IDSA January

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Notes by vineetpunnoose on www.kiwipaper.com
Content
International Reactions to the Parliamentary Elections in Bangladesh 1
Bangladesh Political Crisis and India`s Options 2
Indo-Pak DGsMO Meeting: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back 3
Realism Not Romanticism Should Dictate India's Pakistan Policy 4
Political Crisis in Thailand and Its Effects on Foreign Relations 5
Internal Security Trends in 2013 and a Prognosis 7
India and Maldives: Ties Must Be Consolidated 14
India-South Korea Relations: A New Beginning 16
Governance in Northern Province of Sri Lanka: Stresses and Strains 18
Post-CHOGM Dilemmas of Rajapaksa 18
Measures for Improving Management of National Security 19
Malkangiri: The Tri-junction under Maoist Fire 20
Saudi Arabia's Nuclear Thinking and the Pakistani Connection 21
'Arab Spring': Implications for India 22
The Geneva Conference on Syria: What Will It Deliver? 28
3D Printing and Defence: A Silent Revolution 29
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Notes by vineetpunnoose on www.kiwipaper.com Page 1
International Reactions to the Parliamentary Elections in Bangladesh
Tue, Jan 28, 2014
bangladesh, IDSA, international,
The international reactions to the parliamentary elections assume significance since
Bangladesh heavily depends on a number of developed countries and global organisations
for development assistance, loans and trade concessions. But the tenth Jatiya Sangsad
election has not succeeded to evoke positive response from them largely due to its
non-participatory and violent nature.
A total of 390 candidates, predominantly from the ruling Awami League (AL) and its
allies contested for 147 seats. The remaining 153 seats were uncontested as 27 political
parties, including the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) - led 18 party alliance
boycotted the polls. The Election Commission (EC) claimed a 40% voter turnout
whereas the local media reports indicate it varied between 20% and 30%.
The European Union (EU), Commonwealth, the US, the UK and many other nations
had refused to send election observers. However, a South Asia- based electoral
management group, Forum for Election Management Bodies - South Asia, has observed
that the elections had been conducted "smoothly" and "quite peacefully". The voting
was low in the northern and western strongholds of the BNP and Jamaat-e Islami where
polling booths had been torched and poll officials and ruling party activists attacked.
But in other regions of the country such as greater Chittagong, Dhaka and Barisal, high
turnout was recorded.
All these aspects have been severely criticised by the foreign nations particularly in the
west and major international forums. The US, which is the largest trading partner and
a key ally of Bangladesh on counter-terrorism and global security, has clearly spoken
about its disappointment over the low turnout and violence- marred elections. In a
statement, the US State Department said the just-concluded elections did "not appear
to be credibly express the will of the people". It also called for fresh elections "as soon
as possible'. However, the US pledged to continue its alliance with the Sheikh Hasina
government.
The EU that provides duty-free access for nearly 60% of Bangladesh's booming garment
industry products had repeatedly urged all political parties to create congenial environment
for transparent, inclusive and credible elections.
The secretary of Commonwealth too depreciated the "limited levels of participation
and low voter turnout" while the UN Secretary General, Ben Ki-moon, expressed deep
concern over the massive election violence which he termed "unacceptable".
Unlike the major global powers which termed the polls "non-representative", India -
the closest regional ally of Bangladesh, recognised Sheikh Hasina's victory despite a
"record low voter turnout" and supported her in staking claim to form the next government.
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India said the January 5 elections had been a "constitutional requirement" and part of
the internal and constitutional process of Bangladesh. The MEA pointed out the Sheikh
Hasina government had done everything according to the book and made reconciliatory
offers to the opposition which were turned down. The MEA officials noted that there
was nothing unconstitutional or illegal about the elections. This has been India's
traditional position on Bangladesh and its unhappiness with some Western countries
and NGOs lending support to certain groups. External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid
has stressed on this point by saying "while the US is at some distance from Bangladesh,
we are right next to it". However, India's latest position might complicate matters as
in the recent years, it has been trying to appear as "even-handed" and build a working
relationship with the BNP supremo Khaleda Zia who is known to keep distance from
Bangladesh's giant neighbour because of her domestic political compulsions.
Like India, Russia too approved the elections and thrown its lot with the beleaguered
AL government at a time when Hasina has been desperately seeking international
support. In sharp contrast to the position of the US, Russia's Foreign Ministry in a
statement regretted that principal opposition parties boycotted the elections. The statement
said, "We hope that the authorities and the opposition will not go beyond the Constitution
in order to ensure stability and strengthen democratic institutions in the country...Russia
confirms that it is ready to continue constructive partnership with a government, which
will be formed soon".
Another major arms supplier of Bangladesh since the late 1970's has been China. As
the US and others, China did not debunk the polls and called for political stability in
Bangladesh through dialogue and negotiations expressing concerns over the political
situation. Hasina is reportedly contemplating her first foreign visit to Beijing soon.
Some Asian countries namely Nepal, Vietnam and Cambodia have already recognised
Hasina's victory and sent congratulatory messages on her assuming the office for third
time.
Bangladesh Political Crisis and India`s Options
Mon, Jan 6, 2014
IDSA, international, Bangladesh,
There is a significant difference between the earlier political struggles between the
Awami League (AL) and the BNP with its anti-AL forces to the no-holds-barred political
contest now. The anti-AL political forces, particularly the core Islamists of the Jamaat
Party are apprehensive that a gradual political transformation of Bangladesh to a more
secular political-social orientation will damage their fundamental political interests of
Islamising the nation. On earlier occasions, from the late seventies, the political contests
were more for direct control of state power. Now there are wider implications. The
political outcome of upheavals and churning towards some degree of democratisation
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in the Islamic countries in the past two years may have also had their impact on the
Jamaat and its allies.
In the wake of the current situation, New Delhi is understood to have tacitly conveyed
its sympathies with the secular AL and its 16-party `Aykyojot` (Alliance). India signaled
its intention by not deferring President Pranab Mukherjee`s March 2013 state visit to
Bangladesh even when the BNP was orchestrating its nationwide agitation against the
Sheikh Hasina government for conducting the war crimes` trials. Similarly the current
instability did not deter the foreign secretary Sujatha Singh visiting Dacca last month.
In midst of all the chaos, India has officially taken a prudent stance that it is ready to
do business with any government in Dacca including a military-backed government.
India may have to maintain a two-pronged approach. At the governmental level, it will
have to offer economic benefits and cooperation over a range of areas including some
degree of military assistance so that Dacca does not attempt to hurt India's basic
interests. However, a regime which is communally oriented and anti-India may have
to be dealt on a reciprocal basis but without hurting the basic economic interests of that
nation. Alienation of the common people, particularly its rural folk, can have a lasting
impact and hence should be avoided. The communal Islamist forces have their political
base more in the urbanized areas of Bangladesh and the AL still holds substantial sway
in the rural agrarian areas.
Even during the formation of Bangladesh, it was Indira Gandhi`s statecraft that capitalised
on the internal dynamics of Pakistan, which set in motion the initial political trends in
Bangladesh. None of the political parties in India have tried to effectively develop
fraternal relations with like-minded parties and intelligentia of Bangladesh. A moderating
influence on Bangladesh's polity could have been possible through such relationships.
Indo-Pak DGsMO Meeting: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back
Thu, Jan 2, 2014
Pakistan, IDSA, international,
One important factor in the Indo-Pak relations is the comparative strength of the peace
constituency in both the countries. The constituency favouring peace with India seems
to be growing more rapidly in Pakistan, cutting across the social strata, than is apparently
the case in India. There is a more objective appreciation of what happened in Kargil in
1999. In the current narrative, India's short term culpability in 1971 is balanced by
Pakistan's long-term culpability 4 . Some retired officers of Pakistan Army and Air
Force as well as the Pakistan Foreign Service have been talking about India not being
the primary threat to its existence.
First, unlike Pakistan, the Indo-Pak relations do not evoke the same sentiments throughout
the length and breadth of India. The issue is more or less confined to the northern and
western parts of the country. This hinders formation of a critical mass of public opinion
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across the entire country. Two, there is preponderance of opinion makers who advocate
suspension of talks every time something terrible happens and argue that the dialogue
must resume only after some concrete steps are taken by Pakistan to curb jihadi activities.
Display of self-righteousness and spewing venom is going to lead us nowhere. This is
a self-defeating approach as the dialogue invariably resumes after a prolonged break
without any of the conditions being met by Pakistan. Three, the nature of the problems
besetting the two countries is such that any forward movement would require India to
show greater and perceptible accommodation - be it the issue of Siachin, Sir Creek,
cross-border trade or the more contentious issue of Kashmir itself. Not much of an
effort has been made in India by those who have long been involved in parleys between
the two countries to soften and build public opinion in India that would view any peace
deal with Pakistan with equanimity.
There is no alternative to a dialogue to resolve the issues. It will be a folly to think that
peace can prevail only after all opposition to the moves aimed at bringing about peace
between both the countries vanishes completely.
Realism Not Romanticism Should Dictate India's Pakistan Policy
Thu, Jan 30, 2014
Pakistan, IDSA, international,
India uses geography and an outdated concept of neighbours to desist from taking any
step or making any policy that will address the Pakistan problem substantially, if not
entirely.
Whosoever forms the next government in New Delhi must have an opportunity to
undertake a comprehensive review of India's Pakistan policy. Such exercise should
not only question the hoary assumptions and shibboleths that have guided policymaking
so far, but also forge a policy framework that sheds all starry-eyed notions based on
extraneous considerations - personal friendships, ancestral links, family origins, childhood
nostalgia, romantic notions of being the one to normalise relations to recreate the period
of glorious co-existence (which actually never existed!), delusions of statesmanship
which will be the toast of the world - in favour of a policy that protects and promotes
India's economic, political, security and strategic interests. Hard-nosed and professional
assessment based on ground realities, and not seductive and sugary statements from
Pakistani leaders, must form the basis of any new policy.
Against the backdrop of US-led ISAF withdrawal from Afghanistan and the rising
profile and power of both the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban groups, immense pressure
will come on the next government from sections within India to make concessions to
Pakistan and rescue it from the existential crisis in which it finds itself. Simply put,
Pakistan's existential crisis is of its own making and asking or expecting India to rescue
Pakistan from itself is a mug's game. Innumerable times in the past India has become
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a victim to this 'saviour' complex only to repent later.
The political and diplomatic spin-offs resulting from bilateral trade are at best a fringe
benefit and should not and cannot become the primary objective for opening trade. The
two countries should open up trade for no other reason except that it makes economic
sense and is beneficial for both sides. At the same time, political and security realities
must be factored in while opening trade The recent drugs haul in Kashmir and other
instances of arms, explosives and narcotics being smuggled under the cover of overland
trade should serve as a wake-up call to those who advocate throwing open the borders
for traders.
The utility of people-to-people contacts should also not be overstated. No doubt, travel
between the two countries will help in dispelling some of the myths and falsehoods
that have been propagated over the years. But it will also reaffirm some of the stereotypes.
This is not to deny that there are many Pakistanis with a lot of goodwill towards India;
only these people, despite being very visible and vocal, don't call the shots.
India's Pakistan policy must not be based on statements emanating from Pakistan but
on tangible steps that the Pakistani authorities take to address India's concerns. Apart
from preparing a set of metrics to judge Pakistan's intentions and sincerity, the next
government must resist the temptation of entering into any deal just for the sake of a
deal.
The next government must be open to the idea of grabbing a good deal if one is on
offer. But there is no reason for India to go overboard in trying to seal a deal. In other
words, if Pakistan desires parity with India, it should not expect 'magnanimity' from
India, and if it expects 'magnanimity', then it should not insist on parity. the future
trajectory of relations will depend on whether or not Pakistan's animosity towards India
outweighs its fear and revulsion of the Taliban. If Pakistan sees the Taliban as the
problem, then prospects for a detente, and even normalisation, will improve tremendously.
If, however, India remains the object of hate and the Taliban an ally or asset, then
normalisation or even detente will remain a chimera.
Political Crisis in Thailand and Its Effects on Foreign Relations
Wed, Jan 22, 2014
IDSA, Thailand, international,
There is still no end in sight for Thailand's political crisis that has lasted for more than
seven years since the government of Thaksin Shinawatra was toppled by a military
coup in September 2006.
But the side-effects of the years-long attempt to root out Thaksin's influence from Thai
politics goes beyond domestic political instability and polarization. On the international
front, Thailand's relations with foreign countries are being jeopardized by political
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scams aiming to discredit Thaksin and his party-led government.
The classic case is the Thailand-Cambodia dispute over the Preah Vihear Temple that
flared up in 2008. Following the joint communique in which Thailand expressed support
for Cambodia to list Preah Vihear as a UNESCO World Heritage site,
Thaksin has close personal ties with Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen and may even
have used that to benefit his family business in Cambodia but the Preah Vihear case
has proven to be a wrong move of the anti-Thaksin forces which vow to protect their
national territory. In May 2011, Cambodia finally requested the ICJ to interpret its 1962
rule on Preah Vihear and claimed its right over the 4.6 square kilometer area.
With the Cambodian government being considered by the Yellow Shirts and Democrat
supporters as Thaksin's collaborator and a threat to Thailand's national integrity, the
future territorial settlement over ICJ's ruling between the two governments can possibly
stoke further political tension.
Last month, around a thousand protesters belonging to the Network of Students and
Citizens for Reforms (NSCR), one of the alliances that form the current anti-Yingluck
Shinawatra government movement, marched to the US Embassy and demanded that
US ambassador Kristie Kenney be transferred.
As for China, despite allowing Thaksin residency and closely engaging with the Yingluck
government in many projects, the Asian great power had managed to stay free from
being a victim of Thai political polarization for a long while. However, this seemed to
end last October when Sondhi started to call for his supporters to take a strong stand
against China's plan to colonize Thailand with its business and Chinese immigration
which will be easily facilitated by the future rail connectivity and the impending visa
exemption.
While the main purpose of the movement is to overthrow Thaksin's power, the sense
of animosity and mistrust towards other countries among the Yellow Shirts and Democrat
Party supporters is the by product that is severely affecting Thailand's external relations
with the United States, other key partners, and its overall position in Southeast Asia.
Thailand is a key country in ASEAN which occupies a significant geostrategic location
in Asia and Southeast Asia. For major powers like the US, China, India and Japan,
Thailand serves as a gateway for further economic and political engagement with
Indochina. While engagement with the Thai government is necessary, it is equally
important that the external actors avoid becoming a target of Thai public resentment.
For now, there is no better way than keeping transparency and accountability in all
projects and maintaining good will.
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Internal Security Trends in 2013 and a Prognosis
Fri, Jan 24, 2014
IDSA, international, internal security,
Internal Security Trends in 2013 and a Prognosis
Internal Security Centre January 24, 2014 The internal security situation in India reflected
a marked improvement in 2012-2013 relative to previous years according to the Ministry
of Home Affairs report. 1 Infiltration in Kashmir decreased, terrorism in the hinterland
was kept under control, the levels of violence in the Naxal affected states showed a
decline, and the Northeast of India, while witnessing communal violence, and inflicted
by several armed groups, remained by and large peaceful. Steps were taken to strengthen
the internal security institutional apparatuses like the National Investigation Agency
(NIA), the Multi Agency Centre (MAC), and a Combating Financing Terrorism Cell
(CFC) within the MHA established in 2012. With regard to border management, the
fencing of the Indo-Bangladesh and Indo-Pakistan border, floodlighting of the borders
as well as establishment of several new Integrated Check Posts (ICPs) were a priority
for the Department of Border Management along with road-building along the India-China
and India-Nepal borders. However, certain major challenges remained as in seen from
the trend analysis of 2013. The Kashmir valley continued to remain violence prone,
Naxalism remained active in the affected areas, the armed groups in the Northeast did
not disarm, and communal tensions and terror strikes in vulnerable areas continued.
The porous international land borders also continued to suffer from illegal infiltration
and arms transfers. This Internal Security Issue Brief offers an assessment of the major
trends in 2013 for Jammu and Kashmir , the land borders of India , Naxalism , the
Northeast , terrorism and radicalism in India . It also offers a prognosis for the year
ahead. Jammu and Kashmir - S.K. Sharma Trends in 2013 The situation in Jammu and
Kashmir (J and K), as of now, is calm. But this calm could always prove deceptive.
Right now, there are no agitations, no stone pelting, and no large scale strikes/demonstrations.
During 2013, tourists went to Kashmir in good numbers and there were no large scale
infiltration. However, Kashmiri youth were particularly angry after Mohammad Afzal
Guru was hanged on February 9, 2013 virtually bringing the Kashmir Valley to the
standstill. Hence, while these youths may not come on to the streets and protest but
they have internalized the anger and that is dangerous. One wrong step by the state
could create trouble. Those who monitor the social networking sites can understand
how radicalized Kashmiri youth have become. There are reports that Muslim youths
from J and K have started joining militant outfits, particularly the Lashkar-e-Taiba
(LeT). Both the factions of Hurriyat continued to highlight the human rights violations
by the security forces. The faction led by Mirwaiz Umar Farooq observed human rights
week from December 5, 2013 during which its supporters organized seminars, exhibitions
and documentaries showing how the Indian security forces are engaged in human rights
abuses in Kashmir. Earlier, Al Umar Mujahideen chief who has been dormant for a
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few years made a call to observe October 27, 2013 as a Black Day in Kashmir. Similar
calls were issued by both the factions of Hurriyat and Hizbul Mujahideen supremo
Syed Salahuddin. There were mixed reactions in the Valley on the meeting between
the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan on the sidelines of the United Nations General
Assembly in September 2013. While hardliner Hurriyat leader Syed Ali Shah Geelani
termed the meeting as a 'futile diplomatic move', Mirwaiz Umar Farooq led Hurriyat
called it a "bold initiative". Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) Chairman
Yasin Malik said that there was need for sincere efforts in solving the Kashmir issue.
He said that reiterating old stands and taking cosmetic measures could not be termed
as negotiations. Later he questioned Pakistan about its role in India-Pakistan talks. He
wanted to know what Pakistan has done when Kashmiris have been suffering since the
last 60 years. Four separate delegations led by Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, Syed Geelani,
Yasin Malik and Dukhtarain Millat chief Asiya Andrabi met Sartaj Aziz, Adviser on
Kashmir Affairs to Pakistan Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif in New Delhi on November
10, 2013. During the meeting with Aziz, the Kashmiri leaders reportedly conveyed
their stand that no ready-made solution to Kashmir will be accepted and Kashmiri
leadership must be taken on board as the principal party to the dispute. As is usual,
Aziz reaffirmed that Pakistan will continue to support Kashmiris morally, diplomatically
and politically till its final resolution. In a dramatic turn of events in the beginning of
year 2014, the Hurriyat led by Mirwaiz suffered another split as Democratic Freedom
Party President Shabir Ahmad Shah, National Front Chairman Nayeem Ahmad Khan
and Mahaz-e-Azadi chief Azam Inqalibi announced the formation of a third faction of
the Hurriyat Conference, calling it the "Real Hurriyat". The split reportedly came after
Mirwaiz had addressed a letter to the Convener of Hurriyat in Pakistan occupied Kashmir
(PoK), Yousuf Naseem, asking him not to entertain these leaders as part of Hurriyat.
State assembly elections are due in J and K in October 2014. Peoples' Conference has
decided to contest elections. It's Chairman Sajjad Gani Lone while admitting the role
of militants in Kashmir said that people in Kashmir want a negotiated settlement. So
far Hurriyat has not shown its willingness to join the election fray but a positive statement
was made by one of the senior Hurriyat leader, Abdul Gani Bhat, saying that extremism
does not play a positive role in the South Asian region as both India and Pakistan are
in possession of nuclear weapons. While Congress and National Conference alliance
is likely to continue, there are reports that Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) may join
hands with BJP after the elections if the latter wins sizeable seats in Jammu region.
People in Kashmir are watching the victory of Aam Admi Party (AAP) in Delhi with
great enthusiasm. The AAP has also started its membership drive in the state. The year
2014 will throw up challenges for Kashmir with the withdrawal of U.S. forces from
Afghanistan. The Taliban's continuing presence in south-east and eastern parts of
Afghanistan and the alliances it has with the Haqqani Network and other terrorist groups
in Pakistan pose a serious threat of increased radicalism in Pakistan with a consequent
effect on India particularly in Kashmir. The Taliban and its allies can not only launch
attacks in India or Indian interests in the region but also spearhead the growth of Salafism
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in the sub-continent. It may be mentioned that Al Qaeda, the Taliban as also Tehrik-e-Taliban
Pakistan (TTP) have declared their intentions to target India. As the LeT has been
closely being watched by the world community after the 26/11 attacks, it is likely that
ISI may put Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) to activate jihad in Kashmir. JeM chief Mohammad
Azhar who has been keeping a low profile, has been closely associated with Al Qaeda
and Taliban. It is in this context the Army Chief, General Bikram Singh has justified
the presence of Army personnel in the state on the grounds that there were reports
warning of "spillover from Afghanistan in J&K in 2014 after the withdrawal of US
troops." Moreover, 42 training camps including 25 in PoK are still active in Pakistan
where 2500 militants belonging to LeT, JeM, HuJI and HM are undergoing training.
As of now there are about 200 militants active in Kashmir. According to Director
General of Police, J and K Ashok Prasad, these militants have started targeting security
forces in the state as part of their changed strategy to increase the violence graph, which
has witnessed steep decline in the last four years as only 130 militancy related incidents
were reported in 2013. Land Borders - Pushpita Das Trends in 2013 Two contradictory
trends were observed along the country's land borders in the year 2013. While on one
hand incidences of cross-border firing, infiltrations attempts and intrusions had increased
remarkably leading to tensions and insecurity, on the other, cross-border trade registered
substantial upsurge both in terms of volume and value. 2013 also witnessed concrete
institutional measures being put in place to reduce frictions along India's land borders
as well as to boost cross-border trade. As stated above, security situations along
India-Pakistan border [both International Boundary (IB) in Jammu and the Line of
Control (LoC)], the Line of Actual Control (LoAC) along India-China and India-Myanmar
border deteriorated. Along the India-Pakistan border, there were 196 cases of ceasefire
violations in 2013 as compared to 93 in 2012. Similarly, the IB recorded 149 cases of
trans-border firing by Pakistani Rangers. The LoAC also remained tensed throughout
the year with reports of frequent transgressions by the Peoples' Liberation Army (PLA)
into Indian territory. One such transgression by the PLA in Depsang bulge area in
Daulet Beg Oldie sector in April resulted in a 21 days standoff between the armies of
the two countries. Even the hitherto 'peaceful' India-Myanmar border experienced
moments of disturbances when in August 2013 Myanmar's army tried to set up camps
inside Indian territory and local people protested against the construction of border
fences in Manipur. Given the frequent cross-border firings and intrusions, which created
huge political and diplomatic unease between India and its neighbours, measures were
taken to resolve these issues through interactions and dialogues. Thus, on October 23rd,
India and China signed the Border Defence Cooperation Agreement (BDCA) to strengthen
peace and stability at the border. The BDCA, inter alia , stipulates periodic meetings
at various levels to ensure better flow of information and understandings among the
border guarding forces of India and China. Similarly, the institutional mechanism of
meeting of the Director Generals of Military Operations (DGsMOs) of India and Pakistan
which had lain defunct for 15 years was revived and the DGsMOs of the two countries
met on December 24th to discuss the issue of ceasefire violations along the LoC. Despite
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tensions at the borders, cross-border trade-both border trade and overland normal trade
registered impressive growth in 2013. The inclusion of 12 additional items to the import
list in 2012 resulted in increased border trade across India-China border. While at Nathu
La trade increased by 23 per cent, at Shipki La it registered a growth of 380 per cent
with a total turnover of Rs. 5.33 crore. Similarly, efficient functioning of the integrated
check posts (ICP) at Attari and the opening of the ICP at Agartala in November 2013
boosted overland trade between India-Pakistan and India-Bangladesh considerably.
Buoyed by such encouraging trends, Meghalaya and Tripura proposed opening up of
more border haats with Bangladesh. On the flip side, smuggling of contraband such as
cattle, drugs and narcotics have shown increasing trends across all the borders. For
instances, along India-Bangladesh border contraband worth Rs. 16234 lakh was
confiscated in 2013 compared to Rs. 10329 Lakhs in 2012. The corresponding figures
for India-Nepal border were Rs. 10153 lakh and Rs. 3847 lakh respectively. Expected
Trends in 2014 The LoC and the IB in Jammu will witness increasing attempts of
infiltration by terrorists fuelled by the proposed withdrawal of American forces from
Afghanistan and the expected diversion of Jihadis to Kashmir by Pakistan. As a result
incidences of ceasefire violations along the LoC and IB will also rise in 2014. The
effectiveness of the DGsMOs meetings which has been revived in 2013 will be severely
tested under these circumstances. The LoAC will also continue to experience transgressions
by the PLA, but these incidents might not result in prolonged standoffs between India
and China as witnessed in April 2013 because even though they cannot prevent
transgressions, the mechanisms set up under the BACD are expected to resolve such
issues at the local levels itself. With the Border Security Force (BSF) taking over the
Myanmar border from the Assam Rifles, it is expected that security situation along this
international border shall gradually improve in 2014. The construction of fences and
roads along the India-Pakistan and India-Bangladesh borders will not be completed in
2014 as expected given that forest clearances and other issues continue to delay the
implementation of these projects. Smuggling of contraband and trafficking of drugs,
narcotics and arms will continue, but cases of seizures of contraband are expected to
go up as well given the strengthening of border guarding along India-Nepal and
India-Myanmar borders. Over land trade with Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal is
expected to grow considerably in 2014 as new ICPs will be inaugurated and existing
ones will continue to function efficiently. However, if the domestic political situation
in Bangladesh deteriorates, it would have an adverse effect not only on the peace and
tranquillity at the border but also on the bilateral trade. Naxalism - P. V. Ramana Trends
in 2013 The year past (2013) has reported comparatively fewer fatalities in Naxalite
violence than in the past three years (2010-2012), as the following table indicates.
Parameter 2010 2011 2012 2013 Incidents 2213 1760 1415 1076 Civilians Killed 720
469 301 267 SF Killed 285 142 114 114 Naxals Killed 172 99 74 99 Total Fatalities
1177 710 489 480 Note: Data for 2013 till December 15 Source: Ministry of Home
Affairs, New Delhi Thus the total number of fatalities has been 1177 in 2010, 710 in
2011, 489 in 2012 and 480 in 2013. This reduction in the violence profile could be
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attributed to two factors: increased security force (SF) operations and a tactical retreat
by the Naxalites/Maoists. Besides, as the Prime Minister noted at the Annual Conference
of Director Generals of Police, on November 23, 2013, the reduction in violence: "... is
a result of the combined efforts of the Central and State Governments and is a really
encouraging development. It is important that we don't let up on our efforts to root out
the menace of naxalism and continue to build on our successes." Significantly, elections
to the Legislative Assembly of Chhattisgarh, the hot-bed of Maoist activities, were
conducted rather peacefully and successfully with stray incidents of violence. The
polling percentage, too, was quite high. In this context the Prime Minister said: [it]
clearly underlines the faith of the local population in processes of our functioning
democracy." There have been continued efforts by the Maoists to expand their urban
presence and network. For instance, Prashant Rahi, an Electrical Engineer by training,
and Hem Mishra, a former student, were arrested in September and August, respectively,
in the year past, by Gadchiroli Police, Mahrashtra, for allegedly functioning as couriers
between the Maoists and their urban front-men. The police, according to media reports,
claimed that "the [two] were involved in expanding Maoists' urban base". Responding
to a question in the Lok Sabha, on August 13, 2013, the Minister of State for Home
Affairs maintained that the Maoists said: "... the 'front organizations' of the banned
CPI (Maoist) party as well as organizations sympathetic to the said outfit have been
supporting the cause of the workers employed in factories. Their objective is essentially
to exploit the situation to gain a foot-hold among the working class... Briefly stated, the
strategy for urban areas of the country includes mobilization and organization of the
working classes, building a united front of classes similarly placed to the working
classes and military tactics involving sabotage actions and select assassinations by
'action teams'." He, however, went on to add: "till now, they have failed to make any
significant headway in the urban areas of India". Further, a number of Maoist front
organizations are reported to be active in various parts of the country, especially in
towns and cities (urban areas). Thus according to a media report of October 7, 2013,
the government has identified 128 front organizations. The media report further added
that "17 such organizations [are] operating in Jharkhand, 13 in Andhra Pradesh, 12 in
Karnataka, 10 each in Bihar and Odisha, nine each in Delhi, Maharashtra and [West]
Bengal, eight in Haryana, six in Chhattisgarh, four each in Karnataka and Tamil Nadu
and six in Gujarat." A significant development towards the end of the year was the
surrender of Gumudavelli Venkata Krishna Prasad @ Gudsa Usendi, a native of Warangal
district, Andhra Pradesh, who was the spokesperson of the fiercest guerrilla zone of
the Maoists, the Dandakaranya Special Zone (DKSZ). He carried a reward of Rs 20
lakh. As the General Elections to the Lok Sabha draw closer in 2014, the Maoists might
possibly escalate violence and might execute some spectacular action because it would
give them publicity, as they have done in the past. The determination of the various
State governments and of the Union government would play a significant role in
addressing the Maoist challenge. The security forces would need to not let their guard
down in fighting the Maoists. At the same time, as the Prime Minister noted on November
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23, 2013: "we also have to improve the quality of governance and the pace of development
in the naxal-affected areas. I would also like to emphasize here the need to maintain
the centrality of the local police forces in any anti-naxal operation and the need to
sensitize the security forces being inducted into any of the naxal-affected areas to the
socio-cultural practices of the local people." Northeast India - Namrata Goswami Trends
in 2013 Located in the cusp of Bangladesh, Bhutan, China and Myanmar and home to
various ethnic communities, Northeast India is one of the most panoramic and strategic
landscape of India. The significance of this region has only grown over the years with
its land linkages to Southeast Asia, and the 1, 080 km disputed border that it shares
with China. The year 2013 witnessed some significant developments in this region,
which had both regional and strategic implications. China-India Border Dispute and
Arunachal Pradesh: China claims the northeastern state of Arunachal Pradesh as its
territory. There are two aspects to this claim. The first is directly connected to the issue
of the Tawang monastery which being the second most important monastery has
resonance for China's legitimacy over Tibet. The second is the issue of diverting the
river Brahmaputra (Yarlung Tsangpo in Tibet), which would stress the people of
Northeast India who depend on this river for transport and other livelihood issues.
Intrusions by China across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Arunachal Pradesh
were reported in 2013. In October 2013, a Border Defence Cooperation Agreement
(BDCA) was signed between China and India during the visit of Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh to China. 2 Both sides agreed to refrain from military offensives at
the border and share information on military exercises near the LAC through regular
border personnel meetings. It however remains to be seen whether the BDCA would
put a stop to intrusions in 2014 given the differing perceptions of the LAC. Assam:
Talks were held between the Union and Assam governments and the United Liberation
Front of Asom (ULFA) in 2013 in which the Union government agreed to address one
of the core demands of the outfit, namely the granting of Scheduled Tribe (ST) status
to five communities in Assam: Moran, Motok, Chutia, Koch-Rajbongshi and Tai-Ahom.
ST status guarantees land rights and reserved seats in the Assam state assembly to these
communities. Two other issues that the peace talks generated was the granting of work
permits to Bangladeshi immigrants settled in Assam, as well as not granting citizenship
to their children by birth. These issues have political and social resonance in Assam as
the issue of illegal Bangladeshi migration into Assam is a thorny issue for the state.
However, 2013 also witnessed voices raised against the ULFA by the Terror Victim's
Forum (TVF), an organization that showcases the plight of victims of the insurgency.
The TVF does not support general amnesty for the ULFA, culpable in crimes that killed
their family members. Instead, they want the leaders and cadres to be tried in court and
duly punished under the law. 2013 also reflected a growing discontentment within the
pro-talk ULFA with middle rung leaders and cadres accusing Rajkhowa of failing to
keep the peace talks with the government transparent. This includes leaders of the 28th
battalion who have expressed unhappiness with the secrecy maintained by Rajkhowa
and the Central Committee about the peace talks with the state. There is also growing
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demand to extradite Anup Chetia from Bangladesh. The other significant obstacle that
the peace talks faced in 2013 was the non-involvement of Paresh Barua and the anti-talk
faction of the outfit despite Assam Governor J B Patnaik stating in September 2013
that Paresh Barua should come for talks. This issue will continue to limit the effectiveness
and legitimacy of the talks in 2014. The Assam-Nagaland border remained tensed in
2013 due to the violent altercations between the ethnic communities living at the border
villages. December 2013 witnessed clashes between the Rengma Nagas and the Karbis
after 9 decomposed bodies of Karbi men were found near Dimapur, one of whom was
a Karbi student leader. The cycle of retaliatory violence appeared to be provoked by
the targeting of the Rengma Nagas by Karbi militants in Karbi Anglong district. This
is a negative development between two communities that have lived together for decades
without violence. This episode will now become a part of ethnic historical memory and
could cause more tensions in 2014 unless there is a community approach developed to
talk to each other. Manipur: Manipur continued to remain violence affected in 2013.
In order to address this issue, Memorandum of Understandings (MoUs) was signed
between the Manipur state government and three militant groups: Kangleipak Communist
Party-Nongdreinkhomba (KCP-N), Kuki National Liberation Front (KNLF) and the
Kuki Revolutionary Party (KRP). By signing the MoUs, the three armed groups agreed
to give up arms and start peace talks on September 9, 2013. The MoUs were however
limited to these three groups and dominant armed groups in Manipur especially the
United National Liberation Front of Manipur (UNLF), the People's Revolutionary
Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK), the People's Liberation Army of Manipur (PLA) and
its political wing, the Revolutionary People's Front (RPF) were not a part of the process.
Violent differences continued between the National Socialist Council of Nagalim led
by Isak Chisi Sw---NSCN (IM) and the Meitei armed groups, with little meeting ground.
The differences between the armed groups, as well as the inability of state forces to
incentivize the three dominant Meitei armed groups to come for peace talks will continue
to result in violence in Manipur in 2014. Nagaland: Peace talks between the NSCN
(IM) and the Union government continued in 2013. However, an increasing trend was
the growing anger of local Naga populations at the extortion networks ran by the armed
groups in Nagaland resulting in a refusal to pay. This saw coercive methods employed
by the NSCN (IM), in which two Sumi Naga women were allegedly molested, resulting
in the powerful Sumi Hoho cutting off ties with the NSCN (IM). This trend will continue
in 2014 only vindicating the fact that state law enforcement agencies need to get their
act together and ensure that such extortion networks cannot function with impunity.
Look East Policy: India's look east policy and the importance of Northeast got a booster
in 2013 when representatives from Southeast Asian nations participated in a two day
North East business summit in Dibrugarh in November 2013. The High Commissioner
of Brunei, Darussalam and chairman of the Association of South East Asian Nations
(ASEAN) Dato Paduka Haji Sidek Ali,) stated in his valedictory address that only
connectivity and easy access to markets and investments could bolster the trade and
commerce activities in the Northeast. The summit addressed issues of agriculture,
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management and tourism in which Northeast and ASEAN could successfully collaborate.
Land connectivity through Myanmar was stressed and the political reform and re-entry
of the United States into Myanmar significantly alters the strategic landscape for
Northeast India given the proximity of China to this region and the geo-political
competition for influence that the US and China are involved in. This trend towards
opening up, speedy development of the tri-lateral highway, and higher levels of trade
with continue in 2014. One however has to be mindful of the armed ethnic conflicts in
Myanmar, the flow of drugs and arms from there to Northeast India, and the closeness
of China to some of the Myanmar armed groups, in order to get a deeper strategic sense
of how the opening up may have dual consequences for Northeast, both positive and
negative. Enhancing the positives and mitigating the negatives will remain a challenge
for India in 2014. Following trends can be speculated in 2014: Radicalisation of youth
will continue to be a major challenge. Factors such as polarization of society on communal
lines will fuel radicalisation. Terror outfits like IM will strive for more assistance and
support from foreign countries. Attempts at terror strikes will be made despite the arrest
of Yasin Bhatkal. It is believed that Tehsen Akthar (one of the closest aide of Yasin
Bhatkal) has been given the responsibilities that Yasin Bhatkal used to look after. Riyaz
Bhatkal and Iqbal Bhatkal will continue to plan for terror operations within India from
Pakistan. The LeT will spread its tentacles to major parts of India beyond Jammu and
Kashmir (J&K). Radical outfits such as Popular Front of India (PFI), Karnataka Forum
for Dignity (KFD), etc may play important roles in catering to the needs of IM and
LeT. There may rise a need for better cooperation among the South Asian states
(especially between India and Pakistan) to curb terrorism post United States withdrawal.
India and Maldives: Ties Must Be Consolidated
Tue, Jan 14, 2014
Maldives, IDSA, international,
Mr Abdulla Yameen Abdul Gayoom, the President of Maldives, visited India from
January 1-4, 2014. His decision to visit India first, after his election in November 2013,
is an indication that he wants to repair India-Maldives relations which had received a
setback since President Nasheed was deposed in February 2012.
Maldives has undergone considerable political turbulence in 2012-13. The presidential
election held on September 7, 2013 was annulled by the Supreme Court over allegation
of voting irregularities. The court also cancelled the second round planned on September
28, because none of the candidates could poll more than 50 per cent of the votes. In the
annulled election former President Mohamed Nasheed of Maldivian Democratic Party
(MDP) had secured 45.45 per cent, while Abdullah Yameen of the Progressive Party
of Maldives (PPM) came second with 25.35 per cent of the votes.
In the first round of election held subsequently on November 9, 2013, Nasheed won
about 47 per cent of votes leaving behind his nearest rival Abdulla Yameen at 30 per
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cent. However, in the second round of election, Abdulla Yameen, getting the support
of other opposition parties, managed to get 51.39 per cent, compared to 48.61 percent
for Nasheed. The turnaround in Yameen's fortunes happened as all opponents of
Nasheed joined hands to isolate and defeat him.
During 2012-13, India-Maldives relations suffered considerably. The Maldivian
Government terminated the Indian company GMR contract of the Male airport on
allegations of irregularity in awarding the project. The former President Nasheed had
to take shelter in the Indian embassy in 2013 due to violent protests on the streets of
Male.
During the visit, Mr Yameen was effusive in praising India. He said, "In every hour of
national distress, be it a foreign terrorist coup attempt as with the 1988 mercenary attack
or a natural catastrophe such as the 2004 Asian Tsunami, India helped us wholeheartedly
and generously in restoring normalcy to the lives of our people.
The 1981 trade agreement between the two countries provides for export of essential
commodities and bilateral trade has grown to Rs.700 crores (See Table-1 below). India
imports scrap metals from Maldives while its exports include agriculture and poultry
produce, sugar, fruits, vegetables, spices, rice, flour (atta), textiles, drugs and medicines,
a variety of engineering and industrial products, sand and aggregate, cement for building,
etc. In June 2011, India released three-year quota for export of essential commodities
like Stone Aggregates, Rice, Wheat Flour, Sugar, Dal, Onion, Potato and Eggs from
India to Maldives.
During President Yameen's visit, further attention was paid to strengthen bilateral trade
and investment. The Indian Prime Minister highlighted the key agreements and decisions
based on the joint statement .
India and Maldives have also agreed to enhance connectivity, set up a joint consultative
commission, promote investments, and step up security cooperation between the two
countries.
Security cooperation is a highly significant dimension of bilateral cooperation. The
joint statement recognises that "security interests of both the countries are interlinked".
Within the institutional framework of security cooperation, India and Maldives have
agreed to enhance anti-terrorism cooperation and intensify cooperation in the areas of
training and capacity building of the Maldives National Defence Force and the Maldives
Police Service.
A notable feature of the joint declaration is that it recognises India-Maldivian cooperation
not only in the context of South Asia but also in the context of the Indian Ocean.
Importantly, Maldives is willing to acknowledge India's role in regional integration.
"The two leaders shared the confidence that cooperation at the bilateral, sub-regional
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and regional levels will enable the two countries to realise their developmental aspirations,
and contribute to peace, prosperity and security in the Indian Ocean Region and South
Asia".
The two leaderships must take the process forward and address each other's concerns.
The Maldivian President should walk the talk and try to resolve the contentious GMR
issue quickly to help restore investors' confidence in his country. He should also reassure
India of the reports of growing Chinese presence in the country.
India on its part should help Maldives in building its economy and addressing the needs
of its manpower development. India should also provide developmental assistance to
Maldives the way it has done for Bhutan. The Framework agreement of November
2011 and 2014 joint declaration provide the ground for deepening of the ties.
No doubt there are many factors of instability operating in Maldives. Internal politics
in Maldives has been volatile lately. A stable democracy in Maldives is in India's
interest. It is fortunate that the results of the November 2013 elections were accepted
by all concerned.
India-South Korea Relations: A New Beginning
Wed, Jan 29, 2014
IDSA, international, South Korea,
India and South Korea enjoy warm and friendly relations. However despite its strong
economic foundation, the relationship has so far failed to realize its full potential.
During the visit, both Park and Manmohan Singh presented the following three elements
as a common vision: stronger high level political cooperation, open economic and trade
environment and deeper cultural understanding. they agreed to set the following policy
directions: strengthening bilateral strategic communication channels in the political
and security field; consolidating the institutional framework for economic cooperation
and creating more favourable conditions for further expansion of trade and investment;
deepening mutual understanding by expanding cultural exchanges and people-to-people
interactions and last but not the least, closely cooperating with each other as partners
on the regional and international stages to address common challenges of mankind so
as to usher in a new era of prosperity for the international community. Both the countries
signed nine pacts, including the Agreement on the Protection of Classified Military
Information, the MoU on Joint applied research, the conclusion of negotiations for
revision of the existing Double Taxation Avoidance Convention, etc.
One of the major focus of Park's visit was to discuss about the final clearance for the
multi billion dollar POSCO Steel Plant and the Port project in Odisha, which is one of
the major South Korean ventures in India.
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Both the leaders agreed that sustaining trade growth and expanding economic exchanges
are vital for a stronger India-South Korea relation. Over the years, the relationship has
witnessed tremendous growth in the economic sector. The enforcement of the
Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) in 2010 has helped in
boosting trade relations from $12 billion in 2008 to $20 billion in 2011. It is projected
to reach $40 billion by 2015. While taking advantage of the domestic market in India,
South Korean firms (Hyundai, Samsung, LG, etc) have performed quite well here. They
also agreed to establish a Joint Trade and Investment Promotion Committee at the
cabinet level. The two sides also agreed to establish a CEOs Forum comprising of
captains of the industry and commerce from both sides to provide new ideas for deepening
bilateral economic ties.
As for defense cooperation, in recent years, both the countries have not only conducted
joint naval exercises, but also working together on defense R&D and anti-piracy
operations in the Gulf of Aden.
South Korea has an ambitious space programme and it has been looking for international
partners. India's cost-effective space launches are attractive to Seoul, particularly after
the recent success of Chandrayaan The two countries also agreed to increase collaboration
in the peaceful uses of space science and technology. While appreciating the contribution
of the Science and Technology Cooperation Fund worth $10 million towards joint
research projects since 2011, the two countries agreed to create an additional fund of
$10 million (with a contribution of $5 million by each side) to promote joint mega
projects.
India-South Korea relations have come a long way since the establishment of their
diplomatic relationship in 1973. Throughout the Cold War, the ideological differences
largely deterred the two countries from realizing the full potential of the relationship.
The growing economic interaction since India's economic liberalization pushed both
to explore the possibility of cooperation in areas of mutual interest. Of course India's
growing emphasis on its 'Look East Policy' and South Korea's 'New Asia Diplomatic
Initiative' has helped elevate the relationship to one of 'strategic partnership.' In the
coming years, the two can expand their sphere of cooperation in areas like intelligence
sharing, infrastructure development projects (e.g., shipping). At the multilateral level,
they can even explore the possibility of cooperation with countries like Japan in sectors
like maritime security, counter terrorism, drug trafficking, climate change, UNPKOs,
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities, etc.
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Governance in Northern Province of Sri Lanka: Stresses and Strains
Tue, Jan 21, 2014
IDSA, international, Sri Lanka,
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Post-CHOGM Dilemmas of Rajapaksa
Wed, Jan 15, 2014
IDSA, international, CHOGM, Sri Lanka,
The Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) took place in Colombo,
Sri Lanka in November, 2013. The theme for this year's CHOGM was "Growth with
Equity: Inclusive Development". Of the 50 countries that attended the meeting 1 , 27
were represented by their Heads of State. They adopted the Colombo Declaration on
Sustainable, Inclusive and Equitable Development. 2 While many issues were discussed,
however, media attention was focussed on the reactions of various countries to the
human rights records of Mahinda Rajapaksa regime.
calls of boycott in Sri Lanka because of the alleged war crime committed by the Sri
Lankan military the Prime Ministers of Canada, India and Mauritius among others
decided not to attend the meet reportedly to express their concerns against the Lankan
government's atrocities on the Tamils. The prime minister of UK, David Cameron, on
the other hand, decided to attend the meet and raise his concerns on alleged human
rights violations.
Even Japan's Special Envoy for Peace-Building, Rehabilitation and Reconciliation in
Sri Lanka Yashushi Akashi, who had, in his previous visits, complemented Rajapaksa
government for its efforts and requested international community to have patience,
modified his views during his five day visit in December 2013 and stated that it was
not only the International Community but also The Sri Lankans who were anxiously
"waiting for action and not just sound and fury". 6
Although the Lankan Government as well as the main opposition party United National
Party (UNP) vehemently rejected international investigation, pressure on the government
seems to be building up. There are possibilities of meeting serious consequences in the
UNHRC in March 2014.
Colombo had thought that the CHOGM would provide an opportunity to project its
developmental activities (infrastructure) and reconstruction of the post-war economy
to the world. In reality, however, it provided the world the ground situation While
driving through Jaffna, Cameron's convoy was mobbed by demonstrators carrying
photographs of their loved ones who disappeared during and after the war.
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Participants in the CHOGM also came face to face with the restrictions on peaceful
protest and freedom of expression. People coming from the North to participate in a
human rights festival in Colombo were stopped by security forces
There is a view in Lanka that CHOGM did more harm than good. In fact many are now
questioning the wisdom of the government to host the meet. The government could
only ensure participation, which is the lowest in the history of CHOGM.
Rejecting the March 2014 deadline by Cameron to hold credible investigations, Rajapaksa
reportedly said that "it was extremely unfair to issue such ultimata when the government
was already working towards genuine reconciliation"
As the chair of the commonwealth for next two years and a signatory to the final
communique which talked about freedom of expression, freedom of religion and
protection of human rights, it is the responsibility of the Lankan government to take
some affirmative measures on these issues in the island.
However, caught up in a self-propelled internal debate in Sri Lanka on the justifiability
of 'international investigation', the Rajapaksa government's damage-control diplomacy
seems to be spending more time on buying time rather than initiating concrete measures
to convince the international community of its intentions.
It seems thus probable that Rajapaksa will continue with his nationalist rhetoric to rally
around solid domestic support behind him to duck the threat of UNHRC-driven
investigation, even at the cost of risking international opprobrium. Some commentators
in Sri Lanka even believe that there are high chances of Rajapaksa advancing the date
of Presidential election in 2014 12 to prolong his stay in office by re-fuelling electoral
support through his inflexible nationalist stance, this time, on human rights.
Measures for Improving Management of National Security
Thu, Jan 16, 2014
defense, IDSA, National Security,
India faces multiple external and internal security threats and challenges, but its response
to defeat these successfully has often been inadequate. India's response is usually
marked by knee jerk reactions that fail to optimise the capacities of various organs of
the state.
The first and foremost item on the government's defence and national security reforms
agenda should be the formulation of a comprehensive National Security Strategy (NSS),
including that for internal security. The NSS should be formulated after carrying out
an inter-departmental, inter-agency, multi-disciplinary strategic defence review
The armed forces are now in the second year of the 12th Defence Plan (2012-17) and
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it has not yet been formally approved with full financial backing by the Cabinet
Committee on Security (CCS).
The inability to speedily conclude major defence contracts to enhance national security
preparedness in the face of growing threats and challenges, exemplifies the government's
challenges in grappling with systemic flaws in the procurement procedures and processes.
Despite having formulated the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) and the Defence
Production Policy (DPrP), the government has been unable to reduce bureaucratic red
tape and defence modernisation continues to stagnate. It
While internal security challenges are gradually gaining prominence, preparations for
conventional conflict must not be neglected. Major defence procurement decisions must
be made quickly. The navy waited for long for INS Vikramaditya (Admiral Gorshkov)
aircraft carrier, which has been refurbished in a Russian shipyard at exorbitant cost and
with operationally unacceptable time overruns. Construction of the indigenous air
defence ship has also been delayed.
With the defence budget languishing at less than 2.0 per cent of India's GDP compared
with China's 3.5 per cent and Pakistan's 4.5 per cent plus US military aid - it will not
be possible for the armed forces to undertake any meaningful modernisation.
The government must immediately appoint a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) or a
permanent Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee to provide single-point advice
to the CCS on military matters and to synergise operational plans as well as capital
acquisitions.
Malkangiri: The Tri-junction under Maoist Fire
Thu, Jan 23, 2014
naxalism, IDSA, social, internal security,
In most of the cases, the Maoists had killed the civilians by branding them as police
informers. Out of 30 districts in the state the Maoists have influence over 18 with a
strong presence in six districts-- Malknagiri, Koraput, Rayagada, Gajapati, Nuapada
and Sundargarh.
The Malkangiri district received maximum violence because: first, the Maoists are in
revenge mode to boost the morale of their cadres by targeting security forces and killing
village level political leaders in Jana Adalats by branding them as police informers;
secondly, as part of the Tactical Counter Offensive Campaign (TCOC), the Maoists
believe that the ground they lost in Padia, Kalimela and Motu area of Malkangiri can
be regained by terrorising the tribal people, who are caught in the crossfire between
them and the state. The free movement of the Maoists are also affected in these districts
due to the presence of security forces and therefore they want to strike terror in the
security forces and drive them out of the terrain.
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Third, from the guerrilla operational point of view, the district has an ideal location
because it is situated in a tri-junction where the borders of Odisha, Andhra Pradesh and
Chhattisgarh meet. Fourth, the Maoists want to divert the attention of the security forces
from their new found shelter zone in the Sunabeda forests, which shares border with
Chhattisgarh by intensifying activities in Malkangiri.
Saudi Arabia's Nuclear Thinking and the Pakistani Connection
Tue, Jan 7, 2014
Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, nuclear, IDSA, international,
Two recent developments have generated concerns among non-proliferation advocates.
A recent BBC report allegedly claimed that Saudi Arabia invested in developing nuclear
weapons made in Pakistan which are now ready for delivery to the Kingdom nation.
The second event relates to the recently concluded nuclear deal between Iran and the
global powers. Given the apprehension that Riyadh possesses of Tehran, the Kingdom
nation believes that the emerging rapprochement between the United States and the
Iran will prove inimical to the interests of the ideologically differing Saudi Arabia.
Riyadh anticipates that in the long run a nuclear Iran will be emboldened in Saudi
Arabia's proxy conflicts with Iran in states like Palestine, Bahrain, Yemen and most
recently Syria. At present, there is enormous skepticism prevailing the nuclear deal will
between Iran and the P5+1 countries will persuade Tehran to renounce its nuclear
weapons programme. President Hassan Rouhani has already emphasized in an interview
to the Financial Times that Iran will not fully dismantle its nuclear programme as part
of a comprehensive agreement. The Iran nuclear deal is yet to reach a comprehensive
conclusion on its strategic programme about which Saudi Arabia has expressed its
strong apprehension and skepticism. Whether Iran will relinquish its nuclear programme
as demanded by the western powers, Israel and the Arab states including Riyadh is not
known.
There are alleged information suggesting Riyadh is beefing up its military links with
Islamabad to counter Tehran's expansionist plans either by acquiring atomic weapons
from Islamabad or a pledge of nuclear cover
Conventionally, Saudi Arabia has been a strong advocate of a Weapons of Mass
Destruction Free Zone (WMDFZ) in the Middle East since the early 1970s. This has
been the stated nuclear non-proliferation official and nuclear disarmament policy of all
Arab States including Saudi Arabia. It firmly advocates that it is in the best interests
of all states including Israel and Iran to relinquish their nuclear weapons.
The interim nuclear pact reached between Iran and the world powers have been received
with guarded approval within the Saudi Arabia. Unlike the Israeli Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu, the Saudi Arabian government has maintained a discreet silence
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over the Iranian nuclear deal in Geneva emphasizing Riyadh's distrust on the pact
The emerging US-Iran rapprochement could be a harbinger of a Tehran's policy of
appeasement towards Washington. Continued policy of appeasement towards the US
could benefit Iran to progress on its nuclear programme in the long term.
'Arab Spring': Implications for India
Thu, Jan 2, 2014
IDSA, international, Arab Spring, middle east,
The wave of poplar protests called 'Arab Spring' started in Tunisia in December 2010
when the people protested against their ruler Ben Ali who then fled to Saudi Arabia.
This raised hopes among millions of other citizens in the neighbouring Arab countries.
Thus, within a short span of time the protests spread to other countries like Algeria,
Libya, Jordan, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Bahrain, Yemen and some other Gulf countries. The
demands of the protesters varied from country to country but in general it included
demands for political freedom, social freedom, press freedom, improved human rights
conditions, economic betterment etc. The demands reflect a desire among the masses,
particularly the new generation of young and educated, to be liberated from the reins
of the old and authoritarian leadership and play a role in the decision making process
of the state. Till date, the protests have overthrown four long serving dictators -- Ben
Ali of Tunisia, Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, Muammar Gaddafi of Libya and Ali Abdullah
Saleh of Yemen. While the Bashar Al Assad regime in Syria is struggling for its survival,
other countries have successfully managed to suppress the protests against the regimes
either by crackdown by the security forces or by promising economic and political
reforms.
This has brought the region a new contour - a wave of protests for democratic reforms
in an otherwise authoritarian Arab world. The regime change also carries with it the
potentials of change in policies towards the neighbourhood and beyond. Throughout
the uprisings, the major regional countries have fought political and diplomatic wars
among themselves trying to assert their influence over the region. The Shia-Sunni war
of words has come to the fore during the protests. The outside powers have taken the
opportunity to strengthen their interests by intervening in the conflicts. On the whole,
the regional security scenario in West Asia has worsened with the arrival of the Arab
Spring.
But the prospect of democracy in the region has receded. Most regimes have been able
to keep at bay, at least for the time being, the calls for change. The expectations from
the Arab Spring turned out to be overambitious. The old order has reasserted itself and
managed to survive for the time being. Arab spring is now commonly referred to as
Arab winter, reflecting the failure of protests movements to bring about change in the
region. Democracy may not have come to these countries as expected, yet the region
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has nevertheless changed dramatically in the last three years. The regimes have survived,
but there is no surety how long will they survive. The internal and external environment
has changed. What is now clear is that the change will be unpredictable and nonlinear
and violence ridden. The old order will have to find new ways of surviving. Repression,
inducement and cajolement seem to be the tactic.
The major characteristics of the Arab spring have been:
A great deal of violence has erupted and is likely to continue. There is no early prospect
of democracy taking hold in the region. The new regimes are likely to be even more
repressive. They will use repression and inducements to subdue protests and perpetuate
themselves. A fall of Syrian regime will change the balance of power. The so called
Shia "axis of resistance" consisting of Iran, Syria and Hezbollah in Lebanon will be
weakened. Extremism will grow exponentially, affecting not only the region but globally.
The historic sectarian fault lines have become wide open and the region could be torn
apart if the sectarian tensions continue unchecked. Amidst the protests and violence in
the Arab streets, Iran has risen as a major regional power. Iran-Saudi rivalry for supremacy
will be the defining feature of the evolving situation. Religious extremism has become
pronounced. Al Qaeda had got a second wind. Salafists are on the rise and becoming
prominent in the political arena. Muslim Brotherhood has tasted power in Egypt but
later has been thrown out of power and subsequently banned by the Egyptian government.
The behaviour and future action of the Muslim Brotherhood will, to large extend,
determine the security and democratic transition in Egypt. GCC counties like Qatar are
involved in carving out a new balance of power. Qatar, though small but extremely
rich, is playing an aggressive role in the new balance of power. Likewise, Turkey, which
led the call for Assad regime to reform, has become an important player in the region.
The regime is sympathetic to Muslim Brotherhood. But, the role of Turkey and Qatar
is controversial and may lead to unintended consequences. The rise of Iran has deeply
upset the Sunni regimes. Its alleged quest for nuclear weapons has alarmed the GCC
countries and Israel. If Iran acquires a nuclear weapon, Saudi Arabia will almost certainly
do so, possibly with the help of Pakistan. Chemical weapons have been used in Syria.
Russia has brokered a deal under which Syria is set to hand over its pile of chemical
weapons for destruction. Syrian regime has got a reprieve. In this process, the US has
been seen as weak and not in control of the situation. The US policies may undergo
change. The US has already started talk to Iran on nuclear issue and was forced to take
Russian help in the Syrian case. The shale gas revolution in the US will reduce its
dependence upon the oil from the region although its strategic objective of controlling
Iran still remains. Saudi Arabia is extremely upset with the US on the Syrian deal and
the US talks with Iran. It showed its displeasure by not accepting a seat in the UNSC,
an unprecedented step.
Implications for India
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India has longstanding historical and cultural relations with the West Asian region. For
India, in particular, West Asia is a significantly important region. People-to-people
contacts have existed between India and West Asia for centuries. India has been a
supporter of the Palestinian cause and has demanded a comprehensive relationship with
the Palestinian state and the people. Any development in the region has direct implications
for India. There are nearly 6.5 million Indians living and working in the West Asian
region. According to a World Bank report India received US $ 70 billion in remittances
during 2012 and a majority of the remittances came from the region. In addition, India's
total trade with West Asia in the year 2012-13 stands at US$ 205.71 billion. The region
is also vital for India's energy security. Nearly two-thirds of our hydrocarbon imports
are from this region.
India has two choices: be passive and reactive as the region takes new shape, or, be
proactive and help shape the region keeping its own interests in mind. Most countries
in the region want India to play a more proactive role in keeping with its rising global
profile. India's substantial interests in the region would compel India to be proactive
and not be a mere bystander. India will have to carve out a well thought out strategy
towards the region.
Political
Declare a clearly articulated "Look West Policy" : As India-Gulf relationship is taking
an upward trajectory, and India's stakes and interests are growing with time, it is time
for India to adopt a formally articulated "Look West Policy" in line with the successful
"Look East Policy". The sheer volume of India's engagement with the region and its
critical importance India's security means that standing aloof is no option. A "Look
West Policy" should focus on strengthening bilateral political, economic and security
ties with the countries of the Gulf region. As the countries of the region have adopted
a Look East Policy to targeting the Asian powers, it is an opportune time for India to
adopt and pursue a policy solely focusing on the region. Institutionalising the exchange
of regular high-level visits and setting reasonably high targets with specific time lines
will be necessary. Regular interaction at the highest levels will infuse further confidence
in the relationship. Thus, India must articulate its interests in the region clearly through
a Look West Policy backed by road maps and resources. Appoint a special envoy for
West Asia : It may be useful for India to resume the practice of appointing a special
envoy for West Asia who keeps in regular touch with the leaders of the region on a
regular basis. It would help in understanding the changing political dynamics in the
region and help shape India's policy towards them. Upgrade bilateral relationships :
India has excellent bilateral relations with most countries in the region such as Iran,
Iraq and the GCC countries. Egypt is reaching out to India to which India must respond
favourably. With Palestine India has had historically friendly relations and India supports
the Palestinian cause. India's relationship with Israel has strengthened since the
establishment of the diplomatic ties in 1992. Israel has emerged as a major source of
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defence technology and equipments and also as a supplier of agricultural technologies
to India. It is also keen to expand its ties with India at political level. These relationships
are valuable and need to be solidified and India must strengthen the bilateral relationship
by engaging them in multiple fronts. Cooperate on multilateral formats : Along with
strengthening bilateral ties with the countries of the region India must deal with these
countries in multilateral forums like the GCC and Arab League. GCC is one such
important and influential regional organisation in the region India has been trying to
engage deeply with. India has links with GCC which must be continuously stimulated.
Despite their internal differences on some matters, the countries of the GCC follow a
similar policies on several political, economic, security and strategic matters. Most
recently, their unity was reflected during the uprising in Bahrain where the member
countries not only gave political support but also economic aid and military support to
deal with the crisis. The shared challenges in the region have gradually made the
organisation stronger and they have been taking steps to further strengthen their links
and discover new areas of cooperation among themselves. Thus, it may be easier to
deal with the organisation as a whole on matters on which all members of GCC have
a common position. Follow a balanced approach between countries : India will have
to do some fine balancing acts: between Iran and GCC; between Israel and the Arabs;
between Israel and the Palestinians. The situation can be handled by taking principled
positions, by expanding the basis of bilateral relations, by focussing on the economic
and people to people content of the ties. India should also strengthen ties on human
security issues, particularly, counter-terrorism. Given the complex nature of the politics
in the region, it would be wise for India to continue with the policy of balancing its
relationship with major players in the region. As India has stakes transcending the GCC,
Iran and Iraq, taking sides will be detrimental to India's interests. Rather, India should
try to engage with the countries and work together on the mutual areas of interest.
Security
Forging new cooperative security architecture : The present security architecture in
West Asia is US-centric. With the rise of new actors the balance of power in the region
is being altered. India, on account of its considerable security interests should be alive
to the emergence of new developments in the security arena and be proactive in the
region. India's recent initiatives with the region reflect its growing desire to strengthen
defence and security ties with the Gulf countries, though this has been taking place at
a slow pace. There are several issues such as terrorism, piracy, criminal activities,
money laundering and small arms smuggling which call for increasing security cooperation
between India and the Gulf countries, but security being a very sensitive issue, these
countries usually adopt caution in moving forward. However, as the security challenges
continue to grow not only for India but also for the Gulf countries, increased cooperation
in this field is required in the future regional security architecture. We should expand
and strengthen our missions by posting new Defence Attaches in the region. Build out
of area capabilities : During the protests as the security situation deteriorated in some
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countries, India took up the rescue efforts to evacuate citizens. India has successfully
evacuated citizens from countries like Egypt and Libya. Keeping in view the fluid
political and security situation in the region, such contingencies may be expected to
arise in future. India should pay special importance to building out of area capacities.
This will require building diplomatic capabilities, naval capacities and a dialogue with
partners in West Asia. Be prepared for a fundamentalist backlash : The rise of extremism
in the region will have unpleasant consequences for India. There are reports that
extremists from Afghanistan, Pakistan and Bangladesh are fighting in Syria. India must
be prepared to deal with the fundamentalist blow back from the region by strengthening
its internal security systems, by raising awareness about the looming threat and by
involving our moderate populations in bilateral and multilateral contacts. In the past,
there have been reports of some extremist elements in India being ideologically motivated
by some groups in the region and also of receiving money through hawala channel.
Thus, India should remain prepared for any such backlash coming from the region.
Economic
Diversifying India's trade relations : India's trade with West Asian countries is highly
skewed and trade balance is mostly in favour of the regional countries except the UAE.
India's bilateral trade is heavily dominated by the energy supply from the region. Also,
a large chunk of the India's total trade is exchanged with big trading partners like the
UAE and Saudi Arabia. Thus, there is a need to diversify trade with other countries of
the region which needs special attention by India. Need for enhancing investment : The
GCC's investments into India have increased in recent years (from US$ 223 million
in 2005 to US$ 2639.5 million in January 2012), however, it remains much below their
potential. India need to take tangible steps to attract foreign investments by further
relaxing some trade rules including regulatory restrictions and inviting West Asian
investors in general and GCC investors in particular to actively participate in India's
robust growth story for mutual benefit. It is equally important to identify specific areas
for cooperation such as export of engineering goods and textiles, and also a huge scope
for increase in consultancy, including turnkey projects in the infrastructure sector in
the Gulf region. Cooperation in small and medium enterprise (SME) : India has built
its expertise in the SME business model worldwide; though, this talent has still not
been used in West Asian countries appropriately. India could influence this potential
and the desire of West Asian countries to diversify their economies to build a mutually
beneficial relationship. Trade and investment cooperation between India and the West
Asian region must be based on a long-term strategy and an effective mechanism so as
to achieve the desired objectives of the two sides. The mechanism should be a multistage
setup involving both official and non-official agencies like trade organisations, financial
institutions and shipping corporations.
Energy
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Energy Cooperation : The current buyer-seller relationship needs to change into a
partnership of criss-cross investments in India and the West Asian oil-exporting countries.
This policy will facilitate greater interdependence and also help address the general
criticism that India's policy towards the region needs to go beyond energy considerations.
India should look for opportunities for joint ventures in West Asia not only with
international companies but also with local companies. Priority should be accorded to
projects like LNG liquefaction, fertiliser and desalination plants and other such ventures
which will be beneficial for both sides. For attracting investments from the sovereign
funds of these countries, India should engage in high-level diplomacy with countries
like Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar. Through a mutually agreed upon mechanism,
a share of the oil and gas revenues earned from India should be earmarked for investment
in India. The purchase of a minimum fixed volume of oil and/or gas at average monthly
prices could be worked out and agreed upon bilaterally. Iran and Iraq need to be factored
in a big way while formulating India's energy policy towards the region. Although Iraq
is a high-risk proposition and Iran a problematic one, to ensure its future stable energy
supply, India should work on long-term plans to expand its energy cooperation with
Iraq and Iran. Food security is a big issue in the West Asian region. Therefore, an energy
and food trade-off can be looked upon as a policy option to strengthen India's energy
ties with the regional countries . Surplus refining capacity is India's strength, which
should be leveraged through contractual arrangements involving the purchase of crude
oil and sale of refined products with as many countries as possible. Some oil-exporting
countries may want refining capacities to be created on their soil. India could enter into
joint ventures for establishing refineries on their soil . There could be a structured
India-GCC energy cooperation dialogue every year to enhance the energy cooperation
between India and the GCC countries. Such a dialogue could cover upstream and
downstream hydrocarbon cooperation, energy efficiency, renewable energy, clean
technologies and civil nuclear cooperation.
Soft power
Establishing India Chairs in the West Asian countries would further promote their
understanding of India. It is important for us to create awareness about India's foreign
policy and the role that India can play in the establishment of peace and stability not
only in the south or West Asia but also the in the world. India's capability and enthusiasm
to play the role of a responsible world power should be emphasised and spread in the
intellectual discourse and among the policy makers in the region. In this regard,
establishing India chairs would be an important step in right direction. Indian educational,
technical and vocational institutions should be encouraged to open their branches in
West Asia, much the way the Western institutions are doing. Similarly, to give a further
boost to the diplomatic presence in the region and spread Indian culture among the
West Asian countries, India should seriously consider establishing India Culture Centres
throughout the region. Culture Centres would facilitate understanding and exchange of
each other's culture, people and promote understandings between the people. India
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needs to use its soft power such as cultural exchange, holding inter-faith dialogues and
developing language skills. An annual India-West Asia dialogue should be established
to discuss the developments in the region and to promote mutual bilateral relations
between the two. Such a dialogue would provide an avenue for discussion of scholarly
and policy related issues. Scholars and representatives from both India and the West
Asian countries can gather to freely discuss and deliberate on the issues of mutual
concern and interest. Premier Indian security think tanks could anchor such dialogues.
India must devote substantial diplomatic and intellectual resources to understand the
evolving trends in this highly complex region. Contacts must be maintained at official
and non-official levels. MEA's public diplomacy division should be active in explaining
India's links with the region and stressing India's stakes. Building academic linkages
: India should devote significant scholarly and academic interests in studying the region.
One dynamic step in this regard would be to bolster the teaching of Arabic and Persian
languages and produce a crop of youngsters who can engage with the region at a level
beyond that of skilled workers.
The Geneva Conference on Syria: What Will It Deliver?
Mon, Jan 20, 2014
IDSA, syria , Geneva II , international,
The UN has convened an international conference on Syria to meet in Montreux,
Switzerland, starting from January 22, 2014. Thirty odd states, including India, will
attend. The US is standing in the way of Iran's participation. Incidentally, though the
forthcoming conference is not going to be held in Geneva, for convenience, it is called
Geneva 2.
No concrete results came out of that conference and in protest the former UN Secretary
General Kofi Annan resigned. If Kerry is expecting Iran to announce publicly that it
will agree to Assad's exit or even to negotiate that, he is not being realistic. Obviously,
he wants to prevent Iran's participation.
Russia has stated clearly that Iran's absence will prevent the conference from delivering
the intended results. Most observers will agree with Russia on this. Without Iran's
support, military, economic, and moral, President Assad might not have survived till
now. This is in addition to whatever is sent by air through Iraqi airspace. Any expectation
that the interim nuclear deal would change Iran's stand on Syria has proved wrong.
The US has so far failed to stop Iraq from letting Iran use its territory for sending
supplies to Syria. Both Iraq and Iran support President Assad.
Apart Iran's likely absence, there is another shadow hanging over the conference. It is
not clear who will attend from the Syrian opposition.
The opposition wants an assurance that Assad will leave office before agreeing to attend
the conference. The opposition is in disarray and it knows that it lacks the clout to
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extract any such commitment.
The Kurds, a significant player in the unfolding tragedy are divided about attending
the conference. The Syrian Kurdish Democratic Party will attend, reluctantly, as part
of the Coalition.
The Syrian Government can, ironically enough, derive some comfort from the sorry
state of affairs. It has made it clear that Assad's position is not negotiable. It has added
one more caveat: Decisions taken in Montreux would be put to a referendum and only
the people of Syria will take the final decision.
3D Printing and Defence: A Silent Revolution
Fri, Jan 3, 2014
IDSA, science & tech, 3d printing,
Imagine a technician in a war zone sending an e-mail along with a digital scan of an
unserviceable part of an armoured fighting vehicle which then gets printed at the nearest
available 3D printer and delivered to him in no time. This can possibly minimize the
need of carrying and maintaining large inventories in battle zone. This revolution is
taking place in a very silent manner and is likely to have far reaching implications for
supply chain and logistics management of the armed forces. In a 3D printing technology,
an object is created layer by layer through a specially designed printer using plastic or
other materials.
Operational readiness of defence forces largely depend upon the serviceability state of
equipment in the hands of the troops. Often, non-availability of critical spares and
components leads to non-availability of equipments and weapons to the troops, seriously
hampering their war-fighting capability and especially when it comes to vintage foreign
origin equipments. Once the digital scan or drawing is made available, the component
can be straightway printed by a suitable 3D printer and raw material made available
close to the site of breakdown in repair workshops.
The most striking thing about 3D printing is the way it can convert the digital inventory
into physical objects thereby reducing the requirement of critical storage space drastically.
Navy is in an advantageous position since it allows digital inventory to be carried
onboard ships and submarines.
Disaster relief is also one area where 3D printing can aid the relief operation. Shelters
can be printed onsite as per the requirement. Walls of these shelters are printed using
special blend of cement and there strength is found to much higher than traditional
walls due to layer by layer printing. Another area where defence forces have its utility
is healthcare. There is a possibility in the near future of bio-printing drugs and vaccines.
Instead of keeping the sensitive drugs and vaccines close to battlefield, they can be
simply printed through 3D printer to avert any pandemic or provide defence against a
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possible biological or chemical attack. Bio printing machines are able to recreate heart
tissues, lungs, jaw bones and other prosthetics limbs which will prove to be very useful
for military hospitals for onsite treatment when removal of patient is not possible.
First, replacement parts which in war fighting machines are very critical have to be
ensured for their safety standards since quality of 3D printer, the material used and the
environment in which they are created has serious bearing. Therefore, standards are
needed which are virtually non-existent world over. Secondly, printing of parts also
requires purchasing intellectual property rights from original equipment manufacturer
(OEM) which may cost a substantial amount to exchequer. Thirdly, the ease with which
parts can be printed does raise serious questions. Anyone holding digital designs with
printing capability can churn out critical parts which have serious implications for
national security. Digital designs of weapons falling into the hands terrorist organizations
can result in disastrous situation. Further, if an adversary lays his hands on digital files
of proprietary designs, there is a possibility of altering the designs by hacking into the
digital repository. Therefore, cyber security will assume greater importance.

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