The Family Code of the Philippines

Title I. Marriage
1. Acebedo vs. Arquero
Article 1 of the Family Code provides that marriage is an inviolable
social institution !hose nature" consequences" and incidents are
governed by la! and not subject to stipulation.# It is an
institution of public order or policy" governed by rules established
by la! !hich cannot be made inoperative by the stipulation of the
parties.
$. %spinosa and &lindo
%'tra(udicial dissolution of the con(ugal partnership !ithout (udicial
approval is void. The Court has also ruled that a notary public
should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the family
by encouraging the separation of the spouses and e'tra(udicially
dissolving the con(ugal partnership"
Chapter 1. )equisites of Marriage
1. )epublic vs. Albios
Facts* Albios and Fringer !ere married"after the marriage Albios
+led for the annulment on the ground that they really does not have
intention of entering marriage state that the same !as entered only
to acquire an American citi,enship.
Issue* Is the marriage void-
.eld* /o"marriage is valid
Contrary to the +ndings of CA there !as real consent because it
!as not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent.
Their consent !as also conscious and intelligent as they
understood the nature and the bene+cial and inconvenient
consequences of their marriage" as nothing impaired their ability
to do so.
Albios and Fringer had an undeniable intention to be bound in
order to create the very bond necessary to allo! the respondent
to acquire American citi,enship. 0nly a genuine consent to be
married !ould allo! them to further their ob(ective" considering
that only a valid marriage can properly support an application for
citi,enship. There !as" thus" an apparent intention to enter into
the actual marriage status and to create a legal tie" albeit for a
limited purpose. &enuine consent !as" therefore" clearly
present.There is no la! that declares a marriage void if it is
entered into for purposes other than !hat the Constitution or la!
declares" such as the acquisition of foreign citi,enship. Therefore"
so long as all the essential and formal requisites prescribed by
la! are present" and it is not void or voidable under the grounds
provided by la!" it shall be declared valid.
$. 1angayan vs. 1angayan
Facts*
1en(amin !ere married to A,unena. 2ater 1en(amin entered into
another marriage !ith 3ally but !ith no valid marriage license.
4uring their marriage they acquired properties. After sometime
relationship bet!een 1en(amin and 3ally ended consequently
1en(amin petition to nullify the marriage on the ground that
there is no marriage license. The same !as granted.
Issue*
a. Is the court correct-
b. 5hat !ould be the property relation-
.eld*
a. 6es. 7nder Article 89 of the Family Code" a marriage
solemni,ed !ithout a license" e'cept those covered by Article 8:
!here no license is necessary" ;shall be void from the
beginning.; In this case" the marriage bet!een 1en(amin and
3ally !as solemni,ed !ithout a license. It !as duly established
that no marriage license !as issued to them and that Marriage
2icense.
b. The property relations of 1en(amin and 3ally is governed by
Article 1:<. 1en(amin and 3ally cohabitated !ithout the bene+t
of marriage. Thus" only the properties acquired by them through
their actual (oint contribution of money" property" or industry
shall be o!ned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. Thus" both the trial court and the Court
of Appeals correctly e'cluded the 8= properties being claimed by
3ally !hich !ere given by 1en(amin>s father to his children as
advance inheritance.
8. )epublic vs. CA and Castro
The certi+cation of ;due search and inability to +nd; issued by
the civil registrar of Pasig en(oys probative value" he being the
o?cer charged under the la! to @eep a record of all data relative
to the issuance of a marriage license. 7naccompanied by any
circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to 3ection $A" )ule 18$
of the )ules of Court" a certi+cate of ;due search and inability to
+nd; su?ciently proved that his o?ce did not issue marriage
license no. 81AB1<$ to the contracting parties..ence the
marriage is void.
:. 3evilla vs. Cardenas
The absence of the logboo@ is not conclusive proof of nonCissuance
of Marriage 2icense /o. $==D=A$. It can also mean" as !e believed
true in the case at bar" that the logboo@ (ust cannot be found. In the
absence of sho!ing of diligent eEorts to search for the said logboo@"
!e cannot easily accept that absence of the same also means nonC
e'istence or falsity of entries therein.
Finally" the rule is settled that every intendment of the la! or fact
leans to!ard the validity of the marriage" the indissolubility of the
marriage bonds.
$8
The courts loo@ upon this presumption !ith great
favor. It is not to be lightly repelledF on the contrary" the
presumption is of great !eight.
9. 3y vs. CA
Facts*
Filipina and Fernando !ere married !ithout a valid marriage license"
the
same being issued only after one year from celebration of marriage.
Issue* Is the marriage valid.
.eld* /o. A marriage license is a formal requirementF its absence
renders the marriage void ab initio. In addition" the marriage
contract sho!s that the marriage license" numbered B$8=91A" !as
issued in Carmona" Cavite" yet" neither petitioner nor private
respondent ever resided in Carmona.
B. /inal vs. 1ayadog
Pepito and /orma !ere married only < months after the death of
Pepitos former !ife. /o marriage license !as secured in the same
alleging that
they have been cohabiting as . and 5 for 9 years.
Issue* Is the marriage valid-
.eld* /o. FiveCyear commonCla! cohabitation period"should be a
period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the
marriage. This 9Cyear period should be a period of cohabitation
characteri,ed by e'clusivity G meaning no third party !as involved
at anytime !ithin the 9 years and continuity G that is unbro@en.
In this case" at the time of Pepito and respondentHs marriage" it
cannot be said that they have lived !ith each other as husband and
!ife for at least +ve years prior to their !edding day. From the time
PepitoHs +rst marriage !as dissolved to the time of his marriage !ith
respondent" only about t!enty months had elapsed.
=. )epublic vs. 4ayot
Facts* Iose and Felisa !ere married !ithout a marriage license since
they stated in their a?davit that they have lived together as
husband and !ife for 9 years" ho!ever the same !as not the truth.
Issue* 5hether the marriage maybe invalidated on the ground of
falsi+cation.
.eld* 6es. The e'ception of a marriage license under Article =B
applies only to those !ho have lived together as husband and !ife
for at least +ve years and desire to marry each other. It is
indubitably established that Iose and Felisa have not lived together
for +ve years at the time they e'ecuted their s!orn a?davit and
contracted marriage. .ence the marriage is void ab initio.
<. Morigo vs. People
2ucio and 2ucia contracted marriage but the same !as !ithout a
marriage ceremony.After sometime 2ucio entered into another
marriage believing that his marriage !ith 2ucia !as already
e'tinguished since 2ucia acquired divorce decree abroad. A bigamy
case !as thereafter +led against 2ucio.
Issue* 5hether the marriage is valid.
.eld* /o" 3ince there !as no actual marriage ceremony performed
bet!een 2ucio and 2ucia by a solemni,ing o?cer. Instead" !hat
transpired !as a mere signing of the marriage contract by the t!o"
!ithout the presence of a solemni,ing o?cer. The marriage is void
ab initio thus" needs no (udicial declaration of nullity. 3uch act alone"
!ithout more" cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid
marriage for !hich petitioner might be held liable for bigamy.
A. )epublic vs. Iyoy
Crasus and Fely !ere married ho!ever marital discord had set in
because of the Fely is said to be hotCtempered" a nagger and
e'travagant#. %ventually annulment !as +led on the ground That
Fely committed acts that hurt and embarrassed respondent Crasus
and the rest of the family. .er hotCtemper" nagging" and
e'travaganceF her abandonment of respondent CrasusF her
marriage to an AmericanF and even her Jaunting of her American
family and her American surname" may indeed be manifestations of
her alleged incapacity to comply !ith her marital obligations
Issue. Is there psychological incapacity.
.eld* /o. the totality of evidence presented by respondent Crasus
failed miserably to establish the alleged psychological incapacity of his
!ife FelyF therefore" there is no basis for declaring their marriage null
and void It is !orthy to emphasi,e that Article 8B of the Family Code of
the Philippines contemplates do!nright incapacity or inability to ta@e
cogni,ance of and to assume the basic marital obligationsF not a mere
refusal" neglect or di?culty" much less" ill !ill" on the part of the errant
spouse.
K$BL
Irreconcilable diEerences" conJicting personalities"
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility" physical abuse" habitual
alcoholism" se'ual in+delity or perversion" and abandonment" by
themselves" also do not !arrant a +nding of psychological incapacity
under the said Article.
K$=L
It refers to a serious psychological illness
aMicting a party even before the celebration of marriage. It is a
malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of a!areness of
the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to
assume.#
K

The root cause for such !as not identi+ed. If the root cause of the
incapacity !as not identi+ed" then it cannot be satisfactorily
established as a psychological or mental defect that is serious or
graveF neither could it be proven to be in e'istence at the time of
celebration of the marriageF nor that it is incurable.
1D. )epublic vs. 0rbecido
Facts*
0rbecido and Myrus !ere married ho!ever the same ended !hen
Myrus acquired 73 citi,enship and thereafter acquired divorce decree
and +nally married another man. 0rbecido no! +les before the court
for authority to remarry. 03& ho!ever assails the same contending
that Art. $B apply only to mi' marriagesF that is marriage celebrated
bet!een Filipino citi,en and alien.
Issue* Is Art. $B applicable to the case. the provision !as enacted to ;avoid
the absurd
situation !here the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse !ho"
after
obtaining a divorce" is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.;11
.eld* 6es. The t!in elements for the application of Paragraph $ of
Article $B as follo!s*
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated
bet!een a Filipino citi,en and a foreignerF and
$. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The rec@oning point is not the citi,enship of the parties at the time of
the celebration of the marriage" but their citi,enship at the time a valid
divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to
remarry
Clearly" the t!in requisites for the application of Paragraph $ of Article
$B are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano" the divorced# Filipino
spouse" should be allo!ed to remarry.
11. Corpu, vs. 3to. Tomas
Facts* Corpu, a former Filipino acquired Canadian Citi,enship. 2ater
married 3to. Tomas"ho!ever the same ended up after it !as found
out by Corpus that 3to. Tomas had another man. Corpu, then +led
for divorce !hich !as granted. Coming bac@ in P. he no!
petitioned to the court for (udicial recognition of divorce decree
under Art. $B. The same !as opposed by 30& on the ground that he
is not the proper party.
Issue* 5hether Corpu, may avail of art. $B.
.eld* /o" only Filipino spouse can invo@e the second paragraph of
Article $B of the Family Code .o!ever is not su?cient to dismiss
&irberts petition before the )TC for its unavailability doesn>t
necessarily strip &erberts of legal interest to petition the )TC for the
recognition of his foreign decree.
The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and
conformity with the
aliens national law have been duly proven according to our rules of
evidence, serves asa presumptive evidence of right in favor of
Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 3 of the Rules of !ourt
which provides for the e"ect of foreign #udgments$
4irect involvement or being the sub(ect of the foreign (udgment is
su?cient to clothe a party !ith the requisite interest to institute an
action before our courts for the recognition of the foreign (udgment.
In a divorce situation" !e have declared" no less" that the divorce
obtained by an alien abroad may be recogni,ed in Philippines"
provided thedivorce is valid according to his or her national la!.
1$. Fu(i@i vs. Marinay
Fu(i@i and Marinay !ere married but because parents of Fu(i@i is not
agreeable to the marriage thus could not bring Marinay abroad.
%ventually they lost contact and Marinay married another Iapanese
guy !ithout dissolving the +rst marriage. Marinay !as brought to
Iapan ho!ever the li@e!ise separated because of physical abuse.
3he left Mae@ara and re@indle relationship !ith Fu(i@i. Fu(i@i and
Mae@ara obtained declaration declaring second marriage of void on
the ground of bigamy. They then returned to the Philippines and
+led petition for Iudicial recognition of foreign (udgment the same
ho!ever denied by the )TC concluding that only a spouse may
petition to declare their void !hom in this case Mae@ara and
Marinay.
Issue*Is the )TC correct-
.eld. /o The )ule on 4eclaration of Absolute /ullity of Noid
Marriages and Annulment of Noidable Marriages does not apply in a
petition to recogni,e a foreign (udgment relating to the status of a
marriage !here one of the parties is a citi,en of a foreign country.
%uliano&'lave v$ Republic"
:=
this Court held that the rule in A.M. /o.
D$C11C1DC3C that only the husband or !ife can +le a declaration of
nullity or annulment of marriage ;does not apply if the reason
behind the petition is bigamy.;
Chapter $. Noid and Noidable Marriage.
18. Capili vs. People
Facts. Iames contracted a second marriage !ith 3hirley !hile his
+rst marriage !ith Oarla still subsists. A bigamy case !as then
+led"Iames moved for the dismissal alleging that there is pending
declaration of nullity hence the same is a pre(udicial question.
Issue* 5hether there is PP-
.eld* /o the accused may still be charged !ith the crime of
bigamy" even if there is a subsequent declaration of the nullity of
the second marriage" so long as the +rst marriage !as still
subsisting !hen the second marriage !as celebrated. The
subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the frst
marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of
nullity, the crime had already been consummated.
1:. Carino vs. Carino
3antiago contracted t!o marriages during his lifetime"the +rst !as
!ith 3usan /icdao !ith !hom he had t!o child and the second !as
!ith 3usan 6ee. After the death of 3antiago both !ives claim for the
bene+ts. 3usan 6ee alleged that the +rst marriage !ith petitioner
!as !ithout a valid marriage license. .ence void ab initio. The )TC
rendered decision in favour of )espondent.
Issue* 5hether or not the marriage bet!een 3usan /icdao is void.
.eld* 6es" the marriage bet!een petitioner 3usan /icdao and the
deceased" having been solemni,ed !ithout the necessary marriage
license" and not being one of the marriages e'empt from the
marriage license requirement" is undoubtedly void ab initio.
It does not follo! from the foregoing disquisition" ho!ever" that
since the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is declared void
ab initio" the death bene+ts# under scrutiny !ould no! be a!arded
to respondent 3usan 6ee. under Article :D of the Family Code" for
purposes of remarriage" there must +rst be a prior (udicial
declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage" though void" before
a party can enter into a second marriage" other!ise" the second
marriage !ould also be void.
Accordingly" the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the
previous marriage of the deceased and petitioner 3usan /icdao
does not validate the second marriage of the deceased !ith
respondent 3usan 6ee. The fact remains that their marriage !as
solemni,ed !ithout +rst obtaining a (udicial decree declaring the
marriage of petitioner 3usan /icdao and the deceased void. .ence"
the marriage of respondent 3usan 6ee and the deceased is" li@e!ise"
void ab initio.
Considering that the t!o marriages are void ab initio" the applicable
property regime !ould not be absolute community or con(ugal
partnership of property" but rather" be governed by the provisions of
Articles 1:= and 1:<.
19. Pui,on vs. 1elen
%liseo !ere married !ith Amelia. .o!ever %liseo had a common la!
!ife 2ourdes de 1elen !ith !hom he has a child Maria. After the
death of %liseo"letters of administration !as +led by 2ourdes
representing Iennifer natural child of %liseo. Amelia opposed the
same"contending Maria not a proper party. 2ourdes in their ans!er
impugned the marriage bet!een Amelia claiming it !as bigamous
for having been entered during the subsistence of marriage
bet!een Amelia and Filipito. The court declared %liseo and Amelia>s
marriage void.
Issue* 5hether the court is correct.
.eld* 6es. In a void marriage" it !as though no marriage has ta@en
place" thus" it cannot be the source of rights. Any interested party
may attac@ the marriage directly or collaterally. A void marriage can
be questioned even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the
marriage. That is !hy the action or defense for nullity is
imprescriptible" unli@e voidable marriages !here the action
prescribes. 0nly the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but
any proper interested party may attac@ a void marriage.
$:
1B. Man,ano vs. Iudge 3anche,
The fact that Man,ano and Payao had been living apart from their
respective spouses for a long time already is immaterial. Article
B8Q1R of the Family Code allo!s spouses !ho have obtained a
decree of legal separation to live separately from each other" but in
such a case the marriage bonds are not severed. %lse!ise
stated" legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie" much
less authori,e the parties to remarry. This holds true all the more
!hen the separation is merely de facto" as in the case at bar.
1=. 2lave vs. Tamano
Psychological Incapacity
1<. Iocelyn 3ua,o vs. Angelito 3ua,o
Angelito and Iocelyn !ere married. After some time Iocelyn as@ed
for annulment of the ground und art.8B
.eld*
Iocelyn>s evidence insu?cient to establish Angelito>s psychological
incapacity to perform essential marital obligations. .abitual
drun@enness" gambling and refusal to +nd a (ob" !hile indicative of
psychological incapacity" do not" by themselves" sho! psychological
incapacity. All these simply indicate di?culty" neglect or mere refusal
to perform marital obligations that" as the cited (urisprudence holds"
cannot be considered to be constitutive of psychological incapacity in
the absence of proof that these are manifestations of an incapacity
rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness.
1A. .alili vs. .alili
1en(amin +led before the )TC to declare his marriage !ith Chona void
ab intio.
.eld* It has been su?ciently established that petitioner had a
psychological condition that !as grave and incurable and had a deeply
rooted cause. This Court" in the same Tecase" recogni,ed that
individuals !ith diagnosable personality disorders usually have longC
term concerns" and thus therapy may be longCterm.
K1=L
Particularly"
personality disorders are longCstanding" inJe'ible !ays of behaving
that are not so much severe mental disorders as dysfunctional styles of
living. These disorders a"ect all areas of functioning and, beginning in
childhood or adolescence, create problems for those who display them
and for others$(
K1<L
)eCMarriage due to absence of 3pouse
$D. Manuel vs. People
Manuel !as prosecuted for bigamy. .e invo@e as defence that he did
not @no! that his marriage is still subsisting. That he has no intention
to commit bigamy. That under the code his marriage automatically
terminated since he has no information about his spouse for almost $9
years
Issue* Is there a bigamy-
.eld* 6es. Article of the Family Code no! clearly provides that for
the purpose of the present spouse contracting a second
marriage" he or she must +le a summary proceeding as provided
in the Code for the declaration of the presumptive death of the
absentee" !ithout pre(udice to the latter>s reappearance. This
provision is intended to protect the present spouse from a
criminal prosecution for bigamy under Art. 8:A of the )evised
Penal Code because !ith the (udicial declaration that the missing
spouses presumptively dead" the good faith of the present
spouse in contracting a second marriage is already established.
$1. 333 vs. 1ailon
Clemente 1ailon and Alice 4ia, !ere married. After sometime
Clemente +led before the )TC to declare Alice presumptively
dead. After 18 years Clemente married Teresita Iarque. 2ater
Clemente died"the latter being a member of 333 !as entitled
to bene+ts !hich are no! claimed by Terista"ho!ever Cecilia
!ho claimed to be daughter of Clemente from %lisa opposed
the same. Claiming that Clemente contracted 8 marriages"
the 1
st
!ith A2ice" the second !ith %lisa and the third !ith
Terisita.
Issue* 5ho is entitled for the bene+ts.
.eld* Teresita" 7nder the Article :$ Family Code" no (udicial
proceeding to annul a subsequent marriage is necessary. if a
subsequent marriage is dissolved by the death of either spouse" the
eEects of dissolution of valid marriages shall arise. The good or bad
faith of either spouse can no longer be raised" because" as in
annullable or voidable marriages" the marriage cannot be questioned
e'cept in a direct action for annulment. It bears reiterating that a
voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally e'cept in a direct
proceeding. Consequently" such marriages can be assailed only during
the lifetime of the parties and not after the death of either" in !hich
case the parties and their oEspring !ill be left as if the marriage had
been perfectly valid.
99
7pon the death of either" the marriage cannot
be impeached" and is made good ab initio.
9B
In the case at bar" as no step !as ta@en to nullify" in accordance !ith
la!" 1ailon>s and respondent>s marriage prior to the former>s death in
1AA<" respondent is rightfully the dependent spouseCbene+ciary of
1ailon.
Annulment of Noidable Marriages
$$. Almelor vs. )TC of 2as Pinas
2eonida +led before )TC a petition for annulment of her marriage
!ith Manuel on the ground that consent !as obtained by fraudF the
concealment of Manuel that he is homose'ual. The same !as
granted by the court.
Issue* Is the court correct in granting the same-
.eld* /o. /o!here in the said decision !as it proven by
preponderance of evidence that Manuel !as a homose'ual at the
onset of his marriage and that he deliberately hid such fact to his
!ife It is the concealment of homose'uality" and not
homose'uality per se" that vitiates the consent of the innocent
party. 3uch concealment presupposes bad faith and intent to
defraud the other party in giving consent to the marriage. . An
allegation of vitiated consent must be proven by preponderance of
evidence.
.omose'uality per se is only a ground for legal separation. It is its
concealment that serves as a valid ground to annul a
marriage. Concealment in this case is not simply a blan@et denial"
but one that is constitutive of fraud. It is this fundamental element
that respondent failed to prove.
Title II. 2egal 3eparation
$8. 1ugayong vs. &ine,
1ugayong +led petition for legal separation on the ground of the
alleged adultery of &ine,.
.eld* The legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent
spouse" provided there has been no condonation of or consent to
the adultery or concubinage. 5here both spouses are oEenders"
legal separation cannot be claimed by either of them. Collusion
bet!een the parties to obtain legal separation shall cause the
dismissal of the petition.
A detailed e'amination of the testimony of the plaintiEChusband"
especially those portions quoted above" clearly sho!s that there
!as a condonation on the part of the husband for the supposed
;acts of ran@ in+delity amounting to adultery; committed by
defendantC!ife. Admitting for the sa@e of argument that the
in+delities amounting to adultery !ere committed by the defendant"
a reconciliation !as eEected bet!een her and the plaintiE. The act
of the latter in persuading her to come along !ith him" and the fact
that she !ent !ith him and consented to be brought to the house of
his cousin Pedro 1ugayong and together they slept there as
husband and !ife for one day and one night" and the further fact
that in the second night they again slept together in their house
li@e!ise as husband and !ife G all these facts have no other
meaning in the opinion of this court than that a reconciliation
bet!een them !as eEected and that there !as a condonation of the
!ife by the husband. The reconciliation occurred almost ten months
after he came to @no! of the acts of in+delity amounting to
adultery.
$:. 2apu,C3y vs. &ine,
Carmen 3y +led a petition for legal separation against %ufemio
alleging that during the subsistence of their marriage %ufemio had
an aEair !ith another !oman. Carmen sought to deprived %ufemio
of his property rights. %ufemion in his ans!er counterclaimed for
the declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of his prior
marriage !ith one &o .io@. 4uring the pendency of the action
Carmen 3y died.
Issue* 4oes the death of the plaintiE before +nal decree" in an
action for legal separation" abate the action- If it does" !ill
abatement also apply if the action involves property rights-
.eld* 6es" An action for legal separation !hich involves
nothing more than the bedCandCboard separation of the spouses is
purely personal. 1eing personal in character" it follo!s that the
death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself
A further reason !hy an action for legal separation is abated by the
death of the plaintiE" even if property rights are involved" is that
these rights are mere eEects of decree of separation" their source
being the decree itselfF !ithout the decree such rights do not come
into e'istence" so that before the +nality of a decree" these claims
are merely rights in e'pectation. If death supervenes during the
pendency of the action" no decree can be forthcoming.
$9. 0ng vs. 0ng
2ucita +led a petition for legal separation against 5illiam of the of
repeated physical violence. 2ucita claimed that* soon after three years
of marriage" she and 5illiam quarreled almost every day" !ith physical
violence being inJicted upon herF 5illiam !ould shout invectives at her
li@e ;putang ina mo;" ;gago;" ;tanga;" and he !ould slap her" @ic@ her"
pull her hair" bang her head against concrete !all and thro! at her
!hatever he could reach !ith his hand and 5illiam hit her on her head"
left chee@" eye" stomach" and armsF !hen 5illiam hit her on the
stomach and she bent do!n because of the pain" he hit her on the
head then pointed a gun at her and as@ed her to leave the houseF
Issue* Is the ground for legal separation e'ist-
.eld* 6es. 5illiam himself admitted that there !as no day that he did
not quarrel !ith his !ife" !hich made his life miserable" and he blames
her for being negligent of her !ifely duties and for not reporting to him
the !rongdoings of their children.
TIT2% III. )I&.T3 A/4 012I&ATI0/3 1%T5%%/ .731A/4 A/4 5IF%.
$B. Illusorio vs. Illusorio
%rlinda +led before the court a petition for habeas corpus to have
the custody of her husband.
.eld* The la! provides that the husband and the !ife are obliged to
live together" observe mutual love" respect and +delity.
$D
The
sanction therefor is the ;spontaneous" mutual aEection bet!een
husband and !ife and not any legal mandate or court order; to
enforce consortium.
$1
Title IN. Property )elations 1et!een .usband and 5ife
$=. Tan vs. Andrade
)osario entered into a contract of sale of a parcel of land !ith
1obby. The sale !as opposed by )osario>s children claiming that the
property is not e'clusively o!ned by the latter rather it !as coC
o!ned by them" hence they as@ed for annulment before the court.
In this case" records reveal that the con(ugal partnership of )osario
and her husband !as terminated upon the latter>s death on August
=" 1A=<
.
Issue* Is the property belongs to con(ugal property of the spouses-
.eld* /o. the said properties !ere e'clusive properties of )osario.
Article 1BD of the Civil Code
8<
!hich states that ;KaLll property of the
marriage is presumed to belong to the con(ugal partnership" unless
it be proved that it pertains e'clusively to the husband or to the
!ife.; For this presumption to apply" the party invo@ing the same
must" ho!ever" preliminarily prove that the property !as indeed
acquired during the marriage.
In this case" there is no evidence to indicate !hen the property !as
acquired by petitioner Iose+na. Thus" !e agree !ith petitioner
Iose+na>s declaration in the deed of absolute sale she e'ecuted in
favor of the respondent that she !as the absolute and sole o!ner of
the property. ' '
$<. 4ela Pena vs. AvilaC same to the preceeding case.
$A. Ching vs. &oyangco
The contract of sale !as null and void for being contrary to morals and
public policy. The sale was made by a husband in favor of a
concubine after he had abandoned his family and left the
conjugal home where his wife and children lived and from
whence they derived their support. The sale was subversive of
the stability of the family, a basic social institution which
public policy cherishes and protects.
Additionally, the law emphatically prohibits the spouses from
selling property to each other subject to certain eceptions.
!imilarly, donations between spouses during marriage are
prohibited
The prohibitions apply to a couple living as husband and wife
without beneft of marriage, otherwise, "the condition of
those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than
those in legal union."
8D. .omeo!ners 3avings and 2oan 1an@s vs. Miguela 4ailo
Miguela and Marcelino !ere married in Aug 1AB=. After several years
Marcelino obtained a loan from petitioner and constituted )%M in
favour of the petitioner !ithout the consent of Miguela. Marcelino
failed to pay" consequently the mortgage !as foreclose. After the
death of Marcelino it came to the @no!ledge of Miguela that the
property !as no! o!ned by the petitioner. Miguela no! +led an action
to annul the sale"therebeing no consent on his part"the property being
a con(ugal asset.
Issue* 5hether the sale is null and void.
.eld* 6es. 7nder art 1$: of the family code. Also the con(ugal
partnership shall not be liable for the loan obtained by Marcelino
sinceFor the sub(ect property to be held liable" the obligation
contracted by the late Marcelino 4ailo" Ir. must have redounded to the
bene+t of the con(ugal partnership.
81. Pelayo vs. Pere,
2oren,a" by a?'ing her signature to the 4eed of 3ale on the space
provided for !itnesses" is deemed to have given her implied consent
to the contract of sale.
8$. 3ps. 1autista vs. 3ilva
88. )avina vs. Nilla Abrille
An action !as +led by Mary to annul the sale that !as entered by her
husband involving a house and lot that !as acquired during the
marriage through the eEorts of both parties in 1A<$.
Issue* 5hether the property belongs to con(ugal property.
.eld* 6es" Article 1BD of the /e! Civil Code provides" ;All property of
the marriage is presumed to belong to the con(ugal partnership" unless
it be proved that it pertains e'clusively to the husband or to the !ife.;
/o evidence !as adduced to sho! that the sub(ect property !as
acquired through e'change or barter. The presumption of the con(ugal
nature of the property subsists in the absence of clear" satisfactory
and convincing evidence to overcome said presumption or to prove
that the sub(ect property is e'clusively o!ned by Pedro.
C.APT%) =. P)0P%)T6 )%&IM%3 0F 7/I0/3 5IT.07T MA))IA&%.
8:. Agapay vs. Palang
Carlina +led an action to recover a parcel of land and house and lot
against %rlinda the second !ife of Miguel. 3aid parcel of land !as
acquired during the cohabitation of %rlina and Miguel and the house
and lot !as acquired during their void marriage since his former
marriage stil subsist.
Issue* 5ho o!ns the said property.
.eld* Carlina" 7nder Article 1:<" only the properties acquired by both
of the parties through their actual #oint contribution of money, property
or industry shall be o!ned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. It must be stressed that actual contribution is
required by this provision" in contrast to Article 1:=. If the actual
contribution of the party is not proved" there !ill be no coCo!nership
and no presumption of equal shares.

!ince #rlinda failed to establish that she actually contributed
to the acquisition of said property he is therefore not the co$
owner thereof Consequently" the properties should " revert to the
con(ugal partnership property of the deceased Miguel and private
respondent Carlina Palang
89. 3alas Ir. Ns. Aguila
3alas and Aguila !ere married in 1A<9. 2ater 3alas left the con(ugal
d!elling and never communicated !ith Aguila. In $DD8 Aguila +led a
petition to nullify her marriage !ith 3alas petitions state that there are
no con(ugal properties. The same !as granted in $DD=. 3hortly
thereafter Aguila +led manifestations that she discovered properties
by her husband. 1ased on the evidence presented said properties !as
acquired during the subsistence of marriage bet!een parties.
Issue* 5hat property regime should govern.
.eld* Article 1:= of the Family Code applies to the union of parties
!ho are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to
contract marriage" but !hose marriage is nonetheless declared void
under Article 8B of the Family Code" 7nder this property regime"
property acquired during the marriage is prima facie presumed to
have been obtained through the couple>s (oint eEorts and governed by
the rules on coCo!nership.
TITI2% N. T.% FAMI26
8B. Alvare, vs. )amire,
3ec. $$. 4isquali+cation by reason of marriage. S 4uring their
marriage" neither the husband nor the !ife may testify for or against
the other !ithout the consent of the aEected spouse" e'cept in a civil
case by one against the other" or in a criminal case for a crime
committed by one against the other or the latter>s direct
descendants or ascendants.;
8=. April Martine, vs. )odulfo
Article 191 of the Family code must be construed strictly" it being an
e'ception to the general rule. .ence" a sisterCinCla! or brotherCinCla! is
not included in the enumeration. The petitioner is not a member of the
same family as that of her deceased husband and the respondent*
8<. .iyas 3avings and 2oan 1an@ vs. Acuna
)equirement under Article 191 of the Family Code is applicable only in
cases !hich are e'clusively bet!een or among members of the same
family" it necessarily follo!s that the same may be invo@ed only by a
party !ho is a member of that same family.
TIT2% N. T.% FAMI26 .0M%
8A. Patricio vs. 4ario III
As a general rule" the family home may be preserved for a minimum of
1D years follo!ing the death of the spouses or the unmarried family head
!ho constituted the family home" or of the spouse !ho consented to the
constitution of his or her separate property as family home. After 1D
years and a minor bene)ciary still lives therein" the family home shall be
preserved only until that minor bene+ciary reaches the age of ma(ority. ,
Three re*uisites must concur before a minor bene)ciary is entitled to the
bene)ts of +rt$ ,-. /,0 the relationship enumerated in +rt$ ,-4 of the
1amily !ode2 /30 they live in the family home, and /30 they are
dependent for legal support upon the head of the family$
Marcelino 2oren,o ). 4ario IN cannot be considered as bene+ciary
contemplated under Article 19: because he did not ful+ll the third
requisite of being dependent on his grandmother for legal support. that
grandchildren cannot demand support directly from their grandparents if
they have parents Qascendants of nearest degreeR !ho are capable of
supporting them
5ith this +nding" there is no legal impediment to partition the sub(ect
property.
:D. Ariola vs Ariola
Article 19A. The family home shall continue despite the death of one or
both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of ten
years or for as long as there is a minor bene+ciary" and the heirs
cannot partition the same unless the court fnds compelling
reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever
owns the property or constituted the family home.
Consequently" its actual and immediate partition cannot be sanctioned
until the lapse of a period of 1D years from the death of Fidel Arriola" or
until March 1D" $D18.
:1. 4e Mesa vs. 3P3 Acero
The settled rule is that the right to eemption or forced sale
under Article %&' of the Family Code is a personal privilege
granted to the judgment debtor and as such, it must be claimed
not by the sheri(, but by the debtor himself before the sale of
the property at public auction. It is not su?cient that the person
claiming e'emption merely alleges that such property is a family
home. This claim for eemption must be set up and proved to the
!heri(. ' ' '.
$<
Qemphasis supplied and citations omittedR
.aving failed to set up and prove to the sheriE the supposed e'emption
of the sub(ect property before the sale thereof at public auction" the
petitioners no! are barred from raising the same. Failure to do so estop
them from later claiming the said e'emption.
TIT2% NI. PAT%)/IT6 A/4 FI2IATI0/
:$. &rande vs. Antonio
0n its face" Art. 1=B" as amended" is free from ambiguity. And !here
there is no ambiguity" one must abide by its !ords. The use of the
!ord ;may; in the provision readily sho!s that an ac@no!ledged
illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use the surname of his
illegitimate father. The !ord ;may; is permissive and operates to
confer discretion
1=
upon the illegitimate children.
:8. &erardo Concepion vs. CA
In +ne" the law and only the law determines who are the
legitimate or illegitimate children for one)s legitimacy or
illegitimacy cannot ever be compromised
**. Cabatania vs. CA.
The fact that Florencia>s husband is living and there is a valid
subsisting marriage bet!een them gives rise to the presumption that
a child born !ithin that marriage is legitimate even though the mother
may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced
as an adulteress.
11
The presumption of legitimacy does not only Jo!
out of a declaration in the statute but is based on the broad principles
of natural (ustice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The
presumption is grounded on the policy to protect innocent oEspring
from the odium of illegitimacy.
1$
:9. 4e Iesus vs. %state of 4i,on
In an attempt to establish their illegitimate +liation to the late Iuan &.
4i,on" petitioners" in eEect" !ould impugn their legitimate status as
being children of 4anilo de Iesus and Carolina Aves de Iesus. This step
cannot be aptly done because the la! itself establishes the legitimacy
of children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents. The
presumption of legitimacy fes a civil status for the child born
in wedloc+, and only the father,
18
or in eceptional instances
the latter,s heirs,
1:
can contest in an appropriate action the
legitimacy of a child born to his wife. Thus, it is only when the
legitimacy of a child has been successfully impugned that the
paternity of the husband can be rejected.
4eclaration of legitimacy by la! cannot be attac@ed collaterally"
19
one
that can only be repudiated or contested in a direct suit speci+cally
brought for that purpose
:B. 4olina vs. &lenn
To be entitled to legal support" petitioner must" in proper action" +rst
establish the +liation of the child" if the same is not admitted or
ac@no!ledged. If +liation is beyond question" support follo!s as
matter of obligation.
A
In short" illegitimate children are entitled to
support and successional rights but their +liation must be duly proved
4olina>s remedy is to +le for the bene+t of her child an action against
Nallecera for compulsory recognition in order to establish +liation and
then demand support
:=. Nerceles vs. Posadas
The letters" one of !hich is quoted above" are private hand!ritten
instruments of petitioner !hich establish Nerna Ai,a>s +liation under
Article 1=$ Q$R of the Family Code. In addition" the array of evidence
presented by respondents" the dates" letters" pictures and
testimonies" to us" are convincing" and irrefutable evidence that Nerna
Ai,a is" indeed" petitioner>s illegitimate child.
TIT2% NII. A40PTI0/
:<. Adoption of 2IM
The la! is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner" having
remarried at the time the petitions for adoption !ere +led" must (ointly
adopt. 3ince the petitions for adoption !ere +led only by petitioner
herself" !ithout (oining her husband" 0lario" the trial court !as correct
in denying the petitions for adoption on this ground.
:A. Adoption of &arcia
0ne of the eEects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a
legitimate child of the adopter for all intents and purposes pursuant to
Article 1<A
K$1L
of the Family Code and 3ection 1=
K$$L
Article N of )A <99$.
K$8L
-eing a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows
that !tephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a
legitimate child without discrimination of any +ind, including
the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother, as
discussed above.
9D. 2andingin vs. )epublic
5ritten consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the
validity of a decree of adoption. Indeed" the natural right of a parent
to his child requires that his consent must be obtained before his
parental rights and duties may be terminated and reCestablished in
adoptive parents. In this case" petitioner failed to submit the !ritten
consent of Amelia )amos to the adoption.
91. 2ihom vs. 3ibulo
The ne! la!" had already abrogated and repealed the right of an
adopter under the Civil Code and the Family Code to rescind a decree
of adoption. Consistently !ith its earlier pronouncements" the Court
should no! hold that the action for rescission of the adoption decree"
having been initiated by petitioner after ).A. /o. <99$ had come into
force" no longer could b
TIT2% NII. 37PP0)T
9$. 2acson vs. 2acson
.KPetitioner>sL insistence on requiring a formal demand from his !ife is
truly pointless" in the face of his ac@no!ledgment of and commitment
to comply !ith such obligation through a note in his o!n hand!riting
Pursuant to Article $D= of the Family Code" /oel 4aban can rightfully
e'act reimbursement from the petitioner. The provision reads*

5hen the person obliged to support another un(ustly refuses or
fails to give support !hen urgently needed by the latter" any
third person may furnish support to the needy individual" !ith
right of reimbursement from the person obliged to give support.

98. Perla vs. 1aring
;An order for ' ' ' support ' ' ' must be issued only if paternity or
+liation is established by clear and convincing evidence.;
1
in a birth certi+cate" the lac@ of participation of the supposed father in
the preparation of a baptismal certi+cate renders this document
incompetent to prove paternity
TLo prove open and continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child" there must be evidence of the manifestation of the
permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as
his" by continuous and clear manifestations of parental aEection and
care" !hich cannot be attributed to pure charity.
9:. 3ps 2im vs. 2im
&randchildren cannot demand support directly from their
grandparents if they have parents Qascendants of nearest
degreeR who are capable of supporting them. This inability of
%d!ard and Cheryl to su?ciently provide for their children shifts a
portion of their obligation to the ascendants in the nearest degree"
both in the paternal QpetitionersR and maternal
K1AL
lines"
Title IT PA)%/TA2 A7T.0)IT6
99. 1ec@ett vs. Iudge 3armiento
The matter of custody is not permanent and unalterable.,4wphi, If
the parent !ho !as given custody suEers a future character change
and becomes un+t" the matter of custody can al!ays be reCe'amined
and ad(usted ' ' '. To be sure" the !elfare" the best interests" the
bene+t" and the good of the child must be determined as of the time
that either parent is chosen to be the custodian. ' ' '
9B. 3alientes vs. Abanilla
5abeas corpus may be resorted to in cases !here rightful custody is
!ithheld from a person entitled thereto.
./0
7nder Article $11
.%10
of the
Family Code" respondent 2oran and petitioner Marie Antonette have
(oint parental authority over their son and consequently (oint
custody. Further" although the couple is separated de facto" the issue
of custody has yet to be ad(udicated by the court. In the absence of a
(udicial grant of custody to one parent" both parents are still entitled
to the custody of their child. In the present case" private respondent>s
cause of action is the deprivation of his right to see his child as
alleged in his petition.
.%%0
.ence" the remedy of habeas corpus is
available to him.
9=. &ualberto vs. &ualberto
for custodypendente lite of their child !ho is less than seven years of
age. There being no su?cient proof of any compelling reason to
separate the minor from his mother" custody should remain !ith her.
;The general rule is recommended in order to avoid a tragedy !here a
mother has seen her baby torn a!ay from her. /o man can sound the
deep sorro!s of a mother !ho is deprived of her child of tender age.
The e'ception allo!ed by the rule has to be for Ucompelling reasons>
for the good of the child* those cases must indeed be rare" if the
mother>s heart is not to be unduly hurt. If she has erred" as in cases of
adultery" the penalty of imprisonment and the QrelativeR divorce
decree !ill ordinarily be su?cient punishment for her. Moreover" her
moral dereliction !ill not have any eEect upon the baby !ho is as yet
unable to understand the situation.; Q)eport of the Code Commission"
p. 1$R
9<. 1riones vs. Miguel
An illegitimate child is under the sole parental authority of the mother.
In the e'ercise of that authority" she is entitled to @eep the child in her
company. The Court !ill not deprive her of custody" absent any
imperative cause sho!ing her un+tness to e'ercise such authority and
care.
C.APT%) $. 3ubstitute and 3pecial Parental Authority
9A. 1agtas vs. .on. )uth and &allardo
The purpose of a petition for habeas corpus is not limited to the
production of the child before the court. The main purpose of the
petition for habeas corpus is to determine !ho has the rightful
custody over the child.
In passing on the !rit in a child custody case" the court deals !ith a
matter of an equitable nature. /ot bound by any mere legal right of
parent or guardian" the court gives his or her claim to the custody of
the child due !eight as a claim founded on human nature and
considered generally equitable and (ust. Therefore" these cases are
decided" not on the legal right of the petitioner to be relieved from
unla!ful imprisonment or detention" as in the case of adults" but on
the court>s vie! of the best interests of those !hose !elfare requires
that they be in custody of one person or another.
BD. Nancil vs. 1elmes
that respondent" being the natural mother of the minor" has the
preferential right over that of petitioner to be his guardian.
;The la! vests on the father and mother (oint parental authority over
the persons of their common children. In case of absence or death of
either parent" the parent present shall continue e6ercising parental
authority. 0nly in case of the parents> death" absence or unsuitability
may substitute parental authority be e'ercised by the surviving
grandparent.;
B1. 3t. Marys Academy vs. Carpitanos
for petitioner to be liable" there must be a +nding that the act or
omission considered as negligent !as the pro'imate cause of the
in(ury caused because the negligence must have a causal connection
to the accident.
11
B$. 3t. Iosephs College vs. Miranda
As found by both lo!er courts" the pro'imate cause of Iayson>s in(ury
!as the concurrent failure of petitioners to prevent the foreseeable
mishap that occurred during the conduct of the science e'periment.
Petitioners !ere negligent by failing to e'ercise the higher degree of
care" caution and foresight incumbent upon the school" its
administrators and teachers.
Article $1< of the Family Code" in relation to Article $1<D of the Civil
Code" besto!s special parental authority on the follo!ing persons !ith
the corresponding obligation" thus*
Art. $1<. The school" its administrators and teachers" or the individual"
entity or institution engaged in child care shall have special parental
authority and responsibility over the minor child !hile under their
supervision" instruction or custody.
TIT2% TI. 37MMA)6 I74ICIA2 P)0C%%4I/&3 I/ T.% FAMI26 2A5
B8. )epublic vs. Tango
B:. )epublic vs. &ranada
CINI2 C04% 0F T.% P.I2IPPI/%3
TIT2% TII. 73% 0F 73%)/AM%3
B9. 5ang vs.Cebu )egistrar
BB. 3ilverio vs. )epublic
B=. )epublic vs. Cagandahan
B<. .atima 6asin vs. 3haria
BA. )emo vs. 3ec. 0f Foreign AEairs
=D. 4e la Cru, vs. &arcia