CHING T. CAMPOSAGRADO CASES NO.

13


1. CESAR SAMPAYAN, petitioner, vs. The HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, CRISPULO VASQUEZ and
FLORENCIA VASQUEZ GILSANO, respondents. [G.R. No. 156360. January 14, 2005]
FACTS: The siblings Crispulo Vasquez and Florencia Vasquez-Gilsano filed complaint for forcible entry
against Cesar Sampayan in the MCTC of Agusan del Sur, for allegedly having entered and occupied a parcel
of land, and built a house thereon without their knowledge, consent or authority, the entry having been
supposedly effected through strategy and stealth.
Defendant Sampayan denied the material allegations of the complaint and averred that neither the plaintiffs nor
their mother have ever been in possession of the land and that he does not even know plaintiffs identities or
their places of residence. He claimed that he did not enter the subject lot by stealth or strategy because he
asked and was given permission therefor by Maria Ybaez, the overseer of the lots true owners, Mr. and Mrs.
Anastacio Terrado who were then temporarily residing in Cebu City for business purposes. Also, Sampayan
alleged that the plaintiffs claim has long prescribed for the reason that the lot in dispute had been possessed
and declared for taxation purposes by the spouses Felicisimo Oriol and Concordia Balida-Oriol in 1960, and
that in 1978, the Oriol spouses sold one-half (1/2) of the lot to the spouses Mr. and Mrs. Anastacio Terrado,
while the other half, to the couple Manolito Occida and Juliana Sambale-Occida in 1979. Both vendees, so
Sampayan averred, have actually possessed the respective portions purchased by them up to the present. He
thus prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.
The MCTC rendered judgment dismissing the compliant for lack of merit. Therefrom, the plaintiffs appealed to
the RTC, which reversed that of the MCTC, taking note of the fact that Cristita Quita was among the oppositors
in Cadastral Case No. 149 and that she filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application over the lot. On the basis of
such finding, the RTC concluded that it was Cristita Quita, predecessor-in-interest of the herein private
respondents, who was in actual prior physical possession of the land. Unable to accept the RTC judgment,
Sampayan went to the CA on a petition for review which was denied. His motion for reconsideration having
been similarly denied. Sampayan now files a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
ISSUE: 1. WHETHER OR NOT MCTC HAS JURISDICTION? 2. WHETHER OR NOT THE COMPLAINT FOR
FORCIBLE ENTRY IS PROPER?
HELD: 1. Yes. For the MCTC to acquire jurisdiction over a forcible entry case, it is enough that the complaint
avers the jurisdictional facts, i.e. that the plaintiff had prior physical possession and that he was deprived
thereof by the defendant through force, intimidation, threats, strategy and stealth.[8] The complaint in this case
makes such an averment. Hence, the irrelevant circumstance that the evidence adduced during the hearing
rendered improper an action for forcible entry is of no moment and cannot deprive the MCTC of its jurisdiction
over the case. The MCTC continues to have that jurisdiction.
2. Not proper. ACCION PUBLICIANA OR PLENARIA DE POSESION, AND NOT FORCIBLE ENTRY, is the
proper action.
In an action for forcible entry, the plaintiff must prove that he was in prior possession of the land or building and
that he was deprived thereof by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. Absence of prior
physical possession by the plaintiff in a forcible entry case warrants the dismissal of his complaint.
Undoubtedly, the issue of prior physical possession is one of fact, and settled is the rule that this Court is not a
trier of facts and does not normally embark on a re-examination of the evidence adduced by the parties during
trial. Of course, the rule admits of exceptions which are present in this case to wit: when the findings of facts
are conflicting; and when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the
parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.
The uncontested findings of the MCTC judge himself during his ocular inspection of the premises in dispute
that what he saw thereat confirmed the allegations of the defendant [now petitioner Sampayan] that his
predecessors-in-interest have introduced improvements by planting caimito trees, coconut trees, and others on
the land in question, adding that [N]othing can be seen on the land that plaintiff had once upon a time been in
possession of the land, and categorically stating that [T]he allegation that Cristita Quita, the predecessor-in-
interest of the plaintiffs had been in possession of the said property since 1957, openly, exclusively,
continuously, adversely and in the concept of an owner is a naked claim, unsupported by any evidence.
Then, too, there is the sworn affidavit of Dionesia Noynay to the effect that she had been residing since 1960
onward on Lot No. 1957, the lot adjacent to Lot No. 1959, and that neither the private respondents nor their
mother had ever possessed Lot No. 1959. Coming as it does from an immediate neighbor, Dionesias
statement commands great weight and respect. Incidentally, the MCTC judge himself found during the ocular
inspection that a portion of the house of Macario Noynay, husband of Dionesia, protruded on the land.
We note that in the herein assailed decision, the Court of Appeals attached much significance to the fact that
private respondents mother Cristita Quita was an oppositor in Cadastral Case No. 149. We rule and so hold
that the mothers being an oppositor in said cadastral case does not, by itself, establish prior physical
possession because not all oppositors in cadastral cases are actual possessors of the lots or lands subject
thereof.


2. LILIA V. PERALTA-LABRADOR VS. SILVERIO BUGARIN, substituted by his widow, CONSOLACION
BUGARIN.
FACTS: Lilia V. Peralta-Labrador filed a case for Recovery of Possession and Ownership, with the MTC of
San Felipe, Zambales. She alleged that she is the owner of the land, with an area of 400 sq. m. located at
Sitio Caarosipan, Barangay Manglicmot, San Felipe, Zambales, having purchased the same from spouses
Artemio and Angela Pronto. She was issued Tax Declaration and paid the taxes due thereon. DPWH
constructed a road which traversed the land thereby separating 108 sq. m. from the rest of petitioners lot, for
which she was issued Tax Declaration.
Later, respondent Silverio Bugarin forcibly took possession of the 108 sq. m. lot and refused to vacate the
same despite the pleas of petitioner. Hence, she instituted a complaint for recovery of possession and
ownership against respondent.
Respondent contended that the area claimed by petitioner is included in the 4,473 square meter lot, covered
by the OCT No. P-13011; and that he has been in continuous possession and occupation thereof since 1955.
In his Amended Answer with Counterclaim, however, respondent failed to allege that the questioned lot is
covered by the OCT No. P-13011, and instead asserted that he planted fruit bearing trees in the property.
Respondent further pleaded the defenses of lack of cause of action and prescription.
The court a quo ruled in favor of respondent declaring him as the owner of the controverted lot on the basis of
the OCT No. P-13011. The complaint was dismissed for failure of petitioner to prove prior physical possession
and ownership thereof. The RTC affirmed the assailed decision, hence petitioner filed a petition for review
before the Court of Appeals which was however denied for insufficiency of evidence to prove ownership or
prior actual physical possession. The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied. Hence the
instant petition.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT MTC HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE COMPLAINT FOR FORCIBLE ENTRY?
HELD: No jurisdiction.
It is clear that petitioners averment make out a case for forcible entry because she alleged prior physical
possession of the subject lot way back in 1976, and the forcible entry thereon by respondent. Considering her
allegation that the unlawful possession of respondent occurred two years prior to the filing of the complaint, the
cause of action for forcible entry has prescribed and the MTC had no jurisdiction to entertain the case.
Petitioners complaint therefore should have been filed with the proper RTC.
It is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be waived by the parties or cured by their silence,
acquiescence or even express consent. Hence, the failure of respondent to insist on the defenses of lack of
cause of action and prescription stated in his Amended Answer with Counterclaim will not vest the MTC with
jurisdiction over the case.
An action for forcible entry is a quieting process and the one year time bar for filing a suit is in pursuance of the
summary nature of the action. Thus, we have nullified proceedings in the MTCs when it improperly assumed
jurisdiction of a case in which the unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession had exceeded one year.
After the lapse of the one year period, the suit must be commenced in the RTC via an accion publiciana, a suit
for recovery of the right to possess. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of
possession of realty independently of title. It also refers to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one
year from the accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty
independently of title. Likewise, the case may be instituted before the same court as an accion reivindicatoria,
which is an action to recover ownership as well as possession.
Corrollarily, jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations of the complaint. Thus, in ascertaining
whether or not the action falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the inferior courts, the averments of the
complaint and the character of the relief sought are to be examined.
Forcible entry is a quieting process, and that the restrictive time bar is prescribed to complement the summary
nature of such process. Indeed, the one-year period within which to bring an action for forcible entry is
generally counted from the date of actual entry to the land. However, when entry is made through stealth, then
the one-year period is counted from the time the plaintiff learned about it. After the lapse of the one-year
period, the party dispossessed of a parcel of land may file either an accion publiciana, which is a plenary action
to recover the right of possession; or an accion reivindicatoria, which is an action to recover ownership as well
as possession.
Moreover, even if the MTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter, the complaint should still be dismissed
because petitioner failed to prove that the controverted 108 sq. m. lot is part of Cadastral Lot No. 2650. Ei
incumbit probotio qui dicit, non qui negat. He who asserts, not he who denies, must prove.[22] Failing to
discharge this burden, the dismissal of the complaint is proper.



3. GABRIEL ELANE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and INOCENCIO V. CHUA, respondents.
FACTS: Private respondent Inocencio Chua filed an action for forcible entry in the then City Court of Olongapo
City for the eviction of petitioner Gabriel Elane from a portion of a parcel of land designated as Block V, LC
Project No. 14, Olongapo City, BF Map LC 2427, which was the subject of a permit to occupy issued to private
respondent by the Bureau of Forestry on August 16, 1961.
Private respondent alleges that on February 15, 1980, while visiting the property, he discovered that petitioner
was constructing a semi-concrete building on a portion thereof, without his knowledge and consent. The order
made by private respondent upon petitioner to desist therefrom was ignored by the latter. 4 When his demand
letter of March 1, 1980 to stop said construction was refused, private respondent filed an action for forcible
entry.
Petitioner Gabriel Elane claims that he was granted a permit by the Bureau of Forest Development over a
parcel of land located at Upper Kalaklan, with an area of 360 square meters, more or less, designated as Block
V, LC Project No. 14, Olongapo City, BF Map LC 2427, evidenced by a certification from the said bureau dated
April 10, 1979; on which he constructed a warehouse and a gasoline station pursuant to permits issued to him
by the said bureau and that he has been in possession and occupation of that parcel of land continuously and
uninterruptedly since 1970, having originally erected a hut thereon which was later replaced by a bungalow;
and that the land has been declared for taxation in his name and the real property taxes thereon paid by him
for the years 1970 to 1979. 6
MTC dismissed the complaint and which, on appeal, was affirmed in toto by the RTC. Thereafter, herein
private respondent elevated the case on a petition for review to respondent court which reversed the decisions
of the two courts a quo and rendered judgment ordering therein respondent Elane to remove or demolish the
residential house or building that he constructed on that part of the land in question, to vacate and return
possession of said parcel of land to therein petitioner Chua and to pay said petitioner P5,000.00 by way of
attorney's fees, with the costs of suit. 7 A motion for reconsideration was denied.
ISSUE: WON ca committed grave abuse of discretion in giving due course to the petition for review?
HELD: No grave abuse of discretion.
Private respondent was in earlier possession of the contested lot; his sales application preceded that of
petitioner; his warehouse and gasoline station already existed long before petitioner took possession of the
parcel of land in question; and he has been paying taxes and rental fees thereon since 1968.
Having been in prior continuous possession, private respondent is preferentially entitled to occupy the land.

Petitioner's intrusion upon the disputed premises can properly be categorized as one effected through stealth.
Where forcible entry was thus made clandestinely, the one-year prescriptive period should be counted from the
time private respondent demanded that the deforciant desist from such dispossession when the former learned
thereof.23 The records reflect that such discovery and prohibition took place on February 15, 1980, reiterated
thereafter in the demand letter of March 1, 1980, both to no avail. Consequently, the one-year period had not
expired on March 6, 1980 when private respondent filed the ejectment suit with the then City Court of
Olongapo City.


4. CARMELITA T. PANGANIBAN, petitioner, vs. PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION,
respondent.
FACTS: Petitioner Carmelita Panganiban entered into a Sublease and Dealer Agreement (SLDA) with private
respondent Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation. Through the SLDA, private respondent subleased to
petitioner a gasoline station located at 427 Samson Road, EDSA, Caloocan City. The Agreement may be
terminated by SHELL at any time during the first six (6) month. If it is not terminated during the first six (6)
months, it shall continue to be in effect for another period of 4 years, unless otherwise terminated as herein
provided in paragraph 5(3). The parties agree that this Agreement is, however, co-terminus with SHELLs
lease on the site referred to under paragraph 1 of this Agreement notwithstanding the total 5-year period
aforementioned.
Private respondent is not the owner of the lot subject of the sublease. Private respondent was only leasing the
lot from its owner, Serafin Vasquez, for a period of 15 years.
Private respondent notified petitioner that the SLDA was expiring on July 31, 1995. Private respondent then
advised petitioner to wind up her business. Believing that the SLDA had not yet expired and was still effective,
petitioner continued to pay rentals for the gasoline station. Private respondent refused to accept the
payments.
Petitioner filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC of Makati City. Private respondent filed an unlawful
detainer case against petitioner with the MTC of Caloocan City.
Private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the case in RTC claiming that the issue of the renewal of the lease
should be raised in the unlawful detainer case pending before the MTC.
MTC ruled in favor of the private respondents. Petitioner appealed.
RTC dismissed the petition for declaratory relief. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order
which was denied because of petitioners failure to appear at the hearing.
Petitioner filed a petition for review under Rule 45 with the SC. SC referred the petition for certiorari to the CA
because the appellate court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court and petitioner failed to cite a special or
important reason for the Court to take immediate cognizance of the petition.
CA denied the petition for certiorari on the ground of litis pendentia.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT ca erred in affirming rtc-makatis dismissal of civil case no. 95-1010 on motion of
shell on the ground of litis pendentia which was filed long after shell had filed its answer?
HELD: No, dismissal is proper.

An action for unlawful detainer is filed by a person from whom possession of any land or building is unlawfully
withheld by another after the expiration or termination of the latters right to hold possession under a contract,
express or implied.[25] Clearly, the interpretation of a provision in the SLDA as to when the SLDA would
expire is the key issue that would determine petitioners right to possess the gasoline service station. When the
primary issue to be resolved is physical possession, the issue should be threshed out in the ejectment suit, and
not in any other case such as an action for declaratory relief to avoid multiplicity of suits.
There is a more compelling reason for the dismissal of the action for declaratory relief. The Metropolitan Trial
Court had already resolved the unlawful detainer case in favor of private respondent even before the Regional
Trial Court dismissed the action for declaratory relief. The Metropolitan Trial Court issued its Decision on
September 25, 1996 and this decision is now on appeal.[26] The Regional Trial Court dismissed the action for
declaratory relief on February 21, 1997 based on the April 30, 1996 Motion to Dismiss filed by private
respondent that raised the ground of litis pendentia. Based on the record, it appears that private respondent
failed to inform the Regional Trial Court of the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court on the unlawful detainer
case. The significance of the earlier resolution of the unlawful detainer case, however, will not escape our
attention.
Indeed, the action for declaratory relief had become vexatious. It would have been an exercise in futility for the
Regional Trial Court to continue the proceedings in the action for declaratory relief when the Metropolitan Trial
Court had already ruled that the term of the SLDA was for only five years or until July 31, 1995.[27] Moreover,
the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court once it attains finality would amount to res judicata. The proper
forum for petitioner to clarify the provision of the SLDA on the expiration of the term of the contract is in her
appeal of the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court in the unlawful detainer case.
Petitioner erroneously believes that the unlawful detainer case should have been dismissed because private
respondent was already guilty of laches when it filed the ejectment suit 269 days from July 31, 1995, the date
private respondent claims the SLDA expired. A complaint for unlawful detainer should be filed within one year
after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession occurs.[28] When the action is to terminate the
lease because of the expiration of its term, it is upon the expiration of the term of the lease that the lessee is
already considered to be unlawfully withholding the property.[29] The expiration of the term of the lease
immediately gives rise to a cause of action for unlawful detainer.[30] In such a case, a demand to vacate is no
longer necessary.[31]Private respondent therefore had one year or 365 days from July 31, 1995 to file the case
for unlawful detainer. Laches definitely had not yet set in when private respondent filed the unlawful detainer
case 269 days after the expiration of the SLDA. Private respondent did not sleep on its right when it filed the
unlawful detainer case well within the prescriptive period for filing the action.
The action for declaratory relief was not yet submitted for resolution when private respondent filed the action
for unlawful detainer. There is also no proof that private respondent filed the ejectment suit in anticipation of
the early resolution of the action for declaratory relief. Private respondent was not out to frustrate the
impending resolution of the action for declaratory relief when it filed the ejectment suit. In fact, the unlawful
detainer case was already decided upon by the Metropolitan Trial Court even before the Regional Trial Court
dismissed the action for declaratory relief. It appears that it is petitioner who wants to avoid the adverse ruling
in the unlawful detainer case by insisting that the action for declaratory relief be given preference even after the
ejectment suit was already decided. The abuse feared by petitioner does not apply in this case and yet,
petitioner urges us to reevaluate the applicability of a doctrine based on a feared hypothetical abuse. This, we
cannot do. We can only rule upon actual controversies, not on scenarios that a party merely conjures to suit
her interest.


5. NONITO LABASTIDA and CONSTANCIA LABASTIDA, Petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE
C. DELESTE, SR., JOSE L. DELESTE, JR., RAUL L. DELESTE and RUBEN L. DELESTE, respondents.
FACTS: Plaintiffs [private respondents] are the owners of a parcel of land and a portion of said lot was leased
to defendants [herein petitioners] for the sum of P200.00 as monthly rental. Plaintiffs filed a case against
defendants denominated as one for recovery of possession and damages with preliminary mandatory
injunction. The complaint alleged, among others, that in the latter part of 1979 plaintiffs served notice to the
occupants-lessees on their land, including defendants, to vacate the property because the owners would erect
a commercial building thereon; that defendants, instead of heeding the request, repaired their (defendants)
building, put additional constructions on the lot, partitioned the first storey of the building and converted the
same into four (4) stores or business spaces and subleased the same to other persons without the knowledge
and consent of the plaintiffs; that after other previous notices, plaintiffs sent a written demand to defendants to
vacate the land but the latter refused; that again, plaintiffs made and sent another written notice to defendants
to vacate but to no avail; and that plaintiffs suffered actual damage in the amount of P40,000.00 which was
the increase of construction materials and labor costs and moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00.
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on two grounds, namely: (a) lack of jurisdiction of the trial
court over the person of one of the defendants and over the nature or subject matter of the action and (b)
pendency of an ejectment case filed by the plaintiffs against the same defendants in the MTC of Iligan City
involving the same property.
The motion to dismiss was denied by the lower court, ruling that the complaint was filed after one year from the
date of demand. Defendants reiterated their defense of lack of jurisdiction of the trial court, insisting that the
case should have been filed before the municipal court. The trial court gave judgment for the private
respondents based on the findings. Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of
the trial court.
issues: 1. WON the action is for recovery of possession (accion publiciana) or for ejectment (desahucio)? 2.
WON the rtc has jurisdiction to try the case filed against the petitioners?
HELD: 1. Although entitled For Recovery of Possession, Damages, with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, it
is evident from the allegations of the complaint filed by private respondents that the case was actually for
unlawful detainer.
In their complaint, private respondents alleged that they were the registered owners of the lot subject of the
case and thus entitled to possession thereof; that petitioners were their lessees, paying rent on a month-to-
month basis; and that despite repeated demands to vacate the land made by private respondents, petitioners
refused to leave the premises. This amounts to an allegation that petitioners were unlawfully withholding
possession of the land. A lease on a month-to-month basis is deemed to expire at the end of the month upon
notice to vacate addressed by the lessor to the lessee.[7] The refusal of the lessee to leave the premises gives
rise to an action for unlawful detainer.
Private respondents action is not for recovery of possession. It is not for a determination which party has a
better right of possession. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly found the action to be for
ejectment.
2. RTC has no jurisdiction.
In case several demands to vacate are made, the period is reckoned from the date of the last demand.[9] In
this case, several demands to vacate were alleged to have been made by private respondents, the last of
which was dated February 20, 1983. As the complaint was filed on December 3, 1983, that is, within one year
from February 20, 1983, it is clear that the case should have been brought in the Municipal Trial Court.
The Regional Trial Court would have jurisdiction if the deprivation of possession had been committed through
other means than those enumerated in Rule 70, or if the period of dispossession under Rule 70 has lasted for
more than a year.
Where there are several demands made, the period of unlawful withholding starts to run from the date of the
last demand on the theory that if the lessor brings no action shortly after the demand, it may be because he
has agreed to the renewal of the lease.
Rule 70, Sec. 2 provides that no action could be brought against petitioners for alleged violation of the terms
and conditions of their lease agreement unless a notice to vacate is given to the lessee. On the other hand, if
the action for unlawful detainer is based on the expiration of the lease, no notice is required. Any notice given
only serves to negate any inference that the lessor has agreed to extend the period of the lease. Such a notice
is needed only when the action is due to the lessees failure to pay rent or to comply with the conditions of the
lease.

6. YAP v. CRUZ
Facts: Private respondent Cruz was the bonafide tenant of Amado Q. Bugayon, Jr. for almost five years in the
premises in question just before this controversy started. He religiously paid the monthly rentals of P1,400.00,
introduced several improvements and operated a veterinary clinic known as Malate Veterinary Clinic.
Sometime in the latter part of July, 1985, he offered for sale the goodwill of the veterinary clinic and some of its
equipment to Dr. Wendelyn V. Yap, et al., the petitioners herein.
Cruz introduced to the landlord Dr.. Yap as the person interested in taking over the clinic. However, the
negotiations did not materialize but the petitioners managed to enter into a contract of lease for the said
premises with the landlord. As a result, private respondent Cruz brought an action for "Forcible Entry with
Damages" with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 27 against petitioners herein and the landlord.
MTC rendered its judgment in favor of Cruz and ordered the defendants to vacate. The RTC affirmed the
MTCs decision. Upon appeal, the CA dismissed the case. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lease between Cruz and the landlord is still valid and subsisting which justifies him
for filing the complaint of Forcible Entry with Damages?
HELD: Yes. Correctly, the petitioners claim a right to the premises in question apart from the proposed sale of
the goodwill. Precisely, private respondent's action for forcible entry and damages recognizes such fact
because he predicates his cause of action on the deprivation of his possession by virtue of the new lease
contract executed by the petitioners with the landlord.
When the petitioners and the landlord executed a new contract of lease, the lease of private respondent was
still valid and subsisting. There is no question that private respondent has not effectively relinquished his
leasehold rights over the premises in question in view of the failure of negotiations for the sale of the goodwill.
Clearly, the transfer of the leasehold rights is conditional in nature and has no force and effect if the condition
is not complied with.
In the case at bar, however, the lack of proper notice or demand to vacate upon the private respondent is
clearly evident. In the absence of such notice, the lease of private respondent continues to be in force and can
not be deemed to have expired as of the end of the month automatically. Neither can the non-payment of the
rent for the month of August, 1985 be a ground for termination of the lease without a demand to pay and to
vacate. The instant case can easily be differentiated from the case of Vda. de Kraut v. Lontok, G.R. No. L-
18374, February 27, 1963, 7 SCRA 281, which was cited by petitioners in support of their contention that a
lease on a month-to-month basis may be terminated at the end of any month and shall be deemed terminated
upon the lessee's refusal to pay the increased rental because here there was neither demand on the part of
the landlord to pay the rental nor refusal on the part of the private respondent to pay the same as in fact he
made a tender of his rental payment in the latter part of August, 1985. Thus, when the landlord and the
petitioners entered into a new contract of lease effectively depriving the private respondent of his lease, they
were clearly guilty of forcible entry in view of the subsisting lease of private respondent.


7. IGNACIO & DE LA CRUZ v. CFI of BULACAN & LIPANA
FACTS: The said landholding is owned by Felizardo Lipana and tenanted by Alipio Marcelo until his death.
Two cases involving the land were pending in the Court of Agrarian Relations at the time of death, namely:
CAR Case No. 750-Bulacan '62, "Alipio Marcelo vs. Felizardo Lipana;" and CAR Case 827-Bulacan '62,
entitled "Felizardo Lipana vs. Alipio Marcelo." A third case CAR Case No. 895 was filed on December
20, 1962 by Maximo Marcelo against Felizardo Lipana and Magdalena dela Cruz (the latter having been the
alleged common-law wife of Alipio Marcelo), praying that he, Maximo be declared as entitled to succeed to the
tenancy and status of the deceased. On July 23, 1963, acting on a motion of Maximo Marcelo to enjoin
Magdalena dela Cruz from interfering with his peaceful cultivation of the landholding, as well as an urgent
motion of Felizardo Lipana for leave to cultivate the same land.
Thereafter, a compromise agreement in the three CAR cases was entered into by Maximo Marcelo and
Felizardo Lipana, wherein the former surrendered all his rights over the landholding in favor of the latter. A
judgment in accordance with the terms and conditions of said compromise was thereupon rendered by the trial
Judge on November 5, 1964, declaring that CAR Cases Nos. 750, 895 and 827 were deemed closed and
terminated as between Maximo Marcelo and Felizardo Lipana.
On July 15, 1965 Magdalena dela Cruz filed a complaint against Lipana (Case No. 1221), asking the
CAR to declare her the lawful tenant of the landholding, to fix the annual, rentals thereof during the past three
years and to award damages in her favor by way of attorney's fees and consequential expenses. In her
complaint she alleged the Alipio Marcelo, the former tenant, surrendered the landholding to Lipana on
November 21, 1962, where upon she succeeded as such tenant upon agreement with the latter that on
November 13, 1964 the CAR issued an order stating that the dismissal of CAR Case No. 895 was without
prejudice to her right to file an independent action to assert her claim against Lipana, her co-defendant therein;
the together with her husband 2 she continued to work on the land during the agricultural year 1964-65, but
that after they had plowed the land in preparation for the agriculture natural year 1965-66 defendant's
henchmen created some disturbance at the place for the purpose of ejecting her for forcibly therefrom. Plaintiff
was allowed to litigate as pauper, and notice of the filing of the complaint was served up Lipana on July 31,
1965.
On July 29, 1965 Lipana in turn went to the Municipal Court of Plaridel, Bulacan on an action for "Ejectment
and Forcible Entry" (Civil Case No. 235), with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
against Magdalena dela Cruz and her husband Lorenzo Ignacio, alleging that he, Lipana, had been placed in
possession of the landholding by the provincial sheriff of Bulacan by virtue of the order of the CAR dated
January 27, 1965 in CAR Cases Nos. 750, 827 and 895.
Defendants denied the substantial averments of the complaint and alleging as affirmative defense the
pendency of CAR Case No. 1221. On August 2, 1965 the Municipal Court of Plaridel ordered defendants,
pending the hearing of the case on the merits, to desist from plowing, harrowing, and/or planting the land in
question upon the filing by plaintiff of a bond of P2,000.00.
On October 7, 1965 plaintiff filed a motion to declare defendants in contempt of court for having plowed,
narrowed and planted the land in question in spite of the existence of the injunctive order.
On May 31, 1966 a decision in Civil Case No. 235 was rendered by the Municipal Court, ordering defendants
to vacate the land and to remove their house therefrom. This decision was likewise appealed to the Court of
First Instance, where the case was docketed as Civil Case No. 3363-M. Again, defendants were allowed to
appeal as paupers.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Municipal Court of Plaridel, Bulacan has jurisdiction over the ejectment case
against petitioners, which case was subsequently appealed to the Court of First Instance, where it was shown
that another case had been filed ahead in the Court of Agrarian Relations wherein petitioners asked that they
be declared the lawful tenants of the disputed landholding.
HELD: The facts show clearly that these cases proceed from and involve essentially a tenancy dispute. Before
Civil Case No. 235 was filed in the Municipal Court of Plaridel three cases involving the same landholding had
already been filed with the Court of Agrarian Relations. The issue as to who had been in actual possession of
the land since the death of the tenant Alipio Marcelo was before the CAR in Case No. 895, a suit brought by
Maximo Marcelo against Lipana and Magdalena dela Cruz, wherein he sought to be declared as the tenant by
right of succession to Alipio Marcelo. The case, however, was dismissed together with CAR Cases Nos. 725
and 827 originally brought by Alipio Marcelo, without the issue of actual possession having been resolved, by
virtue of the compromise agreement entered into between Maximo and Lipana. Magdalena dela Cruz
thereafter filed her complaint CAR Case No. 1221 to have herself declared the lawful tenant of the
landholding.
While it is true that the jurisdiction of the court in a suit for ejectment or forcible entry is determined by the
allegations in the complaint, yet where tenancy is averred as a defense and, upon hearing, is shown to be the
real issue, the court should dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction. 3 The decision of the CAR, it should be
remembered, was rendered upon a compromise agreement between Maximo Marcelo and Felizardo Lipana.
The right of Magdalena dela Cruz, who was a co-defendant in CAR Case No. 895, was not touched upon in
said agreement. There the decision simply stated that CAR Cases Nos. 750, 827 and 895 were "deemed
closed and terminated as between Maximo Marcelo and Felizardo Lipana;" and the writ of execution was
limited to "placing Mr. Felizardo Lipana immediately in possession of the landholding formerly cultivated by
Maximo Marcelo or any person, agent, and/or representative acting in behalf of Maximo Marcelo."


8. SALVACION P. ONQUIT v. JUDGE AURORA BINAMIRA-PARCIA & SHERIFF MATIAS
FACTS: The charge against respondent Judge stems from a forcible entry casewith prayer for temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction with damages. Said case was assigned to her sala. The
complainant and her two brothers were therein co-defendants. Complainant raised the issue of jurisdiction
stating that said case falls within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) because it involves tenancy over an agricultural land. Thereafter, complainant and her co-defendants
filed with respondent Judge, an Ex-Parte Motion for Disqualification, Request for Disqualification and Request
for Resolution. Basically, these motions were founded on the trial courts alleged lack of jurisdiction. In a single
Order, respondent Judge denied all three motions ruling that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the
complaint and not those raised by defendants. Moreover, according to respondent Judge, the claim regarding
the nature of the case at bar would not automatically divest the court of its jurisdiction.
In the complaint now before this Court, complainant details several allegations and one of which is that the
land subject of the forcible entry case is an agricultural riceland, thus, it is the Department of Agrarian Reform
which has original and exclusive jurisdiction, and not the respondent Judge's court;
She recounts that ejectment cases were earlier filed before her sala against some of complainants family
members involving different areas of the disputed lot. In these separate cases, respondent Judge ordered their
ejectment, which she claims is the reason for complainants vindictiveness. She claims moreover, that in a
Special Civil Case (No. 1852) filed against her before the Albay Regional Trial Court, to restrain her from taking
cognizance of Civil Case No. 1048-L, she nevertheless proceeded Civil Case No. 1048-L, after the special civil
case was dismissed. She then ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, and required an
injunction bond from complainants opponents. All these were resented, according to the respondent Judge, by
the complainant.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Judge committed grave abuse of discretion when she took cognizance
HELD: No. Considering the Complaint, the Comments, and the Reply as well as the pleadings and exhibits
submitted, we find no grave abuse of authority, grave misconduct and bias on the part of respondent Judge.
The fact that respondent Judge took cognizance of the forcible entry case did not taint her action with grave
abuse of authority, even if defendant had alleged that the land in question was under agricultural tenancy, and
that there was an issue of jurisdiction. Well-settled is the principle that the courts shall not be divested of
jurisdiction over a case merely by what is raised in the answer. What determines the nature of an action and a
court's jurisdiction over it are the allegations set up by the plaintiff. Basic is the rule that the material
averments in the complaint, which in this case is for ejectment, determine the jurisdiction of the court. And,
jurisprudence dictates that the court does not lose its jurisdiction over an ejectment case by the simple
expedient of a party raising as a defense therein the alleged existence of a tenancy relationship between the
parties. It is the duty of the court to receive evidence to determine the veracity of allegations of tenancy. In an
Order of respondent Judge dated 09 February 1996, it was ruled that, considering the evidence presented, the
land in question is an irrigated riceland, but not tenanted. This matter was even brought up on a petition for
certiorari with prohibition to the Regional Trial Court of Ligao, Albay, but said petition was denied. These
antecedents are sufficient to convince us that the respondent Judge did not act with grave abuse of authority in
assuming jurisdiction over the case filed in her sala.

9. BERNARTE v. CA
FACTS: Estrella Arastia, in her own behalf and as attorney-in-fact of the heirs of Teodorica Reinares Arastia,
Leticia Arastia-Montenegro and Juanita Arastia, filed a complaint for violation of Section 73 (b) of Republic Act
No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988) before the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando,
Pampanga, Branch 48 in its capacity as a Special Agrarian Court.
It was alleged that after the EDSA Revolution, herein petitioners, who organized themselves into the
Anibang Manggagawa sa Agricultura (A.M.A.), illegally intruded into the land located at Lubao, Pampanga
(with an aggregate area of around 210 hectares) of the plaintiffs, burned the existing sugarcane plants and
started to cultivate small portions thereof. As a result, the land was abandoned by Rustico Coronal, the civil
lessee, and taken over by plaintiff-owners. Alleging further that there had been "definite" findings and rulings by
the Department of Agrarian Reform" that "no tenancy relationship" existed between the parties, petitioners
herein continued to forcibly enter, intrude into and molest the possession of the over the land in question in
violation of Section 73 (b) of Republic Act No. 6657. The complaint prayed for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order to enjoin petitioners from entering into the land and intruding in the possession thereof and,
after hearing, the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction which should be made permanent after a full-
blown trial.
Petitioners averred that they had been in continuous and peaceful possession of their respective tillages since
1950 when the late Teodorica Arastia was still the administratrix of the landholding in question. They moved for
the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction as it was the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR), through the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), pursuant to
Section 50 of Republic Act No. 6657, that had jurisdiction over the case. Meanwhile, on November 29, 1989,
petitioners filed before the DARAB a complaint against Estrella Arastia (DARAB Case No. 161-P'89), the
complaint alleged that on September 25, 1989, through the use and employ of armed men, Estrella Arastia
forcibly evicted and drove them out of their landholdings, harvested and appropriated their standing rice crops,
destroyed their vegetable crops, took their deep well and set fire on their houses.
After conducting the necessary proceedings, the BARCs found that petitioners had been in possession and
cultivation of their respective farmholdings. This fact was contained in the report dated May 23, 1988 of Mr.
Vicente Jimenez, CARPO/Officer-in-Charge, Provincial Office of Pampanga, to the Secretary of the
Department of Agrarian Reform which was transmitted to the DARAB on September 18, 1989.
ISSUE: Regional Trial Court, acting as a Special Agrarian Court has jurisdiction over the case?
HELD: As regards the issue of jurisdiction over the dispute between them and the Arastias, petitioners should
be reminded that the allegations in a compliant are determinative factors of said issue. On this matter, the
Court declared:
Jurisdiction over the subject-matter is determined upon the allegations made in the complaint, irrespective of
whether the plaintiff is entitled or not entitled to recover upon the claim asserted therein a matter resolved
only after and as a result of the trial. Neither can the jurisdiction of the court be made to depend upon the
defenses made by the defendant in his answer or motion to dismiss. If such were the rule, the question of
jurisdiction would depend almost entirely upon the defendant. 25
In her complaint in Agrarian Case No. 2000, Estrella Arastia alleged that she and the rest of the plaintiffs
therein were the registered owners of the parcels of land in question which herein petitioners illegally intruded
into, damaged and cultivated under the status of holding "actual title over the properties;" that the definite
findings and rulings of the DAR showed that "no tenancy relationship" existed between the parties and that
petitioners were definitely not qualified beneficiaries of the rights and benefits under Republic Act No. 6657 as
they were not in any way tenants and/or legitimate tillers of the subject land, and that the acts of petitioners
violated Section 73 (b) of said law.
Petitioner's raising the issue of jurisdiction in their answer to the complaint did not automatically divest the
lower court of jurisdiction over Agrarian Case No. 2000. The court had to continue exercising authority to hear
the evidence for the purpose of determining whether or not it had jurisdiction over the case. In a plethora of
cases, this Court has made the pronouncement that once jurisdiction is vested, the same is retained up to the
end of the litigation. 26 After such hearing, if tenancy had in fact been shown to be the real issue, then the
court should dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. 27
It should be pointed out, moreover, that in filing Agrarian Case No. 2000, Estrella Arastia was merely ejecting
petitioners from the land on the ground that no tenancy relationship existed between them. However, her
invocation of Sec. 73 (b) of Republic Act No. 6657 which considers as a prohibited act "forcible entry or illegal
detainer by persons who are not qualified beneficiaries under this Act to avail themselves of the rights and
benefits of the Agrarian Reform Program," obviously led the court to docket the case as Agrarian Case No.
2000 and assume jurisdiction over it as a special agrarian court. 28
Such actions were in consonance with Section 56 29 and 57 of said law which vest upon the Regional Trial
Court, acting as a Special Agrarian Court, with jurisdiction over two classes of agrarian-related cases: (1)
"petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners" and (2) "prosecution of all criminal
offenses" under the same law. A criminal offender under Republic Act No. 6657 is, pursuant to Section 74 of
the law, "(a)ny persons who knowingly and willfully violates the provisions of this Act." 30 Thus, the lower court
correctly assumed jurisdiction over Agrarian Case No. 2000.


10. RURAL BANK OF STA. IGNACIA INC. v. DIMATULAC
FACTS: The deed of sale in favor of Reyes was cancelled by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) by
reason of her non-occupancy of said property, and made the land available for distribution to the landless
residents of San Rafael. In 1971, respondents took possession of the property and were allocated portions of
200 square meters each. They paid the purchase price and awaited their Emancipation Patent titles.
Despite her knowledge that the land had reverted to the government, Reyes sold the property to the
spouses Maximo Valentin and Retina Razon in a Deed of Sale dated April 4, 1973. The spouses thereafter
obtained TCT No. 106153 thereon. On finding, however, that respondents were in possession of the property,
Valentin and Razon filed a complaint for recovery and damages against respondents, docketed as Civil Case
No. 6152, with the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac, Tarlac. The Republic intervened in said case and along with
respondents, contending that the title of the spouses was null and void, because the sale by Reyes was in
violation of the terms and conditions of sale of the lot by the RPA to Reyes. The trial court decided in favor of
the spouses Maximo Valentin and Retina Razon. But on appeal, the appellate court in CA-G.R. CV No. 14909,
entitled "Spouses Maximo E. Valentin and Retina Razon v. Sps. Ricardo Garcia and Mona Macabili, et al.,"
reversed the judgment, cancelled the title of the spouses, and decreed the reversion of the property to the
government for disposition to qualified beneficiaries.
meanwhile, on February 15, 1987, or during the pendency of the case, Razon mortgaged the property to
petitioner rural bank to secure a loan. The property was subsequently extra-judicially foreclosed when Razon
failed to pay the loan and on October 20, 1987, petitioner purchased the property. TCT No. 330969 was
accordingly issued to herein petitioner.
Petitioner filed a complaint for unlawful detainer and damages with the MTC of Tarlac, Tarlac. Petitioner
alleged that respondents were occupying the property by mere tolerance as they had no contract of lease with
it, nor right or claim annotated on its title. It also averred that it had advised respondents of its purchase of the
property and had demanded that respondents vacate the same, but its notice went unheeded. Respondents in
their Answer claimed that they had been occupants of the land since 1971 and had been awarded as
beneficiaries by the government after the titles of Reyes and Razon were nullified. They also maintained that
the lots had been reverted to the government by virtue of the final and executory judgment in CA-G.R. CV No.
14909. MTC dismissed the case. The RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC dismissing herein petitioner's
complaint for unlawful detainer and damages against respondents. The appellate court also dismissed the
petition and ruled that the possession of respondents was not by mere tolerance but by lawful mandate of the
law and by virtue of its final judgment in CA-G.R. CV No. 14909.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it dismissed the complaint for
unlawful deatainer of the petitioner bank?
HELD: No. In ejectment cases the question is limited to which party among the litigants is entitled to the
physical or material possession of the premises, that is to say, who should have possession de facto.15
Settled is the rule, however, that in an ejectment case, the assertion by a defendant of ownership over the
disputed property does not serve to divest an inferior court of its jurisdiction.16 When the defendant raises the
defense of ownership and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of
ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved for the purpose only of determining the issue of
possession.17 Said judgment shall be conclusive with respect to the possession only, and shall in no wise bind
the title of the realty, or affect the ownership thereof. It shall not bar an action between the same parties
respecting title to the real property.18 Only with this understanding of that well-entrenched principle can we
accept the ruling of the municipal court in Civil Case No. 6367 that "the case is dismissed for want of
jurisdiction."19
Therefore, there is no reversible error in the decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining those of the
lower courts that the possession of respondents is not by mere tolerance. Respondents' possession springs
from their right as lawful beneficiaries of a government program, pursuant to law. Certainly, the decision of the
appellate court in CA G.R. CV No. 14909 binds not just the beneficiary but also the bank as claimant of the
land. In contrast, petitioner's claim to possession of the land emanates from a nullified and non-existing title of
its predecessors-in-interest, from which it cannot rely to eject the respondents from the premises.

11. DURAN VS . COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. Nos. 125256, 126973, May 2, 2006
FACTS: The complaint in the case at bench is for Reconveyance of certain portions of a 449 square meter
parcel of land situated in Mabolo, CebuCity covered by TCT No. 99527 in the name of defendant-appellant
Jesus Duran who is married to Demetria Duran. Plaintiffs-appellees Jorge Olivar, Praxedes Umpad
Gantuangco assisted by husband Alberto Gantuangco, Emilio Dichos, Luisa Nuez assisted by her husband
Faustino Nunez and Juanito Lawas sought to recover the portions on which they have built their respective
dwellings as shown on a Sketch Plan of the controverted lot.
TCT No. 25018 shows that the prior owner of the lot was one Antonina Oporto who leased out the property to
the plaintiffs and the defendants. Oporto decided to sell the whole lot later. Two witnesses namely plaintiffs-
appellees Jorge Olivar and Praxedes Gantuangco gave concurring testimonies that plaintiffs and defendants
requested owner-lessor Antonina Oporto to sell the lot to them. Evidence further shows that the latter acceded
to sell the land to the parties at P100.00 per square meter. Defendant-appellant Jesus Duran however was
designated by plaintiffs to negotiate for the lowering of the purchase price. This fact is practically corroborated
by defendants-appellants claim that it was Jesus who insisted that he be the one to bargain with Antonina
Oporto. Subsequently however, defendant-appellant Jesus bought the lot in its entirety for himself from
Antonina Oporto on for the sum of P37,000.00. The aggrieved plaintiffs-appellees learned of the transaction
only when they were summoned to appear before the barangay captain in anticipation of the filing of the case
for unlawful detainer. As a consequence, plaintiffs-appellees impute bad faith on defendant-appellant Jesus
Duran.
Defendants-appellants filed an Unlawful Detainer case with the Municipal Trial Court, Cebu City.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint for unlawful detainer filed by petitioners against them.
ISSUE:WON Court of Appeals dismissal of the complaint for unlawful detainer valid?
HELD: Trusts are either express or implied. Express trusts are created by the intention of the trustor or of the
parties, while implied trusts come into being by operation of law, either through implication of an intention to
create a trust as a matter of law or through the imposition of the trust irrespective of, and even contrary to, any
such intention. In turn, implied trusts are either resulting or constructive trusts. Resulting trusts are based on
the equitable doctrine that valuable consideration and not legal title determines the equitable title or interest
and are presumed always to have been contemplated by the parties. They arise from the nature or
circumstances of the consideration involved in a transaction whereby one person thereby becomes invested
with legal title but is obligated in equity to hold his legal title for the benefit of another. On the other hand,
constructive trusts are created by the construction of equity in order to satisfy the demands of justice and
prevent unjust enrichment. They arise contrary to intention against one who, by fraud, duress or abuse of
confidence, obtains or holds the legal right to property which he ought not, in equity and good conscience, to
hold.
The dismissal of the complaint for unlawful detainer, we find the same correct in view of the operative
antecedents.
Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 provides that Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and
unlawful detainer: Provided, That when, in such cases, the defendant raises the question of ownership in his
pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the
issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.
In this case, petitioners assert a right to possess by virtue of their purchase of the property. Private
respondents, on the other hand, also claim ownership by virtue of constructive trust. The issue of ownership,
being inextricably linked with that of possession, should therefore be resolved for purposes of determining the
question of possession.
Given the Court of Appealss ruling that petitioners assertion of ownership is unlawful and that private
respondents are entitled to reconveyance, the appellate court could not but take its own findings into account
to determine who among the parties has a better right to possession. It correctly dismissed the complaint for
unlawful detainer and ruled that petitioners are obliged to turn over the possession of the pertinent portions of
the property to private respondents being the owners thereof.
As regards the procedural question of whether the Court of Appeals should have given due course to the
petition purportedly filed late because private respondents filed a prohibited motion for reconsideration of the
RTCs decision, it is settled that a motion for reconsideration may be filed from a decision of the RTC in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the inferior courts in ejectment cases.[12] Petitioners
contention should, perforce, be rejected.




12. ROBERTS vSs. PAPIO, G.R. No. 166714, February 9, 2007
FACTS: Sometime in 1982 she purchased from defendant a residential house and lot situated at Brgy.
Valenzuela, Makati City. Upon Papios pleas to continue staying in the property, they executed a two-year
lease contract which commenced on May 1, 1982. The monthly rental was P800.00. Thereafter, TCT No.
114478 was issued in her favor and she paid all the realty taxes due on the property. When the term of the
lease expired, she still allowed Papio and his family to continue leasing the property. However, he took
advantage of her absence and stopped payment beginning January 1986, and refused to pay despite repeated
demands. In June 1998, she sent a demand letterthrough counsel requiring Papio to pay rentals from January
1986 up to May 1998 and to vacate the leased property. The accumulated arrears in rental are as follows: (a)
P360,000.00 fromJanuary 1, 1986 to December 31, 1997 at P2,500.00 per month; and (b) P50,000.00, from
January 1, 1998 to May 31, 1998 atP10,000.00 per month. She came to the Philippines but all efforts at an
amicable settlement proved futile. Thus, in April 1999, she sent the final demand letter to defendant directing
him and his family to pay and immediately vacate the leased premises. Amelia Roberts, through her attorney-
in-fact, Matilde Aguilar, filed a Complaintfor unlawful detainer and damages against Martin Papio before the
MeTC.
Papio alleged that he executed on April 13, 1982 deed of absolute sale and the contract of lease. Roberts, his
cousin who is a resident of California arrived in the Philippines and offered to redeem the property. Believing
that she had made the offer for the purpose of retaining his ownership over the property, he accepted. She
then remitted P59,000.00 to the mortgagor for his account, after which the mortgagee cancelled the real estate
mortgage. However, he was alarmed when the plaintiff had a deed of absolute sale over the property prepared
(for P83,000.00 as consideration) and asked him to sign the same. She also demanded that the defendant turn
over the owners duplicate of TCT No. S-44980. The defendant was in a quandary. He then believed that if he
signed the deed of absolute sale, Roberts would acquire ownership over the property. He asked her to allow
him to redeem or reacquire the property at any time for a reasonable amount.[18] When Roberts agreed, Papio
signed the deed of absolute sale.
Pursuant to the right to redeem/repurchase given him by Roberts, Papio purchased the property for
P250,000.00. In July 1985, since Roberts was by then already in the USA, he remitted to her authorized
representative, Perlita Ventura, the amount ofP150,000.00 as partial payment for the property.[19] On June 16,
1986, she again remitted P100,000.00, through Ventura. Both payments were evidenced by receipts signed
by Ventura.[20] Roberts then declared that she would execute a deed of absolute sale and surrender the title
to the property. However, Ventura had apparently misappropriated P39,000.00 out of the P250,000.00 that she
had received; Roberts then demanded that she pay the amount misappropriated before executing the deed of
absolute sale. Thus, the sole reason why Roberts refused to abide by her promise was the failure of her
authorized representative to remit the full amount ofP250,000.00. Despite Papios demands, Roberts refused
to execute a deed of absolute sale. Accordingly, defendant posited that plaintiff had no cause of action to
demand payment of rental and eject him from the property.
ISSUE: WON the MeTC had jurisdiction in an action for unlawful detainer to resolve the issue of who between
petitioner and respondent is the owner of the property and entitled to the de facto possession thereof.
HELD: Section 18, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides that when the defendant raises the defense of
ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of
ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession. The judgment
rendered in an action for unlawful detainer shall be conclusive with respect to the possession only and shall in
no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building. Such judgment would not bar an action
between the same parties respecting title to the land or building.[46]
The summary nature of the action is not changed by the claim of ownership of the property of the
defendant.[47] The MeTC is not divested of its jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer action simply because the
defendant asserts ownership over the property.
The sole issue for resolution in an action for unlawful detainer is material or de facto possession of the
property. Even if the defendant claims juridical possession or ownership over the property based on a claim
that his transaction with the plaintiff relative to the property is merely an equitable mortgage, or that he had
repurchased the property from the plaintiff, the MeTC may still delve into and take cognizance of the case and
make an initial or provisional determination of who between the plaintiff and the defendant is the owner and, in
the process, resolve the issue of who is entitled to the possession. The MeTC, in unlawful detainer case,
decides the question of ownership only if it is intertwined with and necessary to resolve the issue of
possession.[48] The resolution of the MeTC on the ownership of the property is merely provisional or
interlocutory. Any question involving the issue of ownership should be raised and resolved in a separate action
brought specifically to settle the question with finality, in this case, Civil Case No. 01-851 which respondent
filed before the RTC.

13. TECSON vs. GUTIERREZ, 452 SCRA 781
FACTS: On August 21, 1997, petitioners filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against respondent before the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) docketed as Civil Case No. 2287.[2] They alleged that they were the owners of a
residential lot covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-62466, which they leased to respondent for
and in consideration of four cavans of palay yearly under an oral lease agreement. The lot was to be used by
the respondent as the site of his dwelling. They declared that starting the year 1995, respondent failed to pay
the yearly rental. Thus, they considered the lease terminated and made oral and written demands on him to
vacate the property. Respondent, however, stubbornly refused to leave.
On the same day, petitioners also filed a complaint for forcible entry against respondent before the MTC
docketed as Civil Case No. 2288.[3] They charged him of occupying, since January 1997, a portion of their
residential lot under TCT No. T-62465, without their consent. This lot is adjacent to the subject lot of Civil Case
No. 2287.
In his answer, respondent averred that he was a farmer beneficiary of a homelot composed of the subject
parcels of land. He alleged that the petitioners unlawfully reclassified the lot from agricultural to residential,
subdivided it, and evicted the tenants. Respondent also stated that the same lots were the subject of DARAB
Case No. R-03-028101-98.
On August 21, 1998, the MTC decided Civil Case No. 2288 in favor of petitioners. It ruled that respondent
cannot claim entitlement to acquire the subject lot as his homelot for the following reasons: (1) respondent was
not a tenant-farmer of the petitioners; (2) the land was residential and not agricultural, and the respondent was
using it for purposes other than agricultural; (3) the subject lot was far from respondents farm; and (4) no
certification was issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform that the land was respondents homelot.[4] The
MTC ordered respondent to vacate the premises and to pay petitioners a monthly rental of P800 beginning
January 1997 until he vacates the premises.[5]
On August 24, 1998, the MTC likewise decided Civil Case No. 2287 in favor of petitioners based on the same
reasons. The MTC ordered the respondent to vacate the parcel of land and to pay petitioners four cavans of
palay or its equivalent per annum beginning 1995 and every year thereafter until he vacates the subject
land.[6]
Respondent appealed the decisions to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). He maintained that it is the Department
of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), not the MTC, which has jurisdiction over the actions. The
RTC, however, affirmed in toto the MTC decisions.
ISSUE: WON the case involved agrarian reform matters which should be resolved by the DARAB and not by
the MTC.
HELD: NO. At the outset, we must point out that this appeal stemmed from ejectment suits wherein the
jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations in the complaint[12] and the character of the relief
sought.[13] In their complaint for unlawful detainer, petitioners alleged that the respondent unlawfully withheld
possession of the land despite several demands on him to vacate the premises, and that these demands were
made after the latter failed to pay the rent. Likewise, in their complaint for forcible entry, petitioners averred
that respondent deprived them of physical possession of the land by means of stealth and strategy. Based on
the averments in the complaint, the Municipal Trial Court indeed properly acquired jurisdiction over the cases
below between herein petitioners and the respondent.
Although respondent impugned the validity of petitioners title over the property and claimed it to be his
homelot, this assertion could not divest the MTC of jurisdiction over the ejectment cases.[14] The court could
not be divested of jurisdiction over the ejectment cases on the mere allegation that the defendant asserts
ownership over the litigated property.[15] Moreover, a pending action involving ownership of the same property
does not bar the filing or consideration of an ejectment suit, nor suspend the proceedings.[16] The ejectment
cases can proceed independently of the DARAB case. The underlying reason for this rule is to prevent the
defendant from trifling with the summary nature of an ejectment suit by the simple expedient of asserting
ownership over the disputed property.[17]
It is settled that the only issue for resolution in ejectment suits is the physical or material possession of the
property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the party litigants.[18] In forcible entry and
unlawful detainer cases, even if the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the
question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the MTC, nonetheless, has
the undoubted competence to provisionally resolve the issue of ownership for the sole purpose of determining
the issue of possession.[19]
In our view, petitioners are entitled to possess the parcels of land. For respondent failed to show that the land
had been awarded to him by the Department of Agrarian Reform as his homelot.

14.BUGARIN vs. PALISOC, G.R. No. 157985, December 2, 2005
FACTS: The present controversy arose from a complaint for ejectment, docketed as Civil Case No. 11799,
filed before the MeTC by private respondents Cecilia B. Palisoc and Marina B. Mata. In a decision [4] dated
February 27, 2002, the court declared respondents as the rightful possessors of the properties in dispute. It
also ordered the petitioners to vacate the premises and pay to private respondents the rentals.
Petitioners appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paraaque City, Branch 274 while private respondents
moved for execution pending appeal. On January 8, 2003, the RTC affirmed the MeTC decision with the
modification that petitioners must start paying rentals from the date of the appealed decision.
On January 28, 2003, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Opposition to the Issuance of a Writ of
Execution. In an order dated March 3, 2003, the RTC denied the motion and granted private respondents'
motion for execution for failure of petitioners to post a supersedeas bond or to pay the back rentals. Thus, a
writ of execution pending appeal was issued. On March 7, 2003, petitioners were served with the writ and
notice to vacate.
Petitioners contend that the Orders of the MeTC violated the mandatory requirements of Section 28 [7] of Rep.
Act No. 7279 since there was no 30-day notice prior to the date of eviction or demolition and there had been no
consultation on the matter of resettlement. They also claim that there was neither relocation nor financial
assistance given. They insist that the MeTC orders are patently unreasonable, impossible and in violation of
the law.
ISSUE:WON the Orders of the MeTC proper.
HELD:YES. Under Section 19, [10] Rule 70 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, a judgment on a forcible
entry and detainer action is immediately executory to avoid further injustice to a lawful possessor, and the
court's duty to order the execution is practically ministerial.[11] The defendant may stay it only by (a) perfecting
an appeal; (b) filing a supersedeas bond; and (c) making a periodic deposit of the rental or reasonable
compensation for the use and occupancy of the property during the pendency of the appeal. [12] Once the
Regional Trial Court decides on the appeal, such decision is immediately executory under Section 21, [13]
Rule 70, without prejudice to an appeal, via a petition for review, before the Court of Appeals or Supreme
Court.
Clearly, petitioners' petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals was filed as a substitute for the lost
remedy of appeal. Certiorari is not and cannot be made a substitute for an appeal where the latter remedy is
available but was lost through fault or negligence. [16] Thus, the filing of the petition for certiorari did not
prevent the RTC decision from becoming final and executory. [17] The RTC acted correctly when it remanded
the case to the court of origin in the order dated April 11, 2003.[18]
Thus, we find that the MeTC cannot be faulted for issuing the assailed orders to enforce the RTC judgment.
Both orders were issued after the requisite notice and hearing. Moreover, the Court of Appeals did not issue
any writ of preliminary injunction to stay the execution of the judgment.
Petitioners tried to stay the execution of the order of demolition by filing a petition for review with prayer for
TRO before us. We earlier denied said prayer for TRO. We also find petitioners' contention that the said orders
violated Rep. Act No. 7279, particularly Section 28(c), [19] totally without merit. Under the provision, eviction or
demolition may be allowed when there is a court order for eviction and demolition, as in the case at bar.
Moreover, nothing is shown on record that petitioners are underprivileged and homeless citizens as defined in
Section 3(t) of Rep. Act No. 7279. [20] The procedure for the execution of the eviction or demolition order
under Section 28(c) is, in our view, not applicable.


15. ANTONIO vs. GERONIMO, 476 SCRA 340
FACTS: A complaint for unlawful detainerwas filed before the MTC of Antipolo, by Alexander Catolos (private
respondent), who alleged that he was the registered owner of 4 parcels of land situated at Mayamot, Antipolo,
Rizal. The defendants therein were the petitioners, who were occupying the said properties.
Private respondent claimed he allowed petitioners to occupy portions of his land without requiring them to pay
rent, on the condition that the latter would immediately vacate the same in the event that the former would
need the premises. However, when private respondent did notify petitioners of his need to use the premises,
petitioners refused to vacate the land even after demand.
The complaint was resolved in favor of private respondent. In a Decision , respondent judge ordered
petitioners to vacate the subject properties and pay the amount of P200.00 as reasonable compensation for
the use and occupation of the properties, as well as P20,000.00 for litigation expenses and attorneys fees.
Private respondent filed a motion for issuance of a writ of demolition. The lower court granted the motion
and directed the issuance of a writ of demolition
Partial demolition had already taken place by April 1994. Private respondent filed an urgent ex parte motion,
seeking the full implementation of the writ of demolition. This was granted.
The Sangguniang Bayan of Antipolo, Rizal passed Resolution, authorizing Mayor Daniel Garcia to acquire thru
expropriation or purchase the subject properties for public purposes/socialized housing. Another resolution,
was issued amending the previous resolution by further authorizing the municipal mayor to secure financing for
the acquisition of the said parcel of land subject of this case.
In Resolution the Sangguniang Bayan informed respondent court of the expropriation and the fact that the
funds required for the same have already been included in the 1996 budget, and requested that the demolition
be held in abeyance. At this point, the writ of demolition had not yet been fully implemented.
The demolition proceeded despite said resolutions of the Sangguniang Bayan.
ISSUE: WON a resolution for expropriation by a local government unit can suspend the writ of execution and
demolition in an ejectment case.
HELD:NO. In actions for ejectment, the general rule is if judgment is rendered against the defendant, it is
immediately executory. Such judgment, however, may be stayed by the defendant only by: (a) perfecting an
appeal; (b) filing a supersedeas bond; and (c) making a periodic deposit of the rental or the reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of the property during the pendency of the appeal.[12] These
requisites must concur. Thus, even if the defendant had appealed and filed a supersedeas bond but failed to
pay the accruing rentals, the appellate court could, upon motion of the plaintiff with notice to the defendant, and
upon proof of such failure, order the immediate execution of the appealed decision without prejudice to the
appeal taking its course. Such deposit, like the supersedeas bond, is a mandatory requirement; hence, if it is
not complied with, execution will issue as a matter of right.
Jurisprudence is replete with cases which provide for the exceptions to the rule cited above. These are the
existence of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which prevented the defendant from making the
monthly deposit, or the occurrence of supervening events which have brought about a material change in the
situation of the parties and would make the execution inequitable or where there is compelling urgency for the
execution because it is not justified by the prevailing circumstances
In the instant case, no ordinance was passed by the Sangguniang Bayan of Antipolo.These resolutions cannot
partake of a supervening event so as to suspend the writ of execution in the ejectment proceedings. They
merely express at most an intention to expropriate. Private respondent correctly maintained that there was no
positive act of instituting the intended expropriation proceedings.
Assuming arguendo that instead of resolutions, an ordinance was passed by the Sangguniang Bayan, we still
find for private respondent. There is no dispute that a local government unit possesses the power of eminent
domain. But the taking of private properties is not absolute. The power of eminent domain must not be
exercised arbitrarily, even if purposed for resolving a critical problem such as urban squatting. The safeguards
afforded by law require strict observance.
Expropriation has no binding legal effect unless a formal expropriation proceeding has been instituted.

16. SPOUSES MARCIANO CHUA and CHUA CHO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES
MARIANO C. MORENO and SHEILA MORENO, respondent.
FACTS: on March 5, 1993, the Municipal Trial Court (branch II) of Batangas City rendered judgment for
petitioners [private respondents herein] with respect to four lots located in Galicano St., Batangas City,
ordering the ejectment of private respondents [petitioners herein] and ordering them to pay monthly rentals of
P50,000.00 starting April 7, 1992 until they shall have vacated the lots and surrendered their possession to
petitioners and the sum of P20,000.00 as attorneys fees.
The decision was received by private respondents counsel on March 10, 1993; that on March 11, 1993 he filed
a notice of appeal; and that on March 16, 1993, the MTC ordered the records of the case transmitted to the
RTC.
On March 29, 1993, petitioners moved for the execution of the decision in their favor, alleging that although
private respondents had filed a notice of appeal, the latter had not filed a supersedeas bond nor make [sic] a
deposit every month of the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the properties as required by Rule
70, sec. 8.
Private respondents opposed the motion, claiming that they are co-owners of the lots. Also claimed that while
they are willing to pay bond, they had been kept busy attending to their businesses and thus unable to secure
a bond.
RTC denied motion for execution, on the ground that the transmission by the MTC of the records of the
ejectment case to the RTC, without waiting for the expiration of the period of appeal, prevented private
respondents from filing a supersedeas bond on time. CA overruled RTC (RTC erred in extending the period for
filing a supersedeas bond).
ISSUE: WON RTC wrong in extending bond period. (YES)
HELD: The bond was filed out of time. The motion for execution was filed eighteen days from the date the
petitioners received a copy of the MTCs decision, after the appeal had already been perfected. Because no
supersedeas bond had been filed within the period for appeal, a writ of execution should have been issued as
a matter of right. Petitioners manifestly failed to adduce a compelling reason to justify a departure from the
aforecited rule.
To stay the immediate execution of the said judgment (ejectment) while the appeal is pending, the foregoing
provision requires that the following requisites must concur: (1) the defendant perfects his appeal; (2) he files
a supersedeas bond; and (3) he periodically deposits the rentals which become due during the pendency of
the appeal (Sec 8 rule 70 ROC).
Petitioners need not require the MTC to fix the amount of the supersedeas bond. They could have computed
this themselves.

17. BIENVENIDO ONCE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. CARLOS Y. GONZALES, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo Branch VI;
PROVINCIAL SHERIFF of Iloilo, and JUANITO PEA, respondents.
FACTS: In the city court of Iloilo City, in a decision dated April 29, 1976, ordered Bienvenido Once to vacate an
apartment in a building owned by Juanita Pea and to pay a monthly rental of P290 until the premises have
been vacated, plus P1,000 as attorney's fees. It was not indicated in the decision when the payment of the
monthly rental should commence and no back rentals was adjudged.
Bienvenido Once filed a motion for reconsideration. He alleged that he had been occupying the apartment
since 1966; that he was the only one singled out for ejectment; that the commissioner's report on the alleged
dilapidated condition of the building was not set for hearing, that he occupied the apartment as residence and
for use as a carinderia which allegedly was his sole means of livelihood, and that he should be given a
preference to reoccupy the apartment after the completion of the repairs.
The city court denied the motion in its order of June 2, 1976. Bienvenido Once appealed. He deposited in the
city court rentals from april to September 1976.
Juanito Pea, the owner of the apartment, filed in the Court of First Instance a motion dated July 9, 1976 for
immediate execution of the city court's judgment. He invoked, as grounds, Once's alleged failure to file a
supersedeas bond and the supposed untenantable condition of the apartment.
Executive Judge Valerio V. Rovira granted the motion for execution (defendant not paying superseades bond).
ISSUE: WON the lower court erred in ordering execution of the city court's judgment pending appeal. (YES)
HELD: No such bond was necessary because no back rentals were adjudged in the city court's judgment. The
attorney's fees of P1,000 need not be covered by a supersedeas bond.
Once's timely deposit of the rentals for April, May, June, July and August, 1976 stayed the execution of the
judgment pending appeal. In such a situation, no supersedeas bond was required to stay execution of the city
court's judgment.
Order of execution was not justified under the rules (ROC when it was 1977). Under the rules of court at that
time, it only requires a supersedeas bond only if there are accrued rentals in arrears. It dispenses with that
bond if the defeated tenant deposits in court the rentals due from time to time. The execution proceeding
already mentioned is void.

18. Siy vs NLRC
For resolution is private respondent Elena Embangs motion to cite Atty. Frederico P. Quevedo, counsel of
petitioner Mariano Y. Siy, in contempt of court for delaying this case and impeding the execution of the
judgment rendered herein, in violation of Canon 12 and Rule 12.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
This case originated from a complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of holiday pay and holiday
premium pay filed by Embang against petitioner and Philippine Agri Trading Center. The labor arbiter ruled in
favor of Embang (He was a regular employee). On March 8, 2002, the Third Division of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) denied petitioners appeal and affirmed the decision of the labor arbiter with
some modifications on 13 month pay. NIRC denied the MFR and CA denied Certiorari and Redconsideration of
Siy even up to the SC Siy tried to vent his claims which was also denied.
Embang filed a motion for execution. Atty. Quevedo filed in his answer that Embang rejected offers for
reinstatement. When the labor arbiter granted the writ of execution, Atty. Quevedo again went to the higher
courts.
ISSUE: WON Atty. Quevedo is in contempt (YES indirect)
HELD: SC denied with finality the petitioners petition for review on certiorari almost two years ago. But the
decision of the labor arbiter (affirmed with modification by the NLRC and upheld by the CA and this Court)
remains unsatisfied up to now because of Atty. Quevedos sly maneuvers on behalf of his client.
Well-settled is the principle that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and
may no longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of
fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land.
The only exceptions to the general rule are the correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tunc entries
which cause no prejudice to any party, void judgments, and whenever circumstances transpire after the finality
of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable.
Elementary is the rule that an order granting a motion for a writ of execution is not appealable. Thus, Atty.
Quevedos deceptively innocent appeal constituted either a willful disregard or gross ignorance of basic rules
of procedure resulting in the obstruction of justice.

19. Encinas vs National Book Store july 28, 2005
FACTS: In the Resolution dated 6 April 2005, the Court required Atty. Ricardo T. Calimag, counsel for Roberto
P. Madrigal-Acopiado and his attorney-in-fact Datu Mohaldin R.B. Sulaiman, to show cause why he should not
be cited for contempt of court for his participation in the submission of a fake judicial decision to this Court.
This concerns his compliance therewith entitled Motion to Show Cause.
Counsel explains that he filed the Motion for Intervention with Leave of Court and Petition-In-Interventionon (to
which was appended a copy of the fake decision) behalf of his clients to seek the truth in order that justice will
prevail. He reasons that he was misled in the appreciation of the evidence (referring to the forged judicial
decision) made available to him at the time of submission of the Motion and Petition-In-Intervention. At the
same time, he asserts that there was an honest mistake in the appreciation of the documents and that there
was never any malice intended in the submission of the questioned documents. In fact, he even welcomes the
referral of the incident to the National Bureau of Investigation so as to identify the mastermind of the production
of the fake decision.
ISSUE: WON the lawyers are guilty of contempt (YES direct)
HELD: Direct contempt, or contempt in facie curiae, is misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a
court or judge so as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the
court, and can be punished summarily without hearing.
It is insulting to assert a claim before this Supreme Court based on an obvious and incompetent forgery and
conceived by one with so primitive a sense of what normative standards would pass judicial muster. The
Supreme Court cannot accept counsels declarations of good faith and honest mistake since, as a member of
the Bar and an officer of the court, he is presumed to know better. He is required to thoroughly prepare himself
on the law and facts of his case and the evidence he will adduce. The minimum he could have done was to
verify with the appropriate authorities the documents upon which his clients based their claims, and not have
relied on his clients assertions.
Counsels actuations may even constitute a violation of the lawyers oath. As an officer of the court, he is
reminded of his basic duties to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial
officers, to do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court, nor mislead or allow the Court to be misled
by any artifice, and to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.

20. Regalado vs GO
FACTS: The present controversy stemmed from the complaint of illegal dismissal filed before the Labor Arbiter
by herein respondent Antonio S. Go against Eurotech Hair Systems, Inc. (EHSI), and its President Lutz
Kunack and General Manager Jose E. Barin. The Labor Arbiter ruled that respondent Go was illegally
dismissed from employment.
On appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), EHSI, Kunack and Barin employed the legal
services of De Borja Medialdea Bello Guevarra and Gerodias Law Offices where herein petitioner Atty.
Regalado worked as an associate. NLRC reversed Labor Arbiters rulings. Gos MFR denied.
Respondent Go elevated the adverse decision to the Court of Appeals. CA granted Gos petition for certiorari.
On 16 July 2003, after the promulgation of the Court of Appeals decision but prior to the receipt of the parties
of their respective copies, the parties decided to settle the case and signed a Release Waiver and Quitclaim.
With the approval of the Labor Arbiter; In view of the amicable settlement, the Labor Arbiter, on the same day,
issued an Order dismissing the illegal dismissal case with prejudice.
After the receipt of a copy of the Court of Appeals decision, respondent Go, through counsel, filed, on 29 July
2003, a Manifestation with Omnibus Motion seeking to nullify the Release Waiver and Quitclaim dated 16 July
2003 on the ground of fraud, mistake or undue influence. In the same motion, respondent Go, through counsel,
moved that petitioner Atty. Regalado be made to explain her unethical conduct for directly negotiating with
respondent Go without the knowledge of his counsel. The waiver and quitclaim was declared void.
ISSUE: WON Atty. Regalado is in contempt (NO)
HELD: Indirect contempt proceedings may be initiated only in two ways: (1) motu proprio by the court; or (2)
through a verified petition and upon compliance with the requirements for initiatory pleadings. Procedural
requirements as outlined must be complied with.
Respondent Go filed a Manifestation with Omnibus Motion, which was unverified and without any supporting
particulars and documents. Such procedural flaw notwithstanding, the appellate court granted the motion and
directed petitioner Atty. Regalado to show cause why she should not be cited for contempt. Upon petitioner
Atty. Regalados compliance with the appellate courts directive, the tribunal proceeded in adjudging her guilty
of indirect contempt and imposing a penalty of fine, completely ignoring the procedural infirmities in the
commencement of the indirect contempt action.
Clearly, respondent Gos Manifestation with Omnibus Motion was the catalyst which set everything in motion
and led to the eventual conviction of Atty. Regalado. It was respondent Go who brought to the attention of the
appellate court the alleged misbehavior committed by petitioner Atty. Regalado. Without such positive act on
the part of respondent Go, no indirect contempt charge could have been initiated at all.
We cannot, therefore, argue that the Court of Appeals on its own initiated the indirect contempt charge without
contradicting the factual findings made by the very same court which rendered the questioned resolution.

21. ROSARIO TEXTILE MILLS, INC., vs. COURT OF APPEALS.
FACTS: On 1 August 1984, RMC Garments, Inc. (RMC) leased from Peter Pan Corporation (Peter Pan) its
properties (Leased Premises) located on Ortigas, Metro Manila where RMC, a garments manufacturing
company, installed machinery on the Leased Premises and brought in furniture, office equipment and supplies.
Two years thereafter, Rosario Textile Mills Corp. (Rosario Textile) advised RMC in a letter that it had
acquired the Leased Premises, including the chattels found inside, from GBC Corporation (GBC) through a
Deed of Assignment of Rights and Interests and demanded RMC to vacate the Leased Premises within 10
days. Rosario Textile proceeded to exercise its right of self-help. Representatives of Rosario Textile entered
the Leased Premises; cut off RMCs power supply and communication lines; barricaded the road leading to the
Leased Premises, padlocked the entrances and posted guards to prevent entry and Rosario Textile removed
the machinery, equipment, garments and other chattels found inside the Leased Premises.
Consequently, RMC and Peter Pan filed an injunction suit in the trial court which trial court granted upon
posting P50,000 bond by petitioner. RMC filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction for the return of the missing chattels which RTC granted.
Rosario Textile assailed the Order in a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. CA upheld
RTC. The SC likewise affirmed the Decision, which attained finality with the entry of judgment on 17 August
1988.
On 2 February 1989, the trial court issued an Order[6] requiring Rosario Textile to comply with the 20 January
1987 and 23 February 1987 Orders and reiterated its orders directing defendants to allow entry to the Leased
Premises and to return the various machineries they took. The Sheriffs Report stated that copy of the Order
was served on Rosario Textiles counsel in the presence of its Vice-President for Operations/Personnel, Mr.
Antonio Angco. However, Rosario Textile did not comply. In 1993 and 1994, RMC filed two motions to cite
Rosario Textiles board of directors and officers in contempt of court for refusing to comply with the trial courts
final order. On 8 April 1996, the trial court issued another Order[7] requiring Rosario Textile (petitioners
officers) to return the sewing machines within 5 days from notice under pain of contempt. Petitioners officers
moved for reconsideration, which the trial court denied.
Petitioners filed a Manifestation and Compliance on 7 January 1997 stating that they could no longer return the
sewing machines since these were gutted by the fire. On 23 May 1997, the trial court issued the Order ruling
that the alleged destruction of the sewing machines did not extinguish petitioners obligation to return these
machines. The trial court held that petitioners were already in default at the time the fire allegedly destroyed
the machines. The dispositive portion of the Order reads:
Petitioners assailed the Orders dated 23 May and 4 December 1997 in a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit. MR denied. Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioners contend that they should not be cited for indirect contempt because that the trial court did not give
them notice of the injunction order they supposedly violated.
ISSUE: Whether or not the order finding petitioners in contempt of court is valid.
HELD: YES. Officers of the Petitioner Corporation had actual notice of the order. Officers of the petitioner
corporation cannot credibly disclaim knowledge of the order requiring the corporation to return the sewing
machines since petitioners knew or should have known that their personnel took possession of the chattels
inside the private respondents factory and transferred them to the petitioners warehouse and that the private
respondent demanded the return of the subject machines. The sheriffs Report dated February 22, 1989 states
that the legal counsel for the petitioner corporation and the Vice-President for operations and personnel were
present when he tried to enforce the order of the court against the petitioner but he was prevented by its
security officers. At the very least, the officers of the petitioner corporation had actual notice of the order.
Claim of petitioners officers that the trial court did not afford them sufficient notice and opportunity to be heard
in the contempt proceedings is misplaced. To comply with the procedural requirements of indirect contempt
under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, there must be (1) a complaint in writing which may either be a motion for
contempt filed by a party or an order issued by the court requiring a person to appear and explain his conduct,
and (2) an opportunity for the person charged to appear and explain his conduct.The trial court complied with
these requirements in this case. When RMC filed motions for contempt, the trial court gave petitioners officers
an opportunity to explain their side. Petitioners officers filed oppositions to the motions for contempt and even
filed motions to reconsider the orders of the trial court requiring them to return the sewing machines.
It is not correct to say that in contempt proceedings a court should observe all the due process requirements
attending a criminal proceeding and that proof beyond reasonable doubt should support a finding of contempt
of court regardless of whether these are civil or criminal.
The Court held in Remman Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals[14] that:
In general, criminal contempt proceedings should be conducted in accordance with the principles and rules
applicable to criminal cases, in so far as such procedure is consistent with the summary nature of contempt
proceedings. So it has been held that the strict rules that govern criminal prosecutions apply to a prosecution
for criminal contempt, that the accused is to be afforded many of the protections provided in regular criminal
cases, and that proceedings under statutes governing them are to be strictly construed. However, criminal
proceedings are not required to take any particular form so long as the substantial rights of the accused are
preserved.
Civil contempt proceedings, on the other hand, are generally held to be remedial and civil in nature; that is, for
the enforcement of some duty, and essentially a remedy resorted to, to preserve and enforce the rights of a
private party to an action and to compel obedience to a judgment or decree intended to benefit such a party
litigant. The rules of procedure governing criminal contempt proceedings, or criminal prosecutions, ordinarily
are inapplicable to civil contempt proceedings. (Emphasis supplied)
The contempt involved in this case is civil since it arose from petitioners act of defying the trial courts writ of
preliminary injunction, which clearly ordered petitioners officers to return all the sewing machines taken from
the Leased Premises.


22. RE: LETTER DATED 21 FEBRUARY 2005 OF ATTY. NOEL S. SORREDA
A.M. No. 05-3-04-SC. July 22, 2005

FACTS: In a letter[1] to the Chief Justice dated February 21, 2005, with copies thereof furnished all the
Associate Justices of the Court and other government entities, RTC judges and counsels listed thereunder,
Atty. Noel S. Sorreda, who identified himself as member, Philippine Bar, expressed his frustrations over the
unfavorable outcome of and the manner by which the Court resolved the 10 cases filed by him recounting
therein and alleging circumstances surrounding the dismissal on February 7, 2000[2] of the very first case he
filed with the Court, UDK-12854, entitled Ramon Sollegue vs. Court of Appeals, et al.
Frustrated with the adverse ruling thereon, Atty. Sorreda had previously written a letter[3] dated April 2, 2001
addressed to the Chief Justice, copy furnished all the Associate Justices of this Court, the Court of Appeals
and the Office of the Solicitor General, denouncing the Court, as follows:
Mr. Chief Justice, I believe the manner the Court comported itself in the aforesaid case is totally execrable and
atrocious, entirely unworthy of the majesty and office of the highest tribunal of the land. It is the action not of
men of reason or those who believe in the rule of law, but rather of bullies and tyrants from whom might is
right. I say, shame on the High Court, for shoving down a hapless suitors throat a ruling which, from all
appearances, it could not justify.
Reacting, the Court, in an en banc Resolution dated August 14, 2001,[4] required Atty. Sorreda to show cause
why he should not be properly disciplined for degrading, insulting and dishonoring the Supreme Court by
using vile, offensive, intemperate and contemptuous derogatory language against it. In response to the show
cause order, Atty. Sorreda addressed two (2) more letters to the Court dated December 2, 2001[5] and June
16, 2002,[6] arguing for the propriety of his action and practically lecturing the Court on his concepts of Legal
and Judicial Ethics and Constitutional Law. Court merely noted said two letters.
Persistent in imputing to the Court and its Justices offensive and uncalled remarks, Atty. Sorreda again went
on a rampage in his letter of February 21, 2005 again maliciously attacking the Court and its Justices, portion
of it as follows:
Where did the Court get such brazenness, such shameless boldness, as to dismiss on the ground that the
docket fees had not been paid, when the evidence clearly show they in fact were? What manner of men are
you- even challenging the citizenry to inform on the corrupt, and the bar to become like Frodo in the fight
against societys evils in your public speeches and writings, and yet you yourselves committing the same evils
when hidden from public view. Are all these rulings in the ten cases not the clearest manifestation that the
supreme magistrates have bought into the What-are-we-in-power-for mentality?
In an en banc Resolution[11] dated March 15, 2005, the Court again required Atty. Sorreda to show cause why
he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for maliciously attacking the Court and its Justices.
By way of compliance to the second show cause order, Atty Sorreda, in his letter of May 10, 2005[12], again
with copies thereof furnished the Justices, states that he does not see the need to say any more because the
cause has already been shown as clear as day in his earlier letter of 21 February 2005, adding that [T]he
need is for the High Tribunal to act on the instant matter swiftly and decisively. While admitting the great
seriousness of the statements and imputations I have leveled against the Court, he dared the Court whether
it is capable of a judgment that will be upheld by the Supreme Judge.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Sorreda can be held guilty of contempt due to the remarks he has made in his
letters addressed to the court.
HELD: YES. Atty. Noel S. Sorreda is found guilty both of contempt of court and violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility amounting to gross misconduct as an officer of the court and member of the Bar.
Unfounded accusations or allegations or words tending to embarrass the court or to bring it into disrepute have
no place in a pleading. Their employment serves no useful purpose. On the contrary, they constitute direct
contempt of court or contempt in facie curiae and a violation of the lawyers oath and a transgression of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. As officer of the court, Atty. Sorreda has the duty to uphold the dignity and
authority of the courts and to promote confidence in the fair administration of justice.[24] No less must this be
and with greater reasons in the case of the countrys highest court, the Supreme Court, as the last bulwark of
justice and democracy.
Atty. Sorreda must be reminded that his first duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice, to which
his clients success is wholly subordinate. His conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of
law and ethics. The use of intemperate language and unkind ascription can hardly be justified nor can it have a
place in the dignity of judicial forum. Civility among members of the legal profession is a treasured tradition that
must at no time be lost to it. Hence, Atty. Sorreda has transcended the permissible bounds of fair comment
and constructive criticism to the detriment of the orderly administration of justice. Free expression, after all,
must not be used as a vehicle to satisfy ones irrational obsession to demean, ridicule, degrade and even
destroy this Court and its magistrates.
Atty. Sorreda, as a citizen and as an officer of the court, is entitled to criticize the rulings of this Court, to point
out where he feels the Court may have lapsed with error. But, certainly, this does not give him the unbridled
license to insult and malign the Court and bring it into disrepute. Against such an assault, the Court is duty-
bound to act to preserve its honor and dignity and to safeguard the morals and ethics of the legal
profession.







23. SILAS Y. CAADA vs JUDGE ILDEFONSO B. SUERTE
A.M. No. RTJ-04-1875
FACTS: A warrant of arrest was issued on the basis of the direct contempt order issued by the respondent
Judge against the complainant Silas Y Canada. As a result, complainant was detained for fourteen (14) days
and only the writ of habeas corpus issued by the Court of Appeals saved him from further detention. Within his
14-day stay in jail, he was not able to post bond for temporary liberty apparently because the warrant of arrest
issued by respondent judge indicated that complainant is not entitled to such a privilege. The words NO BAIL
RECOMMENDED were written on the face of the warrant of arrest.
With this, Silas Y. Caada, in a verified letter-complaint dated November 8, 2003, administratively charged
respondent Judge Ildefonso B. Suerte of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 60, Barili, Cebu, of arbitrary
detention punished under Article 124 of the Revised Penal Code and the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019
entitled Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act as well as the Canons of Judicial Ethics for having issued an
order citing complainant in direct contempt of court and for having ordered his arrest and subsequent detention
without affording him the opportunity to post bail.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent, Judge Ildefonso B. Suerte, is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and
procedure and violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.
HELD: YES. This is a clear case of gross ignorance of the procedural rule. Section 2, Rule 71 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure is the governing authority on the matter. Its pertinent provision reads as follows, to
wit:
SECTION 1. Direct contempt punished summarily.
SECTION 2. Remedy therefrom The person adjudged in direct contempt by any court may not appeal
therefrom, but may avail himself of the remedies of certiorari or prohibition. The execution of judgment shall be
suspended pending resolution of such petition, provided such person files a bond fixed by the court which
rendered the judgment and conditioned that he will abide by and perform the judgment should the petition be
decided against him.
Clearly, the rule allows the person subject of a direct contempt judgment to file a bond to be fixed by the court
as a remedy for the imposition of the judgment. In making it appear that complainant is not entitled to post a
bond, respondent has gone beyond his authority as provided under the above-cited procedural rule. What is
involved here is a fundamental procedural rule and well-known judicial norm. If the law is so elementary, not to
know it or to act if one does not know it, constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
He should have known that under Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court if the penalty of imprisonment is
imposed upon the contemnor by a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, the same should
not exceed ten days. Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court clearly provides:
Section 1. Direct contempt, punished summarily. A person guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or so near
a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the court,
offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an
affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so, may be summarily adjudged in contempt by such court
and punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) days, or
both, if it be a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, or by a fine not exceeding two
hundred pesos or imprisonment not exceeding one (1) day, or both, if it be a lower court.
In the instant case, the order of respondent judge directing the arrest of complainant did not specify the period
within which the latter should be imprisoned. Worse, it is not disputed that complainant was detained for 14
days, 4 days beyond what the above-cited Rule allows. Were it not for the writ of habeas corpus issued by the
Court of Appeals, complainant would not have been released from detention
We also note that respondent judge had likewise cited complainants counsel in direct contempt for having
attached complainants affidavit in a motion for inhibition filed with the trial court. She was assessed a fine of
P3,000.00. Again, this is erroneous because it is clear under Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court that a
penalty of fine imposed by a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank should not exceed
P2,000.00.
As to respondents denial of complainants right to post bail, we agree with the Office of the Court
Administrator that under Section 2 of the same Rule, the execution of a judgment finding a person in direct
contempt of court may be suspended if such person avails of the remedies of certiorari or prohibition, provided
he files a bond fixed by the court which rendered the judgment and conditioned that he will abide by and
perform the judgment should the petition be decided against him. In the present case, respondent effectively
prevented complainant from resorting to his right to post a bond as provided for under the above-cited
provision of the Rules of Court by indicating in the arrest warrant he issued that complainant is not entitled to
bail. In doing so, respondent unduly deprived the latter of his prized and fundamental right to liberty, a right
which is protected and guaranteed by our Constitution.



24. ROSITA M. BARRETE vs. JUDGE VENANCIO J. AMILA
A.M. No. MTJ-92-733 February 23, 1994
This is an administrative complaint dated 4 August 1992, filed by Rosita M. Barrete against Municipal Circuit
Trial Court ("MCTC") Judge Venancio J. Amila, for grave abuse of power and authority relative to Civil Case
No. 313 for unlawful detainer, entitled "Juanita Bungabong vs. Rosita Barrete."
Respondent Judge Amila in Civil Case No. 313 ruled in favor of plaintiff Juanita Bungabong, which ordered
defendant Rosita Barrete, herein complainant, to vacate the house owned by plaintiff which was occupied by
complainant. A writ of execution was subsequently issued by respondent Judge in an Order dated 3 January,
1992. However, on 16 January 1992, pursuant to complainant's request, the Sheriff gave her until the end of
the month to vacate the subject premises. As of 6 July 1992, Barrete had not vacated; hence, an alias writ of
execution was issued. Again, complainant was given an extension of two (2) days to pack up and leave. On 8
July 1992, the Sheriff went back to the premises and although he did not find complainant there, it was clear
that she had not vacated because her furniture and other belongings were still in the house. Upon inquiry, the
Sheriff learned that complainant had gone to Tacloban City and was due to return anytime. The Sheriff then
put a padlock on the door of the house occupied by complainant. 1
On 22 January 1992, plaintiff Bungabong's counsel filed a motion to declare Rosita Barrete in Contempt of
Court. On 23 July 1992, respondent Judge ordered for the arrest of Rosita Barrete. A motion to quash the
order of arrest and to release Rosita Barrete was filed, but complainant Barrete and her three (3) children
remained in detention until 28 July 1992, a Tuesday (the Judge being absent from office Monday, 27 July
1992) after she had been brought before respondent Judge and had promised that she would vacate the
house and lot she had been occupying.
In her administrative complaint, Rosita Barrete alleged that she had requested the Provincial Deputy Sheriff to
give her up to the end of July to pack her things and look for a new place, for her and her three (3) children, to
stay in. Complainant claims that her arrest and detention without according her a day in court constituted a
flagrant violation of her right to due process.
ISSUES: 1.Whether or not respondent Judge acted arbitrarily in ordering the complainants arrest and
detention.
2.Whether or not the act of the complainant in refusing to vacate the premises constituted direct contempt.
HELD: 1.YES. Judge Amila acted arbitrarily and with disregard for complainant's rights when he ordered her
incarceration on the ground of contempt for her failure to comply voluntarily with the final judgment and the
writs of execution ordering evacuation from the premises and the delivery of possession of the property to
plaintiff.
The records show that at the time complainant was arrested, no delivery of possession of the subject premises
had been made to the plaintiff; the writ of execution had not yet been implemented.
The mere refusal or unwillingness on the part of complainant to vacate said property did not constitute
contempt. The contumacious act punishable under Rule 71 is:
Sec. 3 (b). Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment or command of a court, or
injunction granted by a court or judge, including the act of a person who after being dispossessed or ejected
from any real property by the judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or
induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or
possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto.
(Emphasis supplied)
The writ of possession was directed not to complainant, but to the Sheriff, who was to deliver the properties to
plaintiff Bungabong. As the writ did not command the complainant to do anything, complainant could not be
held guilty of disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment or command of a court.
Moreover, complainant could not be punished for contempt under paragraph (b) of Section 3, Rule 71, for
disobedience of or resistance to the judgment of the trial court because said judgment was not a special
judgment enforceable under Section 9, Rule 39, Rules of Court, which reads as follows:
Sec. 9. Writ of execution of special judgment. When a judgment requires the performance of any other act
than the payment of money, or the sale or delivery of real or personal property, a certified copy of the judgment
shall be attached to the writ of execution and shall be served by the officer upon the party against whom the
same is rendered, or upon any other person required thereby, or by law, to obey the same, and such party or
person may be punished for contempt if he obeys such judgment. (Emphasis supplied)
When the judgment requires the delivery of real property, it must be executed in accordance with Section 8 (d)
of Rule 9, and any contempt proceeding arising therefrom must be based on the second part of Section 3 (b) of
Rule 71 (see emphasized portion of Section 3 (b), Rule 71 above) and not on "the disobedience of or
resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or command of a court, or injunction granted by a court or
judge" in relation to Section 9 of Rule 39.
2.NO. To constitute direct contempt, the alleged misbehavior must have been committed in the presence of or
so near a court or judge as to obstruct or interrupt proceedings before the court. Complainant was not guilty of
such misbehavior.
In the instant case, complainant was arrested and detained for failure to comply with the judgment of eviction,
on the mistaken belief of respondent judge that she was thereby guilty of direct contempt of court and thus
could be summarily punished with imprisonment. To make matters worse, complainant's three (3) minor
children, who had no idea whatsoever about the controversy, were dragged into it when they were incarcerated
with their mother.
Since complainant was not guilty of the alleged contempt, the order for her arrest had no legal basis. Even if
complainant had not been guilty of contempt, the method employed by respondent Judge to compel
compliance from her was not justified the same is not sanctioned by the Rules. In the case of U.S. vs.
Ramayrat, 8 the Court ruled that for execution of the final judgment, the Sheriff could have availed himself of
the public force (i.e., assistance of the police authorities), had it been necessary to resort thereto. It was not up
to respondent Judge to ensure execution of the judgment by ordering the arrest of complainant. In the instant
case, respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of authority and misconduct in office in ordering the arrest of
complainant.


25. JUDGE NAPOLEON INOTURAN vs. JUDGE MANUEL Q. LIMSIACO, JR.

A.M. No. MTJ-01-1362. May 6, 2005
FACTS: Judge Napoleon Inoturan of the RTC, Branch133, Makati city wrote a letter requesting that Judge
Manuel Q. Limsiaco Jr. of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Valladolid-San Enrique-Pulupandan, Negros
Occidental, be investigated and charged accordingly. Judge Inoturan stated that Mario Balucero was charged
before his court with 2 counts of violation of BP. Blg. 22. Balucero failed to appear for arraignment despite the
notices prompting Inoturan toissue a bench warrant against him. Judge Inoturan received from the NBI the
return of the bench warrant with the information that Balucero was arrested in Bacolod City and that he had
posted a property bail bond before the MCTC f Valladolid-San Enrique-Pulupandan. Attached to it was the
order of release signed by Judge Manuel Limsiaco Jr.
The arraignment of Balucero was set several times, but he failed to appear prompting Judge Inoturan to order
the cancellation of Baluceros property bond and forfeited in favor of the government. A warrant of arrest
should also be issued against him.Judge Inoturan ordered Ignacio Denila, Clerk of Court of the MCTC of
Valladolid to forward to his sala the property bond posted for Balucero. Denila failed to comply and therefore
he was cited in contempt and was ordered to be detained until he complied. Denila surrendered to the police
but was ordered released on the same day by Judge Limsiaco.On Aug. 7, 1988, Denila sent a letter to Inoturan
stating that Balucero did not post any property bond in Judge Limsiacos court; that he referred to Limsiaco the
order to turn over the property bond to his court and that Limsiaco said there was no documents submitted by
Balucero.
The Office of the Court Administration tasked Executive Judge Garvilles to make an investigation. In his
findings, the supposed property bond allegedly approved by Judge Limsiaco did not exist. Limsiaco also acted
w/o authority . Balucero was arrested in Bacolod City which means the application for bail should have been
filed with any of the 14 branches of the Bacolod City RTC. Garvilles also found out that Limsiaco ordered the
release of the accused in several other cases without the posting of bail. Judge Garvilles recommended that
Judge Limsiaco be administratively charged of gross ignorance of the law and serious irregularity in the
performance of duty and abuse of authority.This was referred to Executive Judge Morales. One of her findings
was this: Respondent judge issued the order of release of Balucero even prior to his arrest and that no bail
was posted.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Limsiaco is guilty of ignorance of the law and procedure for ordering Baluceros
release even without bail.
HELD: YES. Section 1 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure states that: Bail is the security
given for the release of a person in custody of the law, furnished by himor a bondsman, to guarantee his
appearance before any court as required under the conditions hereinafter specified.
. An accused under detention can not be released without bail. As found by the investigating Judges,
accused Balucero did not post bail but still Respondent judge ordered his release. Respondent Judge also
failed to give a satisfactory explanation why he issued the Release Order of Balucero even if he did not post
bail and was not under detention. Respondent Judge acted without authority I approving such bail. Section 17,
Rule 114 states that:
Bail in the amount fixed may be filed with the court where the case is pending, or in the absence or
unavailability of the judge thereof, with any regional trial judge, metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or
municipal circuit trial judge in the province, city, or municipality. If the accused is arrested in a province, city, or
municipality other than where the case is pending, bail may also be filed with any regional trial court of said
place, or if no judge thereof is available, with any metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal
circuit trial judge therein.

26. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. SEVERINO LISTANA, SR., respondent.
FACTS: Respondent Severino Listana is the owner of a parcel of land which he voluntarily offered to sell the
said land to the government, through the DAR under R.A. 6657, also known as the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988 (CARL). The DAR valued the property at P5,871,689.03, which was however rejected by
the respondent. Hence, the DARAB of Sorsogon commenced summary administrative proceedings to
determine the just compensation of the land.
Thereafter, a Writ of Execution was issued by the PARAD directing the manager of Land Bank to pay the
respondent the aforesaid amount as just compensation in the manner provided by law. Respondent filed a
Motion for Contempt with the PARAD, alleging that petitioner Land Bank failed to comply with the Writ of
Execution. He argued that such failure of the petitioner to comply with the writ of execution constitutes
contempt of the DARAB.
Meanwhile, petitioner Land Bank filed a petition with the RTC of Sorsogon, Branch 52, sitting as a Special
Agrarian Court (SAC), for the determination of just compensation.
PARAD issued an Order granting the Motion for Contempt.
Petitioner Land Bank filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforequoted Order,[8] which was however
denied by the PARAD. Thus, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal with the PARAD.
On the other hand, the SAC dismissed the petition for the determination of just compensation filed by petitioner
Land Bank. Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of said dismissal was likewise denied.
PARAD Capellan denied due course to petitioners Notice of Appeal and ordered the issuance of an Alias Writ
of Execution for the payment of the adjudged amount of just compensation to respondent. He directed the
issuance of an arrest order against Manager Alex A. Lorayes.[12]
Petitioner Land Bank filed a petition for injunction before the RTC of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, with application for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain PARAD Capellan from issuing the order of arrest. The
trial court ordered respondent Provincial Adjudicator of the DARAB or anyone acting in its stead is enjoined as
it is hereby enjoined from enforcing its order of arrest against Mr. Alex A. Lorayes pending the final termination
of the case before RTC upon the posting of a cash bond by the Land Bank.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the trial courts order, which was denied. Thus, respondent
filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
ISSUES: (1) WON certiorari is the proper remedy? (2) whether or not motion for contempt filed with the parad
is valid?

1. Yes. Petitioner submits that the special civil action for certiorari filed by respondent before the Court of
Appeals to nullify the injunction issued by the trial court was improper, considering that the preliminary
injunction issued by the trial court was a final order which is appealable to the Court of Appeals via a notice of
appeal.
Petitioners submission is untenable. Generally, injunction is a preservative remedy for the protection of ones
substantive right or interest. It is not a cause of action in itself but merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to a
main suit. Thus, it has been held that an order granting a writ of preliminary injunction is an interlocutory order.
As distinguished from a final order which disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular
proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined
by the court, an interlocutory order does not dispose of a case completely, but leaves something more to be
adjudicated upon.[19]
Clearly, the grant of a writ of preliminary injunction is in the nature of an interlocutory order, hence,
unappealable. Therefore, respondents special civil action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals was the
correct remedy under the circumstances. Certiorari is available where there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
The order granting a writ of preliminary injunction is an interlocutory order; as such, it cannot by itself be
subject of an appeal or a petition for review on certiorari. The proper remedy of a party aggrieved by such an
order is to bring an ordinary appeal from an adverse judgment in the main case, citing therein the grounds for
assailing the interlocutory order. However, the party concerned may file a petition for certiorari where the
assailed order is patently erroneous and appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief.
2. Not valid. The contempt proceedings initiated through an unverified Motion for Contempt filed by the
respondent with the PARAD were invalid for the following reasons: First, the Rules of Court clearly require the
filing of a verified petition with the Regional Trial Court, which was not complied with in this case. The charge
was not initiated by the PARAD motu proprio; rather, it was by a motion filed by respondent. Second, neither
the PARAD nor the DARAB have jurisdiction to decide the contempt charge filed by the respondent. The
issuance of a warrant of arrest was beyond the power of the PARAD and the DARAB. Consequently, all the
proceedings that stemmed from respondents Motion for Contempt, specifically the Orders of the PARAD
dated August 20, 2000 and January 3, 2001 for the arrest of Alex A. Lorayes, are null and void.
Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was
committed by an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not
be punished for contempt (Rule 71, Sec. 4).
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with supporting
particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the
requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. If the contempt charges
arose out of or are related to a principal action pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that
fact but said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in its discretion orders
the consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal action for joint hearing and decision.
The requirement of a verified petition is mandatory. Henceforth, except for indirect contempt proceedings
initiated motu proprio by order of or a formal charge by the offended court, all charges shall be commenced by
a verified petition.
Therefore, there are only two ways a person can be charged with indirect contempt, namely, (1) through a
verified petition; and (2) by order or formal charge initiated by the court motu proprio.
In the case at bar, neither of these modes was adopted in charging Mr. Lorayes with indirect contempt.
More specifically, Rule 71, Section 12 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, referring to indirect contempt
against quasi-judicial entities, provides:
Sec. 12. Contempt against quasi-judicial entities. Unless otherwise provided by law, this Rule shall apply to
contempt committed against persons, entities, bodies or agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions, or shall
have suppletory effect to such rules as they may have adopted pursuant to authority granted to them by law to
punish for contempt. The Regional Trial Court of the place wherein the contempt has been committed shall
have jurisdiction over such charges as may be filed therefore.
The foregoing amended provision puts to rest once and for all the questions regarding the applicability of these
rules to quasi-judicial bodies, to wit:
1. This new section was necessitated by the holdings that the former Rule 71 applied only to superior and
inferior courts and did not comprehend contempt committed against administrative or quasi-judicial officials or
bodies, unless said contempt is clearly considered and expressly defined as contempt of court, as is done in
the second paragraph of Sec. 580, Revised Administrative Code. The provision referred to contemplates the
situation where a person, without lawful excuse, fails to appear, make oath, give testimony or produce
documents when required to do so by the official or body exercising such powers. For such violation, said
person shall be subject to discipline, as in the case of contempt of court, upon application of the official or body
with the Regional Trial Court for the corresponding sanctions.[23] (emphasis in the original)
Evidently, quasi-judicial agencies that have the power to cite persons for indirect contempt pursuant to Rule 71
of the Rules of Court can only do so by initiating them in the proper Regional Trial Court. It is not within their
jurisdiction and competence to decide the indirect contempt cases. These matters are still within the province
of the Regional Trial Courts. In the present case, the indirect contempt charge was filed, not with the Regional
Trial Court, but with the PARAD, and it was the PARAD that cited Mr. Lorayes with indirect contempt