Kuroda vs.

Jalandoni
G.R. L-2662, March 26, 1949
Ponente: Moran, C.J.

Facts:
1. Petitioner Sheginori Kuroda was the former Lt. General of the Japanese Army and
commanding general of the Japanese forces during the occupation (WWII) in the country. He
was tried before the Philippine Military Commission for War Crimes and other atrocities
committed against military and civilians. The military commission was establish under
Executive Order 68.

2. Petitioner assails the validity of EO 68 arguing it is unconstitutional and hence the military
commission did not have the jurisdiction to try him on the following grounds:
- that the Philippines is not a signatory to the Hague Convention (War Crimes)

3. Petitioner likewise assails that the US is not a party of interest in the case hence the 2 US
prosecutors cannot practice law in the Philippines.

Issue: Whether or not EO 68 is constitutional thus the military tribunal jurisdiction is
valid

HELD:

1. EO 68 is constitutional hence the tribunal has jurisdiction to try Kuroda. EO 68 was
enacted by the President and was in accordance with Sec. 3, Art. 2 of Constitution which
renounces war as an instrument of national policy. Hence it is in accordance with generally
accepted principles of international law including the Hague Convention and Geneva
Convention, and other international jurisprudence established by the UN, including the
principle that all persons (military or civilian) guilty of plan, preparing, waging a war of
aggression and other offenses in violation of laws and customs of war. The Philippines may
not be a signatory to the 2 conventions at that time but the rules and regulations of both are
wholly based on the generally accepted principles of international law. They were accepted
even by the 2 belligerent nations (US and Japan)

2. As to the participation of the 2 US prosecutors in the case, the US is a party of interest
because its country and people have greatly aggrieved by the crimes which petitioner was
being charged of.

3. Moreover, the Phil. Military Commission is a special military tribunal and rules as to
parties and representation are not governed by the rules of court but the provision of this
special law.


G.R. No. L-17465, People v. Castro et al., 11 SCRA 699
August 31, 1964
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NICOMEDES CASTRO, ET AL., accused-appellants.
Eligio A. Manto and Jose V. Alcantara for accused appellants.
Office of the SOLICITOR General for plaintiff-appellee.
PER CURIAM:
This is an appeal from the death sentence imposed by the Court of First Instance of Ilocos
Sur, in its Criminal Case No. 3714, upon the accused Nicomedes Castro, Godofredo Basuel,
and Rufino Cinco for the double murder on 21 July 1959 of the then incumbent mayor of the
municipality of Cabugao, Lucio Zabala, and his wife, Petra Serna.
At or about 7:30 o'clock in the evening of 21 July 1959, the Zabala family was taking supper
at the fluorescent-lighted dining room in the ground floor of their house in the aforesaid
municipality. Two armed men, one in a transparent raincoat and a narrow-brim buri hat and
the other also with a buri hat, entered the house through the front door of the sala, passed by
the sala, which was similarly lighted, and proceeded to the adjoining dining room.
... The mayor was at the head of the table with his back to the north heartily making jokes as
the gracious meal was progressing. His wife Petra Serna was by his right. Next to Petra Serna
was her 23 year old daughter Luzvimin. On the left side of the table were seated the latter's
sisters Lupeza and Erlinda. Beside Erlinda was their grandmother Lorenza Sosa (Exh. F).
Liberty, 10 year old son of Mayor Zabala, had just finished his supper and was then in the
sala playing marbles with other children, namely, Jovencio Cruz, 10-year old, and Ricardo
Somera, 9-year old. Mayor Zabala had nine (9) children but these named were the ones in the
house then. (Decision, pp. 7-8)
Upon seeing the intruders, the mayor invited them to eat, but, unexpectedly, he was answered
by gunfire. He managed to stand; he received two shots more. His wife made a feeble
attempt to grab the gun from one of the assailants, but she, too, was shot down. The rest who
partook of the supper screamed and scampered, while the malefactors ran away, passing the
same route where they entered.
An autopsy on the body of Mayor Lucio Zabala showed four (4) gunshot wounds, including
a fatal one through the heart (Exhibit "A"). Gunpowder burns were found on the points of
entry of two of these wounds. The wife Petra Serna expired at the provincial hospital at about
eleven o'clock of the same night of two gunshot wounds, both with 1- centimeters entrance,
one lacerating the apical portion of the left lung and the other perforating the small intestines
and lacerating the right external iliac vessel (Exh. "E").
At the time of the shooting, the local chief of police, Cristeto Serrano, was also
at hometaking supper. Upon hearing the burst of gunshots, he dressed; and when he was
about to leave his house, he was informed by an approaching policeman, that the mayor had
been shot. They proceeded to the mayor's house and found the mayor dead Serrano inquired
from Petra Serna, who was sprawled west of the dining table, about the number of the
assailants, but she could not speak; instead, she made a sign by using her two fingers. He had
her sent to a nearby hospital. On his inquiry, Luzvimin Zabala told the chief of police that
she could identify the gunman if shown to her; she gave him a description of one of the
killers as a fellow of slender build, with fair complexion, "slight chinito eyes", thin lips, and
about 5 ft. 4 inches tall. At that moment, the provincial commander and some enlisted men
arrived policemen and PC soldiers were sent out to scour the town for the assailants, but the
night's search yielded none. The following morning, the police and enlisted men started
picking up several suspects from a list of police characters. The first group, consisting of four
(4), were brought to the municipal building of Cabugao, made to wear raincoats and buri
hats, and, through a hole, Luzvimin Zabala peeped at them one by one. Luzvimin rejected all
these suspects and several others thereafter shown her, more or less fifteen (15) in all, until
on 1 August 1959, in the afternoon, at the puericulture center near the municipal building,
she identified one, now appellant Nicomedes Castro.
That same afternoon of 1 August 1959, Nicomedes Castro was investigated by the 131st PC
Company in the office of the chief of police of Cabugao. His statement was taken signed and
sworn to by him before Justice of the Peace Santiago P. Corpuz of Cabugao. In it he
disclaimed knowledge of, and participation in the brutal slaughter of the spouses, but alleged
that at the time of the killing he was at home in Lapog, all prepared and packed for a long
planned trip to Cagayan with his family; that the journey was intended to start at dawn on the
first Maura Transit bus on 22 July 1959 but had to be cancelled upon his child's getting sick
(Exhs. "7"-"7-a").
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted
and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other
evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts.
In another investigation held on 3 August 1959, this time at the headquarters of the PC Task
Force Zebra at Mindoro, Vigan, Ilocos Sur, Nicomedes Castro signed a four page confession,
reciting and recounting, among others: that he had previously been convicted of, and has
served sentence for, illegal possession of firearms; that on 17 July 1959, in the house of
Rufino Cinco, he (Nicomedes Castro), Rufino Cinco, Godofredo Basuel, and Marcelino
Basuel planned to kill Mayor Zabala on the promise of Santos Sabio to give them, through
Simeon Suller, P5,000 each; that Dianong Formoso furnished a jeep and driver and weapons;
that he and Godofredo Basuel were the ones who entered the house of the mayor and killed
him and his wife, while Rufino Cinco and Marcelino Basuel were left in front of the house as
lookouts; that after killing their victims, they proceeded to that store of Ignacio Quitebis to
wait for a bus to Cagayan; that they left a carbine wrapped in a rice sack and a plastic
material at the back of the Cabugao Institute building; that he threw the .45 caliber pistol to
the other side of the fence of Quitebis for fear of being searched by patrolman Zabala, who
dropped by at the store; that when no bus arrived, after waiting an hour they left the place;
that on 23 July 1959 Santos Sabio gave him P100, and requested to talk things over after the
burial of the mayor; that he and his wife went to Vigan where he bought a watch for her
daughter, making his wife believe that he won the money in a monte game; that he used the
diary of his daughter, Adelaide, but tore and threw away the page bearing the date of 21 July
1959 where he had inscribed the following: "pinapapataymi ni mayor"; that his previous
incriminator statement about Dianong Formoso was given out of political spite and not true,
but the rest of his statement are true, and the real truth is that it was Santos Sabio who
supplied the weapons on 17 July 1959, at 8: 00 o'clock in the morning, in the house of
Rufino Cinco (Exhs. "B", "B-1", "B-2", "B-3").
The foregoing confession was sworn to on the same day before the Justice of the Peace of
Cabugao. Below the jurat is handwritten the following:
Questions by the Fiscal:
Q. Do you solemnly swear and affirm all what you have stated above in this sworn
statement?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Have you been forced, intimidated or threatened or promised anything in consideration
of the statements given by you here?
A. No, I was not forced; I was not threatened and nobody promised me anything.
followed by the signature of Nicomedes Castro (Exh. "B-3") ; and at the back of the last page
is another jurat dated the 4th of August 1959, by the provincial fiscal (Exh. "B-4").
A diary was found in Castro's possession, but the page pertaining to 21 July 1959 is missing
(Exh. "G").
On the same day and in the same headquarters, Rufino Cinco was also investigated. Thereat,
he signed a four page confession, stating, among others, his previous convictions for public
scandal, physical injuries, and illegal possession of firearms; that the plan to kill Mayor
Zabala was first confided to him; that Nicomedes Castro and Godofredo Basuel were the
ones who entered the house of the Zabalas while he stood guard in front of the house on
orders of Santos Sabio that aside from those named, Simeon Suller, Irineo Santillan, Mariano
Ascueta and two others were with them; that, after the job was accomplished, all the firearms
were placed in the jeep of Suller that he, Godofredo Basuel, Marcelino Basuel, and
Nicomedes Castro waited at the store of Ignacio Quitebis at about midnight or one o'clock in
the morning of 22 July 1959 for a bus to Cagayan, and, while waiting, patrolman Zabala
arrived; that Quitebis came out to inquire who they were; that he was with Godofredo Cinco,
Godofredo Basuel, and Marcelino Basuel in the cigarette store of Maria Basuel in Pugos,
Cabugao, at five o'clock in the afternoon of 21 July 1959 (Exhs. "C", "C-1", "C-2" & "C-3").
Appellant Cinco's oath to the foregoing confession was administered by the provincial fiscal
in Vigan on the 4th day of August 1959 (Exh. "C-3").
On 5 August 1959, the provincial fiscal filed an information in the court a quo, charging
Nicomedes Castro, Rufino Cinco and others, who were unnamed, for the double murder of
the deceased spouses. On the same day, in the PC Task Force headquarters in Mindoro,
Vigan, Godofredo Basuel in an investigation, admitted, in a signed confession, participation,
as the companion gunman of Nicomedes Castro. He stated therein that he had been
convicted, in Camiling, Tarlac, of robbery in band and illegal possession of firearms, had
agreed to the plan to kill Mayor Zabala on the promise of P1,500, and had stayed in Laoag,
Ilocos Norte, until his arrest (Exhs. "D", "D-1", & "D-2"). The jurat was signed by the
provincial fiscal on the 6th day of August 1959, below which is a handwritten admission in
Ilocano of appellant Godofredo Basuel that the fiscal translated to him his statement.
Whereupon, on 6 August 1959, the fiscal filed an amended information to include Godofredo
Basuel, recommending no bail.
The indictees moved, through counsel, on 18 August 1959, for their transfer from the
headquarters of the Zebra Task Force at Mindoro, Vigan, to the provincial jail on the grounds
of better accessibility to counsel and the relatives of the accused. The court granted the
motion. On arraignment on 21 August 1959, the three accused entered a common plea of
"Not guilty", and verbally moved for a physical and medical examination, which was
granted, likewise. The examination was undertaken on the same day by the assistant
provincial health officer.
Found on Nicomedes Castro were five (5) scars,
evidently the results of the abrasion which have healed by primary or secondary intention.
Such abrasions could have been caused by friction or sliding or by a blow from rough or
blunt instrument. (Exh. "6").
According to the doctor, the elongated sear at the forehead, right side, and the elongated
scars on the medial and lateral surfaces of the first phalanx of the right middle finger could
have been inflicted in 2 to 4 weeks from the date of the examination, and that the last-named
sear could possibly have been inflicted by inserting a bullet between the fingers and applying
pressure thereat; but it is also possible that all the sears of Castro could have been caused by
falling from a jeep, intensely, on hard ground and trying to stand in a hurry.
On Rufino Cinco was found a "Scar, linear, slightly curved, 1 1/3 inches long, posterior
chest, mid-scapular line, right, level of last intercostal space, which the doctor opines prior
opines could not have been inflicted 16 or 17 days to the examination because the color of
the scar is pale pink but could have been caused "much later than 2 weeks."
Godofredo Basuel complained from pain on deep inspiration at the left chest, but the doctor
found no evidence or sign of external and internal injury at the time of examination, and
concluded that:
Had there been a blow or a series of blows from a round instrument such as clenched fist
resulting in contusion, such contusion would have been evident if they were inflicted twelve
to fourteen days prior to the date of examination. ... (Exh. "6")
On all the accused, the doctor found no pain on deep pressure in their abdominal region.
The accused assign fourteen (14) errors in the appealed decision, which, however, may be
grouped as pertaining to the admissibility of the confessions, the conspiracy, the
identification of the accused, and generally, on the appreciation of evidence for both the
prosecution and the defense, including those on the respective alibi of the accused.
With respect to the accused-appellant, Nicomedes Castro, there is direct evidence that he was
one of the killers of Mayor Zabala and his wife in the testimony of the mayor's daughter,
Luzvimin Zabala. She narrated to the court how she was seated at her mother's right near the
door of the dining room when she saw this appellant and another man shoot her parents. She
recognized Castro, and, although she did not know his name, was able to describe his
features to the mayor when the latter questioned her shortly after the shooting. The
speculation of the defense that surprise and terror at the sudden attack would have prevented
her recognition of Castro is set at naught by the description of the gunman's features; her
assertion, right at the start, that she could identify him if she ever saw him again and did, in
fact, later point him out to the authorities, at the town puericulture center, where she was
confronted by the appellant Castro. Her clear impressions and veracity are vouched for by
her candid admission to the police that she did not recognize Castro's companion, and by her
refusal to identify as the assassin anyone on suspicion and previously brought to her until she
finally was faced by Castro.
The defense also attempted to nullify Castro's identification through the testimony of the
constabulary agent, Cardines, Jr., who affirmed that, prior to the confrontation at the
puericulture center, Castro was brought to Luzvimin at her father's house; that the Chief of
Police talked to her but she shook her head, and later told the agent that he (or they) had
better look for another witness. This testimony of Cardines appear unworthy of belief,
considering that the Chief of Police denied that Castro was brought to Luzvimin at her
father's house before both met at the puericulture center, and the admission of Cardines that
he did not hear her talk with the Chief of Police nor call the Chief's attention to the alleged
gestures and words of Luzvimin that gave him (Cardines) the impression that she did not
recognize Castro. At any rate, the negative gestures of the girl, given in response to a
question that Cardines did not hear, admit of other explanation, while her identification of
Castro at the puericulture center and in court were straightforward and positive.
Luzvimin's identification was supported by that of her brother, Liberty Zabala, a young boy
of ten who pointed to appellants Basuel and Castro as the two men who entered his parents'
house on the fatal night, passed by the sala, where the boy was playing, on the way to the
dining room, and met him again in going out after the shooting. The confessions of Castro
and Basuel signed before the justice of the peace and reaffirmed before Provincial Fiscal
Juvenal Guerrero, likewise confirm the testimony of the late mayor's children. Indeed,
Castro, in his confession (Exhibit "B"), narrated how after committing the crime he aimed his
gun at the boy Liberty but was prevented by his companion from adding a third victim to
those killed in the dining room.
The defense, to be sure, exerted mighty efforts to discredit the confessions by attempting to
prove that they were extorted by torture and maltreatment of the appellants. After detailed
consideration, the trial judge rejected their claim and admitted the confessions; and our own
study of the record reveals that no error was committed in so doing. As the trial court
remarked in its decision, the confessions are not only replete with details that the police,
Constabulary and CIS agents could not have known, and gave names of minor characters that
the investigators had no reason to include or be interested in; but the confessions of Castro,
Cinco, and Basuel are different in details, such as who shouted the command, "Icammo!"
(give it to him!) that preceded the massacre, and the wanderings of the assassins before and
after the shooting. Even more, there are features that reveal the spontaneity of the
declarations. Thus, in his own statement (Exhibit "B") appellant Castro declared that the
weapons and jeep in which the assassins rode, on August 21, the night of the crime, were
furnished by one Dianong Formoso"; but later, in the same statement, he manifested that this
detail was not true, but that he named Formoso out of revenge (Exhibit "B-2"). Just what
interest could the agents have to include these details in the statement is difficult to imagine.
Again, the confession of Castro is to the effect that the rifle used in the murder had been left
behind the schoolhouse; the agents had found one in the place indicated and sent it to Manila,
where the ballistic tests showed that it was not the murder weapon. If the agents as hinted by
the defense, bad planted this weapon, they would have taken care not to have it subjected to
ballistic tests, knowing, as they must have, that it had no possible connection with the
murder. A third instance is the revelation in the confession of Castro that the .45 caliber
pistol with which Mayor Zabala and his wife had been shot was thrown away by him in the
yard of Ignacio Quitebis the very night of the murder, leading the CIS agents later to bring
Castro to that yard in a vain search for the pistol. Why should they make that search if the
confession had been manufactured by them? It is against common sense that the agents of the
law should Chase their own imaginings.
The foregoing are adequate samples to establish beyond doubt that the contents of the
confessions were not concocted or dictated by the police or the constabulary officers but are
truthful revelations made by those appellants.
On the question of the voluntariness of their confessions, accused-appellants have supplied in
their testimony a harrowing picture of barbaric torture allegedly inflicted upon them by the
constabulary and CIS personnel because the accused would not sign the statements prepared
by the agents of the law; but close scrutiny thereof reveals inconsistencies and
improbabilities that render the story unworthy of belief. Thus, appellant Castro testified that
he was maltreated to make him admit the authorship of the crime at the town puericulture
center, even before he was identified by Luzvimin Zabala, the only witness to connect him to
the foul deed. Castro further asserted that he was successively maltreated, given electric
shocks and the "water cure", and battered to insensibility in five, different rooms (referred to
as Rooms number one to five) of the headquarters of Task Force Zebra in Mindoro, Ilocos
Sur, until he finally signed his confession. We find it difficult to believe that the Task Force
should maintain as many as five different rooms for torture purposes, when the tortures
described by the accused could certainly have been inflicted on them in one and the same
room. Accused Castro and Cinco both further attested that as a result of the maltreatment
blood spurted from noses and mouths and stained their clothes and handkerchiefs, and that
this clothing was later delivered by the agents in exchange for clean raiment to Castro's wife.
Victorina Cinco, who preserved and exhibited them at the trial. Why should the police
surrender blood-stained clothes without first attempting to clean the stains, unless bent on
convicting themselves? Castro further asserted that as a result of the torture, he suffered
abrasions in different parts of his body, the scars of which were examined by Dr. Jose
Florendo, the assistant health officer, at the request of the Provincial Fiscal, on 21 August
1959, about three weeks after this appellant was taken into custody. The doctor, however,
was unable to certify whether these scars were due to maltreatment, and admitted the
possibility that they could have been self-inflicted or else caused by Castro's falling to the
ground when he admittedly jumped from the agent's running jeep in a vain effort to escape.
What is certain, however, is that at least the scar on the first phalanx of the right middle
finger of Castro, can not be attributed to the agents' forcible squeezing of his right hand while
cartridges or bullets were inserted between the fingers, as claimed by him, because the scar is
found on the side of only one finger. The cartridges or bullets inserted, as described by the
accused, must have been hard on one side and soft on the other in order not to cause abrasion
on the opposite finger.
These details, coupled with the evident firmness and speedy with which the signatures to the
confessions were written, the failure of all appellants to complain to the justice of the peace
before whom the confessions were sworn to, the written denials of force, intimidation or
promise appended thereto by the accused and signed in the presence of the Provincial Fiscal,
and the improbability that the details appearing in the confessions were suggested or
concocted by the police (as has been previously discussed), impel this Court to reject the
claim that the confessions are involuntary. It may be added that some of the persons
mentioned in Castro's confession (Exhibit "B") and in those of Cinco (Exhibit "C") and
Basuel "Exhibit "D") were also investigated, and no proof is on record that they were
intimidated, hurt, or coerced in any way.
As to appellants Basuel and Cinco, whose descriptions of the torture they had undergone is
plainly copied from that of Castro, it is enough to note that neither showed any traces of
maltreatment detectable by the examining physician. Cinco, moreover, stated under oath in
Exhibit "I" (executed only 2 days after the challenged confession, Exhibit "C") that he was
under Constabulary custody at his own request; that he was repentant and willing to turn
state's witness.
Of course, we agree with the defense that, while from the purely evidentiary standpoint, a
confession may be truthful even if coerced yet it must not be overlooked that extraction of
such a confession infringes the constitutional guarantees of due process and the inhibition
against compulsory self-incrimination (Const., Art. III, sec. 1 (I and 18) that are among the
touchstones dividing democratic from totalitarian methods, and that the violation of these
Constitution prescriptions suffices to render the coerced confession objectionable. However,
the burden of proof to clearly show involuntariness is on the accused and in the case at bar it
has not been adequately met.
Nevertheless, we think that judges, justices of the peace and fiscals, to whom persons
accused are brought for swearing to the truth of their statements, would do well to adopt the
practice of having the confessants physically and thoroughly examined by independent and
qualified doctors before administering the oath, even if it is not requested by the accused. Or,
if no doctor is immediately available, the swearing officers should themselves examine the
entire bodies of the confessants for marks of violence, particularly the portions covered by
their clothing. Such examination, if regularly required, and the results officially noted, would
not only deter attempts to secure confessions through violence but ultimately shorten and
speed up criminal trials (where accused persons almost invariably repudiate their
confessions) by precluding future controversies on whether the statements were obtained
through torture or not. Common sense advises that the swearing officers should not be
content with affirmations by the accused that their statements are voluntary, nor with denials
that they were improperly procured. Manifestations of this kind are to be expected if the
accused is to return to the custody of the agents who obtained this confessions, since
repudiation of the statement would result in the infliction of further punishment by those
charged with improperly extracting the challenged statements.
Likewise, the practice of bringing suspects or witnesses for examination away from their
towns, their acquaintances and friends, is to be deplored, as it usually engenders suspicion
that the subjects have been coerced in the course of their investigation, thereby alienating the
confidence and goodwill of the inhabitants toward the law enforcement agencies.
All the three accused interposed alibis that were discredited by the evidence on record.
Castro's contention is that he stayed in his house the whole night of 21 July 1959, because
although he had planned to go to Cagayan with his family to look for cheap rice, and had so
advised his close friends, almost brothers, Nestor and Eugenio Fontilla, he was unable to do
so because his second youngest child developed a severe cold and high fever; so that when
the Fontillas passed by his house at midnight, the accused and his wife advised them that "if
the child would recover, we would see each other in Cagayan". Against this is the testimony
of Ignacio Quitebis that he saw both Castro and accused Rufino Cinco (his brother-in-law) in
front of his store in the early morning of 22 July 1959, and so did Patrolman Fernando
Zabala a short while later, Mercedes Cinco, Castro's wife, informed the court, in turn, that
the sick child was nearly two year old, and had to be taken to the local dispensary for
treatment. Yet the dispensary records (Exhibit "8"), produced to support the alibi, refer to a
one-month old child named Romeo Castro.
As to Godofredo Basuel, who was a resident of Camiling, Tarlac, he claimed to have gone to
Cabugao, Ilocos Sur, on 20 July 1959 to look for his father, and that he spent the whole night
of 21 July, after playing with the children of his cousin, Pacita Cinco, at her house, where he
stayed until 25th July. That day he left for Laoag to look for one Arce, who promised him
work, and was arrested at a restaurant by CIS agents, from whom at first he tried to conceal
his identity by claiming that he was named David. At the trial, Basuel gave the ridiculous
explanation that he used the name David because he became sick whenever he used the name
Godofredo.
Rufino Cinco, for his part, alleged that he spent the night of 21 July with his witness,
Gregorio Magrubang, celebrating the latter's birthday; the prosecution established that
Magrubang's true birthday, as shown by his BIRTH CERTIFICATE (Exhibit "K"), was 14
November, and not 21st July. In addition, this accused, who had confessed to having acted as
a lookout for the others, subsequently executed an affidavit (Exhibit "I") manifesting his
repentance and his willingness to turn state's evidence, although he seems to have changed
his mind later on, and denied guilt. His explanation that he was tricked by the agents into
signing Exhibit "I" is plainly incredible, for the agents of the law did not need Exhibit "I", as
they already held Cinco's previous confession, Exhibit "C".
These alibis of the appellants, supported only by the testimony of close friends and relatives,
who could remember distinctly only the events of the night of 21 July (the night of the
murder), fail to cast reasonable doubt on their culpability.
The defense likewise disputes the finding of conspiracy that renders each one of the accused
responsible for the acts of his companions in the commission of the double murder. While no
direct evidence was produced that a previous agreement was had among them, their
concerted action in going armed and together to their victim's house, and there, while one
stayed as a lookout, the other two entered and shot the mayor and his wife, leaving again
together afterwards, admits no other rational explanation but conspiracy (People vs. Upao L-
6771, 28 May 1957, and cases cited).
We, therefore, find no error in the decision appealed from, and the same is hereby affirmed.
However, for lack of sufficient votes, the death penalty imposed is reduced to reclusion
perpetua, in accordance with law.
Villavicencio vs Lukban - A case digest
G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL. vs. JUSTO
LUKBAN, ET AL.

Issue:

The writ of Habeas Corpus was filed by the petitioner, with the prayer that the respondent
produce around 170 women whom Justo Lukban et, al deported to Davao. Liberty of abode
was also raised versus the power of the executive of the Municipality in deporting the
women without their knowledge in his capacity as Mayor.

Facts:

Justo Lukban as Manila City's Mayor together with Anton Hohmann, the city's Chief of
Police, took custody of about 170 women at the night of October 25 beyond the latters
consent and knowledge and thereafter were shipped to Mindanao specifically in Davao
where they were signed as laborers. Said women are inmates of the houses of prostitution
situated in Gardenia Street, in the district of Sampaloc.

That when the petitioner filed for habeas corpus, the respondent moved to dismiss the case
saying that those women were already out of their jurisdiction and that , it should be filed in
the city of Davao instead.

The court ruled in favor of the petitioner with the instructions;

For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were open: (1)
They could have produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ;
or (2) they could have shown by affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity those
persons could not safely be brought before the court; or (3) they could have presented
affidavits to show that the parties in question or their attorneywaived the right to be present.

Held:

The court concluded the case by granting the parties aggrieved the sum of 400 pesos each,
plus 100 pesos for nominal damage due to contempt of court. Reasoning further that if
the chief executive of any municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a
private citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and then, when
called upon to defend his official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that the
person was under no restraint and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this other
municipality.
We believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the
court and has it in his power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he
has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if the party to whom the writ is
addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a person before the application for the writ
is no reason why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under
no authority of law, could deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao, the same
officials must necessarily have the same means to return them from Davao to Manila. The
respondents, within the reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of
her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the
courts, while the person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The
great writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded.

Yamashita v. Styer Digest
Yamashita vs. Styer
G.R. L-129 December 19, 1945
Ponente: Moran, C.J.

Facts:
1. Yamashita was the Commanding General of the Japanese army in the Philippines during
World War 2. He was charged before the American military commission for war crimes.

2. He filed a petition for habeas corpus and prohibition against Gen. Styer to reinstate his
status as prisoner of war from being accused as a war criminal. Petitioner also questioned the
jurisdiction of the military tribunal.

Issue: Whether or not the military tribunal has jurisdiction

Held:

YES.
1. The military commission was lawfully created in conformity with an act of Congress
sanctioning the creation of such tribunals.

2. The laws of war imposes upon a commander the duty to take any appropriate measures
within his powers to control the troops under his command to prevent acts which constitute
violation of the laws of war. Hence, petitioner could be legitimately charged with personal
responsibility arising from his failure to take such measure. In this regard the SC
invoked Art. 1 of the Hague Convention No. IV of 1907, as well as Art. 19 of Hague
Convention No. X, Art. 26 of 1929 Geneva Convention among others.

3. Habeas corpus is untenable since the petitioner merely sought for restoration to his former
status as prisoner of war and not a discharge from confinement. This is a matter of military
measure and not within the jurisdiction of the courts.

4. The petition for prohibition against the respondent will also not life since the military
commission is not made a party respondent in the case. As such, no order may be issued
requiring it to refrain from trying the petitioner.


People V. Lol-Lo & Saraw (1922)
People v. Lol-lo & Saraw, 43 Phil. 19
G.R. No. 17958 February 27, 1922.
MALCOLM, J.

FACTS:
2 boats of Dutch possession left matuta. In 1 of the boats was 1 individual, a Dutch
subject, and in the other boat 11 men, women, and children, subjects of Holland. The 2nd
boat arrived between the Islands of Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies. There the boat
was surrounded by 6 vintas manned by 24 Moros all armed. The Moros first asked for food,
but once on the Dutch boat, too for themselves all of the cargo, attacked some of the men,
and brutally violated 2 of the women. All of the persons on the Dutch boat, except the 2
young women, were again placed on it and holes were made in it, the idea that it would
submerge. The Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. 2 of the Moro marauder
were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the women, and Saraw. At Maruro the 2 women were
able to escape.
Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu,
Philippine Islands. There they were arrested and were charged in the Court of First Instance
of Sulu with the crime of piracy
All of the elements of the crime of piracy are present. Piracy is robbery or forcible
depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority and done animo furandi, and in the
spirit and intention of universal hostility.
Pirates are in law hostes humani generis.
Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind. It may be
punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into
which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial
limits.
As it is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime was
committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those limits, though
neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes."

ISSUE: W/N the provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the crime of piracy are still in
force.

HELD: In accordance with provisions of Act No. 2726, the defendant and appellant Lol-lo,
who is found guilty of the crime of piracy and is sentenced therefor to be hung until dead.

YES.
Penal code dealing with the crime of piracy, notably articles 153 and 154, to be still in
force in the Philippines.
The crime of piracy was accompanied by (1) an offense against chastity and (2) the
abandonment of persons without apparent means of saving themselves. It is, therefore, only
necessary for us to determine as to whether the penalty of cadena perpetua or death should be
imposed.
At least 3 aggravating circumstances, that the wrong done in the commission of the
crime was deliberately augmented by causing other wrongs not necessary for its commission,
that advantage was taken of superior strength, and that means were employed which added
ignominy to the natural effects of the act, must also be taken into consideration in fixing the
penalty.



People V. Oanis 1943
People v. Oanis, 74 Phil. 257
G.R. No.L-47722 July 27, 1943
MORAN, J.

Lesson applicable: mitigating circumstances

FACTS:
Captain Godofredo Monsod, Constabulary Provincial Inspector at Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija,
received from Major Guido a telegram of the following tenor: "Information received escaped
convict Anselmo Balagtas with bailarina and Irene in Cabanatuan get him dead or alive."
Captain Monsod accordingly called for his first sergeant and asked that he be given four
men.
The same instruction was given to the chief of police Oanis who was likewise called by the
Provincial Inspector.
Defendants Oanis and Galanta then went to the room of Irene, and an seeing a man sleeping
with his back towards the door where they were, simultaneously or successively fired at him
with their .32 and .45 caliber revolvers. Awakened by the gunshots, Irene saw her paramour
already wounded, and looking at the door where the shots came, she saw the defendants still
firing at him. Shocked by the entire scene. Irene fainted; it turned out later that the person
shot and killed was not the notorious criminal Anselmo Balagtas but a peaceful and innocent
citizen named Serapio Tecson, Irene's paramour.
According to Appellant Galanta, when he and chief of police Oanis arrived at the house, the
latter asked Brigida where Irene's room was. Brigida indicated the place, and upon further
inquiry as to the whereabouts of Anselmo Balagtas, she said that he too was sleeping in the
same room.
ISSUE: W/N they may, upon such fact, be held responsible for the death thus caused to
Tecson

HELD: appellants are hereby declared guilty of murder with the mitigating circumstance
YES.
ignorantia facti excusat, but this applies only when the mistake is committed without fault or
carelessness
appellants found no circumstances whatsoever which would press them to immediate action.
The person in the room being then asleep, appellants had ample time and opportunity to
ascertain his identity without hazard to themselves, and could even effect a bloodless arrest if
any reasonable effort to that end had been made, as the victim was unarmed.
"No unnecessary or unreasonable force shall be used in making an arrest, and the person
arrested shall not be subject to any greater restraint than is necessary for his detention."
a peace officer cannot claim exemption from criminal liability if he uses unnecessary force or
violence in making an arrest
The crime committed by appellants is not merely criminal negligence, the killing being
intentional and not accidental. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be
unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act performed without malice.
2 requisites in order that the circumstance may be taken as a justifying one:
1. offender acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right-present
2. injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of
such duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office.-not present
According to article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty lower by 1 or 2 degrees than
that prescribed by law shall, in such case, be imposed.


People v. Chaw Yaw Shun 23 SCRA 127 [1968]
The assistant provincial fiscal filed an information for murder against Victorio
Alvarez, Dionisio Carasig, Chaw Yaw Shun @ George Chua and two John Does, alleging
that said accused, acting in conspiracy, with the attendant qualifying and generic aggravating
circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength, use of motor
vehicle, nocturnity and by a band, killed Hector Crisostomo. It was after investigation that
the authorities did not find any evidence that would lead to the killers but a certain check was
drawn by Alvarez in favour of the deceased. So the authorities picked Alvarez up and the
latter was charged with two John Does. Alvarez admitted that he killed Crisostomo with the
participation of a certain George Chua and Johnny Yao and two John Does. However the
confessions of Alvarez were conflicting from the recorded tapes to his written statements.
The trial court admitted the confessions but George stated that he has a defense of alibi for he
was playing mah-jong then as corroborated by other evidence and witness.

Issue: Whether the confession of an alleged co-conspirator in a killing is admissible.

Ruling: No. Conspiracy must be proved by independent evidence other than the confession.
The admissibility of a confession by one accused against the other in the same case, must
relate to statements made by one conspirator during the pendency of the unlawful enterprise
(or during its existence) and in furtherance of its objects, and not to a confession made, as in
this case, long after the conspiracy had been brought to an end. Conspiracy must be real and
not presumptive. It must be proved as the crime itself, independent from the confession. But
in the case at bar, the trial court admitted the conflicting confession of Alvarez which are not
binding on the appellant for being hearsay, aside from having been repudiated by Alvarez
himself during the trial. There is, therefore, no inter-locking confession so to say, for there
being no independent evidence establishing an overt act of appellant Chua connected to the
crime, conspiracy must necessarily be discarded.

Lim vs. Ponce De Leon Case Digest August 29, 1975
TOPIC: ARTICLE 32 OF THE CIVIL CODE/ SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
FACTS:Taha sold to a certain Alberto Timbangcaya a motor launch named M/L "SAN
RAFAEL". A year later or on April 9, 1962 Alberto Timbangcaya filed a complaint with the
Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Palawan alleging that after the sale Jikil Taha forcibly took
away the motor launch from him.
Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon, upon being informed that the motor launch was in Balabac,
Palawan, wrote the Provincial Commander of Palawan requesting him to direct the
detachment commander-in Balabac to impound and take custody of the motor launch.
On June 26, 1962, Fiscal Ponce de Leon reiterated his request to the Provincial Commander
to impound the motor launch, explaining that its subsequent sale to a third party, plaintiff-
appellant Delfin Lim, cannot prevent the court from taking custody of the same.
2
So, on July
6, 1962 upon order of the Provincial Commander, defendant-appellee Orlando Maddela,
Detachment Commander of Balabac, Palawan, seized the motor launch "SAN RAFAEL"
from plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim and impounded it.
Delfin Lim and Jikil Taha filed a case against Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon and Orlando
Maddela, alleging that on July 6, 1962 Orlando Maddela entered the premises of Delfin Lim
without a search warrant and then and there took away the hull of the motor launch without
his consent; that he effected the seizure upon order of Fiscal Ponce de Leon who knew fully
well that his office was not vested with authority to order the seizure of a private property;
that said motor launch was purchased by Delfin Lim from Jikil Taha in consideration of
Three Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00), Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) of which has been
given to Jikil Taha as advance payment; that as a consequence of the unlawful seizure of the
motor launch, its sale did not materialize; and that since July 6, 1962, the said motor launch
had been moored at the Balabac Bay, Palawan and because of exposure to the elements it had
become worthless and beyond repair.
In their answer, defendants-appellees denied the material allegations of the complaint and as
affirmative defenses alleged that the motor launch in question which was sold by Jikil Taha
to Alberto Timbangcaya on April 29, 1961 was sometime in April 1962, forcibly taken with
violence upon persons and with intent to gain by Jikil Taha from Alfredo Timbangcaya
without the latter's knowledge and consent, thus giving rise to the filing of a criminal charge
of robbery against Jikil Taha; that Fiscal Ponce de Leon, in his capacity as Acting Provincial
Fiscal of Palawan ordered Orlando Maddela to seize and impound the motor launch "SAN
RAFAEL", for being the corpus delicti of the robbery; and that Orlando Maddela merely
obeyed the orders of his superior officer to impound said launch. By way of counterclaim,
defendants-appellees alleged that because of the malicious and groundless filing of the
complaint by plaintiffs-appellants, they were constrained to engage the services of lawyers,
each of them paying P500.00 as attorney's fees; and that they suffered moral damages in the
amount of P5,000.00 each and actual damages in the amount of P500.00 each. They also
prayed that each of them awarded exemplary damages in the amount of P1,000.00.
ISSUES/HELD:
whether or not defendant-appellee Fiscal Ponce de Leon had the power to order the seizure
of the motor launch in question without a warrant of search and seizure even if the same was
admittedly the corpus delicti of the crime.
ANSWER: NEGATIVE. the power to issue a search warrant is vested in a judge or
magistrate and in no other officer and no search and seizure can be made without a proper
warrant
whether or not defendants-appellees are civilly liable to plaintiffs-appellants for damages
allegedly suffered by them granting that the seizure of the motor launch was unlawful.
ANSWER. AFFIRMATIVE. To be liable under Article 32 of the New Civil Code it is
enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs and it is not
required that defendants should have acted with malice or bad faith. Except for Madella who
was merely acting under orders.
RATIO DICIDENDI:
since in the present case defendants-appellees seized the motor launch without a warrant,
they have violated the constitutional right of plaintiffs-appellants against unreasonable search
and seizure.
Under the old Constitution
7
the power to issue a search warrant is vested in a judge or
magistrate and in no other officer and no search and seizure can be made without a proper
warrant. At the time the act complained of was committed, there was no law or rule that
recognized the authority of Provincial Fiscals to issue a search warrant. In his vain attempt to
justify the seizure of the motor launch in question without a warrant Fiscal Ponce de Leon
invoked the provisions of Republic Act No. 732, which amended Sections 1674 and 1687 of
the Revised Administrative Code. But there is nothing in said law which confers upon the
provincial fiscal; the authority to issue warrants, much less to order without warrant the
seizure of a personal property even if it is the corpus delicti of a crime. True, Republic Act
No. 732 has broadened the power of provincial fiscals to conduct preliminary investigations,
but said law did not divest the judge or magistrate of its power to determine, before issuing
the corresponding warrant, whether or not probable cause exists therefor.
8

We are not prepared to sustain his defense of good faith. To be liable under Article 32 of the
New Civil Code it is enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of the
plaintiffs and it is not required that defendants should have acted with malice or bad faith.
But defendant-appellee Orlando Maddela cannot be held accountable because he impounded
the motor launch upon the order of his superior officer. While a subordinate officer may be
held liable for executing unlawful orders of his superior officer, there are certain
circumstances which would warrant Maddela's exculpation from liability. The records show
that after Fiscal Ponce de Leon made his first request to the Provincial Commander on June
15, 1962 Maddela was reluctant to impound the motor launch despite repeated orders from
his superior officer.
21
It was only after he was furnished a copy of the reply of Fiscal Ponce
de Leon, dated June 26, 1962, to the letter of the Provincial Commander, justifying the
necessity of the seizure of the motor launch on the ground that the subsequent sale of the
launch to Delfin Lim could not prevent the court from taking custody of the same,
22
that he
impounded the motor launch on July 6, 1962. With said letter coming from the legal officer
of the province, Maddela was led to believe that there was a legal basis and authority to
impound the launch. Then came the order of his superior officer to explain for the delay in
the seizure of the motor launch.
23
Faced with a possible disciplinary action from his
Commander, Maddela was left with no alternative but to seize the vessel. In the light of the
above circumstances. We are not disposed to hold Maddela answerable for damages.


ROGELIO ABERCA, et al. vs. FABIAN VER, et al.
L-69866
April 15, 1988
FACTS:
Sometime in the early 1980s, various Intelligence units of the AFP known as Task
Force Makabansa (TFM) were ordered by respondents then Maj. Gen. Fabian Ver to conduct
pre-emptive strikes against known communist-terrorist (CT) underground houses in view of
increasing reports about CT plans to sow disturbances in Metro Manila. In compliance
thereof, the TFM raided several places, employing in most cases defectively issued judicial
search warrants. During these raids, certain members of the raiding TFM confiscated a
number of purely personal items belonging to the 20 petitioners. Petitioners were arrested
without proper arrest warrants issued by the courts. For some period after their arrest, they
were arrested without denied visits of relatives and lawyers; interrogated in violation of their
rights to silence and counsel, through threats, torture and other forms of violence in order to
obtain incriminatory information or confessions and in order to punish them.
Plaintiffs then filed an action for damages before the RTC of Quezon City against
respondents-officers of the AFP headed by Ver. Respondents, in their motion to dismiss,
claimed that (1) the wrti of habeas corpus was suspended, thus giving credence to
petitioners detention; (2) respondents were immune from liability for acts done in the
performance of their official duties, and that (3) the complaint did not state a cause of action
against respondents.
On November 8, 1983, the RTC granted the motion to dismiss the case. A motion
to set aside the order dismissing the complaint, and a supplemental motion for
reconsideration were filed by petitioners. On May 11, 1984, the trial court, without acting on
the motion to set aside the Order of Nov. 8, 1983, declared the finality of said Order against
petitioners. After their motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC, petitioners then
filed the instant petition for certiorari, on March 15, 1985, seeking to annul and set aside the
respondent courts resolutions and order.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a civil
action for damages for illegal searches conducted by military personnel and other violations
of rights and liberties guaranteed under the Constitution;
(2) Whether or not respondents may invoke state immunity from suit for acts done in the
performance of official duties and functions;
(3) Whether or not a superior officer, under the notion of respondeat superior, be
answerable for damages jointly and severally with his subordinates, to the person whose
constitutional rights and liberties have been violated.
HELD:
(1) The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus (PWHC) does not
destroy petitioners right and cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention and
other violations of their constitutional rights. The suspension does not render valid an
otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended is merely the right of the individual
to seek release from detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of
obtaining his liberty.
Moreover, as pointed out by petitioners, their right and cause of action for damages
are explicitly recognized in PD 1755 which amended Art. 1146 of the Civil Code by adding
the following text: However, when the action (for injury to the rights of the plaintiff or for
quasi-delict) arises from or out of any act, activity or conduct of any public officer involving
the exercise of powers or authority arising from martial law including the arrest, detention
and/or trial of the plaintiff, the same must be brought within one year.
Even assuming that the suspension of the PWHC suspends petitioners right of
action for damages for illegal arrest and detention, it does not and cannot suspend their rights
and causes of action for injuries suffered because of respondents confiscation of their
private belongings, the violation of their right to remain silent and to counsel and their right
to protection against unreasonable searches and seizures and against torture and other cruel
and inhuman treatment.
The question became moot and academic since the suspension of the PWHC had
been lifted with the issuance of then Pres. Corazon Aquino of Proclamation No. 2 on March
25, 1986.
(2) It may be that the respondents, as members of the AFP, were merely
responding to their duties, as they claim, to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
insurrection, rebellion and subversion in accordance with Proclamation No. 2054 of Pres.
Marcos, despite the lifting of Martial Law on January 27, 1981, and in pursuance of such
objective, to launch pre-emptive strikes against alleged CT underground houses. But this
cannot be construed as a blanket license or roving commission untrammeled by any
constitutional restraint, to disregard or transgress upon the rights and liberties of the
individual citizen enshrined and protected by the Constitution.
Article 32 of the Civil Code, which renders any public officer or employees, or any
private individual, liable in damages for violating the constitutional rights and liberties of
another, does not exempt the respondents from responsibility. Only judges are excluded
from liability under the said article, provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a
violation of the Revised Penal Code or other penal statute.
This is not say that military authorities are restrained from pursuing their assigned
task or carrying out their mission with vigor, to protect the Philippines from its enemies,
whether of the left or of the right, or from within or without, seeking to destroy or subvert
our democratic institutions and imperil their very existence. What is meant is that in carrying
out their task and mission, constitutional and legal safeguards must be observed; otherwise,
the very fabric of our faith will start to unravel. In the battle of competing ideologies, the
struggle of mind is just as vital as the struggle of arms. The linchpin in that psychological
struggle is faith in the rule of law. Once that faith is lost or compromised, the struggle may
well be abandoned.
(3) The doctrine of respondeat superior is not applicable in this case. It has been
generally limited in its application to principal and agent or to master and servant
relationships. No such relationship exists superiors of the military and their
subordinates. However, the decisive factor in this case is the language of Art. 32, Civil
Code; the law speaks of an officer or employee or person directly or indirectly
responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is
not the actor alone who must answer for damages under Art. 32; the person indirectly
responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party. Art.
32 makes the persons who are directly as well as indirectly responsible for the transgression
joint tortfeasors.
OBRA v. CA
FACTS
Petitioner Benjamin Obra was Regional Director of the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences
(BMGS) in Baguio. On jun 26, 1985, Jeannette Grybos wrote him a letter on behalf of the
Gillies heirs complaining that private respondents (Sps. James and June Brett) had been
conducting illegal mining activities in Bgy. Palasa-an, Mankayan, Benguet, belonging to
Gillies family. On the same day, Obra wrote Brig. Gen Tomas Dumpit1 requesting assistance
in apprehending a truck2 allegedly used by Sps. Brett in illegal mining. The next day, Obra
wrote Sps Brett and Grybos informing them that BMGS was going to conduct an ocular
inspeciton and field investigation and requesting them to be present so that all matters
shall be gathered and collated in order for this Office to take appropriate action. Elements of
RUC under Maj. Densen seized the truck3 as it was entering Mamakar mining area. It was
impounded by the military and prevented from leaving the area except on mercy missions4.
Private respondents filed a complaint for injunction and damages with the RTC as the truck
was seized without due provess in violation of their constitutional rights under Art. 32 of the
Civil Code.
ISSUE
Whether or not petitioners (Obra and Dumpit) were authorized to seize the vehicle in the
absence of any finding of probably cause (PC).
HELD
NO.Although peittioners have authority to order seizure and confiscation via PD. 1281, Art
IV, S3 of the 1973 Constitution merely validated the grant by law to nonjudicial officers of
the power to issue warrants but did not in any way exempt them from the duty of
determining the eixstence of probable cause. Petitioner Obras letters to private respondents
and Grybos clearly stated that an investigation was to be held on July 2-5, 1985 to determine
the veracity of the allegations of Grybos complaint. His only basis was an alleged
certification from the BMGS that no mining permit had been issued to the Sps. However,
such certification was not presented in evidence. The seizure cannot be justified under the
moving vehicle doctrine as there is no existence of probable cause. The doctrine does not
give poblice officers umliminted discretion to conduct warrantless searches of automobiles in
the absence of PC. Therefore, the CA is correct in affirming the RTCs decision that
petitioners are liable for damages (P100,000) and attorneys fees (P10,000) in violation of
the Sps. Rights under Art. 32 of the Civil Code.
Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo
G.R. No. 180906
07 October 2008
PONENTE: Puno, C.J.
PARTIES:
1. PETITIONERS: SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE and CHIEF OF
STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES
2. RESPONDENTS: RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO MANALO
NATURE: Petition for Review on Certiorari
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND:
1. Supreme Court: Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order
2. Supreme Court: Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to treat their Existing Petition as
Amparo Petition
3. Court of Appeals: Upon order of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals summarily
heard the Petition of Amparo. Thereafter, the Court of Appeals issued a judgment which
is the subject of the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.
FACTS:
On 14 February 2006, at past noon, Raymond Manalo (hereafter referred to as Raymond)
and Reynaldo Manalo (hereafter referred to as Reynaldo) were abducted by military men
belonging to the Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) on the suspicion that
they were members and supporters of the New Peoples Army (NPA). After eighteen (18)
months of detention and torture, the brothers escaped on 13 August 2007.
On 23 August 2007, Raymond and Reynaldo filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and
Temporary Restraining Order before the Supreme Court to stop the military officers and
agents from depriving them of their right to liberty and other basic rights. In a Resolution
dated 24 August 2007, the Supreme Court ordered the Secretary of the Department of
National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), their
agents, representatives, or persons acting in their stead, and further enjoined them from
causing the arrest of Raymond and Reynaldo. Forthwith, they filed a Manifestation and
Omnibus Motion to Treat Existing Petition as Amparo Petition, to Admit Supporting
Affidavits, and to Grant Interim and Final Amparo Reliefs.
While the aforementioned case was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on
24 October 2007. Raymond and Reynaldo subsequently filed a manifestation and omnibus
motion to treat their existing peti tion as amparo petition.
On 25 October 2007, the Supreme Court resolved to treat the 23 August 2007 Petition as a
petition under the Amparo Rule. The Supreme Court likewise granted the Writ of Amparo
and remanded the petition to the Court of Appeals to conduct the summary hearing and
decide the petition.
On 26 December 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the privilege of the writ of amparo. The
Court of Appeals ordered the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the
AFP to furnish the Manalos and the court with all official and unofficial investigation reports
as to the custody of Raymond and Reynaldo, confirm the present places of official
assignment of two military officials involved, and produce all medical reports and records of
Raymond and Reynaldo while under military custody.
Aggrieved, the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP filed an
appeal with the Supreme Court.
PERTINENT ISSUES:
1. Whether or not statements from the victims themselves is sufficient for amparo petitions.
2. Whether or not actual deprivation of liberty is necessary for the right to security of a
person may be invoked.
ANSWER:
1. It depends on the credibility and candidness of the victims in their statements.
2. No.
SUPREME COURT RULINGS:
1. ON EVIDENCE REQUIRED ON AMPARO PETITIONS
Effect of the nature of enforced disappearance and torture to the quantum of evidence
required With the secret nature of an enforced disappearance and the torture perpetrated on
the victim during detention, it logically holds that much of the information and evidence of
the ordeal will come from the victims themselves, and the veracity of their account will
depend on their credibility and candidness in their written and/or oral statements. Their
statements can be corroborated by other evidence such as physical evidence left by the
torture they suffered or landmarks they can identify in the places where they were detained.
Where powerful military officers are implicated, the hesitation of witnesses to surface and
testify against them comes as no surprise.
2. ON RIGHT TO SECURITY AS A GROUND FOR AMPARO PETITION
Permutations of the Right to Security A closer look at the right to security of person
would yield various permutations of the exercise of this right. First, the right to security of
person is freedom from fear. In its whereas clauses, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR) enunciates that a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of
speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest
aspiration of the common people. Some scholars postulate that freedom from fear is not
only an aspirational principle, but essentially an individual international human right. It is the
right to security of person as the word security itself means freedom from fear. Article
3 of the UDHR provides, viz: Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.
xxx
Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or
security. Article III, Section II of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that, as a general rule,
ones body cannot be searched or invaded without a search warrant. Physical injuries
inflicted in the context of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances constitute more
than a search or invasion of the body. It may constitute dismemberment, physical disabilities,
and painful physical intrusion. As the degree of physical injury increases, the danger to life
itself escalates. Notably, in criminal law, physical injuries constitute a crime against persons
because they are an affront to the bodily integrity or security of a person.
xxx
Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of ones rights by the
government. In the context of the writ of amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the
right to life and liberty under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the right to
security of person (as freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological
integrity) under Article III, Section 2. The right to security of person in this third sense is a
corollary of the policy that the State guarantees full respect for human rights under Article
II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the government is the chief guarantor of order and
security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person is
rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights especially when
they are under threat. Protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization of
the government apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced
disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of
justice.
Freedom from fear as a right In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, freedom
from fear is the right and any threat to the rights to life, liberty or security is the actionable
wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a reaction; threat is a stimulus, a cause of action. Fear caused
by the same stimulus can range from being baseless to well-founded as people react
differently. The degree of fear can vary from one person to another with the variation of the
prolificacy of their imagination, strength of character or past experience with the stimulus.
Thus, in the amparo context, it is more correct to say that the right to security is actually
the freedom from threat. Viewed in this light, the threatened with violation Clause in the
latter part of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule is a form of violation of the right to security
mentioned in the earlier part of the provision.
Deprivation of liberty is not necessary before the right to security may be invoked While
the right to security of person appears in conjunction with the right to liberty under Article 9,
the Committee has ruled that the right to security of person can exist independently of the
right to liberty. In other words, there need not necessarily be a deprivation of liberty for the
right to security of person to be invoked.
DISPOSITIVE:
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 26 December 2007.


Furundzija Case: The Judgement of the Trial Chamber

Anto Furundzija found guilty on both charges and sentenced to 10 years in prison

Today, Thursday 10 December 1998, Trial Chamber II, consisting of Judge Florence Mumba
(presiding), Judge Antonio Cassese and Judge Richard May, pronounced their judgement in
the case The Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija. This judgement is the third to be rendered after
trial by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and marks the
sixth time that sentences have been handed down.


THE SENTENCES IMPOSED

The Trial Chamber found Anto Furundzija GUILTY, as a co-perpetrator of torture, a
Violation of the laws or customs of war, for which he has been sentenced to 10 years
imprisonment.

The Trial Chamber also found Anto Furundzija GUILTY, of aiding and abetting in outrages
upon personal dignity, including rape, which constitutes a Violation of the laws or customs
of war, for which he has been sentenced to 8 years imprisonment.

These multiple sentences are to be served concurrently.

Background:

Further to a sealed indictment, Furundzija was detained by SFOR on 18 December 1997. An
amended indictment, issued on 2 June 1998, alleged that the accused was the local
commander of a special unit of the military police of the Croatian Defence Council (HVO)
known as the "Jokers". In this capacity he and another soldier interrogated Witness A.
During the questioning, Witness A had a knife rubbed against her inner thigh and lower
stomach by the other soldier, who threatened to put his knife inside her vagina should she not
tell the truth. The amended indictment further alleged that Furundzija continued to
interrogate Witness A and Victim B while they were beaten on the feet with a baton by the
other soldier and further, that Furundzija stood by, failing to intervene in any way, while
Witness A was forced to have oral and vaginal sexual intercourse with the other soldier.

The trial of Furundzija commenced on 8 June 1998 and the proceedings continued until 22
June 1998, at which time the hearing was closed with judgement reserved to a later date.
Following a motion filed by the Defence, the Trial Chamber ordered that the proceedings be
reopened. These further proceedings covered a period of four days and the trial was finally
closed on 12 November 1998.

The judgement is a document of approximately 100 pages, which this press release does
not summarise. It is merely an outline of the most significant legal aspects of the
judgement and an overview of the findings reached by the Chamber.

The full text of the official summary as read out in Court by the Presiding Judge and of
the judgement itself will be mailed upon request by the Public Information Unit.



THE MOST SIGNIFICANT LEGAL ASPECTS

For Article 3 of the Statute (Violations of the laws or customs of war) to apply, the existence
of an armed conflict had to be established. The Trial Chamber relied on the test formulated
by the Appeals Chamber in the Tadi case. Accordingly, based on the evidence submitted by
both parties, the Trial Chamber found that, at the material time, a state of armed conflict
existed in central Bosnia and Herzegovina between the HVO and the Army of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. Furthermore, the Trial Chamber found a connection between this armed
conflict and the acts underlying the charges against the accused.

The proceedings that took place in November 1998 essentially dealt with the reliability of
Witness As evidence in light of any psychological disorder caused by her traumatic ordeal.
The Trial Chamber found that the expert evidence demonstrated that, even when a person is
suffering from PTSD [post-traumatic stress disorder], he or she may still be a reliable
witness, and accepted Witness As testimony that she had sufficiently recollected the
material aspects of the relevant events.

The judgement furthermore provides a definition of torture under international humanitarian
law. In this regard, the Trial Chamber found that the prohibition against torture has attained
the status of jus cogens, which can be defined as a peremptory norm of international law
from which no derogation is permitted.

According to the summary, as read out in court, the Trial Chamber found the elements of the
offence of torture to be as follows: "the intentional infliction, by act or omission, of severe
pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, for the purpose of obtaining information or a
confession or of punishing, intimidating, humiliating or coercing the victim or a third
person, or of discriminating on any ground against the victim or a third person. For such an
act to constitute torture, one of the parties thereto must be a public official or must, at any
rate, act in a non-private capacity, e.g. as a de facto organ of a State or any other authority
wielding entity."

Having found that it is indisputable that rape and other serious sexual assaults in situations of
armed conflict entail criminal liability of the perpetrators, the Trial Chamber upheld the
finding in the recent judgement in the elebii case that, in certain circumstances, rape may
amount to torture under international law. However, the Trial Chamber has seen fit to expand
the definition of rape first formulated by Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in the Akayesu case and followed in the ICTY elebii
judgement.

According to the summary of the judgement, the Trial Chamber found that under
international criminal law the offence of rape comprises the following elements: "the sexual
penetration, however slight, either of the vagina or anus of the victim by the penis of the
perpetrator, or any other object used by the perpetrator, or of the mouth of the victim by the
penis of the perpetrator, where such penetration is effected by coercion or force or threat of
force against the victim or a third person."

As to individual criminal responsibility under Article 7(1) of the Statute, the Trial Chamber
found that aiding and abetting under international criminal law requires practical assistance,
encouragement, or moral support having a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime
(actus reus), and knowledge that such acts assist the commission of the offence (mens rea).

Furthermore, the Chamber is determined that an accused who, under this standard would be
liable for aiding and abetting torture, is responsible as a co-perpetrator of torture, if he or she
participates in an integral part of the torture and partakes of the prohibited purpose behind
the torture, i.e. the intent to obtain information or a confession, to punish or intimidate,
humiliate, coerce or discriminate against the victim or a third person.

CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED

According to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Mr. Furundzija is entitled to credit for
time spent in custody pending surrender to the Tribunal and time spent in detention pending
trial or appeal. Accordingly, the Trial Chamber determined that 11 months and 22 days will
be deducted from the sentence today imposed on Furundzija, together with such additional
time as he may serve pending the determination of any final appeal.