!"#$%&#" (% )*++ ,-.*/0# ,%#1%+%/*2.

+ 3-/41"&(
Befoie getting uown to the business at hanu, I'u like to expiess my
giatituue to Westminstei College foi biinging us togethei heie. A
special thanks to Rich ueenan anu }im NcRae anu to the wonueiful
stuuents in youi philosophy club, who woikeu so long anu haiu to make
this thing happen. I'u also like to thank the stuuent oiganizations that
suppoiteu this event anu maue it possible. Finally, I want to thank Bill
Ciaig foi being heie. It's a gieat piivilege anu a uistinct honoi to have
an exchange of views with a woilu-class philosophei like him, anu I
expect to leain a lot.
It's no seciet, of couise, that I uon't shaie Bill's evaluation of this
paiticulai aigument. Be seems to think it's a ieal clinchei, wheieas I
think it succeeus only in iaising lots of ueep anu inteiesting questions
that we'ie not in a veiy goou position to answei.
<CLICK 1>
Since Bill has
uevoteu most of his time to uefenuing piemise 2 - the one that says that
the univeise began to exist, I'll begin by taking a close look at the
suppoit he offeis foi that claim.
Fiist, though, we neeu to make suie that the woiu "univeise" is
unueistoou in a sense stiong enough to help us ieach the conclusion
2
that is neeueu at this stage of the oveiall aigument.
<CLICK 2>
What Bill
!""#$ to show is that &'" (')*" )+ ,'-$./0* 1"0*.&- has a cause. Anu that
incluues whatevei "univeises" othei than )21$ may exist, oi have
existeu. If, foi example, physical ieality consisteu in a seiies of
"univeises," each having a beginning anu an enu, anu each somehow
containing the seeu of the next, we'u neeu to show - not just that )21
"univeise" hau a cause - but that theie was a +.1$& membei of the seiies
anu that .& hau a cause.
That's one ieason why the two ,21"*- ,'.*)$),'./0* aiguments Bill
has given foi thinking that a beginningless seiies of events is impossible
aie so impoitant to his oveiall pioject. If eithei of them weie successful,
it woulu yielu piecisely the conclusion that's neeueu heie.
The $/."!&.+./ consiueiations, on the othei hanu, aie completely
inauequate to uo the job.
<CLICK 3>
Beie's what the expeits I have
consulteu tell me. At best, physics says that thiiteen oi so billion yeais
ago "oui" univeise was in a state of "3&1"4"*- '.5' eneigy anu uensity.
When the eneigy levels aie that high, quantum effects aie extiemely
significant, physics is entiiely speculative, anu just about eveiything is
up foi giabs. It isn't cleai what physical laws woulu apply in a situation
S
like that. Consequently, science gives us no license whatevei to jump to
the conclusion that the whole of physical ieality began "fiom liteially
nothing."
<CLICK 4>
Anyone who occasionally glances at 6/."!&.+./ 74"1./0! 8
oi at 7$&1)!)4- magazine - knows that theie is an ongoing iiot of
speculation about all this, much of it not at all fiienuly to the view Bill
favois. But it's all just speculation, anu until the physicists soit things
out on empiiical giounus, we have to iely on puiely philosophical
aiguments. So, then, can philosophy uelivei what physics cannot.
<CLICK 5>
Consiuei the fiist of Bill's two philosophical aiguments
foi saying that a beginningless seiies is impossible. Let's keep things
simple. Suppose we'ie talking about a seiies of uisciete, non-
oveilapping events of finite uuiation - each occuiiing aftei all the
pievious ones. If theie was no fiist event, infinitely many have
occuiieu.
Bill says this is absolutely impossible. An actual infinite can't exist
in the ieal woilu, because infinite collections have weiiu piopeities that
make them impossible. By way of illustiation anu aigument, Bill asks us
4
to consiuei a hotel having infinitely many iooms, each occupieu by
exactly one guest. "Bilbeit's Botel" is full.
<CLICK 6>

Neveitheless, ioom can be founu foi moie guests - inueeu, foi
infinitely many moie. If the guests aie moveu to uiffeient iooms in just
the iight way, as many iooms as you like can be maue available without
kicking anyone out oi making anyone uouble up. This allegeuly absuiu
implication is blameu entiiely on the fact that the hotel is .!+.!.&".
So just how impossible is an infinite hotel. So impossible,
appaiently, that even 9)# coulu not cieate one. No one, no mattei how
poweiful, coulu. This is supposeu to enable us to see that a
beginningless seiies of events is 0*$) absolutely impossible. Boes it.
<CLICK 7>
At this point, some people ieply that the piopeities of the
infinite aie simply uiffeient fiom those of the finite. 0f couise (" can't
builu an infinite hotel. But a uou who coulu cieate the whole of physical
ieality out of nothing coulu make a univeise as laige as Be likeu - even
an infinitely laige one. Anu if Be uiu, Be coulu ceitainly put an infinite
hotel into it. A hotel like that woulu inueeu have the weiiu piopeities
Bill has so viviuly uesciibeu. But that's noimal foi wholes with infinitely
many paits.
S
This may well be coiiect, but I want to piess a moie subtle
objection. The conclusion that an infinite hotel is impossible is baseu on
the supposeu absuiuity of making ioom foi new guests without kicking
anyone out, oi making anyone shaie. But of couise this uoesn't follow
4"1"*- fiom the .!+.!.&- of the hotel, but iathei fiom what happens
when infinity is /)4:.!"# with )&'"1 ,1),"1&."$ of this imaginaiy hotel.
We get the "weiiu" implication )!*- because the guests can be 4);"#.
Weie that not the case, new guests coulu !)& be accommouateu - !)&
";"! .! 0! .!+.!.&" ')&"*.
Let's ietuin to the case we'ie inteiesteu in - that of a seiies of past
events, each having occuiieu aftei infinitely many otheis.
<CLICK 8>

0nlike the guests in the hotel, who aie not naileu uown, past events aie
insepaiable fiom theii iespective tempoial locations. 0nce an event has
occuiieu at a paiticulai time, it can't be "moveu" to some othei time.
The signing of the Beclaiation of Inuepenuence, foi instance, cannot be
"moveu out of" }uly 4, 1776. 0f couise, time continueu to pass, anu new
events weie (anu continue to be) auueu to those that hau alieauy
occuiieu when the signing hau been completeu. But that's no moie
absuiu than making space foi new guests by builuing new iooms. It
follows that the impossibility of a Bilbeit's Botel - if, inueeu, it is
6
impossible - has no beaiing on )21 question conceining the possibility
of a beginningless seiies of past events.
<CLICK 9>
To see that something must have gone wiong heie, let's
think about the possibility of an "!#*"$$ +2&21". That's possible, isn't it.
A favoiite veise of a much loveu hymn comes to minu: "When we've
been theie ten thousanu yeais biight shining as the sun we've no
less uays to sing uou's piaise than when we fiist begun."
So imagine an enuless seiies of futuie piaises, each taking the
same amount of time, anu each occuiiing aftei all the otheis. That's
possible, isn't it.
It's tiue, of couise, that we'll nevei aiiive at a time at which we
have 0*1"0#- $0.# infinitely many heavenly piaises. At eveiy stage in the
futuie seiies of events as I am imagining it, we will have saiu only
finitely many. <2& &'0& 40="$ !)& 0 ,01&./*" )+ #.++"1"!/" &) &'" ,).!& >
04 0:)2& &) 40="? If you ask, "Bow many uistinct piaises (.** :" saiu."
the only sensible answei is, .!+.!.&"*- 40!-.
By way of illustiation, suppose that uou makes it the case that two
people - call them 'Bill' anu 'Wes'
<CLICK 10>
- will take tuins piaising
Bim foievei, anu that each of theii piaises will take piecisely one
7
"minute" of celestial time. Bill will uo the even numbeieu piaises, anu
Wes (given his contiaiian natuie) will uo the ouu ones. If uou is omniscient,
Be knows exactly who will say which woius of piaise uuiing "0/' of those infinitely many
futuie moments. Bow many uistinct piaises (.** they say. The only
sensible answei is, .!+.!.&"*- 40!-.
Now imagine someone (unuei the spell of Bill's ieflections on
Bilbeit's Botel) objecting, "If uou coulu uo that, Be coulu insteau have
ueteimineu that Bill anu Wes will stop aftei piaise numbei six.
>!+.!.&"*- 40!- piaises woulu be pieventeu, anu the numbei of theii
futuie piaises woulu be )!*- $.3. Alteinatively, uou coulu have
ueteimineu that @"$ be silent uuiing the celestial minutes between
Bill's futuie piaises. In this case too, .!+.!.&"*- 40!- piaises woulu be
pieventeu, but the numbei of futuie piaises woulu insteau be .!+.!.&".
That's ciazy." Beie's anothei objection of the same kinu. "But uou
coulu have ueteimineu that Bill anu Wes will wait a celestial minute
aftei each paii of piaises, thus making 'ioom' foi .!+.!.&"*- 40!- 4)1"
piaises by a thiiu cieatuie. Infinitely many piaises aie auueu, but the
numbei of uistinct piaises that will be saiu is no gieatei. That's ciazy
too."
8
Nust we concluue fiom such ieflections as these that an enuless
seiies of futuie events is 0:$)*2&"*- .4,)$$.:*". 0bviously not! But then
neithei shoulu we say that a beginningless seiies of past events is
impossible.
<CLICK 11>
As fai as the paiauoxes of infinity aie conceineu,
the two cases aie on exactly the same footing. The only uiffeience is
that at any time in an enuless futuie infinitely many events (.** occui,
wheieas at any time in a beginningless past, infinitely many '0;"
occuiieu. The foimei is obviously possible. Why not the lattei.
<CLICK 12>
What about Bill's $"/)!# philosophical aigument against
the infinite past. Even if an actual infinite weie in piinciple possible,
Bill thinks a beginningless seiies of past events woulu be impossible
because it completes an infinite seiies that has been piouuceu by
successive auuition - something that supposeuly cannot be uone.
Remembei "the Count" in 6"$04" 6&1""&.
<CLICK 13>
Be likes to
"count things." "0ne banana, two bananas, thiee bananas . . ." The man
can ceitainly count. But if he $&01&"# )2& with the aim of counting 0** the
natuial numbeis at the same iate, he woulu nevei finish. 0n the othei
hanu, if time (anu "the Count" himself) hau no beginning, theie woulu be
9
no bai to his having counteu all the way uown to zeio without missing a
single numbei.
Well, why not. Bill says this is impossible because !" $%&'"! (&!
)% *+,%! -./ .% +' 0+!+'.+!* !"- $&1.%$ 1.&! &1 '"2% %&$3+%$ 1+2%.
Aftei all, if the past has no beginning, then the Count has &3-&/'
&3$%&4/ hau enough time to complete the job. So, Bill concluues, he
(&!!"1 be finishing now - oi, inueeu, at any eailiei time.
This is a complete non-sequitui.
<CLICK 14>
Fiom the fact that we
know of no goou ieason ('- something is so, it uoes not follow that it's
impossible foi it to :" so!
<CLICK 15>
But isn't "tiaveising the infinite"
obviously impossible. I answei: That uepenus on what you mean by
"tiaveising the infinite."
<CLICK 16>
If you mean that %&(. )+ .!+.!.&"*-
40!- ";"!&$ A)+ "B20* #210&.)!C '0$ )//211"#, then no goou ieason has
been given foi thinking this is .4,)$$.:*". If, on the othei hanu, you
mean, '1&$1+!* "51 "! &! .!+.!.&" $"1."$ A)+ &'"4C 0!# /)4,*"&.!5 .&, then
of couise 1.&16' impossible. But it's not ielevant to the case we aie
inteiesteu in - that of an infinite seiies of past events -+1. !" '1&$1+!*
7"+!1. It's tiue that no 4"4:"1 of a beginningless seiies of past events is infinitely uistant
1u
fiom the piesent. But fiom this it uoes not follow that the numbei of events that have
occuiieu must be finite.
So much foi Bill's uefense of piemise 2 of his main aigument.
<CLICK 17>
What about ,1"4.$" DE What about the claim that ('0&";"1
:"5.!$ &) "3.$& 42$& '0;" 0 /02$".
<CLICK 18>
I have seiious uoubts about
the 5!+,%$'&3 &773+(&)+3+1/ of this piinciple, anu I am unmoveu by the
consiueiations Bill has offeieu in its suppoit.
The fiist of these - &'" /*0.4 &'0& $)4"&'.!5 /0!F& /)4" +1)4
!)&'.!5 - is, chaiitably inteipieteu, meiely a iestatement of the
piinciple. The seconu - &'0& (.&')2& &'.$ ,1.!/.,*" !) 1"0$)! /)2*# :"
5.;"! +)1 $0-.!5 &'0& :./-/*"$ 0!# <""&');"! 0!# $2/' /)2*#!F& ,), .!&)
:".!5 2!/02$"# - is flat-out wiong. We have a ton of expeiience in favoi
of saying that things *.=" &'0& can't just pop into existence. We uon't
neeu to ueuuce it fiom a univeisal piinciple that applies to absolutely
eveiything.
Boes what's tiue of a bicycle apply to physical ieality as a whole.
It's not obvious that it woulu.
<CLICK 19>
We'ie talking about the oiigin of
the whole natuial oiuei heie. A bicycle comes into existence (.&'.! the
natuial oiuei. uiven the way things woik in oui woilu, it is impossible
foi things *.=" :./-/*"$ to pop into existence uncauseu. But theie is no
11
compaiable /)!&"3& foi the oiigin of the whole natuial oiuei - nothing
that coulu make it .4,)$$.:*" foi it to come into existence.
Bill's thiiu consiueiation - that his causal piinciple is constantly
veiifieu anu nevei falsifieu - is a gioss oveisimplification. 7& &'" *";"* )+
4"#.24 $.G"# ):H"/&s, it may holu up. But so uo a lot of othei
geneializations that woulu be quite haimful to the case Bill wants to
make foi cieation )2& )+ nothing. Beie aie a few.
<CLICK 20>

"I0&"1.0* things always come fiom 40&"1.0* things."
"Nothing is evei cieateu )2& )+ nothing."
"Nothing is evei causeu by anything &'0& .$ !)& .&$"*+ .! &.4"."
"Eveiy event is ,1"/"#"# .! &.4" by othei events."
Bill uoesn't accept any of &'"$" well-attesteu empiiical geneializations.
Coulu he be applying a uouble stanuaiu. Accepting those that help his
case, anu iejecting those that uon't.
<CLICK 21>
Beie's something else to think about. In the wonueifully
stiange woilu of quantum mechanics, things uon't always seem to have
a cause. In what's calleu "quantum fluctuation," paiis of paiticles
spontaneously pop into existence in a quantum vacuum. What causes
12
this. Theie is no plausible canuiuate. A quantum vacuum has a veiy
low level of eneigy, but nobouy thinks that this is the cause.
So, then, one can have peifectly ieasonable uoubts even about
piemise 1 - both at the level of paiticle physics anu with iegaiu to the
oiigin (if any) of the whole natuial oiuei.
<CLICK 22>
But what if we uiu think that the whole of physical
ieality hau a beginning anu a cause. What uoes that have to uo with the
existence of uou. Well, Bill thinks it follows stiaightaway that this
cause must be non-tempoial, unchanging, immateiial, anu
"unimaginably poweiful." Finally, anu most impoitantly, he says that
this cause must be "peisonal." Be gives a couple of ;"1- quick
aiguments foi this last claim.
Accoiuing to the fiist,
<CLICK 23>
"the only entities we know of
which can be timeless anu immateiial aie eithei minus oi abstiact
objects, like numbeis." Numbeis anu the like aien't veiy plausible
canuiuates foi being the cause of the the whole of physical ieality. So,
Bill concluues, this cause "must" be a timeless anu immateiial minu.
This is 42/' too quick.
<CLICK 24>
}ust because we uon't "know of"
something uoes nothing to show that it coulun't exist. I quite agiee that
1S
my favoiite numbei is not the cause of the the whole of physical ieality.
But the iealm of "timeless anu immutable" objects is uisputeu teiiitoiy
in philosophy, anu we aie not in much of a position to say what it coulu
oi coulu not contain. Even if it /)2*# contain minus, it might, foi all we
know, contain othei things that aie capable of enteiing into causal
ielations.
Bill's seconu aigument
<CLICK 25>
foi saying that the cause of the
univeise must be peisonal implicitly assumes that theie can be only two
types of cause - fiee ,"1$)!0* 05"!&$, anu .4,"1$)!0* $2++./."!&
/)!#.&.)!$. Bill aigues that an .4,"1$)!0* "&"1!0* cause coulu have only
an "&"1!0* effect. Since he thinks the univeise is not eteinal, he
concluues that the cause of the univeise can only have been an eteinal
peisonal agent who fieely chose "to cieate the woilu in time."
I have time to voice just two woiiies about this aigument. The
fiist
<CLICK 26>
conceins Bill's example of an eteinal anu impeisonal
cause. It's actually an example of an impeisonal &"4,)10* cause &'0& '0$
!) :"5.!!.!5. If watei hau 0*(0-$ 0*1"0#- been aiounu anu hau 0*(0-$
0*1"0#- hau a tempeiatuie below zeio centigiaue, it woulu 0*(0-$
0*1"0#- have been fiozen (without beginning). But on Bill's view, 9)# is
14
not eteinal in &'0& sense, since that woulu involve beginningless
tempoial uuiation of just the soit that Bill believes to be impossible. So
uoes this example show anything that's ielevant to the timeless kinu of
eteinity we'ie supposeu to be talking about heie.
Beie, very briefly, is my seconu woiiy.
<CLICK 27>
Assume that uou
is eteinal, all-knowing, anu all-poweiful, anu that Be ueciues to cieate
the univeise. It follows that uou's #"/.$.)! to cieate must be as eteinal
as Be is. uou's meie existence isn't sufficient foi the existence of the
univeise, but Bis eteinal uecision to cieate it .$. So, by the logic of Bill's
aigument, we shoulu concluue that the univeise is just as eteinal as
uou's uecision to cieate it. Cleaily, something has gone wiong.
I'll concluue with a biief comment on the exceeuingly low
stanuaiu Bill sets foi a "goou" philosophical aigument.
<CLICK 28>
The
piemises uon't even neeu to be "plausible," he says - "just moie
plausible than theii opposites." But suiely, when you uon't know
enough even to say, "This is plausible," you uon't have a founuation on
which to builu an aigument foi a conclusion that you can :"*.";"!
To see just how bau the pioblem is, suppose that each of the
logically inuepenuent piemises Bill neeus to get all the way to the
1S
conclusion that 0 ,"1$)!0* 9)# cieateu the univeise meets this low
stanuaiu. By way of illustiation, suppose that theie aie just foui
logically inuepenuent piemises, anu make the veiy geneious
assumption that the piobability is two to one in favoi of each of them.
<CLICK 29>
Then the piobability that all of them aie tiue is less than u.2,
anu the piobability that at least one of them is false is gieatei than u.8!
<CLICK 30>
Imagine a lauuei with foui iungs, anu suppose that the
piobability that at least one of them will bieak is in the neighboihoou of
u.8. Woulu you tiust that lauuei. No.
<CLICK 31>
Then you shoulun't put
too awfully much weight on this veision of the cosmological aigument!
5"# 6%--*#(%&
789:8;<