Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 148571 September 24, 2002


GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Represented by the Philippine Department of Justice, petitioner,
vs.
HON. GUILLERMO PURGANAN, Presiding Judge Regional Trial Court of Manila and
MARC JIMENEZ a.k.a. MARCIO BATACAN CRESPO, respondent
Davide Jr., CJ, Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Morales and Callejo, Sr.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J .:
In extradition proceedings, are prospective extraditees entitled to notice and hearing before warrants
for their arrest can be issued? Equally important, are they entitled to the right to bail and provisional
liberty while the extradition proceedings are pending? In general, the answer to these two novel
questions is "No." The explanation of and the reasons for, as well as the exceptions to, this rule are
laid out in this Decision.


The Case
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to void and set
aside the Orders dated May 23, 2001
1
and July 3, 2001
2
issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 42.
3
The first assailed Order set for hearing petitioners application for the issuance
of a warrant for the arrest of Respondent Mark B. Jimenez.
The second challenged Order, on the other hand, directed the issuance of a warrant, but at the
same time granted bail to Jimenez. The dispositive portion of the Order reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the [Court] finds probable cause against
respondent Mark Jimenez. Accordingly let a Warrant for the arrest of the respondent be
issued. Consequently and taking into consideration Section 9, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure, this Court fixes the reasonable amount of bail for respondents
temporary liberty at ONE MILLION PESOS (Php 1,000,000.00), the same to be paid in cash.
Furthermore respondent is directed to immediately surrender to this Court his passport and
the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation is likewise directed to include the name of the
respondent in its Hold Departure List."
4

Essentially, the Petition prays for the lifting of the bail Order, the cancellation of the bond, and the
taking of Jimenez into legal custody.
The Facts
This Petition is really a sequel to GR No. 139465 entitled Secretary of Justice v. Ralph C. Lantion.
5

Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty,
6
the United States Government, through
diplomatic channels, sent to the Philippine Government Note Verbale No. 0522 dated June 16, 1999,
supplemented by Note Nos. 0597, 0720 and 0809 and accompanied by duly authenticated
documents requesting the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan Crespo.
Upon receipt of the Notes and documents, the secretary of foreign affairs (SFA) transmitted them to
the secretary of justice (SOJ) for appropriate action, pursuant to Section 5 of Presidential Decree
(PD) No. 1069, also known as the Extradition Law.
Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought and was granted a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) by the RTC of Manila, Branch 25.
7
The TRO prohibited the Department of
Justice (DOJ) from filing with the RTC a petition for his extradition. The validity of the TRO was,
however, assailed by the SOJ in a Petition before this Court in the said GR No. 139465. Initially, the
Court -- by a vote of 9-6 -- dismissed the Petition. The SOJ was ordered to furnish private
respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the latter a
reasonable period within which to file a comment and supporting evidence.
8

Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the SOJ, this Court issued its October 17, 2000
Resolution.
9
By an identical vote of 9-6 -- after three justices changed their votes -- it reconsidered
and reversed its earlier Decision. It held that private respondent was bereft of the right to notice and
hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. This Resolution has become final and
executory.
Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the United States of America, represented by the
Philippine DOJ, filed with the RTC on May 18, 2001, the appropriate Petition for Extradition which
was docketed as Extradition Case No. 01192061. The Petition alleged, inter alia, that Jimenez was
the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida on April 15, 1999. The warrant had been issued in connection with the following charges in
Indictment No. 99-00281 CR-SEITZ: (1) conspiracy to defraud the United States and to commit
certain offenses in violation of Title 18 US Code Section 371; (2) tax evasion, in violation of Title 26
US Code Section 7201; (3) wire fraud, in violation of Title 18 US Code Sections 1343 and 2; (4) false
statements, in violation of Title 18 US Code Sections 1001 and 2; and (5) illegal campaign
contributions, in violation of Title 2 US Code Sections 441b, 441f and 437g(d) and Title 18 US Code
Section 2. In order to prevent the flight of Jimenez, the Petition prayed for the issuance of an order
for his "immediate arrest" pursuant to Section 6 of PD No. 1069.
Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Respondent Jimenez filed before it an "Urgent
Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion,"
10
which prayed that petitioners application for an arrest warrant be
set for hearing.
In its assailed May 23, 2001 Order, the RTC granted the Motion of Jimenez and set the case for
hearing on June 5, 2001. In that hearing, petitioner manifested its reservations on the procedure
adopted by the trial court allowing the accused in an extradition case to be heard prior to the
issuance of a warrant of arrest.
After the hearing, the court a quo required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. In his
Memorandum, Jimenez sought an alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should issue, he be
allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000.
The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for hearing on June 15, 2001. Thereafter, the court
below issued its questioned July 3, 2001 Order, directing the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and
fixing bail for his temporary liberty at one million pesos in cash.
11
After he had surrendered his
passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty via the
challenged Order dated July 4, 2001.
12

Hence, this Petition.
13

Issues
Petitioner presents the following issues for the consideration of this Court:
I.
The public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in adopting a procedure of first hearing
a potential extraditee before issuing an arrest warrant under Section 6 of PD No. 1069.
II.
The public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the prayer for bail and in
allowing Jimenez to go on provisional liberty because:
1. An extradition court has no power to authorize bail, in the absence of any law that
provides for such power.
2. Section 13, Article III (right to bail clause) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution and
Section 4, Rule 114 (Bail) of the Rules of Court, as amended, which [were] relied
upon, cannot be used as bases for allowing bail in extradition proceedings.
3. The presumption is against bail in extradition proceedings or proceedings leading
to extradition.
4. On the assumption that bail is available in extradition proceedings or proceedings
leading to extradition, bail is not a matter of right but only of discretion upon clear
showing by the applicant of the existence of special circumstances.
5. Assuming that bail is a matter of discretion in extradition proceedings, the public
respondent received no evidence of special circumstances which may justify
release on bail.
6. The risk that Jimenez will flee is high, and no special circumstance exists that will
engender a well-founded belief that he will not flee.
7. The conditions attached to the grant of bail are ineffectual and do not ensure
compliance by the Philippines with its obligations under the RP-US Extradition
Treaty.
8. The Court of Appeals Resolution promulgated on May 10, 2001 in the case
entitled Eduardo T. Rodriguez et al. vs. The Hon. Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 17,
Manila, CA-G.R. SP No. 64589, relied upon by the public respondent in granting
bail, had been recalled before the issuance of the subject bail orders."
14

In sum, the substantive questions that this Court will address are: (1) whether Jimenez is entitled to
notice and hearing before a warrant for his arrest can be issued, and (2) whether he is entitled to bail
and to provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings are pending. Preliminarily, we shall take
up the alleged prematurity of the Petition for Certiorari arising from petitioners failure to file a Motion
for Reconsideration in the RTC and to seek relief in the Court of Appeals (CA), instead of in this
Court.
15
We shall also preliminarily discuss five extradition postulates that will guide us in disposing
of the substantive issues.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
Preliminary Matters
Alleged Prematurity of Present Petition
Petitioner submits the following justifications for not filing a Motion for Reconsideration in the
Extradition Court: "(1) the issues were fully considered by such court after requiring the parties to
submit their respective memoranda and position papers on the matter and thus, the filing of a
reconsideration motion would serve no useful purpose; (2) the assailed orders are a patent nullity,
absent factual and legal basis therefor; and (3) the need for relief is extremely urgent, as the
passage of sufficient time would give Jimenez ample opportunity to escape and avoid extradition;
and (4) the issues raised are purely of law."
16

For resorting directly to this Court instead of the CA, petitioner submits the following reasons: "(1)
even if the petition is lodged with the Court of Appeals and such appellate court takes cognizance of
the issues and decides them, the parties would still bring the matter to this Honorable Court to have
the issues resolved once and for all [and] to have a binding precedent that all lower courts ought to
follow; (2) the Honorable Court of Appeals had in one case
17
ruled on the issue by disallowing bail
but the court below refused to recognize the decision as a judicial guide and all other courts might
likewise adopt the same attitude of refusal; and (3) there are pending issues on bail both in the
extradition courts and the Court of Appeals, which, unless guided by the decision that this Honorable
Court will render in this case, would resolve to grant bail in favor of the potential extraditees and
would give them opportunity to flee and thus, cause adverse effect on the ability of the Philippines to
comply with its obligations under existing extradition treaties."
18

As a general rule, a petition for certiorari before a higher court will not prosper unless the inferior
court has been given, through a motion for reconsideration, a chance to correct the errors imputed to
it. This rule, though, has certain exceptions: (1) when the issue raised is purely of law, (2) when
public interest is involved, or (3) in case of urgency.
19
As a fourth exception, the Court has also ruled
that the filing of a motion for reconsideration before availment of the remedy of certiorari is not a sine
qua non, when the questions raised are the same as those that have already been squarely argued
and exhaustively passed upon by the lower court.
20
Aside from being of this nature, the issues in the
present case also involve pure questions of law that are of public interest. Hence, a motion for
reconsideration may be dispensed with.
Likewise, this Court has allowed a direct invocation of its original jurisdiction to issue writs of
certiorari when there are special and important reasons therefor.
21
In Fortich v. Corona
22
we stated:
[T]he Supreme Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition filed
directly [before] it if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised,
warrant. This has been the judicial policy to be observed and which has been reiterated in
subsequent cases, namely: Uy vs. Contreras, et. al., Torres vs. Arranz, Bercero vs. De
Guzman, and, Advincula vs. Legaspi, et. al. As we have further stated in Cuaresma:
x x x. A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue these
writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor,
clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. x x x.
Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to take primary jurisdiction over the present
petition in the interest of speedy justice and to avoid future litigations so as to promptly put
an end to the present controversy which, as correctly observed by petitioners, has sparked
national interest because of the magnitude of the problem created by the issuance of the
assailed resolution. Moreover, x x x requiring the petitioners to file their petition first with the
Court of Appeals would only result in a waste of time and money.
That the Court has the power to set aside its own rules in the higher interests of justice is well-
entrenched in our jurisprudence. We reiterate what we said in Piczon vs. Court of Appeals:
23

Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that
tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be avoided. Time and
again, this Court has suspended its own rules and excepted a particular case from their
operation whenever the higher interests of justice so require. In the instant petition, we
forego a lengthy disquisition of the proper procedure that should have been taken by the
parties involved and proceed directly to the merits of the case.
In a number of other exceptional cases,
24
we held as follows:
This Court has original jurisdiction, concurrent with that of Regional Trial Courts and the
Court of Appeals, over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and
habeas corpus, and we entertain direct resort to us in cases where special and important
reasons or exceptional and compelling circumstances justify the same."
In the interest of justice and to settle once and for all the important issue of bail in extradition
proceedings, we deem it best to take cognizance of the present case. Such proceedings constitute a
matter of first impression over which there is, as yet, no local jurisprudence to guide lower courts.
Five Postulates of Extradition
The substantive issues raised in this case require an interpretation or construction of the treaty and
the law on extradition. A cardinal rule in the interpretation of a treaty or a law is to ascertain and give
effect to its intent.
25
Since PD 1069 is intended as a guide for the implementation of extradition
treaties to which the Philippines is a signatory,
26
understanding certain postulates of extradition will
aid us in properly deciding the issues raised here.
1. Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of Crime.
First, extradition treaties are entered into for the purpose of suppressing crime
27
by
facilitating the arrest and the custodial transfer
28
of a fugitive
29
from one state to the other.
With the advent of easier and faster means of international travel, the flight of affluent
criminals from one country to another for the purpose of committing crime and evading
prosecution has become more frequent. Accordingly, governments are adjusting their
methods of dealing with criminals and crimes that transcend international boundaries.
Today, "a majority of nations in the world community have come to look upon extradition as
the major effective instrument of international co-operation in the suppression of crime."
30
It
is the only regular system that has been devised to return fugitives to the jurisdiction of a
court competent to try them in accordance with municipal and international law.
31

An important practical effect x x x of the recognition of the principle that criminals
should be restored to a jurisdiction competent to try and punish them is that the
number of criminals seeking refuge abroad will be reduced. For to the extent that
efficient means of detection and the threat of punishment play a significant role in the
deterrence of crime within the territorial limits of a State, so the existence of effective
extradition arrangements and the consequent certainty of return to the locus delicti
commissi play a corresponding role in the deterrence of flight abroad in order to
escape the consequence of crime. x x x. From an absence of extradition
arrangements flight abroad by the ingenious criminal receives direct encouragement
and thus indirectly does the commission of crime itself."
32

In Secretary v. Lantion
33
we explained:
The Philippines also has a national interest to help in suppressing crimes and one way to do
it is to facilitate the extradition of persons covered by treaties duly entered [into] by our
government. More and more, crimes are becoming the concern of one world. Laws involving
crimes and crime prevention are undergoing universalization. One manifest purpose of this
trend towards globalization is to deny easy refuge to a criminal whose activities threaten the
peace and progress of civilized countries. It is to the great interest of the Philippines to be
part of this irreversible movement in light of its vulnerability to crimes, especially
transnational crimes."
Indeed, in this era of globalization, easier and faster international travel, and an expanding ring of
international crimes and criminals, we cannot afford to be an isolationist state. We need to cooperate
with other states in order to improve our chances of suppressing crime in our own country.
2. The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the Accused
Second, an extradition treaty presupposes that both parties thereto have examined, and that both
accept and trust, each others legal system and judicial process.
34
More pointedly, our duly
authorized representatives signature on an extradition treaty signifies our confidence in the capacity
and the willingness of the other state to protect the basic rights of the person sought to be
extradited.
35
That signature signifies our full faith that the accused will be given, upon extradition to
the requesting state, all relevant and basic rights in the criminal proceedings that will take place
therein; otherwise, the treaty would not have been signed, or would have been directly attacked for
its unconstitutionality.
3. The Proceedings Are Sui Generis
Third, as pointed out in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion,
36
extradition proceedings are not criminal in
nature. In criminal proceedings, the constitutional rights of the accused are at fore; in extradition
which is sui generis -- in a class by itself -- they are not.
An extradition [proceeding] is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into
operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. To begin with, the
process of extradition does not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an
accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be
extradited. Hence, as a rule, constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt
or innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by an extraditee x x x.
x x x x x x x x x
There are other differences between an extradition proceeding and a criminal proceeding. An
extradition proceeding is summary in nature while criminal proceedings involve a full-blown
trial. In contradistinction to a criminal proceeding, the rules of evidence in an extradition
proceeding allow admission of evidence under less stringent standards. In terms of the
quantum of evidence to be satisfied, a criminal case requires proof beyond reasonable doubt
for conviction while a fugitive may be ordered extradited upon showing of the existence of a
prima facie case. Finally, unlike in a criminal case where judgment becomes executory upon
being rendered final, in an extradition proceeding, our courts may adjudge an individual
extraditable but the President has the final discretion to extradite him. The United States
adheres to a similar practice whereby the Secretary of State exercises wide discretion in
balancing the equities of the case and the demands of the nations foreign relations before
making the ultimate decision to extradite."
Given the foregoing, it is evident that the extradition court is not called upon to ascertain the guilt or
the innocence of the person sought to be extradited.
37
Such determination during the extradition
proceedings will only result in needless duplication and delay. Extradition is merely a measure of
international judicial assistance through which a person charged with or convicted of a crime is
restored to a jurisdiction with the best claim to try that person. It is not part of the function of the
assisting authorities to enter into questions that are the prerogative of that jurisdiction.
38
The ultimate
purpose of extradition proceedings in court is only to determine whether the extradition request
complies with the Extradition Treaty, and whether the person sought is extraditable.
39

4. Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith.
Fourth, our executive branch of government voluntarily entered into the Extradition Treaty, and our
legislative branch ratified it. Hence, the Treaty carries the presumption that its implementation will
serve the national interest.
Fulfilling our obligations under the Extradition Treaty promotes comity
40
with the requesting state. On
the other hand, failure to fulfill our obligations thereunder paints a bad image of our country before
the world community. Such failure would discourage other states from entering into treaties with us,
particularly an extradition treaty that hinges on reciprocity.
41

Verily, we are bound by pacta sunt servanda to comply in good faith with our obligations under the
Treaty.
42
This principle requires that we deliver the accused to the requesting country if the
conditions precedent to extradition, as set forth in the Treaty, are satisfied. In other words, "[t]he
demanding government, when it has done all that the treaty and the law require it to do, is entitled to
the delivery of the accused on the issue of the proper warrant, and the other government is under
obligation to make the surrender."
43
Accordingly, the Philippines must be ready and in a position to
deliver the accused, should it be found proper.
5. There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight
Fifth, persons to be extradited are presumed to be flight risks. This prima facie presumption finds
reinforcement in the experience
44
of the executive branch: nothing short of confinement can ensure
that the accused will not flee the jurisdiction of the requested state in order to thwart their extradition
to the requesting state.
The present extradition case further validates the premise that persons sought to be extradited have
a propensity to flee. Indeed,
extradition hearings would not even begin, if only the accused were willing to submit to trial in the
requesting country.
45
Prior acts of herein respondent -- (1) leaving the requesting state right before
the conclusion of his indictment proceedings there; and (2) remaining in the requested state despite
learning that the requesting state is seeking his return and that the crimes he is charged with are
bailable -- eloquently speak of his aversion to the processes in the requesting state, as well as his
predisposition to avoid them at all cost. These circumstances point to an ever-present, underlying
high risk of flight. He has demonstrated that he has the capacity and the will to flee. Having fled
once, what is there to stop him, given sufficient opportunity, from fleeing a second time?
First Substantive Issue:
Is Respondent Entitled to Notice and Hearing
Before the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest?
Petitioner contends that the procedure adopted by the RTC --informing the accused, a fugitive from
justice, that an Extradition Petition has been filed against him, and that petitioner is seeking his
arrest -- gives him notice to escape and to avoid extradition. Moreover, petitioner pleads that such
procedure may set a dangerous precedent, in that those sought to be extradited -- including
terrorists, mass murderers and war criminals -- may invoke it in future extradition cases.
On the other hand, Respondent Jimenez argues that he should not be hurriedly and arbitrarily
deprived of his constitutional right to liberty without due process. He further asserts that there is as
yet no specific law or rule setting forth the procedure prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest, after
the petition for extradition has been filed in court; ergo, the formulation of that procedure is within the
discretion of the presiding judge.
Both parties cite Section 6 of PD 1069 in support of their arguments. It states:
SEC. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest; Hearing, Service of Notices.- (1)
Immediately upon receipt of the petition, the presiding judge of the court shall, as soon as
practicable, summon the accused to appear and to answer the petition on the day and hour
fixed in the order. [H]e may issue a warrant for the immediate arrest of the accused which
may be served any where within the Philippines if it appears to the presiding judge that the
immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused will best serve the ends of justice.
Upon receipt of the answer, or should the accused after having received the summons fail to
answer within the time fixed, the presiding judge shall hear the case or set another date for
the hearing thereof.
(2) The order and notice as well as a copy of the warrant of arrest, if issued, shall be
promptly served each upon the accused and the attorney having charge of the case."
(Emphasis ours)
Does this provision sanction RTC Judge Purganans act of immediately setting for hearing the
issuance of a warrant of arrest? We rule in the negative.
1. On the Basis of the Extradition Law
It is significant to note that Section 6 of PD 1069, our Extradition Law, uses the word "immediate" to
qualify the arrest of the accused. This qualification would be rendered nugatory by setting for hearing
the issuance of the arrest warrant. Hearing entails sending notices to the opposing
parties,
46
receiving facts and arguments
47
from them,
48
and giving them time to prepare and present
such facts and arguments. Arrest subsequent to a hearing can no longer be considered "immediate."
The law could not have intended the word as a mere superfluity but, on the whole, as a means of
imparting a sense of urgency and swiftness in the determination of whether a warrant of arrest
should be issued.
By using the phrase "if it appears," the law further conveys that accuracy is not as important as
speed at such early stage. The trial court is not expected to make an exhaustive determination to
ferret out the true and actual situation, immediately upon the filing of the petition. From the
knowledge and the material then available to it, the court is expected merely to get a good first
impression -- a prima facie finding -- sufficient to make a speedy initial determination as regards the
arrest and detention of the accused.
Attached to the Petition for Extradition, with a Certificate of Authentication among others, were the
following: (1) Annex H, the Affidavit executed on May 26, 1999 by Mr. Michael E. Savage -- trial
attorney in the Campaign Financing Task Force of the Criminal Division of the US Department of
Justice; (2) Annexes H to G, evidentiary Appendices of various exhibits that constituted evidence of
the crimes charged in the Indictment, with Exhibits 1 to 120 (duly authenticated exhibits that
constituted evidence of the crimes charged in the Indictment); (3) Annex BB, the Exhibit I "Appendix
of Witness [excerpts] Statements Referenced in the Affidavit of Angela Byers" and enclosed
Statements in two volumes; (4) Annex GG, the Exhibit J "Table of Contents for Supplemental
Evidentiary Appendix" with enclosed Exhibits 121 to 132; and (5) Annex MM, the Exhibit L "Appendix
of Witness [excerpts] Statements Referenced in the Affidavit of Betty Steward" and enclosed
Statements in two volumes.
49

It is evident that respondent judge could have already gotten an impression from these records
adequate for him to make an initial determination of whether the accused was someone who should
immediately be arrested in order to "best serve the ends of justice." He could have determined
whether such facts and circumstances existed as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
person to believe that the extradition request was prima facie meritorious. In point of fact, he actually
concluded from these supporting documents that "probable cause" did exist. In the second
questioned Order, he stated:
In the instant petition, the documents sent by the US Government in support of [its] request
for extradition of herein respondent are enough to convince the Court of the existence of
probable cause to proceed with the hearing against the extraditee."
50



We stress that the prima facie existence of probable cause for hearing the petition and, a priori, for
issuing an arrest warrant was already evident from the Petition itself and its supporting documents.
Hence, after having already determined therefrom that a prima facie finding did exist, respondent
judge gravely abused his discretion when he set the matter for hearing upon motion of Jimenez.
51

Moreover, the law specifies that the court sets a hearing upon receipt of the answer or upon failure
of the accused to answer after receiving the summons. In connection with the matter of immediate
arrest, however, the word "hearing" is notably absent from the provision. Evidently, had the holding
of a hearing at that stage been intended, the law could have easily so provided. It also bears
emphasizing at this point that extradition proceedings are summary
52
in nature. Hence, the silence of
the Law and the Treaty leans to the more reasonable interpretation that there is no intention to
punctuate with a hearing every little step in the entire proceedings.
It is taken for granted that the contracting parties intend something reasonable and
something not inconsistent with generally recognized principles of International Law, nor with
previous treaty obligations towards third States. If, therefore, the meaning of a treaty is
ambiguous, the reasonable meaning is to be preferred to the unreasonable, the more
reasonable to the less reasonable x x x ."
53

Verily, as argued by petitioner, sending to persons sought to be extradited a notice of the request for
their arrest and setting it for hearing at some future date would give them ample opportunity to
prepare and execute an escape. Neither the Treaty nor the Law could have
intended that consequence, for the very purpose of both would have been defeated by the escape of
the accused from the requested state.
2. On the Basis of the Constitution
Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is invoked by Jimenez, does not require a
notice or a hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest. It provides:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized."
To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the Constitution itself requires only
the examination -- under oath or affirmation -- of complainants and the witnesses they may produce.
There is no requirement to notify and hear the accused before the issuance of warrants of arrest.
In Ho v. People
54
and in all the cases cited therein, never was a judge required to go to the extent of
conducting a hearing just for the purpose of personally determining probable cause for the issuance
of a warrant of arrest. All we required was that the "judge must have sufficient supporting documents
upon which to make his independent judgment, or at the very least, upon which to verify the findings
of the prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause."
55

In Webb v. De Leon,
56
the Court categorically stated that a judge was not supposed to conduct a
hearing before issuing a warrant of arrest:
Again, we stress that before issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely determine personally
the probability, not the certainty of guilt of an accused. In doing so, judges do not conduct a
de novo hearing to determine the existence of probable cause. They just personally review
the initial determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is supported by
substantial evidence."
At most, in cases of clear insufficiency of evidence on record, judges merely further examine
complainants and their witnesses.
57
In the present case, validating the act of respondent judge and
instituting the practice of hearing the accused and his witnesses at this early stage would be
discordant with the rationale for the entire system. If the accused were allowed to be heard and
necessarily to present evidence during the prima facie determination for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest,
what would stop him from presenting his entire plethora of defenses at this stage -- if he so desires --
in his effort to negate a prima facie finding? Such a procedure could convert the determination of a
prima facie case into a full-blown trial of the entire proceedings and possibly make trial of the main
case superfluous. This scenario is also anathema to the summary nature of extraditions.
That the case under consideration is an extradition and not a criminal action is not sufficient to justify
the adoption of a set of procedures more protective of the accused. If a different procedure were
called for at all, a more restrictive one -- not the opposite -- would be justified in view of respondents
demonstrated predisposition to flee.
Since this is a matter of first impression, we deem it wise to restate the proper procedure:
Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the judge must study them
and make, as soon as possible, a prima facie finding whether (a) they are sufficient in form and
substance, (b) they show compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law, and (c) the person sought
is extraditable. At his discretion, the judge may
require the submission of further documentation or may personally examine the affiants and
witnesses of the petitioner. If, in spite of this study and examination, no prima facie finding
58
is
possible, the petition may be dismissed at the discretion of the judge.
On the other hand, if the presence of a prima facie case is determined, then the magistrate must
immediately issue a warrant for the arrest of the extraditee, who is at the same time summoned to
answer the petition and to appear at scheduled summary hearings. Prior to the issuance of the
warrant, the judge must not inform or notify the potential extraditee of the pendency of the petition,
lest the latter be given the opportunity to escape and frustrate the proceedings. In our opinion, the
foregoing procedure will "best serve the ends of justice" in extradition cases.
Second Substantive Issue:


Is Respondent Entitled to Bail?
Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, is worded as follows:
Art. III, Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall
not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.
Excessive bail shall not be required."
Respondent Mark B. Jimenez maintains that this constitutional provision secures the right to bail of
all persons, including those sought to be extradited. Supposedly, the only exceptions are the ones
charged with offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong. He also
alleges the relevance to the present case of Section 4
59
of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court which,
insofar as practicable and consistent with the summary nature of extradition proceedings, shall also
apply according to Section 9 of PD 1069.
On the other hand, petitioner claims that there is no provision in the Philippine Constitution granting
the right to bail to a person who is the subject of an extradition request and arrest warrant.
Extradition Different from Ordinary Criminal Proceedings
We agree with petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the constitutional
provision on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only
when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not
apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or
acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every
accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to
acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt."
60
It follows that the constitutional
provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not
at issue.
The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended" does not detract from the rule that the
constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds application "only to persons judicially
charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion."
61
Hence, the
second sentence in the constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal
proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to mean that the right is available
even in extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature.
That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the United States is
not an argument to grant him one in the present case. To stress, extradition proceedings are
separate and distinct from the trial for the offenses for which he is charged. He should apply for bail
before the courts trying the criminal cases against him, not before the extradition court.
No Violation of Due Process
Respondent Jimenez cites the foreign case Paretti
62
in arguing that, constitutionally, "[n]o one shall
be deprived of x x x liberty x x x without due process of law."
Contrary to his contention, his detention prior to the conclusion of the extradition proceedings does
not amount to a violation of his right to due process. We iterate the familiar doctrine that the essence
of due process is the opportunity to be heard
63
but, at the same time, point out that the doctrine does
not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard.
64
Where the circumstances -- such as those
present in an extradition case -- call for it, a subsequent opportunity to be heard is enough.
65
In the
present case, respondent will be given full opportunity to be heard subsequently, when the
extradition court hears the Petition for Extradition. Hence, there is no violation of his right to due
process and fundamental fairness.
Contrary to the contention of Jimenez, we find no arbitrariness, either, in the immediate deprivation
of his liberty prior to his being heard. That his arrest and detention will not be arbitrary is sufficiently
ensured by (1) the DOJs filing in court the Petition with its supporting documents after a
determination that the extradition request meets the requirements of the law and the relevant treaty;
(2) the extradition judges independent prima facie determination that his arrest will best serve the
ends of justice before the issuance of a warrant for his arrest; and (3) his opportunity, once he is
under the courts custody, to apply for bail as an exception to the no-initial-bail rule.
It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the extradition of respondent,
proceedings had already been conducted in that country. But because he left the jurisdiction of the
requesting state before those proceedings could be completed, it was hindered from continuing with
the due processes prescribed under its laws. His invocation of due process now has thus become
hollow. He already had that opportunity in the requesting state; yet, instead of taking it, he ran away.
In this light, would it be proper and just for the government to increase the risk of violating its treaty
obligations in order to accord Respondent Jimenez his personal liberty in the span of time that it
takes to resolve the Petition for Extradition? His supposed immediate deprivation of liberty without
the due process that he had previously shunned pales against the governments interest in fulfilling
its Extradition Treaty obligations and in cooperating with the world community in the suppression of
crime. Indeed, "[c]onstitutional liberties do not exist in a vacuum; the due process rights accorded to
individuals must be carefully balanced against exigent and palpable government interests."
66

Too, we cannot allow our country to be a haven for fugitives, cowards and weaklings who, instead of
facing the consequences of their actions, choose to run and hide. Hence, it would not be good policy
to increase the risk of violating our treaty obligations if, through overprotection or excessively liberal
treatment, persons sought to be extradited are able to evade arrest or escape from our custody. In
the absence of any provision -- in the Constitution, the law or the treaty -- expressly guaranteeing the
right to bail in extradition proceedings, adopting the practice of not granting them bail, as a general
rule, would be a step towards deterring fugitives from coming to the Philippines to hide from or
evade their prosecutors.1wphi 1. nt
The denial of bail as a matter of course in extradition cases falls into place with and gives life to
Article 14
67
of the Treaty, since this practice would encourage the accused to voluntarily surrender to
the requesting state to cut short their detention here. Likewise, their detention pending the resolution
of extradition proceedings would fall into place with the emphasis of the Extradition Law on the
summary nature of extradition cases and the need for their speedy disposition.
Exceptions to the No Bail Rule
The rule, we repeat, is that bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. However, the judiciary
has the constitutional duty to curb grave abuse of discretion
68
and tyranny, as well as the power to
promulgate rules to protect and enforce constitutional rights.
69
Furthermore, we believe that the right
to due process is broad enough to include the grant of basic fairness to extraditees. Indeed, the right
to due process extends to the "life, liberty or property" of every person. It is "dynamic and resilient,
adaptable to every situation calling for its application."
70

Accordingly and to best serve the ends of justice, we believe and so hold that, after a potential
extraditee has been arrested or placed under the custody of the law, bail may be applied for and
granted as an exception, only upon a clear and convincing showing (1) that, once granted bail, the
applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2) that there exist special,
humanitarian and compelling circumstances
71
including, as a matter of reciprocity, those cited by the
highest court in the requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein.
Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and since it is derived essentially
from general principles of justice and fairness, the applicant bears the burden of proving the above
two-tiered requirement with clarity, precision and emphatic forcefulness. The Court realizes that
extradition is basically an executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising from the presidential power
to conduct foreign relations. In its barest concept, it partakes of the nature of police assistance
amongst states, which is not normally a judicial prerogative. Hence, any intrusion by the courts into
the exercise of this power should be characterized by caution, so that the vital international and
bilateral interests of our country will not be unreasonably impeded or compromised. In short, while
this Court is ever protective of "the sporting idea of fair play," it also recognizes the limits of its own
prerogatives and the need to fulfill international obligations.
Along this line, Jimenez contends that there are special circumstances that are compelling enough
for the Court to grant his request for provisional release on bail. We have carefully examined these
circumstances and shall now discuss them.
1. Alleged Disenfranchisement
While his extradition was pending, Respondent Jimenez was elected as a member of the House of
Representatives. On that basis, he claims that his detention will disenfranchise his Manila district of
600,000 residents. We are not persuaded. In People v. Jalosjos,
72
the Court has already debunked
the disenfranchisement argument when it ruled thus:
When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they did so with
full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge
that he could achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the
confines of prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if voters elect a person with full
knowledge that he is suffering from a terminal illness, they do so knowing that at any time, he
may no longer serve his full term in office.
In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question of constitutional equal
protection.
The Constitution guarantees: x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of
laws. This simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in
rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The organs of government may not show any
undue favoritism or hostility to any person. Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be displayed.
Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allows different
treatment? Is being a Congressman a substantial differentiation which removes the accused-
appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons validly confined under law?
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an
excuse to free a person validly [from] prison. The duties imposed by the mandate of the
people are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks
highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members
of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with
the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one
or a few of its members. Depending on the exigency of Government that has to be
addressed, the President or the Supreme Court can also be deemed the highest for that
particular duty. The importance of a function depends on the need for its exercise. The duty
of a mother to nurse her infant is most compelling under the law of nature. A doctor with
unique skills has the duty to save the lives of those with a particular affliction. An elective
governor has to serve provincial constituents. A police officer must maintain peace and
order. Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification
from those others who are validly restrained by law.
A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest[,] wittingly or otherwise, insidious
discriminations are made in favor of or against groups or types of individuals.
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare
may justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may
plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.
We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable
classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not
substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom
and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the
purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class."
73

It must be noted that even before private respondent ran for and won a congressional seat in Manila,
it was already of public knowledge that the United States was requesting his extradition. Hence, his
constituents were or should have been prepared for the consequences of the extradition case
against their representative, including his detention pending the final resolution of the case.
Premises considered and in line with Jalosjos, we are constrained to rule against his claim that his
election to public office is by itself a compelling reason to grant him bail.
2. Anticipated Delay
Respondent Jimenez further contends that because the extradition proceedings are lengthy, it would
be unfair to confine him during the pendency of the case. Again we are not convinced. We must
emphasize that extradition cases are summary in nature. They are resorted to merely to determine
whether the extradition petition and its annexes conform to the Extradition Treaty, not to determine
guilt or innocence. Neither is it, as a rule, intended to address issues relevant to the constitutional
rights available to the accused in a criminal action.
We are not overruling the possibility that petitioner may, in bad faith, unduly delay the proceedings.
This is quite another matter that is not at issue here. Thus, any further discussion of this point would
be merely anticipatory and academic.
However, if the delay is due to maneuverings of respondent, with all the more reason would the
grant of bail not be justified. Giving premium to delay by considering it as a special circumstance for
the grant of bail would be tantamount to giving him the power to grant bail to himself. It would also
encourage him to stretch out and unreasonably delay the extradition proceedings even more. This
we cannot allow.
3. Not a Flight Risk?
Jimenez further claims that he is not a flight risk. To support this claim, he stresses that he learned
of the extradition request in June 1999; yet, he has not fled the country. True, he has not actually
fled during the preliminary stages of the request for his extradition. Yet, this fact cannot be taken to
mean that he will not flee as the process moves forward to its conclusion, as he hears the footsteps
of the requesting government inching closer and closer. That he has not yet fled from the Philippines
cannot be taken to mean that he will stand his ground and still be within reach of our government if
and when it matters; that is, upon the resolution of the Petition for Extradition.
In any event, it is settled that bail may be applied for and granted by the trial court at anytime after
the applicant has been taken into custody and prior to judgment, even after bail has been previously
denied. In the present case, the extradition court may continue hearing evidence on the application
for bail, which may be granted in accordance with the guidelines in this Decision.
Brief Refutation of Dissents
The proposal to remand this case to the extradition court, we believe, is totally unnecessary; in fact,
it is a cop-out. The parties -- in particular, Respondent Jimenez -- have been given more than
sufficient opportunity both by the trial court and this Court to discuss fully and exhaustively private
respondents claim to bail. As already stated, the RTC set for hearing not only petitioners application
for an arrest warrant, but also private respondents prayer for temporary liberty. Thereafter required
by the RTC were memoranda on the arrest, then position papers on the application for bail, both of
which were separately filed by the parties.
This Court has meticulously pored over the Petition, the Comment, the Reply, the lengthy
Memoranda and the Position Papers of both parties. Additionally, it has patiently heard them in Oral
Arguments, a procedure not normally observed in the great majority of cases in this Tribunal.
Moreover, after the Memos had been submitted, the parties -- particularly the potential extraditee --
have bombarded this Court with additional pleadings -- entitled "Manifestations" by both parties and
"Counter-Manifestation" by private respondent -- in which the main topic was Mr. Jimenezs plea for
bail.
A remand would mean that this long, tedious process would be repeated in its entirety. The trial
court would again hear factual and evidentiary matters. Be it noted, however, that, in all his
voluminous pleadings and verbal propositions, private respondent has not asked for a remand.
Evidently, even he realizes that there is absolutely no need to rehear factual matters. Indeed, the
inadequacy lies not in the factual presentation of Mr. Jimenez. Rather, it lies in his legal arguments.
Remanding the case will not solve this utter lack of persuasion and strength in his legal reasoning.
In short, this Court -- as shown by this Decision and the spirited Concurring, Separate and
Dissenting Opinions written by the learned justices themselves -- has exhaustively deliberated and
carefully passed upon all relevant questions in this case. Thus, a remand will not serve any useful
purpose; it will only further delay these already very delayed proceedings,
74
which our Extradition
Law requires to be summary in character. What we need now is prudent and deliberate speed, not
unnecessary and convoluted delay. What is needed is a firm decision on the merits, not a circuitous
cop-out.
Then, there is also the suggestion that this Court is allegedly "disregarding basic freedoms when a
case is one of extradition." We believe that this charge is not only baseless, but also unfair. Suffice it
to say that, in its length and breath, this Decision has taken special cognizance of the rights to due
process and fundamental fairness of potential extraditees.
Summation
As we draw to a close, it is now time to summarize and stress these ten points:
1. The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings is to determine whether the request
expressed in the petition, supported by its annexes and the evidence that may be adduced
during the hearing of the petition, complies with the Extradition Treaty and Law; and whether
the person sought is extraditable. The proceedings are intended merely to assist the
requesting state in bringing the accused -- or the fugitive who has illegally escaped -- back to
its territory, so that the criminal process may proceed therein.
2. By entering into an extradition treaty, the Philippines is deemed to have reposed its trust in
the reliability or soundness of the legal and judicial system of its treaty partner, as well as in
the ability and the willingness of the latter to grant basic rights to the accused in the pending
criminal case therein.
3. By nature then, extradition proceedings are not equivalent to a criminal case in which guilt
or innocence is determined. Consequently, an extradition case is not one in which the
constitutional rights of the accused are necessarily available. It is more akin, if at all, to a
courts request to police authorities for the arrest of the accused who is at large or has
escaped detention or jumped bail. Having once escaped the jurisdiction of the requesting
state, the reasonable prima facie presumption is that the person would escape again if given
the opportunity.
4. Immediately upon receipt of the petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the
judge shall make a prima facie finding whether the petition is sufficient in form and
substance, whether it complies with the Extradition Treaty and Law, and whether the person
sought is extraditable. The magistrate has discretion to require the petitioner to submit
further documentation, or to personally examine the affiants or witnesses. If convinced that a
prima facie case exists, the judge immediately issues a warrant for the arrest of the potential
extraditee and summons him or her to answer and to appear at scheduled hearings on the
petition.
5. After being taken into custody, potential extraditees may apply for bail. Since the
applicants have a history of absconding, they have the burden of showing that (a) there is no
flight risk and no danger to the community; and (b) there exist special, humanitarian or
compelling circumstances. The grounds used by the highest court in the requesting state for
the grant of bail therein may be considered, under the principle of reciprocity as a special
circumstance. In extradition cases, bail is not a matter of right; it is subject to judicial
discretion in the context of the peculiar facts of each case.
6. Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due process and to fundamental fairness.
Due process does not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard. A subsequent
opportunity is sufficient due to the flight risk involved. Indeed, available during the hearings
on the petition and the answer is the full chance to be heard and to enjoy fundamental
fairness that is compatible with the summary nature of extradition.
7. This Court will always remain a protector of human rights, a bastion of liberty, a bulwark of
democracy and the conscience of society. But it is also well aware of the limitations of its
authority and of the need for respect for the prerogatives of the other co-equal and co-
independent organs of government.
8. We realize that extradition is essentially an executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising
out of the presidential power to conduct foreign relations and to implement treaties. Thus, the
Executive Department of government has broad discretion in its duty and power of
implementation.
9. On the other hand, courts merely perform oversight functions and exercise review
authority to prevent or excise grave abuse and tyranny. They should not allow contortions,
delays and "over-due process" every little step of the way, lest these summary extradition
proceedings become not only inutile but also sources of international embarrassment due to
our inability to comply in good faith with a treaty partners simple request to return a fugitive.
Worse, our country should not be converted into a dubious haven where fugitives and
escapees can unreasonably delay, mummify, mock, frustrate, checkmate and defeat the
quest for bilateral justice and international cooperation.
10. At bottom, extradition proceedings should be conducted with all deliberate speed to
determine compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law; and, while safeguarding basic
individual rights, to avoid the legalistic contortions, delays and technicalities that may negate
that purpose.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed RTC Order dated May 23, 2001 is hereby
declared NULL and VOID, while the challenged Order dated July 3, 2001 is SET ASIDE insofar as it
granted bail to Respondent Mark Jimenez. The bail bond posted by private respondent is
CANCELLED. The Regional Trial Court of Manila is directed to conduct the extradition proceedings
before it, with all deliberate speed pursuant to the spirit and the letter of our Extradition Treaty with
the United States as well as our Extradition Law. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 153675 April 19, 2007
GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, represented by the
Philippine Department of Justice, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO MUOZ, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J .:
For our resolution is the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, seeking to nullify the two Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
8, Manila (presided by respondent Judge Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr.) issued in Civil Case No. 99-95773.
These are: (1) the Order dated December 20, 2001 allowing Juan Antonio Muoz, private
respondent, to post bail; and (2) the Order dated April 10, 2002 denying the motion to vacate the
said Order of December 20, 2001 filed by the Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice (DOJ), petitioner. The petition alleges
that both Orders were issued by respondent judge with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction as there is no provision in the Constitution granting bail to a potential
extraditee.
The facts are:
On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of Hong
Kong signed an "Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons." It took effect on
June 20, 1997.
On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong reverted back to the Peoples Republic of China and became the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region.
Private respondent Muoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts of the
offense of "accepting an advantage as agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of
Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of
conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong Kong. On August 23, 1997 and
October 25, 1999, warrants of arrest were issued against him. If convicted, he faces a jail term of
seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each charge.
On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for
the provisional arrest of private respondent. The DOJ then forwarded the request to the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which, in turn, filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 19 an application
for the provisional arrest of private respondent.
On September 23, 1999, the RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an Order of Arrest against private
respondent. That same day, the NBI agents arrested and detained him.
On October 14, 1999, private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari,
prohibition andmandamus with application for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ of habeas
corpus questioning the validity of the Order of Arrest.
On November 9, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision declaring the Order of Arrest void.
On November 12, 1999, the DOJ filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari, docketed as
G.R. No. 140520, praying that the Decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed.
On December 18, 2000, this Court rendered a Decision granting the petition of the DOJ and
sustaining the validity of the Order of Arrest against private respondent. The Decision became final
and executory on April 10, 2001.
Meanwhile, as early as November 22, 1999, petitioner Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the extradition of private respondent, docketed as Civil
Case No. 99-95733, raffled off to Branch 10, presided by Judge Ricardo Bernardo, Jr. For his part,
private respondent filed, in the same case,- a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner.
After hearing, or on October 8, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the petition for
bail, holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private
respondent is a high "flight risk."
On October 22, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further hearing Civil Case No. 99-
95733. It was then raffled off to Branch 8 presided by respondent judge.
On October 30, 2001, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his
application for bail. This was granted by respondent judge in an Order dated December 20, 2001
allowing private respondent to post bail, thus:
In conclusion, this Court will not contribute to accuseds further erosion of civil liberties. The petition
for bail is granted subject to the following conditions:
1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby undertakes
that he will appear and answer the issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times
hold himself amenable to orders and processes of this Court, will further appear for
judgment. If accused fails in this undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in favor of the
government;
2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;
3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its own motion
for hold departure order before this Court even in extradition proceeding; and
4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or if they
so desire to the nearest office, at any time and day of the week; and if they further desire,
manifest before this Court to require that all the assets of accused, real and personal, be
filed with this Court soonest, with the condition that if the accused flees from his undertaking,
said assets be forfeited in favor of the government and that the corresponding lien/annotation
be noted therein accordingly.
SO ORDERED.
On December 21, 2001, petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was
denied by respondent judge in his Order dated April 10, 2002.
Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is
nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the
right being limited solely to criminal proceedings.
In his comment on the petition, private respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under
the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process resulting
in a prolonged deprivation of ones liberty.
Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that the right to bail shall not be impaired, thus:
Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released
on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in this jurisdiction. Nonetheless, this is not the first
time that this Court has an occasion to resolve the question of whether a prospective extraditee may
be granted bail.
In Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of
Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo,
1
this Court, speaking
through then Associate Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, later Chief Justice, held that the
constitutional provision on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings. It is "available only in
criminal proceedings," thus:
x x x. As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the constitutional provision on bail quoted
above, as well as Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been
arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition
proceedings because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every
accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to
acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt" (De la Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1,
6, September 17, 1971, per Fernando, J., later CJ). It follows that the constitutional provision on bail
will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue.
The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended" does not detract from the rule that the
constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds application "only to persons judicially
charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion" (Sec. 18, Art. VIII,
Constitution). Hence, the second sentence in the constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes
the right to bail in criminal proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to mean
that the right is available even in extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature.
At first glance, the above ruling applies squarely to private respondents case. However, this Court
cannot ignore the following trends in international law: (1) the growing importance of the individual
person in public international law who, in the 20th century, has gradually attained global recognition;
(2) the higher value now being given to human rights in the international sphere; (3) the
corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling their treaty
obligations; and (4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our
fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other.
The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the worth of the
individual person and the sanctity of human rights. Slowly, the recognition that the individual
person may properly be a subject of international law is now taking root. The vulnerable doctrine that
the subjects of international law are limited only to states was dramatically eroded towards the
second half of the past century. For one, the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after World War II resulted
in the unprecedented spectacle of individual defendants for acts characterized as violations of the
laws of war, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity. Recently, under the Nuremberg
principle, Serbian leaders have been persecuted for war crimes and crimes against humanity
committed in the former Yugoslavia. These significant events show that the individual person is now
a valid subject of international law.
On a more positive note, also after World War II, both international organizations and states gave
recognition and importance to human rights. Thus, on December 10, 1948, the United Nations
General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in which the right to life,
liberty and all the other fundamental rights of every person were proclaimed. While not a treaty, the
principles contained in the said Declaration are now recognized as customarily binding upon
the members of the international community. Thus, in Mejoff v. Director of Prisons,
2
this Court,
in granting bail to a prospective deportee, held that under the Constitution,
3
the principles set
forth in that Declaration are part of the law of the land. In 1966, the UN General Assembly also
adopted the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which the Philippines signed and
ratified. Fundamental among the rights enshrined therein are the rights of every person to life,
liberty, and due process.
The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations, committed to uphold the
fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This commitment
is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: "The State values the dignity
of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights." The Philippines, therefore, has
the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process,
ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable
it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other
words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under
detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include
the right to be admitted to bail. While this Court in Purganan limited the exercise of the right to bail to
criminal proceedings, however, in light of the various international treaties giving recognition and
protection to human rights, particularly the right to life and liberty, a reexamination of this Courts
ruling in Purganan is in order.
First, we note that the exercise of the States power to deprive an individual of his liberty is
not necessarily limited to criminal proceedings. Respondents in administrative proceedings,
such as deportation and quarantine,
4
have likewise been detained.
Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our eyes to our jurisprudential
history. Philippine jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal
proceedings only. This Court has admitted to bail persons who are not involved in criminal
proceedings. In fact, bail has been allowed in this jurisdiction to persons in detention during
the pendency of administrative proceedings, taking into cognizance the obligation of the
Philippines under international conventions to uphold human rights.
The 1909 case of US v. Go-Sioco
5
is illustrative. In this case, a Chinese facing deportation for failure
to secure the necessary certificate of registration was granted bail pending his appeal. After noting
that the prospective deportee had committed no crime, the Court opined that "To refuse him bail is to
treat him as a person who has committed the most serious crime known to law;" and that while
deportation is not a criminal proceeding, some of the machinery used "is the machinery of criminal
law." Thus, the provisions relating to bail was applied to deportation proceedings.
In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons
6
and Chirskoff v. Commission of Immigration,
7
this Court ruled that
foreign nationals against whom no formal criminal charges have been filed may be released on bail
pending the finality of an order of deportation. As previously stated, the Court in Mejoff relied upon
the Universal declaration of Human Rights in sustaining the detainees right to bail.
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also be allowed
in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to
deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both
are administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue.
Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the
light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and
protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty.
Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not impaired.
Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) defines
"extradition" as "the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the
disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in connection
with any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him
under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government."
Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign power, created by treaty, to demand
the surrender of one accused or convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and the
correlative duty of the other state to surrender him to the demanding state.
8
It is not a criminal
proceeding.
9
Even if the potential extraditee is a criminal, an extradition proceeding is not by its
nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime, even though such punishment may follow
extradition.
10
It is sui generis, tracing its existence wholly to treaty obligations between different
nations.
11
It is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee.
12
Nor is
it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative in character.
13
Its object is to prevent
the escape of a person accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state from
which he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment.
14

But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by the following: (a) it entails a
deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential extraditee and (b) the means employed to attain
the purpose of extradition is also "the machinery of criminal law." This is shown by Section 6 of
P.D. No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) which mandates the "immediate arrest and
temporary detention of the accused" if such "will best serve the interest of justice." We further
note that Section 20 allows the requesting state "in case of urgency" to ask for the "provisional
arrest of the accused, pending receipt of the request for extradition;" and that release from
provisional arrest "shall not prejudice re-arrest and extradition of the accused if a request for
extradition is received subsequently."
Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a
criminal process. A potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of
liberty, and forced to transfer to the demanding state following the proceedings. "Temporary
detention" may be a necessary step in the process of extradition, but the length of time of the
detention should be reasonable.
Records show that private respondent was arrested on September 23, 1999, and remained
incarcerated until December 20, 2001, when the trial court ordered his admission to bail. In other
words, he had been detained for over two (2) years without having been convicted of any
crime. By any standard, such an extended period of detention is a serious deprivation of his
fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged deprivation of liberty which prompted the
extradition court to grant him bail.
While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no
provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the
Constitution.
The applicable standard of due process, however, should not be the same as that in criminal
proceedings. In the latter, the standard of due process is premised on the presumption of innocence
of the accused. As Purganancorrectly points out, it is from this major premise that the ancillary
presumption in favor of admitting to bail arises. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition
proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the arrest warrant and the "temporary detention" is
the possibility of flight of the potential extraditee. This is based on the assumption that such
extraditee is a fugitive from justice.
15
Given the foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus bears
the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted bail.
The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its
obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region. Failure to comply with these obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and defeats the
purpose of extradition. However, it does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty
obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditees rights to life, liberty, and due
process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by
international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive an
extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily
met.
An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or denying
bail can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of
preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in character, the standard of
substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the object of
extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his
Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno,
proposed that a new standard which he termed "clear and convincing evidence" should be used
in granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than proof
beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must
prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders
and processes of the extradition court.
In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not
a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether
private respondent may be granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence."
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to the trial court to determine
whether private respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence." If not,
the trial court should order the cancellation of his bail bond and his immediate detention; and
thereafter, conduct the extradition proceedings with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 121917 July 31, 1996
ROBIN CARIO PADILLA, accused-appellant,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellees.
R E S O L U T I O N

FRANCISCO, J .:p
On appellant Robin C. Padilla's application for bail.
In an information filed before the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, appellant was charged with
violation of P.D. No. 1866 for illegal possession of firearms punishable by reclusion
temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua.
1
Pending trial, appellant was released on bail. Thereafter,
appellant was convicted as charged and meted an indeterminate penalty of 17 years 4 months and 1 day
of reclusion temporal to 21 years of reclusion perpetua. He appealed to public respondent Court of
Appeals, but judgment was rendered affirming his conviction. Respondent court cancelled his bailbond
and ordered his arrest for confinement at the New Bilibid Prison. Appellant filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied. Dissatisfied, appellant is now before us by way of a petition for review
on certiorari with an application for bail praying, among others, to be allowed to post bail for his temporary
liberty. In his subsequent pleading,
1
appellant moved for the separate resolution of his bail application.
The threshold issue is whether or not appellant is entitled to bail.
Bail is either a matter of right, or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense charged is not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
2
On the other hand, upon conviction by
the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
bail becomes a matter of discretion.
3
Similarly, if the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding
six (6) years but not more than twenty (20) years then bail is a matter of discretion, except when any of
the enumerated circumstances
4
under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present then bail shall be
denied. But when the accused is charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetuaor life imprisonment, and evidence of guilt strong, bail shall be denied,
5
as it is neither a matter
of right nor of discretion. If the evidence, however, is not strong bail becomes a matter of
right.
6

In People v. Nitcha
7
, the Court, reiterating established jurisprudence, there said:
. . . if an accused who is charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua is
convicted by the trial court and sentenced to suffer such a penalty, bail is neither a
matter of right on the part of the accused nor of discretion on the part of the court. In
such a situation, the court would not have only determined that the evidence of guilt
is strong which would have been sufficient to deny bail even before conviction it
would have likewise ruled that the accused's guilt has been proven beyond
reasonable doubt. Bail must not then be granted to the accused during the pendency
of his appeal from the judgment of conviction. Construing Section 3, Rule 114 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, this Court, in the en
banc Resolution of 15 October 1991 in People v. Ricardo Cortez, ruled that:
Pursuant to the aforecited provision, an accused who is charged with
a capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua,
shall no longer be entitled to bail as a matter of right even if he
appeals the case to this Court since his conviction clearly imports that
the evidence of his guilt of the offense charged is strong.
8

In this case, appellant was convicted of a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua. Applying
the aforequoted rule, we find appellant not entitled to bail as his conviction clearly imports
that the evidence of his guilt is strong. And contrary to appellant's asseveration, a summary
hearing for his bail application for the sole purpose of determining whether or not evidence is
strong is unnecessary. Indeed, the extensive trial before the lower court and the appeal
before respondent court are more than sufficient in accomplishing the purpose for which a
summary hearing for bail application is designed.
Rule 114, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, moreover, is clear.
Thus:
Sec. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, not bailable. No person charged with a capital offense, or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetuaor life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt
is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.
Administrative Circular No. 2-92, in addition, applies in this case. The circular unequivocably
provides that when an accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense which under
the law at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail is punishable
by reclusion perpetua and is out on bail and after trial is convicted by the trial court of the
offense charged, his bond shall be cancelled and the accused shall be placed in confinement
pending resolution of his appeal. Appellant's application must, perforce, fail as he is no
longer entitled to bail.
Be that as it may, we are not unwilling to accommodate his request for an X-ray and Magnetic
Resonance Imaging (MRI) at St. Luke's Hospital as follow-up examinations for his 1994 slipped-disc
operation. It has been said that while justice is the first virtue of the court, yet admittedly, humanity is
the second. Hence, petitioner's request for the badly needed X-ray and MRI examinations for which
the New Bilibid Prison Hospital is inadequately equipped, as certified to by its Chief Officer, deserves
attention. We recall that way back in 1946, we allowed in Dela Rama v.People's Court,
9
a precedent
on which appellant now anchors his application, a prisoner to be released on bail when his continued
detention would be injurious to his health. This trend, however, has changed with the development of
times. Besides, appellant's situation is not akin to Dela Rama's factual milieu. While appellant now shall
be denied bail, nevertheless, we cannot be indifferent to his medical needs. And by granting appellant's
request, the Court is merely performing its supervisory powers over detainees to safeguard, among
others, their proper accommodation and health pursuant to Section 25 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court,
as amended.
ACCORDINGLY, the cancellation of appellant's bailbond by public respondent court is AFFIRMED
and the instant application for bail is DENIED for lack of merit. Appellant's request for an X-ray and
MRI examinations at St. Luke's Hospital is GRANTED which should be conducted at the first
opportune time to be arranged by the Director of the New Bilibid Prison with the responsible officers
of the hospital, provided that appellant shall be at all times subject to the security conditions imposed
by the prison's director. The responsibility for the enforcement of the subject request, as well as the
security of the appellant, devolves upon the Director of the New Bilibid Prison. Upon termination of
the medical examinations, appellant shall be recommitted to prison without delay. As much as
possible, any unnecessary publicity should be avoided.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 115407 August 28, 1995
MIGUEL P. PADERANGA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

REGALADO, J .:
The adverse decision in this case promulgated by respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 32233 on November 24, 1993, as well as its resolution of April 26, 1994 denying the
motion for reconsideration thereof, are challenged by petitioner Miguel P. Paderanga in this
appeal by certiorari through a petition which raises issues centering mainly on said
petitioner's right to be admitted to bail.
On January 28, 1990, petitioner was belatedly charged in an amended information as a co-
conspirator in the crime of multiple murder in Criminal Case No. 86-39 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 18 of Cagayan de Oro City for the killing of members of the Bucag family
sometime in 1984 in Gingoog City of which petitioner was the mayor at the time. The original
information, filed on October 6, 1986 with the Regional Trial Court of Gingoog City,
1
had
initially indicted for multiple murder eight accused suspect, namely, Felipe Galarion, Manuel
Sabit, Cesar Sabit, Julito Ampo, Eddie Torion, John Doe, Peter Doe And Richard Doe as the
alleged conspirators in the indiscriminate slaying of the spouses Romeo and Juliet Bucag and
their son, Romeo, Jr. However, only one of the accused, Felipe Galarion, was apprehended, tried
and eventually convicted. Galarion later escaped from prison. The others have remained at large
up to the present.
2

In a bizarre twist of events, one Felizardo ("Ely") Roxas was implicated in the crime. In an
amended information dated October 6, 1988, he was charged as a co-accused therein. As
herein petitioner was his former employer and thus knew him well, Roxas engaged the
former's services as counsel in said case. Ironically, in the course of the preliminary
investigation therein, said accused, in a signed affidavit dated March 30, 1989 but which he
later retracted on June 20, 1990, implicated petitioner as the supposed mastermind behind
the massacre of the Bucag family.
3

Then, upon the inhibition of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City from the case per
his resolution of July 7, 1989, the Department of Justice, at the instance of said prosecutor,
designated a replacement, State Prosecutor Henrick F. Gingoyon, for purposes of both the
preliminary investigation and prosecution of Criminal Case No. 86-39. Pursuant to a
resolution of the new prosecutor dated September 6, 1989, petitioner was finally charged as
a co-conspirator in said criminal case in a second amended information dated October 6,
1992. Petitioner assailed his inclusion therein as a co-accused all the way to this Court in
G.R. No. 96080 entitled "Atty. Miguel P. Paderanga vs. Hon. Franklin M. Drilon, Hon.
Silvestre H. Bello III, Atty. Henrick F. Gingoyon, Helen B. Canoy and Rebecca B. Tan." In
an en banc decision promulgated on April 19, 1991, the Court sustained the filing of the
second amended information against him.
4

Under this backdrop, the trial of the base was all set to start with the issuance of an arrest
warrant for petitioner's apprehension but, before it could be served on him, petitioner through
counsel, filed on October 28, 1992 a motion for admission to bail with the trial court which set
the same for hearing on November 5, 1992. Petitioner duly furnished copies of the motion to
State Prosecutor Henrick F. Gingoyon, the Regional State Prosecutor's Office, and the
private prosecutor, Atty. Benjamin Guimong. On November 5, 1992, the trial court proceeded
to hear the application for bail. Four of petitioner's counsel appeared in court but only
Assistant Prosecutor Erlindo Abejo of the Regional State Prosecution's Office appeared for
the prosecution.
5

As petitioner was then confined at the Cagayan Capitol College General Hospital due to
"acute costochondritis," his counsel manifested that they were submitting custody over the
person of their client to the local chapter president of the integrated Bar of the Philippines
and that, for purposes of said hearing of his bail application, he considered being in the
custody of the law. Prosecutor Abejo, on the other hand, informed the trial court that in
accordance with the directive of the chief of their office, Regional State prosecutor Jesus
Zozobrado, the prosecution was neither supporting nor opposing the application for bail and
that they were submitting the same to the sound discretion of the trail judge.
6

Upon further inquiries from the trial court, Prosecutor Abejo announced that he was waiving
any further presentation of evidence. On that note and in a resolution dated November 5,
1992, the trial court admitted petitioner to bail in the amount of P200,000.00. The following
day, November 6, 1992, petitioner, apparently still weak but well enough to travel by then,
managed to personally appear before the clerk of court of the trial court and posted bail in
the amount thus fixed. He was thereafter arraigned and in the trial that ensued, he also
personally appeared and attended all the scheduled court hearings of the case.
7

The subsequent motion for reconsideration of said resolution filed twenty (20) days later on
November 26, 1992 by Prosecutor Gingoyon who allegedly received his copy of the petition for
admission to bail on the day after the hearing, was denied by the trial court in its omnibus order
dated March 29, 1993. On October 1, 1993, or more than six (6) months later, Prosecutor Gingoyon
elevated the matter to respondent Court of Appeals through a special civil action for certiorari. Thus
were the resolution and the order of the trial court granting bail to petitioner annulled on November
24, 1993, in the decision now under review, on the ground that they were tainted with grave abuse of
discretion.
8

Respondent court observed in its decision that at the time of petitioner's application for bail,
he was not yet "in the custody of the law," apparently because he filed his motion for
admission to bail before he was actually arrested or had voluntarily surrendered. It further
noted that apart from the circumstance that petitioner was charged with a crime punishable
by reclusion perpetua, the evidence of guilt was strong as borne out by the fact that no bail
was recommended by the prosecution, for which reasons it held that the grant of bail was
doubly improvident. Lastly, the prosecution, according to respondent court, was not afforded
an opportunity to oppose petitioner's application for bail contrary to the requirements of due
process. Hence, this appeal.
Petitioner argues that, in accordance with the ruling of this Court in Santiago vs. Vasquez
etc., et al.,
9
his filing of the aforesaid application for bail with the trial court effectively conferred
on the latter jurisdiction over his person. In short, for all intents and purposes, he was in the
custody of the law. In petitioner's words, the "invocation by the accused of the court's jurisdiction
by filing a pleading in court is sufficient to vest the court with jurisdiction over the person of the
accused and bring him within the custody of the law."
Petitioner goes on to contend that the evidence on record negates the existence of such
strong evidence as would bar his provisional release on bail. Furthermore, the prosecution,
by reason of the waiver by Prosecutor Abejo of any further presentation of evidence to
oppose the application for bail and whose representation in court in behalf of the prosecution
bound the latter, cannot legally assert any claim to a denial of procedural due process.
Finally, petitioner points out that the special civil action for certiorari was filed in respondent
court after an unjustifiable length of time.
On the undisputed facts , the legal principles applicable and the equities involved in this
case, the Court finds for petitioner.
1. Section 1 of Rule 114, as amended, defines bail as the security given for the release of a
person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, conditioned upon his
appearing before any court as required under the conditions specified in said Rule. Its main
purpose, then, is to relieve an accused from the rigors of imprisonment until his conviction
and yet secure his appearance at the trial.
10
As bail is intended to obtain or secure one's
provisional liberty, the same cannot be posted before custody over him has been acquired by the
judicial authorities, either by his lawful arrest or voluntary surrender.
11
As this Court has put it in a
case "it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free."
12

The rationale behind the rule is that it discourages and prevents resort to the former
pernicious practice whereby an accused could just send another in his stead to post his bail,
without recognizing the jurisdiction of the court by his personal appearance therein and
compliance with the requirements therefor.
13
Thus, inFeliciano vs. Pasicolan, etc., et
al.,
14
where the petitioner who had been charged with kidnapping with murder went into hiding
without surrendering himself, and shortly thereafter filed a motion asking the court to fix the
amount of the bail bond for his release pending trial, the Supreme Court categorically pronounced
that said petitioner was not eligible for admission to bail.
As a paramount requisite then, only those persons who have either been arrested, detained,
or other wise deprived of their freedom will ever have occasion to seek the protective mantle
extended by the right to bail. The person seeking his provisional release under the auspices
of bail need not even wait for a formal complaint or information to be filed against him as it is
available to "all persons"
15
where the offense is bailable. The rule is, of course, subject to the
condition or limitation that the applicant is in the custody of the law.
16

On the other hand, a person is considered to be in the custody of the law (a) when he is
arrested either by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued pursuant to Section 6, Rule 112, or by
warrantless arrest under Section 5, Rule 113 in relation to Section 7, Rule 112 of the revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure, or (b) when he has voluntarily submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court by surrendering to the proper authorities.
17
in this light, the ruling, vis-
a-vis the facts in Santiago vs. Vasquez, etc., et al.,
18
should be explained.
In said case, the petitioner who was charged before the Sandiganbayan for violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, filed through counsel what purported to be an
"Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond." Said petitioner was at the time
confined in a hospital recuperating from serious physical injuries which she sustained in a
major vehicular mishap. Consequently, she expressly sought leave "that she be considered
as having placed herself under the jurisdiction of (the Sandiganbayan) for purposes of the
required trial and other proceedings." On the basis of said ex-parte motion and the peculiar
circumstances obtaining in that incident, the Sandiganbayan authorized petitioner to post a
cash bail bond for her provisional liberty without need of her personal appearance in view of
her physical incapacity and as a matter of humane consideration.
When the Sandiganbayan later issued a hold departure order against her, she question the
jurisdiction of that court over her person in a recourse before this Court, on the ground that
"she neither been arrested nor has she voluntarily surrendered, aside from the fact that she
has not validly posted bail since she never personally appeared before said court" In
rejecting her arguments, the Court held that she was clearly estopped from assailing the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan for by her own representations in the urgent ex
parte motion for bail she had earlier recognized such jurisdiction. Furthermore, by actually
posting a cash bail was accepted by the court, she had effectively submitted to its jurisdiction
over her person. Nonetheless, on the matter of bail, the Court took pains to reiterate that the
same cannot be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by the judicial
authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender.
In the case of herein petitioner, it may be conceded that he had indeed filed his motion for
admission to bail before he was actually and physically placed under arrest. He may,
however, at that point and in the factual ambience therefore, be considered as being
constructively and legally under custody. Thus in the likewise peculiar circumstance which
attended the filing of his bail application with the trail court, for purposes of the hearing
thereof he should be deemed to have voluntarily submitted his person to the custody of the
law and, necessarily, to the jurisdiction of the trial court which thereafter granted bail as
prayed for. In fact, an arrest is made either by actual restraint of the arrestee or merely by his
submission to the custody of the person making the arrest.
19
The latter mode may be
exemplified by the so-called "house arrest" or, in case of military offenders, by being "confined to
quarters" or restricted to the military camp area.
It should be stressed herein that petitioner, through his counsel, emphatically made it known
to the prosecution and to the trail court during the hearing for bail that he could not
personally appear as he was then confined at the nearby Cagayan Capitol College General
Hospital for acute costochondritis, and could not then obtain medical clearance to leave the
hospital. The prosecution and the trial court, notwithstanding their explicit knowledge of the
specific whereabouts of petitioner, never lifted a finger to have the arrest warrant duly served
upon him. Certainly, it would have taken but the slightest effort to place petitioner in the
physical custody of the authorities, since he was then incapacitated and under medication in
a hospital bed just over a kilometer away, by simply ordering his confinement or placing him
under guard.
The undeniable fact is that petitioner was by then in the constructive custody of the law.
Apparently, both the trial court and the prosecutors agreed on that point since they never
attempted to have him physically restrained. Through his lawyers, he expressly submitted to
physical and legal control over his person, firstly, by filing the application for bail with the trail
court; secondly, by furnishing true information of his actual whereabouts; and, more
importantly, by unequivocally recognizing the jurisdiction of the said court. Moreover, when it
came to his knowledge that a warrant for his arrest had been issued, petitioner never made
any attempt or evinced any intent to evade the clutches of the law or concealed his
whereabouts from the authorities since the day he was charged in court, up to the
submission application for bail, and until the day of the hearing thereof.
At the hearing, his counsel offered proof of his actual confinement at the hospital on account
of an acute ailment, which facts were not at all contested as they were easily verifiable. And,
as a manifestation of his good faith and of his actual recognition of the authority of trial court,
petitioner's counsel readily informed the court that they were surrendering custody of
petitioner to the president of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Misamis Oriental
Chapter.
20
In other words, the motion for admission to bail was filed not for the purpose or in the
manner of the former practice which the law proscribes for the being derogatory of the authority
and jurisdiction of the courts, as what had happened in Feliciano. There was here no intent or
strategy employed to obtain bail in absentia and thereby be able to avoid arrest should the
application therefore be denied.
2. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution lays down the rule that before conviction, all indictees
shall be allowed bail, except only those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong. In pursuance thereof, Section 4 of Rule 114, as
amended, now provides that all persons in custody shall, before conviction by a regional trial court of
an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a
matter of right. The right to bail, which may be waived considering its personal nature
21
and which, to
repeat, arises from the time one is placed in the custody of the law, springs from the presumption of
innocence accorded every accused upon whom should not be inflicted incarceration at the outset since
after trial he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be established beyond reasonable doubt.
22

Thus, the general rule is that prior to conviction by the regional trial court of a criminal offense, an
accused is entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right, the present exceptions thereto being
the instances where the accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable
by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment
23
and the evidence of guilt is strong. Under said general rule,
upon proper application for admission to bail, the court having custody of the accused should, as a matter
of course, grant the same after a hearing conducted to specifically determine the conditions of the bail in
accordance with Section 6 (now, Section 2) of Rule 114. On the other hand, as the grant of bail becomes
a matter of judicial discretion on the part of the court under the exceptions to the rule, a hearing,
mandatory in nature and which should be summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court,
24
is
required with the participation of both the defense and a duly notified representative of the prosecution,
this time to ascertain whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong for the provisional liberty of the
applicant.
25
Of course, the burden of proof is on the prosecution to show that the evidence meets the
required quantum.
26

Where such a hearing is set upon proper motion or petition, the prosecution must be give an
opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may want to introduce before
the court may resolve the application, since it is equally entitled as the accused to due process.
27
If
the prosecution is denied this opportunity, there would be a denial of procedural due process, as a
consequence of which the court's order in respect of the motion or petition is void.
28
At the hearing, the
petitioner can rightfully cross-examine the witnesses presented by the prosecution and introduce his own
evidence in rebuttal.
29
When, eventually, the court issues an order either granting or refusing bail, the
same should contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution, followed by its conclusion as to
whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong.
30
The court, though, cannot rely on mere affidavits or
recitals of their contents, if timely objected to, for these represent only hearsay evidence, and thus are
insufficient to establish the quantum of evidence that the law requires.
31

In this appeal, the prosecution assails what it considers to be a violation of procedural due process
when the court below allowed Assistant Prosecutor Erlindo Abejo of the Regional State Prosecutor's
Office to appear in behalf of the prosecution, instead of State Prosecutor Henrick P. Gingoyon who
is claimed to be the sole government prosecutor expressly authorized to handle the case and who
received his copy of the motion only on the day after the hearing had been conducted. Accordingly,
the prosecution now insists that Prosecutor Abejo had no authority at all to waive the presentation of
any further evidence in opposition to the application for bail and to submit the matter to the sound
discretion of the trial court. In addition, they argue that the prosecution was not afforded "reasonable
time" to oppose that application for bail.
We disagree. Firstly, it is undisputed that the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor acted as the
collaborating counsel, with State Prosecutor Henrick Gingoyon, in Criminal Case No. 86-39 on the
basis of an authority from then Chief State Prosecutor Fernando de Leon which was sent through
radio message on July 10, 1992 and duly received by the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor on
the same date. This authorization, which was to be continuing until and unless it was expressly
withdrawn, was later confirmed and then withdrawn only on July 12, 1993 by then Secretary of
Justice Franklin M. Drilon. This was done after one Rebecca Bucag-tan questioned the authority of
Regional State Prosecutor Jesus Zozobrado and State Prosecutor II Erlindo Abejo to enter their
appearance as collaborating government prosecutors in said criminal case.
32
It was in fact by virtue of
this arrangement that the same Prosecutor Zozobrado and Prosecutor Perseverando Arana entered their
appearance as collaborating prosecutor in the previous hearing in said case.
33
Hence, on the strength of
said authority and of its receipt of the notice of the hearing for bail, the Regional State Prosecutor's Office,
through Prosecutor Abejo, could validly represent the prosecution in the hearing held on November 5,
1992.
Secondly, although it is now claimed that Prosecutor Abejo was allegedly not familiar with
the case, he nonetheless was explicitly instructed about the position of the Regional State
Prosecutor's Office on the matter. Prosecutor Zozobrado, whose office received its copy of
the motion on the very day when it was sent, that is, October 28, 1992, duly instructed
Prosecutor Abejo to manifest to the court that the prosecution was neither supporting nor
opposing the application for bail and that they were submitting the matter to its sound
discretion. Obviously, what this meant was that the prosecution, at that particular posture of
the case, was waiving the presentation of any countervailing evidence. When the court a
quo sought to ascertain whether or not that was the real import of the submission by
Prosecutor Abejo, the latter readily answered in the affirmative.
The following exchanges bear this out:
PROSECUTOR ERLINDO ABEJO:
I was informed to appear in this case just now Your Honor.
COURT:
Where is your Chief of Office? Your office received a copy of the
motion as early as October 28. There is an element of urgency here.
PROSECUTOR ABEJO:
I am not aware of that, Your Honor, I was only informed just now. The
one assigned here is State Prosecutor Perseverando Arena, Jr. who
unfortunately is in the hospital attending to his sick son. I do not know
about this but before I came I received an instruction from our Chief
to relay to this court the stand of the office regarding the motion to
admit bail. That office is neither supporting nor opposing it and we are
submitting to the sound discretion of the Honorable Court.
COURT:
Place that manifestation on record. For the record, Fiscal Abejo,
would you like to formally enter your appearance in this matter?
PROSECUTOR ABEJO:
Yes, Your Honor. For the government, the Regional State
Prosecutor's Office represented by State Prosecutor Erlindo Abejo.
COURT:
By that manifestation do you want the Court to understand that in
effect, at least, the prosecution is dispensing with the presentation of
evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong, the denial . . .
PROSECUTOR ABEJO:
I am amenable to that manifestation, Your Honor.
COURT:
Final inquiry. Is the Prosecution willing to submit the incident covered
by this particular motion for resolution by this court?
PROSECUTOR ABEJO:
Yes, Your Honor.
COURT:
Without presenting any further evidence?
PROSECUTOR ABEJO:
Yes, Your Honor.
34

It is further evident from the foregoing that the prosecution, on the instructions of Regional
State prosecutor Zozobrado, had no intention at all to oppose the motion for bail and this
should be so notwithstanding the statement that they were "neither supporting nor opposing"
the motion. What is of significance is the manifestation that the prosecution was "submitting
(the motion) to the sound discretion of the Honorable Court." By that, it could not be any
clearer. The prosecution was dispensing with the introduction of evidenceen contra and this
it did at the proper forum and stage of the proceedings, that is, during the mandatory hearing
for bail and after the trial court had fully satisfied itself that such was the position of the
prosecution.
3. In Herras Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons,
35
it was stressed that where the trial court has
reasons to believe that the prosecutor's attitude of not opposing the application for bail is not
justified, as when he is evidently committing a gross error or a dereliction of duty, the court, in the
interest of Justice, must inquire from the prosecutor concerned as the nature of his evidence to
determine whether or not it is strong. And, in the very recent administrative matter Re:First
Indorsement Dated July 21, 1992 of Hon. Fernando de Leon, Chief State Prosecutor, Department
of Justice;Alicia A. Baylon, City Prosecutor of Dagupan City vs. Judge Deodoro Sison,
36
the
Court, citing Tucay vs. Domagas, etc.,
37
held that where the prosecutor interposes no objection
to the motion of the accused, the trial court should nevertheless set the application for hearing
and from there diligently ascertain from the prosecution whether the latter is really not contesting
the bail application.
No irregularity, in the context of procedural due process, could therefore be attributed to the
trial court here as regards its order granting bail to petitioner. A review of the transcript of the
stenographic notes pertinent to its resolution of November 5, 1992 and the omnibus order of
March 29, 1993 abundantly reveals scrupulous adherence to procedural rules. As
summarized in its aforementioned order, the lower court exhausted all means to convince
itself of the propriety of the waiver of evidence on the part of the prosecution. Moreover, the
omnibus order contained the requisite summary of the evidence of both the prosecution and
the defense, and only after sifting through them did the court conclude that petitioner could
be provisionally released on bail. Parenthetically, there is no showing that, since then and up
to the present, petitioner has ever committed any violation of the conditions of his bail.
As to the contention that the prosecutor was not given the opportunity to present its evidence
within a reasonable period of time, we hold otherwise. The records indicate that the Regional
State Prosecutor's Office duly received its copy of the application for bail on the very same
day that the it was filed with the trial court on October 28, 1992. Counted from said date up to
the day of the hearing on November 5, 1992, the prosecution had more than one (1) week to
muster such evidence as it would have wanted to adduce in that hearing in opposition to the
motion. Certainly, under the circumstances, that period was more than reasonable. The fact
that Prosecutor Gingoyon received his copy of the application only on November 6, 1992 is
beside the point for, as already established, the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor was
authorized to appear for the People.
4. What finally militates against the cause of the prosecutor is the indubitably unreasonable
period of time that elapsed before it questioned before the respondent court the resolution
and the omnibus order of the trial court through a special civil action for certiorari. The
Solicitor General submits that the delay of more than six (6) months, or one hundred eighty-
four (184) days to be exact, was reasonable due to the attendant difficulties which
characterized the prosecution of the criminal case against petitioner. But then,
the certiorariproceeding was initiated before the respondent court long after trial on the
merits of the case had ensued in the court below with the active participation of prosecution
lawyers, including Prosecutor Gingoyon. At any rate, the definitive rule now in that the
special civil action for certiorari should not be instituted beyond a period of the three
months,
38
the same to be reckoned by taking into account the duration of time that had expired
from the commission of the acts complained to annul the same.
39

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 32233,
promulgated on November 24, 1993, annulling the resolution dated November 5, 1992 and the
omnibus order dated March 29, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, as well as
said respondent court's resolution of April 26, 1994 denying the motion for reconsideration of said
judgment, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The aforesaid resolution and omnibus order of
the Regional Trail Court granting bail to petitioner Miguel P. Paderanga are hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 158763 March 31, 2006
JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALBERTO P. DALMACIO, and ROMEO B. OCON, Petitioners,
vs.
VIRGILIO M. TULIAO, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J .:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the 18
December 2002 Decision
1
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67770 and its 12 June 2003
Resolution denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The dispositive portion of the assailed
decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad to have acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Orders, the
instant petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition is hereby GRANTED and GIVEN DUE
COURSE, and it is hereby ordered:
1. The assailed Joint Order dated August 17, 2001, Order dated September 21, 2001, Joint
Order dated October 16, 2001 and Joint Order dated November 14, 2001 dismissing the two
(2) Informations for Murder, all issued by public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad in
Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE for
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and another entered UPHOLDING, AFFIRMING[,] and REINSTATING the Order
dated June 25, 2001 and Joint Order dated July 6, 2001 issued by the then acting Presiding
Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan;
2. Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524 are hereby ordered REINSTATED in the
docket of active criminal cases of Branch 36 of the Regional Trial Court of Santiago City,
Isabela; and
3. Public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is DIRECTED to ISSUE forthwith Warrants
of Arrest for the apprehension of private respondents Jose "Pempe" Miranda, SPO3 Alberto
P. Dalmacio, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon and accused Rodel T. Maderal in said Criminal Cases
Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524.
2

The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:
On 8 March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Purok Nibulan, Ramon, Isabela, which
were later identified as the dead bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of private
respondent Virgilio Tuliao who is now under the witness protection program.
Two informations for murder were filed against SPO1 Wilfredo Leao, SPO1 Ferdinand Marzan,
SPO1 Ruben B. Agustin, SPO2 Alexander Micu, SPO2 Rodel Maderal, and SPO4 Emilio Ramirez in
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santiago City.
The venue was later transferred to Manila. On 22 April 1999, the RTC of Manila convicted all of the
accused and sentenced them to two counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was
yet to be arraigned at that time, being at large. The case was appealed to this Court on automatic
review where we, on 9 October 2001, acquitted the accused therein on the ground of reasonable
doubt.
Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Maderal was arrested. On 27 April 2001, he executed a sworn
confession and identified petitioners Jose C. Miranda, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon, and SPO3 Alberto P.
Dalmacio, a certain Boyet dela Cruz and Amado Doe, as the persons responsible for the deaths of
Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao.
Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder against petitioners, Boyet dela Cruz, and
Amado Doe, and submitted the sworn confession of SPO2 Maderal. On 25 June 2001, Acting
Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan issued warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2
Maderal.
On 29 June 2001, petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation, to
reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash the warrants of arrest.
In the hearing of the urgent motion on 6 July 2001, Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of
petitioners and issued a Joint Order denying said urgent motion on the ground that, since the court
did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by the court. In
the meantime, petitioners appealed the resolution of State Prosecutor Leo T. Reyes to the
Department of Justice.
On 17 August 2001, the new Presiding Judge Anastacio D. Anghad took over the case and issued a
Joint Order reversing the Joint Order of Judge Tumaliuan. Consequently, he ordered the
cancellation of the warrant of arrest issued against petitioner Miranda. He likewise applied this Order
to petitioners Ocon and Dalmacio in an Order dated 21 September 2001. State Prosecutor Leo S.
Reyes and respondent Tuliao moved for the reconsideration of the said Joint Order and prayed for
the inhibition of Judge Anghad, but the motion for reconsideration was denied in a Joint Order dated
16 October 2001 and the prayer for inhibition was denied in a Joint Order dated 22 October 2001.
On 25 October 2001, respondent Tuliao filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with
this Court, with prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order, seeking to enjoin Judge Anghad from
further proceeding with the case, and seeking to nullify the Orders and Joint Orders of Judge
Anghad dated 17 August 2001, 21 September 2001, 16 October 2001, and 22 October 2001.
On 12 November 2001, this Court issued a Resolution resolving to grant the prayer for a temporary
restraining order against Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the criminal cases. Shortly after
the aforesaid resolution, Judge Anghad issued a Joint Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing
the two Informations for murder against petitioners. On 19 November 2001, this Court took note of
respondents cash bond evidenced by O.R. No. 15924532 dated 15 November 2001, and issued the
temporary restraining order while referring the petition to the Court of Appeals for adjudication on the
merits.
Respondent Tuliao filed with this Court a Motion to Cite Public Respondent in Contempt, alleging
that Judge Anghad "deliberately and willfully committed contempt of court when he issued on 15
November 2001 the Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the informations for murder." On 21
November 2001, we referred said motion to the Court of Appeals in view of the previous referral to it
of respondents petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.
On 18 December 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision granting the petition
and ordering the reinstatement of the criminal cases in the RTC of Santiago City, as well as the
issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal. Petitioners moved for a
reconsideration of this Decision, but the same was denied in a Resolution dated 12 June 2003.
Hence, this petition.
The facts of the case being undisputed, petitioners bring forth to this Court the following assignments
of error:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in reversing and setting aside the
Joint Order of Judge Anastacio D. Anghad dated August 17, 2001, September 21, 2001, October 16,
2001 and November 14, 2001 issued in criminal cases numbered 36-3523 and 36-3524; and, erred
in upholding, affirming and reinstating the Order dated July 6, 2001 issued by then Acting Presiding
Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan, on the alleged rule that an accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he
does not submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in directing the reinstatement of
Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and 36-3524 in the docket of Active Criminal Cases of Branch 36 of the
Regional Trial Court of Santiago City, Philippines, and in ordering the public respondent to re-issue
the warrants of arrest against herein petitioners.
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
Wit all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in ordering the
reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 in the docket of active criminal cases
of Branch 36 of the regional trial court of Santiago City, Philippines, and in ordering the public
respondent to issue warrants of arrest against herein petitioners, the order of dismissal issued
therein having become final and executory.
Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires neither jurisdiction over the person of
the accused, nor custody of law over the body of the accused.
The first assignment of error brought forth by the petitioner deals with the Court of Appeals ruling
that:
[A]n accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the jurisdiction of the
court. Jurisdiction over the person of the accused may be acquired either through compulsory
process, such as warrant of arrest, or through his voluntary appearance, such as when he
surrenders to the police or to the court. It is only when the court has already acquired jurisdiction
over his person that an accused may invoke the processes of the court (Pete M. Pico vs. Alfonso V.
Combing, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-91-764, November 6, 1992). Thus, an accused must first be placed in
the custody of the law before the court may validly act on his petition for judicial reliefs.
3

Proceeding from this premise, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners Miranda, Ocon and
Dalmacio cannot seek any judicial relief since they were not yet arrested or otherwise deprived of
their liberty at the time they filed their "Urgent Motion to complete preliminary investigation; to
reinvestigate; to recall and/or quash warrants of arrest."
4

Petitioners counter the finding of the Court of Appeals by arguing that jurisdiction over the person of
the accused is required only in applications for bail. Furthermore, petitioners argue, assuming that
such jurisdiction over their person is required before the court can act on their motion to quash the
warrant for their arrest, such jurisdiction over their person was already acquired by the court by their
filing of the above Urgent Motion.
In arguing that jurisdiction over the person is required only in the adjudication of applications for bail,
petitioners quote Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar Herrera:
Except in applications for bail, it is not necessary for the court to first acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the accused to dismiss the case or grant other relief. The outright dismissal of the case
even before the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused is authorized under
Section 6(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure (Sec. 12a). In Allado vs. Diokno (232 SCRA 192), the case was dismissed on
motion of the accused for lack of probable cause without the accused having been arrested. In Paul
Roberts vs. Court of Appeals (254 SCRA 307), the Court was ordered to hold the issuance of a
warrant of arrest in abeyance pending review by the Secretary of Justice. And in Lacson vs.
Executive Secretary (301 SCRA 102
5
), the Court ordered the case transferred from the
Sandiganbayan to the RTC which eventually ordered the dismissal of the case for lack of probable
cause.
6

In arguing, on the other hand, that jurisdiction over their person was already acquired by their filing
of the above Urgent Motion, petitioners invoke our pronouncement, through Justice Florenz D.
Regalado, in Santiago v. Vasquez
7
:
The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over his person, is
accomplished either by his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or other
pleadings requiring the exercise of the courts jurisdiction thereover, appearing for arraignment,
entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of bail, since the same is intended to obtain the
provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same cannot be posted before custody of the
accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender.
Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody of the law and jurisdiction over
the person. Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the application for bail, but
is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the defendant where the mere
application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
accused.
8
Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender,
9
while
jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary
appearance.
10
One can be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the
court over his person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion before
arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject to the jurisdiction of the
court over his person, and yet not be in the custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes
custody after his trial has commenced.
11
Being in the custody of the law signifies restraint on the
person, who is thereby deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him to become obedient to the
will of the law.
12
Custody of the law is literally custody over the body of the accused. It includes, but
is not limited to, detention.
The statement in Pico v. Judge Combong, Jr.,
13
cited by the Court of Appeals should not have been
separated from the issue in that case, which is the application for admission to bail of someone not
yet in the custody of the law. The entire paragraph of our pronouncement in Pico reads:
A person applying for admission to bail must be in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his
liberty. A person who has not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court has no right to invoke
the processes of that court. Respondent Judge should have diligently ascertained the whereabouts
of the applicant and that he indeed had jurisdiction over the body of the accused before considering
the application for bail.
13

While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as it concerns bail, we clarify that, as a
general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of
the court.
15
As we held in the aforecited case of Santiago, seeking an affirmative relief in court,
whether in civil or criminal proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance.
Pico deals with an application for bail, where there is the special requirement of the applicant being
in the custody of the law. In Feliciano v. Pasicolan,
16
we held that "[t]he purpose of bail is to secure
ones release and it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free. Thus, bail is the security
required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of law." The rationale behind
this special rule on bail is that it discourages and prevents resort to the former pernicious practice
wherein the accused could just send another in his stead to post his bail, without recognizing the
jurisdiction of the court by his personal appearance therein and compliance with the requirements
therefor.
17

There is, however, an exception to the rule that filing pleadings seeking affirmative relief constitutes
voluntary appearance, and the consequent submission of ones person to the jurisdiction of the
court. This is in the case of pleadings whose prayer is precisely for the avoidance of the jurisdiction
of the court, which only leads to a special appearance. These pleadings are: (1) in civil cases,
motions to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, whether or
not other grounds for dismissal are included;
18
(2) in criminal cases, motions to quash a complaint
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused; and (3) motions to quash a
warrant of arrest. The first two are consequences of the fact that failure to file them would constitute
a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person. The third is a consequence of the fact
that it is the very legality of the court process forcing the submission of the person of the accused
that is the very issue in a motion to quash a warrant of arrest.
To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the
accused is deemed waived by the accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief,
except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction
over his person. Therefore, in narrow cases involving special appearances, an accused can invoke
the processes of the court even though there is neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of
the law. However, if a person invoking the special jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must
first submit himself to the custody of the law.
In cases not involving the so-called special appearance, the general rule applies, i.e., the accused is
deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court upon seeking affirmative relief.
Notwithstanding this, there is no requirement for him to be in the custody of the law. The following
cases best illustrate this point, where we granted various reliefs to accused who were not in the
custody of the law, but were deemed to have placed their persons under the jurisdiction of the court.
Note that none of these cases involve the application for bail, nor a motion to quash an information
due to lack of jurisdiction over the person, nor a motion to quash a warrant of arrest:
1. In Allado v. Diokno,
19
on the prayer of the accused in a petition for certiorari on the ground of lack
of probable cause, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining PACC from enforcing the
warrant of arrest and the respondent judge therein from further proceeding with the case and,
instead, to elevate the records to us.
2. In Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,
20
upon the accuseds Motion to Suspend Proceedings and to
Hold in Abeyance Issuance of Warrants of Arrest on the ground that they filed a Petition for Review
with the Department of Justice, we directed respondent judge therein to cease and desist from
further proceeding with the criminal case and to defer the issuance of warrants of arrests against the
accused.
3. In Lacson v. Executive Secretary,
21
on the prayer of the accused in a petition for certiorari on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Sandiganbayan, we directed the Sandiganbayan to
transfer the criminal cases to the Regional Trial Court even before the issuance of the warrants of
arrest.
We hold that the circumstances forcing us to require custody of the law in applications for bail are
not present in motions to quash the warrant of arrest. If we allow the granting of bail to persons not
in the custody of the law, it is foreseeable that many persons who can afford the bail will remain at
large, and could elude being held to answer for the commission of the offense if ever he is proven
guilty. On the other hand, if we allow the quashal of warrants of arrest to persons not in the custody
of the law, it would be very rare that a person not genuinely entitled to liberty would remain scot-free.
This is because it is the same judge who issued the warrant of arrest who will decide whether or not
he followed the Constitution in his determination of probable cause, and he can easily deny the
motion to quash if he really did find probable cause after personally examining the records of the
case.
Moreover, pursuant to the presumption of regularity of official functions, the warrant continues in
force and effect until it is quashed and therefore can still be enforced on any day and at any time of
the day and night.
22
Furthermore, the continued absence of the accused can be taken against him in
the determination of probable cause, since flight is indicative of guilt.
In fine, as much as it is incongruous to grant bail to one who is free, it is likewise incongruous to
require one to surrender his freedom before asserting it. Human rights enjoy a higher preference in
the hierarchy of rights than property rights,
23
demanding that due process in the deprivation of liberty
must come before its taking and not after.
Quashing a warrant of arrest based on a subsequently filed petition for review with the Secretary of
Justice and based on doubts engendered by the political climate constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.
We nevertheless find grave abuse of discretion in the assailed actions of Judge Anghad. Judge
Anghad seemed a little too eager of dismissing the criminal cases against the petitioners. First, he
quashed the standing warrant of arrest issued by his predecessor because of a subsequently filed
appeal to the Secretary of Justice, and because of his doubts on the existence of probable cause
due to the political climate in the city. Second, after the Secretary of Justice affirmed the prosecutors
resolution, he dismissed the criminal cases on the basis of a decision of this Court in another case
with different accused, doing so two days after this Court resolved to issue a temporary restraining
order against further proceeding with the case.
After Judge Tumaliuan issued warrants for the arrest of petitioners, petitioner Miranda appealed the
assistant prosecutors resolution before the Secretary of Justice. Judge Anghad, shortly after
assuming office, quashed the warrant of arrest on the basis of said appeal. According to Judge
Anghad, "x x x prudence dictates (that) and because of comity, a deferment of the proceedings is but
proper."
24

Quashal on this basis is grave abuse of discretion. It is inconceivable to charge Judge Tumaliuan as
lacking in prudence and oblivious to comity when he issued the warrants of arrest against petitioners
just because the petitioners might, in the future, appeal the assistant prosecutors resolution to the
Secretary of Justice. But even if the petition for review was filed before the issuance of the warrants
of arrest, the fact remains that the pendency of a petition for the review of the prosecutors resolution
is not a ground to quash the warrants of arrest.
In Webb v. de Leon,
25
we held that the petitioners therein cannot assail as premature the filing of the
information in court against them on the ground that they still have the right to appeal the adverse
resolution of the DOJ Panel to the Secretary of Justice. Similarly, the issuance of warrants of arrest
against petitioners herein should not have been quashed as premature on the same ground.
The other ground invoked by Judge Anghad for the quashal of the warrant of arrest is in order if true:
violation of the Constitution. Hence, Judge Anghad asked and resolved the question:
In these double murder cases, did this Court comply or adhere to the above-quoted constitutional
proscription, which is Sec. 2, Article III Bill of Rights; to Sec. 6(a), Rule 112, Rules of Criminal
Procedure and to the above-cited decisional cases? To this query or issue, after a deep perusal of
the arguments raised, this Court, through [its] regular Presiding Judge, finds merit in the contention
of herein accused-movant, Jose "Pempe" Miranda.
26

Judge Anghad is referring to the following provision of the Constitution as having been violated by
Judge Tumaliuan:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
27

However, after a careful scrutiny of the records of the case, including the supporting evidence to the
resolution of the prosecutor in his determination of probable cause, we find that Judge Anghad
gravely abused his discretion.
According to petitioners:
In this case, the nullity of the order of Judge Tumaliuan, for the arrest of the petitioners is apparent
from the face of the order itself, which clearly stated that the determination of probable cause was
based on the certification, under oath, of the fiscal and not on a separate determination personally
made by the Judge. No presumption of regularity could be drawn from the order since it expressly
and clearly showed that it was based only on the fiscals certification.
28

Petitioners claim is untrue. Judge Tumaliuans Joint Order contains no such indication that he relied
solely on the prosecutors certification. The Joint Order even indicated the contrary:
Upon receipt of the information and resolution of the prosecutor, the Court proceeded to determine
the existence of a probable cause by personally evaluating the records x x x.[29]
The records of the case show that the prosecutors certification was accompanied by supporting
documents, following the requirement under Lim, Sr. v. Felix
30
and People v. Inting.
31
The supporting
documents are the following:
1. Resolution dated 21 June 2001 of State Prosecutor Leo S. Reyes;
2. Affidavit dated 22 May 2001 of Modesto Gutierrez;
3. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Romeo B. Ocon;
4. Joint Counter Affidavit dated 23 May 2001 of Mayor Jose C. Miranda and Reynaldo de la
Cruz;
5. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Alberto Dalmacio;
6. Decision dated 22 April 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 41 in Criminal
Case No. 97-160355;
7. Sworn statement dated 27 April 2001 of Rodel Maderal;
8. Information dated 22 June 2001;
9. Affidavit-complaint of Virgilio Tuliao; and
10. Medico-legal Reports of the cadavers of Elezer Tuliao and Vicente Buazon.
Hence, procedurally, we can conclude that there was no violation on the part of Judge Tumaliuan of
Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution. Judge Anghad, however, focused on the substantive part of
said section, i.e., the existence of probable cause. In failing to find probable cause, Judge Anghad
ruled that the confession of SPO2 Maderal is incredible for the following reasons: (1) it was given
after almost two years in the custody of the National Bureau of Investigation; (2) it was given by
someone who rendered himself untrustworthy for being a fugitive for five years; (3) it was given in
exchange for an obvious reward of discharge from the information; and (4) it was given during the
election period amidst a "politically charged scenario where "Santiago City voters were pitted against
each other along the lines of the Miranda camp on one side and former City Mayor Amelita S.
Navarro, and allegedly that of DENR Secretary Heherson Alvarez on the other."
32

We painstakingly went through the records of the case and found no reason to disturb the findings of
probable cause of Judge Tumaliuan.
It is important to note that an exhaustive debate on the credibility of a witness is not within the
province of the determination of probable cause. As we held in Webb
33
:
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime
has been committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on
clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable
doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. As well put in Brinegar
v. United States, while probable cause demands more than "bare suspicion," it requires "less than
evidence which would justify x x x conviction." A finding of probable cause merely binds over the
suspect to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt.
x x x Probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be determined in a summary
manner. Preliminary investigation is not a part of trial x x x.
Dismissing a criminal case on the basis of a decision of this Court in another case with different
accused constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
Judge Anghad had quashed the warrant of arrest on the ground, among other things, that there was
a petition for review of the assistant prosecutors resolution before the Secretary of Justice.
However, after the Secretary of Justice affirmed the prosecutors resolution, Judge Anghad
summarily dismissed the two criminal cases against the petitioners on the basis of the following
explanation:
Rodel Maderal was one of the accused in People vs. Wilfredo Leano, et al., RTC, Branch 41, Manila,
and based from his sworn statements, he pinpointed to Mr. Miranda the mastermind and with him
and the other police officers as the direct perpetrators, the October 9, 2001 Decision of the Supreme
Court absolving the five cops of murder, certainly makes his sworn Statements a "narration of
falsehood and lies" and that because of the decision acquitting said officers "who were likewise
falsely linked by said Rodel Maderal in his April 27, 2001 statements, it is now beyond doubt that
Rodel Maderal made untruthful, fabricated and perjured statements and therefore the same is
without probable value." This Court agrees with the defenses views. Indeed, of what use is
Maderals statements when the Supreme Court rejected the prosecutions evidence presented and
adduced in Criminal Case No. 97-160355. Rodel Maderal is supposed to turn state witness in these
two (2) cases but with the Supreme Court decision adverted to, the probative value of his statements
is practically nil.
x x x x
This Court finds merit to the manifestation of the accused Miranda dated October 18, 2001, praying
for the summary dismissal of the two (2) murder charges in view of the latest decision of the
Supreme Court in People of the Philippines vs. Wilfredo Leao, et al., G.R. No. 13886, acquitting the
accused therein and in effect disregarding all the evidence presented by the prosecution in that
case. Accordingly, the two (2) informations [for] murder filed against Jose Miranda are ordered
dismissed.
34

This is a clear case of abuse of discretion. Judge Anghad had no right to twist our decision and
interpret it to the discredit of SPO2 Maderal, who was still at large when the evidence of the
prosecution in the Leao case was presented. A decision, even of this Court, acquitting the accused
therein of a crime cannot be the basis of the dismissal of criminal case against different accused for
the same crime. The blunder of Judge Anghad is even more pronounced by the fact that our
decision in Leao was based on reasonable doubt. We never ruled in Leao that the crime did not
happen; we just found that there was reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused therein, since
the prosecution in that case relied on circumstantial evidence, which interestingly is not even the
situation in the criminal cases of the petitioners in the case at bar as there is here an eyewitness:
Rodel Maderal. The accused in Leao furthermore had no motive to kill respondent Tuliaos son,
whereas petitioners herein had been implicated in the testimony of respondent Tuliao before the
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee.
It is preposterous to conclude that because of our finding of reasonable doubt in Leao, "it is now
beyond doubt that Rodel Maderal made untruthful, fabricated and perjured statements and therefore
the same is without probable value."
35
On the contrary, if we are to permit the use of our decision in
Leao, an acquittal on the ground of reasonable doubt actually points to the probability of the
prosecutions version of the facts therein. Such probability of guilt certainly meets the criteria of
probable cause.
We cannot let unnoticed, too, Judge Anghads dismissal of the informations two days after we
resolved to issue, upon the filing of a bond, a temporary restraining order prohibiting him from further
proceeding with the case. The bond was filed the day after the informations were dismissed. While
the dismissal of the case was able to beat the effectivity date of the temporary restraining order,
such abrupt dismissal of the informations (days after this Courts resolve to issue a TRO against
Judge Anghad) creates wild suspicions about the motives of Judge Anghad.
Nullification of a proceeding necessarily carries with it the reinstatement of the orders set aside by
the nullified proceeding.
In their second assignment of error, petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals did not recall or
reinstate the warrants of arrest issued by Judge Tumaliuan, but instead directed Judge Anghad to
issue apparently new warrants of arrest.
36
According to the petitioners, it was an error for the Court
of Appeals to have done so, without a personal determination of probable cause.
We disagree. Whether the Court of Appeals ordered the issuance of new warrants of arrest or
merely ordered the reinstatement of the warrants of arrest issued by Judge Tumaliuan is merely a
matter of scrupulous semantics, the slight inaccuracy whereof should not be allowed to affect the
dispositions on the merits, especially in this case where the other dispositions of the Court of
Appeals point to the other direction. Firstly, the Court of Appeals had reinstated the 25 June 2001
Order of Judge Tumaliuan,
37
which issued the warrants of arrest. Secondly, the Court of Appeals
likewise declared the proceedings conducted by Judge Anghad void. Certainly, the declaration of
nullity of proceedings should be deemed to carry with it the reinstatement of the orders set aside by
the nullified proceedings. Judge Anghads order quashing the warrants of arrest had been nullified;
therefore those warrants of arrest are henceforth deemed unquashed.
Even if, however, the Court of Appeals had directed the issuance of new warrants of arrest based on
a determination of probable cause, it would have been legally permissible for them to do so. The
records of the preliminary investigation had been available to the Court of Appeals, and are also
available to this Court, allowing both the Court of Appeals and this Court to personally examine the
records of the case and not merely rely on the certification of the prosecutor. As we have ruled in
Allado v. Diokno and Roberts v. Court of Appeals, the determination of probable cause does not rest
on a subjective criteria. As we had resolved in those cases to overrule the finding of probable cause
of the judges therein on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, in the same vein, we can also
overrule the decision of a judge reversing a finding of probable cause, also on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion.
There is no double jeopardy in the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before arraignment
In their third assignment of error, petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible
error in ordering the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524, alleging that the
order of dismissal issued therein had become final and executory. According to petitioners:
It is also worthy to point out at this juncture that the Joint Order of Judge Anghad dated November
14, 2001 is NOT ONE of those Orders which were assailed in the private respondent Tuliaos
Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition filed by the private respondent before the Court of
Appeals. As carefully enumerated in the first page of the assailed Decision, only the following Orders
issued by Judge Anghad were questioned by private respondent, to wit:
1.) Joint Order dated August 17, 2001;
2.) Order dated September 21, 2001;
3.) Joint Order dated October 16, 2001; and
4.) Joint Order dated October 22, 2001.
Obviously, the Joint Order dated November 14, 2001 of Judge Anghad, which ultimately dismissed
Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 AND 36-3524 is NOT included in the list of the assailed Order/Joint
Orders. Hence, the Court of Appeals should not have passed upon the validity or nullity of the Joint
Order of November 14, 2001.
38

Petitioners must have forgotten that respondent Tuliaos Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus was filed not with the Court of Appeals, but with this Court. The Court of Appeals
decided the case because we referred the same to them in our 19 November 2001 Resolution. Such
petition was filed on 25 October 2001, around three weeks before the 14 November 2001 Order.
Upon receipt of the 14 November 2001 Order, however, respondent Tuliao lost no time in filing with
this Court a Motion to Cite Public Respondent in Contempt, alleging that Judge Anghad "deliberately
and willfully committed contempt of court when he issued on 15 November 2001 the Order dated 14
November 2001 dismissing the informations for murder." On 21 November 2001, we referred said
motion to the Court of Appeals, in view of the previous referral of respondent Tuliaos petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.
Our referral to the Court of Appeals of the Motion to Cite Public Repondent in Contempt places the
14 November 2001 Order within the issues of the case decided by the Court of Appeals. In claiming
that Judge Anghad committed contempt of this Court in issuing the 14 November 2001 Order,
respondent Tuliao had ascribed to Judge Anghad an act much more serious than grave abuse of
discretion.
Respondent Tuliao claims that Judge Anghad issued the 14 November 2001 Order on 15 November
2001, antedating it so as to avoid the effects of our 12 November 2001 Resolution. In said 12
November 2001 Resolution, we resolved to issue a temporary restraining order enjoining Judge
Anghad from further proceeding with the criminal cases upon the respondent Tuliaos filing of a bond
in the amount of P20,000.00. Respondent Tuliao had filed the bond on 15 November 2005.
While we cannot immediately pronounce Judge Anghad in contempt, seeing as disobedience to
lawful orders of a court and abuse of court processes are cases of indirect contempt which require
the granting of opportunity to be heard on the part of respondent,
39
the prayer to cite public
respondent in contempt and for other reliefs just and equitable under the premises should be
construed to include a prayer for the nullification of said 14 November 2001 Order.
In any case, the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before arraignment does not constitute
double jeopardy. Double jeopardy cannot be invoked where the accused has not been arraigned and
it was upon his express motion that the case was dismissed.
40

As to respondent Tuliaos prayer (in both the original petition for certiorari as well as in his motion to
cite for contempt) to disqualify Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the case, we hold that the
number of instances of abuse of discretion in this case are enough to convince us of an apparent
bias on the part of Judge Anghad. We further resolve to follow the case of People v. SPO1
Leao,
41
by transferring the venue of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 to the City of
Manila, pursuant to Article VIII, Section 4, of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 18 December 2002 and the Resolution
dated 12 June 2003 of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that
Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 be transferred to and raffled in the Regional Trial
Court of the City of Manila. In this connection,
1) Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Executive Judge of the RTC of the City of
Santiago, Isabela, who is directed to effect the transfer of the cases within ten (10) days after
receipt hereof;
2) The Executive Judge of the RTC of the City of Santiago, Isabela, is likewise directed to
report to this Court compliance hereto within ten (10) days from transfer of these cases;
3) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila shall proceed to raffle the criminal cases within
ten (10) days from the transfer;
4) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila is likewise directed to report to this Court
compliance with the order to raffle within ten (10) days from said compliance; and
5) The RTC Judge to whom the criminal cases are raffled is directed to act on said cases
with reasonable dispatch.
6) Finally, Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is directed to issue forthwith warrants of arrest for the
apprehension of petitioners Jose C. Miranda, Alberto P. Dalmacio, Romeo B. Ocon, and
accused Rodel T. Maderal, conformably with the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 18
December 2002.
The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court dated 4 August 2003 is hereby LIFTED.
Costs against Petitioners.
SO ORDERED
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 114350 January 16, 1997
JOSE T. OBOSA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J .:
The main issue in this case is whether petitioner Jose T. Obosa, who was charged with two (2)
counts of murder (a capital offense)
1
for the ambush slaying of former Secretary of Interior and Local
Governments Jaime N. Ferrer and his driver Jesus D. Calderon, but who was convicted only of two (2)
counts of homicide by the trial court, may be granted bail after such conviction for homicide, a non-capital
offense. The Regional Trial Court of Makati answered in the affirmative but the Court of Appeals ruled
otherwise.
Petitioner thus asks this Court to resolve said issue in this petition under Rule 65 assailing the two
Resolutions
2
of the respondent Court
3
promulgated on November 19, 1993 and March 9, 1994,
respectively. The first Resolution
4
of November 19, 1993 disposed as follows:
5

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Solicitor General's motion to cancel accused-appellant
Jose T. Obosa's bailbond. The Court NULLIFIES the lower court's order dated May 31, 1990,
granting bail to accused Obosa.
Let warrant issue for the arrest of the accused-appellant Jose T. Obosa.
On the same date, November 19, 1993, an Order of Arrest against petitioner was issued under
signature of then Court of Appeals Associate Justice Bernardo P. Pardo.
6

On December 7, 1993, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash Warrant of Arrest and to Set Aside and
Reconsider Resolution of November 19,1993.
7
The second assailed Resolution
8
promulgated on
March 9, 1994 denied the motion as follows:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court hereby DENIES accused Obosa's "Motion to quash warrant
of arrest and to set aside and reconsider the resolution of November 19, 1993" dated
December 4, 1993, for lack of merit.
Let a copy of this resolution be given to the Honorable, the Secretary of Justice, Manila, so
that he may issue the appropriate directive to the Director, Bureau of Corrections,
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, for the rectification of the prison record of accused Jose T. Obosa.
The Facts
Aside from the disagreement as to the date when notice of appeal was actually filed with the trial
court,
9
the facts precedent to this petition are undisputed as set out in the first assailed Resolution,
thus:
10

On December 4, 1987, Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe charged the accused Jose T.
Obosa and three others with murder on two counts, by separate amended informations filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 56, for the ambush-slaying of Secretary of Local
Governments Jaime N. Ferrer and his driver Jesus D. Calderon, which occurred on August 2,
1987, at about 6:30 in the evening, at La Huerta, Para()aque, Metro Manila, as Secretary Ferrer
was riding in his car, going to the St. Andrew Church near the plaza of La Huerta, to hear Sunday
mass.
Each information alleged that the killing was with the attendance of the following
qualifying/aggravating circumstances, to wit: treachery, evident premeditation, abuse of
superior strength, nighttime purposely sought, disregard of the respect due to the victim on
account of his rank and age (as to Secretary Ferrer), and by a band. The Prosecutor
recommended no bail, as the evidence of guilt was strong.
During the trial of the two cases, which were consolidated and tried jointly, the accused
Obosa was detained at Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig, Metro Manila.
At the time of the commission of the two offenses, the accused Obosa was a virtual
"escapee" from the National Penitentiary at Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, particularly, at the
Sampaguita Detention Station, where he was serving a prison term for robbery as a
maximum security prisoner.
Indeed, by virtue of a subpoena illegally issued by a judge of the Municipal Trial Court of
Sariaya, Quezon, accused Obosa was escorted out of prison to appear before said judge on
the pretext that the judge needed his presence so that the judge could inquire about the
whereabouts of the accused therein. While accused Obosa was out of prison, he was able to
participate in the commission of the double murder now charged against him as principal for
the ambush-slaying of Secretary Ferrer and his driver (Lorenzo vs. Marquez, 162 SCRA 546,
553).
Witnesses positively identified accused Jose T. Obosa as one of three assassins firing at a
car near the canteen at the corner of Victor Medina Street and Quirino Avenue, Para()aque,
Metro Manila. It was the car of Secretary Ferrer. He sustained eight entrance gunshot
wounds on the right side of his head, neck and body, while his driver sustained three
entrance wounds on the left temple, right side of the neck, right arm, chest and right hip.
They died on the spot.
In its decision dated May 25, 1990, the lower court found the accused Obosa guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of homicide on two
counts.
11
In ruling that the crime committed was homicide, not murder as charged in the
informations, the lower court declared that there was no qualifying circumstance attendant. In
fact, however, the lower court itself found that the accused shot the victims while the latter were
inside the car, unwary of any danger to their lives, for unknown to them, were the assassins
lurking in the dark, firing their guns from behind, a circumstance indubitably showing treachery
(People vs. Tachado, 170 SCRA 611, People vs. Juanga, 189 SCRA 226). There is treachery
when the victims were attacked without warning and their backs turned to the assailants, as in
this case (People vs. Tachado,supra). There is treachery when the unarmed and unsuspecting
victim was ambushed in the dark, without any risk to his assailants (People vs. Egaras, 163
SCRA 692). Moreover, the crimes could be qualified by taking advantage of superior strength and
aid of armed men (People vs. Baluyot, 170 SCRA 569). Where the attackers cooperated in such
a way to secure advantage of their combined strength, there is present the qualifying
circumstance of taking advantage of superior strength (People vs. Baluyot, supra; People vs.
Malinao, 184 SCRA 148).
On May 31, 1990, the lower court promulgated its decision and on the same occasion,
accused Obosa manifested his intention to appeal and asked the Court to allow him to post
bail for his provisional liberty. Immediately, the lower court granted accused Obosa's motion
and fixed bail at P20,000.00, in each case.
On June 1, 1990, accused Obosa filed a written notice of appeal, dated June 4, 1990,
thereby perfecting appeal from the decision (Alama vs. Abbas, 124 Phil. 1465). By the
perfection of the appeal, the lower court thereby lost jurisdiction over the case and this
means both the record and the person of the accused-appellant. The sentencing court lost
jurisdiction or power to do anything or any matter in relation to the person of the accused-
appellant (Director of Prisons vs. Teodoro, 97 Phil. 391, 395-396), except to issue orders for
the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties, which do not involve any matter
litigated by the appeal (People vs. Aranda, 106 Phil. 1008).
On June 4, 1990, accused Obosa filed a bailbond in the amount of P40,000.00, through
Plaridel Surety and Assurance Company, which the lower court approved. On the same day,
June 4, 1990, the lower court issued an order of release. The prison authorities at the
National Penitentiary released accused Obosa also on the same day notwithstanding that, as
hereinabove stated, at the time of the commission of the double murder, accused Obosa was
serving a prison term for robbery.
The respondent Court likewise discoursed on the service of sentence made by the accused. Thus, it
extensively discussed the following computation on the penalties imposed upon the petitioner for his
previous offenses, which all the more convinced respondent Court that petitioner was not entitled to
bail on the date he applied therefor on May 31, 1990 and filed his bailbond on June 4, 1990, as
follows:
12

At the time the accused committed the crimes charged, he was an inmate at the National
Penitentiary, New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. He was in jail, but was able to
commit the Ferrer assassination. He was serving imprisonment by final judgment in each of three
(3) cases, namely, (a) theft, for which he was sentenced to eleven (11) months and fifteen (15)
days of prision correccional; (b) robbery in band, for which he was sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to four (4) years,
two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as maximum, and (c) evasion of service of
sentence, for which he was sentenced to six (6) months of arresto mayor. These sentences are to
be served successively not simultaneously (Article 70, Revised Penal Code; People vs. Reyes,
52 Phil. 538; Gordon vs. Wolfe, 6 Phil. 76; People vs. Medina, 59 Phil. 134; United States vs.
Claravall, 31 Phil. 652; People vs. Olfindo, 47 Phil. 1; People vs. Tan, 50 Phil. 660). In successive
service of sentences, the time of the second sentence did not commence to run until the
expiration of the first (Gordon vs. Wolfe, supra).
He commenced service of sentence on October 11,1979 (with credit for preventive
imprisonment) and was admitted to the New Bilibid Prisons on January 5, 1980 (See prison
record attached to Supplement, dated January 31, 1994 of the Solicitor General; Cf. prison
record [incomplete] attached to Manifestation dated February 2, 1994 of the Accused
Appellant).
On December 25, 1980, he escaped from detention at Fort Del Pilar, Baguio City, where he
was temporarily working on a prison project (See decision, Grim. Case No. 4159-R, Regional
Trial Court, Baguio City, People vs. Jose Obosa y Tutaa). While a fugitive from justice, he
committed other crimes, in Quezon City, Makati, and Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. The cases
are pending (See prison record, supra).
He was recaptured on August 27, 1986. Under prison regulations, he forfeited his allowance
for good conduct prescribed by law (Article 97, Revised Penal Code; Act 2489 of the
Philippine Legislature). In addition, he must serve the time spent at large (TSAL) of five (5)
years, eight (8) months and two (2) days, and the unserved portion of his successive
sentences for robbery in band, theft and evasion of service of sentence aforementioned. In
sum, he has to serve the balance of his sentence for robbery in band of four (4) years, two
(2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional the sentence for theft of eleven (11)
months and fifteen (15) days of prision correccional; and the sentence for evasion of service
of sentence of six (6) months ofarresto mayor, reaching a total of five (5) years, seven (7)
months and sixteen (16) days. Since his commitment to jail on October 11, 1979, to the time
he escaped on December 25, 1980, he had served one (1) year, two (2) months, and
fourteen (14) days, which, deducted from the totality of his prison term, would leave a
balance of four (4) years, five (5) months and two (2) days. Thus, he must still serve this
unserved portion of his sentences in addition to the time spent at large. Counting the time
from his re-arrest on August 27, 1986, and adding thereto five (5) years, eight (8) months
and two (2) days (time spent at large), the result is that he must serve up to April 29, 1992.
To this shall be added the remaining balance of his successive sentences of four (4) years,
five (5) months and two (2) day(s). Consequently, he has to serve sentence and remain in
confinement up to October 1, 1996. Of course, he may be given allowance for good conduct.
But good conduct time allowance can not be computed in advance (Frank vs. Wolfe, 11 Phil.
466). This is counted only during the time an accused actually served with good conduct and
diligence (Frank vs. Wolfe,supra; See Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, Vol. I, 1987 ed., pp.
803-804). However, accused Obosa can not avail himself of this beneficent provision of the
law because, while he was at large, he committed infraction of prison rules (escaping) and
other crimes, including the Ferrer assassination, and for which he was placed under
preventive imprisonment commencing on December 4, 1987, the date the informations at bar
were filed against him. Because he was then under custody, no warrant of arrest or
commitment order need be issued (Asuncion vs. Peralejo, G.R. No. 82915, June 22, 1988,
minute resolution; Cf. People vs. Wilson, 4 Phil. 381; Umil vs. Ramos, 187 SCRA 311).
Allowance for good conduct does not apply to detention prisoners (Baking vs. Director of
Prisons, 28 SCRA 851). Consequently, by all reckoning, accused Obosa could not be
released from prison on June 4, 1990, when he was admitted to bail. His release was illegal.
He still has to serve the balance of his unserved sentences until October 1, 1996.
On September 6, 1993, respondent People, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed
with respondent Court an urgent motion,
13
praying for cancellation of petitioner's bail bond.
Petitioner promptly filed an opposition,
14
to which respondent People submitted a reply.
15
Thereupon,
respondent Court issued its first questioned Resolution dated November 19, 1993:
16
a) canceling
petitioner's bail bond, b) nullifying the trial court's order of May 31, 1990 which granted bail to petitioner,
and c) issuing a warrant for his immediate arrest.
Petitioner's twin motions for reconsideration
17
and quashal of warrant of arrest proved futile as
respondent Court, on March 9, 1994, after the parties' additional pleadings were submitted and after
hearing the parties' oral arguments, issued its second questioned Resolution denying said motions for
lack of merit.
The Issues
The petitioner worded the issue in this case as follows:
18

The principal constitutional and legal issues involved in this petition is (sic) whether petitioner as
accused-appellant before the respondent Honorable Court of Appeals is entitled to bail as a
matter of right and to enjoy the bail granted by the Regional Trial Court, in Makati, Metro Manila,
pending appeal from the judgment convicting him of Homicide on two (2) counts though charged
with Murder; and assuming that bail is a matter of discretion, the trial court had already exercised
sound discretion in granting bail to accused-appellant, now petitioner in this case, and respondent
Court of Appeals is devoid of jurisdiction in cancelling said bailbond.
The Solicitor General stated the issues more clearly, thus:
19

I
Whether or not the trial court still have (sic) jurisdiction over the case when it approved
petitioner's bail bond on June 4, 1990.
II
Considering that the murder charge against petitioner still stands pending his appeal and
strong evidence of guilt actually exists based on respondent Court of Appeals' own
preliminary determination and the lower court's initial finding as well, is petitioner entitled to
bail as a matter of right pending review of his conviction for homicide?
III
How does petitioner's prison record affect his alleged right to bail?
The Court's Ruling
First Issue: Trial Court's Jurisdiction
To decide the issue of whether the cancellation of bail bond by the respondent Court was correct, we
deem it necessary to determine first whether the trial court had jurisdiction to grant bail under the
circumstances of this case.
Petitioner contends that the trial court was correct in allowing him "to post bail for his provisional
liberty on the same day, May 31, 1990 when the judgment of conviction of (sic) homicide was
promulgated and the accused-appellant (petitioner) manifested his intention to appeal the judgment
of conviction. At the time, the lower court still had jurisdiction over the case as to empower it to issue
the order granting bail pending appeal. Appellant filed his notice of appeal only on June 4, 1990, on
which date his appeal was deemed perfected and the lower court lost jurisdiction over the case.
Hence, the grant of bail on May 31, 1990 cannot be validly attacked on jurisdictional grounds."
20

Through its counsel, the Solicitor General, respondent People admits that petitioner manifested his
intention to appeal on May 31, 1990 and filed his written notice of appeal on June 1, 1990. But the
Solicitor General nevertheless contends that ". . . it was only on June 4, 1990, or three (3) days after
perfecting his appeal that petitioner posted his bail bond in the amount of P40,000.00 through
Plaridel Surety and Assurance Company. Clearly, when the lower court approved the bail bond on
the same day June 4, 1990), it no longer had Jurisdiction over the case."
21

The respondent Court found that "(o)n June 1, 1990, accused Obosa filed a written notice of appeal,
dated June 4, 1990, thereby perfecting appeal from the decision . . ."
22

We reviewed the page
23
cited by respondent Court, and found that indeed, the written notice of appeal,
although dated June 4, 1990, was made and actually served upon the trial court on June 1, 1990. Such
being the case, did the trial court correctly approve the bail bond on June 4,1990? To answer this, there is
a need to revisit Section 3, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 3. How appeal taken. (a) The appeal to the Regional Trial Court, or to the Court of
Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction, shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the
judgment or order appealed from, and by serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.
xxx xxx xxx
Since petitioner did file the written notice of appeal on June 1, 1990, petitioner's appeal was,
perforce, perfected, without need of any further or other act, and consequently and ineluctably, the
trial court lost jurisdiction over the case, both over the record and over the subject of the case.
24
As
has been ruled:
25

The question presented for our resolution is: Did the Court of First Instance that convicted
respondent Lacson have the power and authority to issue the writ of preliminary injunction,
prohibiting the transfer of said Lacson from the provincial hospital of Occidental Negros to the
Insular Penitentiary at Muntinglupa, Rizal? While there is no express provision on this point, it is
contrary to the generally accepted principles of procedure for said court to be invested with said
power or authority. A necessary regard for orderly procedure demands that once a case, whether
civil or criminal, has been appealed from a trial court to an appellate (sic) court and the appeal
therefrom perfected, the court a quoloses jurisdiction over the case, both over the record and
over the subject of the case. Thus in civil cases the rule is that after the appeal has been
perfected from a judgment of the Court of First Instance, the trial court losses (sic) jurisdiction
over the case, except to issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the
parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal (Rule 41, Sec. 9). The jurisdiction
of the court over the matters involved in the case is lost by the perfected appeal, save in those
cases which the rules expressly except therefrom. (Emphasis supplied).
But it should be noted that the bail was granted on May 31, 1990 by the trial Court.
26
The validity and
effectivity of the subsequent approval of the bail bond by the trial court on June 4, 1990 is therefore the
matter at issue. We agree with respondent Court and respondent People that, while bail was granted by
the trial court when it had jurisdiction, the approval of the bail bond was done without authority, because
by then, the appeal had already been perfected and the trial court had lost jurisdiction. Needless to say,
the situation would have been different had bail been granted and approval thereof given before the
notice of appeal was filed.
As the approval was decreed by the trial court in excess of jurisdiction, then the bailbond was never
validly approved. On this basis alone, regardless of the outcome of the other issues, it is indisputable
that the instant petition should be dismissed.
Second Issue: Is Petitioner Entitled To Bail
As A Matter of Right?
The second issue, while no longer critical to the disposition of this case, will nevertheless be tackled,
in view of its importance. The Solicitor General argues that "(f)or while petitioner was convicted of
the lesser offense of homicide, the fact that he has appealed resultantly throws the whole case open
for review and reverts him back to his original situation as a person charged with the capital offense
of murder on two (2) counts against whom a strong evidence of guilt exists as initially found by the
trial court during the bail proceedings a quo."
27

Petitioner answers by saying that "once the accused who is charged with a capital offense is
convicted not of the offense for which he is charged but for a lesser one which is not capital or
punished with reclusion perpetua, he is entitled to bail as a matter of right because the fact that the
evidence of his guilt of a capital offense is not strong is necessarily to be inferred from his conviction
of the lesser offense."
28

On this point, respondent Court ratiocinated:
29

In this case, although the accused is charged with murder on two counts, and evidence of guilt is
strong, the lower court found him guilty of homicide also on two (2) counts. He has appealed. An
appeal by the accused throws the whole case open for review and this includes the penalty, the
indemnity and the damages awarded by the trial court which may be increased (Quemuel vs.
Court of Appeals, 130 Phil. 33). The appellate court may find the accused guilty of the original
crime charged and impose on him the proper penalty therefor (Linatoc vs. People, 74 Phil. 586).
By virtue of the appeal, the conviction for the lesser offense of homicide is stayed in the
meantime. Hence, the accused is back to the original situation as he was before judgment (Cf .
Peo vs. Bocar, 97 Phil. 398), that is, one charged with capital offenses where evidence of guilt is
strong. Bail must be denied.
To resolve this issue, we refer to Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which provides:
Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall
not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.
Excessive bail shall not be required.
In the case of De la Camara vs. Enage,
30
we analyzed the purpose of bail and why it should be denied
to one charge with a capital offense when evidence of guilt is strong:
. . . Before conviction, every person is bailable except if charged with capital offenses when
the evidence of guilt is strong. Such a right flows from the presumption of innocence in favor
of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would
be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thereby a
regime of liberty is honored in the observance and not in the breach. It is not beyond the
realm of probability, however, that a person charged with a crime, especially so where his
defense is weak, would just simply make himself scarce and thus frustrate the hearing of his
case. A bail is intended as a guarantee that such an intent would be thwarted. It is, in the
language of Cooley, a "mode short of confinement which would, with reasonable certainty,
insure the attendance of the accused" for the subsequent trial. Nor is there anything
unreasonable in denying this right to one charged with a capital offense when evidence of
guilt is strong, as the likelihood is, rather than await the outcome of the proceeding against
him with a death sentence, an ever-present threat, temptation to flee the jurisdiction would
be too great to be resisted. (Emphasis supplied).
The aforequoted rationale applies with equal force to an appellant who, though convicted of an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, was nevertheless originally
charged with a capital offense. Such appellant can hardly be unmindful of the fact that, in the
ordinary course of things, there is a substantial likelihood of his conviction (and the corresponding
penalty) being affirmed on appeal, or worse, the not insignificant possibility and infinitely more
unpleasant prospect of instead being found guilty of the capital offense originally charged. In such an
instance, the appellant cannot but be sorely tempted to flee.
Our Rules of Court, following the mandate of our fundamental law, set the standard to be observed
in applications for bail. Section 3, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal procedure,
31
as amended,
provides:
Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception. All persons in custody shall, before final conviction,
be entitled to bail as a matter of right, except those charged with a capital offense or an
offense which, under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of the application
for bail, is punishable by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong. (Emphasis
supplied).
In Borinaga vs. Tamin,
32
which was promulgated in 1993, this Court laid down the guidelines for the
grant of bail:
The 1987 Constitution provides that all persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong shall, before conviction, be
bailable by sufficient sureties or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law.
Corollarily, the Rules of Court, under Section 3, Rule 114 thereof, provides that all persons in
custody shall, before final conviction, be entitled to bail as a matter of right, except those
charged with a capital offense or an offense which, under the law at the time of its
commission and at the time of the application for bail, is punishable by reclusion perpetua,
when evidence of guilt is strong.
As now revised in the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure and provided in Rule 114 thereof,
the rules on availability of bail to an accused may be restated as follows:
1. Admission to bail is a matter of right at any stage of the action where the
charge is not for a capital offense or is not punishable by reclusion perpetua;
[Sec. 3, Rule 114, 1985 Rules on Crim. Procedure].
2. Regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution, no bail shall be
allowed if the accused is charged with a capital offense or of an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua and the evidence of guilt is strong; [Idem].
3. Even if a capital offense is charged and the evidence of guilt is strong, the
accused may still be admitted to bail in the discretion of the court if there are
strong grounds to apprehend that his continued confinement will endanger
his life or result in permanent impairment of health, [De la Rama vs. People's
Court, 43 O.G. No. 10, 4107 (1947)] but only before judgment in the regional
trial court; and
4. No bail shall be allowed after final judgment, unless the accused has
applied for probation and has not commenced to serve sentence, [Section
21, Rule 114, 1985 Rules of Court] the penalty and offense being within the
purview of the probation law.
However, the above guidelines, along with Rule 114 itself, have since been modified by
Administrative Circular No. 12-94, which was issued by this Court and which came into effect on
October 1, 1994. Verily, had herein petitioner made application for bail after the effectivity of said
circular, this case would have been readily and promptly resolved against petitioner. For, quite
recently, in Robin Cario Padilla vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,
33
we held, making reference to said
administrative circular:
Bail is either a matter of right, or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense charged
is not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. On the other hand, upon
conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, bail becomes a matter of discretion. Similarly, if the court
imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years but not more than twenty (20)
years then bail is a matter of discretion, except when any of the enumerated circumstances
under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present then bail shall be denied. Butwhen the
accused is charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, and evidence of guilt is strong, bail shall be denied, as it is neither a matter
of right nor a discretion. If the evidence, however, is not strong bail becomes a matter of
right. (Citation omitted; emphasis supplied).
And, as above adverted to, the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 of
the 1994 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure the presence of any of which could preclude the
grant of bail are as follows:
(a) That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or
has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That the accused is found to have previously escaped from legal
confinement, evaded sentence, or has violated the conditions of his bail
without valid justification;
(c) That the accused committed the offense while on probation, parole, or
under conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of the accused or his case indicate the probability
of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that during the pendency of the appeal, the
accused may commit another crime.
It will be readily noted that, pursuant to the foregoing amendments, not only does the conviction of
petitioner for two counts of homicide disqualify him from being admitted to bail as a matter of right
and subject his bail application to the sound discretion of the court, but more significantly, the
circumstances enumerated in paragraphs a, b, d and e above, which are present in petitioner's
situation, would have justified and warranted the denial of bail, except that a retroactive application
of the said circular in the instant case is barred as it would obviously be unfavorable to petitioner.
But be that as it may, the rules on bail at the time of petitioner's conviction (i.e., prior to their
amendment by Adm. Circular 12-94) do not favor petitioner's cause either. In Quemuel vs. CA, et
al.,
34
this Court held that the appeal in a criminal case opens the whole case for review and this includes
the penalty, which may be increased. Thus, on appeal, as the entire case is submitted for review, even
factual questions may be increased. Thus, on appeal, as the entire case is submitted for review, even
factual questions may once more be weighed and evaluated. That being the situation, the possibility of
conviction upon the original charge is ever present. Likewise, if the prosecution had previously
demonstrated that evidence of the accused's guilt is strong, as it had done so in this case, such
determination subsists even on appeal, despite conviction for a lesser offense, since such determination
is for the purpose of resolving whether to grant or deny bail and does not have any bearing on whether
petitioner will ultimately be acquitted or convicted of the charge.
We have previously held that, while the accused, after conviction, may upon application be bailed at
the discretion of the court, that discretion particularly with respect to extending the bail should
be exercised not with laxity, but with caution and only for strong reasons, with the end in view of
upholding the majesty of the law and the administration of justice.
35

And the grave caution that must attend the exercise of judicial discretion in granting bail to a
convicted accused is best illustrated and exemplified in Administrative Circular No. 12-94 amending
Rule 114, Section 5 which now specifically provides that, although the grant of bail is discretionary in
non-capital offenses, nevertheless, when imprisonment has been imposed on the convicted accused
in excess of six (6) year and circumstances exist (inter alia, where the accused is found to have
previously escaped from legal confinement or evaded sentence, or there is an undue risk that the
accused may commit another crime while his appeal is pending) that point to a considerable
likelihood that the accused may flee if released on bail, then the accused must be denied bail, or his
bail previously granted should be cancelled.
But the same rationale obtained even under the old rules on bail (i.e., prior to their amendment by
Adm. Circular 12-94). Senator Vicente J. Francisco's
36
eloquent explanation on why bail should be
denied as a matter of wise discretion after judgment of conviction reflects that thinking, which remains
valid up to now:
The importance attached to conviction is due to the underlying principle that bail should be
granted only where it is uncertain whether the accused is guilty or innocent, and therefore,
where that uncertainty is removed by conviction it would, generally speaking, be absurd to
admit to bail. After a person has been tried and convicted the presumption of innocence
which may be relied upon in prior applications is rebutted, and the burden is upon the
accused to show error in the conviction. From another point of view it may be properly
argued that the probability of ultimate punishment is so enhanced by the conviction that the
accused is much more likely to attempt to escape if liberated on bail than before conviction. .
. .
Third Issue: Petitioner's Record
Petitioner claims that respondent Court of Appeals erred in concluding "that at the time the bail was
granted and approved by His Honor of the trial court, he has still to serve sentence and remain in
confinement up to October 1, 1996" and hence was not entitled to bail.
37
Petitioner, citing Luis B.
Reyes,
38
maintains that the Bureau of Corrections properly released him from prison on July 18, 1990.
We find it unnecessary to address this issue in the resolution of the instant petition. Having already
determined that the bail bond was approved without jurisdiction and that the Court of Appeals was
correct in issuing the two questioned Resolutions, we thus hold that, petitioner cannot be released
from confinement. The determination of whether or not petitioner should still be imprisoned up to
October 1, 1996, and only thereafter may possibly be released on bail is no longer material for the
disposition of this case. Thus, we shall longer burden ourselves with the resolution of this academic
issue.
EPILOGUE
In sum, we rule that bail cannot be granted as a matter of right even after an accused, who
is charged with a capital offense, appeals his conviction for a non-capital crime. Courts must
exercise utmost caution in deciding applications for bail considering that the accused on appeal may
still be convicted of the original capital offense charged and that thus the risk attendant to jumping
bail still subsists. In fact, trial courts would be well advised to leave the matter of bail, after conviction
for a lesser crime than the capital offense originally charged, to the appellate court's sound
discretion.
We also hold that the trial court had failed to exercise the degree of discretion and caution required
under and mandated by our statutes and rules, for, aside from being too hasty in granting bail
immediately after promulgation of judgment, and acting without jurisdiction in approving the bailbond,
it inexplicably ignored the undeniable fact of petitioner's previous escape from legal confinement as
well as his prior convictions.
Upon the other hand, the respondent Court should be commended for its vigilance, discretion and
steadfastness. In ruling against bail, it even scoured the records and found that treachery attended
the killing thereby justifying its action. The trial court's literal interpretation of the law on bail was
forcefully debunked by the appellate courts' excellent disquisition on the rationale of the applicable
rules. Truly, law must be understood not by "the letter that killeth but by the spirit that giveth life."
Law should not be read and interpreted in isolated academic abstraction nor even for the sake of
logical symmetry but always in context of pulsating social realities and specific environmental facts.
Truly, "the real essence of justice does not emanate from quibblings over patchwork legal
technicality. It proceeds from the spirit's gut consciousness of the dynamic role of law as a brick in
the ultimate development of the social edifice."
39

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant petition is hereby DENIED and the two assailed
Resolutions AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
A.M. No. RTJ-96-1335 March 5, 1997
INOCENCIO BASCO, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE LEO M. RAPATALO, Regional Trial Court, Branch 32, Agoo, La Union, respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N

ROMERO, J .:
In a sworn letter-complaint dated August 14, 1995, complainant Inocencio Basco charged
respondent Judge Leo M. Rapatalo of RTC, Branch 32, Agoo, La Union with gross ignorance or
willful disregard of established rule of law for granting bail to an accused in a murder case (Criminal
Case No. 2927) without receiving evidence and conducting a hearing.
Complainant, who is the father of the victim, alleged that an information for murder was filed against
a certain Roger Morente, one of three accused. The accused Morente filed a petition for bail. The
hearing for said petition was set for May 31, 1995 by petitioner but was not heard since the
respondent Judge was then on leave. It was reset to June 8, 1995 but on said date, respondent
Judge reset it to June 22, 1995. The hearing for June 22, 1995, however, did not materialize.
Instead, the accused was arraigned and trial was set. Again, the petition for bail was not heard on
said date as the prosecution's witnesses in connection with said petition were not notified. Another
attempt was made to reset the hearing to July 17, 1995.
In the meantime, complainant allegedly saw the accused in Rosario, La Union on July 3, 1995. He
later learned that the accused was out on bail despite the fact that the petition had not been heard at
all. Upon investigation, complainant discovered that bail had been granted and a release order dated
June 29, 1995
1
was issued on the basis of a marginal note
2
dated June 22, 1995, at the bottom of the
bail petition by Assistant Prosecutor Manuel Oliva which stated: "No objection: P80,000.00," signed and
approved by the assistant prosecutor and eventually by respondent Judge. Note that there was already a
release order dated June 29, 1995 on the basis of the marginal note of the Assistant Prosecutor dated
June 22, 1995 (when the hearing of the petition for bail was aborted and instead arraignment took place)
when another hearing was scheduled for July 17, 1995.
In his comment dated October 16, 1995, respondent Judge alleged that he granted the petition
based on the prosecutor's option not to oppose the petition as well as the latter's recommendation
setting the bailbond in the amount of P80,000.00. He averred that when the prosecution chose not to
oppose the petition for bail, he had the discretion on whether to approve it or not. He further declared
that when he approved the petition, he had a right to presume that the prosecutor knew what he was
doing since he was more familiar with the case, having conducted the preliminary investigation.
Furthermore, the private prosecutor was not around at the time the public prosecutor recommended
bail.
Respondent Judge stated that in any case, the bailbond posted by accused was cancelled and a
warrant for his arrest was issued on account of complainant's motion for reconsideration. The
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor apparently conformed to and approved the motion for
reconsideration.
3
To date, accused is confined at the La Union Provincial Jail.
A better understanding of bail as an aspect of criminal procedure entails appreciating its nature and
purposes. "Bail" is the security required by the court and given by the accused to ensure that the
accused appears before the proper court at the scheduled time and place to answer the charges
brought against him or her. In theory, the only function of bail is to ensure the appearance of the
defendant at the time set for trial. The sole purpose of confining the accused
in jail before conviction, it has been observed, is to assure his presence at the trial.
4
In other words, if
the denial of bail is authorized in capital offenses, it is only in theory that the proof being strong, the
defendant would flee, if he has the opportunity, rather than face the verdict of the court. Hence the
exception to the fundamental right to be bailed should be applied in direct ratio to the extent of probability
of evasion of the prosecution.
5
In practice, bail has also been used to prevent the release of an accused
who might otherwise be dangerous to society or whom the judges might not want to release."
6

It is in view of the abovementioned practical function of bail that it is not a matter of right in cases
where the person is charged with a capital offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. Article 114, section 7 of the Rules of Court, as amended, states, "No person" charged
with a capital offense, or an offense punishable byreclusion perpetua or life imprisonment when the
evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal action."
When the grant of bail is discretionary, the prosecution has the burden of showing that the evidence
of guilt against the accused is strong. However, the determination of whether or not the evidence of
guilt is strong, being a matter of judicial discretion, remains with the judge. "This discretion by the
very nature of things, may rightly be exercised only after the evidence is submitted to the court at the
hearing. Since the discretion is directed to the weight of the evidence and since evidence cannot
properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or produced before the court,
7
it is obvious that a proper
exercise of judicial discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be submitted to the court, the petitioner
having the right of cross examination and to introduce his own evidence in rebuttal."
8

To be sure, the discretion of the trial court, "is not absolute nor beyond control. It must be sound, and
exercised within reasonable bounds. Judicial discretion, by its very nature involves the exercise of
the judge's individual opinion and the law has wisely provided that its exercise be guided by well-
known rules which, while allowing the judge rational latitude for the operation of his own individual
views, prevent them from getting out of control. An uncontrolled or uncontrollable discretion on the
part of a judge is a misnomer. It is a fallacy. Lord Mansfield, speaking of the discretion to be
exercised in granting or denying bail said: "But discretion when applied to a court of justice, means
sound discretion guided by law. It must be governed by rule, not by humour; it must not be arbitrary,
vague and fanciful; but legal and regular."
9

Consequently, in the application for bail of a person charged with a capital offense punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, a hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the
discretion of the court, must actually be conducted to determine whether or not the evidence of guilt
against the accused is strong. "A summary hearing means such brief and speedy method of
receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of
hearing which is merely to determine the weight of evidence for the purposes of bail. On such
hearing, the court does not sit to try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that
ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome
of the trial or on what further evidence may be therein offered and admitted. The course of inquiry
may be left to the discretion of the court which may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has
reference to substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and cross
examination."
10
If a party is denied the opportunity to be heard, there would be a violation of procedural
due process.
That it is mandatory for the judge to require a hearing in a petition for bail is emphasized in the
following cases:
(1) People v. Sola decided in 1981.
11
In this case seven separate informations for
murder were filed against the accused Sola and 18 other persons. After preliminary
investigation. the municipal trial court issued warrants for their arrest. However without
giving the prosecution the opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt against the
accused is strong, the court granted them the right to post bail for their temporary
release. CitingPeople v San Diego,
12
we held: "We are of the considered opinion that
whether the motion for bail of a defendant who is in custody for a capital offense be
resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial, the prosecution must
be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may
desire to introduce before the court should resolve the motion for bail. If, as in the
criminal case involved in the instant special civil action, the prosecution should be denied
such an opportunity, there would be a violation of procedural due process, and the order
of the court granting bail should be considered void on that ground.
(2) People v. Dacudao decided in 1989.
13
In this case, an information was filed against
the accused for murder, a non-bailable offense. The judge, without conducting any
hearing, granted bail on the ground that there was not enough evidence to warrant a
case for murder because only affidavits of the prosecution witnesses who were allegedly
not eyewitnesses to the crime were filed. We held: "Whatever the court possessed at the
time it issued the questioned ruling was intended only for prima facie determining
whether or not there is sufficient ground to engender a well founded belief that the crime
was committed and pinpointing the persons who probably committed it. Whether or not
the evidence of guilt is strong for each individual accused still has to established unless
the prosecution submits the issue on whatever it has already presented. To appreciate
the strength or weakness of the evidence of guilt, the prosecution must be consulted or
held. It is equally entitled to due process.
(3) People v. Calo decided in 1990.
14
In this case, the prosecution was scheduled to
present nine witnesses at the hearings held to determine whether the evidence against
the private respondents was strong.After hearing the fifth witness, the respondent judge
insisted on terminating the proceedings. We held: "The prosecution in the instant case
was not given adequate opportunity to prove that there is strong evidence of guilt and to
present within a reasonable time all the evidence it desired to present.
(4) Libarios v. Dabalo decided in 1991
15
which involved an administrative complaint
against the respondent judge for ignorance of the law and grave abuse of discretion. In
this case, the respondent judge, without conducting any prior hearing, directed the
issuance of a warrant of arrest against the accused charged with murder, fixing at the
same time the bail at P50,000.00 each on the ground that the evidence against them was
merely circumstantial. We held: "Where a person is accused of a capital offense, the trial
court must conduct a hearing in a summary proceeding to allow the prosecution to
present, within a reasonable time, all evidence it may desire to produce to prove that the
evidence of guilt against the accused is strong before resolving the issue of bail for the
temporary release of the accused. Failure to conduct a hearing before fixing bail in the
instant case amounted to a violation of due process." The respondent judge was ordered
to pay a fine of P20,000.00 and warned to exercise more care in the performance of his
duties.
(5) People v. Nano decided in 1992.
16
In this case, the judge issued an order admitting
the accused in a kidnapping and murder case to bail without any hearing. We held: "The
prosecution must first be given an opportunity to present evidence because by the very
nature of deciding applications for bail, it is on the basis of such evidence that judicial
discretion is weighed against in determining whether the guilt of the accused is strong."
(6) Pico v. Combong, Jr. decided in 1992.
17
In this administrative case, the respondent
judge granted bail to an accused charged with an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua, without notice and hearing, and even before the accused had been arrested or
detained. We held: "It is well settled that an application for bail from a person charged
with a capital offense (now an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua) must be set for
hearing at which both the defense and the prosecution must be given reasonable
opportunity to prove (in case of the prosecution) that the evidence of guilt of the applicant
is strong, or (in the case of the defense) that such evidence of guilt was not strong." The
respondent judge was ordered to pay a fine of P20,000.00 and warned to exercise
greater care and diligence in the performance of his duties.
(7) De Guia v. Maglalang decided in 1993,
18
the respondent judge issued a warrant of
arrest and also fixed the bail of an accused charged with the non bailable offense of
statutory rape, without allowing the prosecution an opportunity to show that the evidence
of guilt against the accused is strong. Respondent judge alleged that the only evidence
on record = the sworn statements of the complaining witness and her guardian = were
not sufficient to justify the denial of bail. We held: "It is an established principle that in
cases where a person is accused of a capital offense, the trial court must conduct a
hearing in a summary proceeding, to allow the prosecution an opportunity to present,
within a reasonable time, all evidence it may desire to produce to prove that the evidence
of guilt against the accused is strong, before resolving the issue of bail for the temporary
release of the accused. Failure to conduct a hearing before fixing bail amounts to a
violation of due process." It was noted that the warrant of arrest was returned unserved
and that after the case was re-raffled to the complainant judge's sala, the warrant was set
aside and cancelled. There was no evidence on record showing whether the approved
bail was revoked by the complainant judge, whether the accused was apprehended or
whether the accused filed an application for bail. Hence, the respondent judge was
ordered to pay a fine of P5,000.00 instead of the usual P20,000.00 that the court imposes
on judges who grant the application of bail without notice and hearing.
(8) Borinaga v. Tamin decided in 1993.
19
In this case, a complaint for murder was filed
against five persons. While the preliminary investigation was pending in the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, a petition for bail was filed by one of the accused before the
respondent judge in the Regional Trial Court. The respondent judge ordered the
prosecutor to appear at the hearing to present evidence that the guilt of the accused is
strong. At the scheduled hearing, the public prosecutor failed to appear prompting the
respondent to grant the application for bail. We held: "Whether the motion for bail of an
accused who is in custody for a capital offense be resolved in a summary proceeding or
in the course of a regular trial, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present
within a reasonable time all evidence it may desire to introduce before the court may
resolve the motion for bail." The respondent judge was fined P20,000.00 and was warned
that the commission of a similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.
(9) Aurillo v. Francisco decided in 1994.
20
In this administrative case, the respondent
judge issued two separate warrants of arrest against two persons charged with murder
and parricide, but fixed the amount of bail for each accused without notifying the
prosecution of any motion to fix bail nor of any order granting the same. Citing People
v. Dacudao,
21
we held: "A hearing is absolutely indispensable before a judge can
properly determine whether the prosecution's evidence is weak or strong. Hence, a
denial of the prosecution's request to adduce evidence, deprives it of procedural due
process, a right to which it is equally entitled as the defense. A hearing is required to
afford the judge a basis for determining the existence of those factors set forth under
Rule 114, Sec 6." The respondent judge was ordered to pay a fine of P20,000 with a
warning that the commission of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with
more severely.
(10) Estoya v. Abraham-Singson decided in 1994.
22
In this case, an administrative
complaint was filed against the respondent judge, alleging, among others, that she
granted an application for bail filed by the accused charged with murder. The grant was
made over the objection of the prosecution which insisted that the evidence of guilt was
strong and without allowing the prosecution to present evidence in this regard. We held:
"In immediately granting bail and fixing it at only P20,000.00 for each of the accused
without allowing the prosecution to present its evidence, the respondent denied the
prosecution due process. This Court had said so in many cases and had imposed
sanctions on judges who granted applications for bail in capital offenses and in offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua without giving the prosecution the opportunity to prove
that the evidence of guilt is strong." The respondent judge was dismissed from service
because the erroneous granting of bail was just one of the offenses found to have been
committed by her in the aforesaid complaint.
(11) Aguirre v. Belmonte decided in 1994.
23
In this administrative case, the respondent
judge issued warrants of arrest and, at the same time and on his own motion, authorized
the provisional release on bail of the accused in two criminal cases for murder. The
accused were still at large at the time the order granting bail was issued. We held: "A
hearing is mandatory before bail can be granted to an accused who is charged with a
capital offense." The judge was ordered to pay a fine of P25,000.00 with a warning that a
repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely. He
was meted a fine in a higher amount than the usual P20,000.00 because it involved two
criminal cases wherein the respondent judge, "was not only the grantor of bail but
likewise the applicant therefor."
(12) Lardizabal v. Reyes decided in 1994.
24
In this administrative case, the respondent
judge issued an order directing the arrest of the accused charged with rape and, motu
proprio, fixed the bail of the accused in the amount of P80,000.00 without any application
on the part of the accused to be admitted to bail. When the accused filed a motion to
reduce bailbond, the respondent judge, again, without any prior notice and hearing,
reduced the bail to P40,000.00. We held: "The rule is explicit that when an accused is
charged with a serious offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, such as rape, bail may
be granted only after a motion for that purpose has been filed by the accused and a
hearing thereon conducted by a judge to determine whether or not the prosecution's
evidence of guilt is strong." The respondent judge was ordered to pay a fine of
P20,000.00 with a warning that a repetition of similar or the same offense will be dealt
with more severely.
(13) Guillermo v. Reyes decided in 1995
25
involving an administrative complaint
against the respondent judge for granting bail to the two accused charged with serious
illegal detention. When the two accused first filed a joint application for bail, the petition
for bail was duly heard and the evidence offered by the accused and the prosecution in
opposition thereto were properly taken into account. However, the respondent judge
denied the application for bail on the around that it was premature since the accused
were not yet in custody of the law. In a subsequent order, the respondent judge, without
conducting any hearing on aforestated application and thereby denying the prosecution
an opportunity to oppose the same, granted said petition upon the voluntary appearance
in court of the two accused. Respondent judge insisted that there was a hearing but the
proceeding he adverted to was that which was conducted when the motion for bail was
first considered and then denied for being premature. We held: "The error of the
respondent judge lies in the fact that in his subsequent consideration of the application
for bail, he acted affirmatively thereon without conducting another hearing and what is
worse, his order concededly lacked the requisite summary or resume of the evidence
presented by the parties and necessary to support the grant of bail." The respondent
judge was reprimanded because despite the irregularity in the procedure adopted in the
proceeding, the prosecution was undeniably afforded the benefit of notice and hearing.
No erroneous appreciation of the evidence was alleged nor did the prosecution indicate
its desire to introduce additional evidence in an appropriate challenge to the aforestated
grant of bail by the respondent.
(14) Santos v. Ofilada decided in 1995.
26
In this case, an administrative complaint was
filed against the respondent judge, who, without notice and hearing to the prosecution,
granted bail to an accused charged with murder and illegal possession of firearm. We
held: "Where admission to bail is a matter of discretion, a hearing is mandatory before an
accused can be granted bail. At the hearing, both the prosecution and the defense must
be given reasonable opportunity to prove, in case of the prosecution, that the evidence of
guilt of the applicant is strong, and in the case of the defense, that evidence of such guilt
is not strong." The respondent judge was ordered to pay a fine of P20,000.00 with a
warning that a repetition of similar acts will warrant a more severe sanction.
(15) Sule v. Biteng decided in 1995.
27
In this administrative case, the respondent
judge, without affording the prosecution the opportunity to be heard, granted with
indecent haste the petition for bail filed by the accused charged with murder because the
accused ". . . voluntarily surrendered to the authorities as soon as he was informed that
he was one of the suspect (sic) . . . ." We held: "With his open admission that he granted
bail to the accused without giving the prosecution any opportunity to be heard, the
respondent deliberately disregarded decisions of this court holding that such act amounts
to a denial of due process, and made himself administratively liable for gross ignorance
of the law for which appropriate sanctions may be imposed." The respondent judge was
ordered to pay a fine of P20,000.00 and warned that commission of the same or similar
acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.
(16) Reymualdo Buzon, Jr. v. Judge Tirso Velasco decided in 1996.
28
In this
administrative case, the respondent judge, without hearing nor comment from the
prosecution, granted bail to an accused charged with murder. Notably, no bail was
recommended in the warrant of arrest. We held: "When bail is a matter of discretion, the
judge is required to conduct a hearing and to give notice of such hearing to the fiscal or
require him to submit his recommendation. . . . Truly, a judge would not be in a position to
determine whether the prosecution's evidence is weak or strong unless a hearing is first
conducted." A fine of P20,000.00 was imposed on the respondent judge with the stern
warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more
severely.
The aforecited cases are all to the effect that when bail is discretionary, a hearing, whether summary
or otherwise in the discretion of the court, should first be conducted to determine the existence of
strong evidence, or lack of it, against the accused to enable the judge to make an intelligent
assessment of the evidence presented by the parties.
Since the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong is a
matter of judicial discretion, the judge is mandated to conduct a hearing even in cases where the
prosecution chooses to just file a comment or leave the application for bail to the discretion of the
court.
Hence:
(1) In the case of Gimeno v. Arcueno, Sr.,
29
an administrative complaint was filed against the
respondent judge for granting bail to one of the accused in a robbery with homicide case without affording
the prosecution a chance to be heard. The respondent judge explained that he issued an order for the
motion to fix bail but the public prosecutor filed a comment instead which respondent judge thought was
adequate compliance with law. Respondent added that the evidence of guilt of the accused, as disclosed
by the records, was not so strong as to deny the application for bail. In fact, the accused who filed for bail,
together with three others, were later dropped by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor from the
information for failure of the witnesses to positively identify them. We held: "The grant of bail is a matter of
right except in cases involving capital offenses when the matter is left to the sound discretion of the court.
That discretion lies, not in the determination whether or not a hearing should be held but in the
appreciation and evaluation of the prosecution's evidence of guilt against the accused. . . . A hearing is
plainly indispensable before a judge can aptly be said to be in a position to determine whether the
evidence for the prosecution is weak or strong." Although the respondent judge's explanation was not
enough to completely exculpate him, the circumstances, coupled with his sincere belief in the propriety of
his order warranted a mitigation of the usual sanction the court imposes in cases of this nature. The
respondent judge was ordered to pay a fine of P5,000.00 and warned that a repetition of the same or
similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.
(2) In the case of Concerned Citizens v. Elma,
30
an administrative complaint was filed against the
respondent judge for granting bail to a person charged with illegal recruitment in large scale and estafa in
five separate informations. The accused filed a motion to fix bail and the respondent judge instead of
setting the application for hearing, directed the prosecution to file its comment or opposition. The
prosecution submitted its comment leaving the application for bail to the discretion of the court. The
respondent judge, in granting the bail of the accused rationalized that in ordering the prosecution to
comment on the accused's motion to fix bail, he has substantially complied with the requirement of a
formal hearing. He further claimed that he required the prosecution to adduce evidence but the latter
refused and left the determination of the motion to his discretion. This Court held, "It is true that the weight
of the evidence adduced is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. However, such discretion may
only be exercised after the hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose
of determining whether or not he should be granted liberty. . . . In the case at bar, however, no formal
hearing was conducted by the respondent judge. He could not have assessed the weight of evidence
against the accused Gatus before granting the latter's application for bail." The respondent judge was
dismissed from service because he was previously fined for a similar offense and was sternly warned that
a repetition of the same or similar offense would be dealt with more severely.
(3) In the case of Baylon v. Sison,
31
an administrative complaint was filed against the respondent judge
for granting bail to several accused in a double murder case. The respondent judge claimed that he
granted the application for bail because the assistant prosecutor who was present at the hearing did not
interpose an objection thereto and that the prosecution never requested that it be allowed to show that
the evidence of guilt is strong but instead, submitted the incident for resolution. The respondent judge
further claimed that the motion for reconsideration of the order granting bail was denied only after due
consideration of the pertinent affidavits. We held: "The discretion of the court, in cases involving capital
offenses may be exercised only after there has been a hearing called to ascertain the weight of the
evidence against the accused. Peremptorily, the discretion lies, not in determining whether or not there
will be a hearing, but in appreciating and evaluating the weight of the evidence of guilt against the
accused." The respondent judge was ordered to pay a fine of P20,000.00 with a stern warning that the
commission of the same or similar offense in the future would be dealt with more severely.
A hearing is likewise required if the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence in opposition to the
application to grant and fix bail. "The importance of a hearing has been emphasized in not a few
cases wherein the court ruled that even if the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence or fails to
interpose an objection to the motion for bail, it is stillmandatory for the court to conduct a hearing or
ask searching questions from which it may infer the strength of the evidence of guilt, or the lack of it,
against the accused."
32

In the recent case of Tucay v. Domagas,
33
an administrative complaint was filed against the
respondent judge for granting bail to an accused charged with murder. The application for bail contained
the annotation "No objection" of the provincial prosecutor and the respondent judge, without holding a
hearing to determine whether the evidence of the prosecution was strong, granted bail and ordered the
release of the accused from detention with instructions to the bondsman to register the bond with the
Register of Deeds within ten days. It was later found out that the assessed value of the property given
was short of the amount fixed for the release of the accused. We held: "Although the provincial prosecutor
had interposed no objection to the grant of bail to the accused, respondent judge should have
nevertheless have set the petition for bail for hearing and diligently ascertained from the prosecution
whether the latter was not really contesting the bail application . . . . Only after satisfying himself that the
prosecution did not wish to oppose the petition for bail for justifiable cause (e.g., for tactical reasons) and
taking into account the factors enumerated in Rule 114, Sec. 6 for fixing bail should respondent judge
have ordered the petition for bail and ordered the release of the accused." Respondent judge herein was
ordered to pay a fine of P20,000.00 and was given a stern warning that the commission of a similar
offense in the future would be dealt with more severely.
Corollarily, another reason why hearing of a petition for bail is required, as can be gleaned from the
abovecited case, is for the court to take into consideration the guidelines set forth in Section 6, Rule
114 of the Rules of Court in fixing the amount of bail.
34
This Court, in a number of cases
35
held that
even if the prosecution fails to adduce evidence in opposition to an application for bail of an accused, the
court may still require that it answer questions in order to ascertain not only the strength of the state' s
evidence but also the adequacy of the amount of bail.
After hearing, the court's order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for
the prosecution.
36
On the basis thereof, the judge should then formulate his own conclusion as to
whether the evidence so presented is strong enough as to indicate the guilt of the accused. Otherwise,
the order granting or denying the application for bail may be invalidated because the summary of
evidence for the prosecution which contains the judge's evaluation of the evidence may be considered as
an aspect of procedural due process for both the prosecution and the defense.
This court in the case of Carpio v. Maglalang
37
invalidated the order of respondent judge granting bail
to the accused because "Without summarizing the factual basis of its order granting bail, the court merely
stated the number of prosecution witnesses but not their respective testimonies, and concluded that the
evidence presented by the prosecution was not "sufficiently strong" to deny bail to Escano."
With the mounting precedents, this Court sees no reason why it has to repeatedly remind trial court
judges to perform their mandatory duty of conducting the required hearing in bail applications where
the accused stands charged with a capital offense.
An evaluation of the records in the case at bar reveals that respondent Judge granted bail to the
accused without first conducting a hearing to prove that the guilt of the accused is strong despite his
knowledge that the offense charged is a capital offense in disregard of the procedure laid down in
Section 8, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as amended by Administrative Circular No. 12-94.
Respondent judge admittedly granted the petition for bail based on the prosecution's declaration not
to oppose the petition. Respondent's assertion, however, that he has a right to presume that the
prosecutor knows what he is doing on account of the latter's familiarity with the case due to his
having conducted the preliminary investigation is faulty. Said reasoning is tantamount to ceding to
the prosecutor the duty of exercising judicial discretion to determine whether the guilt of the accused
is strong. Judicial discretion is the domain of the judge before whom the petition for provisional
liberty will be decided. The mandated duty to exercise discretion has never been reposed upon the
prosecutor.
In the case of Montalbo v. Santamaria,
38
this Court held that the respondent judge is duty bound to
exercise judicial discretion conferred upon him by law to determine whether in the case at bar, the proof is
evident or the presumption of guilt is strong against the defendant and to grant or deny the petition for
provisional liberty. It also held that a writ of mandamuswill lie in order to compel the respondent judge to
perform a duty imposed upon him by law.
The absence of objection from the prosecution is never a basis for granting bail to the accused. It is
the court's determination after a hearing that the guilt of the accused is not strong that forms the
basis for granting bail. Respondent Judge should not have relied solely on the recommendation
made by the prosecutor but should have ascertained personally whether the evidence of guilt is
strong. After all, the judge is not bound by the prosecutor's recommendation. Moreover, there will be
a violation of due process if the respondent Judge grants the application for bail without hearing
since Section 8 of Rule 114 provides that whatever evidence presented for or against the accused's
provisional release will be determined at the hearing.
The practice by trial court judges of granting bail to the accused when the prosecutor refuses or fails
to present evidence to prove that the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong can be traced to the
case of Herras Teehankee v. Director of Prisons
39
where this Court gave the following "instructions" to
the People's Court,
40
thus:
1) In capital cases like the present when the prosecutor does not oppose the petition
for release on bail, the court should, as a general rule, in the proper exercise of its
discretion, grant the release after the approval of the bail which it should fix for the
purpose;
2) But if the court has reasons to believe that the special prosecutor's attitude is not
justified, it may ask him questions to ascertain the strength of the state's evidence or
to judge the adequacy of the amount of bail;
3) When, however, the special prosecutor refuses to answer any particular question
on the ground that the answer may involve a disclosure imperiling the success of the
prosecution or jeopardizing the public interest, the court may not compel him to do
so, if and when he exhibits a statement to that effect of the Solicitor General, who, as
head of the Office of Special Prosecutors, is vested with the direction and control of
the prosecution, and may not, even at the trial, be ordered by the court to present
evidence which he does not want to introduce provided, of course, that such
refusal shall not prejudice the rights of the defendant or detainee.
41

The rationale for the first instruction was stated by this Court, as follows:
If, for any reason, any party should abstain from introducing evidence in the case for
any definite purpose, no law nor rule exists by which he may be so compelled and
the court before which the case is pending has to act without that evidence and, in so
doing, it clearly would not be failing in its duties. If the Constitution or the law plots a
certain course of action to be taken by the court when certain evidence is found by it
to exist, and the opposite course if that evidence is wanting, and said evidence is not
voluntarily adduced by the proper party, the court's clear duty would be to adopt that
course which has been provided for in case of absence of such evidence. Applying
the principle to the case at bar, it was no more within the power nor discretion
of the court to coerce the prosecution into presenting its evidence than to force the
prisoner into adducing hers. And when both elected not to do so, as they had a
perfect right to elect, the only thing remaining for the court to do was to grant the
application for bail.
As for the second instruction, this Court stated that:
The prosecutor might not oppose the application for bail and might refuse to satisfy
his burden of proof, but where the court has reasons to believe that the prosecutor's
attitude is not justified, as when he is evidently committing a gross error or a
dereliction of duty, the court must possess a reasonable degree of control over him in
the paramount interest of justice. Under such circumstance, the court is authorized
by our second instruction to inquire from the prosecutor as to the nature of his
evidence to determine whether or not it is strong, it being possible for the prosecutor
to have erred in considering it weak and, therefore, recommending bail.
As for the third instruction, this Court declared:
It must be observed that the court is made to rely upon the official statement of the
Solicitor General on the question of whether or not the revelation of evidence may
endanger the success of the prosecution and jeopardize the public interest. This is
so, for there is no way for the court to determine that question without having the
evidence disclosed in the presence of the applicant, disclosure which is sought to be
avoided to protect the interests of the prosecution before the trial.
It is to be recalled that Herras Teehankee was decided fully half a century ago under a completely
different factual milieu. Haydee Herras Teehankee was indicted under a law dealing with treason
cases and collaboration with the enemy. The said "instructions" given in the said case under the
1940 Rules of Court no longer apply due to the amendments introduced in the 1985 Rules of Court.
In the 1940 Rules of Court of the Philippines, the applicable provisions on "Bail" provides, as follows:
Sec. 5. Capital offenses defined. A capital offense, as the term is used in this rule,
is an offense which, under the law existing at the time of its commission, and at the
time of the application to be admitted to bail, may be punished by death.
Sec. 6. Capital offenses not bailable. No person in custody for the commission of
a capital offense shall be admitted to bail if the evidence of his guilt is strong.
Sec. 7. Capital offense burden of proof. On the hearing of an application for
admission to bail made by any person who is in custody for the commission of a
capital offense, the burden of showing that the evidence of guilt is strong is on the
prosecution.
The above-cited provisions have not been adopted in toto in the 1985 Rules of Court, as amended
by Administrative Circular No. 12-94, since some phrases and lines have been intercalated, as
shown by the underscored phrases and statements below:
Sec. 6. Capital offense, defined. A capital offense, as the term is used in these
rules, is an offense which, under the law existing at the time of its commission and at
the time of the application to be admitted to bail, may be punished with death.
Sec. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, not bailable. No person charged with a capital offense, of an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetuaor life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt
is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.
Sec. 8. Burden of proof in bail application. At the hearing of an application for
admission to bail filed by any person who is in custody for the commission of an
offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the prosecution
has the burden of showing that evidence of guilt is strong. The evidence presented
during the bail hearings shall be considered automatically reproduced at the trial, but
upon motion of either party, the court may recall any witness for additional
examination unless the witness is dead, outside of the Philippines or otherwise
unable to testify.
It should be noted that there has been added in Section 8 a crucial sentence not found in the
counterpart provision, Section 7, Rule 110 of the 1940 Rules of Court. The above-underscored
sentence in section 8, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules of Court, as amended, was added to address a
situation where in case the prosecution does not choose to present evidence to oppose the
application for bail, the judge may feel duty-bound to grant the bail application. In such a case, the
judge may well lose control of the proceedings. In a sense, this undermines the authority of a judge
since all that the prosecution has to do to "force" the judge to grant the bail application is to refrain
from presenting evidence opposing the same. In effect, this situation makes Sections 6 and 7 of the
1940 Rules of Court on "Bail" meaningless since whether or not the evidence of guilt of a person
charged with a capital offense is strong cannot be determined if the prosecution chooses not to
present evidence or oppose the bail application in a hearing precisely to be conducted by the trial
judge for that purpose, as called for in the two sections. In the event that the prosecution fails or
refuses to adduce evidence in the scheduled hearing, then a hearing as in a regular trial should be
scheduled. In this regard, a hearing in the application for bail necessarily means presentation of
evidence, and the filing of a comment or a written opposition to the bail application by the
prosecution will not suffice.
The prosecution under the revised provision is duty bound to present evidence in the bail hearing to
prove whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong and not merely to oppose the grant of
bail to the accused. "This also prevents the practice in the past wherein a petition for bail was used
as a means to force the prosecution into a premature revelation of its evidence and, if it refused to
do so, the accused would claim the grant of bail on the ground that the evidence of guilt was not
strong."
42

It should be stressed at this point, however, that the nature of the hearing in an application for bail
must be equated with its purpose i.e., to determine the bailability of the accused. If the prosecution
were permitted to conduct a hearing for bail as if it were a full-dress trial on the merits, the purpose
of the proceeding, which is to secure the provisional liberty of the accused to enable him to prepare
for his defense, could be defeated. At any rate, in case of a summary hearing, the prosecution
witnesses could always be recalled at the trial on the merits.
43

In the light of the applicable rules on bail and the jurisprudential principles just enunciated, this Court
reiterates the duties of the trial judge in case an application for bail is filed:
(1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to
submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as
amended);
(2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the
prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is
strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion (Sections
7 and 8, supra);
(3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the
summary of evidence of the prosecution (Baylon v. Sison, supra);
(4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval
of the bailbond. (Section 19, supra). Otherwise, petition should be denied.
The above-enumerated procedure should now leave no room for doubt as to the duties of the trial
judge in cases of bail applications. So basic and fundamental is it to conduct a hearing in connection
with the grant of bail in the proper cases that it would amount to judicial apostasy for any member of
the judiciary to disclaim knowledge or awareness thereof.
44
A judge owes it to the public and the
administration of justice to know the law he is supposed to apply to a given controversy. He is called upon
to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules. There will be faith
in the administration of justice only if there be a belief on the part of litigants that the occupants of the
bench cannot justly be accused of a deficiency in their grasp of legal principles.
45

Respondent judge herein insists that he could exercise his discretion in granting bail to the accused
since the Assistant Prosecutor signified in writing that he had no objection to the grant of bail and
recommended, instead, the bailbond in the sum of P80,000.00. It is to be emphasized that although
the court may have the discretion to grant the application for bail, in cases of capital offenses, the
determination as to whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong can only be reached after due
hearing which, in this particular instance has not been substantially complied with by the respondent
Judge.
While it may be true that the respondent judge set the application for bail for hearing three times,
thus showing lack of malice or bad faith in granting bail to the accused, nonetheless, this does not
completely exculpate him because the fact remains that a hearing has not actually been conducted
in violation of his duty to determine whether or not the evidence against the accused is strong for
purposes of bail. Normally, the Court imposes a penalty of P20,000.00 fine in cases where the judge
grants the application for bail without notice and hearing. In view however of the circumstances of
this case, a reprimand instead of the P20,000.00 would suffice.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Judge Leo M. Rapatalo, RTC, Branch 32, Agoo,
La Union, is hereby REPRIMANDED with the WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts
in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.