wipe away our transgressions by his
obedience. In summary, since the merit of Christ
depends on the sole grace of God, which established
this way of salvation for us, [284] his merit is op-
posed no less suitably than grace to all human
forms of righteousness.
Nec ver est, qud Calvini mentem in his verbis
esse dicamus, qud Christus pro nobis mortuus
sit, & perfectissimam obedientiam Deo
praestiterit, id a Dei bona voluntate erga nos
profectum esse, alioqui nihil fuisse, quod
Christum ad tantum opus patrandum adigere
posset: non autem sensisse Calvinum, Christi
obedientiam propria virtute Dei gratiam nobis
promereri non potuisse. Nam istud cum ipsis
verbis non consentit, praesertim ver cum illis,
Christus non nisi ex Dei beneplacito quicquam
mereri potuit. Ex quibus apparet, illum sensisse
non solm, ideo obedientem fuisse Christum,
quia Deus voluerit: sed etiam su obedienti nihil
Now, it will do no good to argue that Calvin's
intent in these words is as follows: Because
Christ died for us and accomplished perfect
obedience to God, it came about by God's
good will toward us. Otherwise, there was
nothing to compel Christ to perform such a
work. This does not mean, however, that Cal-
vin regarded Christ's obedience as unable to
merit God's grace for us through its own pow-
er. This explanation will not do, since it does
not agree with Calvin's words, particularly
with these: Christ was not able to gain any
merit except by the good pleasure of God. This
sentence makes it clear that Calvin not only
thought that Christ was obedient because God
willed it, but also that he could not gain any
eum mereri potuisse, nisi Deus, ut mereretur,
decrevisset. Praeterea id apertis etiam ex aliis
verbis fit, quae paullo ante scripserat. Dixerat
enim: Equidem fateor, si quis simpliciter & per se
Christum opponere vellet iudicio Dei, non fore
merito locum, quia non reperietur in homine
dignitas, quae possit Deum promereri.
merit by his obedience unless God had
decreed that he should gain merit. Calvin's
position becomes even more clear from what
he had written just before: For my part, I
confess that, if someone should wish simply and
per se to oppose Christ to the judgment of God,
there will be no place for merit, because worth is
not found in humans that is able to gain merit
with God.
At dices fortasse, Calvinum in his verbis
Christum, ut hominem, dumtaxat considerare,
non autem ut Deum. Quasi ver in eo loco
quaereretur, utrm Christus, quatenus homo est,
aliquid nobis meritus esset, & non aperta esset
disputatio de toto Christo, utrm scilicet haec duo
pugnarent: Nos Dei gratia servatos esse, &,
Christum nobis apud ipsum Deum salutem
meruisse.
Perhaps you will say that Calvin, in this dis-
course, is considering Christ strictly from the
standpoint of his humanity but not as God.
You might say that it is as if Calvin were con-
sidering whether Christ, in so far as he is a
human being, could gain merit for us. Ac-
cordingly, Calvin is not really saying anything
one way or the other about the entire Christ
(i.e., in both natures) gaining merit. Calvin
simply addresses this question: is our salva-
tion by the grace of God opposed to Christ
meriting salvation for us with God himself?
Qud igitur Calvinus Christi, ut hominis, in hac
disputatione mentionem fecit: hoc non ideo
factum est ab eo quia totum Christum sibi
considerandum non proposuerit: alioqui
quaestionem non decidisset; sed quia rect
noverat, divinam naturam nihil nec sibi, nec aliis
mereri posse, & Christum non nisi quatenus
homo est, mereri aliquid potuisse. Quod si aliun-
de in eius scriptis non eliceretur, ex hoc uno cert
loco apertissim colligeretur. Ut enim Christum
simpliciter, & per se, hoc est, a Dei (ut ipsemet
deinde se explicat) ordinatione & beneplacito
separatum mereri non potuisse probet, inquit, non
posse in homine dignitatem reperiri, quae Deum
promereri possit. nam si, Christum alia ratione,
qum quatenus homo est, simpliciter & per se
mereri potuisse, arbitratus esset: ineptissim
argumentatus fuisset, & nihil plan dixisset.
Now, let us consider the fact that Calvin treats
Christ from the standpoint of his humanity in
this disputation. We should not interpret this
to mean that Calvin did not intend to consider
the entire Christ (i.e., in both natures). There
is another reason why Calvin did not express
himself clearly on this question. He rightly
knew that the divine nature could not gain
merit for itself or for others, and that Christ
could gain merit only in so far as he was a
human being. Even if this cannot be demon-
strated from other passages in his writings,
this one passage certainly implies it with clari-
ty. In order to prove that Christ simply and
per se (i.e., apart from God's ordination and
good pleasure, as he explains later) could not
gain merit, he says that there is nothing about
human beings that is worthy to gain merit
with God. If Calvin believed that Christ could
gain merit simply and per se in some other
way than through his humanity, then his
argument becomes inept and completely lack-
ing in substance.
[285] Idem Calvinus ex parte hoc ipsum, de quo
agitur, nempe qud Christus propria eorum, quae
passus est virtute, eas poenas, quas nos divinae
iustitiae debebamus, non solverit, non obscur
indicat, cum alibi ait, Christum dependisse, ac
persolvisse omnes, quae a nobis expetendae
erant, poenas: uno hoc dumtaxat excepto, qud
doloribus mortis non poterat detineri. Quomodo
enim eorum, quae dantur, propria vi satisfieri
potest, si mins solvitur, qum debetur?
[285] To some extent Calvin himself is quite
clear about this very fact which is under
discussion, namely, that Christ could not have
paid, on the basis of the inherent power of his
sufferings, the penalties that we owed to
divine justice. He makes this plain when he
states that Christ paid the entire penalty that
should be demanded of us, with just this one
exception: the anguish of death could not hold
him in subjection. But he could not make
satisfaction through the inherent power of
what he performed if he paid less than what
was owed.
Sensit igitur vir iste, cui nec doctrina, nec iudicii
acumen deerat, fieri non posse, ut Christus
eorum vi, quae fecit, & passus est, nobis
quidquam fit meritus, aut pro nobis divinae
iustitiae satisfecerit. Verumtamen interea, cum
verum aliquot sacrae scripturae locorum ac
germanum sensum assequi non posset, &
fortasse illi durum videretur ab inveterata, & ab
ipso iam recepta aliisque tradita sententia
discedere:
Therefore, Calvinwho lacked neither
knowledge nor sharp judgmentrecognized
that Christ could not gain any merit for us or
make satisfaction to divine justice for us on
the strength of what he did and suffered.
Nevertheless, Calvin was still unable to attain
to the true or genuine sense of some of the
scriptural passages on this subject. Perhaps it
was hard for him to depart from the long
established view still accepted by him and
handed down to others.
quamquam per quaerendi speciem a Laelio
Socino patruo meo veritatis admonitus: qud
Christus nobis salutem aeternam apud Deum
ver & propri promeritus sit, non mod
asseverare perrexit: sed quae ad Laelii
quaestionem responderat, & in libro ipsius
epistolarum deinde edita sunt, in suam
Christianae religionis institutionem retulit; in
quibus nihil fer praetermissit, quod ad receptam
illam sententiam confirmandam afferri potuerit.
My uncle Laelius, however, advised Calvin of
the truth, under the pretense of inquiring into
the matter. But not only did Calvin assert
confidently in response that Christ literally
and properly merited eternal salvation for us
with God, but the arguments that he had writ-
ten in response to Laelius' questions and then
published in the book of his letters were re-
peated in his Institutes of the Christian Religion.
In these writings Calvin left no stone
unturned to confirm the traditional opinion.
28

Mirum san est, illum, qui Christum per se &
simpliciter quidquam mereri non potuisse, &
viderat & concesserat, non vidisse, inde
It is certainly strange that one who had both
understood and admitted that Christ could
not gain merit simply and per se did not also
see that it necessarily follows from this that
necessari sequi, Christum ver & propri nihil
nobis meritum fuisse. Pugnat enim secum ipsa
haec enunciatio, & seipsam destruit, Christum
ver & propri salutem nobis non per se, sed per
Dei gratiam fuisse promeritum. Nam, si verum &
proprium meritum intervnit: iam excluditur Dei
gratia. sin non per se, sed per Dei gratiam
meritus est Christus: iam ver & propri meritus
non est. Ut enim in re simili inquit Paulus, Si per
gratiam: iam non ex operibus; alioqui gratia iam
non est gratia. Sin ex operibus: iam non est
gratia; alioquin opus iam non est opus. Rom. 11
v. 6.
Christ could not truly and properly gain merit
for us. For this proposition opposes itself and
self-destructs: Christ literally and properly
merited salvation for us, not per se but
through the grace of God. If literal and
proper merit had occurred, then God's grace
is thereby excluded. But if Christ did not gain
merit per se but through the grace of God,
then he did not at the same time gain literal
and proper merit. Speaking on a similar
subject, Paul states, If it is through grace then it
is no longer by works: otherwise grace is no longer
grace. But if it is by works then it is no longer by
grace: otherwise a work is no longer a work
(Rom. 11:6).
Nec regula illa vulgaris, quam Calvinus affert,
Quae subalterna sunt non pugnant, ad hanc
repugnantiam tollendam quidquam momenti
habet.
Calvin appeals to a common rule to obviate
this difficulty: Factors that are subalternate do
not oppose.
29
But this rule is useless for re-
moving the aforementioned contradiction.
Primm enim nihil hc est subalternum; sed
eodem tempore de eadem re invicem pugnantia
dicuntur.
First of all, in the case we are considering,
nothing is subalternate, but they are men-
tioned as contradictory, occurring at the same
time and concerning the same issue.
Deinde non ita intelligenda [286] est regula illa,
quasi ea, quae ver inter se pugnant, subalterna
esse queant. Nisi autem hoc modo intelligatur,
non video, quomodo regula illa Calvinum
adiuvare possit. si enim ita argumentari vult: Dei
gratia, & proprium Christi meritum sunt
subalterna; ergo non pugnant: quia ea, quae
subalterna sunt, pugnare nequeunt; pro concesso
id sumit, de quo disputatur. Negant enim, qui ab
eo dissentiunt, & de hoc potissimm contenditur,
Dei gratiae proprium Christi meritum subiici
posse. idque propterea negant, qud pugnent
inter se Dei gratia, & proprium Christi meritum.
Quorum ver unum alteri subiiciendum est, ea
inter se iam pugnare non debent.
Next, we should not understand this rule
[286] to mean that those phenomena which
are in genuine opposition to one another can
exist in a subalternate relationship. Other-
wise, the rule is of no help to Calvin. If Calvin
wishes to argue, The grace of God and the
proper merit of Christ are subalternate.
Therefore, they are not in opposition, since
those phenomena that are subalternate cannot
be in opposition, he has taken for granted the
very question under dispute. Those who dis-
agree with him deny that the proper merit of
Christ is consistent with the grace of God; this
is the main point of contention. Their denial
is based on the fact that the grace of God and
the proper merit of Christ are in direct opposi-
tion. On the other hand, if one of these is
subject to the other, then they ought not to be
in mutual opposition any longer.
Fit quidem interdum, ut ea, quae alioqui per se
invicem pugnant, ex eo, qud unum alteri
subiiciatur, pugnare desinant. Nam ob eam
subiectionem id, quod subiicitur, qualitates, quae
repugnantiae caussa erant, deponit; nec iam est
id, quod per se antea erat.
Indeed, sometimes it happens that two
phenomena that otherwise are in mutual
opposition cease to be opposed because one is
made subject to the other. Because of that
subjection the object that is subordinated lays
aside the qualities which caused the oppo-
sition. Therefore, the subordinated object is
no longer, per se, what it was before.
Atque, ut ab hoc meriti, & gratiae Dei exemplo
non recedamus: pugnant inter se haec duo, qud
homo per Dei gratiam salvus fiat, & qud suis
meritis salutem consequatur. Si tamen merita
hominis Dei gratiae subiiciantur, id est, si dicatur,
eos, qui Christo obediunt, mereri vitam aeternam,
non quidem ipsius obedientiae vi, sed quia Deus
pro sua incomparabili benignitate statuit, ut,
quicumque Christo obediat, vitam aeternam
habeat, non pugnabunt in salute consequenda
ipsius hominis merita cum Dei gratia, cum ab hac
illa omnino pendeant. Sed iam non erunt ea
merita propri merita, & qualia sunt ea, quae cum
divinam gratia consistere nequeunt.
Applying this to the case of merit and of
God's grace, the following two states of affairs
are in mutual opposition: that human beings
are saved by God's grace, and that they attain
salvation by their own merits. In fact, human
merits are really subject to the grace of God.
That is, those who obey Christ merit eternal
life, not on the strength of their own obedi-
ence but because God has determined, out of
his incomparable kindness, to grant it to
whomever obeys Christ. Such human merits
do not oppose God's grace in salvation, since
these merits are completely dependent on his
grace. But in this case, such merits are no
longer literal merits, and therefore are no
longer unable to coexist with divine grace.
In Christo, si velimus eum divinae iustitiae plen,
& ver pro nobis satisfecisse, opus est veris &
propriis meritis, & ob eam rem ipse Calvinus, qui
satisfactionem istam asserit, ait, rect & propri
dici, Christum nobis promeritum esse gratiam Dei
& salutem, & ver Christum obedienti su nobis
apud patrem gratiam acquisivisse ac promeritum
esse. Sed quomodo huiusmodi merita in Christo
reperiemus, si, ut ea cum divina gratia, propter
quam nobis salutem partam esse constat,
conciliemus, divinae gratiae ipsa subiecerimus,
atque dixerimus, Christum non propria eorum,
quae fecit, & passus est, virtute, sed quia ita Deo
pro sua bonitate visum fuit, su obedienti nobis
liberationem a poenis peccatorum nostrorum
If we wish to affirm that Christ made full and
literal satisfaction for us to divine justice,
Christ had to gain literal and proper merits.
Consequently, Calvin himself, who upholds
the doctrine of satisfaction, states that it is cor-
rect and proper to affirm that Christ merited
the grace of God and salvation for us, and that
Christ genuinely acquired and merited grace
for us with the Father by his obedience. But
how can we find this literal kind of merit in
Christ if, in order to reconcile those merits
with divine grace (on account of which grace
salvation was provided for us) we subject
those merits to divine grace? How can we
affirm literal merit in Christ if we say that
Christ merited freedom from the penalties of
our sins for us only because God was pleased
promeritum fuisse? [287] Nam quid aliud hoc
est, qum disert negare, merita vera & propria in
Christo reperiri?
to grant this freedom, for the sake of his kind-
ness, and not because of the inherent power of
his deeds and sufferings? [287] This is simply
a clear denial that Christ gained literal and
proper merit.
Mult plura dici possent, ut apert
demonstraretur, si concedatur, Christum per se &
simpliciter non posse divino iudicio opponi, sed
tantummodo, ut inquit Calvinus, propter Dei
beneplacitum: concedi quoque necesse esse,
non potuisse a Christo pro peccatis nostris ver &
plen satisfieri. Sed quoniam plerique ex vestris
idem sentiunt, & res ipsa per se satis manifesta
videtur; amplis in ea patefacienda immorandum
non esse arbitrati sumus.
There is much more we could say to show
clearly that once one admits that Christ could
not counterbalance divine judgment per se
and simply, but only on the basis of God's
good pleasure, as Calvin says, then one must
also admit that Christ could not have made
literal and complete satisfaction for our sins.
But because many of you are of the same
opinion, and because the matter is self-evi-
dent, I have decided not to elaborate further
on this aspect of the discussion.
Cumque ea tria, quae ab initio proposueramus,
abunde me praestitisse confidam: & planum
fecisse primm, Deum potuisse, nulla vera pro
peccatis nostris satisfactione accepta, ea nobis
condonare: deinde, etiam id facere eum voluisse:
postrem, non potuisse Christum vel sua morte,
vel alia ratione iustitiae divinae pro peccatis
nostris satisfacere; Nihil aliud, antequam in hac
disputatione nostra, quod ad eam satisfactionem
attinet, peroremus, faciendum restat, qum, ut
argumentum quoddam, quod tamquam omnium
validissimum ad tuam opinionem propugnandam,
meamque profligandam in extrema acie
constituere voluisti, omnium infirmissimum esse
ostendamus.
I believe I have accomplished the three goals I
laid out from the start, namely to show that:
(1) God could forgive us our sins without
having received literal satisfaction for them;
(2) he in fact wished to do so; and (3) Christ
could not, either by his death or in any other
way, make satisfaction for our sins to divine
justice. Therefore, the only task remaining be-
fore we wind up our disputation about the
doctrine of satisfaction is to consider a certain
argument of yours. You would have us be-
lieve that this argument is the most potent
defense of your position and the ultimate
weapon against mine. But I will show that
this argument is actually the weakest of all.

Chapter VII
Chapter VII
Argumentum, quo maxim probari credebat
Adversarius, Christum mortuum fuisse, ut pro
peccatis nostris satisfaceret, nullius momenti
esse, breviter primm demonstratur.
First of all, the argument that my opponent
believes to be a key proof that Christ died to make
satisfaction for our sins is briefly shown to carry
no weight.
Institutum igitur sermonem persequens, pluribus
verbis illud ad hunc modum explicas.
After the beginning of the discourse, you give
a long explanation of your doctrine in the
following words:
Covetus:
You, Covetus, state:
Sed vide quaeso in quam foveam imprudens
incidas. Cum enim videris tibi deum valde
extollere in eo quod illum misericordem tantum a
nobis agnosci cupis, non vides interea te illi
foedissimam iniustitiae notam inurere. Nam si
Christus, quemadmodum asseris, mortuus non
est, ut pro nobis Deo satisfaceret. Cert mori
nullo modo debuit, ac ne potuit quidem, Et
iniustus erit Deus, qui eum morti tradiderit.
I wish you could see the pit into which you have
fallen, you imprudent person! You think you are
praising God highly, in as much as you would
have us acknowledge him as only merciful. Mean-
while, you are blind to the fact that you have
branded him with the most loathsome injustice.
For if Christ, as you claim, did not die to make sat-
isfaction for us to God, then he certainly should
not have died at all, and in fact could not have
died. God would have been unjust to have handed
him over to die.
An non enim mors peccati stipendium est Rom. 6.
Et nunquid per peccatum mors intravit in
mundum, ita ut iam in homines non eo nomine,
quo sunt homines, sed quo peccatores imperium
[288] suum exerceat? At Christus, ut dicis, non
est mortuus pro peccatis nostris. Ergo sequeretur
mortuum esse pro suis. Nam ver mortuus est.
The wages of sin is death (Rom. 6). And death en-
tered the world through sin, such that God exer-
cises his [288] authority against human beings.
But he does not exercise judgment against human
beings per se, simply because they are human, but
because they are sinners. You, however, deny that
Christ died for our sins. Therefore, it follows that
Christwho really did diemust have died for his
own sins.
Et moritur nemo nisi pro peccatis aut suis aut
alienis. Dicere autem, Christum mortuum esse
pro peccatis suis, quanta esset blasphemia: De
fructu enim arboris non comedit, & peccatum in
eo nullum unquam fuit. Nonne scis illum a
peccato originali immunem? Conceptus est enim
non ex homine, sed ex spiritu sancto. Unde &
factum est, ut ab ipso conceptionis momento,
quod in utero Mariae virginis conceptum erat,
sanctum esset; quod etiam ex Matth. primo liquet.
No one dies unless it is because of sin: either for his
own sins or for the sins of someone else. But to say
that Christ died for his own sins is a great blasphe-
my. Christ did not eat the fruit of the tree, and he
never committed any sin. Do you not realize that
he was free from original sin? He was conceived
by the holy spirit, not from a human being. From
the very moment of conception, what was con-
ceived in the virgin Mary's womb was holy. The
beginning of Matthew's gospel makes this
especially clear.
Quod autem attinet ad ea peccata, quae vocamus
actualia, Certe ubi radix non est, aut arbor, ibi
neque rami neque fructus inveniri possunt. Ubi
non est originalis corruptio, ibi etiam non sunt
actualia peccata, quae non aliunde quam ab illa
corruptione manant. Idcirco Christus dictus est
agnus immaculatus. Idcirco ad Heb. 4. dicitur
Concerning those sins that we call actual,
certainly where there is no root or tree there are no
branches or fruit. Where there is no original
corruption there are no actual sins; actual sins
arise only from such corruption. Consequently,
Christ is called the spotless lamb. Hebrews 4
states that he was tempted in all things even as we
are, but without sin. And in 2 Cor. 5 Paul writes
tentatus fuisse in omnibus, ut & nos, sed absque
peccato. & 2. Cor. cap. quinto scribit Paulus
Christum non novisse peccatum, & ut testatur
Petrus prioris secundo Christus peccatum non
fecit, nec inventus est dolus in ore eius.
that Christ did not know sin. Peter states (1 Pet.
2) that Christ did not commit sin, nor was any
guile found in his mouth.
Iam igitur si Christus, ut asseris, mortuus non est
pro peccatorum nostrorum satisfactione, si etiam
ut scriptura ver docet non est mortuus pro
peccatis suis, cum peccatum in eo nullum
unquam fuerit. Nunquid fateri oportebit (quod ut
impiissimum ne cogitare quidem fas est) Christum
a Deo iniust, immerit, & nulla cum legitima
causa morti traditum esse?
If, as you affirm, Christ did not die in satisfaction
for our sins, and if, as Scripture truly teaches, he
did not die for his own sins, since he never had
any, it will be necessary to conclude that Christ
was handed over to die by God unjustly,
undeservedly and for no legitimate reason. But
this conclusion is too impious even to imagine!
At satius est (non mihi sed veritati crede) explosa
opinione tua, secundum sacrae scripturae
doctrinam agnoscere Deum nostrum, qui ver
misericors est, etiam ver iustum esse iudiciique
sui iustissimam & aequissimam severitatem in eo
potissimum declarasse, quod ut nos peccatores
salutis aeternae participes faceret, voluerit a
Christo filio suo nostroque mediatore & servatore
pro peccatis nostris moriente, divinae suae
iustitiae plen satisfieri. Hoc fecit Christus, & in
eo servatorem nostrum esse & agnosci, debere
manifestissime declaravit.
Now that your view is demolished, would it not be
better to acknowledge, in keeping with the scrip-
tural doctrine, that our God is both truly merciful
and truly just? Would it not be better to admit
that God declared the just and fair rigor of his
judgment especially by willing that Christ his son,
our mediator and savior, should die for our sins to
make complete satisfaction to his divine justice, in
order to make us partakers of eternal salvation?
Do not take my word for it but believe the truth!
Because Christ made satisfaction, he declared that
he is our savior, and should be acknowledged as
such.
Socinus
I say in response:
Si omnia, quae in hac argumentatione tua
perperam a te dicta sunt, persequi atque
explicare voluero, vereor, ne haec sola huius
meae responsionis pars iustum volumen efficiat.
Quare reprimam me; & in ipso argumento
refellendo totus ero. Caetera errata tua maiore
ex parte tantummodo indicabo, ut vel ex eo,
qum iniquam caussam defendas, agnoscere
possis.
If I decided to refute and discuss in detail all
of the falsehoods in this argumentation of
yours, I am afraid that this part alone of my
response to you would comprise an entire
book! Therefore, I will refute the essence of
your argument. As far as your other errors
are concerned, I will only mention them to
some extent. Even at that, you should be able
to see just how wicked the cause is that you
are championing.
Ut igitur argumenti tui quae vis sit, appareat, illud
paucis verbis [289] perstringemus, & ad
In order to make the strength of your
argument apparent, I will deal with it briefly
syllogismi formam, ut loquuntur, reducemus. Sic
igitur argumentaris. Quicumque moritur, aut pro
suis aut pro alienis peccatis moritur. Christus
mortuus est. Ergo Christus aut pro suis, aut pro
alienis peccatis mortuus est. Sed Christus pro
suis peccatis non est mortuus. Ergo Christus pro
alienis peccatis mortuus est.
[289] by reducing it to the form of a syllogism,
as it is called. You argue as follows:
Whoever dies, dies either for his own sins, or
for the sins of others. Christ died. Therefore,
Christ died either for his own sins or for the
sins of others. But Christ did not die for his
own sins. Therefore, Christ died for the sins
of others.
Tota haec argumentatio concedi potest, & tamen
nihil vel te adiuvabit, vel mihi oberit. Nam, ut
supra lat exposui, & fateor ipse, & glorior,
Christum pro peccatis nostris mortuum esse;
quamvis tu, id me negare, hc disert dicas. Qua
de re satis iam alibi supr dictum fuit: & quanta
haec calumnia videri possit, apert
demonstratum. Sed, ut ibi diximus, quid hoc ad
satisfactionem istam vestram stabiliendam?
Even if I conceded this entire argument it
would still do nothing to help you or to refute
me. As I explained extensively above, I
myself both confess and boast that Christ died
for our sinseven though you say rather
bluntly that I deny this. I have already
discussed this issue more than adequately
elsewhere, clearly demonstrating how your
assertion was a malicious slander. But, as I
asked there, how does your argument support
your doctrine of satisfaction?
An non, mori pro peccatis, est peccatorum
caussa mori? An non peccatorum causs mori
quis potest, nulla satisfactione interveniente?
Qud si dixeris, in prima argumenti tui
propositione, Pro peccatis mori, nihil aliud
significare, qum, pro peccatis satisfacere, & te in
eum sensum ea verba hoc loco accipere; certe &
falsa, & impia per se apparebit ea propositio, cum
innumerabiles moriantur, qui nec pro suis, nec
pro alienis peccatis satisfaciunt: immo, ut te
credere arbitror, Christo excepto, omnes. Quae
tamen propositio, etiam si verissima esset, nihil te
adiuvaret; ut mox apparebit.
To die for sins means to die because of
sins. And someone can certainly die because
of sins apart from any satisfaction taking
place. Perhaps you say that the phrase to die
for sins in the context of the major premise of
your argument simply means to make satis-
faction for sins. In that case, your prop-
osition is plainly false and impious per se,
since countless individuals die who neither
make satisfaction for their own sins or for the
sins of others. In fact, I am sure that you
yourself believe Christ to have been the only
one who died to make satisfaction. Neverthe-
less, even if your proposition were totally
true, it would still be of no help to you, as I
will soon make plain.
Nam alia fortasse ratione tua verba
interpretaberis; & dices, Pro peccatis mori, in tua
propositione idem esse, ac, mori, quia sibi
imputentur peccata. Verm ex iis, quae supr
disputata sunt, apparet, ea verba istud significare
non posse; cum dictio Pro numquam impulsivam,
Perhaps you will interpret your words
differently, saying that to die for sins in
your proposition means to die because sins
are imputed to the person. But from what
we disputed above, it appears that the words
of your proposition cannot be understood in
this sense. This expression for never speaks
sed semper finalem caussam declaret. Qud si
tamen sensu isto, quamquam nimis improprio, ea
verba protulisti; nihil aliud in tua argumentatione
concludis, qum, Christum mortuum esse, quia illi
aliena peccata imputata fuerint. Sed consequitur
ne ex hoc, Christum pro nostrm omnium
peccatis divinae iustitiae satisfecisse? Nonne
aliena peccata imputata illi dicerentur, si vel unius
tantm hominis peccata illi imputata fuissent,
propter quae mortuus esset? Nonne omnis illa,
quam somniasti, & mihi obiicere voluisti, Dei
iniustia evanesceret, si vel propter unicum
cuiuspiam peccatum, quod ipsi imputatum foret,
Christus [290] mortuus fuisset, atque, ut tibi
placet, pro ipso satisfecisset? Quomodo igitur, ut
ista Dei iniustitia non existat, necessarium esse
concludis, ut Christus ideo mortuus fit, quia ipsi
nostra (omnia scilicet) peccata imputata fuerint?
of the impulsive cause but always of the final
cause. But if in fact you use those words in
this sense, improperly so, all one could con-
clude from your argument is that Christ died
because the sins of others were imputed to
him. But it does not follow from this that
Christ made satisfaction to divine justice for
the sins of us all. If Christ died because even
the sins of only one person were imputed to
him, sins other than his own will have in that
case been imputed to him. If Christ would
have died (and, if you please, made satisfac-
tion) because even just one sin of anyone was
imputed to him, [290] then all of that injustice
on God's part, which you dreamed up and
want to bring up in reproach against me,
would vanish. Therefore, how can you con-
clude that in order for God not to be guilty of
this alleged injustice it was necessary for
Christ to die because our sinsall of them
will have been imputed to him?
Sed demus, omnia peccata nostra Christo
imputata fuisse, & ob eam rem ipsum mortuum
esse; num idcirco pro ipsis peccatis eum
satisfecisse, concludendum erit? Certe (ut
quidem ex tua propositione in alterum istum
sensum accepta necessari sequitur) quilibet
nostrm, qui Christiani sumus, ideo morimur, quia
imputantur nobis delicta nostra. Nemo tamen
nostrm pro suis delictis, moriendo, satisfacit.
But let us grant that all our sins were imputed
to Christ and that he died as a consequence.
We still should not conclude that he made
satisfaction for those sins. Certainly if we un-
derstand your proposition in the second sense
mentioned above, it necessarily follows that
any of us Christians dies because our trans-
gressions are imputed to us. Nevertheless,
none of us makes satisfaction for his own
transgressions by dying.
Sed postrem dices, tuam propositionem nihil
aliud sibi velle, qum, neminem mori, nisi vel ipse
peccaverit, vel aliena peccata illi imputentur: nec
propterea affirmari abs te, qud nobis delicta
nostra imputentur, quamvis mortem non
experturis, nisi peccassemus. Atqui neque hoc
verum est, ut infr demonstrabitur:
Finally, you might say that your proposition
means simply that no one dies unless either
the actual person under consideration has
sinned or because the sins of someone else are
imputed to that person. But you will add that
you are not thereby also affirming that our
own transgressions are imputed to us, grant-
ing that had we not sinned we would not
experience death. But neither is this inter-
pretation of your proposition true, as I will
demonstrate below.
nec, si esset, verbis tuis ullo modo conveniret; in
quibus necesse foret, dictionem Pro mod hac,
mod illa ratione interpretari. Praeterea satis est
ostendisse, potuisse Christo aliena peccata
imputari, & quidem ita, ut pro ipsis satisfecerit,
nec tamen inde sequi, illum pro nostris omnium
delictis satisfecisse; quia, videlicet, ad istud, unde
hoc sequi negamus, conficiendum, vel unius
tantm peccata illi imputata fuisse sat fuerit.
Even if it were true, it would contradict your
own words, according to which we must
interpret the expression for sometimes in
one way and sometimes in another. Besides,
the terms of your argument would be suffi-
ciently met if one shows that the sins of others
could be imputed to Christ in such a way that
he will have made satisfaction for them. But
it does not follow from this that Christ made
satisfaction for the transgressions of us all. I
deny that it necessarily follows because if the
sins of even only one person were imputed to
him, the requirements of your proposition
would be met sufficiently.
Itaque, ut praefatus sum, totum argumentum tibi
concedi potest, nec tamen id, quod cupis, ullo
modo efficies. Sed, ut argumenti tui non fallacia,
aut vanitas tantm, sed foeditas etiam
conspiciatur; ipsam illam propositionem tuam, ex
qua tota argumentatio pendet, adhuc diligentis
examinabimus.
And so, as I said before, I could concede your
entire argument to you and you will still not
accomplish your goal. But I shall examine
this same proposition of yourson which
your entire argumentation hangseven more
carefully. In doing so I hope to expose the
hideousness of your argument, in addition to
its fallacy and futility.
Chapter VIII
Chapter VIII
Argumentationis Adversarii propositionem,
Neminem mori, nisi pro peccatis aut suis aut
alienis, falsam & ineptam esse, de quacumque
tandem morte eam interpretari velimus, apert
ostenditur.
The proposition of my opponent's argumentation,
Nobody dies except for sins: either for his own
sins or for the sins of others, is clearly shown to
be false and absurd, regardless of the sort of death
to which we would have it apply.
Ais igitur, Moritur nemo, nisi pro peccatis aut suis,
aut alienis. Dic, rogo te, axioma istud tuum unde
tandem prodit? Quanam vel ratione, vel
scripturae auctoritate, quocumque modo illud
interpreteris, confirmari potest? Cur ita nud,
nulla express ac disert [291] confirmatione
adhibita, ipsum proferre audes, cum illi uni
argumentatio tua universa innitatur? Hoc cert
non illud est, quod te facere in tuo scripto
profiteris, in illis praesertim Graecis verbis ad eius
finem appositis, . Non solm
You say, No one dies, unless it is for either his
own sins or for the sins of others. Tell me:
where did you come up with this axiom?
And, interpreting it however you will, what
reason or authority of Scripture can you use to
confirm it? Since your entire argument rests
on this one axiom, how dare you assert it so
baldly, without adducing a shred of evidence
for it? [291] You are hardly observing the
promise you made when you wroteespe-
cially the promise you made in those Greek
words you placed at the end of your letter,
enim sine scriptura id a te dictum est; sed contra
omnem scripturam, adeoque contra omne ius,
omnemque rationem.
(ouden ater graph s legomen), we say noth-
ing without scriptural proof. For not only
did you state this axiom without any scriptur-
al proof, but it in fact contradicts all Scripture,
as well as all law and reason.
Nam aut verbum Moritur in tuo axiomate mortem
perpetuam significat, aut temporariam. Rursus, si
temporariam: aut violentam, aut naturalem. Si
mortem perpetuam significat; inepta & falsa est
enunciatio; cum omnes homines, post primos
parentes, etiam sine ullis propriis peccatis, ut
postea demonstrabitur, eam mortem subire
cogantur: & nemo sit, qui pro alienis peccatis
mortem aeternam subeat, etiamsi dictioni Pro, in
enunciatione ista, impulsivae caussae
significationem tribuas.
The verb die in your axiom signifies either
eternal death or temporary death. On the one
hand, if it designates temporary death, it
signifies either violent or natural death. On
the other hand, if it designates eternal death,
then the statement is absurd and false. This is
because all human beings born after our first
parents, even without any sins of their own
(as I will show later), are compelled to under-
go that death. But no one undergoes eternal
death for the sins of someone else, even
granting that the word for in your axiom
speaks of the impulsive cause.
Tametsi enim omnes ab Adamo prognati morti
perpetuae sunt obnoxii, id, ut infr latis
disseretur, non ideo fit, qud ipsis Adami delictum
imputetur: sed quia ab eo progeniti sunt, qui morti
perpetuae divino decreto fuit addictus. & ita non
propter peccati imputationem, sed propter generis
propagationem, id illis contingit.
Even if all who are Adam's descendants are
liable to experience eternal death, they do not
die because Adam's transgression is imputed
to them, as we will discuss in more detail
below. Rather, they are liable to eternal death
because they have descended from one who
was given over to unending death by divine
decree. Therefore, the fact that death befalls
the human race is the result of the prop-
agation of the race, not of the imputation of
sin.
Si dixeris, Adami delictum satis impulsivam
caussam mortis perpetuae, cui obnoxii sunt
homines, fuisse, cum, absque eo delicto foret, id
non accidisset; Primm hoc, illud redolet, quod
reprehendi solet, Utinam ne in nemore Pelio, & c.
Nec enim de remota, sed de proxima caussa
quaerimus. Proxima autem caussa eius mortis,
ut diximus, non fuit nobis Adami delictum, sed
generis propagatio. Deinde, ut supr vidisti, non
mins a me, qum a caeteris, affirmatur,
Christum occasione nostrorum peccatorum
mortuum esse: immo etiam causs ipsorum; sive
Perhaps you will respond that Adam's trans-
gression was a sufficient impulsive cause for
eternal death, to which all human beings are
liable. After all: eternal death would not have
entered the picture without this transgression.
First of all, this is reminiscent of the common
object of criticism, Would that not in Pelion's
woods. . . .
30
We are not seeking the remote
but the proximate cause. The proximate cause
of eternal death, as we said, is not Adam's
transgression imputed to us but is the propa-
gation of the race. Next, as I showed you
above, I am not the only one to affirm that our
impulsivam, sive finalem caussam intelligas.
Verum tamen, sicut a finali caussa satisfactionem
penitus excludo; ita ab impulsiva imputationem
qum longissim removeo.
sins provided the occasion for Christ's death.
In fact, I even say that Christ died because of
those sinsregardless of whether you un-
derstand the cause as impulsive or final.
Nevertheless, even as I completely exclude
satisfaction from the final cause, I also utterly
rule out imputation from the impulsive cause.
Sed, ut verum fit, Adami posteris ipsius Adami
delictum imputari, & ita fieri, ut mortem perpetuam
propter alieni delicti imputationem quis subire
possit: quid hoc ad Christum, qui mortem
perpetuam minim subiit?
Now, according to your view, Adam's trans-
gression is imputed to Adam's own descen-
dants, thereby making it possible for someone
to undergo eternal death because of the impu-
tation of another's transgression. But this has
nothing to do with Christ, who hardly experi-
enced eternal death.
Iam si violentam mortem verbum Moritur in tuo
axiomate significat, falsissima est tui argumenti
propositio; cum nemo sit [292] qui iur propter
aliena peccata occidatur, & innumerabiles
reperiantur, qui quamvis nec propter sua, nec
propter aliena peccata, tamen interficiuntur.
quales sine dubio sunt martyres Dei, & Christi
omnes, & quicumque, innocentes cum sint, tamen
occiduntur; praesertim ver Christiani, & Deo
fidentes, quibus omnia delicta divina benignitate
condonata sunt.
If, moreover, the verb he dies in your axiom
signifies a violent death, then your argument's
proposition is completely false. No one [292]
is justly killed because of another's sins. Also,
there are countless individuals who die, yet
not on account of their own sins or the sins of
another. Certainly all the martyrs of God and
Christ fall into this category, as well as any
innocent person who is killed. But the
foremost examples are Christians and
believers in God, who have received for-
giveness of their transgressions out of divine
generosity.
Nec ver huic manifestissimae veritati adversatur
id, quod ait Petrus, Tempus esse, ut iudicium a
Dei domo incipiat; quasi Deus iustis hominibus
mala multa immittat, propter aliqua ipsorum
peccata: alioqui ea non immissurus. Apostoli
enim scopus est ostendere, quid impiis & ab ipso
Deo alienis Deus facturus sit, cum pios & suos ita
affligat. nam, ut idem postmodum ait, Si iustus
vix servatur, impius & peccator ubi comparebunt?
Hoc est, si Deus vult, iustos per multas
calamitates ingredi in regnum caelorum, quasnam
calamitates experturos esse credimus homines
impios & peccatis onustos?
Peter does not contradict this obvious truth,
when he says that it is time for judgment to
begin with the house of Godas though God
would send many evils, which he would not
have otherwise sent, against the righteous be-
cause of some of their sins. The Apostle's pur-
pose is to show what God is going to do to the
impious, who are separated from God, since
he brings affliction on the pious, who are his
own people. Shortly after the statement
quoted above, Peter writes, If the righteous
scarcely are saved, what will become of the wicked
and the sinner? That is, if God intends for the
just to enter the kingdom of heaven through
many tribulations, what kind of tribulations
should we expect that the wicked, who are
immersed in sins, will experience?
Iudicium autem, afflictiones iustorum mins
propri appellavit, quia eodem nomine iniustorum
afflictiones complecti voluit: quae propri iudicium
appellantur; ut inter utrosque commodis
comparationem persequi posset; praesertim,
cum, in specimen, iustorum quoque afflictiones,
poenae illis a Deo inflictae videantur. Quare de
Christo ipso, qui caput omnium iustorum fuit,
scriptum est, nos autem reputavimus eum plagis
afflictum, percussum a Deo, & humiliatum, Esa.
53 v 4.
Besides, Peter used the term judgment to
describe the afflictions of the just in a less
proper sense. He did so because he wanted
the afflictions of the unjust to be comprehend-
ed under the same term, which is in their case
a judgment properly so called. By applying
the same word to both the righteous and the
wicked he could more readily draw a com-
parison between each of them, especially
since, by way of example, the afflictions of the
righteous also appear as penalties that God
has inflicted on them. Likewise, concerning
Christ himself, who was the head of all the
just, it is written, But we regarded him as
stricken with blows, smitten and humiliated by
God (Isa. 53:4).
Huic autem rei, quam hoc loco observamus,
simile est illud, quod supr notavimus, Christi
afflictiones, & infirmitates impropri in epist. ad
Heb. peccata dicta fuisse: cum eodem tempore id
nomen propri infirmitatibus antiquorum
sacerdotum accommodaretur: ut concinnis cum
illis sacerdotibus Christus conferri posset. Atque
huius sermonis figurae, cum scilicet idem verbum
eodem tempore uni propri, alteri impropri
accommodatur, innumera sunt, & in profanis &
sacris scriptis eaque clarissima exempla.
What we see in this passage is similar to the
observation we made above, namely, that in
the book of Hebrews the afflictions and
infirmities of Christ were called sins in an
improper sense, due to the fact that the term
is appropriate for the infirmities of the priests
under the old covenant. Therefore, the writer
to the Hebrews applies the term to Christ to
facilitate his comparison with those priests.
There are many clear examples of such a
figure of speechwhich applies the same
word in the same context literally to one
person or object but improperly to another
found throughout both secular and sacred
literature.
Non igitur affliguntur iusti a Deo, ut ver & propri
adversus eos, quos carissimos habet, quibusque
omnia delicta condonavit, iudicium exerceat.
Nec, si illi omni prorsus peccato vacarent,
propterea eos numquam ullis perpessionibus
subiiceret; cum id declarandae bonitatis, &
potentiae suae grati potissimm ab ipso fiat.
quae profect mirum in modum elucebunt, [293]
Therefore, the righteous are not afflicted by
God in the sense that he truly and properly
exercises judgment against those whose trans-
gressions he has completely forgiven and who
are dear to him. Even if they were completely
without sin it would not follow that he would
never subject them to any sufferings, since he
brings about their sufferings especially to
declare his goodness and power. These attrib-
cum miserrimos in hoc mundo & contemptissimos
homines, quia in ipso omnem spem collocaverint,
ipsiusque dicto audientes fuerint, ad sempiternam
felicitatem & gloriam evehet.
utes will truly shine forth in a wonderful way,
[293] since he will carry the most wretched
and despised of this world to eternal hap-
piness and glory, because they will have
placed their entire hope in him and will have
obeyed his word.
Qud si non rar suos affligit Deus, ut eos
admoneat & castiget, in officioque contineat; id
cert non tunc fit, cum, ut veri Christiani, aliquid
mali patiuntur, & Deum eam ipsam ob caussam
glorificandi materia illis suppeditatur. De
eiusmodi autem perpessionibus, quibus Christiani
homines ut Christiani, subiacent, loqui ibi
Apostolum, proxim antecedentia verba
manifest declarant. Iam, cum Deus suos
castigat, tunc & alio nomine, qum quia ipsius
veri cultores sint, eos affligi curat; & quamvis ipsi
tunc etiam Deo ob id gratias agere debeant, &
argumentum inde benignitatis divinae percipere
possint; tamen ea ratione, quam Petrus sine
dubio intelligit, Deum glorificandi materiam non
habent; quae ex eo demum proficiscitur, qud
quis dignus habeatur, qui, pro Dei gloria
illustranda, iniuri afficiatur. unde summa oritur
laetitia; de qua ipse Petrus in eadem epistola
nonnulla alia divinissim scribit: & de qua verba
fiunt Act. 5. v. 41. & aliis in locis.
But if God often afflicts his own to admonish,
chasten and maintain their obedience to him,
that is different than when he allows them to
suffer some evil as a means of glorifying him
because they are Christians. The immediately
preceding words make it clear that the Apos-
tle is talking about sufferings of this sort, to
which Christians as Christians are subject.
Indeed, when God chastises his own, he
makes it clear that they are not afflicted be-
cause they are his true worshippers per se.
Even though they should thank God for their
chastisement and see in it the proof of his
kindness toward them, nevertheless this is no
occasion for glorifying God in the way Peter
has in mind. Peter is speaking of the case
where someone is deemed worthy to be
afflicted with harm in order to show the glory
of God. This is the cause of great rejoicing.
Peter, under inspiration, speaks about this re-
joicing elsewhere in the same epistle. Like-
wise, Acts 5:41 and other texts speak of this
rejoicing as well.
Quocirca ea, quae auctor ad Heb. docet cap. 12.
ubi afflictiones eorum, ad quos scribit, qui, ut ex
multis coniici potest, e qud essent Christiani,
affligebantur, castigationes divinas esse affirmat,
non ita intelligenda sunt, quasi semper, id est, de
omnibus Christianorum afflictionibus id dici possit:
sed tantummodo, cum ii, qui, ut Christiani,
affliguntur, nondum tales sunt, quales in hoc
mundo eos esse oportet; ita ut, non quia sint veri
Christiani, sed quia Christi nomen profitentur, ea
mala patiantur.
Consequently, we must understand the teach-
ing which the writer to the Hebrews gives in
chapter 12 as follows. In this chapter he
affirms that the afflictions of his readers are
divine chastenings. These individuals were
afflicted in so far as they were Christians, as
we can infer from many indications. But
these chastenings should not be understood
as if they characterize all the sufferings which
Christians experience. God chastises Chris-
tians in this way who are not yet the kind of
people they ought to be in this world.
Therefore, they do not suffer these evils
simply because they are true Christians per
se, but because they confess the name of
Christ.
31

Huiusmodi autem fuisse illos, ad quos auctor ille
scribit, & tepidos, quales Christus aspernatur, in
Deo colendo eo tempore se praebuisse, ade ut
castigatione divina non leviter indigerent: cum alia
eiusdem epistolae verba non obscur indicant,
tum ver illa apert demonstrant, quae eodem
loco habentur; videlicet: nondum usque ad
sanguinem restitistis, contra peccatum
decertantes; & obliti estis exhortationis, quae
vobis tamquam filiis, loquitur, & c. Ista enim
oblivio cert iis non obrepsisset, qui fervidi Dei
cultores esse perrexissent.
The writer to the Hebrews includes in this
group those who have proven themselves
lukewarm in worshipping God. Christ de-
spises them to such an extent that they stand
in serious need of divine chastisement. Not
only do other passages in this same epistle
clearly bear this out, but the words of this
very passage prove this: You have not yet
struggled to the point of shedding blood in your
fight against sin. And you have forgotten the ex-
hortation, which was spoken to you as to
sons. . . . Such forgetfulness would not have
crept up on those who had continued to be
passionate worshippers of God.
Iam ver, etiamsi concederem, omnes
Christianorum afflictiones [294] castigationem
divinam secum coniunctam habere (quod tamen
a veritate alienissimum esse existimo), nihil hoc
ad mortem violentam, de qua loquimur, quam
profect alia ratione, qum, ut eos castiget, & in
officio contineat, suis inferri vult Deus. Nulla enim
post mortem esse potest vitae correctio, aut
emendatio. Ex quo perspicuum est, ut diximus,
innumerabiles esse, qui, quamvis nec propter
sua, nec propter aliena peccata, tamen
interficiuntur. Eiusmodi sunt ii, qui Deo ita cari
sunt, ut eorum innocente sanguine gloriam suam
patefieri velit. Nam, propter aliena peccata eos
non interfici, nemo est qui dubitet. Propter sua
ver, quis affirmare audebit; cum nec punitioni fit
locus, ubi omnia condonata sunt nec vitae, &
morum perfectiori emendationi, ubi mors
intervenit?
For the sake of argument, I will grant you
what I regard as completely false: that all the
afflictions which Christians experience [294]
entail divine chastisement. But such a con-
cession would have no bearing on the violent
death about which we speak. God does not
afflict his own with such a death to chastise
them or to maintain their allegiance to him.
After all, there can be no correction or
emendation of life after death! This fact
makes it plain, as we said, that there are
countless individuals who are killed, neither
because of their own sins nor because of the
sins of others. In this category are people who
are so dear to God that he wishes to reveal his
glory through the shedding of their innocent
blood. In their case, no one doubts that they
are not killed because of the sins of others.
On the other hand, no one will dare to affirm
that they are killed for their own sins. That is
because there is no occasion for punishment
where there is complete forgiveness of sin,
nor is there an opportunity for a more com-
plete emendation of life and morals where
death occurs.
Eos autem violentam mortem ex Dei voluntate
non experturos, nisi aliquid peccassent, tantum
abest, ut verum fit, ut qu innocentiores sunt, e
magis per ipsorum mortem Dei gloria illustretur, &
Dei propositio
32
in iustis affligendis deserviatur.
Ita ut, quod ad hanc partem attinet, si fieri posset,
praestaret, eos nunquam quidquam mali
commisisse; quemadmodum, cum de ipso Christo
agemus, apertis ostendetur.
It is an utter falsehood to say that God would
not have willed their violent death unless they
had committed some sin. Quite the contrary:
the more innocent they are, the more God's
glory is shown in their death, and the more
God's purpose in afflicting the righteous is
served. In terms of their innocence, their vio-
lent death, if it were possible, would be proof
that they never committed any evil. We will
show this clearly when we talk about Christ
himself.
At ver, ut video, verbo Moriendi mortem
naturalem praecipu significare voluisti. Nam,
violentam te non intellexisse, ostendunt verba illa
tua, An non enim mors peccati stipendium est,
Rom. 6. Et nunquid per peccatum mors intravit in
mundum, ita ut iam in homines non eo nomine,
quo sunt homines, sed quo peccatores imperium
suum exerceat? Quae tua verba ad violentam
mortem, quatenus violenta est, accommodari
nequeunt; cum mors violenta, quatenus est
violenta, nec peccati stipendium sit, nec in homi-
nes imperium suum exerceat.
But I perceive that you intend the verb to
die to signify primarily natural death. By the
following statements you indicate that you do
not have violent death in view: For is not
death the wage of sin (Rom. 6)? And did not death
enter the world through sin, so that it should
exercise its jurisdiction over humans not per se,
because they are human, but because they are sin-
ners? Your statements cannot apply to a
violent death, in so far as it is violent. Violent
death, to the extent that it is violent, is not the
wage of sin, nor does it exercise its jurisdic-
tion over human beings.
Sed vide, qum long a vertitate aberres. Mors
naturalis quatenus naturalis est, & omnibus
communis, non est peccati stipendium, sed natu-
rae nostrae, quam ipsemet Adamus in ipsa
creatione accepit, propria sequela. Peccati
autem stipendium est moriendi necessitas, &
mors aeterna.
Look at how far you have deviated from the
truth! Natural death, in so far as it is natural
and common to all, is not the wage of sin. It is
the proper result of our nature, which Adam
himself received in his very creation. But the
wage of sin is the necessity of dying and eter-
nal death.
Id vel ex eo patet, qud Christus nos, qui illi fidem
habemus, ab omni prorsus peccato, id est,
peccati poena & reatu liberavit; & tamen
naturalem mortem non ademit: sed aeternam
dumtaxat, & moriendi necessitatem. De aeterna
morte non est, qui ambigat.
The truth of my position is shown by the fact
that Christ freed us, who exercise faith in him,
completely from all sinthat is, from the
penalty and guilt of sin. Nevertheless, he did
not take away natural death but only eternal
death and the necessity of dying. There is no
doubt that he had eternal death in mind.
De moriendi autem necessitate [295] admonere
nos possunt ii ex nobis, quos vivos offendet
Concerning the necessity of dying, [295] we
find the case of Christians who are alive at
postremus Christi adventus, qui mortem non
gustabunt. Idem enim iudicium faciendum est de
omnibus, quod de paucis illis. Nam si moriendi
necessitatem Christus non sustulisset: ne illi
quidem pauci mortem effugere possent.
Moriuntur igitur caeteri fideles, non quia propter
peccatum eos mori necesse fit, cum peccati
reatus penitus sublatus fuerit: sed propter
mortalitatem, quae etiam ante peccatum, & sine
peccato, homini, utpote corpus animale habenti,
& ex terra ab ipso initio formato, naturalis erat; ut
rect inprimis animadvertit, & lat exposuit
Augustinus de Genesi ad litteram lib. 6. cap. 19.
& deinceps usque ad postremum caput 29.
Christ's second coming, and who will not
taste death, to be instructive. For if Christ had
not removed the necessity of dying, even
these few individuals would not be able to
avoid death. Therefore, all other believers
(i.e., who are not alive at the second advent)
die because of their mortality, not because it is
necessary for them to die on account of their
sin; the guilt of their sin was borne thorough-
ly. Their mortality is natural to human beings
even before sin and quite apart from it, in as
much as it is natural to living organisms,
formed from the earth right from the start.
Augustine notes this quite correctly, and
discusses it in detail in his commentary on
Genesis; see book six, chapters nineteen
through the end of chapter twenty-nine.
Beneficio igitur Christi a moriendi necessitate
liberati sunt, qui ipsi confidunt, alioqui mortem
necessari subituri. Hinc manavit illa in epist. ad
Heb. sententia cap. 9. ad finem, Statutum est
hominibus semel mori. Ibi enim hominis ex divino
decreto conditio, quam ab Adamo traximus, citra
Christi beneficium, consideratur. Quamquam
verbum , quod vetus interpres convertit,
statutum est, eventum, & rei naturam potis,
qum divinum decretum, declarat.
Therefore, the benefit of Christ frees believers,
who would otherwise experience death, from
the necessity of dying. The statement which
appears at the end of Hebrews 9, It is ap-
pointed to men once to die, is based on this
truth. That passage considers the human con-
dition from the standpoint of the divine
decree. This passage has our condition de-
rived from Adam in view, apart from the
benefit of Christ. Although the old transla-
tion
33
renders the word (apokeitai) as to
be appointed, it actually speaks of the event
and the nature of the thing rather than of the
divine decree.
Qud autem mors naturalis, quatenus naturalis
est, poena peccati non sit, latissim a nobis alio
loco disputatum est. Hc pauca haec dixisse
sufficiat; praesertim cum ex eodem cap. 6. epist.
ad Rom. constet, Paulum, cum dixit, peccati
stipendium esse mortem, non naturalem, sed
aeternam mortem intellexisse. Eo siquidem
sensu paullo ante bis Mortis nomen usurpaverat,
cum de eadem re loqueretur: primm v 16.
deinde v. 21. id quod illi ubique familiarissimum
Since we disputed elsewhere in great detail
that natural death, to the extent that it is
natural, is not the penalty of sin, these few re-
marks should be adequate for our purposes
here.
34
This brief discussion is adequate
particularly since Romans 6 shows that Paul
understands eternal and not natural death
when he states that the wages of sin is death.
That this is Paul's understanding is shown
from the fact that he used the word in that
sense two times just shortly before (vv. 16 and
est. quod etiam vitae aeternae antithesis, quam
donum Dei esse dicit, ibidem satis apert
ostendit.
21); natural death is his most typical meaning
of the word. In this same passage he shows
clearly what is the opposite of eternal life,
which he calls the gift of God.
In quincto autem cap. ubi scriptum est, mortem in
mundum per peccatum intrasse, nihil cogit de
morte naturali, quatenus naturalis est, ea verba
intelligere. Immo de necessaria & aeterna morte
toto illo cap. agi apert indicant extrema verba
illa: Ut, sicut regnavit peccatum in mortem, ita &
gratia regnet per iustitiam in vitam aeternam.
primm enim tamquam de re praeterita, & quae
dumtaxat ante Christum aut sine Christo esset,
de regno loquitur peccati in mortem. At mors
naturalis etiam post Christum regnat; &, quatenus
naturalis est, in iis etiam, qui per ipsum a peccati
reatu liberati sunt, [296] locum habere
conspicitur. Deinde eam mortem vitae aeternae
opponit; quod de aeterna morte sermonem esse
ostendit.
Moreover, in the fifth chapter, where he
writes that death entered the world through
sin, there is no compelling reason to under-
stand this as a reference to natural death, in so
far as it is natural. Indeed, Paul's words at the
end of chapter five show clearly that he is
talking about necessary and eternal death
throughout the entire chapter: So that, just as
sin reigned in death, even so grace should reign
through righteousness to eternal life. For one
thing, he speaks about the reign of sin in
death as if he were speaking about a past
matter, which would be applicable before
Christ or without Christ. But natural death
continues to reign even after Christ and, in so
far as it is natural, is seen to apply even to
those who have been freed through him from
the guilt of sin. [296] Next, he places that
death in opposition to eternal life. This shows
that the death he had in mind is eternal death.
Nam si dicas, de aeterna morte ibi sermonem
esse non posse, cum in omnes eam mortem
pervasisse dicat apostolus: Respondeo, ibi non
de eventu, sed de reatu agi. Certum est autem,
eos etiam, qui ante Christum mortem aeternam
non subierunt, nisi Dei grati servati essent, non
mins, qum caeteri, funditus perituros fuisse,
quippe qui & ipsi mortis aeternae rei forent.
Perhaps you will object, saying that the
Apostle cannot be talking about eternal death,
since he states that death came to all people. I
would respond that he is not talking about the
actual occurrence of death but only about the
guilt connected with it. There is no doubt that
even those who did not experience eternal
death before Christ were liable to it. There-
fore, they would have completely perished if
they, no less than others, had not been saved
by the grace of God.
Confirmatur hoc ex eo, quod eodem cap. v 18.
scriptum est, Igitur, sicut per unius delictum in
omnes homines in condemnationem, & c. Neque
enim omnes per delictum illud reipsa condemnati
fuere; sed rei tantummodo condemnationis facti
sunt. Ex quo etiam perspicu apparet, quid
This truth is confirmed by verse 18 of this
same chapter: Therefore, just as the transgres-
sion of one resulted in condemnation against all
human beings. . . . For it is not true that all
were actually condemned through that trans-
gression, but only that they were made liable
to that condemnation. From this fact what
mortis nomine intelligat toto eo cap. Paulus. Id
enim, quod alibi mortem appellat, hc
condemnationem vocat. Quod etiam fecerat v 16.
Quae autem sit condemnatio illa, ex antithesi
Iustificationis vitae, quae hoc v 18. subiicitur,
manifestum est. Iustificatio enim illa vitae nihil
aliud est, nisi absolutio a peccatis per vitam
aeternam. Quare condemnatio similiter nihil aliud
esse potest, qum mortis aeternae reatus.
Paul means throughout the entire chapter by
the word death becomes plain. What he
elsewhere calls death, he calls condemna-
tion here. (See, for example, verse 16.) Of
what that condemnation consists is evident
from being placed in antithesis to justification
of life, which is discussed near verse 18. Justi-
fication of life is simply the acquittal from
sin's penalty through eternal life. Accord-
ingly, condemnation is simply the guilt of
eternal death.
Vides igitur, te pessim loqui, cum ais, neminem
mori, nisi pro peccatis aut suis, aut alienis, si de
naturali morte loqueris: cum potis nemo prorsus
sit, qui pro peccatis, aut propter peccata, sive
sua, sive aliena morti naturali subiaceat: & ad
axioma tuum tacit confirmandum te sacrae
scripturae auctoritate abusum fuisse.
I trust that you can now see how bad your
statement is, namely, that no one dies unless it
is for his own sins or for the sins of another, if
the death you have in mind is natural death.
Quite the opposite is true: no one is subjected
to natural death because of sins: either his
own or another's. And so, you see that in
your tacit attempt to confirm your axiom you
have abused the authority of holy Scripture.
35

Ex quo etiam manifestum est, non posse axioma
tuum sustineri, etiamsi illud ita interpretareris, ac
si dixisses, Nemo moritur, nisi vel ipse peccaverit,
vel aliena peccata ipsi imputentur; cum nemo, ut
dictum est, ideo naturaliter moriatur (de qua
morte sine dubio loqui voluisti) quia peccaverit.
Nam, etiamsi nemo peccaret: propter id tamen,
qud homines nati essent, naturali morti omnes
essent obnoxii.
Moreover, since no one experiences natural
death because of sin (and it is natural death
about which you speak), it is evident that
your axiom cannot stand, even if you decided
to interpret it to mean, No one dies unless
that person sins, or unless the sins of another
are imputed to him. Even if no one had
sinned, all would be liable to experience natu-
ral death on account of the fact that they were
born human.
At dices fortasse, de naturali quidem morte, id
est, de subiacendo ipsi morti te loqui voluisse:
verm non quatenus tantummodo id naturale est;
sed etiam quatenus est necessarium.
Perhaps you will qualify your argument as
follows. You will say that you indeed want to
speak about natural death, that is, about being
subject to this death. But your intention is to
speak about this death not only to the degree
that it is natural, but even in so far as it is
necessary.
Si ita intelligis, eodem morbo laborat axioma
tuum, quo laboraret, si de morte aeterna sive
perpetua loqui voluisses, cum nullus homo [297]
If you choose to understand your axiom in
this way, it will be afflicted with the same
malaise from which it would suffer if you
would speak of unending or eternal death.
umquam fuerit, aut futurus sit, qui propter aliena
peccata (quae sibi videlicet, imputentur; sic enim
ipse intelligis) moriendi necessitati aut subiectus
fuerit, aut subiacere possit.
There was never any [297] human being, nor
will there ever be, who is subject or could be
subject to the necessity of dying on account of
the sins of someone else (i.e., imputed to him,
which is how you would have it).
Quod si tamen fieri posset, nihil istud ad
Christum, qui moriendi necessitati subiectus non
fuit. Immo, dices, subiectus fuit. nam divino &
incommutabili decreto statutum erat, ut is
moreretur. Atqui ista necessitas moriendi non ea
est, de qua loquimur, quaeque humano generi
propter peccatum inflicta est. nec enim ab
antiquissima illa divini iudicis sententia, cuius vi
necessari omnes homines, qui ipsius Dei
benignitate inde exempti non fuerint, mortem
subeunt, necessaria Christi mors profecta est;
sed ex singulari Dei voluntate tota pependit.
But even if death did result from sin, this
would have nothing to do with Christ, who
was not subject to the necessity of dying. But
you will object that he was indeed subject to
death. It was established through a divine
and irrevocable decree that he should die. But
that is not the kind of necessity we are talking
about in this discussion, and which is inflicted
on the human race as a result of sin. The ne-
cessity of Christ's death did not result from
that ancient sentence of the divine judge,
through the force of which sentence all
human beings necessarily undergo death. (I
am speaking about all human beings who
have not been excluded from it by the kind-
ness of God himself.) But Christ's death de-
pended completely on God's particular will.
Praeterea necessitati moriendi is subiectus esse
ver dici non potest, qui in ipsa morte non
remanet: immo ne mori quidem. Hinc
Abrahamus, Isaacus, & Iacobus, quamvis mortem
naturalem gustaverint, vivere tamen dicuntur;
nimirum quia in morte remansuri non sunt, atque
ob eam rem Deus, qui non mortuorum, sed
viventium est Deus, ipsorum se Deum merit
vocare potuit, Christo teste: qui inde futuram
illorum resurrectionem adversus Sadducaeos
apert colligit.
Besides, one cannot truly be said to have been
subject to death or even to die unless he
remains in that very death. Hence, Abraham,
Isaac and Jacob are said to live even though
they experienced natural death, because they
certainly will not remain in death. And for
that reason God, who is the God of the living
and not of the dead, could rightly call himself
their God. Christ bore witness to this, clearly
inferring from this their future resurrection, in
opposition to the teaching of the Sadducees.
Qui necessari moriuntur, in aeterna morte etiam
remanent. nam, ut paullo ante dictum fuit, qui
mortem aeternam non subeunt, ii, utpote ab omni
peccati poena liberati, non necessari, sed
naturaliter tantm moriuntur. Cui naturali morti
ipse quoque Christus subiectus fuit: non quidem
propter peccata ulla vel sua, vel aliena: sed quia
Moreover, one who necessarily dies also re-
mains in eternal death. As I noted a bit
earlier, those who do not experience eternal
death, having been freed from sin's penalty,
die only naturally but not necessarily. Christ
himself was also subject to this natural death.
He was not subject because of any sineither
his own or those of anotherbut because he
homo natus erat. Mortuus est enim propter
peccata nostra, non quatenus illi alioqui,
postquam homo natus fuerat, naturaliter
moriendum erat, sed quatenus violentam mortem
subiit volens.
was born human. Christ died for our sins in
the sense that he was willing to undergo a
violent death, not in the sense that he would
have died naturally otherwise, being born
human.
Natus est quidem homo, ut violentam mortem
subire posset, & per eam mortem aboleret illum,
qui mortis imperium habebat, hoc est diabolum,
atque eos liberaret, qui eiusdem mortis timore per
totam vitam obnoxii erant servituti. Heb. 2. 14.
Sed ipsum hominem nasci, & naturaliter morti
subiectum esse, per se, nec propria, nec aliena
peccata ullo modo arguit.
He was indeed born human so that he could
undergo a violent death, and through that
death destroy the one who exercised death's
jurisdiction over us, that is, the devil. And he
was born human to free those who were en-
slaved to this same death for their entire lives
through fear (Heb. 2:14). The fact that this
man was born and naturally subject to death
proves that he died on his own account and
not on account of his own sins or the sins of
another.
Quare non erat, qud tantopere laborares, ut
ostenderes, Christum nulla prorsus proprii peccati
labe infectum fuisse; quasi, eo concesso,
consequens esset, ipsum pro alienis peccatis
morti [298] fuisse obnoxium: & periculum foret, ne
ego, ut sententiam meam defenderem, adversus
apertissima sacrarum litterarum testimonia
Christum peccatorem facerem. Quod tamen dum
abs re, & intempestiv curas, iusto Dei iudicio
foed lapsus es: cum ad Christi innocentiam
confirmandam eam rationem affers, qud
Christus originalis (quam vocant) corruptionis
omnino expers fuerit. Ais enim, ubi non est
originalis corruptio, ibi etiam non sunt actualia
peccata, quae non aliunde, qum ab illa
corruptione manant.
Consequently, what you have labored so hard
to prove is false. You tried to show that
Christ was not at all tainted with the stain of
his own sin. But then you argue as if, having
shown that, it somehow follows that he was
liable for the sins of others, [298] and that I
was in danger of making Christ a sinner
(against the clear testimonies of holy Scrip-
ture) in order to defend my view. But even as
you were obsessed with this issue, you have
nevertheless fallen into the just judgment of
God quite loathsomely, since you advanced
the argument of Christ's freedom from origi-
nal corruption (as they call it) in order to
confirm Christ's innocence. For you say,
Where there is no original corruption, there are
no actual sins, which do not arise other than by
that corruption.
Ergo, si tibi credendum est, primus homo peccare
non potuit, quia procul dubio, antequam peccaret,
originalis corruptionis omnino expers erat.
Agnoscis, ut arbitror, errorem tuum; &, vel hoc
solo, iustas poenas te supervacaneae tuae
ratiocinationis dedisse, iam sentire potes.
Now, if you are to be believed, the first man
would not have been able to sin because,
without a doubt, he was utterly free of origi-
nal corruption before he sinned. I have no
doubt that you recognize your error and this
alone is punishment enough for your su-
perfluous reasoning.
Quid igitur iam dicemus de universa ipsa
argumentatione tua, cum non mod, etiamsi tota
tibi concedatur, nihil inde efficiatur, quod vel tuam
sententiam iuvet, vel meam infirmet: sed
propositio illa tua, ex qua omnis argumenti vis
petenda est, quocumque pacto eam interpreteris,
ade falsa & inepta sit, ut vix quidquam magis
falsum, aut ineptum dici possit? Id autem mult
evidentis adhuc demonstrabitur, si eam rursus,
idque paullo exactis & interis (ut ita dicam)
expenderimus.
There is really nothing left to say about your
entire argument, since even if I granted your
argument in its entirety it would still do
nothing to help your position or harm mine.
Not only that, but your proposition, from
which the entire force of your argument is de-
rived, is so false and absurdhowever you
wish to interpret itthat one would be hard
pressed to say anything more false and
absurd. I will show its absurdity more plainly
still, when we again examine it more precisely
and up close (so to speak).
Chapter IX
Chapter IX
Adversarii indicata propositio, dum penitus
examinatur, magis etiam & falsa & inepta
demonstratur. &, qud Christus sit mortuus, nec
tamen illi peccata nostra imputata fuerint: hoc vel
maxim Dei iustitiam commendare, ratione
concluditur.
A more detailed analysis of my opponent's
proposition, which has already been mentioned,
demonstrates it to be all the more false and absurd.
It is concluded with good reason that the fact that
Christ died and yet our sins were not imputed to
him especially commends the justice of God.
Cum igitur dicis, Nemo moritur, & c. aut verbum
Moritur ita intelligis, ut id, quod fit, spectetur, aut
id, quod fieri debet, aut id, quod fieri potest.
Whey you say, No one dies . . . , you
understand the verb to die to refer either to
what does in fact happen, or what ought to
happen, or what can happen.
Si id, quod fit, spectasti, idem est, ac si dixisses,
nemo umquam est mortuus, & c. Atqui hoc
primm, ut vidimus, falsissimum est. Deinde,
etiamsi verissimum esset, nihil, quod te adiuvaret,
ex eo elicere posses; cum multa iur fiant, quae
nunquam vel ante, vel post facta fuere: &
interdum non iure solum, sed maxima etiam cum
laude, & gloria illius, qui facit.
Now, if you would have the verb refer to
what does in fact happen, the meaning is the
same as if you had said, No one ever
dies. . . . But first of all, this is completely
false, as we saw. Next, even if it were abso-
lutely true, you could still derive nothing
from this which would help your position.
Many unique but nevertheless legitimate
events occur, which never happened before
and will not happen in the future. Indeed, not
only is it legitimate for someone to bring
about such a unique occurrence, but
sometimes the person may perform it to his
own highest praise and renown.
Sed si id, quod fieri debet, respexisti; perinde est,
ac si dictum esset, Nemo [299] mori tenetur. Hoc
Now, if you had in view that which ought to
occur, your statement means the same as if
pariter, ut supr ostendimus, falsissimum est. Et,
si verissimum esset, nihil tamen ad rem faceret;
cum, ut demonstratum fuit, Christus non ideo
mortuus fit, quia mori alioqui teneretur: sed quia
ita & Deo, & ipsi visum est.
you had written, No [299] one is bound to
die. . . . But this meaning is likewise com-
pletely false, as I showed above. Again, even
if it were absolutely true, it would still accom-
plish nothing toward the matter under con-
sideration. We already demonstrated that
Christ did not die because he was otherwise
bound to do so, but because it was agreeable
to both God and himself.
Sin ver ad id, quod fieri potest, respicere voluisti;
id duplicem habet rationem. Aut enim ius, aut
ipsum factum spectatur; & ita, ut iurisconsulti
loquuntur, aut de iure, aut de facto.
But if you understand the verb to refer to that
which can occur, we must consider the
proposition from two angles. You are either
speaking of what can occur legally or in fact.
And so, as the lawyers tell us, you are speak-
ing either de jure or de facto.
Si de facto loqueris: idem est, Nemo moritur, & c.
quod, Fieri non potest, ut quis moriatur, & c.
Verm istud ade falsum esse apparet, ut nulla
refutatione indigeat. Qud enim quis nec pro
suis, nec pro alienis peccatis moriatur, id neque
ullam, ut loquuntur, contradictionem implicat, nec
aliquid praeterea eorum, quae sive
impossibilia esse perhibentur, continet.
If you are speaking de facto, the expression
No one dies. . . . is equivalent to It cannot
happen that anyone dies. . . . But that is so
obviously false that there is no point in even
refuting it. For to say that someone dies nei-
ther for his own sin nor for the sins of another
does not imply any contradiction, as they say,
nor does it entail any phenomena which are
maintained to be (adunata) or impossible.
Sin autem de iure loqui voluisti, nihil aliud ea
verba significant, qum, iniustum & iniquum esse,
ut quis moriatur: & tamen nec pro suis, nec pro
alienis peccatis id patiatur. Et hoc sine dubio illud
est, quod potissimm dicere voluisti. Nam inde,
si id verum esset, rect concluderes, cum dicis,
Iniust facturum fuisse Deum, qui Christum morti
tradidisset, nisi eum pro alienis peccatis mori
voluisset, cum pro suis is, qui innocentissimus
erat, mori non posset:
But if you wish to speak de jure, your words
can only mean that it is unjust and wicked for
someone to die unless it is for his own sins or
for the sins of another. This meaning, un-
doubtedly, is what you intend by your state-
ment. And if this statement were true, you
would have drawn a correct inference from it
when you said, God would have committed
an unjust act when he handed Christ over to
die, unless he wanted him to die for the sins
of others, since he, being completely innocent,
could not die for his own sins.
& ob eam rem statuis, me Deo, dum eum
misericordiae nomine extollere curo, imprudenter
foedissimam iniustitiae notam inurere, qui
affirmare ausim, Christum non ideo mortuum
You try to establish from this alleged fact the
idea that I have rashly branded God with the
most loathsome mark of injustice, even as I
seek to praise him as merciful. I supposedly
do this because I dare to affirm that Christ did
fuisse, qud ipsi aliena peccata imputata fuerint.
nam hoc omnino illud est, quod apud te ea verba
significant, Pro alienis peccatis mori.
not die because the sins of others were im-
puted to him. This imputation is the meaning
of your expression, to die for the sins of
another.
Quamvis enim, ut dictum fuit, vis dictionis Pro
cum ea significatione nullo pacto convenire
possit; verisimilius est tamen, te mins propri
loquutum fuisse, qum vel id conclusisse, quod
non quaeris, & ego quoque fateor, vel id
proposuisse, quod manifest & falsum & impium
esse deprehenditur; ut initio praesentis
disputationis satis demonstratum est.
But, as I already stated, the force of the word
for cannot in any way agree with this
meaning. Nevertheless, it is more probable
that you did not express yourself quite accu-
rately than: (1) that you would conclude what
you were not after and what I myself also con-
fess; or (2) that you intended to make a state-
ment that is plainly observed to be false and
wicked, as we observed at the start of this
present disputation.
Sentis igitur, iniustum esse, ut quis moriatur, qui
non ideo moriatur, quia ipsi vel sua vel aliena
peccata imputentur. Haec tua opinio duas partes
habet. Una illud est, quod verbis disert est
expressum Altera ex verborum sententia
necessari sequitur: Iur scilicet posse alicui
aliena peccata imputari, & ob eam caussam [300]
iur etiam mortem infligi, quamvis alioqui
innocentissimus fit.
Therefore, you regard it as unjust that some-
one should die unless that person dies be-
cause of the imputation of either his own sins
or the sins of another. Your position has two
parts. The one part you have stated expressly.
The other part is a necessary deduction from
your words: that the sins of another are
rightly imputed to someone, and for that
reason [300] death is rightly inflicted on the
person, even though that person is otherwise
completely innocent.
De priore parte primm videamus. Cumque iam
exemplis, eam a veritate mirum in modum
dissidere, supr demonstraverimus; operae pre-
tium fuerit, num idem rationibus confirmari possit,
experiri.
Let us begin by considering the first part.
Since earlier we used examples to demon-
strate that this first part of your position is
amazingly far from the truth, it will be valu-
able to see whether its falsity can likewise be
confirmed by rational arguments.
Cur igitur tandem iniustum censeri debet, ut
aliquis moriatur, quamvis ei nec propria, nec
aliena peccata imputentur? Cert non aliam ob
caussam, nisi quia mors peccati poena fit, &
nemo mori teneatur, nisi quia vel ipse peccaverit,
vel alius quispiam, pro quo ipse poenas luat. At
ver, an non potest quis volens id perpeti, quod
perpeti alioqui non tenetur: nec tamen propterea
ulla ex parte iustitiam laedere? Immo quid magis
Why must we conclude that it is unjust for
someone to die, even though neither the
person's own sins nor the sins of another are
imputed to this person? Certainly the injus-
tice could only arise from the notion that
death is the penalty of sin, and that no one is
bound to die unless either the person actually
sinned, or unless that person is bearing the
punishment for someone else's sin. But if
someone were willing, why could not that
laude & admiratione dignum esse potest, qum,
cum quis id facere nullo mod teneatur, multa
tamen mala experiri velle, ut aliis bene sit? Quod
igitur summis laudibus extollendum est, id
iniustum esse, affirmare non erubescemus?
person bear what they were not otherwise
obligated to bear, without harming justice? In
fact, there is nothing more praiseworthy and
admirable than for someone to suffer many
evils for the good of others, when that person
was under absolutely no obligation to do so.
We should be ashamed to call such laudable
action unjust!
Nulla quantumvis magna mala, & sontibus lege
constituta potest quisquam iniust, id est, cum
aequitatis, & rectitudinis offensione perpeti,
quamvis innocentissimus fuerit; nisi ea vel sine
caussa, vel ob iniustam caussam, perpetiatur;
praesertim si inde ad alios maxima commoda
manatura sint; sive is sua sponte omnino ea mala
subeat; sive, alio, cui parere debeat, iubente, ea
subire non recuset.
Regardless of how innocent a person might
be, and however serious are the evils (i.e., es-
tablished by law against the guilty) that they
suffer, the suffering only becomes unjust if the
person suffers them either for no reason or for
an unjust reason. (And by unjust I am speak-
ing of an offense against what is fair and up-
right.) And it is especially permissible under
any of these circumstances: (1) if the greatest
advantages will accrue to others as a result of
the suffering; (2) when the person expe-
riencing the suffering does so freely; or (3)
that the person who does not refuse to bear
the suffering agrees to do so at the bidding of
one to whom he owes obedience.
Iniustitia igitur non ex ipsa malorum sibi non
debitorum perpessione oritur; sed ex perpessionis
vel nulla vel iniusta caussa sive
36
occasione
proficiscitur.
Consequently, injustice does not arise from
the suffering of undeserved evils per se, but it
occurs when there is either no cause or an
unjust cause or occasion of the suffering.
Finge, ut similitudine ad rem nostram satis
accommodata veritatem investigemus simul, &
explicemus, Regem esse, qui multos ex suis
subiectis sibi contumaces ex lege in insulam
aliquam desertam, horridam, & pestilentem
deportari seu relegari iusserit; cumque ii partim
animo rebelli adversus ipsum esse perseverent,
partim domum redeundi omnem prorsus spem
abiecerint; iubeat Rex, filium suum, quem unic
diligat, & sibi obedientissimum esse noverit, in
eandem insulam se conferre: ibique tam diu
commorari, quoad aliqua perfecerit, ex quibus
contumaces illi ipsius Regis animum, si ipsi
Let us employ a metaphor, appropriate for the
issue before us, to help us both examine and
explain the truth. Imagine that there was a
king, who passed a law requiring many of his
subjects, who were stubbornly opposed to
him, to be banished to a horrible and pesti-
lential desert island.
37
Now, these subjects
continued to maintain a rebellious attitude
against the king, and had completely lost all
hope of ever returning home. So the king
commanded his son, whom he especially
loved and who was extraordinarily obedient
to him, to go to that same island and remain
there until he accomplished certain activities,
resipiscere velint, ade placatum fore, agnoscere
queant, ut non mod reditus in patriam sibi
concedatur, verm etiam ingentibus praeterea
beneficiis ab ipso Rege afficiantur.
through which these rebellious subjects
would be able to recognize the king's true atti-
tude toward them. The king wanted these
subjects to realize that if they would be
willing to repent, he would be pleased with
them. In fact, he would not only allow them
to return to their homeland, but he would
even bestow vast benefits on them.
Num, quia nemo, qui Regi contumax non fuerit,
eam insulam, ne [301] ad brevissimum quidem
tempus, incolere teneatur, & eiusmodi
contumaciae tantm poena eius insulae habitatio,
sive perpetua sive temporaria, constituta fuerit:
iniustum esse dicemus, ut filius, qui Regi semper
obedientissimus fuit, in ea insula, ipso Rege
iubente, per aliquod tempus habitare non recuset,
& sese omnibus malis, quae eam insulam
incolentibus perferre necesse est, subiicere non
dubitet, ut contumacium illorum resipiscentiam, &
ab ea poena liberationem maximamque utilitatem
procuret?
Now, let us grant that no one was obligated to
inhabit that island for even a moment unless
he was rebellious, [301] and that inhabiting
this island, either temporarily or perpetually,
is the penalty established for these stubborn
individuals only. Does this force us to
conclude that the son, who always obeyed the
king, did an unjust act when he agreed to
obey the king's orders to dwell on that island
for a period of time? And was it unjust for
him to agree to endure all the evils decreed
against these rebellious people, in order to
secure their repentance, liberate them from
that penalty, and bestow great benefits on
them? Not at all!
Quis & Regis, qui carissimum sibi &
coniunctissimum hominem, ut subiectorum
suorum saluti & tranquillitati consulat, tot malis
obiicere voluerit, & hominis illius, qui alacri animo,
quamvis innocentissimus, ea, quae nocentium
hominum poenae esse solent, ut alios inde
eximat, pati non detrectaverit, mansuetudinem,
munificentiam, & eximiam denique bonitatem non
miris modis praedicet, atque suspiciat?
Rather, everyone would both proclaim in the
strongest possible terms and admire the
gentleness, liberality and exceptional good-
ness of both the king and his son. Indeed, the
king had such regard for the peace and safety
of his subjects that he willingly subjected to
such evils the man who was dearest and
nearest to him. And we also extol his son,
who was ready and willing to suffer the pen-
alties that normally fall on the guilty, even
though he himself was completely innocent;
he did this in order to release them from their
punishment.
Quis hc aliquam iniustitiae vel inanem quidem
umbram animadvertere potuerit? Immo quis non
horreat, id iniustum esse, secum animo reputare,
quod ex nobilissima iustitiae parte, ex
beneficentia scilicet & liberalitate manaverit?
No one can find even a hint of unrighteous-
ness here. Instead, we shudder to entertain
the thought that this deed, which springs
from the most noble part of justice (that is,
kindness and generosity), is unjust.
Nos ii eramus, qui a Deo rege nostro in hanc
miseriarum & mortis insulam, propter
contumaciam nostram, in perpetuum ex divina
lege relegati fueramus & cum partim contumaces
esse pergeremus, partim, a tanta servitute
liberatum nos iri, nunquam speraremus; praecepit
Deus Iesu filio illi suo & carissimo &
obedientissimo, ut easdem miserias, eandemque
mortem tantisper subiret, dum nobis fides facta
esset, si resipuerimus, futurum, ut non solm a
miseriarum & mortis necessitate liberemur; sed
ad beatissimam quoque & sempiternam vitam
transferamur.
We were the ones who were perpetually con-
signed to this island of miseries and death, by
order of the divine law which God our king
instituted against our sins. And partly since
we, too, continued to maintain a rebellious
attitude, and partly since we had completely
lost all hope of being liberated from our slav-
ery, God commanded Jesus, his own most
dear and obedient son, to undergo those same
miseries and that same death to which we
were subject. He endured this until faith was
kindled in us to believe that if we repented,
God would not only free us from the necessity
of death and miseries, but that he would also
bring us to blessed and unending life.
Paruit ille; &, quamquam sanctissimus, volens se
tantis malis subiecit, quae hominum sceleribus
debentur. Atque hac ratione salutis viam nobis
patefecit.
Jesus obeyed, and, even though completely
holy, willingly subjected himself to the evils
which the wicked deeds of people deserve. In
so doing, he revealed to us the way of salva-
tion.
Est, quis ipsius Dei, & Christi, in hoc opere
perficiendo, ingentem & inauditam cum
liberalitatem, tum charitatem non obstupescat?
Est, qui praestantissimam iustitiae partem Deum
& Christum hac in re exercuisse, agnoscere
38
non
compellatur?
No one can fail to be astounded at the enor-
mous and unheard of graciousness and love
of both God and Christ in performing this
work. Everyone must acknowledge that in
this way God and Christ exercised the better
part of justice.
Est denique, qui Deum hc iniustitiae accusari
posse, dicere non perhorrescat, nisi Christo alie-
na peccata imputata fuerint? Num iniuria aliqua
Christo a Deo facta est, quia ipsius iussu, ut nobis
bene [302] esset, mala scelerosis hominibus
debita haud invitus subiit?
Next, there is no one who would not shudder
to say that, unless the sins of others were im-
puted to Christ, God can be accused of injus-
tice in this case. For God hardly wronged
Christ when, by God's command, he willingly
endured the evils deserved by the wicked, so
that it might turn out well for us. [302]
Tum demum illi iniuria facta fuisset, si tanta mala,
quantumvis volenti, poenae nomine ei immissa
forent; quippe qui nulli poenae, utpote
innocentissimus, subiacere posset. Quid qud
omnium, quae, Deo iubente, non poenae quidem
nomine, sed nos a poena, ex divina sola
And finally, God would have wronged Christ
if he allowed such great evils to come upon
Christ as a punishment, regardless of how
willing Christ might have been. Christ cer-
tainly could not have been subjected to any
punishment, in as much as he was completely
innocent. How else are we to explain the fact
clementia, liberandi grati, pertulit, eiusmodi
praemium reportavit, quod omnem humanae
mentis captum superat, quodque ut supr visum
est, ipsi magistri vestri universae ipsius
obedientiae quam longissim antecellere
confitentur, sic, ut, ipsum id commereri potuisse,
prorsus negent?
that he brought back reward that exceeds the
capacity of the human mind to fathom, be-
cause of all the evils that he endured at God's
command? (Even your own teachers admit
that the extent of Christ's reward far outstrips
the extent of his obedience, thereby denying
that he could deserve this reward fully.)
What he endured was not called punishment,
but it freed us from punishment by divine
mercy alone.
Nulla igitur iniustitiae suspicio, plan relinquitur in
eo, qud Deus Christum mori voluerit, quamvis &
ipse Christus innocentissimus esset, nec aliorum
peccata illi imputata fuerint. Quin immo omnia
bonitatis, & beneficentiae, & porr iustitiae in eo
Dei consilio plena conspiciuntur.
The fact that God wished for Christ to die,
even though Christ was both completely
innocent and at the same time the sins of
another were not imputed to him, occasions
no cause for suspicion. Rather, God's plan
shows his complete goodness, kindness and,
in turn, justice.
& ea, unde tibi (nescio quo pacto) iniustitiae
suspicio orta est; haec ipsa, inquam, ad facti
ipsius commendationem, & ad scopum, quam
Deus sibi proposuerat, atque ade ad ipsius
iustitiam declarandam necessaria erant.
Now, consider those actions from which the
suspicion of injustice arises in your mind.
(How, I do not know.) It is these very actions
which were necessary both to commend this
very deed and to accomplish the goal which
God had intended. They were utterly neces-
sary for declaring his justice.
Qud enim & ipse Christus innocentissimus
esset, nec illi aliena peccata imputarentur, ita ut
mortem, mortem, inquam, illam & violentam &
execrabilem, quae maleficis hominibus
debebatur, nulla ratione prorsus, nisi quia sic
Deus iuberet, sustinere teneretur; hoc ipsius Dei
cum supremam erga humanum genus charitatem
commendat, tum veram iustitiam, quam ad sui
nominis gloriam patefacere decreverat, mirific
tunc declarat, cum eum, qui nihil mali ullam ob
caussam commeritus fuerat, a principibus huius
mundi, dum ipsi Deo obedire studet, iniustissim
dira morte occisum, ad vitam postmodum omni
felicitate circumfluentem evehit atque extollit.
Consider the fact that Christ himself was both
completely innocent, that the sins of others
were not imputed to him, and that therefore
Christ was in no way bound to endure death
unless God commanded him to do so. (I am
speaking here about that violent and accursed
death which evildoers deserve.) This fact not
only commends God's own supreme love to-
ward the human race, but it also wondrously
declares his true justice. He decreed to reveal
this justice to the glory of his name, since he
afterwards raised and exalted Christ to over-
flowing life and happiness. This is the same
Christ who, having been unjustly killed in a
dreadful death, had deserved to suffer no evil.
Yet, he had been zealous to obey God himself
from the foundations of the world.
Qud si Christus, quamvis ipse omnis culpae
expers esset, iur tamen, ut, scilicet, alienorum
peccatorum sibi imputatorum poenas daret, tam
atroci mortis genere interfectus fuit; & Dei charitas
minuitur, atque obscuratur, qui dum nobis bene
facit, interim ius suum persequitur: & nos
iustitiam, hoc est, rectitudinem ipsius, ex Christi
exaltatione non agnoscimus. Nam, tametsi
Christus, quod ad humana iura attinet,
nihilominus iniustissim occisus fuisset; quod
tamen pertinet ad divina, propter [303] alienorum
peccatorum imputationem, quae cert si facta fuit,
iur a Deo factam esse oportet, iustissim
interfectus esset, quare nulli rectitudini, in eo
postmodum summis beneficiis afficiendo, locus
relictus foret. Quae enim rectitudo esse potest in
malorum exantlatorum praemiis illi attribuendis,
qui ea mala iur passus fuerit?
But if Christ was justly killed in such a
horrible death in order to pay the penalties for
other people's sins which were imputed to
him (granted that he himself was personally
free from any guilt), then God's love is both
diminished and obscured. For even as God
did good to us, he at the same time pressed
his rights, thereby diminishing the justice
that is, uprightnesswhich we would see in
the exaltation of Christ. Let us grant that
Christ's killing had been unjust from the
standpoint of human law. Now, consider the
matter from the standpoint of divine law, on
the basis of imputing the sins of others to him.
[303] Certainly, if such an imputation had
taken place, then God had every right to kill
him. Therefore, God would not have been
upright in bestowing on him afterwards the
highest benefits. It is hardly upright to
reward someone for enduring all the evils for
which he deserved to suffer.
At enim dices, iur quidem potuisse ex Dei
voluntate Christo aliena peccata imputari; sed
tamen nihil fuisse, cur ille, ut sibi imputarentur,
commeritus esset (quamquam haec duo, ut
postea videbimus, simul stare nequeunt) & hinc,
in Christo extollendo, Dei rectitudinem apparere,
qud mortem, quam antea pertulerat, non nisi ex
Dei singulari decreto perferre teneretur, alioquin
ab ipsa prorsus immunis futurus. Quomodo igitur
iniustum futurum fuisse ais, si Christus mortuus
esset, nec illi aliena peccata imputata fuissent
(cum sua, quae nulla erant, ei imputari non
possent) & id sine dubio propterea affirmas, quia
alioqui Christus morti subeundae obnoxius non
fuisset?
You will respond that God could indeed be
quite just in choosing to impute the sins of
others to Christ. But on the other hand, you
will say that he in no way deserved to have
these sins imputed to him. (I will show later
that these two statements are mutually exclu-
sive.) Therefore, in extolling Christ, God's up-
rightness is evident, because it was solely by
God's decree that he was bound to bear the
death, from which he would have otherwise
been free. Consequently, you will argue that
it was not unjust for Christ to die, nor for the
sins of others to be imputed to him (since he
had no sins of his own to be imputed to him),
because Christ was not otherwise obligated to
undergo death.
Nam eandem ob caussam peccata aliena illi
imputari iniustum similiter censendum esset.
neque enim, ut dictum est, ei imputationi
subeundae Christus obnoxius erat. Itaque vides,
But the same reason proves the opposite: that
it should be considered unjust for the sins of
others to be imputed to Christ. For neither, as
was stated, was Christ liable to undergo this
imputation. And so, you see, you yourself
te ipso teste, nullam iniustitiam animadverti posse
in eo solo, qud aliquis id perferat, quod perferre
non tenetur, & ita, Christum, quamvis nulla ratio-
ne mori teneretur, mori tamen potuisse, omni
interim iustitia, ex parte videlicet Dei, & ipsius
Christi (sic enim ubique mea verba accipienda
sunt) incolumi remanente.
bear witness that no unrighteousness is
evident from the mere fact of someone
bearing what he is not bound to bear. You see
that Christ could die even though he was not
bound to die, with no harm to justice on the
part of either God or Christ himself. (When I
speak of justice, I always have the justice of
God and of Christ in view.)
Adde iis, quae dicta sunt, qud si Christus, quia
sibi aliena peccata imputata essent, ideo infamem
ac detestabilem illam mortem subiisset: nobis
eiusdem mortis subeundae, si opus esset (quod
tamen eum fecisse universa scriptura testatur)
exemplum non reliquisset. Cur enim nos mori
eius exemplo deberemus, cum nobis aliena
peccata non imputentur? Quid nobis cum illo hac
in parte commune esse posset?
Add to the foregoing the fact that if Christ en-
dured that disgraceful and abominable death
because the sins of others were imputed to
him, he would not have provided us with an
example of undergoing this same death
assuming that such an example were neces-
sary. (And the Scriptures everywhere testify
that he did provide us with such an example.)
For, based on his example, there would be no
reason for us to die, since the sins of others
are not imputed to us. There would be noth-
ing in common between him and us in this
respect.
Num idcirco exemplum nobis reliquisse diceretur,
quia si ipse propter alienorum peccatorum
imputationem mortuus esset, mult magis nos
propter nostrorum imputationem mori
deberemus? Sed quomodo imputari nobis
possent peccata nostra, si iam ipsi Christo, ut vos
dicitis, omnia imputata fuere: aut potis, ut
verissimum est, si summa & sola Dei liberalitate
[304] ea nobis universa condonata sunt? Ut nihil
dicam, qud, etiamsi nobis alioqui peccata nostra
imputari adhuc possent, absurdissim tamen
diceretur, cum mortem ob Dei gloriam subimus, id
propterea nobis contingere, qud peccata nostra
nobis imputentur.
How, then, can we say that he left us an exam-
ple? If he died on account of the imputation
of the sins of others, it is all the more true that
we should die on account of the imputation of
our own sins. But there is no way for our own
sins to be imputed to us if, as you teach, all of
them were already imputed to Christ
himselfor rather, which is actually the case,
all of them have been forgiven to us by the
highest and sole kindness [304] of God. This
is quite apart from that fact that, if it were oth-
erwise true that our sins could be imputed to
us, it is nevertheless absurd to say that when
we experience death as a way of glorifying
God, it happens because our sins have been
imputed to us.
Oportuit igitur, ut ad rem redeam, si Christus
nobis mortem alacri animo propter Dei gloriam
perferendi exemplum praebiturus erat, ipsum, non
quia ulla peccata ei imputata essent, sed omnino
Therefore, getting back to our subject, if
Christ was going to provide us an example of
being ready and willing to bear death to the
glory of God, it would not be fitting for him to
die because any sins were imputed to him,
immerentem mori; ade ut iure optimo ea dicere
posset, quae David pris de ipso sub sua
persona dixerat, Quae non rapui, tunc reddidi,
Psal. 69. v 5. Quae verba nullam iuridicam (ut sic
dixerim) caussam fuisse demonstrant, cur
Christus eam mortem perferre teneretur. Sed
cert non aliqua tantm, sed maxima fuit
eiusmodi caussa, cur eam sustinere deberet, si ei
peccata nostra omnia imputata fuerant.
but because he was completely innocent. This
is so true that he could have rightly echoed
the words that David, speaking as David, had
said previously about himself: Then I returned
what I did not steal (Ps. 69:5). These words
show that there was no legal cause (so to
speak) that bound Christ to bear that death.
But certainly, if all our sins had been imputed
to Christ, there was not only some cause for
him to endure death, but the highest cause.
Oportuit, inquam, sive suorum, sive alienorum
peccatorum respectu omnino immerentem
Christum mori: & solm, quia Deus ita iuberet: &,
ut nobis vitam pareret, volentem interfici; ut nos
quoque lict nec nostra, nec aliena peccata nobis
imputentur: quia tamen sic Deus iubet, atque
etiam interea, ut sanguinis nostri fusione aliorum
fidem vel excitemus, vel confirmemus, interfici
non recusemus: & qu innocentiores fuerimus, e
nos ad tam egregium facinus patrandum aptiores,
& Dei scopo accommodatiores esse,
agnoscamus.
I say it was proper for Christ, being com-
pletely innocent with respect to either his own
sins or the sins of others, to die, but only
because God commanded it. And it was
fitting that he willingly allowed himself to be
killed, in order to provide life to us. Likewise,
we also should not refuse to be killed, so that
we might stimulate and confirm the faith of
others by shedding our blood. We would be
willing to die even though neither our own
sins nor the sins of others are imputed to us,
but simply because God commanded it. And
the more innocent we are, the better suited we
know we are to accomplishing such an admi-
rable deed and the closer we come to fulfilling
God's purpose.
Satis, ut videtur, a nobis probatum fuit, nullam
penitus iniustitiam in eo conspici posse, qud quis
moriatur, nec tamen ideo moriatur, quia sibi vel
sua vel aliena delicta imputentur; & tantum
abesse, ut iniustum fuerit, Christum a Deo morti
tradi, nisi aliena peccata ei imputata fuerint, ut
potis ex eo ipso, qud nulla prorsus peccata ei
imputata fuerint, Dei iustitia, hoc est, summa
beneficentia, nec non aequitas, & rectitudo
maxim eluceat. Atque ita, priorem tui illius
axiomatis partem non exemplis tantm, quod
antea feceramus, sed rationibus quoque,
falsissimam esse demonstravimus. Nunc de
altera parte videamus.
It seems that I have sufficiently proven
that there is no unrighteousness evident from
the fact that someone dies, even though that
person does not die because either the
person's own transgressions or the transgres-
sions of others are imputed to him. And we
proved that it was so far from the truth to say
that it would have been unjust for God to
have handed Christ over to die unless the sins
of others were imputed to him, that the exact
opposite is true: God's justice (i.e., the highest
kindness, fairness and uprightness) especially
shines forth from the very fact that no sins at
all were imputed to him. And so, we have
shown that the first part of your axiom is
completely false, not only by the examples
that we gave earlier, but also by reasons.
Now let us turn to the other part of your
axiom.
Chapter X
Chapter X
Non potuisse Christo a Deo peccata nostra
imputari, nisi, ut sibi imputarentur, commeritus
fuerit. ex quo Adversarii argumentum, cui
tantopere fidebat, mult magis & inutile & ineptum
esse concluditur.
Our sins could not have been imputed to Christ by
God, unless he deserved to have them imputed to
him. From this fact the conclusion is drawn that
the argument of my opponent, on which he placed
such great weight, is all the more useless and
absurd.
[305] Continet igitur reipsa axioma illud tuum, iur
posse alicui aliena peccata imputari, lict is
innocentissimus sit. Ego san non video, quid
absurdius, aut iniquius dici, vel excogitari potuerit;
praesertim si ad Christum, cuius caussa id dictum
a te fuit, referatur.
[305] Your axiom actually assumes that it can
be just for the sins of others to be imputed to
someone, even though that person is com-
pletely innocent. I fail to see how anyone
could say or think of a more ridiculous or
wicked notion. This is especially the case if
your axiom is applied to Christ, with
reference to whom you stated it in the first
place.
Supr, cum fieri non posse dicebamus, ut quis
corporales poenas pro alio pendat; eius rei
occasione, a Deo nemini aliena peccata imputari,
ostensum est: ne patris quidem filio; nisi filius
patrem imitetur. Sic enim conciliatur, ut nosti, id,
quod dictum est Exo. cap. 20 & Deut. cap. 5.
Deum scilicet punire peccata parentum in filiis,
cum eo, quod scriptum est Ezechielis cap. 18.
filium iniquitatem patris non portaturum Quae
conciliatio apertissim colligitur ex eodem cap.
18. Ezechielis v 14. & deinceps.
Earlier, when we noted that no one could
suffer bodily penalties for another person, we
also showed that the sins of others could not
be imputed by God to anyone. Indeed, the
sins of the father could not be imputed to the
son, unless the son were to imitate the
wickedness of the father. As I noted, Exodus
20 and Deuteronomy 5, which state that God
punishes the sins of the parents in the sons,
can be harmonized with Ezekiel 18, which
states that the son will not bear the iniquity of
the father. Ezekiel 18:14 ff. clearly suggests
how to harmonize these seemingly contra-
dictory statements.
Duo igitur, ut aliena peccata alicui imputari
queant, coniunctim necessari requiruntur. Unum
est, illum, cui imputari debent, ei, cuius peccata
imputanda sunt, ita coniunctum esse, ut propter
solam ipsam coniunctionem particeps illius
delictorum esse videatur. Alterum est, ipsum
Two conditions must necessarily be met at the
same time before the sins of others may be im-
puted to someone. One condition is that the
one who is to receive the imputation of the
sins must be connected to the person whose
sins are to be imputed in such a way that the
one to receive the imputation should appear
quoque peccasse, & illius scelera imitatum fuisse.
Alioqui ut ratio ipsa manifest docet, iniquissima
ea imputatio censenda esset.
to be a partaker of the other's transgressions
solely on account of that connection. The
other condition is that the person who re-
ceives the imputation must also have sinned,
and have imitated the wickedness of that
other person. Otherwise, as reason itself
obviously teaches, we should regard the im-
putation as completely wicked.
Cum Deus Sodomam destruere vellet,
Abrahamus, qui de Loti potissimm salute in ea
civitate habitantis sollicitus erat, Deum alloquens,
sic ait: Absit a te, ut facias rem talem, ut morti
facias iustum cum impio, sitque iustus, sicut
impius. Absit [inquam] a te. Numquid iudex
universae terrae non faciet iudicium? Gen. 18 v.
25. Iniquum igitur censetur apud Deum, ut iustus
un cum impio affligatur; nisi scilicet alia subsit
caussa, praeter eam, qud is inter impios degat,
eisque commistus sit. Id quod etiam eo tempore
eventus comprobavit, non pris a Domino
Sodomae igne caelits immisso, qum iustus
Lotus un cum familia sua inde extractus esset.
When God wished to destroy Sodom,
Abraham was particularly anxious about the
safety of Lot, who was living in that city.
Therefore, he said to God, Far be it from you to
put to death the righteous along with the wicked,
and treat the righteous as you treat the wicked.
You should never do such an act! Will not the
judge of the whole earth do what is right? (Gen.
18:25). Therefore, it would be wickedness on
God's part to afflict a righteous person along
with the wicked simply because the righteous
person lives among and has dealings with the
wicked; he would need another reason
beyond the fact that the person lives among
the wicked. Besides, the actual outcome of
this situation proves the point. God did not
send down fire from heaven on Sodom until
after he removed righteous Lot and his family
from there.
At quant iniquius erit, ut eo nomine affligatur
iustus, quia illi impiorum scelera imputentur?
Nam non solm sine caussa affligetur, sed etiam
per iniustissimae caussae speciem. Itaque du-
plex illi & utraque insignis iniuria fiet.
It would be exceedingly wicked for the
righteous person, as such, to be afflicted
because the evil deeds of the wicked are im-
puted to him. Not only would this righteous
person have been afflicted for no reason, but
even for what has the appearance of a com-
pletely unrighteous reason. Therefore, the
person is extraordinarily wronged twice over.
Cum igitur illa duo simul iuncta in alienis peccatis
imputandis requirantur, in Christo autem neutrum
fuisse appareat; quid quaeso detestabilius fieri
potuisset, qum illi aliena peccata imputare?
While both of the above mentioned conditions
must be met at the same time before the sins
of others may be imputed to someone, it
appears that Christ's situation meets neither
requirement. I would like to know what more
despicable event could occur than for the sins
of others to be imputed to him.
Christus non mod aliorum turpia scelera imitatus
non est: [306] sed sanctissim semper &
innocentissim vixit. Cum ipsis ver scelestis, id
est, cum hominibus, quorum universa peccata illi
imputata fuisse vultis, ea sola ratione coniunctus
fuit, qud & ipse homo erat. Caeteroqui nullus
homo fuit umquam, aut futurus est, qui ab aliis
hominibus, aequ ac ipse, disiunctus fuerit. Quae
igitur tandem caussa erat, cur illi aliorum peccata
imputari possent?
First of all, Christ did not imitate the base,
wicked deeds of others. [306] Rather, he
always lived a completely holy and blameless
life. But secondly, Christ was connected with
those wicked humansthat is, all the humans
whose sins you would have imputed to him
only by virtue of the fact that he, like them,
was a human being. Apart from this connec-
tion, there was never anyone who was so
separated from others as he was, nor will
there ever be. That being the case, no reason
remains to impute the sins of others to him.
Huc accedit, qud potest quidem Deus iur, si
velit, ei peccata non imputare, cui merit imputari
possent, De suo enim iure, ut saepius dictum est,
quilibet, quantum velit, decedere potest. Sed
nemini iur aliena peccata imputare potest Deus,
cui merit imputari non possint.
Add to this the fact that God certainly could
still be quite just even if he should choose not
to impute sins to those who deserve it. I have
frequently stated that anyone can deviate
from his own right to punish, to whatever
extent he pleases. But God could not be just
in imputing the sins of others to someone,
unless that person deserves to have them
imputed.
Peccatorum enim alienorum imputatio apud
Deum non ex eorum numero est, quae a sola
ipsius voluntate pendent; sed ad alia etiam
relationem habet; & in ipsa non de Dei tantm,
sed de alterius quoque iure agitur. Quapropter,
quemadmodum Deus neminem punit eam solam
ob caussam, quia sic velit, sed etiam quia is
puniri meretur; sic nemini imputat peccata aliena,
quia simpliciter ita velit: sed quia is, ut sibi
imputentur, commeritus fuerit.
Imputing the sins of others does not fall into
the category of actions that depend on God's
will alone. Rather, such an action is related to
other factors. In this instance God's right is
not the only issue, but the right of others also
comes into play. Therefore, just as God
punishes someone because that person
deserves it and not simply because God wants
to punish the person, he likewise does not im-
pute the sins of others to someone simply
because he wants to, but because the person
deserves to have them imputed to him.
Et quemadmodum, ut quis ver puniri possit; non
satis est, qud ipse puniri velit, nisi delictum
aliquod commiserit (Relativa enim sunt poena, &
delictum: ita ut ubi delictum non est, ibi poena
esse nullo modo possit) sic, ut alicui ver aliena
peccata possint imputari, non satis est ipsum ita
Now, in the case of punishment, before a
person can truly receive punishment, it is not
enough simply for the person to wish to
receive it. The person must also have com-
mitted some transgression. That is because
punishment is relative to transgression: where
there is no transgression there cannot be any
velle; nisi imputationis antecedens alia digna
caussa subsit.
punishment. Likewise, in order for the sins of
others to be truly imputed to a person, it is
not enough for the person to wish to have
these sins imputed. There must also be some
other worthy, antecedent basis for the
imputation.
Potest quidem is, qui nihil deliquit, affligi, nec
iniuri: non mod si ipse velit, sed etiam invitus: si
is in alterius potestate sit, qui optimo aliquo consi-
lio, & fortassis illi ipsi salutari, ipsum, lict &
immerentem & invitum, affligi velit; Sed ea afflictio
nulla prorsus ratione poena, sive punitio
censenda erit. Sic etiam, qui nihil aut facit, aut in
se habet, quare aliena peccata sibi imputari
merit possint: potest quidem sine iniuria affligi,
praesertim si ipse ita velit; sed interim ea afflictio
nullo modo imputatio, sive effectus imputationis
alienorum peccatorum esse censebitur.
Now, there are circumstances where a person
who has committed no transgression can be
afflicted without being wronged. This is true
not only where the innocent person wishes to
be afflicted, but even in instances where the
innocent person is unwilling to receive afflic-
tion. For example, the innocent person could
be under the authority of another who wishes
to afflict him in order to achieve a higher pur-
poseperhaps even to save the innocent
person himself. But such affliction should not
at all be regarded as penalty or punishment.
It is quite possible for someone to be afflicted
without being wrongedparticularly if they
are willing to be afflictedeven if the person
has done nothing nor provides any inherent
ground to have the sins of others deservedly
imputed to him. But at the same time, this
affliction should not be regarded as an
imputation, or the effect of imputation, of the
sins of others.
Hinc fit, ut, si Christo a Deo aliena peccata ver
imputata fuerunt, non satis fuerit, ipsum Christum,
id fieri, alacri animo voluisse: sed necesse sit,
ipsum, ut ea sibi imputarentur, commeritum
fuisse. Quo nihil execrabilius excogitari potest.
Id tamen te sentire indicat, qud non solm velle
videris, [307] illum, divina iustitia sarta recta
remanente, morti traditum esse: sed merit etiam
fuisse traditum. Nam profect, ut Christus merit
morti traditus fuerit, non satis est, illi peccata
nostra, si mod id fieri potuisset, fuisse imputata;
sed necesse est etiam, ut sibi imputarentur,
ipsum commeritum esse. Alioqui, ut paullo ante
dictum est, non merit, sed ex singulari Dei
We may conclude from this that even if Christ
were ready and willing to have the sins of
others truly imputed to him by God, it still
could not occur. It would also be necessary to
show that he deserved to have them imputed
to him. But there is no more detestable
thought imaginable. This would appear to be
your belief, since you affirm that [307] not
only was Christ handed over to die without
any damage to divine justice, but also that
Christ deserved to be handed over to die.
Truly, in order for Christ to deserve to be
handed over to die, it would not have been
enough for our sins to have been imputed to
him, even if such an action were possible. It is
decreto, citra tamen ullam iniustitiam (ut ego
quidem assero) morti traditus fuisset.
also necessary for Christ to have deserved to
have them imputed to him. Otherwise, what I
affirmed a little earlier would be the truth of
the matter: Christ was handed over to die, not
because he deserved it, but simply because
God decreed ityet without injustice.
At enim tu, ut videtur, inter duo haec extrema
Merit, & Immerit nihil medium constituis:
quamvis vocem Immerit pro eo quod est
Indign, accipias; cum tamen in eum sensum, ut
fer fit, ea voce accepta, fieri possit, ut quis nec
merit, nec immerit morti tradatur. Quod cert
Christo evnit. Is enim neque merit morti
traditus est, quia nihil commiserat, quare mortem
illam meritus fuisset: nec tamen ullo pacto
immerit, hoc est, indign; cum is nec invitus a
Deo, in cuius tamen potestate erat, nec temere,
sed volens, & in finem omnium praestantissimum
morti traditus fuerit.
It seems that you allow nothing between the
extremes of deservedly and unde-
servedly. However, you take the word
undeservedly in the sense of unworthily.
But taking the word in that sense, as is usually
the case, it would then be possible for
someone to die neither deservedly nor unde-
servedly. But this is exactly what happened
to Christ. He was not handed over to death
deservedly, since he had committed nothing
wicked from which he could have merited
death. On the other hand, he did not die
undeservedly, i.e., unworthily, since he was
not unwilling to let God, in whose power he
was, hand him over to die, nor was he handed
over to die without reason. But he died
willingly, in order to accomplish the most ex-
cellent purpose there could be.
Qud si Immerit pro eo, quod est, Non merit, id
est, Non quia ita meritus esset, accipias: iam
apparebit, nihil absurdi in ea sententia contineri,
qud Christus immerit morti fuerit a Deo traditus;
nisi, Christum a Deo morti tradi non debuisse
velis, si is, ut traderetur, commeritus non esset.
But suppose you take the meaning of
undeservedly as not deservedly, that is,
not because he deserved it. In that case, as we
will soon see, it is not unreasonable to say that
Christ was undeservedly handed over to die
by God. The only way it will be unreasonable
is if you insist that God should not have
handed over Christ to die unless Christ
deserved to be handed over.
Itaque, cum, concludens, ita scribis: Iam igitur si
Christus, ut asseris, non est mortuus pro
peccatorum nostrorum satisfactione, si etiam ut
scriptura ver docet, non est mortuus pro
peccatis suis, cum peccatum in eo nullum
unquam fuerit. Nunquid fateri oportebit (quod ut
impiissimum ne cogitare quidem fas est) Christum
a Deo iniust immerit, & nulla cum legitima
In your conclusion you write: If, as you affirm,
Christ did not die in satisfaction for our sins, and
if, as Scripture truly teaches, he did not die for his
own sins, since he never had any, it will be neces-
sary to conclude that Christ was handed over to
die by God unjustly, undeservedly and for no
legitimate reason. But this conclusion is too
impious even to imagine! Since you yourself
wrote this, and affirm that it is the height of
caussa morti traditum esse? Cum, inquam, haec
scribis, & maxim impium esse statuis, vel
cogitare quidem, Christum immerit morti a Deo
traditum fuisse: aut maxim impium id esse
affirmas, quod ab omni impietate qum
longissim abest, immo cuius contradictorium
(quod vocant) Christum scilicet merit a Deo
morti traditum fuisse, maxim impium est: aut
indign factum id esse statuis, quod iur fieri
potuit; ut supr abunde demonstratum fuit.
Indign autem & iniqu Christum a Deo morti
traditum fuisse, nisi is mortuus sit pro peccatorum
nostrorum satisfactione, ideo te asseverare, quia,
ni ita esset, Christus, ut morti traderetur, meritus
non fuisset, & [308] ita te, ut dixi, qud Christus id
meritus fuerit, affirmare:
impiety even to think that God handed Christ
over to die undeservedly, you must conclude
one of the following: (1) You must either af-
firm that an action is especially impious,
which is in reality the farthest thing from all
impiety. In fact, the contradiction (as they call
it) of this action is what is especially impious,
namely, that Christ was deservedly handed
over by God to die; or (2) you must establish
that an action which could have occurred
justly, as we amply demonstrated above, was
done unworthily. But you affirm that Christ
would have been unworthily and wickedly
handed over to die by God unless he died in
satisfaction for our sins. You assert this be-
cause, if this were not so, Christ did not
deserve to be handed over to die. [308]
Consequently, you affirm that Christ de-
served to die, as I already noted.
vel ex eo percipi potest, qud verbis Iniust, &
Immerit addis etiam, Nulla cum legitima caussa.
Quae verba, cum de finali caussa intelligi
nequeant, de antecedente ut intelligantur,
necesse est. Unde apparet, te antecedentem
aliquam legitimam caussam mortis Christi,
praeter Dei, & ipsius Christi voluntatem (quippe
qud tibi in Christo morti tradendo Dei, ipsiusque
Christi voluntas satis esse non videatur) omnino
statuere. Ea ver nulla alia esse potest, nisi,
qud Christus id meritus fuisset.
These facts make it plain why you add to
the words unjustly and undeservedly, the
expression with no legitimate cause as well.
These words must be understood as referring
to the antecedent cause, since they cannot be
understood as referring to the final cause.
From this it is apparent that you thoroughly
establish some legitimate antecedent cause for
Christ's death beyond the will of God and of
Christ himself; the will of God and of Christ
himself does not seem to be enough in your
mind to hand Christ over to die. But the only
possible antecedent cause can be that Christ
deserved it.
Quamvis autem, ut dictum est, de antecedente
tantm, non etiam de finali caussa te loqui
necesse sit; cum tamen ita univers loqueris,
videris finalem etiam legitimam caussam a morte
Christi excludere, nisi is pro satisfactione
nostrorum peccatorum morti traditus fuisset.
Quod tamen falsissimum esse ex iis apparet,
quae ante a nobis latissim disputata sunt. ubi
finales plures legitimae mortis Christi caussae,
Now, as I already noted, throughout your dis-
course it is necessary for you always to speak
of the antecedent cause alone, not of the final
cause. In speaking this way you seem to ex-
clude the legitimate final cause from the death
of Christ; the only final cause you allow is that
he was handed over to die in satisfaction for
our sins. But the final cause you allow was
shown to be completely false from what we
sine ulla pro peccatis nostris satisfactione,
explicatae fuerunt.
disputed earlier in great detail. In our earlier
discussion we explained many legitimate final
causes for Christ's death that do not involve
satisfaction for our sins.
Vides igitur, ut ad propositum revertamur, praeter
caetera iniqua, & absurda, in quam horribilem
blasphemiam incideris, dum Christo peccata
nostra imputari potuisse contendis; qud scilicet
Christus, ut ea sibi imputarentur, commeritus
fuerit: & proinde merit, hoc est, quia ea dignus
esset, morti illi acerbissimae & ignominiae atque
execrationis plenissimae fuerit a Deo traditus.
Returning once again to our subject, you see
that, besides the other wicked and ridiculous
results of your theory, you have also fallen
into committing horrible blasphemy when
you urge that our sins could have been
imputed to Christ. You blaspheme by saying
that in order for our sins to be imputed to
Christ, he was deserving to have them imput-
ed. Consequently, he was handed over to this
most bitter, disgraceful and completely detest-
able death by God deservedly, that is, be-
cause he deserved it!
Iam quid tibi tandem de tuo illo axiomate videtur,
Nemo moritur, nisi pro peccatis aut suis, aut
alienis: sive priorem eius, quam nos fecimus, sive
posteriorem partem spectes; praesertim, si ad
Christi personam accommodari debeat? Potuit'ne
aliquid alicui in mentem venire, quod vel magis
falsum, vel magis absurdum, atque ade inpium
sit? Quid de universo ipso argumento? in quo te
tibi ipsi vehementer placuisse, praeter alias
coniecturas, ex quorundam verbis, quibuscum,
antequam scriptum tuum mihi exhiberetur,
collocutus fueras, manifest deprehendi. Num
aliud aut insulsius, aut frigidius, quod attinet ad
quaestionem nostram, excogitari potuit?
Are you still pleased with your axiom, No
one dies, unless it is either for his own sins, or for
the sins of others? Are you pleased with either
the first part (which we have discussed), or
the latter part, especially when we apply it to
the person of Christ? No one could dream up
an axiom more false, ridiculous or impious.
What has happened to your entire argument?
Before I saw your writing, I received a report
from certain people with whom you had
spoken. From their words, I clearly observed
that you were greatly pleased with yourself
because of this argument, which you valued
above all others. But no on could think up an
argument more insipid or dull that could be
brought to bear on our subject.
Uter tandem nostrm imprudens Deo
foedissimam iniustitiae notam inurere tentat? An
ego, qui Christum a Deo, ut ea ratione nobis
aeterna salus compararetur, turpissimae &
saevissimae [309] morti traditum fuisse affirmo,
quamvis nulla praeterea antecedens caussa
esset, cur ille eam mortem perferre deberet: id
quod summa cum divinae iustitiae
commendatione fieri potuit; an potis tu, qui ideo
Which of us, then, is really the imprudent
person who finally attempts to brand God
with the loathsome mark of unrighteous-
ness? Is it I, who affirm that God handed
over Christ to an exceedingly disgraceful and
cruel death, [309] apart from any other ante-
cedent cause, in order to provide the way of
eternal salvation for us, which could take
place with the highest commendation of
divine justice? Or are you the one who
Christum ex Dei decreto ei morti traditum fuisse
ais, quia illi peccata nostra universa imputata
fuerint: quod sine summa iniustitia fieri nullo
modo potuit?
brands God with the mark of unrighteous-
ness, by affirming that Christ was handed
over to death by God's decree, because all our
sins were imputed to him, which could never
occur without the greatest injustice?
Equidem spero, te vel ex sola postremi huius
argumenti tui examinatione, sententiae tuae cum
absurditatem, tum iniquitatem agniturum: & me
non iniuri a te, & reliquis, qui tecum sentiunt,
quicumque, & quotcumque illi tandem sint, hac in
re dissentire fassurum.
For my part, I hope that you will acknowl-
edge not only the absurdity of your view but
also its iniquity, if only because of my analysis
of your last argument. I also hope that I can
admit to my disagreement with you on this
issue without being wronged by you and
your allieswhoever they may be and
however many of them there may be.
Quod te eo facilis facturum esse existimo, si
quae mala ex tua sententia proveniant, & an
itidem ulla ex mea, etiamsi falsa esset, provenire
possent, tecum animo reputaveris.
I believe that you will more readily act as I
would hope if you ponder in your heart what
evils proceed from your view, and whether
any evils can arise from mine, even if my view
were false.
Chapter XI
Chapter XI
Ex Coveti suorumque sententia multa mala, ex
Socini ver, nulla prorsus, provenire posse,
demonstratur.
It is demonstrated that many evils can result
directly from the view of Covetus and his allies
but not from the view of Socinus.
Ex sententia igitur tua primm id necessari
proficiscitur, Deum aut non potuisse, aut noluisse,
nulla vera pro peccatis nostris satisfactione
accepta, ea nobis liberaliter condonare. Qud
noluerit, hoc propriam ipsius & veram misericordi-
am, ac beneficentiam non obscurat solm, sed
funditus etiam delet. Qud non potuerit, hoc eius
maiestatem, auctoritatemque supremam atque
infinitam imminuit, & certis limitibus
circumscriptam coercet, ac continet. Utrumque
eius nomen, & gloriam vehementer laedit, atque
dedecorat.
First of all, your view necessarily involves the
idea that God was either unable or unwilling
to forgive our sins freely, without first
receiving literal satisfaction for them. If he
were unwilling, this would not only obscure
his inherent and true mercy and kindness, but
it would even destroy them completely. If he
were unable, this would diminish his majesty
and unlimited, supreme authority; his author-
ity would be constrained by certain limits.
This greatly harms and dishonors both his
name and his glory.
Deinde, quod mult adhuc gravius est, eiusdem
sententiae vi, Dei vera iustitia, hoc est rectitudo &
aequitas, quae omnium actionum eius perpetua
est comes, & in eo inter ipsius proprias &
Next, an even more serious result of your
view is that God's true justicethat is, up-
rightness and fairnessis thoroughly weak-
ened and even destroyed. This is the upright-
admirabiles qualitates, tamquam in caelo sol inter
alia sidera, refulget, penitus labefactatur, atque
convellitur.
ness and fairness that is always involved in all
of his actions, and outshines his inherent and
admirable qualities, just as the sun shines in
heaven among the other stars.
Sed neque altera illa iustitia, id est, ipsius in
delictis puniendis severitas, qua non rar,
praesertim ver adversus contumaces & rebelles
uti solet, ulla ex parte conservatur, aut retinetur.
sed eius loco temeraria quaedam immanitas
substituitur; ut, si ea sententia vera est, Deus in
salute nostra procuranda & iniquissimus &
immanissimus fuisse appareat.
On the other hand, consider the other kind of
justice, that is, his severity in punishing trans-
gressions, which he commonly exercises
especially against the stubborn and rebellious.
This, too, is not at all salvaged. A certain rash
savageness is substituted in its place. If your
view is true, God would appear to have been
utterly wicked and savage in obtaining our
salvation.
Adde huic iniquitati, & immanitati summam [310]
insipientiam; dum Christi morte nostrorum
delictorum poenas compensari curat: cum tamen
id fieri nullo modo potuisse constet.
To this wickedness and savageness we must
also add the height [310] of foolishness.
According to your view, God was obsessed
about being paid back for the penalties of our
transgressions through the death of Christ,
even though this must be absolutely impos-
sible.
Praeterea eiusdem sententiae vel caus, vel
occasione, Christi gloria non minima ex parte
obscuratur. Nam & eius erga nos charitatem in
morte pro nobis subeunda, ut postea dicemus,
deprimit,
39
& ipsius proprium & peculiare munus,
Evangelii cum annuntiandi, tum confirmandi,
apostolis, & prophetis poene ex aequo fit com-
mune: & aeternae salutis nobis dandae potestas,
quam ut homo habet, illi, ut homini, magna cum
impietate, & sacrilegio adimitur, atque eripitur.
nec interea, quomodo morte, & obedienti su
cunctis, qui ipsius dicto audientes fuerint, omnium
peccatorum veniam pepererit, vel agnoscitur, vel
rect intelligitur.
Moreover, Christ's glory is greatly obscured
as well. For either as a direct or indirect result
of your view, his love toward us in undergo-
ing death for us (as we will discuss later) is
mitigated. It also diminishes his proper and
unique office of proclaiming and confirming
the gospel, placing it on almost equal footing
with the apostles and prophets. The power of
granting eternal salvation to us, which he pos-
sesses as a human being, is snatched from him
as a human, resulting in great impiety and
sacrilege. Nor, meanwhile, does your view
properly understand or acknowledge how he
provided the pardon of all our sins, to all who
obey him, through his death and obedience.
Ex cuius rei ignoratione aliud postrem malum,
vestrae sententiae acceptum referendum, quod
omnium nocentissimum est, facillim consequitur.
Omne enim pietatis studium, ut experientia ipsa
satis declarat, frigescit atque extinguitur: dum
Finally, another evil, which is the most
harmful of all, readily follows on the heels of
this ignorance. Your view throws cold water
on any zeal for living a pious life, since people
regard themselves as already righteous be-
cause the penalty for all their sins has been
putant homines iam reipsa se iustos esse, quia,
scilicet, omnium suorum peccatorum poenae
universae, divinae iustitiae persolutae fuerint.
Qua de re paullo post fusis disseremus.
paid to divine justice. We will go into more
detail on this matter a little later.
Nunc ex altera parte, num mala aliqua ex
sententia mea proveniant, dispiciamus. Primm
illud certissimum est, ipsius vi Deo non solm
nihil adimi, sed id omne tribui, quod tribui in nobis
servandis aut potest, aut debet. Summa enim illi
misericordia, & beneficentia, ac liberalitas, atque
clementia cum summa tum iustitia, id est,
rectitudine & aequitate, tum sapientia coniuncta
ascribitur.
Now, from the other angle, let us consider
whether my view results in any evils. First of
all, there is no doubt that my view not only
does not rob God, but even assigns to him all
the credit that can or ought to be assigned to
him in saving us. It assigns to him the highest
mercy, kindness and graciousness connected
with the highest justicethat is, uprightness
and fairnessand wisdom.
Eius suprema potestas illibata conservatur.
Severitas illius in ulciscendis praefractorum &
perditae spei hominum sceleribus, quae verae
iustitiae pars censeri potest, non mod non
negatur, verm etiam astruitur, cum
resipiscentibus tantummodo eum citra ullam vel
ipsorum, vel alterius cuiuspiam pro ipsis veram
satisfactionem, veniam dare affirmatur.
consequens est enim, ut caeteris, quemadmodum
Paulus loquitur, ira, indignatio, afflictio, &
anxietas, iusto ipsius iudicio, immineat.
My view does nothing to jeopardize his
supreme power. Not only does it allow the
aspect of true justice, which deals severely in
avenging the evil deeds of people cut off from
him and destitute of hope, but it even enhanc-
es it, since it affirms that he grants pardon
only to the penitent. He pardons them
without either any literal satisfaction of their
own, or from some other person on their
behalf. For it logically follows that wrath,
affliction and grief, which arises from his righ-
teous judgment, threatens the others, as Paul
tells us.
40

Deinde, quod ad Christum attinet, ipsi etiam non
mod nihil detrahitur, sed quod detractum fuerat,
restituitur. dum verus & solus divinae benignitatis
in peccatis, omnibus iis, qui resipiscunt, in per-
petuum ita condonandis, [311] ut aeternam ac
beatissimam vitam consequantur, & annunciator,
& confirmator asseritur; dumque eiusdem vitae,
quatenus homo est, dominus atque largitor a Deo
constitutus agnoscitur.
Next, considering Christ, nothing at all is
taken away from him, but what was taken
away from him by your view is restored. He
is declared to be the true and sole person to
proclaim and confirm the divine kindness in
forgiving sins forever to all those who repent,
[311] declaring that they will obtain eternal
and blessed life. But at the same time, he is
acknowledged to have been appointed by
God as lord and giver of this life, in so far as
he is a human being.
Nec ver, si eum omnes peccatorum nostrorum
poenas Deo persolvisse, si, quaecumque nos
But nothing is or can be taken away from him
if: (1) it is denied that he paid all the penalties
of our sins to God, (2) it is denied that he per-
facere debebamus, pro nobis praestitisse, adde,
si Dei iram nobis placasse, negatur: quidquam
idcirco ipsi aut detrahitur, aut detrahi posset; cum
ex his tribus duo priora fieri nullo modo potuerint:
tertium ver & Dei clementiae, cuius ipse
constantissimus praedicator fuit, plurimm
detrahat, & ipsi Christo non parum adimat: dum
pro vero servatore, id est, delictorum
condonatore, & vitae sempiternae datore, eum
veniae & salutis (ut sic loquar) impetratorem facit.
formed for us whatever we ourselves were
bound to perform, and (3) it is denied that he
appeased the wrath of God for us. The first
two of these cannot take away from Christ,
since they could not happen to begin with.
But concerning the third, if he really appeased
the wrath of God, then God's mercy is dimin-
ished, which Christ himself proclaimed more
than anyone else. In turn, this also takes
much away from Christ himself, replacing a
true savior, that is, a forgiver of trans-
gressions, with an obtainer (so to speak) of
forgiveness and salvation.
Num fortasse sententia mea Christi charitatem
eximiam in iis, quae propter nos fecit, & passus
est, aliqua ex parte minuit? Num eum dirissimum
atque teterrimum supplicium nostrm caussa,
quamvis innocentissimum, perferre voluisse
negat? Immo nonne ipsius, in morte pro nobis
oppetenda, erga nos charitatem extollit, quam tua
sententia, ut paullo ante attigimus, deprimit?
Nam ex tua sententia, ut vidimus, necessari
concluditur, Christo merit imputata fuisse omnia
delicta nostra. Sed quaenam eximia charitas
esse potest illius, qui pro alio idcirco aliquid mali
sustineat, qud id sustinere aliqua ratione
mereatur? In eo Christi erga nos charitas mirific
elucet, qud quamvis nulla prorsus ratione, ut
mea sententia habet, tot mala perpeti teneretur,
nisi quia Deus ita decreverat; ut tamen nos
ingenti beneficio afficeret, ea perpeti non
dubitaverit.
Nor does my opinion at all diminish the
exceptional love that Christ showed in what
he did and suffered for us. It does not deny
that he was willing to bear that utterly abomi-
nable and hideous punishment for our sakes,
even though he was completely innocent.
Indeed, this extols his love toward us in dying
for us, which your view removes, as we dis-
cussed earlier. Based on your view, it is nec-
essary to conclude that all our transgressions
were deservedly imputed to Christ. What ex-
ceptional love is found in one who bears some
evil for another because that person, for some
reason, deserved to bear it? But according to
my position, Christ's marvelous love toward
us shines, because he was bound to suffer
such evils for no other reason than that God
so decreed it. Nevertheless, he did not hesi-
tate to suffer those evils, so that he might
affect us with such a vast benefit.
Praeterea Christi adversum nos charitas multum
imminuitur, si, ut Deo ipsius patri satisfieret, id
est, quod nos ei debebamus, persolveretur, eam
mortem subire voluerit. quod ex tua sententia
necessari consequens, a mea plan excluditur.
Itaque, si mea sententia admittatur, pura &
sincera Christi charitas in morte illa pro nobis
subeunda apert conspicitur, nulla vel ipsius
Moreover, if Christ wished to undergo death
in order to make satisfaction to his father
that is, to pay what we were owing to him
this greatly weakens Christ's love toward us.
That necessarily follows from your view,
while mine rules it out. And so, if my view is
allowed, the pure and unadulterated love of
Christ is evident in the death he endured for
us. Christ's love is not mixed and disturbed,
obligatione, vel eius patris utilitate, ut ita dicam,
mista atque turbata; quae incommoda in
recipienda sententia tua contingere, manifestum
est.
as it were, either by any obligation of his own,
or by some advantage he was to obtain for his
father. But it is clear that these disadvantages
are involved when your view is adopted.
His omnibus illud adde, qud etiamsi mea
sententia falsa esset, non tamen ipsam
amplectenti detrimentum seu impedimentum
ullum, in aeterna salute adipiscenda, umquam
esset allatura. [312] Nam, cum nec Dei, nec
Christi gloriam ulla ex parte imminuat: cum homi-
nes a fide, & spe omni in ipsis collocanda ne
tantillum quidem retrahat: cum vitae
sanctimoniam nullo pacto impediat; non san
video, cur cuiquam eam admittenti vel minimum
quidem officere possit.
Besides all of these facts, we must also point
out that even if my opinion were false, no
harm or barrier in obtaining salvation would
come to someone who embraces it. [312] It
does not at all diminish the glory of God or
Christ. It certainly keeps people from placing
faith and all their hope in themselves. Nor
does it hinder holiness of life in any way. I
therefore fail to see how my view could harm
anyone, even slightly, who embraces it.
Nam si dicas, necesse esse, ut salutem ea
ratione nobis partam esse credamus, qua parta
fuit: & hanc esse eam fidem, sine qua universae
sacrae litterae, salutem nobis obvenire non
posse, testantur; qum hoc a veritate sit alienum,
in reliquis tui scripti verbis examinandis
planissimum fiet.
Perhaps you will say that it is necessary for us
to believe that salvation was provided to us in
the way that it was actually provided, and
that such correct belief is that faith which the
Bible says we must have in order to be saved.
But on examining what you have written else-
where, it becomes obvious just how far this is
from the truth.
Interim considera, num verisimile sit, aliquem
beneficio sibi a rege quopiam facto, propter id
solum privandum esse, qud alia ratione & via,
qum ea, qua factum est, sed tamen ut ipsi
saltem videtur mult & praestantiore, & ipsi regi
honorificentiore, beneficium sibi factum esse
credat.
Meanwhile, consider whether it is likely that
someone, having received a benefit from a
king, would be deprived of it simply because
he believed that it was accomplished by
another method than the one actually em-
ployeda method which seemed to that
person, at least, to be far more excellent and
honoring to the king himself.
At sententia vestra, si quis eam admittat,
quamvis, ut ego quidem arbitror, fieri possit, ut
salutem non auferat; tamen praeter qum, qud
Deum maxim, Christum non minim iniuri
afficit, & fidem atque spem, quam in utroque
collocare debemus, ut ex iis, quae infr dicentur,
manifestis apparebit, non parum turbat, atque
pervertit; universam etiam sanctimoniam, sine
But let us assume, as I think is the case, that
your view could be allowed to some extent
without resulting in the actual loss of salva-
tion. Nevertheless, it still inflicts considerable
harm on both God and Christ, and greatly dis-
torts and disturbs the faith and hope which
we ought to place in each of them. Apart
from this, as we will make even more clear
below, it is also able to destroy all holiness,
qua nemo Dominum videbit, ut dictum fuit,
persundare potens est.
without which no one will see the Lord, as
was stated.
Quare te, pro ea charitate, quam omnibus
hominibus, maxim ver iis, qui Christi nomen
profitentur, me debere agnosco, & rogo, &
moneo, ut in ea retinenda persistere nolis;
praesertim cum non tuae tantm salutis, sed
eorum quoque, qui tuae curae commissi a Deo
fuerunt, rationem habere debeas; quorum
sanguinem, si culpa tua perierint, de tuis manibus
aliquando requiret Dominus. At cert facillim
peribunt culp tu, si illis eam doctrinam
obtruseris, quae a vitae innocentia eos revocare
possit.
Therefore, I entreat and admonish you for the
sake of that love which I acknowledge that I
owe to all men, but especially to those who
name the name of Christ. I entreat you to
abandon your position, especially since you
will give an account not only of your own
salvation, but also of those whom God has
committed to your care. If they perish
through your fault, the Lord will require their
blood from your hands someday. There is no
doubt that they will perish readily through
your fault, if you will have forced a doctrine
on them that can divert them from an inno-
cent life.
Quod hactenus imprudens fecisti, condonabit tibi
Deus clementissimus. Sed, cum ex iis, quae a
me dicta fuere, in suspicionem saltem falsitatis
sententiae tuae adduci possis; null veni dignus
eris, si, vel quia, te antehac errasse, tacit
confiteri pudeat, vel quia caeterorum tui ordinis
invidiam subire pigeat, vel quamcumque aliam
eiusmodi ob caussam, populum ea opinione
imbuere perrexeris.
Because up to this point you have acted out of
ignorance, our most merciful God will forgive
you. But what I have told you should lead
you at least to suspect the falsity of your opin-
ion. Therefore, you will not be worthy of any
pardon if you continue to instruct the people
in your view, either because you would be
disgraced to admit that you were formerly in
error, or because you would be ashamed to
experience the ill will others of others of your
communion, or for any other reason of this
sort.
[313] Iamque ex iis, quae hactenus a nobis
disputata sunt, non modo, quidquid a te contra
sententiam meam allatum fuit, plenissim
confutatum videtur: sed etiam id omne abunde
confirmatum, quod in explicatione ipsius
sententiae meae a me in schedula tibi tradita
scriptum fuerat; & inter caetera (id quod caput
erat controversiae nostrae) apert demonstratum,
Christum pro peccatis nostris divinae iustitiae, per
quam nos damnari mereremur, non satisfecisse.
Quocirca hic finis huic meae scriptioni imponi
posset.
[313] From what we have disputed thus far,
not only does whatever you put forth to coun-
ter my view appear to have been fully refuted,
but also what I wrote on the small piece of
paper handed to you in explanation of my
opinion is abundantly proven. Among other
issues, the chief point of contention between
us has clearly been decided: Christ did not
make satisfaction for our sins to divine justice,
through which justice we deserved to be con-
demned. Therefore, I could draw this
disputation to a close here and now.
Verm, quia ex eorum, quae in tuo scripto reliqua
sunt, diligente examinatione maior fortasse
utilitas, qum ex omnibus, quae hucusque dicta
fuere, proficisci potest, & salutis nostrae aeternae
ratio mult adhuc claris, & exactis explicari
atque intelligi, pestilentissimique errores per
hominum aut malitiam, aut imprudentiam in
Christi ecclesiam invecti aut retegi, atque refelli,
aut cert manifest indicari; non abs re visum est
mihi hoc adhuc laboris ad Dei gloriam suscipere:
& caetera etiam, quae scripsisti, accuratissim
maiore ex parte excutere, atque perpendere.
However, perhaps we will reap a greater
advantage by carefully examining certain
issues which remain in your writing than
from what has been stated thus far. Perhaps
we will be able to explain and understand the
way of our eternal salvation even more clearly
and precisely. Perhaps also the most
unwholesome errors that have entered the
church of Christeither through the
wickedness or ignorance of peoplewill be
refuted or at least clearly indicated. There-
fore, it seems to me that it would be profitable
to undertake this further labor for the glory of
God. And so, we will examine with greater
accuracy and detail even the other issues
about which you wrote.

Index Page 142
INDEX OF PARTS AND CHAPTERS TO
DE JESU CHRISTO SERVATORE
[Below is the table of contents to the entire work.]

INDEX PARTIUM, ET CAPITUM HUIUS
DISPUTATIONIS
INDEX OF PARTS AND CHAPTERS OF
THIS DISPUTATION
Disputationis de Iesu Christo Servatore
A Disputation Concerning Jesus Christ the
Savior
Pars Prima
Part One
In qua refelluntur rationes, quas Covetus, ad
suam sententiam confirmandam, & Socini
convellendam, ex sacris litteris ductas afferre
tentavit.
In which the arguments, drawn from the Scrip-
tures, which Covetus has attempted to bring
forward to prove his opinion and overthrow
Socinus', are refuted.
Caput I: Refellitur ratio a divina iustitia ducta; &
ostenditur, nullam Dei iustitiam omnino
postulasse, ut peccata nostra punirentur.
Chapter 1: The argument drawn from divine
justice is refuted. It is shown that the righ-
teousness of God does not at all demand that
our sins be punished.
Caput II: Ratione liberationis ab aeterna morte,
ac salutis nostrae per Christum breviter exposita,
ostenditur, Christum, servatorem nostrum vel ob
id merit dici, qud salutis aeternae viam nobis
annunciaverit; iis refutatis, quae in contrarium
Adversarius attulerat.
Chapter 2: After the argument of our libera-
tion from eternal death and also of our salva-
tion through Christ is briefly expounded, it is
shown that Christ, because he announced to us
the way of eternal salvation, is therefore
rightly called our savior. The arguments
which my opponent had brought forth in
opposition are refuted.
Caput III: Docetur, Christum merit servatorem
nostrum dici eam ob causam, qud salutis
aeternae viam nobis confirmaverit, Adversarii
obiectione diluta.
Chapter 3: After rendering the objection of my
opponent untenable, it is taught that Christ is
deservedly called our savior because he
confirmed to us the way of eternal salvation.
Caput IV: Demonstratur, refutatis Adversarii
obiectionibus, nos Christum imitari posse,
hancque esse aeternae salutis viam: ob idque
Christum iur Servatorem nostrum appellari.
Chapter 4: After refuting the objections of my
opponent, it is demonstrated that we can
imitate Christ, and that this is the way of
eternal salvation; because of this, Christ is
justly called our Savior.
Index Page 143
Caput V: Explicatur, quomodo Christus, a
mortuis resurgendo, salutis aeternae viam nobis
ostenderit, ac propterea noster servator sit:
refutatis Adversarii obiectionibus.
Chapter 5: After the objections of my oppo-
nent are refuted, it is explained how Christ, by
rising from the dead, has pointed out to us the
way of eternal salvation, and is on that account
our savior.
Caput VI: Probatur, refutatis Adversarii
contrariis ratiocinationibus, Christum ideo
Servatorem nostrum & esse & nominari, qud
ipse vitam aeternam nobis daturus sit. cuius rei
efficiendae potestatem eum, ut hominem &
mediatorem, habere demonstratur.
Chapter 6: After the reasonings of my oppo-
nent have been refuted, it is proved that
Christ both is and is called our Savior because
he himself is going to give eternal life to us. It
is demonstrated that he has the power to do
this as man and mediator.
Caput VII: Respondetur rationi ex nomine
Mediatoris Christo attributo ducta; & ostenditur,
eo nomine nullam divinae iustitiae exhibitam
satisfactionem, sed nec ullam irae Dei
placationem significari.
Chapter 7: A response is made to the argu-
ment drawn from the title of Mediator attrib-
uted to Christ. It is shown that no satisfaction
offered to divine justice is signified by that
name, nor is any placation of the wrath of God
signified.
Caput IIX: Refutatur ratio ducta ex
reconciliatione nostra cum Deo per Christum
facta; ac docetur, nullo modo inde consequi,
qud Christus irae Dei pro nobis satisfecerit
eamque placaverit. &, brevi ad hoc & superius
caput appendice addita, tota haec disputatio de
Socini sententia a Coveto impugnata concluditur.
Chapter 8: The argument drawn from our
reconciliation with God made through Christ
is refuted. It is taught that it cannot be con-
cluded, on the basis of this argument, that
Christ made satisfaction to the wrath of God
for us and placated it. And this whole dispu-
tation concerning the opinion of Socinus, as-
sailed by Covet, is concluded with a brief
appendix added to this and to the previous
chapter.
Savior
Pars Secunda
Part Two
In qua respondetur ad ipsa sacrarum litterarum
testimonia, quae Covetus pro sua sententia
confirmanda vel protulit, vel proferre poterat.
In which a response is given to the scriptural
evidence which Covet either put forth or could
have put forth to confirm his opinion.
Caput I: Revocatis ad certa quaedam capita
Adversarii testimoniis, ostenditur, redemptionem
nostram per Christum factam, esse
metaphoricam, id est, in ea peragenda nullum
Chapter 1: After reviewing the evidence of my
opponent on certain main points, our
redemption made through Christ is shown to
be metaphorical. In other words, no real price
Index Page 144
verum pretium intervenisse, sive nihil cuiquam
pro nobis solutum fuisse.
has been involved in accomplishing it, or noth-
ing has been paid to anyone for us.
Caput II: Explicatur diligentius tota redemptionis
nostrae per Christum metaphora; & interim non
pauca ex iis sacris testimoniis explanatur, in
quibus de redemptione ista agitur, quae per
ipsam Christi mortem & sanguinis fusionem
nobis contigerit.
Chapter 2: The metaphor of our redemption
through Christ is expounded with some care,
and in the mean time many biblical passages
are explained which have to do with the
redemption that comes about for us through
the very death of Christ and the shedding of
his blood for us.
Caput III: Explicatur, unde fiat, ut non potis
Christi resurrectio, qum mors, redemptionis
nostrae pretium dicatur; cum tamen per Christi
resurrectionem maxim nobis liberatio ista
contigerit. & reliqua testimonia sacra explanatur,
in quibus redemptionis nostrae per Christum
eiusque mortem factae fit mentio.
Chapter 3: It is expounded how it is that the
price of our redemption is ascribed to the
death of Christ rather than to the resurrection,
notwithstanding the fact that our liberation is
contingent most of all upon the resurrection of
Christ. And the remaining biblical texts are
explained which mention our redemption
through Christ and His death.
Caput IV: Explanatur loca sacrarum litterarum,
in quibus simpliciter dicitur, aut Christum
portasse peccata nostra, aut quidpiam simile;
atque ostenditur hinc minim concludi debere,
Christum omnes poenas pertulisse, quas nos
propter peccata nostra pendere debuissemus.
Chapter 4: The biblical passages are explained,
in which it is simply said either that Christ
bore our sins or something similar. And it is
also shown from this that it should not be
concluded that Christ endured all the penalty
which we ought to have paid on account of
our sins.
Caput V: Tria Esaiae prophetae loca cap. 53
expenduntur atque explicantur, ex quibus colligi
posse videtur, Christum persolvisse poenas
nostrorum peccatorum, eiusque morte irae Dei
pro nobis satisfactum fuisse; haecque minim
inde colligi posse demonstratur.
Chapter 5: Three passages of the prophet
Isaiah, chapter 53, are considered. From these
passages it seems possible to infer that Christ
paid the penalty of our sins, and by His death
made satisfaction to the wrath of God for us.
But then it is demonstrated that such an
inference is by no means possible.
Caput VI: Expenditur locus 1 Pet. 2. ver. 23 &
docetur, ibi nec verbis nec sententi dici,
Christum suo corpore in cruce peccatorum
nostrorum poenas sustinuisse. Ostenditur
insuper, etiamsi & apud Esaiam & apud Petrum
ea legerentur, quae Adversarius putat, non
tamen ipsius sententiam inde confirmatum iri.
Chapter 6: 1 Peter 2:23 is considered, and it is
taught that here it does not say either in words
or in meaning that Christ sustained the
punishments of our sins in His body on the
cross. It is shown, moreover, that even if the
texts of Isaiah and Peter read as my opponent
thinks, his opinion would still not be con-
firmed.
Index Page 145
Caput VII: Explicantur ea sacra testimonia,
quae affirmant, Christum propter peccata nostra,
sive pro peccatis nostris mortuum fuisse; &
planum fit, inde minim colligi posse, Christum
morte sua pro peccatis nostris satisfecisse.
Chapter 7: The biblical evidence is discussed,
which affirms that Christ died on account of,
or for our sins. And it is made plain that it can
in no way be concluded that Christ made
satisfaction for sins by His death.
Caput IIX: Respondetur ad ea loca, in quibus
scriptum est, Christum pro nobis passum &
mortuum esse; ac potissimum demonstratur,
dictionem Pro, in eiusmodi locutione, nullo modo
significare Vice, seu Loco.
Chapter 8: A response is made to those
passages in which it is written that Christ
suffered and died for us. And it is above all
demonstrated that the word for, in this
context in no way signifies instead of or in
the place of.
Caput IX: In primis Adversarii verbis quatuor
errata indicantur; & interim quaedam explicantur,
quae ad totam hanc de Christi mortis cum
legalibus sacrificiis collatione tractationem, viam
quodammodo sternere possint.
Chapter 9: Four errors are indicated in the first
words of my opponent. And meanwhile
certain issues are explicated, which can pave
the way for this entire handling of the analogy
between the death of Christ and the legal sacri-
fices.
Caput X: Ex adumbratione mortis Christi in
Legis sacrificiis expiatoriis, nullo modo posse
colligi, Christi mortem pro peccatis nostris
divinae iustitiae satisfecisse.
Chapter 10: It can in no way be concluded
from the foreshadowing of the death of Christ
in the expiatory sacrifices of the Law that the
death of Christ for our sins made satisfaction
to divine justice.
Caput XI: Docetur, nusquam ullo pacto dictum
fuisse, sacrificia illa legalia pro peccatis
satisfacere.
Chapter 11: It is taught that nowhere in any
sense has it been said that those sacrifices
under the Law make satisfaction for sins.
Caput XII: Explicatur ratio & finis illius
anniversarii sacrificii, de quo praecipu ac
plenissim scriptum est Levit. cap. 16 &
ostenditur, nihil inde elici posse, quod iis, quae
hactenus disputata sunt, quidquam adversetur.
Chapter 12: The reason and aim of that yearly
sacrifice is treated, upon which Leviticus 16
focuses at great length. It is shown that
nothing can be produced from this argument
which opposes anything which has been
disputed thus far.
Caput XIII: Facta collatione ipsius mortis Christi
cum legalibus victimis expiatoriis, & quomodo in
expiandis peccatis conveniant, ostenso; planum
fit, per Christi mortem long alia ratione expiari
peccata nostra, qum divinae iustitiae pro illis
satisfaciendo.
Chapter 13: The analogy is made between the
death of Christ himself and the expiatory
victims under the Law. After it has been
shown in what way they correspond in expi-
ating sins, it becomes plain that through the
death of Christ our sins are expiated in a far
different way than to make satisfaction to
Index Page 146
divine justice for them.
Caput XIV: Incipit ostendi, ipsam Christi mortem
mult plus efficere in expiandis peccatis nostris,
qum efficerent victimae illae legales, adeoque
ipsum illud anniversarium sacrificium, in
expiandis peccatis, pro quibus offerebantur.
Chapter 14: It begins to be shown that the very
death of Christ accomplishes much more in
expiating our sins than those sacrifices
(victims) under the Law could accomplish in
expiating the sins of those for whom the
sacrifices used to be offered. This even in-
cludes the yearly sacrifice itself.
Caput XV: Per occasionem explanandi locum
ad Heb. cap. 9. ver. 13, & 14. docetur,
oblationem Christi expiatoriam peractam fuisse
in caelo; & concluditur demonstratio ex eodem
loco, quomodo per Christi mortem a peccatorum
nostrorum poenis perpetu liberemur.
Chapter 15: Explaining Hebrews 9:13-14
provides the opportunity to teach that the
expiatory oblation of Christ was accomplished
in heaven. And the demonstration of how it is
that we are for all time liberated from the
penalties of our sins through the death of
Christ is concluded from that same passage.
Caput XVI: Per Christi mortem homines a
peccando retrahi; legales autem victimas neque
hanc vim, neque alteram illam habuisse, ut in
perpetuum a reatu & poena peccatorum illorum
liberarent, propter quae expianda offerebantur.
Chapter 16: It is taught that through the death
of Christ men are kept from sinning.
Moreover, the victims under the Law, which
were offered to expiate sins, neither had this
power nor another power, to liberate forever
from the guilt and penalty of them.
Caput XVII: Explicantur quaedam sacra
testimonia, quae Adversarii sententiae favere
videntur; &, re quadam expressa, in qua mors
Christi legales victimas in peccatis expiandis
praecipu excellit, itemque alia, in qua illarum
est dissimilis: tractatio haec collationis inter
ipsam, & illas absolvitur atque concluditur.
Chapter 17: Certain biblical passages are
explained, which appear to favor the opinion
of my opponent. And after a certain respect in
which the death of Christ principally surpasses
the victims under the Law in expiating sins is
made clearand another respect in which it is
dissimilar to themthis treatment of the
analogy between the death of Christ and those
victims is completed and concluded.
Caput XIIX: Ex ipsa adumbratione Christi mortis
in legalibus victimis, quid eandem mortem in
expiandis peccatis nostris praestare,
intelligendum fit, breviter exponitur; & discrimen
veteris & novi foederis in expiandis peccatis
attingitur.
Chapter 18: It is briefly shown what should be
understood from the foreshadowing of the
death of Christ in the victims under the Law:
that the same death of Christ is superior in
expiating our sins. And the distinction be-
tween the old and new covenants in expiating
sins is touched upon.
Caput XIX: Ex eo, qud Christus in summi
legalis pontificis persona adumbratus fuerit,
Chapter 19: From the fact that Christ was
foreshadowed in the person of the High Priest
Index Page 147
minim concludi posse, Christum pro peccatis
nostris Deo satisfecisse; sed neque inde probari,
Deum a Christo nobis placatum fuisse.
of the Law, it can hardly be concluded that
Christ made satisfaction for our sins to God.
Nor can it be proven from this foreshadowing
that God was propitiated toward us by Christ.
Caput XX: Collatione facta inter legalem
pontificem & Christum, ostenditur, qua ratione
Christus peccata nostra expiaverit; & pro eis
illum minim Deo satisfecisse, eumque nobis
placasse, docetur. exinde ratio praedictae
expiationis nostrae plenis explicatur, &
confirmatur.
Chapter 20: After the analogy is made be-
tween the priest of the Law and Christ, it is
shown in what way Christ has expiated our
sins. It is taught that Christ in no way made
satisfaction to God for them, nor that God was
reconciled to us. From there the way of our
predicted expiation is fully explained and con-
firmed.
Caput XXI: Ex eadem collatione colligitur (id
quod etiam divinis testimoniis confirmatur)
Christum nostrorum peccatorum expiationem,
antequam post mortem suam in caelum
ingrederetur, non peregisse. quin etiam, ibi in
caelo ipsum peccata nostra perpetu expiare,
iisdem sacris testimoniis demonstratur, atque ex
eadem collatione ostenditur; quamvis ea in re
aliqua dissimilitudo indicetur.
Chapter 21: From that same analogy (which is
confirmed by Scripture) it is concluded that
Christ did not accomplish the expiation of our
sins before he entered into heaven after his
death. In fact, however much dissimilarity is
shown in that matter, the same biblical texts
and the same analogy both demonstrate that
he himself continually makes expiation for our
sins in heaven.
Caput XXII: Christum non mins, quam legalem
pontificem pro se quoque obtulisse ostenditur;
non quidem ex ipsa huius collationis vi, sed ex
apertissimis epist. ad Heb. testimoniis, quidque
id sibi velit, dilucid explicatur; & inde Christum
per satisfactionem peccata nostra minim
expiasse, evincitur.
Chapter 22: It is shown that Christ made an
offering, no less than the priest of the Law, for
himself also. Whatever it is that he wanted for
himself is clearly explicated, not from that
strength of this analogy, but from the clearest
testimonies of the epistle to the Hebrews. And
from this it is proven that Christ in no way
expiated our sins through satisfaction.
Caput XXIII: Ostenditur, Christum revera
sacerdotem non fuisse ante suum in caelum
ingressum, hacque in re legali pontifici esse
dissimilem; & paucis adiectis, tota haec de
sacrificio Christi eiusque in legalibus sacrificiis
adumbratione disputatio concluditur. Inde
explicatur locus Rom. 8 in ipso initio usque ad v.
5. quod reliquum erat ex omnibus testimoniis ab
Adversario pro sua sententia allatis.
Chapter 23: It is shown that Christ was not in
reality a priest before his entrance into heaven,
and in this matter is dissimilar from the priest
of the Law. After adding a few points for
consideration, this whole disputation
concerning the sacrifice of Christ and of his
foreshadowing in the sacrifices under the Law
is concluded. Then the passage in Romans 8 is
expounded from the very beginning until
verse 5, because it was left unconsidered from
all the testimonies brought forward by my
Index Page 148
opponent to prove his opinion.
Caput XXIV: Examinantur tria Pauli apostoli
testimonia, quae pro Adversarii sententia afferri
solent: nempe Gal. 2. v 21, & cap. 4. v 4; Col. 2.
v 14. & planum fit, nihil in illis esse, quod
suadere possit, Christum pro peccatis nostris
divinae iustitiae satisfecisse.
Chapter 24: Three testimonies of the Apostle
Paul are examined, which are usually put
forward on behalf of the opinion of my oppo-
nent: namely, Gal. 2:21 & 4:4; Col. 2:14. And it
becomes plain that there is nothing in these
passages which can persuade that Christ has
made satisfaction for our sins to divine justice.
Caput XXV: Perpenditur diligentissim locus 1
Joh. 2. v 12. & demonstratur, opinionem istam
satisfactionis Christi pro peccatis nostris ex eo
confirmari nullo modo posse; & finis fit
respondendi ad testimonia, quae pro Adversarii
sententia proferri solent.
Chapter 25: 1 John 2:12 is most carefully
considered. It is demonstrated that the theory
of Christ's satisfaction for our sins can no way
be confirmed from it. And this is the end of
the response to the biblical evidence which is
usually advanced in favor of my opponent's
opinion.
Caput XXVI: Examinantur duo loca Heb. 9. v
26, & Apoc. 13. v 8. quatenus ex illis probari
videtur, Christi mortem & sacrificium ad eos
etiam pertinuisse, qui ante ipsum fuerunt. hinc
enim putavit ipse huius disputationis auctor fort
ab Adversariis concludi, Christi mortem ideo
peccata nostra expiasse, qud pro illis
satisfecerit. Verm huius argumentationis &
assumptio & consequentia falsa esse ostenditur.
Quo facto, Adversarii sententiam divinis
testimoniis minim iuvari posse, concluditur.
Chapter 26: Two passages, Heb. 9:26 and Rev.
13:8, are examined in so far as it appears to be
proven from them that the death and sacrifice
of Christ apply even to those who existed
before him. For I myself thought that perhaps
my opponents would use it to conclude that
the death of Christ has expiated our sins
because it has made satisfaction for them.
Nevertheless both the assumption and the
consequence of this argumentation is shown to
be false. Having done this, it is concluded that
the Scriptures can in no way support the
opinion of my opponent.
A Disputation ConcerningJesus Christ the
Savior
Pars Tertia
Part Three
In qua rationes, & testimonia explicantur, quibus
evincitur, falsam esse sententiam istam, qud
Christus morte sua Deo, sive eius iustitiae pro
peccatis nostris satisfecerit. & reliquum
argumentum quoddam ad eam confirmandam ab
Adversario allatum abunde refellitur.
Part three presents arguments and evidence
which disprove the idea that Christ, by His
death, made satisfaction for our sins to God or
to His justice. It also thoroughly refutes a
remaining argument which my opponent ad-
vanced to confirm his view.
Caput I: Deum iur potuisse nobis condonare
Chapter 1: God was able to be quite just in
Index Page 149
peccata nostra, nulla pro ipsis vera satisfactione
accepta.
forgiving our sins without first receiving literal
satisfaction for them.
Caput II: Deum voluisse nobis peccata nostra
condonare, nulla pro ipsis vera satisfactione
accepta.
Chapter 2: God was in fact willing to forgive
us our sins, without having first received
literal satisfaction for them.
Caput III: Nobis non pereuntibus, divinae
iustitiae pro peccatis nostris nullo modo satisfieri
potuisse.
Chapter 3: It was absolutely impossible for
satisfaction to be made to divine justice for the
sins of us, who are not perishing.
Caput IV: Christum poenarum, quas nos, ex
lege Dei, subire tenebamur, solutione, divinae
iustitiae pro nobis satisfacere non potuisse.
Chapter 4: Christ was not able to make satis-
faction to divine justice for us by payment of
the penalties that the law of God obliged us to
undergo.
Caput V: Christum, eorum, quae nos ex lege
Dei facere debebamus, praestatione, divinae
iustitiae pro nobis satisfacere non potuisse.
Chapter 5: Christ could not make satisfaction
for us to divine justice by legally undertaking
those duties that God's law obliged us to do.
Caput VI: Concluditur ex supr disputatis,
Christum non potuisse divinae iustitiae pro
peccatis nostris satisfacere; idque amplis
confirmatur; atque ostenditur, vera & propria
Christi merita ex Adversariorum sententia statui:
quae cum Dei gratia manifest pugnant.
Chapter 6: From the issues disputed above,
the conclusion is reached that Christ could not
make satisfaction for our sins to divine justice.
This conclusion is established more than
adequately. Furthermore, it is shown that the
view of my opponents entails that Christ
gained literal and proper merits. But it is also
shown that such merits are in flat opposition to
the grace of God.
Caput VII: Argumentum, quo maxim probari
credebat Adversarius, Christum mortuum fuisse,
ut pro peccatis nostris satisfaceret, nullius
momenti esse, breviter primm demonstratur.
Chapter 7: First of all, the argument that my
opponent believes to be a key proof that Christ
died to make satisfaction for our sins is briefly
shown to carry no weight.
Caput IIX: Argumentationis Adversarii
propositionem, Neminem mori, nisi pro peccatis,
aut suis aut alienis, falsam & ineptam esse, de
quacumque tandem morte eam interpretari
velimus, apert ostenditur.
Chapter 8: The proposition of my opponent's
argumentation, Nobody dies except for sins:
either for his own sins or for the sins of
others, is clearly shown to be false and ab-
surd, regardless of the sort of death to which
we would have it apply.
Caput IX: Adversarii indicata propositio, dum
penitis examinatur, magis etiam et falsa &
Chapter 9: A more detailed analysis of my
opponent's proposition, which has already
Index Page 150
inepta demonstratur. & qud Christus fit mor-
tuus, nec tamen illi peccata nostra imputata
fuerint, hoc vel maxim Dei iustitiam
commendare, ratione concluditur.
been mentioned, demonstrates it to be all the
more false and absurd. It is concluded with
good reason that the fact that Christ died and
yet our sins were not imputed to him espe-
cially commends the justice of God.
Caput X: Non potuisse Christo a Deo peccata
nostra imputari, nisi, ut sibi imputarentur,
commeritus fuerit. ex quo Adversarii
argumentum, cui tantopere fidebat, mult magis
& inutile & ineptum esse concluditur.
Chapter 10: Our sins could not have been
imputed to Christ by God, unless he deserved
to have them imputed to him. From this fact
the conclusion is drawn that the argument of
my opponent, on which he placed such great
weight, is all the more useless and absurd.
Caput XI: Ex Coveti suorumque sententia multa
mala, ex Socini ver, nulla prorsus provenire
posse, demonstratur.
Chapter 11: It is demonstrated that many evils
can result directly from the view of Covetus
and his alliesbut not from the view of
Socinus.
Savior
Pars Quarta
Part Four
In qua Coveti sententiae appendices quaedam
maximi momenti diligenter examinantur.
In which certain supplementary points of
crucial importance to the opinion of Covetus
are carefully examined.
Caput I: Explicatur opinio Adversarii de
imputatione satisfactionis Christi per fidem,
eiusque absurda quaedam attinguntur; deque ea
disputandi ordo proponitur.
Chapter 1: The opinion of my opponent
concerning the imputation of the satisfaction of
Christ through faith is discussed, and certain
absurd aspects of this opinion are mentioned.
Also, the order of my arguments to the con-
trary is provided.
Caput II: Nullo pacto, ut rect dictum, sustineri
posse id, quod Covetus affirmat, videlicet, Christi
satisfactionem nobis imputari.
Chapter 2: Covetus' assertion that Christ's
satisfaction is imputed to us is indefensible.
Caput III: Perperam ab Adversario dictum
fuisse, per fidem nobis imputari, id est applicari
seu impartiri Christi satisfactionem.
Chapter 3: My opponent errs in his assertion
that the satisfaction of Christ is imputedthat
is, applied or impartedto us through faith.
Caput IV: Christi iustitiam nobis imputari,
merum commentum esse ostenditur, iis
Scripturae locis examinatis omnibus, ubi
Chapter 4: After examining every passage of
Scripture which mentions imputation, it is
shown to be a pure fiction that the righteous-
Index Page 151
imputationis fit mentio, quae in salute nobis per
Christum parta interveniat.
ness of Christ, which should intervene in the
salvation obtained for us through him, is
imputed to us.
Caput V: Ostenditur, nullo modo ex loc 1. Cor.
1. v 30. colligi posse, Christi iustitiam nobis
imputari.
Chapter 5: It is shown that it is impossible to
conclude from 1 Cor. 1:30 that the righteous-
ness of Christ is imputed to us.
Caput VI: Idem demonstratur de loco Rom. 3. v
12, & c. cuius rei grati illa, quam Paulus ibi
instituit, Christi cum Adamo collatio diligenter
explicatur; & totus locus haud mediocriter
illustratur.
Chapter 6: The same truth above is demon-
strated from the passage in Rom. 3:12, etc., as a
result of which the analogy of Christ with
Adam, which Paul establishes there, is care-
fully explained. And not a little light is shed
on the entire passage.
Caput VII: Eos, qui salutis nobis per Christum
partae participes sint futuri, necesse habere, ut
revera sint pii, & revera, non imputatione tantm,
sanct atque innocenter vivant.
Chapter 7: It is necessary that those who
would be partakers of the salvation obtained
for us through Christ consider that they should
be truly pious and live a blameless and holy
life in fact, not by imputation alone.
Caput IIX: Ex ante dictis breviter indicatur
absurditas eius sententiae, qud nobis Christi
iustitia imputetur, quia credamus, illum poenas
peccatis nostris debitas persolvisse. haecque de
Christi iustitiae imputatione disputatio
concluditur.
Chapter 8: From the foregoing discussion is
indicated the absurdity of the opinion that the
righteousness of Christ is imputed to us
because we believe that he paid the punish-
ment owed for our sins. And this is the
conclusion of the disputation concerning the
imputation of Christ's righteousness.
Caput IX: Credere, per ea, quae passus est
Christus, nostra peccata deleta fuisse, nullo
modo eam fidem in Christum esse posse, qua
iustificamur.
Chapter 9: To believe that our sins were
obliterated through Christ's sufferings can in
no way be that faith in Christ by which we are
justified.
Caput X: Respondetur ad rationes, & testi-
monia, quae suadere videntur, fidem in
Christum, qua iustificamur, esse, credere, per
ea, quae passus est Christus, deleta fuisse
peccata nostra.
Chapter 10: A response is made to the argu-
ments and evidence which might convince one
that the faith in Christ, by which we are
justified, is to believe that our sins have been
obliterated through Christ's sufferings.
Caput XI: Explicatur satis accurat ac diligenter,
quid nam fit ea in Christum fides, qua coram Deo
iustificamur, nec non, qua fide ipse Abrahamus,
qui omnium nostrm est pater, iustificatus
Chapter 11: It is explained with care and
accuracy exactly what the nature of faith in
Christ is, by which we are justified before God,
and by which faith Abraham himself, who is
Index Page 152
fuerint.
the father of us all, has been justified.
Caput XII: Ordine proposito Adversarii dicta
refellendi, quomodo fides in Christum donum Dei
fit, breviter explicatur & confirmatur. inde causa
exponitur, cur ex iis, quibus Christus
annunciatur, quidam credant, quidam ver non
credant.
Chapter 12: After the order of refuting the
statements of my opponent is presented, it is
briefly explained and confirmed in what way
faith in Christ is the gift of God. Then the
reason why it is that out of those to whom
Christ is proclaimed certain ones believe but
others do not is given.
Caput XIII: Respondetur ad testimonia, quae
Adversarius pro sua sententia, quomodo
Christus fit Dei donum protulit. Cuius rei
occasione, de divina ad vitam aeternam
praedestinatione, deque humanis in fide
Evangelio adhibenda, viribus, nonnihil disputatur.
Chapter 13: A response is made to the evi-
dence which my opponent has put forth on
behalf of his own opinion as to how Christ is
the gift of God. This example provides an
opportunity to engage in some disputation
about divine predestination to eternal life and
about human ability to exercise faith in the
gospel.
Caput XIV: Gratiae aguntur Adversario pro
ipsius benevolentia & humanitate: Excusatur
respondendi ad eius scriptum tarditas: Et de
caetero quid illi faciendum fit, ostenditur.
Chapter 14: Thanks are given to my opponent
for his benevolence and kindness; apologies
are given for the slowness in responding to his
letter; and concerning remaining issues it is
shown what action should be taken.

ENDNOTES

1
. . . he would be unwilling to forgive my sins without first receiving literal (vera) satisfaction. . . .
The word translated literal is vera in the Latin. This word often has the meaning of true or
real. I have chosen to render this as literal because that meaning seems best to fit Socinus' argument
throughout the treatise. Socinus is not making a distinction between true as opposed to false
satisfaction. The distinction is between literal vs. metaphorical satisfaction. Socinus does allow for a
kind of satisfaction that God demands of us: a pure and blameless lifestyle. Socinus speaks of this
satisfaction on p. of this translation.
Granting that Socinus does allow for metaphorical satisfaction, a translation of real for vera
would not be suitable, either. A metaphorical satisfaction is certainly real, though it is not literal.
2
. . . is not an essential property of God. Literally, does not reside in God, i.e., as an attribute.
3
Wolfgang Musculus sees the truth of this, and writes accordingly in his Common Places.
Wolfgang Musculus (1497-1563) became professor of theology at Bern in 1549. His major work,
which Socinus cites here, is his Loci communes sacrae theologiae of 1560. Socinus is quoting from the locus
de justificatione.
As Muller observes, Vermigli's Loci communes and Musculus' Loci communes both provide
important models for development of the later Protestant orthodoxy. They do not use the discursive
model of Calvin, but adopt the established locus method instead. In their loci they show more
traditional arrangement and contents of discussion. For example, in the Institutes, Calvin does not give
detailed treatment of the divine attributes, while systematic treatment is found both in Vermigli (1.12)
and Musculus (cap. 47-60). Muller observes that Vermigli and Musculus were more thoroughly trained
in intricacies of later medieval theology than Calvin. These men evidence a more positive relationship
between theology and philosophy, and faith and reason than one finds in Calvin. Though they draw on
the philosophical apparatus and organizational structure of the medievals, they operate within the
context of a thoroughly Augustinian anthropology. See Richard A. Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed
Dogmatics. Vol. 1, Prolegomena (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1987), 69.
4
At in nocentis. . . . An erratum in the text gave a reading of At innocentis. This error is noted in the
official errata listing at the beginning of the document.
5
. . . by which a debtor is compelled to pay off his debt. . . . While I have taken the quod here as
referring to the debt, this could also be translated, . . . by which a debtor, because (quod) he owes, . . .
6
. . . they can commit injustice by undermining the law's authority, . . . This could possibly be
translated, . . . they can commit injustice by breaking the law's authority, . . .
7
. . . promiserat, in illis verbis, . . . The text was changed from . . . promiserat in illis verbis, . . . (Note
the comma after promiserat.) This erratum is listed in the errata listing at the beginning of the
document.

Endnotes Page 154

8
But the punitive sanctions, of which Moses had forewarned, are detailed in these words: . . . The
section which follows is from Nehemiah 9:26-28.
9
Robert Stephanus, in his Large Bible, quite rightly explains the passage as follows. . . .
Robert Estienne (1503-1559)Latinized as Stephanuswas the printer to Francis I of France.
He came from a family of printers that was active in Geneva and Paris in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries. He was most well-known for his production of editions of the Scriptures, both in Latin and in
Greek, and for his Thesaurus Linguae Latinae (1532). His annotations to the Bible incurred the hostility of
the Sorbonne, which resulted in his flight to Geneva in 1551. In Geneva, Stephanus adopted Calvinism,
and printed many of Calvin's works. In his New Testament, published in Geneva, he introduced the
versification that is still in use today. Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church, 1985 ed., s.v. Stephanus.
In 1557 Stephanus produced his last and largest edition of the Bible, in three folio volumes, at
Geneva. The three volumes were accompanied by a considerable array of annotations from Vatable
and other scholars, . . . (Basil Hall, Biblical Scholarship: Editions and Commentaries, chap. in
Cambridge History of the Bible, vol. 3, The West from the Reformation to the Present Day, ed. S. L. Greenslade
[Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963], 66-67).
10
. . . if each one of you will not forgive his brother their trespasses. . . Even though their trespasses
seems awkward, this translates the Latin correctly, which reads delicta illorum. The plural here is in
keeping with the Vulgate reading, which in turn imitates the Greek.
11
. . . in order that we might reap the benefit of God's amazing generosity. he verb translated here as
reap is percipere. This verb can have the sense of to take possession of, occupy, take to oneself. It
can also be translated to perceive, observe, comprehend, understand, perceive (Lewis and Short, A
Latin Dictionary, 1984 ed., s.v. percipio). Godbey favors the translation of to obtain on theological
grounds, because in Socinus' theology, the benefits of the remission of sins are not received apart from
Christ (Godbey, Study, 189, footnote 2). Given Socinus' radical emphasis on Christ's prophetic office,
in which Christ makes known to us the way of salvation, a translation of perceive, contrary to
Godbey's assertion, would actually comport well with Socinus' theology. However, the translation
adopted here does not arise out of a larger consideration of Socinus' theology, but instead comes from
the immediately following context, in which Socinus states that we attain (consequeremur) freedom from
eternal death and the possession of eternal life.
12
. . . it is through Christ that we attain freedom from eternal death. . . . It is important to note that
Socinus held to the annihilation of the wicked, rather than to their resurrection unto eternal punishment.
This is concisely summarized in the Epitome of a Colloquium held in Rakw in the year 1601. George
Williams has provided a translation of the Epitome in The Polish Brethren, 1:112-122. The question of
eternal punishment is treated in the section entitled, On the State of the Dead. From this it is quite
clear that Socinus denies the conscious, eternal torment of the wicked.
13
As we have shown above clearly and at great length, it is through Christ that we attain freedom from
eternal death and the possession of eternal life; . . . Socinus is probably referring to his discussion in De
Servatore 1.2.6.
Endnotes Page 155

14
. . . God is wronged by those who are not afraid to deprive him of the first category of generosity, . . .
The category of generosity to which Socinus refers was mentioned earlier. This is God's generosity in
freely remitting our sins by sheer grace.
15
Cum. The text incorrectly reads tum and has been changed to cum. This error is given in the
errata listing at the beginning of the book.
16
But even the second category of generosity is either lessened or at least obscured. The second
category to which Socinus refers is God's giving up his only son so that we can reap the benefit of his
generosity.
17
. . . God did not want to bestow forgiveness on us before a certain exceptional obedience occurred
first. Though not explicitly stated, the obedience Socinus has in view is undoubtedly Christ's.
18
. . . Zaleucus of the Locrians. He established a law which stipulated that a particular crime should be
punished by gouging out both of the offender's eyes. Mason gives this summary of Zaleucus and his
legislation:
. . . the celebrated lawgiver of the Locrians, is said to have been originally a slave employed as a shepherd,
and to have been set free and appointed lawgiver by the direction of an oracle on his enunciating some
excellent laws which he represented Athene as having communicated to him in a dream. . . . The date of the
legislation of Zaleucus is assigned by Eusebius (Chron. Anno 1356, 01. 30. 1) to B.C. 660. . . . The code of
Zaleucus is stated to have been the first collection of written laws that the Greeks possessed (Strab. vi. p.
259; Clem. Alex. Strom. i. p. 309). . . . The character of his laws generally speaking was severe (Zenobius, iv.
10; Diogenianus, iv. 94). They were, however, observed for a long period by the Locrians, who obtained, in
consequence, a high reputation for legal order. . . . One feature of that legislation was that definite penalties
were attached to the violation of the laws, which appears to have been a novelty in law-making, penalties
having elsewhere and till then been determined either by ancient custom or by the tribunals before which the
offender was tried . . . The penalty of adultery is said to have been the loss of the eyes (Aelian, V. H. xiii. 24;
Val. Max. v. 5 3). There is a famous story told by the above-named authors of the son of Zaleucus having
become liable to this penalty, and the father himself suffering the loss of one eye that his son might not be
utterly blinded. (William Smith, ed. A Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, William
Smith, ed. [London: John Murray, 1873], s.v. Zaleucus [ ], by Charles Peter Mason.)
19
. . . sed extremae quoque inscitiae . . . ac fatuitatis perturpissimam atque indignissimam blasphemiam
& contumeliam insimuletur. The word et (and), which should appear after the word fatuitatis, seems
to be missing from the text here. This error is not given in the official errata listing at the beginning of
the document.
20
At. The text incorrectly reads ut and has been changed in accordance with the errata listing at the
beginning of the document.
21
. . . & ea, quam antea habebat, infinitis partibus maiorem, . . . In this passage, the word ea should
be corrected to read eam. This erratum is not given in the official errata listing at the beginning of the
document.
22
. . . whatever operations are immanent in him. . . . Literally, whatever things occur in him.
Endnotes Page 156

23
Some of you argue that, on the basis of God's unshakable will, there can be no remission without the
shedding of blood; this divine decree cannot be changed. According to a printed note in the margin of
the text, the person Socinus has in mind is Zanchi.
24
. . . the essence of the Father must be numerically identical with the essence of the person of the Son.
Literally, this reads, it [the essence] is identical in number in the person of the Father.
25
Sed ubi debitum est, ibi nullum verum & proprium meritum, & quale in hac disputatione intelligi
necesse est, intervenire potest. The text that appears in the Bibliotheca Fratrum Polonorum edition adds
the words: Vide Luc 17. 10.
26
Deflexerint. The text incorrectly reads deflexerunt, and has been changed in accordance with the
errata sheet at the beginning of the document.
27
. . . they turn aside to the acceptation theory. Literally, they turn aside to that other view.
28
My uncle Laelius, however, advised Calvin of the truth, under the pretense of inquiring into the matter.
But not only did Calvin assert confidently in response that Christ literally and properly merited eternal
salvation for us with God, but the arguments that he had written in response to Laelius' questions and
then published in the book of his letters were repeated in his Institutes of the Christian Religion. In these
writings Calvin left no stone unturned to confirm the traditional opinion.
Laelius Socinus carried on written and verbal dialogues with important Protestant leaders
throughout the Continent, including Melanchthon, Bullinger and Zanchi. He was accustomed to
propound his views under the pretense of seeking further enlightenment on the subject under
discussion. Zanchi (Preface to lib. de Tribus Elohim) speaks of him as a man born of a noble and
respectable family, of blameless life and deportment, but nevertheless full of different heresies.
Zanchi also noted that Laelius always propounded these heresies for the sake of discussion, and as
though desiring to be taught. (Fuit is Laelius nobili honestaque familia natus, . . . vitaeque etiam
externae inculpatae, quarum rerum caus mihi quoque intercesserat cum illo non vulgaris amicitia; sed
homo fuit plenus diversarum haeresium, quas tamen mihi nunquam proponebat nisi disputandi causa,
et semper interrogans, quasi cuperet doceri.)
Calvin and Laelius carried on a correspondence over a range of theological topics, including the
bodily resurrection of believers, the propriety of baptism administered by papists, the legitimacy
between marriages between Protestants and those still encumbered by Romish superstitions, etc.
Concerning the passage before us, Laelius had propounded several questions related to the
conflict between salvation by grace alone and salvation as procured through the merits of Christ. Calvin
answered the queries of Laelius in a 1555 letter. See Responsio ad Aliquot Laelii Socini Senensis
Quaestiones, Corpus Reformatorum, vol. 38, Pars Prior: Ioannis Calvini Opera Quae Supersunt Omnia, ed.
Guilielmus Baum, Eduardus Cunitz, [and] Eduardus Reuss Vol. X, Pars Prior (Brunsvigae: Apud C. A.
Schwetschke et Filium [M. Bruhn], 1871), 10.160-65. As Faustus notes, Calvin's responses to Laelius are
reproduced in the Institutes 2.17.1-5 and 3.2.11-12. In 2.17.1 Calvin speaks of Some men too much given
to subtilty, while they admit that we obtain salvation through Christ, will not hear of the name of merit,
by which they imagine that the grace of God is obscured. . . .
Endnotes Page 157

In terms of the answer that Calvin gave to Laelius in his Responsio, Calvin addressed four
questions posed by Laelius. Though the letter to which Calvin is responding is not extant, we can recon-
struct the questions it contained on the basis of Calvin's responses. The question before us, concerning
the relationship between grace and Christ's merits, was probably framed similar to the following: If the
justification of men depends on the sheer mercy of God, how is it necessary that Christ's merit should at
the same time intervene? Willis, 234. Calvin's response, reproduced by Faustus in this passage, is that
Christ's merits depend on God's good pleasure.
Willis (235) and others have noted the resemblance between Calvin's doctrine of Christ's merit
and the acceptation theory of Duns Scotus. But, as Willis points out, the similarity should not be pressed
too far. The medievals, such as Scotus, Lombard and Aquinas, all worried about what Christ merited for
himself, as well as what he merited for others. Calvin, however, restricts himself to what Christ merits
for others. This is treated in more detail in note above, which contrasts Calvin's view with the position
of Lombard.
29
Calvin appeals to a common rule to obviate this difficulty: Factors that are subalternate do not op-
pose.
The verb subalternare appears to be of Medieval rather than classical origin. An object or
factor is subalternate if it is secondary, inferior or dependent on another. See Du Cange, Glossarium
Mediae et Infimae Latinitatis, 1954 ed., s.v. Subalternus. The idea is that one factor may stand in a
relationship of hierarchial dependence on another.
The edition of Calvin's Institutes translated by Beveridge renders Calvin's citation of this rule as
follows:
It is a well-known rule, that principal and accessory are not incompatible, and therefore there is nothing to
prevent the justification of man from being the gratuitous result of the mere mercy of God, and, at the same
time, to prevent the merit of Christ from intervening in subordination to this mercy.
John Allen's rendering is more lucid:
And thus it betrays ignorance to oppose the merit of Christ to the mercy of God. For it is a common maxim,
that between two things, of which one succeeds or is subordinate to the other, there can be no opposition.
There is no reason, therefore, why the justification of men should not be gratuitous from the mere mercy of
God, and why at the same time the merit of Christ should not intervene, which is subservient to the mercy of
God. (John Allen, ed., Calvin's Institutes of the Christian Religion [Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of
Christian Education, 1936], 1:579)
Calvin's argument is that salvation by God's grace and salvation by the merit of Christ do not
stand in contradiction, but in a hierarchically dependent relationship. Simply stated, God graciously
provides a mediator to merit salvation for us, and then graciously agrees to accept this merit. Had God
not been so graciously disposed, Christ could not have gained any merit for us.
Because of the technical character of the term, I have chosen to adopt the rendering of
subalternate, rather than to attempt a dynamic rendering.
Endnotes Page 158

30
. . . this is reminiscent of the common object of criticism, Would that not in Pelion's woods. . . . We are
not seeking the remote but the proximate cause.
Socinus provides an incomplete citation of the opening lines of Euripides' Medea, as translated by
Ennius in his Medea Exul. A more complete citation reads:
O that in Pelion's woods the firwood timbers had not fallen to the ground, cut down by axes, and that
therefrom had not commenced the undertaking to begin the ship which now is named with the name of Argo,
because in it sailed the picked Argive heroes who were seeking the golden fleece of the ram from the
Colchians, with guile, at King Pelias' command. For then never would my mistress, misled, have set foot
away from home.
This passage by Ennius, particularly the first verse or two, was often used as the locus classicus in
discussions of exposition and the efficient cause to illustrate false reasoning (Norma L. Drabkin, The
Medea Exul of Ennius [New York: W. F. Humphrey Press, Inc., 1937], 51). As Drabkin (53) points out,
the first verse became almost proverbial, and was used as a stock expression for the root of all evils. . . .
Cicero (Ad Herennium 2.34; De Fato 34-35; De Inventione 1.91; Topica 61) and Quintillian (Institutiones
Orationae 5.10.83-84) treat the passage in some detail. The fallacy of the argument concerns tracing back
the cause of an event to circumstances too remote. In his De Fato (35), Cicero states:
He might have gone even further back, Would that no tree had ever grown on Pelius! and even further,
Would that no Mount Pelius existed! and similarly one may go on recalling preceding events in infinite
regress. . . . What is the point of recounting these past events? because what follows is this:

For were it so, my roving royal mistress,
Medea, from her home and ne'er set forth,
Heartsick and by love's cruel weapon wounded.
It was not the case that those events brought the cause of love.
Socinus is accusing Covetus with committing the same fallacy, when Covetus tries to tie eternal
death to Adam's transgression. According to Socinus, the immediate or proximate cause for eternal
death is that fact that one has descended from parents who are naturally mortal, by creation.
It should be borne in mind that for Socinus, natural and eternal death refer to the same thing.
Death is annihilation (see note above). To experience eternal death is to cease to exist forever. See also
note , which discusses this issue in the context of Augustine's commentary on Genesis.
31
Therefore, they do not suffer these evils simply because they are true Christians per se, but because
they confess the name of Christ. The meaning of this somewhat ambiguous sentence is illuminated by
the immediately preceding argument. Socinus' point is that only Christiansi.e., those who name the
name of Christsuffer chastisement from God. But this should not be confused with the undeserved
evil one suffers as a testimony for one's faith.
Endnotes Page 159

32
. . . & Dei propositio in iustis affligendis deserviatur. The text has proposito, which is undoubtedly
an error for propositio. This error is not given in the official errata listing at the beginning of the
document.
33
. . . the old translation renders the word. . . . The text literally reads, the old translator (vetus
interpres). Presumably Socinus has Jerome's Vulgate in mind. The Vulgate does translate (apokeitai)
as statutum est.
34
Since we disputed elsewhere in great detail that natural death, to the extent that it is natural, is not the
penalty of sin, . . . Socinus undoubtedly has in mind his De statu primi hominis ante lapsum disputatio,
quam Faustus Socinus Senensis per scripta habuit cum Francisco Puccio Florentino, anno 1578. In qua habetur
responsio, ad Defensionem Francisci Puccii suorum argumentorum, de immortalitate hominis & omnium rerum
ante lapsum in Opera 2.253-369.
35
. . . in your tacit attempt to confirm your axiom you have abused the authority of holy Scripture. In
terms of the Latin word order, the adverb tacitly (tacit) goes with to confirm your axiom. However,
in terms of meaning, it seems more likely that Socinus would charge that Covetus, in his explicit attempt
to prove his axiom, is in fact tacitly abusing the authority of Scripture. After all: Covetus is explicitly
trying to prove his axiom, and only tacitly, i.e., unintentionally, abusing the authority of Scripture. In
spite of the seeming anomaly in the argument, the translation given follows the Latin word order.
36
. . . vel iniusta caussa sive occasione . . . The text originally read, iniusta, caussa sine. (Note the
removal of the comma after iniusta.) This change was made based on the errata listing at the
beginning of the document.
37
Let us employ a metaphor, appropriate for the issue before us, to help us both examine and explain the
truth. Imagine that there was a king, . . . The parable Socinus offers sounds reminiscent, formally, of
the parable of a king given in Anselm's Cur Deus Homo 2.16. Theologically, Anselm and Socinus are
worlds apart. Perhaps Socinus used this metaphor in conscious imitation of and in antithesis to the
Anselmian parable. The point of Anselm's parable is to show how the benefits of Christ's death extend
to those who lived both before and after him.
38
Agnoscere. The text incorrectly reads agnoscore, and has been changed to conform to the errata
sheet at the beginning of the document.
39
Nam & eius erga nos charitatem in morte pro nobis subeunda, ut postea dicemus, deprimit, . . . A
variant reading, given in the edition of De Servatore contained in the text given in the Bibliotheca Fratrum
Polonorum, is, Nam & eius erga nos charitas in morte pro nobis subeunda, ut postea dicemus, deprimitur, . . .
40
For it logically follows that wrath, affliction and grief, which arises from his righteous judgment, threat-
ens the others, as Paul tells us. Note that Socinus does not hold to the orthodox theory of eternal
punishment for the lost.

De Jesu Christo Servatore Part III by Faustus Socinus (Trans. Alan Gomes)

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FAUSTUS SOCINUS

DE JESU CHRISTO SERVATORE, PART III

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