HEIRS OF EMILIANO NAVARRO, petitioner,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT & HEIRS OF SINFOROSO PASCUAL, respondents.
FACTS:
On October 3, 1946, Sinforoso Pascual, now deceased, filed an application for foreshore lease
covering a tract of foreshore land in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan, having an area of approximately
seventeen (17) hectares. This application was denied on January 15, 1953. So was his motion for
reconsideration.
Subsequently, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, also now deceased, Emiliano Navarro, filed a
fishpond application with the Bureau of Fisheries covering twenty five (25) hectares of foreshore
land also in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan.
Initially, such application was denied by the Director of Fisheries on the ground that the property
formed part of the public domain.
Upon motion for reconsideration, the Director of Fisheries, on May 27, 1958, gave due course to
his application but only to the extent of seven (7) hectares of the property as may be certified by
the Bureau of Forestry as suitable for fishpond purposes.
The Municipal Council of Balanga, Bataan, had opposed Emiliano Navarro's application.
Aggrieved by the decision of the Director of Fisheries, it appealed to the Secretary of Natural
Resources who, however, affirmed the grant.
On the other hand, sometime in the early part of 1960, Sinforoso Pascual flied an application to
register and confirm his title to a parcel of land, situated in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan, described
in Plan Psu-175181 and said to have an area of 146,611 square meters.
Pascual claimed that this land is an accretion to his property, situated in Barrio Puerto Rivas,
Balanga, Bataan, and covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 6830.
On March 25, 1960, the Director of Lands, represented by the Assistant Solicitor General, filed
an opposition thereto stating that neither Pascual nor his predecessors-in-interest possessed
sufficient title to the subject property, the same being a portion of the public domain and,
therefore, it belongs to the Republic of the Philippines.


During the pendency of the land registration case, that is, on November 6, 1960, Sinforoso
Pascual filed a complaint for ejectment against Emiliano Navarro, one Marcelo Lopez and their
privies, alleged by Pascual to have unlawfully claimed and possessed, through stealth, force and
strategy, a portion of the subject property covered by Plan Psu-175181.
The defendants in the case were alleged to have built a provisional dike thereon: thus they have
thereby deprived Pascual of the premises sought to be registered. This, notwithstanding repeated
demands for defendants to vacate the property.
The case was decided adversely against Pascual. Thus, Pascual appealed to the Court of First
Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Balanga, Bataan. Because of the similarity of the parties
and the subject matter, the appealed case for ejectment was consolidated with the land
registration case and was jointly tried by the court a quo.
During the pendency of the trial of the consolidated cases, Emiliano Navarro died on November
1, 1961 and was substituted by his heirs, the herein petitioners.
Subsequently, on August 26, 1962, Pascual died and was substituted by his heirs, the herein
private respondents.
On November 10, 1975, the court a quo rendered judgment finding the subject property to be
foreshore land and, being a part of the public domain, it cannot be the subject of land registration
proceedings.
On December 15, 1980, we granted the Solicitor General, acting as counsel for the Director of
Forestry, an extension of time within which to file in this court, a petition for review of the
decision dated November 29, 1978 of the respondent appellate court and of the aforecited
resolution dated November 21, 1980.
ISSUE :
May the land sought to be registered be deemed an accretion in the sense that it naturally accrues
in favor of the riparian owner or should the land be considered as foreshore land?
Before us is a petition for review of: (1) the decision 1 and (2) two subsequent resolutions 2 of
the Intermediate Appellate Court 3 (now the Court of Appeals) in Land Registration Case No. N-
84, 4 the application over which was filed by private respondents' predecessor-in-interest,
Sinforoso Pascual, now deceased, before the Court of First Instance 5 (now the Regional Trial
Court) of Balanga, Bataan.





RULING:
The disputed property was brought forth by both the withdrawal of the waters of Manila Bay and
the accretion formed on the exposed foreshore land by the action of the sea which brought soil
and sand sediments in turn trapped by the palapat and bakawan trees planted thereon by
petitioner Sulpicio Pascual in 1948
Anchoring their claim of ownership on Article 457 of the Civil Code, petitioners vigorously
argue that the disputed 14-hectare land is an accretion caused by the joint action of the Talisay
and Bulacan Rivers which run their course on the eastern and western boundaries, respectively,
of petitioners' own tract of land.
Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under said Article 457, requires the concurrence of the
following requisites: (1) that the accumulation of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible;
(2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river; and (3) that the land where the
accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of the river.
Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited, while alluvium is the soil deposited on the
estate fronting the river bank ; the owner of such estate is called the riparian owner. Riparian
owners are, strictly speaking, distinct from littoral owners, the latter being owners of lands
bordering the shore of the sea or lake or other tidal waters.
Petitioners' claim of ownership over the disputed property under the principle of accretion, is
misplaced.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review is hereby DENIED and DISMISSED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
AGUSTIN V. IACFACTS:
Private respondents, Maria Melad and Pablo Binuyag are among those who are occupying the
western bank of the Cagayan River while on the eastern bank is owned by petitioner Eulogio
Agustin. From 1919 to 1968, the Cagayan river has eroded the lands on the eastern bank
including Agustins Lot depositing alluvium on the land possessed by
Pablo Binuyag. In 1968, after a typhoon which caused a big flood, the Cagayan River changed
its course and returned it to its 1919 bed and it cut through the lands of respondents whose lands
were transferred on the eastern side. To cultivate the lands they had to cross the river. When they
were cultivating said lands, (they were planting corn)Agustin accompanied by the mayor and
some policemen claimed the land and drove them away. So Melad and Binuyag filed separate
complaints for recovery of their lots and its accretions. The Trial Court held ordered Agustin et.
al to vacate the lands and return them to respondents. On appeal, the IAC affirmed in toto the
judgment thus the case at bar.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondents own the accretion and such ownership is not affected by the
sudden and abrupt change in the course of the Cagayan River when it reverted to its old bed
HELD: YES
Art. 457 states that the owner of the lands adjoining river banks own the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the currents of the waters. Accretion benefits a riparian
owner provided that these elements are present: 1) deposit be gradual and imperceptible 2) it
resulted from the effects of the current of the water and3) the land is adjacent to the river bank.
When the River moved from 1919 to 1968, there was alluvium deposited and it was gradual and
imperceptible. Accretion benefits the riparian owner because these lands are exposed to floods
and other damage due to the destructive force of the waters, and if by virtue of law they are
subject to encumbrances and various kinds of easements, it is only just that such risks or dangers
should in some way be compensated by the right of accretion. Also, respondents ownership over
said lots was not removed when due to the sudden and abrupt change in the course of the river;
their accretions were transferred to the other side. Art. 459 states when the current of a river x x
x segregates from an estate on its bank a known portion of land and transfers it to another estate,
the owner of segregated portion retains ownership provided he removes the same w/in 2 years.
And Art. 463 states that whenever the current of a river divides itself into branches, leaving a
piece of land or part thereof isolated, the owner of the land retains ownership. He also retains it if
a portion of land is separated from the estate by the current.

Reynante v. C.A.
207 SCRA 794

DOCTRINE: Granting that the lots were created by alluvial formation and while it is true that
accretions which the bank of rivers may gradually receive from the effect of the current become
the property of the owner of the banks, such accretion to registered land does not preclude
acquisition of the additional are by another person through prescription

FACTS:
Petitioner, Jose Reynante was a tenant over the two lots of Don Cosme Carlos for more than 50
years. A fishpond is situated between the two lots. During his tenancy, Reynante constructed a
nipa hut, and planted and harvested nipa plams, to which he appropriated it as his own. When
Don Cosme Carlos died, his heirs, private respondents, executed a written agreement with
Reynante wherein the latter would turn over the fishpond to the former. After executing the
agreement, Reynante surrendered the fishponds as well as the lots. The fishpond was leased to
one Carlos de la Cruz. However, Reynante did not vacate the lots and continued to live there and
harvest the nipa palms he planted. The private respondents formally demanded that Reynante
vacate the lots to which the latter refused to do. A forcible entry with preliminary injunction was
filed against Reynante however the trial court dismissed the complaint basing from the fact that
Reynante was the prior possessor of the lots. The trial courts decision was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals.

ISSUES:
1. Who between the petitioner and private respondents has prior physical possession
the two lots? -- PETITIONER REYNANTE
2. Whether or not the disputed lots belong to private respondents as a result of
accretion? -- NO

HELD:
It has been held that party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even
against the owner himself. As long as the party is able to prove prior possession he is entitled to
remain on the property until he is lawfully ejected. It is clear from the records that Reynante has
been in possession of the lots for more than 50 years. Consequently, the court cannot legally
grant the possession over the two lots to the private respondents.

The Court of Appeals ruled that the two lots were created by alluvial formation hence under
Article 457 of the New Civil code the ownership of such is granted to the private respondents.
However, although the lands to which the additional areas (which are the two lots subject in this
case) are attached to are registered; the failure to register the additional lands subjected it to
acquisition through prescription. Applying this to the case, the private respondents never
registered the two lots and since Reynante has been in possession of such for more than 50 years
already, its possession over it must be respected unless the private respondents are able to show
that they have the better title over it.
JAGUALING V. CA | EDUAVE, 194 SCRA 607

FACTS:
Eduave claims that she inherited a parcel of land from her parents, which later increased in size
due to erosion caused by typhoon Ineng. In 1973 Jagualing asked her permission to plant corn
and bananas provided that they prevent squatters to come to the area.

The land was the subject of a reconveyance case between Janita Eduave vs. Heirs of Antonio
Factura which was the subject of judgment by compromise in view of the amicable settlement of
the parties. In the amicable settlement the heirs of Antonio Factura (Jagualing), ceded a portion
of the land with an area of 1,289 square meters more or less to Eduave.

Later, Jagualing denied the claim of ownership of Eduave, and asserted that they are the real
owners of the land in litigation containing an area of 18,000 square meters more or less.
According to them, they acquired the land by acquisitive prescription since they have occupied
the land since 1969. They presented tax declarations and photos of actual occupation to prove
claim of prescription.

Eduave filed an action to quiet title and/or remove a cloud over the property in question against
Jagualing. RTC dismissed the complaint for failure of Eduave to establish by preponderance of
evidence their claim of ownership over the land in litigation and that the land is a delta thus is
part of public domain not susceptible of appropriation.

The CA found that the island was formed by the branching off of the river and subsequent
thereto the accumulation of alluvial deposits. Basing its ruling on Articles 463 and 465 of the
Civil Code the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court, declared private
respondents as the lawful and true owners of the land subject of this case and ordered petitioners
to vacate the premises and deliver possession of the land to private respondents.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Jagualing acquired the island thru prescription?
HELD: No.
From the evidence thus submitted, CA had sufficient basis for the finding that the property of
Eduave actually existed and was identified prior to the branching off or division of the river. The
CA, therefore, properly applied Article 463 of the Civil Code which allows the ownership over a
portion of land separated or isolated by river movement to be retained by the owner thereof prior
to such separation or isolation. The parcel of land in question is part of an island that formed in a
non-navigable and non-flotable river; from a small mass of eroded or segregated outcrop of land,
it increased to its present size due to the gradual and successive accumulation of alluvial
deposits. In this regard the CA also did not err in applying Article 465 of the Civil Code. Under
this provision, the island belongs to the owner of the land along the nearer margin as sole owner
thereof; or more accurately, because the island is longer than the property of private respondents,
they are deemed ipso jure to be the owners of that portion which corresponds to the length of
their property along the margin of the river.

It is well-settled that lands formed by accretion belong to the riparian owner. This preferential
right is, under Article 465, also granted the owners of the land located in the margin nearest the
formed island for the reason that they are in the best position to cultivate and attend to the
exploitation of the same. In fact, no specific act of possession over the accretion is required. If,
however, the riparian owner fails to assert his claim thereof, the same may yield to the adverse
possession of third parties, as indeed even accretion to land titled under the torrens system must
itself still be registered.
However, Jagualing failed to prove adverse possession of the land for the required period and
their possession cannot be considered in good faith since by their admission they have
recognized Eduaves ownership over the land. Thus the land still belongs to Eduave.

Islands formed by accretion belong to the riparian owner nearest to its margin. However such
accretion may be lost to third parties thru prescription.
G.R. No. 104813 October 21, 1993
HEIRS OF JOSE OLVIGA, NAMELY: PLACIDA S. OLVIGA, VIRGILIO OLVIGA,
LOLITA OLVIGA, CARMENCITA O. ALPUERTO and JEANETTE OLILA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ANGELITA R. GLOR, SERILINA G. JAMON,
EMELITA G. MADELA, EMAN G. MANALO, MYRNA GLOR, FELIPE GLOR,
GAUDENCIO GLOR and CORNELIO GLOR, respondents.
Natalio T. Paril, Jr. for petitioners.
Leovigildo L. Cerilla for private respondents.

GRIO-AQUINO, J .:
This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 30542,
affirming in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Calauag, Quezon ordering the
defendants, heirs of Jose Olviga (petitioners herein), to reconvey the land in dispute to the
plaintiffs, heirs of Cornelia Glor (now private respondents),and to pay attorney's fees and the
costs of suit.
This case started as an action (Civil Case No. C-883) filed in the Regional Trial Court of
Calauag, Quezon by Angelita Glor and her children against the heirs of Jose Olviga for
reconveyance of a parcel of land, measuring 54,406 square meters (5.44 has), more or less,
known as Lot 13, Pls-84 of the Guinayangan Public Land Subdivision.
The court, after due trial, rendered judgment in favor of the private respondents, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, and considering the foregoing judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the PLAINTIFFS and against the defendants as heirs of Jose Olviga to
reconvey the land in dispute to the plaintiffs as heirs of Cornelio Glor Sr.;
condemning the defendants jointly and severally to pay the plaintiffs attorneys
fees of P5,000.00 plus the costs of the suit. The counterclaim interposed by
defendants is dismissed. ( p. 12, Rollo.)
The judgment was appealed to the Court of Appeals by the defendants who raised several factual
issues regarding possession and fraud, as well as legal issues involving prescription and
purchaser in good faith, but the appellate court dismissed the appeal and affirmed in toto the
decision of the trial court.
It was established by the evidence on record that the land in question was, in 1950, still forest
land when Eutiquio Pureza, then only twelve years old, and his father cleared and cultivated it. In
1954, they introduced improvements such as, coconut trees, jackfruit, mangoes, avocado and
bananas. When the area was released for disposition, the Bureau of Lands surveyed the same in
1956 in the name of Eutiquio Pureza. Since then, the land has been known as Lot 13, Pls-84 of
the Guinayangan Public Land Subdivision. Godofredo Olviga, a son of Jose Olviga then living
with the latter, protested the survey but without respect to a one-half-hectare portion "sa dakong
panulukan ng Amihanan-Silanganan." This protest or "tutol" (Exh. B) of Godofredo Olviga,
brother of petitioners Virgilio Olviga and Lolita Olviga Olila, is of public record in the Bureau of
Lands (Exh. B). In said document, Godofredo Olviga expressly admitted that the lot belonged to
Eutiquio Pureza, except the 1/2 hectare portion claimed by him (Godofredo) which was included
in the survey of Pureza's Lot 13.
In 1960, Eutiquio Pureza filed a homestead application over Lot 13. Without his application
having been acted upon, he transferred his rights in said lot to Cornelia Glor in 1961. Neither the
homestead application of Eutiquio nor the proposed transfer of his rights to Cornelio Glor was
acted upon by the Director of Lands for reasons that the records of the Bureau of Lands do not
disclose.
In 1967, Jose Olviga obtained a registered title for said lot in a cadastral proceeding, in fraud of
the rights of Pureza and his transferee, Cornelio Glor and his family who were the real and actual
occupants of the land.
What must have happened as found by the Court of Appeals, is that since Cornelio Glor, Sr. was
sickly, and his wife (now widowed) Angelita Glor, was unschooled, they failed to follow up
Pureza's homestead application over Lot 13 in the cadastral proceedings in the Municipal Court
of Guinayangan Public Land Subdivision, Pls-84, Case 1 (Philcusa-Foa). In fact, they were not
aware of the proceedings. Angelita Glor testified that no notice was ever posted on Lot 13 about
the proceedings nor did the barangay captain, tell her about them. Neither did she receive any
notice from the court sheriff or any court employee. This non-posting of the hearing of the
cadastral hearing on the land, or in the barangay hall, was confirmed by petitioner Virgilio
Olviga himself who testified that he did not notice any papers posted on the property in question
(tsn, October 18, 1990, pp. 83-84). On the other hand, petitioner's father Jose Olviga, claimed
both Lots 12 and 13, which are adjoining lots, in the same cadastral proceedings. He falsely
omitted in his answer mention of the fact that other persons were in possession of, and claiming
adverse interest in, Lot 13 and that the land had been surveyed for Eutiquio Pureza, the former
occupant who sold his interests to private respondents' parent. Cornelio Glor, in 1961. Glor was
Olviga's neighbor. As a result, both Lots 12 and 13 were declared as uncontested in the name of
Jose Olviga (Exh. 7), and were registered in his name in 1967 in Original Certificate of Title, No.
0-12713 (Exh. 5). In 1971, Olviga requested that OCT No. 0-12713 be split into two (2) TCT's,
one each for the two (2) lots. TCT Nos. T-103823 and T-103824 were issued for lots 12 and 13,
respectively. Jose Olviga later transferred Lot 13 to his son-in-law, Jaime Olila and daughter,
Lolita Olviga resulting in the cancellation of TCT. No. 241314 in the names of the spouses (Exh.
3).
It was also established that the spouses Jaime Olila and Lolita Olviga Olila, were not innocent
purchasers for value of the land from their father, and have never been in the possession. The
Glors and their predecessor-in-interest (Cornelio Glor Sr., and Eutiquio Pureza) were the ones
found to be in possession of the property.
From said finding, and conclusions, the appellate court in its decision dated January 13, 1992,
resolved the issues presented, thus:
. . ., whether or not plaintiffs' action is really one for quieting of title that does not
prescribe; or assuming that their demand for reconveyance of the lot in question
prescribes in ten years, being based on an implied trust, whether their cause of
action should be counted from the date of the issuance of the late Jose Olviga's
title over said lot in 1967 and has, therefore, already prescribed, or whether the
prescriptive period should be counted from the date plaintiffs acquired knowledge
of said title sometime in 1988.
The first question should be answered in the affirmative. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
But even assuming that plaintiffs' action for reconveyance, being based on an
implied or constructive trust, prescribes in ten years, the lower court again
correctly ruled that their cause of action should be considered to have accrued not
from the date of registration of the title of Jose Olviga, defendants' predecessor-
in-interest, over the lot in question in 1967, but only from the time the plaintiffs
learned of such title in 1988. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
All in all, therefore, the court a quo did not err in holding that plaintiffs' action
against defendants-appellants for the reconveyance of the lot in question filed on
April 10, 1989, or in less than a year after they learned of the issuance of a title
over said lot to Jose Olviga, predecessor-in-interest of defendants, has not yet
prescribed.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from herein is AFFIRMED in toto, with
costs against defendants-appellants. (pp. 48-51, Rollo.)
Petitioners now seek a review of the above decision. They allege that the present action has
already prescribed; (2) the Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that the private respondents'
cause of action accrued not in 1967 but in 1988; (3) that the Court of Appeals erred when it
failed to consider that private respondents as mere homestead transferees cannot maintain an
action for reconveyance; (4) that the Faja and Caragay-Layno cases have no bearing and direct
application to the case at bar; and (5) that private respondents have not proven by preponderance
of evidence their ownership and possession of the disputed land.
With regard to the issue of prescription, this Court has ruled a number of times before an action
for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten
years, the point of reference being the date of registration of the deed of the date of the issuance
of the certificate of title over the property (Vda. de Portugal vs. IAC, 159 SCRA 178). But this
rule applies only when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property, since if a person claiming
to be the owner thereof is in actual possession of the property, the right to seek reconveyance,
which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not prescribe.
In Sapto vs. Fabiana, 103 Phil. 683, 686-687, appellants' predecessors sold to appellees in 1931
a parcel of land. The sale was approved by the Provincial Governor of Davao but was never
registered. Possession of the land was, however, transferred to Fabiana and the latter has been in
possession thereof from 1931 up to the present. The widow and children of Samuel Sapto filed
an action to recover the land. This Court in affirming the validity of the sale in favor of appellee
(Fabiana) held:
No enforcement of the contract is in fact needed, since the delivery of possession
of the land sold had consummated, the sale and transferred title to the purchaser,
registration of the contract not being indispensable as between the parties.
Actually the action for conveyance was one to quiet title, i.e., to remove the cloud
cast upon appellee's ownership by the refusal of the appellants to recognize the
sale made by their predecessors. This action accrued only when appellants
initiated their suit to recover the land in 1954. Furthermore, it is an established
rule of American jurisprudence (made applicable in this jurisdiction by Art. 480
of the New Civil Code) that actions to quiet title to property in the possession of
the plaintiff are imprescriptible (44 Am. Jur. p. 47; Cooper vs. Rhea, 39 L.R.A.
930; Inland Empire Land Co. vs. Grant County, 138 Wash. 439 245 Pac. 14).
In Faja vs. Court of Appeals, 75 SCRA 441, 446, this Court likewise reiterated the ruling that:
. . . There is settled jurisprudence that one who is in actual possession of a piece
of land claiming to be owner thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or
his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, the reason for the
rule being, that his undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek the
aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim
of a third party and its effect on his own title, which right can be claimed only by
one who is in possession. No better situation can be conceived at the moment for
Us to apply this rule on equity than that of herein petitioners whose mother,
Felipa Faja, was in possession of the litigated property for no less than 30 years
and was suddenly confronted with a claim that the land she had been occupying
and cultivating all these years, was titled in the name of a third person. We hold
that in such situation the right to quiet title to the property, to seek its
reconveyance and annul any certificate of title covering it, accrued only from the
time in possession was made aware of a claim adverse to his own, and it is only
then that the statutory period of prescription commences to run against possessor.
In the case at bar, private respondents and their predecessors-in-interest were in actual possession
of the property since 1950. Their undisturbed possession gave them the continuing right to seek
the aid of a court of equity to determine the nature of the adverse claim of petitioners, who in 198
disturbed their possession.
The other issues raised in the petition are factual.
The Court of Appeals and the trial court correctly based their findings of tact on the testimonies
of the parties and their witnessess. It can be said therefore that those conclusions are based on
substantial evidence. No cogent reason exists to disturb them. As reiterated in a long line of
decisions, it is beyond the province of this Court to make its own findings of facts different from
those of the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals (Vda. de Cailles vs. Mayuga 170
SCRA 347; New Owners/Management of TML Garments, Inc. vs. Zaragosa, 170 SCRA 563). In
petitions for review of decisions of the Court of Appeals, the jurisdiction of this Court is
confined to a review of questions of law, except when the findings of fact are not supported by
the records or are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute a serious abuse of discretion (Lim vs.
Court of Appeals, 158 SCRA 307; Samson vs. CA, 141 SCRA 194; Republic vs. IAC, 144
SCRA 705). The case at bar does not fall under the exceptions.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision of the Court of Appeals, the petition
for review is DENIED, with costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.


Vda de Aviles v. CA
264 SCRA 473

DOCTRINE: Quieting of Title Not Proper Remedy For Settling Boundary Dispute. Quieting of
title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud upon or doubt or uncertainty with
respect to title to real property.

FACTS:
Petitioners aver that they are the actual possessors of a parcel of land situated in Malawa,
Lingayen, Pangasinan, more particularly described as fishpond, cogonal, unirrigated rice and
residential land, bounded on the N by Camilo Aviles; on the E by Malawa River, on the S by
Anastacio Aviles and on the W by Juana and Apolonio Joaquin, with an area of 18,900 square
meters and declared under Tax Declaration No. 31446. This property is the share of their father,
Eduardo Aviles and brother of the defendant, in the estate of their deceased parents.
Eduardo Aviles was in actual possession of the afore-described property since 1957. In fact, the
latter mortgaged the same with the Rural Bank and Philippine National Bank branch in
Lingayen. When the property was inspected by a bank representative, Eduardo Aviles, in the
presence of the boundary owners, namely, defendant Camilo Aviles, Anastacio Aviles and Juana
and Apolonio Joaquin pointed to the inspector the existing earthen dikes as the boundary limits
of the property and nobody objected. When the real estate mortgage was foreclosed, the property
was sold at public auction but this was redeemed by plaintiffs mother and the land was
subsequently transferred and declared in her name.
Defendant Camilo Aviles asserted a color of title over the northern portion of the property with
an area of approximately 1,200 square meters by constructing a bamboo fence (thereon) and
moving the earthen dikes, thereby molesting and disturbing the peaceful possession of the
plaintiffs over said portion.
Defendant Camilo Aviles admitted the agreement of partition executed by him and his brothers,
Anastacio and Eduardo. The respective area(s) alloted to them was agreed and measured before
the execution of the agreement but he was not present when the measurement was made.
Defendant agreed to have a smaller area because his brother Eduardo asked him that he wanted a
bigger share because he has several children to support. The portion in litigation however is part
of the share given to him in the agreement of partition.
At present, he is only occupying a smaller than his actual share. Tax Declarations Nos. 23575,
481 and 379 covering his property from 1958 show that the area of his property is 14,470 square
meters. The riceland portion of his land is 13,290 square meters, the fishpond portion is 500
square meters and the residential portion is 680 square meters, or a total of 14,470 square meters.
That the topography of his land is not the same, hence, the height of his pilapils are likewise not
the same.
The trial court disposed of the case thus ordering the parties to employ the services of a Land
Surveyor of the Bureau of Lands, Region I, San Fernando, La Union, to relocate and determine
the extent and the boundary limit of the land of the defendant on its southern side in order that
the fourteen thousand four hundred seventy (14,470) square meters which is the actual area given
to the defendant be determined. It ordered the complaint dismissed for lack of basis and merits
Dissatisfied with the trial courts decision, petitioners appealed to the respondent appellate Court.
In its now-assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed in part the decision of the trial court,
reasoning that a special civil action for quieting of title is not the proper remedy for settling a
boundary dispute, and that petitioners should have instituted an ejectment suit instead. It
affirmed the decision of the trial court in dismissing the complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Hon. Court of Appeals is correct when it opined that the complaint for
quieting of title instituted by the petitioners against private respondent before the court a quo is
not the proper remedy but rather, it should be a case for ejectment.

HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that Quieting of Title Not Proper Remedy For Settling Boundary
Dispute. Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud upon or doubt
or uncertainty with respect to title to real property.
The Civil Code authorizes the said remedy in the following language:

Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of
any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective
but is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial
to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.

An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon a title to real property of
any interest therein."

In fine, to avail the remedy of quieting of title, a plaintiff must show that there is an instrument,
record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which constitutes or casts a cloud, doubt, question or
shadow upon the owners title to or interest in real property. Thus, petitioners have wholly
misapprehended the import of the foregoing rule by claiming that respondent Court erred in
holding that there was no xxx evidence of any muniment of title, proceeding, written contract,
xxx, and that there were, as a matter of fact, two such contracts, (i) the Agreement of Partition
executed by private respondent and his brothers (including the petitioners father and
predecessor-in-interest), in which their respective shares in the inherited property were agreed
upon, and (ii) the Deed of Sale evidencing the redemption by petitioner Anastacia Vda. de Aviles
of the subject property in a foreclosure sale. However, these documents in no way constitute a
cloud or cast a doubt upon the title of petitioners. Rather, the uncertainty arises from the parties
failure to situate and fix the boundary between their respective properties.

As correctly held by the respondent Court, both plaintiffs and defendant admitted the existence
of the agreement of partition and in accordance therewith, a fixed area was alloted (sic) to them
and that the only controversy is whether these lands were properly measured. There is no adverse
claim by the defendant which is apparently valid, but is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective,
voidable, or unenforceable and which constitutes a cloud thereon.

Corollarily, and equally as clear, the construction of the bamboo fence enclosing the disputed
property and the moving of earthen dikes are not the clouds or doubts which can be removed
in an action for quieting of title.

An action to quiet title or to remove cloud may not be brought for the purpose of settling a
boundary dispute. The precedent on this matter cited by the respondent Court in its Decision is
herewith reproduced in full.

G.R. No. 180076 November 21, 2012
DIONISIO MANANQUIL, LAUDENCIA MANANQUIL-VILLAMOR, ESTANISLAO
MANANQUIL, and DIANITA MANANQUIL-RABINO, represented by OTILLO
RABINO, Petitioners,
vs.
ROBERTO MOICO, Respondent.
**

D E C I S I O N
DEL CASTILLO, J .:
In order that an action for quieting of title may proper, it is essential that the plaintiff must have
legal or equitable title to, or interest in, the property which is the subject-matter of the action.
Legal title denotes registered ownership, while equitable title means beneficial ownership. In the
absence of such legal or equitable title, or interest, there is no cloud to be prevented or removed.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari
1
assails the March 13, 2007 Decision
2
of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 81229, which reversed and set aside the January 2, 2001
Decision
3
of the Malabon Regional Trial Court, Branch 74 in Civil Case No. 2741-MN, thus
dismissing the said civil case for quieting of title.
Factual Antecedents
Lots 18 and 19 in Dagat-Dagatan, Navotas form part of the land previously expropriated by the
National Housing Authority (NHA) and placed under its Tondo Dagat-Dagatan Foreshore
Development Project where occupants, applicants or beneficiaries may purchase lots on
installment basis. In October 1984, Lot 18 was awarded to spouses Iluminardo and Prescilla
Mananquil under a Conditional Contract to Sell. Lot 19, on the other hand, was sold to Prescilla
in February 1980 by its occupant.
In 1991, Iluminardo and Prescilla died without issue, but it turned out that Prescilla had a child
by a previous marriage namely Eulogio Francisco Maypa (Eulogio). After the spouses death,
Iluminardos supposed heirs (Mananquil heirs) his brothers and sisters and herein petitioners
Dionisio and Estanislao Mananquil (Estanislao), Laudencia Mananquil-Villamor (Laudencia),
and Dianita Mananquil-Rabino (Dianita) executed an Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs
and adjudicated ownership over Lots 18 and 19 in favor of Dianita. They took possession of Lots
18 and 19 and leased them out to third parties.
Sometime later, the Mananquil heirs discovered that in 1997, Eulogio and two others, Eulogio
Baltazar Maypa and Brenda Luminugue, on the claim that they are surviving heirs of Iluminardo
and Prescilla, had executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Waiver of Rights and Sale,
and a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Roberto Moico (Moico).
In May 1997, Moico began evicting the Mananquils tenants and demolishing the structures they
built on Lots 18 and 19. In June, the Mananquils instituted Civil Case No. 2741-MN for quieting
of title and injunctive relief.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The trial court issued a temporary restraining order, thus suspending eviction and demolition.
After trial on the merits, a Decision was rendered in favor of the Mananquils. The dispositive
portion thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Ordering that a permanent injunction be issued enjoining defendant Roberto Moico to
refrain from threatening the tenants and destroying the improvements standing on the
subject properties and from filing the ejectment suits against the tenants;
2. Ordering the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Waiver of Rights and Sale and the
Deed of Absolute Sale dated January 9, 1997 cancelled for having no force and effect;
3. Declaring plaintiffs to be rightfully entitled to the subject properties and the
Extrajudicial Settlement of Heirs of the plaintiffs to be valid and enforceable;
4. Ordering defendants to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the following, to wit:
a. P50,000.00 as moral damages;
b. P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
c. P50,000.00 for and as attorneys fees; and
d. Costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
4

Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Moico appealed to the CA, which reversed the trial court. It held that the petitioners have failed
to show that Iluminardo and Prescilla have
x x x perfected their grant/award from the NHA so as to secure a firm, perfect and confirmed
title over the subject lots. It must be stressed that the Conditional Contract to Sell that covers Lot
No. 18 stipulates several terms and conditions before a grantee of the NHA may legally acquire
perfect title over the land, and there should be no mistake that the same stipulations hold true
with respect to Lot No. 19. Inter alia, the more vital contractual conditions, are: (a) payment in
installment of the price for a specified period, (b) personal use of and benefit to the land by the
grantee, and (c) explicit prohibition from selling, assigning, encumbering, mortgaging, leasing,
or sub-leasing the property awarded x x x.
5

The CA noted that Lots 18 and 19 must still belong to the NHA, in the absence of proof that
Iluminardo and Prescilla have completed installment payments thereon, or were awarded titles to
the lots. And if the couple disposed of these lots even before title could be issued in their name,
then they may have been guilty of violating conditions of the government grant, thus
disqualifying them from the NHA program. Consequently, there is no right in respect to these
properties that the Mananquils may succeed to. If this is the case, then no suit for quieting of title
could prosper, for lack of legal or equitable title to or interest in Lots 18 and 19.
Issues
The present recourse thus raises the following issues for the Courts resolution:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN PASSING UPON AN ISSUE NOT
BEING ASSIGNED AS ERROR IN THE APPELLANTS BRIEF OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS AND NOT TOUCHED UPON DURING THE TRIAL IN THE
COURT A QUO PARTICULARLY THE ALLEGED VIOLATION OF THE SPOUSES
ILUMINARDO AND PRESCILLA MANANQUIL OF THE CONDITIONAL
CONTRACT TO SELL PURPORTEDLY COVERING THE PROPERTIES IN
QUESTION, TO SUIT ITS RATIONALIZATION IN ITS QUESTIONED DECISION
JUSTIFYING THE REVERSAL OF THE DECISION OF THE COURT A QUO.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ALSO COMMITTED A GRIEVOUS ERROR IN
CONSTRUING THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLES 476 AND 477 OF THE CIVIL
CODE AGAINST PETITIONERS NOTWITHSTANDING THE POSITIVE
CIRCUMSTANCES OBTAINING IN THIS CASE POINTING TO THE PROPRIETY
OF THE CAUSE OF ACTION FOR QUIETING OF TITLE.
6

Petitioners Arguments
Petitioners argue that the CA cannot touch upon matters not raised as issues in the trial court,
stressing that the NHA did not even intervene during the proceedings below to ventilate issues
relating to the rights of the parties to Lots 18 and 19 under the Tondo Dagat-Dagatan Foreshore
Development Project. Petitioners claim that since the issue of violation of the terms of the grant
may be resolved in a separate forum between the Mananquils and the NHA, it was improper for
the CA to have pre-empted the issue.
On quieting of title, petitioners advance the view that since they are the legal heirs of Iluminardo
Mananquil, then they possess the requisite legal or equitable title or interest in Lots 18 and 19,
which thus permits them to pursue Civil Case No. 2741-MN; whatever rights Iluminardo had
over the lots were transmitted to them from the moment of his death, per Article 777 of the Civil
Code. And among these rights are the rights to continue with the amortizations covering Lots 18
and 19, as well as to use and occupy the same; their interest as successors-in-interest, though
imperfect, is enough to warrant the filing of a case for quieting of title to protect these rights.
Respondent Moicos Arguments
Moico, on the other hand, argues that because the issue relating to Iluminardo and Prescillas
possible violation of the terms and conditions of the NHA grant is closely related to the issue of
ownership and possession over Lots 18 and 19, then the CA possessed jurisdiction to pass upon
it.
Moico supports the CA view that petitioners failed to prove their title or interest in the subject
properties, just as he has proved below that it was his predecessor, Eulogio, who paid all
obligations relative to Lots 18 and 19 due and owing to the NHA, for which reason the NHA
released and cleared the lots and thus paved the way for their proper transfer to him.
Our Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
An action for quieting of title is essentially a common law remedy grounded on
equity.1wphi1 The competent court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the
complainant and other claimants, not only to place things in their proper place, to make the one
who has no rights to said immovable respect and not disturb the other, but also for the benefit of
both, so that he who has the right would see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated,
and he could afterwards without fear introduce the improvements he may desire, to use, and even
to abuse the property as he deems best. But "for an action to quiet title to prosper, two
indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an
equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim,
encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact
invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy."
7

Contrary to petitioners stand, the issue relating to the grant of rights, title or award by the NHA
determines whether the case for quieting of title may be maintained. If the petitioners are
legitimate successors to or beneficiaries of Iluminardo upon his death under the certificate of
title, award, or grant, or under the special law or specific terms of the NHA program/project
then they possess the requisite interest to maintain suit; if not, then Civil Case No. 2741-MN
must necessarily be dismissed.
From the evidence adduced below, it appears that the petitioners have failed to show their
qualifications or right to succeed Iluminardo in his rights under the NHA program/project. They
failed to present any title, award, grant, document or certification from the NHA or proper
government agency which would show that Iluminardo and Prescilla have become the registered
owners/beneficiaries/ awardees of Lots 18 and 19, or that petitioners are qualified successors or
beneficiaries under the Dagat-Dagatan program/project, taking over Iluminardos rights after his
death. They did not call to the witness stand competent witnesses from the NHA who can attest
to their rights as successors to or beneficiaries of Lots 18 and 19. They failed to present proof, at
the very least, of the specific law, provisions, or terms that govern the Tondo Dagat-Dagatan
Foreshore Development Project which would indicate a modicum of interest on their part. For
this reason, their rights or interest in the property could not be established.
It was erroneous, however, for the CA to assume that Iluminardo and Prescilla may have violated
the conditions of the NHA grant under the Tondo Dagat-Dagatan Foreshore Development
Project by transferring their rights prior to the issuance of a title or certificate awarding Lots 18
and 19 to them. In the absence of proof, a ruling to this effect is speculative. Instead, in resolving
the case, the trial court and the CA on appeal should have required proof that petitioners had,
either: 1) a certificate of title, award, or grant from the proper agency (NHA or otherwise) in the
name of their predecessor Iluminardo, or, in the absence thereof, 2) a right to succeed to
Iluminardos rights to Lots 18 and 19, not only as his heirs, but also as qualified legitimate
successors/beneficiaries under the Tondo Dagat-Dagatan Foreshore Development Project terms
and conditions as taken over by the NHA.
8
Petitioners should have shown, to the satisfaction of
the courts that under the NHA program project governing the grant of Lots 18 and 19, they are
entitled and qualified to succeed or substitute for Iluminardo in his rights upon his death. As
earlier stated, this takes the form of evidence apart from proof of heirship, of course of the
specific law, regulation or terms covering the program/project which allows for a substitution or
succession of rights in case of death; the certificate of title, award or grant itself; or the testimony
of competent witnesses from the NHA.
Proof of heirship alone does not suffice; the Mananquils must prove to the satisfaction of the
courts that they have a right to succeed Iluminardo under the law or terms of the NHA project,
and are not disqualified by non-payment, prohibition, lack of qualifications, or otherwise.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The March 13,
2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 81229 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.


Sps. Hipolito v. Cinco

D E C I S I O N

DEL CASTILLO, J .:

Findings of fact by administrative agencies are generally accorded great respect, if not finality, by
the courts
[1]
by reason of the special knowledge and expertise of said administrative agencies over matters
falling under their jurisdiction.

Challenged in this Petition for Review on Certiorari
[2]
are the May 19, 2006 Decision
[3]
and
August 15, 2006 Resolution
[4]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 89783 which dismissed
petitioners Petition for Review and denied their Motion for Reconsideration respectively. Said assailed
CA Decision which affirmed the February 28, 2005 Resolution
[5]
of the Office of the President (OP), in
O.P. Case No. 04-F-262, states, viz:
In fine, we hold that public respondent Office of the President, in affirming the
resolution of the Secretary of the DPWH which sustained the resolution and the
demolition order of the OBO, committed no grave abuse of discretion, the same being
supported by evidence and having been issued in accordance with law and jurisprudence.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Resolution dated
February 28, 2005 of the Office of the President of the Philippines, issued through the
Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs in O.P. Case No. 04-F-262, is
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
[6]



Petitioners beseech this Court to reverse and set aside said Decision and consequently, to alter a
string of consistent Resolutions issued by the OP in the said O.P. Case No. F-262, the Secretary of the
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) in NBC Case No. 17-03-I-MLA,
[7]
and the Office
of the Building Official (OBO) of the City of Manila in NBC Case No. NG-2002-06.
[8]


Factual Antecedents

Petitioner-spouses Ricardo Hipolito, Jr. and Liza Hipolito (petitioners) allege that on June 15,
1989, Edeltrudis Hipolito yMariano (Edeltrudis)
[9]
entered into an agreement
[10]
with Francisco
Villena
[11]
(now deceased) to rent a portion of the property located at 2176 Nakar Street, San Andres
Bukid, Manila and to construct an apartment-style building adjacent to the existing house thereon. The
contract was for a period of 20 years. Pursuant to the agreement, Edeltrudis built a three-storey apartment
building without securing a building permit. Petitioners inherited the apartment building upon the death
of Edeltrudis.

In 2002 or 13 years after the execution of the agreement, petitioners and the heirs of Francisco
Villena, all residing in the property, were informed that respondent Atty. Carlos D. Cinco (Atty. Cinco)
acquired the subject property through a deed of sale sometime in 1976.

On June 17, 2002, herein respondents Atty. Cinco, Teresita Cinco and Dr. Carlota Balde Cinco
(respondents) filed with the OBO a verified request
[12]
for structural inspection of an old structure located
at 2176 Nakar Street, San Andres Bukid,Manila.

Acting on the request, Building Inspector Engineer Leonardo B. Rico (Engr. Rico) conducted an
initial inspection. In his memorandum Engr. Rico reported that two old and dilapidated buildings made
of wooden materials were found in the premises and recommended that the matter be referred to the
Committee on Buildings (Committee) for further appropriate action and disposition.

Deemed as a petition for condemnation/abatement pursuant to the National Building Code
(NBC) and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, the verified request of the respondents was referred
to the Committee for Hearing/ Investigation.

With prior notices to the parties and the tenants, three hearings were subsequently held from
August 12, 2002 to September 20, 2002 for purposes of resolving the focal issue of the structural
stability, architectural presentability, electrical and fire safety aspect to determine [whether] or not the
subject buildings are still safe for continued occupancy.
[13]
On September 20, 2002, Victoria Villena,
wife and heir of Francisco Villena and owner of one of the two buildings, filed a counter manifestation
questioning respondents personality to file the petition for condemnation, and refuting the technical
evaluation reports of Engr. Rico and respondents commissioned engineer. Whereupon, the Committee
was constrained to schedule an ocular inspection of the subject buildings on October 7, 2002. A report on
the ocular inspection conducted was thereafter submitted through a Memorandum
[14]
dated October 8,
2002, which states:

x x x The subject structure is a 3-storey at the rear portion and Two (2)[-] storey at the
front made up of wooden materials with G.I. sheet roofings.

II. Findings:

1. Corrugated G.I. sheet roofings and its accessories incurred extensive
deterioration/[dilapidation] due to weathering.

2. Ceiling boards [bulging] attributed to water leaks from defective roofing.

3. Exterior and interior wooden boards deteriorated.

4. Doors/windows including its jambs deteriorated/[dilapidated].

5. No provisions of firewall on the sides abutting private lot.

6. Rafters, purlins, and girts deteriorated due to neglect of maintenance.

7. Vibrations were felt on the wooden flooring when exerting wt. An
indication that its support suffered [material] fatigue due to wear and tear and
termite infestation.

8. Wooden columns incurred deterioration/[dilapidation] due to weathering
and termite infestation.

9. Open wiring installation/fire hazard.

10. With notices of condemned installation No. 2K3-62042 EPM issued by OIC,
City Electrical Division, DEPW.

11. Inadequate water supply and drainage system.

12. Outmoded T & G due to neglect of maintenance.

13. Inadequate sanitary/plumbing installation.

III. RECOMMENDATION:

From the foregoing, the subject buildings [appear] to have incurred extensive
deterioration/[dilapidation] [attributed] mainly to long weather exposure, poor
maintenance and termite infestation on its architectural and structural components by 60-
80% which constitutes an Architectural eyesore, structurally unsafe as well as fire and
electrical hazard thereby endangering the life, safety, health and welfare [of] the general
public specifically the tenants thereat, hence, it is strongly recommended that the subject
building be declared dangerous and ruinous in pursuance of Sec. 214 and 215 and Rules
VII and Rule VIII of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. 1096.


Ruling of the Office of the Building Official

In a Resolution
[15]
dated March 26, 2003, the OBO declared the buildings dangerous and ruinous,
and recommended their demolition, to wit:

x x x x

On the basis of the ocular inspection report submitted by the Committee on
Buildings and the findings of the OIC, City Electrical Division DEPW which form part
of this resolution, it appearing that the subject structures incurred an extensive degree of
[dilapidation]/deterioration by 60-80% attributed mainly to long weather exposure,
termite infestation and neglect of maintenance on its architectural and structural
component which constitute architectural eyesore, structurally unsafe as well as electrical
hazards thereby endangering the life, health property and welfare of the general public
particularly the tenants thereat [sic].

Such sorry condition of said structures exist to the extent that remedial/
rehabilitation which is no longer practical and economical as it would entail/ necessitate a
total overdone thereof [sic].

WHEREFORE, premises considered the Committee on Buildings and in
consonance with the findings of the OIC, City Electrical Division DEPW the subject
buildings are hereby found and declared Dangerous and Ruinous and strongly
recommending the issuance of the corresponding Demolition Order in pursuance of
Section[s] 214 and 215 of the National Building Code and Rule VII and VIII of its
Implementing Rules and Regulations further directing the tenants/ occupants thereat to
vacate the premises within fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof to pave the way for its
peaceful and orderly [d]emolition activity.

SO ORDERED.


A Demolition Order
[16]
addressed to the respondents was accordingly issued on even date with
petitioners and their tenants duly furnished with a copy thereof.

Petitioners thus appealed
[17]
to the DPWH.

Ruling of the Department of Public Works and Highways

In their appeal, petitioners prayed for the reversal of the Resolution of the OBO and for the setting
aside of the Demolition Order on the ground that same were anomalously issued. They likewise
contended that respondents petition for condemnation was actually an attempt to circumvent their rights
as builders in good faith. Petitioners prayed for a separate inspection of the two buildings by an impartial
body.

Thus, another ocular inspection was conducted by the Inspectorate Team of the DPWH to
determine the actual physical condition of the subject buildings. The Inspectorate Team reported thus:

There are two (2) Buildings/Structures subject of this appeal. For proper
identification of the two (2) Storey ResidentialBuilding located at front No. 2176 Nakar
Street, San Andres Bukid, is designated as Building I while the Three (3) Storey
Residential Building located at the rear portion is designated as [B]uilding 2.

Building 1

Building I is pre-war vintage (t)wo (2)[-](s)torey structure generally made of
wooden materials. Corrugated G.I. roofing sheets and its accessories are extensively
corroded and deteriorated due to long existence, weather exposure and improper
maintenance. Gutters and [down spouts] are already missing. Interior and exterior
wooden board partitions are deteriorated by about eighty percent (80%). Roof eaves and
media agues are deteriorated and some wooden members are ready to collapse. Doors
and windows including [their] jambs are deteriorated by about eighty percent (80%).
Wooden stair[s] leading to second floor is rotten and deteriorated due to long existence
and termite infestation. Wooden board floorings are sagging and vibration can be felt
when walking on it. Plywood ceiling boards are deteriorated by about eighty percent
(80%).

The wooden roof framing parts such as rafters, purlins, and girts are rotten.
Majority of the wooden posts are termite infested and deteriorated. The wooden beams
and floor joists are noted to have incurred deterioration. Vibration is felt at the second
floor wooden flooring when walked upon, an indication that its wooden structural
supports show signs of material fatigue due to wear and tear and termite infestation.
Structural components of the structure were observed to have deteriorated by about
seventy five percent (75%).

Sanitary/Plumbing fixtures and systems within the building are noted
outmoded, inadequate and not properly maintained. Inadequate water supply and
drainage system within the building is noted. The comfort room is useable and
functioning but is not properly ventilated and unsanitary.

The electrical wiring insulation shows sign of brittleness due to excessive
exposure to ambient heat, moisture and time element. Excessive octopus connections and
dangling of wires/extensions [sic] cords are observed. Some switches and convenience
outlets are detached and defective. Junction/pullboxes are not properly covered thus
exposing electrical wiring connections. Some electrical wiring installations are attached
to deteriorated parts of the building. The electrical wiring installations are already old, not
properly maintained and inadequate to conform to the rules and regulations of the
Philippine Electrical Code (PEC).

Building 2

Building 2 is a three (3)[-](s)torey structure located at the back of the Building I,
and the usage is purely for residential purposes. The building is constructed [out] of
wooden materials, corrugated G.I. roofing sheets and plain G.I. sheets for its accessories.
The said building was constructed sometime in 1989, however, the construction is not in
accordance with the standard and the requirements of the National Building Code (PD
1096). Corrugated G.I. roofing sheets are corroded and deterioration is about seventy
percent (70%). [Down spouts] and gutters are no longer in place. Interior and exterior
wooden board sidings have incurred about sixty percent (60%) deterioration. Some
rooms have no proper ventilation due to excessive partitioning. Eaves [have] no ceiling.
Wooden board floorings are sagging and vibration is felt when walked upon due to
undersized wooden framing. Substandard ceiling height. Plywood ceiling boards are
bulging. No fire resistive wall provided between the two buildings.

As to the Structural, Sanitary/Plumbing and Electrical aspects, Building 2 has
the same findings as in Building I.

From the foregoing, it appears that the subject building attained a degree of
dilapidation that repair works are no longer practical and economical to undertake.

Therefore, it is recommended that the Demolition Order issued by the
OBO, Manila be sustained.
[18]



On May 19, 2004, the Secretary of the DPWH rendered a Resolution
[19]
dismissing the appeal of
the petitioners for lack of merit and affirming the Resolution of the OBO and the issuance of the
Demolition Order.

In the same Resolution, the Secretary of the DPWH opined:

x x x x

In condemnation proceedings of dangerous and ruinous building pursuant to the
National Building Code (NBC) and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR), the
authority of the Building Official is confined to the assessment of the physical condition
of the building sought to be condemned and abated, and depending on the degree of its
deterioration and dilapidation, to issue appropriate order, taking into consideration the
welfare and safety not only of its occupants, but the public in general as well. Corollary
thereto, said official is mandated under the Code, even in the absence of a petitioner or
complainant, to motu propio initiate condemnation proceedings of reported dangerous
and ruinous buildings. The inclusion thereof of the 3-storey building which appellant
claims to have been built by Ediltrudis Villena on the subject property in the
hearing/investigation of the case was within the bounds of the duties and responsibilities
of the OBO. In the said proceedings, the Building Official shall not delve on issues
affecting contract involving the property or of the building subject of the case or of
lessee-lessor relationship, since those are matters within the competence of the court to
pass upon.

Appellants allegation that inspection of the premises was done without their
participation and [that they were] not given the chance to engage the services of an
engineer deserves scant consideration. Records revealed that appellants who actively
participated in the proceedings of the case were duly furnished with copies of appellees
petition for condemnation and the technical evaluation report of their (appellees)
commissioned engineer, and were enjoined to submit their counter technical report. They
however failed to comply. Appellants who at the same time are residents of the building
subject of the proceedings could have easily participated or hire[d] an engineer to
represent them in the inspection conducted by the Committee on Buildings on the
premises as they were duly notified about it and of which they signified their conformity
during the hearing on September 20, 2002. x x x
[20]



Undaunted, petitioners filed an appeal
[21]
with the OP.

Ruling of the Office of the President

Before the OP, the petitioners asserted that the findings of the DPWH Inspectorate Team is
erroneous and that they are builders in good faith. However, the OP found no reversible error to justify
the reversal or modification of the DPWH Resolution, and thus resolved to dismiss the appeal in a
Resolution
[22]
dated February 28, 2005.

The OP likewise subsequently denied with finality petitioners Motion for Reconsideration
[23]
in
an Order
[24]
dated April 25, 2005.

Aggrieved, petitioners filed a Petition for Review
[25]
with the CA.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Before the CA, petitioners again raised the issues they advanced before the administrative bodies,
particularly the issue regarding the ownership of the lot vis--vis their right as builders in good faith.

However, the CA dismissed the petition for review and affirmed the OP Resolution without
addressing the issue of ownership. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration
[26]
but same was denied
in a Resolution
[27]
dated August 15, 2006 for being a mere rehash or repetition of the issues raised in the
petition.

Unwilling to concede, petitioners now come before this Court by way of Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Issues

Petitioners raise the following issues:

A.
WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
RESOLUTION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES SUSTAINING THE
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE OFFICE OF THE BUILDING OFFICIAL
OF MANILA.



B.
WHETHER X X X THE OFFICE OF THE BUILDING OFFICIAL GRAVELY
ERRED IN NOT OBSERVING THE CARDINAL PRIMARY RIGHTS/DUE
PROCESS REQUIREMENTS IN THE CONDUCT OF THE HEARING AND IN
THE CONTENTS OF THE INSPECTION REPORT SUBMITTED BY THE
INSPECTION TEAM INCLUDING THE RESOLUTION OF THE OBO.

C.
WHETHER X X X [THE] OFFICE OF THE BUILDING OFFICIAL (OBO)
OF MANILA OVERSTEPPED THE BOUNDS OF ITS AUTHORITY IN NOT
APPLYING ARTICLE 482 AND ARTICLES 694 TO 707 OF THE NEW CIVIL
CODE IN IMPLEMENTING THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 215 OF THE
BUILDING CODE P.D. 1096 IN THIS CASE.

D.
WHETHER X X X THE PETITIONER[S] OR THEIR PREDECESSOR IN
INTEREST [ARE]/IS A BUILDER IN GOOD FAITH OF THE 3[-]STOREY
APARTMENT BUILDING LOCATED AT THE REAR PORTION OF THE
PROPERTY AND REFERRED TO AS BLDG. 2.

E.
WHETHER X X X THE ACTION FOR EXTRAJUDICIAL ABATEMENT OF
NUISANCE IS PROPER IN THIS CASE.
[28]



Our Ruling


The petition lacks merit.

At the outset, [i]t bears stressing that in a petition for review on certiorari [under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court], the scope of this Courts judicial review of decisions of the [CA] is generally confined
only to errors of law, and questions of fact are not entertained.
[29]
The Supreme Court is not a trier of
facts and it is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh again the evidence considered in the proceedings
below.
[30]
More so, this Court is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh evidence pertaining to factual
issues which have not been subject of any proper proceedings below. Well-entrenched and settled is the
rule that points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court
adequately and on time need not be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing court as they
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
[31]
The determination of who owns the subject property, the
authenticity of the evidence of both parties, and whether petitioners are builders in good faith are
questions of fact, the resolution of which requires the examination of evidence that should be ventilated in
a separate action brought before a proper forum.

As correctly stated by the Secretary of the DPWH in its Resolution,
[32]
the administrative
agencies jurisdiction in this case is confined to the assessment of the physical condition of the building
sought to be condemned and the issuance of the appropriate order relative thereto. Issues affecting
contract involving the property or of the buildings subject of the case are not within their competence to
rule upon. Lest this Court becomes a court of first instance instead of a court of last resort, we decline to
act on matters that have not run the proper legal course.

Nevertheless, we note that petitioners purported right to occupy the property has already ended
two years ago when the 20-year period of the lease agreement expired in year 2009. There being no
provision in the contract, tacit or otherwise, for renewal or extension of the lease, petitioners no longer
have basis to keep hold of Building 2. Hence, the determination of whether petitioners are builders in
good faith is no longer necessary.

As to the other issues, suffice it to say that they boil down to the question of whether the issuance
of the OBO Resolution and Demolition Order was proper, and whether the CA erred when it affirmed the
Resolutions of the OP and the Secretary of the DPWH, which in turn, likewise affirmed the said OBO
Resolution.


A Building Official has the authority to order the
condemnation and demolition of buildings which are
found to be in a dangerous or ruinous condition.


[I]t is unquestionable that the Building Official has the authority to order the condemnation and
demolition of buildings which are found to be in a dangerous or ruinous condition.
[33]
This authority
emanates from Sections 214 and 215 of the National Building Code (Presidential Decree [P.D.] No.
1096) which provides:

Section 214. Dangerous and Ruinous Buildings or Structures

Dangerous buildings are those which are herein declared as such or are
structurally unsafe or not provided with safe egress, or which constitute a fire hazard, or
are otherwise dangerous to human life, or which in relation to existing use, constitute a
hazard to safety or health or public welfare because of inadequate maintenance,
dilapidation, obsolescence, or abandonment; or which otherwise contribute to the
pollution of the site or the community to an intolerable degree.

Section 215. Abatement of Dangerous Buildings

When any building or structure is found or declared to be dangerous or ruinous,
the Building Official shall order its repair, vacation or demolition depending upon the
degree of danger to life, health, or safety. This is without prejudice to further action that
may be taken under the provisions of Articles 482 and 694 to 707 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines.


There is, therefore, no question as to the authority of the OBO to render the challenged issuances.
Here, the Building Official was authorized to issue the questioned Demolition Order in view of his
finding that the disputed structures are dangerous and ruinous buildings within the purview of P.D. No.
1096, in relation to its Implementing Rules and Regulations. Correspondingly, no irregularity in the
process in which the resolution and demolition order were issued is evident. As found by the CA, the
records show that the OBO issued the resolution and Demolition Order only after ocular inspections and
hearings were conducted. Notably, the Inspectorate Team of the DPWH came up with the same
conclusion as the OBO when it conducted its own ocular inspection of the premises, that is both
Buildings 1 and 2 had structural, sanitary, plumbing and electrical defects of up to 80%.
[34]


What is more, contrary to the position of the petitioners that the provisions of the Civil Code on
abatement of nuisances should have been applied in their case, the fact that the buildings in question could
also constitute nuisances under the Civil Code does not preclude the Building Official from issuing the
assailed Demolition Order. As provided by P.D. No. 1096, the authority of the Building Official to order
the repair, vacation or demolition, as the case may be, is without prejudice to further action that may be
undertaken under the relevant provisions of the Civil Code.
[35]


The position taken by petitioners that the OBO is duty-bound to first order the repair of ruinous
and dangerous buildings is erroneous. Petitioners, in their Memorandum,
[36]
quoted Section 215 of the
National Building Code, thus:

Section 215. Abatement of Dangerous Buildings

When any building or structure is found or declared to be dangerous or ruinous,
the Building Official shall order its repair, vacation or demolition depending upon the
degree of danger to life, health, or safety. This is without prejudice to further action that
may be taken under the provisions of Articles 482 and 694 to 707 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines.
[37]



A careful reading of the provision shows that it does not require the OBO to take actions in the
same order or sequence that Section 215 enumerates them. Instead, it authorizes the Building Official to
order either the repair, vacation, or demolition of the building depending on the circumstances presented
before it, particularly on the degree of danger to life, health and safety. In the case at bench, the OBO,
based on its assessment of the buildings, deemed it necessary to recommend and order the demolition of
the said buildings, having found them dilapidated and deteriorated by up to 80%.

The Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the resolution
issued by the Office of the President


Petitioners find error in the CAs reliance on the report of the OBO in affirming the resolution of
the OP. Petitioners contend that the initiation of the proceedings in the OBO was calculated to oust them
from the property and to circumvent their rights as builders in good faith thereby making the findings and
issuances of the OBO unreliable. Petitioners thus beseech this Court to ascertain facts that have already
been determined by the administrative agencies involved and thereafter reviewed and affirmed by the
CA.

We find the contention without merit.

The mandate of the OBO is to act motu proprio, or upon petition validly received, on reported
dangerous and ruinous buildings and structures that pose a threat to the life, health and well-being of the
inhabitants, and the general public. Hence, the OBO, based on its findings, can still act on the matter
pursuant to such mandate, notwithstanding petitioners claim that respondents initiated the proceedings to
circumvent their rights under the law as builders in good faith. Otherwise stated, respondents motive in
initiating the proceedings which led to the issuance of the challenged OBO Resolution and Demolition
Order is immaterial as far as the OBO is concerned, so long as it is satisfied that a building or structure is
dangerous and ruinous.

Remarkably, both the DPWH and the OP found no irregularities in the manner that officials of
the OBO performed their duties and in coming up with its Resolution and Demolition Order. This
conclusion was affirmed by the CA when it resolved the petition before it.
We find no error on the part of the CA when it relied on the findings of fact of the OBO and the
other administrative bodies. As correctly stated by the CA in its Decision:

The powers granted by law, particularly the National Building Code to the
Building Official regarding demolition of buildings are executive and administrative in
nature. It is a well-recognized principle that purely administrative and discretionary
functions may not be interfered with by the courts. In general, courts have no supervising
power over the proceedings and actions of the administrative departments of the
government. This is generally true with respect to acts involving the exercise of judgment
or discretion and findings of fact. The established exception to the rule is where the
issuing authority has gone beyond its statutory authority, exercised unconstitutional
powers or clearly acted arbitrarily and without regard to his duty or with grave abuse of
discretion. None of these obtains in the case at bar. (Citations omitted.)
[38]



By reason of the special knowledge and expertise of said administrative agencies over matters
falling under their jurisdiction, they are in a better position to pass judgment thereon; thus, their findings
of fact in that regard are generally accorded great respect, if not finality, by the courts.
[39]
Such findings
must be respected as long as they are supported by substantial evidence, even if such evidence is not
overwhelming or even preponderant.
[40]
It is not the task of the appellate court to once again weigh the
evidence submitted before and passed upon by the administrative body and to substitute its own judgment
regarding sufficiency of evidence.
[41]


Similarly, this Court will not disturb these factual findings absent compelling reasons to do so.
This Court, in numerous occasions, has cited exceptions to the general rule that it is not a trier of
facts. None of the said exceptions is present in this case. The conclusion reached by the administrative
agencies involved after thoroughly conducting their ocular inspections and hearings and considering all
pieces of evidence presented before them, which finding was affirmed by the CA, must now be regarded
with great respect and finality by this Court.

We take this opportunity to inform petitioners that the appellate court cannot be expected to
actually perform the inspection itself for purposes of validating the findings of the administrative
bodies. Reliance on findings of fact of the lower courts or, in this case, administrative bodies, does not
mean that the appellate court does not conduct its own review. In fact, the appellate court painstakingly
studies every piece of document that comes into its hands, putting together every piece of the puzzle to
come up with the whole picture of the controversy brought before it. That is no easy task.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated May 19, 2006 and the Resolution
dated August 15, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 89783 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.





Adille v. C.A.
157 SCRA 455

DOCTRINE: Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation of co-ownership, must have been
preceded by repudiation (of the co-ownership). The act of repudiation, in turn is subject to
certain conditions: (1) a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership; (2) such an act of repudiation is
clearly made known to the other co-owners; (3) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive, and
(4) he has been in possession through open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of
the property for the period required by law.

FACTS:
Felisa Alzul owns a parcel of land in Legazpi City, Albay. In her lifetime, she married twice.
First,with Bernabe Adille which was Rustico Adille's father and second, with Prospero Asejo
from whom she had other children. In 1939, she entered in a pacto de retro sale with a period of
three years for repurchase. Unfortunately, she died in 1942 and was unable to settle her affairs
accordingly. Rustico, acted on his own and acquired the land along with a OCT, which he was
able to procure stating that he was the only child of Felisa and Bernabe. He has then been in
charge of the land in question and has kept his actions from his siblings. Although there is one,
namely, Emeteria who happens to live in the same land he resides in. He was then deemed
absolute owner of the land and through his actuations seek to keep the land for himself not taking
into account his other brothers nor his sister. It is because of this that plaintiffs have come here
and contend that trial court erred in:
I. ... declaring the defendant absolute owner of the property;
II. ... not ordering the partition of the property; and
III. ... ordering one of the plaintiffs who is in possession of the portion of the property to
vacate the land, p. 1 Appellant's brief.

ISSUE:
May a co-owner acquire exclusive ownership over the property held in common? -- NO

HELD:
Given that Rustico acquired the property individually, tends to it and is in possession together
with the corresponding OCT, it does not discount the fact that the perfection of such was done
through fraudulent means. His function of reacquisition only makes him a trustee in place of his
other siblings. In addition, a torrens title does not make for a mode of extinguishment with regard
to co-ownership. The court also refuses to recognize his claim of ownership by way of
prescription given that he registered said land in 1955 and has been in his possession until 1974.

Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation of co-ownership, must have been preceded by
repudiation (of the co-ownership). The act of repudiation, in turn is subject to certain conditions:
(1) a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership; (2) such an act of repudiation is clearly made known
to the other co-owners; (3) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive, and (4) he has been in
possession through open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the property for the
period required by law.

Rustico's claim falls short because he did not repudiate. In fact, he had been keeping substantive
information for himself leaving all other co-owners oblivious with concern to his acts. So, the
court finds it fit that although the span of time is indeed what prescription necessitates, it is still
not conclusive nor meritorious to its effect.

WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error committed by the respondent Court of Appeals,
the petition is DENIED. The Decision sought to be reviewed is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. No
pronouncement as to costs.





G.R. No. 56550 October 1, 1990
MARINA Z. REYES, AUGUSTO M. ZABALLERO and SOCORRO Z.
FRANCISCO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE ALFREDO B. CONCEPCION, Presiding Judge, CFI of Cavite,
Tagaytay, Br. IV, SOCORRO MARQUEZ VDA. DE ZABALLERO, EUGENIA Z. LUNA,
LEONARDO M. ZABALLERO, and ELENA FRONDA ZABALLERO, respondents.
Law Firm of Raymundo A. Armovit for petitioners.
Leonardo M. Zaballero for private respondents.

CORTS, J .:
On March 13, 1980, petitioners filed with the CFI a complaint for injunction and damages,
docketed as Civil Case No. TG-572, seeking to enjoin private respondents Socorro Marquez
Vda. De Zaballero, Eugenia Z. Luna and Leonardo M. Zaballero from selling to a third party
their pro-indiviso shares as co-owners in eight parcels of registered land (covered by TCT Nos.
A-1316 to A-1322) located in the province of Cavite, with an aggregate area of about 96
hectares. Petitioner claimed that under Article 1620 of the new Civil Code, they, as co-owners,
had a preferential right to purchase these shares from private respondents for a reasonable price.
On March 17, 1980, respondent trial judge denied the ex parte application for a writ of
preliminary injunction, on the ground that petitioners' registered notice of lis pendens was ample
protection of their rights.
On April 24, 1980, private respondents received the summons and copies of the complaint.
Private respondents then filed their answer with counterclaim, praying for the partition of the
subject properties. Private respondent Elena Fronda Zaballero filed a motion for intervention
dated April 29, 1980, adopting therein her co-respondents answer with counterclaim.
At the pre-trial hearing, the parties agreed on the following stipulation of facts:
xxx xxx xxx
1. That the plaintiffs, the defendants and the intervenor are the pro-indiviso co-
owners of the properties cited and described in the complaint;
2. That six and nine tenth (6-9/10) hectares of the land covered by TCT No. T-
1319; approximately twelve (12) hectares of that covered by TCT No. T-1320;
and the entire parcel of covered by TCT No. T-1321, are subject of expropriation
proceedings instituted by the National Housing Authority (NHA) now pending
before this Court in Civil Case Nos. TG-392, TG-396 and TG-417;
3. That based on the evidence presented by the herein parties in the aforecited
expropriation cases, the current valuation of the land and the improvements
thereon is at P95,132.00 per hectare;
4. That on 16 April 1980, the plaintiffs received a written notice from the
defendants and the intervenor that the VOLCANO SECURITIES TRADERS
AND AGRI-BUSINESS CORPORATION had offered to buy the latter's share in
the properties listed in the complaint subject to the following terms:
1. The selling price shall be net at TWELVE & 50/100 (P12.50)
PESOS per square meter, or a total price of NINE MILLION
(P9,000,000.00) PESOS for a total area of SEVENTY TWO (72)
HECTARES ONLY;
2. A downpayment equivalent to THIRTY (30%) PERCENT of the
selling price, or a minimum downpayment of TWO MILLION
SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND (P2,700,000.00) PESOS;
3. The balance of the purchase price to be payable within THREE
(3) YEARS from the date of downpayment in THREE (3)
EQUAL, ANNUAL PAYMENTS with interest at the legal rate
prevailing at the time of payment;
4. The balance shall be covered by a BANK GUARANTEE of
payments and shall not be governed by Art. 1250 of the Civil
Code.
(Cf. Annexes 1, 2 and 3, Answer)
5. That in said letters (Annexes 1, 2 and 3, Answer), the plaintiffs were requested:
a) To exercise their pre-emptive right to purchase defendants' and
intervenor's shares under the above-quoted terms; or
b) To agree to a physical partition of the properties; or
c) To sell their shares, jointly with the defendants and the
intervenor, to the VOLCANO SECURITIES TRADERS AND
AGRI-BUSINESS CORPORATION at the price and under the
terms aforequoted.
6. That the VOLCANO SECURITIES TRADERS AND AGRI-BUSINESS
CORPORATION is ready, willing and able to purchase not only the aliquot
shares of the defendants and the intervenor, but also that of the plaintiffs, in and to
all the properties subject of this case, for and in consideration of the net amount of
TWELVE and 50/100 (P12.50) PESOS per square meter and under the afore-
quoted terms;
xxx xxx xxx
[Annex "C" of the Petition, pp. 1-2, Rollo, pp. 43-44.]
The parties laid down their respective positions, as follows:
PLAINTIFFS
1. That the subject properties are incapable of physical partition;
2. That the price of P12.50 per square meter is grossly excessive;
3. That they are willing to exercise their pre-emptive right for an amount of not
more that P95,132.00 per hectare, which is the fair and reasonable value of said
properties;
4. That the statutory period for exercising their pre-emptive right was suspended
upon the filing of the complaint;
DEFENDANTS AND INTERVENOR
1. That the reasonable price of the subject properties is P12.50 per square meter;
2. That plaintiffs' right of legal pre-emption had lapsed upon their failure to
exercise the same within the period prescribed in Art. 1623 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines;
3. That, assuming the soundness of plaintiffs' claim that the price of P12.50 per
square meter is grossly excessive, it would be to the best interest of the plaintiffs
to sell their shares to the VOLCANO SECURITIES TRADERS AND AGRI-
BUSINESS CORPORATION, whose sincerity, capacity and good faith is beyond
question, as the same was admitted by the parties herein;
4. That the subject properties consisting approximately 95 hectares may be
physically partitioned without difficulty in the manner suggested by them to
plaintiffs, and as graphically represented in the subdivision plan, which will be
furnished in due course to plaintiffs' counsel.
[Annex "C" of the Petition, pp. 2-3; Rollo, pp. 44-45.]
Based on the foregoing, respondent trial judge rendered a pre-trial order dated July 9, 1980
granting petitioners a period of ten days from receipt of the subdivision plan to be prepared by a
competent geodetic engineer within which to express their approval or disapproval of the said
plan, or to submit within the same period, if they so desire, an alternative subdivision plan.
On July 16, 1980, counsel for private respondents sent to the counsel for petitioners a letter
enclosed with a subdivision plan.
On August 4, 1980, petitioners filed their comment to the pre-trial order, contending that the
question of reasonable value of the subject properties remains a contentious issue of fact
ascertainable only after a full trial. Petitioners likewise insisted on their pre- emptive right to
purchase private respondents' shares in the co-ownership after due determination of the
reasonable price thereof.
Thereafter, counsel for private respondents sent the counsel for petitioners another subdivision
plan prepared by a geodetic engineer. Still, no definite communication was sent by petitioners
signifying their approval or disapproval to the subdivision plans.
In order to settle once and for all the controversy between the parties, private respondents filed a
motion dated December 16, 1980 requesting that petitioners be required to formally specify
which of the two options under Article 498 of the New Civil Code they wished to avail of: that
petitioners' shares in the subject properties be sold to private respondents, at the rate of P12.50
per square meter; or that the subject properties be sold to a third party, VOLCANO LAKEVIEW
RESORTS, INC. (claimed to have been erroneously referred to in the pre-trial as VOLCANO
SECURITIES TRADERS AND AGRI-BUSINESS CORPORATION) and its proceeds thereof
distributed among the parties.
Finding merit in the private respondents' request, and for the purpose of determining the
applicability of Article 498 of the New Civil Code, respondent trial judge issued an order dated
February 4, 1981 which directed the parties to signify whether or not they agree to the scheme of
allotting the subject properties to one of the co-owners, at the rate of P12.50 per square meter, or
whether or not they know of a third party who is able and willing to buy the subject properties at
terms and conditions more favorable than that offered by VOLCANO LAKEVIEW RESORTS,
INC. The order contained a series of questions addressed to all the parties, who were thereupon
required to submit their answers thereto.
Private respondents filed a "Constancia" expressing that they were willing to allot their shares in
the subject properties to Socorro Marquez Vda. de Zaballero, at the rate of P12.50 per square
meter, and that they did not know of any other party who was willing and able to purchase the
subject properties under more favorable conditions than that offered by VOLCANO
LAKEVIEW RESORTS, INC.
However, instead of submitting their answers to the queries posed by respondent trial judge,
petitioners filed a motion for clarification as to the true identity of the third party allegedly
willing to purchase the subject properties.
On February 26, 1981, respondent trial judge rejected petitioners' motion on the ground that it
was irrelevant.
Thereupon, on February 27, 1981, petitioners filed a pleading captioned "Compliance and
Motion", (1) reiterating the relevance of ascertaining the true identity of the third party buyer,
VOLCANO SECURITIES TRADERS AND AGRI-BUSINESS CORPORATION or
VOLCANO LAKEVIEW RESORTS, INC., (2) expressing their view that there is actually no
bona fide and financially able third party willing to purchase the subject properties at the rate of
P12.50 per square meter, and, (3) once again insisting on their pre-emptive right to purchase the
shares of private respondents in the co-ownership at a "reasonable price", which is less than that
computed excessively by the latter at the rate of P12.50 per square meter. Petitioners therein
prayed that further proceedings be conducted in order to settle the factual issue regarding the
reasonable value of the subject properties.
On March 16, 1981, respondent trial judge issued an order denying petitioners' motion. The
judge ruled that petitioners did not possess a pre-emptive right to purchase private respondents'
shares in the co-ownership. Thus, finding that the subject properties were essentially indivisible,
respondent trial judge ordered the holding of a public sale of the subject properties pursuant to
Article 498 of the New Civil Code. A notice of sale was issued setting the date of public bidding
for the subject properties on April 13, 1981.
Petitioners then filed a motion for reconsideration from the above order. Respondent trial judge
reset the hearing on petitioners' motion for reconsideration to April 6, 1981, and moved the
scheduled public sale to April 14, 1981.
Without awaiting resolution of their motion for reconsideration, petitioners filed the present
petition for certiorari, alleging that the respondent trial judge acted without jurisdiction, or in
grave abuse of its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in issuing his order dated March
16, 1981 which denied petitioners' claim of a pre-emptive right to purchase private
respondents' pro-indiviso shares and which, peremptorily ordered the public sale of the subject
properties. On April 8, 1981, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the sale of
the subject properties at public auction.
With the comment and reply, the Court considered the issues joined and the case submitted for
decision.
The Court finds no merit in the present petition.
The attack on the validity of respondent trial judge's order dated March 16, 1981 is ultimately
premised on petitioners' claim that they had a pre-emptive right to purchase the pro-
indiviso shares of their co-owners, private respondents herein, at a "reasonable price". It is this
same claim which forms the basis of their complaint for injunction and damages filed against
private respondents in the court a quo.
This claim is patently without basis. In this jurisdiction, the legal provisions on co-ownership do
not grant to any of the owners of a property held in common a pre-emptive right to purchase
the pro-indiviso shares of his co-owners. Petitioners' reliance on Article 1620 of the New Civil
Code is misplaced. Article 1620 provides:
A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the shares of
all the co-owners or of any of them, are sold to a third person. If the price of the
alienation is grossly excessive, the redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one.
Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right of redemption, they
may only do so in proportion to the share they may respectively have in the thing
owned in common [Emphasis supplied].
Article 1620 contemplates of a situation where a co-owner has alienated his pro-indiviso shares
to a stranger. By the very nature of the right of "legal redemption", a co-owner's light to redeem
is invoked only after the shares of the other co-owners are sold to a third party or stranger to the
co-ownership [See Estrada v. Reyes, 33 Phil. 31 (1915)]. But in the case at bar, at the time
petitioners filed their complaint for injunction and damages against private respondents, no sale
of the latter's pro-indiviso shares to a third party had yet been made. Thus, Article 1620 of the
New Civil Code finds no application to the case at bar.
There is likewise no merit to petitioners' contention that private respondents had acknowledged
the pre-emptive right of petitioners to purchase their shares at a "reasonable price". Although it
appears that private respondents had agreed to sell their pro-indiviso shares to petitioners, the
offer was made at a fixed rate of P12.50 per square meter [See Pre-trial Order dated July 9, 1980,
Annex "C" of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 43-45]. It cannot be said that private respondents had
agreed, without qualification, to sell their shares to petitioners. Hence, petitioners cannot insist
on a right to purchase the shares at a price lower than the selling price of private respondents.
Neither do petitioners have the legal right to enjoin private respondents from alienating their pro-
indiviso shares to a third party. The rights of a co-owner of a property are clearly specified in
Article 493 of the New Civil Code, thus:
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits
and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage
it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal
rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation of the mortgage, with respect
to the co-owners shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in
the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
The law does not prohibit a co-owner from selling, alienating or mortgaging his ideal share in the
property held in common. The law merely provides that the alienation or mortgage shall be
limited only to the portion of the property which may be allotted to him upon termination of the
co-ownership [See Mercado v. Liwanag, G.R. No. L-14429, June 30, 1962, 5 SCRA 472; PNB v.
The Honorable Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-34404, June 25, 1980, 98 SCRA 207; Go Ong v.
The Honorable Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 75884, September 24, 1987, 154 SCRA 270,] and, as
earlier discussed, that the remaining co-owners have the right to redeem, within a specified
period, the shares which may have been sold to the third party. [Articles 1620 and 1623 of the
New Civil Code.]
Considering the foregoing, the Court holds that respondent trial judge committed no grave abuse
of discretion when he denied petitioners' claim of a pre-emptive right to purchase private
respondents' pro-indiviso shares.
Moreover, there is no legal infirmity tainting respondent trial judge's order for the holding of a
public sale of the subject properties pursuant to the provisions of Article 498 of the New Civil
Code. After a careful examination of the proceedings before respondent trial judge, the Court
finds that respondent trial judge's order was issued in accordance with the laws pertaining to the
legal or juridical dissolution of co-ownerships.
It must be noted that private respondents, in their answer with counterclaim prayed for, inter
alia, the partition of the subject properties in the event that the petitioners refused to purchase
their pro-indiviso shares at the rate of P12.50 per square meter. Unlike petitioners' claim of a pre-
emptive right to purchase the other co-owners' pro-indivisoshares, private respondents'
counterclaim for the partition of the subject properties is recognized by law, specifically Article
494 of the New Civil Code which lays down the general rule that no co-owner is obliged to
remain in the co-ownership. Article 494 reads as follows:
No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may
demand at any time partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share
is concerned.
Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a certain period of
time, not exceeding ten years, shall be valid. This term may be extended by a new
agreement.
A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which shall not exceed
twenty years.
Neither shall there be partition when it is prohibited by law.
No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners
or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
None of the legal exceptions under Article 494 applies to the case at bar. Private respondents'
counterclaim for the partition of the subject properties was therefore entirely proper. However,
during the pre-trial proceedings, petitioners adopted the position that the subject properties were
incapable of physical partition. Initially, private respondents disputed this position. But after
petitioners inexplicably refused to abide by the pretrial order issued by respondent trial judge,
and stubbornly insisted on exercising an alleged pre-emptive right to purchase private
respondents' shares at a "reasonable price", private respondents relented and adopted petitioner's
position that the partition of the subject properties was not economically feasible, and,
consequently, invoked the provisions of Article 498 of the New Civil Code [Private respondents'
"Motion To Allot Properties To Defendants Or To Sell the Same Pursuant To Article 498 Of The
Civil Code", Annex "D" of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 46-49].
Inasmuch as the parties were in agreement as regards the fact that the subject properties should
not be partitioned, and private respondents continued to manifest their desire to terminate the co-
ownership arrangement between petitioners and themselves, respondent trial judge acted within
his jurisdiction when he issued his order dated February 4, 1981 requiring the parties to answer
certain questions for the purpose of determining whether or not the legal conditions for the
applicability of Article 498 of the New Civil Code were present in the case.
Art. 498 provides that:
Whenever the thing is essentially indivisible and the co-owners cannot agree that
it be alloted to one of them who shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold and its
proceeds distributed.
The sale of the property held in common referred to in the above article is resorted to when (1)
the right to partition the property among the co-owners is invoked by any of them but because of
the nature of the property, it cannot be subdivided or its subdivision [See Article 495 of the New
Civil Code] would prejudice the interests of the co-owners (See Section 5 of Rule 69 of the
Revised Rules of Court) and (2) the co-owners are not in agreement as to who among them shall
be allotted or assigned the entire property upon reimbursement of the shares of the other co-
owners.
Petitioners herein did not have justifiable grounds to ignore the queries posed by respondent trial
judge and to insist that hearings be conducted in order to ascertain the reasonable price at which
they could purchase private respondents' pro-indiviso shares [Petitioners' "Compliance and
Motion" dated February 27, 1981, Annex "H" of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 57-60].
Since at this point in the case it became reasonably evident to respondent trial judge that the
parties could not agree on who among them would be allotted the subject properties, the Court
finds that respondent trial judge committed no grave abuse of discretion in ordering the holding
of a public sale for the subject properties (with the opening bid pegged at P12.50 per square
meter), and the distribution of the proceeds thereof amongst the co-owners, as provided under
Article 498 of the New Civil Code.
Contrary to petitioners' contention, there was no need for further hearings in the case because it
is apparent from the various allegations and admissions of the parties made during the pre-trial
proceedings, and in their respective pleadings, that the legal requisites for the application of
Article 498 of the New Civil Code were present in the case. No factual issues remained to be
litigated upon.
WHEREFORE, the present petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The temporary restraining
order issued by the Court is hereby LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.


Heirs of Maninding v. CA
276 SCRA 601

DOCTRINE: Prescription, as a rule, does not run in favor of a co-heir or co-owner as long as he
expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.

Co-owners cannot acquire by prescription
the share of the other co-owners, absent a clear repudiation of the co-ownership. It must be
clearly shown that he has repudiated the claims of the others, and that they were apprised of his
claim of adverse and exclusive ownership, before the prescriptive period would begin to run.

FACTS:
On 31 July 1979 Segunda Maningding died. Her heirs allegedly discovered the transfers made by
Roque Bauzon in favor of his children only in 1986. Consequently, the heirs sought the partition
of the properties as well as the accounting of the produce but were unsuccessful.

With regard to the sugarland, Roque Bauzon denied having executed the Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication presented by petitioners. He claimed that he acquired ownership over both the
sugarland and the riceland by donation propter nuptias from his parents Ramon Bauzon and
Sotera Zulueta on 21 April 1926 in consideration of his marriage to Petra Loresco. Since the
death of Ramon Bauzon in 1948, Roque had been in open, continuous, notorious, adverse and
actual possession of the subject properties.

RTC ruled that the parcels of land formed part of the estate of Ramon Bauzon and his wife
Sotera Zulueta which, upon their death, devolved by right of succession to their children
Segunda Maningding, Maria Maningding, Juan Maningding and Roque Bauzon in equal pro-
indiviso shares. The court a quo however awarded both parcels to Segunda Maningding and
Roque Bauzon as co-owners in equal shares after finding that Juan Maningding and Maria
Maningding had already executed an Affidavit of Quitclaim and Renunciation. It rejected the
deed of donation for failure to prove its due execution and authenticity and ruled that the same
was negated by the Affidavit of Quitclaim and Renunciation of Juan Maningding and Maria
Maningding in favor of Roque Bauzon and nullified the deed of sale by Roque Bauzon in favor
of Luis Bauzon as regards the riceland and to Eriberta Bauzon with respect to the sugarland. It
concluded that Roque Bauzon could not have validly conveyed both parcels as one-half (1/2) of
each parcel rightfully belonged to Segunda Maningding and her heirs.

CA ruled that the properties validly pertained to Roque Bauzon by virtue of the donation propter
nuptias. Consequently, the transfers made by Roque Bauzon must be given effect. However,
upon motion for reconsideration, the same deed of donation was declared null and void by the
appellate court for failure to comply with Art. 633 of the old Civil Code, the law then applicable,
which required for the validity of the deed of donation to be in a public instrument. Nevertheless,
the same court maintained that the properties belonged to Roque Bauzon by virtue of acquisitive
prescription.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Bauzon acquired the ownership of the land by acquisitive prescription -- YES

HELD:
Bauzon acquired ownership over the subject properties by acquisitive prescription. Prescription,
in general, is a mode of acquiring (or losing) ownership and other real rights through the lapse of
time in the manner and under conditions laid down by law, namely, that the possession should be
in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse. Acquisitive prescription
is either ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in good
faith and with just title for ten (10) years. In extraordinary prescription ownership and other real
rights over immovable property are acquired through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof
for thirty (30) years, without need of title or of good faith.

The disputed lots are unregistered lands. While tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive
evidence of ownership, yet, when coupled with proof of actual possession, as in the instant case,
tax declarations and receipts are strong evidence of ownership.

Even assuming that the donation proper nuptias is void for failure to comply with formal
requisites,

it could still constitute a legal basis for adverse possession. Sixty (60) years have
already elapsed.

Prescription, as a rule, does not run in favor of a co-heir or co-owner as long as he expressly or
impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.

Co-owners cannot acquire by prescription the share of
the other co-owners, absent a clear repudiation of the co-ownership. It must be clearly shown
that he has repudiated the claims of the others, and that they were apprised of his claim of
adverse and exclusive ownership, before the prescriptive period would begin to run.

The evidence relative to the possession, as a fact upon which the alleged prescription is based,
must be clear, complete and conclusive in order to establish said prescription without any
shadow of doubt.

Therefore while prescription among co-owners cannot take place when the acts of ownership
exercised are vague and uncertain, such prescription arises and produces all its effects when the
acts of ownership do not evince any doubt as to the ouster of the rights of the other co-owners.

As disclosed by the records, Roque Bauzon and his heirs possessed the property from 1948 to
1986 to the exclusion of petitioners who were never given their shares of the fruits of the
properties, for which reason they demanded an accounting of the produce and the conveyance to
them of their shares.




QUISUMBING, J .:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals which
affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City, Branch 15 in Civil Case No.
V-5369, ordering the dismissal of the action for repartition, resurvey and reconveyance filed by
petitioners.
Pure questions of law are raised in this appeal as the following factual antecedents are
undisputed:
Salome, Consorcia, Alfredo, Maria, Rosalia, Jose, Quirico and Julita, all surnamed Bornales,
were the original co-owners of Lot 162 of the Cadastral Survey of Pontevedra, Capiz under
Original Certificate of Title No. 18047. As appearing therein, the lot, which consisted of a total
area of 27,179 square meters was divided in aliquot shares among the eight (8) co-owners as
follows:
Salome Bornales 4/16
Consorcia Bornales 4/16
Alfredo Bornales 2/16
Maria Bornales 2/16
Jose Bornales 1/16
Quirico Bornales 1/16
Rosalia Bornales 1/16
Julita Bornales 1/16
On July 14, 1940, Salome sold part of her 4/16 share in Lot 162 for P200.00 to Soledad
Daynolo. In the Deed of Absolute Sale signed by Salome and two other co-owners, Consorcia
and Alfredo, the portion of Lot 162 sold to Soledad was described as having more or less the
following measurements:
63-1/2 meters from point 9 to 10, 35 meters from point 10 to point 11, 30 meters from
point 11 to a certain point parallel to a line drawn from points 9 to "10; and then from this
Certain Point to point 9 and as shown in the accompanying sketch, and made an integral part
of this deed, to SOLEDAD DAYNOLO, her heirs and assigns.
[1]

Thereafter, Soledad Daynolo immediately took possession of the land described above and
built a house thereon. A few years later, Soledad and her husband, Simplicio Distajo, mortgaged
the subject portion of Lot 162 as security for a P400.00 debt to Jose Regalado, Sr. This
transaction was evidenced by a Deed of Mortgage
[2]
dated May 1, 1947.
On April 14, 1948, three of the eight co-owners of Lot 162, specifically, Salome, Consorcia
and Alfredo, sold 24,993 square meters of said lot to Jose Regalado, Sr.
On May 4, 1951, Simplicio Distajo, heir of Soledad Daynolo who had since died, paid the
mortgage debt and redeemed the mortgaged portion of Lot 162 from Jose Regalado, Sr. The
latter, in turn, executed a Deed of Discharge of Mortgage
[3]
in favor of Soledads heirs, namely:
Simplicio Distajo, Rafael Distajo and Teresita Distajo-Regalado. On same date, the said heirs
sold the redeemed portion of Lot 162 for P1,500.00 to herein petitioners, the spouses Manuel Del
Campo and Salvacion Quiachon.
Meanwhile, Jose Regalado, Sr. caused the reconstitution of Original Certificate of Title No.
18047. The reconstituted OCT No. RO-4541 initially reflected the shares of the original co-
owners in Lot 162. However, title was transferred later to Jose Regalado, Sr. who subdivided the
entire property into smaller lots, each covered by a respective title in his name. One of these
small lots is Lot No. 162-C-6 with an area of 11,732 square meters which was registered on
February 24, 1977 under TCT No. 14566.
In 1987, petitioners Manuel and Salvacion del Campo brought this complaint for
repartition, resurvey and reconveyance against the heirs of the now deceased Jose Regalado,
Sr. Petitioners claimed that they owned an area of 1,544 square meters located within Lot 162-C-
6 which was erroneously included in TCT No. 14566 in the name of Regalado. Petitioners
alleged that they occupied the disputed area as residential dwelling ever since they purchased the
property from the Distajos way back in 1951. They also declared the land for taxation purposes
and paid the corresponding taxes.
On April 1, 1987, summons were served on Regalados widow, Josefina Buenvenida, and
two of her children, Rosemarie and Antonio. Josefina and Rosemarie were declared in default on
May 10, 1989 because only Antonio filed an answer to the complaint.
During trial, petitioners presented the Deed of Absolute Sale
[4]
executed between Soledad
Daynolo and Salome Bornales as well as the Deed of Mortgage
[5]
and Deed of
Discharge
[6]
signed by Jose Regalado, Sr. The Deed of Absolute Sale
[7]
showing the purchase by
the Del Campos of the property from the Distajos was likewise given in evidence.
Despite the filing of an answer, Antonio failed to present any evidence to refute the claim of
petitioners. Thus, after considering Antonio to have waived his opportunity to present evidence,
the trial court deemed the case submitted for decision.
On November 20, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint. It held
that while Salome could alienate her pro-indiviso share in Lot 162, she could not validly sell an
undivided part thereof by metes and bounds to Soledad, from whom petitioners derived their
title. The trial court also reasoned that petitioners could not have a better right to the property
even if they were in physical possession of the same and declared the property for taxation
purposes, because mere possession cannot defeat the right of the Regalados who had
a Torrens title over the land.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts judgment, with no pronouncement
as to costs.
[8]

Petitioners now seek relief from this Court and maintain that:
I.
THE FACT THAT THE SALE OF THE SUBJECT PORTION CONSTITUTES A SALE
OF A CONCRETE OR DEFINITE PORTION OF LAND OWNED IN COMMON DOES
NOT ABSOLUTELY DEPRIVE HEREIN PETITIONERS OF ANY RIGHT OR TITLE
THERETO;
II.
IN ANY EVENT, HEREIN PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ARE ALL ESTOPPED FROM
DENYING THE RIGHT AND TITLE OF HEREIN PETITIONERS.
[9]

In resolving petitioners appeal, we must answer the following questions: Would the sale by
a co-owner of a physical portion of an undivided property held in common be valid? Is
respondent estopped from denying petitioners right and title over the disputed area? Under the
facts and circumstances duly established by the evidence, are petitioners entitled to repartition,
resurvey and reconveyance of the property in question?
On the first issue, it seems plain to us that the trial court concluded that petitioners could not
have acquired ownership of the subject land which originally formed part of Lot 162, on the
ground that their alleged right springs from a void sale transaction between Salome and Soledad.
The mere fact that Salome purportedly transferred a definite portion of the co-owned lot by
metes and bounds to Soledad, however, does not per se render the sale a nullity. This much is
evident under Article 493
[10]
of the Civil Code and pertinent jurisprudence on the matter. More
particularly in Lopez vs. Vda. De Cuaycong, et.al.
[11]
which we find relevant, the Court, speaking
through Mr. Justice Bocobo, held that:
The fact that the agreement in question purported to sell a concrete portion of the
hacienda does not render the sale void, for it is a well-established principle that the binding force
of a contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so. Quando res non valet ut
ago, valeat quantum valere potest. (When a thing is of no force as I do it, it shall have as much
force as it can have.)
[12]

Applying this principle to the instant case, there can be no doubt that the transaction entered
into by Salome and Soledad could be legally recognized in its entirety since the object of the sale
did not even exceed the ideal shares held by the former in the co-ownership. As a matter of fact,
the deed of sale executed between the parties expressly stipulated that the portion of Lot 162 sold
to Soledad would be taken from Salomes 4/16 undivided interest in said lot, which the latter
could validly transfer in whole or in part even without the consent of the other co-owners.
Salomes right to sell part of her undivided interest in the co-owned property is absolute in
accordance with the well-settled doctrine that a co-owner has full ownership of his pro-
indiviso share and has the right to alienate, assign or mortgage it, and substitute another person in
its enjoyment
[13]
Since Salomes clear intention was to sell merely part of her aliquot share in Lot
162, in our view no valid objection can be made against it and the sale can be given effect to the
full extent.
We are not unaware of the principle that a co-owner cannot rightfully dispose of a particular
portion of a co-owned property prior to partition among all the co-owners. However, this should
not signify that the vendee does not acquire anything at all in case a physically segregated area of
the co-owned lot is in fact sold to him. Since the co-owner/vendors undivided interest could
properly be the object of the contract of sale between the parties, what the vendee obtains by
virtue of such a sale are the same rights as the vendor had as co-owner, in an ideal share
equivalent to the consideration given under their transaction. In other words, the vendee steps
into the shoes of the vendor as co-owner and acquires a proportionate abstract share in the
property held in common.
Resultantly, Soledad became a co-owner of Lot 162 as of the year 1940 when the sale was
made in her favor. It follows that Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo could not have sold the entire
Lot 162 to Jose Regalado, Sr. on April 14, 1948 because at that time, the ideal shares held by the
three co-owners/vendors were equivalent to only 10/16 of the undivided property less the aliquot
share previously sold by Salome to Soledad. Based on the principle that no one can give what
he does not have,
[14]
Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo could not legally sell the shares pertaining
to Soledad since a co-owner cannot alienate more than his share in the co-ownership. We have
ruled many times that even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only
his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale. Since a co-
owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner will
only transfer the rights of said co-owner to the buyer, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of
the property.
[15]

In this case, Regalado merely became a new co-owner of Lot 162 to the extent of the shares
which Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo could validly convey. Soledad retained her rights as co-
owner and could validly transfer her share to petitioners in 1951. The logical effect of the second
disposition is to substitute petitioners in the rights of Soledad as co-owner of the land. Needless
to say, these rights are preserved notwithstanding the issuance of TCT No. 14566 in Regalados
name in 1977.
Be that as it may, we find that the area subject matter of this petition had already been
effectively segregated from the mother lot even before title was issued in favor of Regalado. It
must be noted that 26 years had lapsed from the time petitioners bought and took possession of
the property in 1951 until Regalado procured the issuance of TCT No. 14566. Additionally, the
intervening years between the date of petitioners purchase of the property and 1987 when
petitioners filed the instant complaint, comprise all of 36 years. However, at no instance during
this time did respondents or Regalado, for that matter, question petitioners right over the land in
dispute. In the case of Vda. de Cabrera vs. Court of Appeals,
[16]
we had occasion to hold that
where the transferees of an undivided portion of the land allowed a co-owner of the property to
occupy a definite portion thereof and had not disturbed the same for a period too long to be
ignored, the possessor is in a better condition or right than said transferees. (Potior est condition
possidentis). Such undisturbed possession had the effect of a partial partition of the co-owned
property which entitles the possessor to the definite portion which he occupies. Conformably,
petitioners are entitled to the disputed land, having enjoyed uninterrupted possession thereof for
a total of 49 years up to the present.
The lower courts reliance on the doctrine that mere possession cannot defeat the right of a
holder of a registered Torrens title over property is misplaced, considering that petitioners were
deprived of their dominical rights over the said lot through fraud and with evident bad faith on
the part of Regalado. Failure and intentional omission to disclose the fact of actual physical
possession by another person during registration proceedings constitutes actual fraud. Likewise,
it is fraud to knowingly omit or conceal a fact, upon which benefit is obtained to the prejudice of
a third person.
[17]
In this case, we are convinced that Regalado knew of the fact that he did not
have a title to the entire lot and could not, therefore, have validly registered the same in his name
alone because he was aware of petitioners possession of the subject portion as well as the sale
between Salome and Soledad.
That Regalado had notice of the fact that the disputed portion of Lot 162 was under claim of
ownership by petitioners and the latters predecessor is beyond question. Records show that the
particular area subject of this case was mortgaged by Soledad and her husband to Jose Regalado,
Sr. as early as May 1, 1947 or one year prior to the alienation of the whole lot in favor of the
latter. Regalado never questioned the ownership of the lot given by Soledad as security for
the P400.00 debt and he must have at least known that Soledad bought the subject portion from
Salome since he could not have reasonably accepted the lot as security for the mortgage debt if
such were not the case. By accepting the said portion of Lot 162 as security for the mortgage
obligation, Regalado had in fact recognized Soledads ownership of this definite portion of Lot
162. Regalado could not have been ignorant of the fact that the disputed portion is being claimed
by Soledad and subsequently, by petitioners, since Regalado even executed a Release of
Mortgage on May 4, 1951, three years after the entire property was supposedly sold to him. It
would certainly be illogical for any mortgagee to accept property as security, purchase the
mortgaged property and, thereafter, claim the very same property as his own while the mortgage
was still subsisting.
Consequently, respondents are estopped from asserting that they own the subject land in
view of the Deed of Mortgage and Discharge of Mortgage executed between Regalado and
petitioners predecessor-in-interest. As petitioners correctly contend, respondents are barred from
making this assertion under the equitable principle of estoppel by deed, whereby a party to a
deed and his privies are precluded from asserting as against the other and his privies any right or
title in derogation of the deed, or from denying the truth of any material fact asserted in it.
[18]
A
perusal of the documents evidencing the mortgage would readily reveal that Soledad, as
mortgagor, had declared herself absolute owner of the piece of land now being litigated. This
declaration of fact was accepted by Regalado as mortgagee and accordingly, his heirs cannot
now be permitted to deny it.
Although Regalados certificate of title became indefeasible after the lapse of one year from
the date of the decree of registration, the attendance of fraud in its issuance created an implied
trust in favor of petitioners and gave them the right to seek reconveyance of the parcel
wrongfully obtained by the former. An action for reconveyance based on an implied trust
ordinarily prescribes in ten years. But when the right of the true and real owner is recognized,
expressly or implicitly such as when he remains undisturbed in his possession, the said action is
imprescriptible, it being in the nature of a suit for quieting of title.
[19]
Having established by clear
and convincing evidence that they are the legal owners of the litigated portion included in TCT
No. 14566, it is only proper that reconveyance of the property be ordered in favor of petitioners.
The alleged incontrovertibility of Regalados title cannot be successfully invoked by respondents
because certificates of title merely confirm or record title already existing and cannot be used to
protect a usurper from the true owner or be used as a shield for the commission of fraud.
[20]

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 30438 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The parties are directed to cause a
SURVEY for exact determination of their respective portions in Lot 162-C-6. Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 14566 is declared CANCELLED and the Register of Deeds of Capiz is
ordered to ISSUE a new title in accordance with said survey, upon finality of this decision.
Costs against respondents.
SO ORDERED.