the ineffectiveness of the state, a high level of corruption, and economic ineffciency, as well as by Russias aggression. A combination of the geopolitical appetites of Russia, the shortcomings of the EUs foreign and security policy, and the lack of democracy and economic effciency in Ukraine produced disastrous consequences for the country and regional security. The upcoming elections will thus be critical for both Ukraine and the EU. Policy Recommendations: After the elections, the new government in Ukraine has to implement economic and democratic reforms as well as enhanced security arrangements in order to strengthen Ukraines sovereignty. The country needs to make strategic changes in its foreign and security policy, while also stabilizing the east of the country. In the long term, provided that there is successful confict settlement in eastern Ukraine, NATO membership would be the best way to safeguard security in the country. Will Elections Make Ukraine Stronger? by Mykola Kapitonenko 1744 R Street NW Washington, DC 20009 T 1 202 683 2650 F 1 202 265 1662 E info@gmfus.org Europe Program Policy Brief October 2014 Vol. 1, No. 2 Introduction Te situation in Ukraine has hardly improved since Petro Poroshenko became president in May, three months afer his predecessor, Viktor Yanukovych, fed the country. Ukraine is still fghting disintegration as Russia continues its hybrid war on its terri- tory. Exploiting Ukraines weaknesses, Russia gains momentum and chal- lenges all key areas of its neighbors security. It is annexing parts of the country, supporting separatists in the East, waging trade wars, and attempting to limit its freedom in foreign policy. Te economy is in a dire situation, which is made worse by the high costs of the war. Meanwhile, the recon- struction of the countrys political system and processes has just started. Te security and economic circum- stances make this a daunting task, complicated further by the deep frag- mentation of the Ukrainian political landscape. Against this background, the next government will have to tackle profound strategic choices as to Ukraines situation between Russia and the West. Military Efforts to Stabilize the Country To Poroshenkos credit, however, Ukraine has made serious eforts to respond to the Russian attack and prevent disintegration. Yet the current situation leaves little room for opti- mism. With about 1,000 of its soldiers killed 1 and about 1 million of its civilians displaced, 2 the price of the confict continues to rise for Ukraine. Following a third military draf in August, the number of Ukrainian troops deployed in the East rose to about 35,000. Separatist forces, combining local rebels and Russian military personnel, number around 15-20,000 and, as of August, were located mainly in big cities and small towns in the densely populated, industrialized regions of Donetsk and Lugansk oblasts (counties). An ofen- sive by the Ukrainian military over the summer resulted in it regaining a number of towns, including Slovyansk and Kramatorsk, the initial bases of separatists. However, a strategic stale- mate was reached once the Ukrainian forces surrounded large urban centers. 1 Memory Book, http://memorybook.org.ua/index1.htm 2 Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/arti- cle/2014/09/02/us-ukraine-security-displaced-idUSK- BN0GX0Y020140902 2 Policy Brief Europe Program Large-scale military operations became impossible as they posed too high a risk for civilians, and a blockade would have been inefcient as the Ukrainian-Russian border in Lugansk oblast was under control of rebels who continued to get direct and full support from Russia. Using gaps in the border, Russia supplied the rebels with weapons, including tanks and artillery systems and volunteers. As a result, the number of rebel troops has remained at the same level, while Russia intensifed and upgraded its operations. Consequently, Ukrainian forces found it increasingly dif- cult to continue the ofensive. And, while they encircled Donetsk and Lugansk, the incursion of Russian troops in the small border town of Novoazovsk on August 27 opened a new front and the confict escalated once again. Te shooting down in July of fight MH17 by a surface- to-air missile, reportedly fred by the separatists, 3 and the recent escalation in fghting near the important coastal city of Mariupol indicate Russias resolve to counter any success Ukraine might have in fghting the separatists. Tat has meant additional political pressure on the Ukrainian government ahead of the coming parliamentary elections, and efectively making the confict on Ukraines territory a part of its political landscape for the foreseeable future. A military deadlock, similar to the ones in the frozen conficts in Moldova and Georgia, seems to ft Russias plans perfectly. Tis situation will require the Ukrainian government to undertake additional political steps and negotiations toward the eastern oblasts, including some form of power sharing. Along with military eforts, steps have been taken to stabilize Ukraine politically. Poroshenko dissolved the Parliament at the end of August and early parliamentary elections were scheduled for October 26. Elected in 2012 under the heavy infuence of the Yanukovych regime, the current parliament proved unable to introduce reforms or to react efectively to current external threats. For example, in January a considerable number of members voted for the authoritarian laws that prompted a new surge in the Maidan protests. 3 Peter Baker, Michael Gordon, Mark Mazzetti. U.S. Sees Evidence of Russian Links to Jets Downing, The New York Times, July 18, 2014, http://www.nytimes. com/2014/07/19/world/europe/malaysia-airlines-plane-ukraine.html; Preliminary Report, Crash Involving Malaysia Airlines Boeing 777-200 Flight MH17, The Hague, Sep- tember 2014, http://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/uploads/phase-docs/701/b3923acad- 0ceprem-rapport-mh-17-en-interactief.pdf In 2011, Yanukovych introduced a mixed electoral system, in which half the members of parliament are elected on a frst-past-the-post basis in districts, and the other half on national party lists. 4 Tis resulted in a large increase in the number of seats won by his Party of Regions in the following years elections. While it only won 30 percent of the votes on national lists, massive support from local administrations and abuse of administrative resources led to the Party of Regions winning almost half of the seats elected in districts. Moreover, many members elected on other party lists focked to the Party of Regions when the parliament was formed. Tis electoral system remains in place, and there are fears of a repetition of the 2012 scenario, with the will of voters again being perverted. More generally, the political system remains fragile and corrupted, and considerable eforts should be taken to achieve more transparency, account- ability, and democracy. Corruption is almost as big a problem as lack of secu- rity. Initiatives such as a Committee on Lustration or an Anticorruption Bureau, launched immediately afer the Maidan, seem obsolete and have produced no practical results. In April, the Parliament approved an anti-corrup- tion law that addresses the lack of control over ofcials in central and local government bodies, as well as over policemen and judges. Te new anti-corruption body that the law created is charged with tracing ofcials incomes going back to 2010, and identifying past and new acts of corruption. As practice suggests, though, law alone is not enough to eradicate corruption; this takes political resolve. Te next Parliament and government, backed by electoral legitimacy, should be able to address corruption vigorously, as part of a general strategy of strengthening the state through democratization, power-sharing, and 4 Lack of unity within the opposition at the time made it easier for Yanukovych to get the law passed. In Parliament 62 deputies (out of 156) from Batkyvschina and 36 (out of 72) from Our Ukraine, two major opposition parties at that time, voted against chang- ing the system. Corruption is almost as big a problem as lack of security. 3 Policy Brief Europe Program enhancement of mutual trust by building cooperation and interdependence networks among societal groups, incorpo- rating minorities, etc. Dismantling the authoritarian system erected by Yanukovych is a key prerequisite, while efective oversight by civil society will be more important than ever. Faced with the real threat of disintegration and national collapse, Ukrainian politicians will hopefully fnally mature and work to bolster civil society. A Fragmented Political Landscape Ukraine lacks well-established political parties organized along ideological lines. Before each election, new forma- tions and parties mushroom that are in fact only diferent combinations of the same politicians. Te party system is in a constant process of reshufing and rebranding, with parties emerging out of nowhere and disappearing afer the next elections. Tey are ofen named afer certain politicians and can be efectively transferred from one to another. As a result, they are anything but a reliable tool for translating societys desires into political decisions. A high level of corruption and low level of input from civil society make political parties instruments for various fnancial groups and oligarchs. Te Petro Poroshenko Bloc, which is leading in the polls and is expected to score over 30 percent of votes, is no more than a motley assembly of politicians who, most likely temporarily, back the presidents program. It has been recently created on the basis of Solidarnist, a party Porosh- enko created in 2001. It has reached an agreement with the Udar party, headed by Vitaliy Klitchko, over joint participa- tion in the elections. Klitchko, currently the mayor of Kyiv, heads the joint list, which is evenly divided between the two parties. UDAR is strongly pro-European and generally backs the presidents program. Te heavyweight Batkivshchyna party, headed by former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, is expected to lose support compared to the 2012 elections, when it was the main opposition to Yanukovychs Party of Regions. In an attempt to boost its appeal, it has placed Nadiya Savchenko, the Ukrainian air force pilot currently detained in Russia, at the head of its list, with Tymoshenko second. Batkivsh- chyna has recently lost a number of prominent members, most notably Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk and Chairman of Parliament Olexander Turchynov. Tey are instead running under the Peoples Front party, formerly Yatsenyuks Front of Changes, which had joined Batkivsh- chyna in 2013. Batkivshchyna and the Peoples Front Party are pro-European and on the moderate lef. Before the split Batkivshchyna was polling at about 14-15 percent of votes, but its support will now be shared with Yatsenyuks new political outft. Several parties, including previously major ones, will struggle to clear the 5 percent electoral threshold for gaining representation in Parliament. Among them are the far-right Svoboda and the far-lef and Communist parties. Fearing falling under the threshold, the Party of Regions recently withdrew from the race, afer it stood at 6 percent approval in opinion polls. Among the new parties, two stand the best chance of making it into Parliament: Civil Position, headed by the former minister of defense, Anatoliy Hrytsenko; and the Radical Party, led by Oleh Lyashko. Te former places anti-corruption and defense at the top of its agenda and polls at about 9-10 percent, while the latter is a populist outft that could end up an unexpected runner-up in the elections, with polling scores around 13 percent. Maidan will bring some new people to the Parliament, but they are unlikely to have a decisive voice in it. As Maidan is not a political party, some of its members are running on the lists of various parties, mainly the Poroshenko Bloc and Peoples Front. Prominent journalists, like Serhiy Leschenko and Mustafa Nayem, will likely be elected, as well as several battalion commanders and social activ- ists. Political parties have featured Maidan activists very prominently in their campaigns, yet it remains to be seen how they will carry the Maidan spirit into the new Parlia- The party system is in a constant process of reshuffing and rebranding, with parties emerging out of nowhere and disappearing after the next elections. 4 Policy Brief Europe Program ment. Judging by the party lists, the share of members of parliament from Maidan is unlikely to be above 10 percent. If politics continues to operate in the traditional way afer the elections, there will be no way for them to infuence major decision-making by the parties management and by the key oligarchs behind them. Tere are several political parties running for the Parliament that have a much greater number of activists, such as Samopomich, led by the mayor of Lviv, Andriy Sadovy, but they are unlikely to clear the threshold. An absence of political reforms afer the elections will lead to the reoccurrence of old problems. Without judicial reforms and more transparent electoral procedures, the system will remain corrupt and inefective. And a simple return to a political compromise similar to the one of 2004, when the Orange Revolution resulted in a shif to a parliamentary republic without any success in overcoming corruption and the infuence of oligarchs, would lead to a repetition of the confict over power between the president and the government, as experienced during Yuschenkos presidency. The Electoral Campaign Security Challenges Te electoral campaign has inevitably focused on security issues. Joining NATO, further integration with the EU, and how to deal with Russia have replaced traditional economic worries. Polls show a dramatic shif in how Ukrainians perceive their countrys security challenges. Lack of atten- tion to foreign policy and an inertial approach, which could be boiled down to being friends with everyone, has been replaced by a distinct division of opinions on an issue that is gaining utmost importance. Tere has been an increase in support for NATO membership, from 34 percent in May to 41 percent in June (with 40 percent still opposing it). 5 A poll by GfKUkraine in September revealed that 52 percent of Ukrainians would support NATO membership. 6 By comparison, 49.7 percent were against NATO membership in 2008, while 31.2 percent supported the idea. 7 Among possible security strategies for their country, 34 percent of Ukrainians prefer NATO member- ship, while 28 percent support the continuation of a non- alignment policy, and 13 percent are in favor of an alliance with Russia (as of June 2014). At the same time, 43 percent say the country should reacquire nuclear weapons, while 37 percent think it should not. Te European future of Ukraine has been at the heart of the demands of Maidan, which, it must be remembered, started afer Yanukovych halted preparations for signing an Association Agreement with the EU. As the crisis has unfolded, the debate over the Europeanness of Ukraine has broadened to include not only the countrys foreign policy options, but also a reformation of life within it. Facing direct foreign aggression, Ukrainians are reconsid- ering how to enhance national security, especially through seeking membership of NATO and the EU, institutions capable of providing direct and fast solutions to its security threats. But while both options are increasingly popular, many experts are skeptical about how probable of short- term solutions they really are and suggest other options, as discussed further below. Coping with Economic Fragility Te Ukrainian economy remains extremely fragile at a time when any successful solution to the current security crisis requires signifcant economic strength. Ukraine has been among the countries most heavily afected by the global fnancial and economic crisis since 2008. Its outdated 5 Democracy Initiatives Polls on Security Issues, http://www.dif.org.ua/ua/polls/2014_ polls/stavlen-bezpeki-.htm 6 More Than Half of Possible Voters Support Ukraines Joning NATO, September 29, 2014, http://www.gfk.com/ua/news-and-events/press-room/press-releases/pages/ politics-290914.aspx 7 Does Ukraine Need Nuclear Weapons? Polls by the Gorshenin Institute, http://www. unian.ua/society/97468-chi-potribna-ukrajini-yaderna-zbroya-opituvannya.html An absence of political reforms after the elections will lead to the reoccurrence of old problems. Without judicial reforms and more transparent electoral procedures, the system will remain corrupt and ineffective. 5 Policy Brief Europe Program industrial sector, which consumes twice as much energy per unit of production than the European average, is unable to generate income per capita at satisfactory levels. Te post-Yanukovych government initiated a program of reforms, but the economy has further deteriorated over the past months. With the annexation of the Crimea by Russia, Ukraine has lost about 3 percent of its GDP and hundreds of billions of dollars in property in the peninsula. 8 Since the outbreak of war, industrial production has fallen by 28.5 percent in the Donetsk oblast and by 56 percent in the Lugansk oblast. In the frst seven months of 2014, Ukrai- nian industry overall lost about 5.8 percent of output, 9
while infation exceeded 12 percent 10 and the currency lost half of its value. Access to the Russian market, which accounts for more than one-third of exports, is increas- ingly problematic, while compensation through access to European markets will take time. At the same time, Ukraines military budget exceeded 4 percent of the GDP in July, which means the country is rapidly turning into a militarized economy. Te anti- terrorist operation in the East, as well as military modern- ization, is demanding considerable economic efort. Under these circumstances, economic assistance from the Western countries, the EU, and international fnancial organizations is gaining importance. Te Energy Challenge Energy remains a key short- and mid-term problem. Ukraine has been heavily dependent on supplies of Russian natural gas, bought at a high price (about $485 per thou- sand cubic meters). Eforts to escape Russias infuence will only be successful if it addresses its energy dependence. Current projects include reverse natural gas supplies from Europe, development of liquefed natural gas terminals, and securing alternative sources of energy, including domestic ones. For energy security to be achieved, such projects need to be complemented by the modernization of Ukrainian industry to make it more energy efcient. But while Ukraine needs sound and strategic energy projects, it also has to survive the coming winter with signifcantly lower supplies of gas from Russia and absent other sources 8 Ministry of Energy of Ukraine: Kiev Lost Billions of Dollars in the Crimea, http://ria.ru/ world/20140530/1010058684.html 9 Decline in Industrial Production in Ukraine Accelerated, http://www.bbc.co.uk/ukrai- nian/rolling_news_russian/2014/08/140818_ru_n_indystry_statistics.shtml 10 Infation Index in Ukraine, http://index.minfn.com.ua/index/inf/?2014 to supplement it. Te short-time goal must be to lower consumption, entailing energy-saving technologies in industry and shifing to electricity in house-heating. Ukraines Strategic Choices Ahead Since security issues have risen up the agenda, the ques- tion of Ukraines foreign policy strategy choice is becoming a key one. Most of the options available to the country imply not only alliance building, but also deep reforms in national security, defense, and economy. Tus, the foreign policy debate is becoming part of a broader political one and an important element of electoral campaigning. Te key area, where all possible solutions to the crisis will be tested, remains security. Te Ukrainian crisis requires short-term measures aimed at de-escalating the confict and long-term security arrangements. Te latter currently boil down to the four models outline below. Preserving Non-Bloc Status Neutral or non-bloc status, as a specifc form of non- alignment, has always been one of the key foreign policy options for Ukraine. Russian pressure and the desire of Ukrainian leaders to minimize the political costs that a serious security option such as joining NATO would have entailed have maintained the countrys non-aligned status. Te non-aligned status works well if security can be provided by other means, such as legal, normative, or The key area, where all possible solutions to the crisis will be tested, remains security. The Ukrainian crisis requires short- term measures aimed at de- escalating the confict and long- term security arrangements. 6 Policy Brief Europe Program organizational ones, and it is efective in an international environment in which countries compete to make absolute gains rather than relative ones and where the chances of military aggression are low. Tis does not apply to Ukraine, since it has been invaded by Russia. Non-alignment and/ or neutrality produces the highest level of risk for Ukraine in mid- and long-term. Even if non-aligned status could be maintained in exchange for signifcant concessions from Russia (with return of Crimea as the fundamental one), it would still be a risky choice as long as Russia maintains its policy of bullying and aggression. Such an option is supported by a diminishing minority of the population (28 percent for non-bloc status compared to 34 percent for NATO membership), 11 and only by two political parties, the Communists and former Party of Regions, neither of which are likely to make it into the next Parlia- ment. Formally introduced in 2010 in the Law on Basics of Internal and Foreign Policy of Ukraine, the non-bloc status is still in place. On August 28, 2014, the National Security and Defense Council recommended abandoning non-alignment. It took almost a month for Poroshenko to issue an order for the government, dated September 24, to prepare a draf law that would end Ukraines non-bloc status and create legal ground for possible NATO member- ship. Tis draf has been introduced into the Parliament, but has not been voted on so far. Finlandization Te option of Finlandization of Ukrainian foreign and security policy has surfaced as a result of the crisis. For Russia, this would be the second-best possible outcome afer Ukrainian non-alignment, and it is a very prob- able scenario in the face of Russian pressure. Te concept derives from the post-World War II experience of Finland, which opted to adapt its foreign policy by taking into account the interests of the Soviet Union. As a result, Finland stayed out of NATO and accepted annexation of parts of its territory. In return, it did not have to join the Warsaw Pact and was able to develop close ties with Euro- pean structures, eventually joining the EU. Finlandization in Ukraine has been, in fact, carried out from the moment the country announced European inte- gration as a priority in 2010 while remaining a non-aligned state. However, Russian active resistance to the Association 11 Democracy Initiatives Polls on Security Issues, http://www.dif.org.ua/ua/ polls/2014_polls/stavlen-bezpeki-.htm Agreement between Ukraine and the EU indicates that the concept is now understood diferently in the Kremlin. Russia sees Finlandization not only as the non-alignment of Ukraine with NATO, but also as it having the right to veto any signifcant Ukrainian foreign policy move. Tis updated version of Finlandization is unacceptable to Ukraine, as it keeps it dependent on a country that is now its aggressor. A sofer version allowing total freedom of action outside NATO could be a compromise, based on two preliminary conditions. First, restoring Ukraines terri- torial integrity, and second, additional multilateral security guarantees. Most pro-Western political parties, including Batkyvschina and Solidarnist, used to support this strategy (along with having a rhetoric of European integration), but the crisis made them shif to demanding NATO member- ship. Finlandization is seen as a possible compromise solution to the current crisis, and as such is still referred to by some politicians. It should be added that positions of political parties over security issues are ofen inconsistent and unstable, subject to shifs and fexibility. Bilateral Alliances with Strategic Partners A countrys security can be enhanced by improving bilat- eral relations with strategic partners, in particular against a specifc enemy and under certain structural conditions. Ukraine made such a decision in the 1990s when post- Soviet quasi-integration projects among former Soviet republics proved to be inefective. Lack of common stra- tegic vision was a main obstacle then, and it most likely remains one today. For example, Ukraines participation in the Commonwealth of Independent States, the GUAM Organization for Democracy and Economic Development, or the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Coopera- Russia sees Finlandization not only as the non-alignment of Ukraine with NATO, but also as it having the right to veto any signifcant Ukrainian foreign policy move. 7 Policy Brief Europe Program tion did not bring about the expected results in strength- ening the countrys security. While bilateral arrangements are quite problematic for ensuring Ukraines security, especially in what is now a dramatically changed strategic environment, they must surely be applied and strengthened as an additional path to security. Examples of existing bilat- eral strategic alliances should be kept in mind. Te likes of Israel, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, or Pakistan have all bet on alliances with the United States in the face of a high risk of regional instability and/or because they were confronted by a powerful neighboring adversary. Tese states are among worlds leaders in military spending, which seems to be a crucial component of this security approach. Poro- shenko has bet on a special partnership with the United States and tried to get the status of prioritized U.S. partner outside NATO for Ukraine. However, so far this seems unlikely to be achieved. Joining NATO More than at any other moment in Ukraines history, joining NATO meets its vital security interests. Taking part in the worlds most efective collective security orga- nization would help minimize hard and sof challenges. NATO membership would certainly be the best possible security enhancer for Ukraine, and it has increasing support among the population and the political class. As the experience of the former socialist states in Central and Eastern Europe shows, there is hardly a better way for a country like Ukraine to meet its numerous regional chal- lenges. However, Ukraine is much more vulnerable than these countries to Russian manipulation, especially with regard to contested territories and frozen conficts. U.S. President Barack Obama has said NATO keeps the door open 12 to Ukraine, and the Alliance has said that it would respect any Ukraines decision to try to join it. 13 Nonethe- less, much preparatory work should be done by Ukraine and NATO if this strategy is to become viable. Before acquiring enough freedom of maneuver to choose any of these security models, Ukraine will have to settle the ongoing confict in the east of the country. On September 5, a preliminary agreement was signed in Minsk estab- 12 Obama hints at NATO membership for Ukraine, urges military support, September 3, 2014, http://rt.com/news/184845-ukraine-obama-nato-membership/ 13 NATO Says It Would Respect Any Ukraine Decision to Try to Join Alliance, The Wall Street Journal, August 29, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/articles/nato-says-it-would- respect-any-ukraine-decision-to-try-to-join-alliance-1409324690 lishing a ceasefre and opening a window for a political solution. 14 However, neither of the parties seems satisfed with the compromise, which is thus seen by many as only a temporary agreement. If Russia aims at either creating a land corridor to the Crimea for itself or at freezing the confict in the Eastern Ukraine, its intervention in the country is far from over. Poroshenko, for his part, will have to come up with initiatives and huge resources to restore normal life in the eastern oblasts. Tat will require complex strategies of post-confict management and efective mechanisms of power-sharing. Dealing with the current situation will require the incoming government to address various issues at various levels at the same time. Te utmost goal remains to strengthen the state. Tis would require completing three interconnected tasks. First, a solution to the current crisis in the east must be found. An efective resolution to the confict may require a long process, and it also should be addressed as part of the broader task of making the state more efective. Democratization, power-sharing, and increasing economic competitiveness are still the best options for dealing with these issues. Second, Ukraine has to undergo deep structural trans- formations that address the political system, economic efciency, and the legal and court systems. Strength- ening the state is of critical importance, and most of this task is for Ukrainians to undertake themselves. No foreign aid will heal a corrupt and inefective state, but sound politics will. 14 Protocol on the results of consultations of the Trilateral Contact Group, signed in Minsk, September 5, 2014, http://www.osce.org/home/123257 NATO membership would certainly be the best possible security enhancer for Ukraine, and it has increasing support among the population and the political class. 8 Policy Brief Europe Program Te views expressed in GMF publications and commentary are the views of the author alone. About the Author Mykola Kapitonenko, Ph.D. is the Executive Director of the Center for International Studies, based in Kyiv, Ukraine. About the Europe Program Te Europe Program aims to enhance understanding of the challeng- es facing the European Union and the potential implications for the transatlantic relationship. Analysis, research, and policy recommen- dations are designed to understand the dichotomy of disintegration and deepening of the EU and to help improve the political, economic, fnancial, and social stability of the EU and its member states. In 2014, the Europe Program focuses on integration and disintegration in the EU, the deepening of the euro area, the changing role of Germany in Europe and the world, as well as challenges in the EUs neighborhood. About GMF Te German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) strengthens transatlantic cooperation on regional, national, and global challenges and opportunities in the spirit of the Marshall Plan. GMF does this by supporting individuals and institutions working in the transatlantic sphere, by convening leaders and members of the policy and business communities, by contributing research and analysis on transatlantic topics, and by providing exchange opportunities to foster renewed commitment to the transatlantic relationship. In addition, GMF sup- ports a number of initiatives to strengthen democracies. Founded in 1972 as a non-partisan, non-proft organization through a gif from Germany as a permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF maintains a strong presence on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has ofces in Berlin, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, Bucharest, and Warsaw. GMF also has smaller representations in Bratislava, Turin, and Stockholm. Finally, Ukraine has to defne its place and strategy within the European security system. Tis implies implementation of the Association Agreement with the EU, developing a new framework for relations with Russia, and enhancing its partnership with NATO. During this process, the West needs to remain close to Ukraine, and assist it through the many crises it faces. Increasing pressure on Russia to raise cost of its aggression and providing Ukraine with fnancial assistance during and afer reforms are where Western help will be most needed. A weak Ukraine is a security challenge for Europe. Te EU and the United States have understood, mostly, that success of Ukraine is also the success of Europe, and that the failure of Ukraine is the failure of Europe.