In the current debate over the EUs political crisis the concept of European

identity has taken centre stage. By evoking a sentiment, backed by a

common history, of we the Europeans the ties between EU institutions
and the citizen are supposed to be strengthened and conicts of interest
among the member states overcome. From this vi ewpoint, the root cause
of the crisis has nothing to do with the inadequate institutional design of
the EU, or the shortcomings of its policies, but everything to do with a lack
of identity and identication on behalf of its citizens. This lack of identity
is partly attributed to territorial expansion and the deepening of
functionality at EU level over the last two decades. To put it more bluntly,
the creation of an internal market and the inclusion of twelve new member
states are accused of alienating citizens from EU institutions whilst
simultaneously weakening the thick identities of the old Community.
As Jacques Derrida and Jrgen Habermas stated exemplarily in their joint
appeal to the European public in 2003, the policy of further expanding
the EU is running up against the limits of the existing administrative
steering mechanisms. Until now, the functional imperatives of creating a
common economic and currency zone have propelled reforms. However,
these driving forces are now exhausted. An active policy that calls not just
for the obstacles to competition but also for a common will on the part of
Chapter 4 Edgar Grande 45
European identity: a
dangerous obsession
Chapter 4
Edgar Grande
Rescuing the European project: EU legitimacy, governance and security 46
the members states is dependent on the motives and convictions of the
citizens themselves.
1
For Derrida and Habermas, the European
Constitution project was supposed to create a new political identity among
European citizens while the Constitutional Treaty was to have transformed
the EU from an obscure elite enterprise into a joint democratic project of
European citizens, thus giving the integration process a new drive.
The failure of the Constitutional Treaty and the rejection of the Lisbon
Treaty in the rst Irish referendum have reinforced calls for the strengthening
of European identity. Meanwhile, however, the debate has taken a somewhat
different turn. The idea of a European identity is no longer linked to a
political identity created by constitutional norms; rather it is connoted with
common cultural norms and values. European identity ought to be
thickened by reanimating the common cultural heritage of Europe.
This cultural turn in the public debate on European identity gives rise to
a number of important questions the most important of which are
related to practical feasibility. Whereas it is possible to link the
strengthening of political identity to a concrete, though contested, political
project, the practical connotations of a culturally dened European
identity seem to be vague and unclear. Even if it were possible to positively
inuence such an identity by means of (European) policies, the effects of
such policies can only be expected to materialise in the long run. Therefore
as a short term remedy for acute problems, efforts to strengthen a culturally
dened European identity seem inappropriate.
Furthermore, the problem with the political debate on European identity
is much more deep seeded than the observation that it might not deliver
what it promises. As I will argue in this chapter, appeals to a culturally
dened European identity are highly contentious in a political sense as
they nurture exclusionary sentiments that have been, in recent years,
successfully articulated and mobilised by nationalistic movements. Thus,
they are counter-productive. It is precisely for this reason that the debate
on European identity must be considered as a dangerous obsession
which could seriously obstruct the integration process as a whole.
The restructuring of politics
in western democracies
In essence, the concept of European identity is based on an inadequate
diagnosis of the EUs current political crisis. So far, questions relating to
the legitimacy challenge have only produced euro-centric explanations
which attribute citizens dissatisfaction with the EU almost exclusively to
its institutions, procedures and policies. Central to this assessment lies
the remoteness and bureaucratic rigidity of the Commission, the non-
transparent decision-making processes, the neo-liberal imbalances of
the Single Market, the lack of information and engagement on behalf of
the citizens, together with a host of other readily cited problems. While it
is true that these factors might represent serious shortcomings in EU
policy processes, and therefore difcult obstacles to any further integration,
this diagnosis only scrapes the surface when it comes to the real causes of
public dissatisfaction with the European project.
Rather, the EU political crisis that we are now witnessing must be
interpreted in the context of the fundamental restructuring of politics in
western democracies. In the last two decades, the process of globalisation
or, to be more precise, de-nationalisation has been transforming the
very basis of politics in western Europe, giving rise to a new integration-
demarcation cleavage.
2
This is not to say that globalisation has added an
entirely new conict dimension to the existing national political space in
west European countries; rather, it has transformed the existing cultural
conict dimension.
This new integration-demarcation cleavage has so far been embedded
into the existing two-dimensional structure of political conict. Whereas,
the cultural dimension, up until the 1970s, was dominated by issues linked
to cultural liberalism and religion, over the last two decades new issues
such as immigration and European integration have played a much more
prominent role in political spaces. Immigration has been the key player in
this respect a theme which was absent from debate before the 1980s
and has become a very polarising and salient issue. In addition to this,
empirical evidence has increasingly drawn attention to the use of this
cultural dimension as the predominant basis on which new parties of
the populist right seek to mobilise their electorate against mainstream
parties.
3
Over the last two decades the result has been the substantial
polarisation of national party systems in most EU member states.
Winners and losers of globalisation
Why does globalisation have the potential to create such a new social
cleavage? And how exactly is this new cleavage related to European
integration? In short, the consequences of globalisation are not the same
for all members of a national community and among national
communities. As a result, globalisation (and Europeanisation) tends to
give rise to new disparities, new oppositions and new forms of competition.
These new forms of economic, cultural and political competition create
Chapter 4 Edgar Grande 47
Rescuing the European project: EU legitimacy, governance and security 48
new groups of winners and losers, which in turn creates political
potential for the articulation of conicting interests as well as new demands
by political parties, interest groups and social movements. Such new
forms of opposition crosscut, not align with, traditional structural and
political cleavages.
4

The literature on globalisation and de-nationalisation has identied at
least three types of conict that contribute to the formation of globalisation
winners and losers: economic competition, cultural diversity and
political integration. First of all, globalisation has resulted in an increase
in transnational economic competition. In advanced west European
welfare states, this has led to the dramatic erosion of protected property
rights and of the streams of income linked to them. In the post-war
decades, industrialised countries introduced a variety of measures to
disconnect income streams (in the form of wages, employment or prots)
from the outcome of the market. However, the increasing transnational
mobility of capital has produced signicant downward pressure on
domestic regulation, tax rates, and wages.
5
Individuals and rms that
previously operated in sheltered sectors, i.e. sectors that were protected
from market pressures through (national!) public regulation, are now, as
they increasingly become exposed to international competition, most
directly affected by this erosion.

At the same time, globalisation should not be solely reduced to its economic
dimension given that it has also led to a signicant increase in diversity
within our societies. Since the 1960s, west European countries have been
faced with mass immigration of ethnic groups who are in many respects
distinct from the indigenous European population. Of course, these
migratory movements can have many different catalysts, e.g. the
dissolution of colonial empires, civil wars and the decline of statehood,
and scarcity of national resources or political persecution, but they all
contribute to a strong increase in socio-cultural diversity in European
societies.
6
One of the crucial questions then is how they cope with this
new, culturally dened diversity. Cultural diversity might not only intensify
economic competition for scarce jobs and shrinking welfare benets, but
it may also threaten the cultural identity of indigenous populations. As a
result, cultural diversity has the potential to create new political conicts
which transcend the structure of those conicts produced by the formation
of the nation-state and of industrialisation in western Europe.
A third source of conict is political integration and the transfer of political
authority to institutions beyond the nation-state.
7
In particular, this refers
to those cases in which such a transfer jeopardises national sovereignty.
The result is an increase in political competition between nation-states on
the one hand, and supra-, trans- and international political authorities on
the other which equally creates winners and losers among their citizens.
To begin with, a transfer of political authority can effectively lead to a
downsizing of the public sector at the national level, thus creating material
losers. More importantly, however, winners and losers emerge from
differences in identication with national norms and institutions.
Individuals who possess a strong identication with their national
community and are attached to its exclusionary norms will perceive a
weakening of the national institutions as a loss. Conversely, citizens with
universalistic or cosmopolitan norms may perceive this weakening as a
gain, if it implies a strengthening of a specic type of cosmopolitan political
institutions, rather than a mere retreat of the state. The attachment to
national traditions, symbols and values plays a prominent role here, as
does the integration into transnational networks.
8
Signicantly, in each
case the conicts created by this political competition do not t into the
old cleavage categories.
The new groups of winners and losers of globalisation created by these
three types of conict are not ideologically predened. Rather, they
constitute new political potential, which can and must be articulated
by political organisations. However, given the heterogeneous composition
of these groups, we cannot expect that the preferences formed as a function
of this new antagonism will be closely aligned with the political divisions
on which domestic politics has traditionally been based. In fact, as we can
observe from the development of national party systems in western
Europe over the last two decades, it has become difcult for established
national political actors to organise around and tap into this new political
potential.
So far, this political potential has been exploited most successfully by
right-wing populist parties who have been able to mobilise the losers of
globalisation by articulating their fears and anxieties in relation to both
immigration and European integration. Over the past two decades, they
have succeeded in linking cultural diversity and economic competition in
such a way as to turn ethnically different groups into symbols of potential
threats not only to the collective identity, but also to the standards of living
among indigenous populations. Consequently in the 1990s and early
2000s the new populist right has clearly constituted the driving force
behind the transformation of west European party systems.
Chapter 4 Edgar Grande 49
Rescuing the European project: EU legitimacy, governance and security 50
Hence, if we are to fully understand the restructuring of political conict
in western Europe, we must distinguish between the two different logics
of political conict: the economic and the cultural. Both logics, it can be
said, articulate structural conicts of globalisation, but they do so in
different ways. A cultural logic of conict emphasises the negative
consequences of cultural diversity and political integration, and in doing
so re-frames economic conicts in cultural terms. An economic logic of
conict stresses the negative consequences of economic competition and
re-frames cultural and political conicts in such a way that they allow
intensifying economic confrontation. While the cultural logic of conict
predominated in the 1990s and 2000s and strengthened the cultural
conict dimension of the political space, the possible resurgence of
economic conicts as a consequence of the global nancial crisis could
strengthen the economic conict dimension in the political space.
Finally, the two logics of conict allow different mobilisation strategies as
well as beneting different political actors. In recent years, the successes
of the radical right in western Europe have been based on a cultural logic
of political conict, while the economic logic of political conict has been
articulated by new left-wing populist parties (in Germany and the
Netherlands, for example). Both groups not only support protectionist
and interventionist programmes, but also mobilise against the EU in its
existing form and against an expansion of the integration process. Without
doubt, the successes of right- and left-wing populist parties have put
established political parties under pressure. This holds in particular for
those social democratic parties that moved to the centre of the political
space in the 1990s and early 2000s. They are now in danger of being
simultaneously squeezed between new contenders on the left and on the
right of the ideological spectrum.
European integration and the new social cleavages
What does this restructuring of political conict mean for European
integration and European identity? Three important implications come to
the fore. First, in both logics of political conict, Europe is perceived as
being part of the problem and not part of the solution. Using the economic
logic, losers of globalisation consider the EU not as a counter-weight to
neoliberal globalisation, but as its intensication and acceleration. From
their point of view, it is difcult, if not impossible, to distinguish between
the benets of an internal European market and the negative consequences
of global economic integration. Meanwhile, using the cultural logic, the
transfer of sovereignty to the EU is primarily perceived as an immediate
threat to national identities, national institutions and national democratic
practices and an enlargement process without limits and clear ends is
seen as a threat to the cultural homogeneity, particularly of old Europe.
At best, European integration seems to produce a delicate trade-off for its
citizens: they have to accept a loss of sovereignty and national identity in
exchange for new, and vaguely dened, economic and political powers.
Unsurprisingly, the EU has therefore become an easy target for all kinds
of populist parties and movements.
Second, the restructuring of political conict has considerably politicised
the process of European integration. Yet, the manifestations and
consequences of this must frustrate those who debate the possibilities and
opportunities of increased politicisation at EU level. Notwithstanding the
remarkable successes of some anti-European parties at the last election to
the European Parliament, we must acknowledge that the politicisation of
Europe mostly takes place at the national level. Since the 1990s, Europe
has become a salient and hotly contested issue in national election
campaigns and, as a result, an issue of mass politics in most member
states.
10
Moreover, the politicisation of Europe did not take place along
the traditional left-right axis; rather, it is the product of anti-European
parties and political movements. Thus, ironically, the mobilisation of
European citizens on European issues has been achieved most successfully
by the critics of the EU and by the defenders of national identity and
sovereignty.
The third implication which comes as a direct consequence of the second
is that appealing to a culturally dened European identity would be like
pouring oil on a re. It has to be said that broader political campaigns and
debates on identity, outside of academia, would largely benet the radical
populist parties on the right and on the left, who have already successfully
mobilised along the lines of identity, immigration and integration. It is
true that the concept of European identity is in itself highly ambiguous,
not least because most of its multiple varieties try to combine unity and
diversity in some way.
11
However, one commonality that runs through
all of the denitions is that by emphasising a European we, the concept
is based on constructions of some kind of sameness. If we cast our minds
back to the Copenhagen Declaration in 1973, it can be observed that it was
precisely this idea of sameness that was highlighted. The declaration
acknowledges the diversity of cultures within Europe and the importance
of common interests, but puts particular emphasis on the framework of
common European civilisation, the attachment to common values and
principles and the increasing convergence of attitudes to life which are
supposed to give the European identity its originality and its own
Chapter 4 Edgar Grande 51
Rescuing the European project: EU legitimacy, governance and security 52
dynamism. While such an idea of European identity has become outdated
in scientic discourses,
12
it still informs the majority of public debates,
where the emphasis is on Europe as a distinctive cultural entity united by
shared values, culture and identity.
13

The dangers of European identity
Such an understanding of European identity will inevitably run into two
difculties. The rst one is identifying the norms and values that constitute
the common cultural heritage of Europe. Usually, references are made
to Europes heritage of classical Greaco-Roman civilisation, christianity,
and the ideas of enlightenment, science, reason, progress and democracy
as the core elements of this proclaimed European legacy.
14
This approach
is obviously euro-centric and completely neglects the importance of
non-European cultures, global processes and dependencies for the
emergence and transformation of European values. Therefore dening
sameness without reference to others is not only incomplete but
inadequate.
15
Moreover, as controversy over the reference to the Christian
tradition in the European Convention in 2003-4 revealed, there is no
agreement on the relative importance of the various different components
of a European civilisation. Consequently, any debate on common
values will inevitably spark off conicts within European societies and
between member states.
There is then a second difculty which is both highly signicant politically
and closely related to the current restructuring of political conict in
Europe. The construction of a cultural boundary necessarily entails
a process of inclusion and exclusion. It requires the designation of
the differences between insiders and outsiders, members and non-
members.
16
Indeed, the concept of cultural identity formation and the
cultural logic of political conict have much in common. They both employ
symbolically dened codes of exclusion, and, as debates on immigration
and EU membership for Turkey have demonstrated in recent years, these
codes have already been dened largely by the political right.
The intense debate on EU boundaries, provoked by the decision to start
membership negotiations with Turkey, is certainly most instructive in this
respect.
17
Here, the question of Turkeys EU membership was transformed
into a question about the cultural identity of Europe. References to a
common geography, a common history and common values were
made in order to permanently exclude Turkey from the EU. Turkey served
as a symbolic code for the Islamic east which was sharply set apart from
the Christian west. This symbolic code was subsequently used to
establish a distinct culturally dened boundary between Europe and non-
Europe. An empirical analysis of this debate in west European countries
reveals that the frames used are not only defending national identity, but
also a nascent European identity that is exclusive (against Turkey) and
inclusive (within Europe) at the same time.
18
As alluded to above, it is the
populist right who have successfully exploited this argument with the help
of identity-based arguments emphasising the threat of mass immigration
and islamisation. The political dangers here are signied; not least due to
the fact that Christian-Democratic and conservative parties, despite their
more general pro-European commitment (with the notable exception of
the British Conservative Party), are in rm opposition to further EU
enlargement, in particular the accession of Turkey.
This debate reveals that it is just as difcult to determine the borders of
Europe as it is to establish the identity of its citizens on the basis of cultural
criteria. Many territorial borders in Europe were drawn and altered in the
past with outright arbitrariness Polands history demonstrates this
exemplarily; not to mention the fact that the historic and cultural ties of
European countries extended well beyond Europe due to their imperialist
and colonial pasts.
19
Moreover, we should not forget that in the age of
globalisation borders have fundamentally changed in their signicance
and character. Borders, even territorial ones, are increasingly becoming
unclear, permeable and in need of political denition and decision. That is
not to say that Europes borders cannot or should not be laid down, but
that they cannot be found in a common history, culture or geography.
Europes borders must be dened politically. In other words, instead of
cultural criteria, we need political criteria.
European integration as an open political project
Past debate and experience in Europe clearly show that it is conceptually
inadequate and politically dangerous to construct a European identity on
the basis of common cultural values. This does not do justice to the
heterogeneity that the EU has already attained, nor to the internal
pluralism of its societies. In particular the latter holds true in the case of
the status of Islam within Europe. Moreover, the EU cannot be dened by
a pre-established set of geographic borders. Any attempt to do so has
faltered and will falter due to the dynamic character of the European
integration process.
This does not mean that the EU can survive without its own identity and
affective ties to its citizens, or that it is principally impossible to limit or
nalise the European integration process. Rather that we should approach
Chapter 4 Edgar Grande 53
Rescuing the European project: EU legitimacy, governance and security 54
these questions in an entirely different manner. The present recipes to
resolve the political crises of the European project are based on a serious
misunderstanding. Essentially, concepts from the history of nation-
building in Europe are being transferred to the EU without qualications.
Instead, the EU and the European integration process must be understood
and promoted as an open political project.
20
Doing so, primarily, means
that European identity must be xed to political criteria and not to historic
or cultural attributes. Europe cannot be united in the long run by a cultural
identity, no matter how it is dened. The European project must be
accomplished through a common political identity. This political identity,
in turn, cannot be imposed top down but needs to emerge from the
European citizens everyday experience with the norms, institutions,
procedures and conicts of the European political process. Nor can it be
based on abstract principles. The European Union must develop its
identity through daily practice as a community of political actions and
communications.
This is where one of the EUs major decits becomes most evident:
Brussels seems incapable of offering European citizens sufcient
opportunity to participate in the political process, something which would
reinforce identication with the European project. The EU has struggled
to create a positive and convincing tie between its politics and the living
conditions and life chances of its citizens and due to this lack of political
identity, compensation by cultural means is insufcient. The circle can
only be squared by the by strengthening the political identity itself.
Therefore, it is essential that EU citizens are given greater opportunity to
participate in European politics. Furthermore the EU needs to expand its
competences in political areas where citizens expect a strong EU presence
most importantly in foreign and security policy.
Dening the European identity politically and not culturally does not
imply that Europe can succeed entirely without a common normative
foundation. Even the European project needs a normative foundation and
this foundation requires a historic dimension. However, neither the
Christian culture nor the universal values of the Enlightenment can be
used to form the normative basis of Europes political identity. In reality it
is the dialectic of Enlightenment
21
on the positive side, the commonly
shared expectations of a social and political order based on reason and, on
the negative side, the common experiences from the horrors of
totalitarianism in the 20th century, the Holocaust, the Stalinist terror, the
Armenian genocide in Turkey and the self-imposed dangers to humanity
and civilisation posed by new technologies. Together and only together
do these attributes constitute a common horizon of experiences along
which the European project has been promulgated in the past and through
which its political identity must also be established normatively in the
future.
Chapter 4 Edgar Grande 55