INDEX

1. Role of Safety Officers 1

1.1 Redefined Role of Safety Officers 1
2.0 Safety Performance - 2009-10 ; 2010-11 (Apr To Sep 2010) 1
2.1 Safety Performance during 2009-10 vis--vis 2008-09. 1
2.2 Safety Performance during April to September, 2010 2
2.3 Collisions and SPAD cases: 3
3.0 Train Accidents on Account of Failure of Railway Staff. 3
4.0 Accident Management 4
4.1 Ordering Excessive Number of ARTs 4
4.2 Delay in Ordering and Departure of ARTs/ARMEs/CRANES 4
4.3 Delays in Restoration of Traffic after Track/OHE Fit Subsequent to Train Accident. 4
5.0 Threshold Value for Damage - Classifying Serious Accidents 5
6.0 Preparation of Accident Manual and DM Plan 5
7.0 Draft Accident Manual of DFCCIL 5
8.0 Operating Rules for Train Operations 6
8.1 Powers of Zonal Railways to amend Unified SRs/ SRs. 6
8.2 Working Instructions for Manned LC Gates Powers to Railways 6
8.3 Change in Working Instructions for Manned LC on Double line: 7
8.4 Change of Normal Position of Manned Non-interlocked (Engineering & Traffic) Gates from
Closed to Road Traffic to Open to Road Traffic 8
8.5 Development of Level Crossing Gate Control Equipment using wire/wireless data
communication - Result of Field Trials. 8
8.6 Precautions for running of trains during fog 8
8.7 Working of Twin Single Line Delegation of Powers to Zonal Railways 8
8.8 Use of Walkie-Talkie Sets: 9
8.9 Shunting During Reception of Trains GR 5.16 9
I
8.10 Provision of Intermediate Block Signal on gradients: 9
8.11 Stabling of load on Main line with live Engine: 9
8.12 Exchange of all right signals between train crew and station staff on multiple line section: 9
8.13 Training of Traffic Staff 10
9.0 Vigilance Control Devices (VCD) on Locomotives 10
10.0 Safety/ Security Teams 10
11.0 Vacancy Status 11
12.0 Vision 2020 Safety Items Plans and Progress 11
13.0 Rail Accident Investigation Cell 12
14.0 LED Type Red Colour Light in Rear of Train 12
15.0 HS Lamp Specifications Trial 12
16.0 Tail Lamp- Problems Reported by Zonal Railways 12
17.0 Breathalyzer Integration in CMS with Biometric Identification 13
18.0 Drivers Biometric Vigilance & Telemetric Control Device 13
19.0 Overloading of Wagons 13
20.0 CADAT Installation 14
21.0 Assessment Centres 14
22.0 Guard/ Drivers Boxes Committee Formed by Board 14
23.0 Speed Guns to Detect Over- Speeding by Drivers. 16
24.0 Preparation of Accident Manual and DM Plan 16
25.0 Implementation of 10 Hour Duty 16
26.0 Equipment Failures 16
27.0 Relief and Restoration Equipment- ARMV/ART 16
II
27.1 Mock Trials/Drills 16
27.2 Review of Beats 16
27.3 Speed Potential of ARTs and 140 tonne BD Cranes 17
27.4 Composition of ARTs 17
27.5 Double Entry/Exit ARMV/ART Siding 17
27.6 Availability of diesel locomotives on electrified routes 17
28.0 SPAD Cases 17
29.0 Expenditure on Road Safety Works 18
29.1 Replacement of LC Gates with ROBs/RUBs 18
29.2 Replacement of LC Gates with Limited Height Subways 18
29.3 De-Manning of LC Gates having Low TVUs 18
29.4 Closure of LC Gates by diverting the traffic & Merging/Combining with adj. LC gates 19
29.5 Manning of Level Crossings 19
29.6 Provision of Lifting Barriers & Basic Infrastructure at LC Gates 19
29.7 Shifting of LC Gates outside Station Limits 20
30.0 Safety Issues of Signal & Telecommunications 20
30.1 Signal without light - failure of Power - Back-up Power Supply 20
30.2 Delay in Works of Track Circuiting, Panel / Route Relay / Electronic Interlocking 20
30.3 Installation of BPAC 20
30.4 Interlocking of Level Crossing Gates 21
30.5 Communication at Level Crossing Gates 21
30.6 Provision/Maintenance of Data Loggers 22
30.7 Provision of FOG-SAFE Device in locos 22
30.8 Exclusive Frequency for Walkie-Talkie/VHF sets for ASMs, Drivers and Guard etc. 22
30.9 Block Failures in SGE Block Instrument 23


III
Index of Annexures

Annexure No. Letter No. & Date Page No.
Annexure 1 Letter No. 2010/Safety(A&R)/3/16 dated 18.08.2010 1-4
Annexure 2 D.O letter no.2010/Safety (A&R)/3/19 dated 29.09.2010 5-10
Annexure 3 Letter no.2010/Safety (A&R)/3/19 dated 08.09.2010. 11-13
Annexure 4 CRBs D.O letter No.2010/Safety (A&R)/3/15 dated
09.08.2010.
14-15
Annexure 5 Boards letter No.2000/Safety (A&R)/19/20 dated 16.08.2010. 16-18
Annexure 6 Letter No.2010/Safety (A&R)/3/15 dated 28.09.2010 19-23
Annexure 7 Boards letter no. 2000/Safety (A&R)/19/20 dated 28.09.2010. 24-25
Annexure 8 letter No.2002/Safety (A&R)/19/29 dated 21.08.2009. 26-27
Annexure 9 Boards letter No.2009/Safety(A&R)/19/17, dated 29.09.2010. 28
Annexure 10 Letter No. 2010/Safety(A&R)/19/18, dated 18.08.2010. 29-30
Annexure 11 Letter No.2000/Safety (A&R)/19/39 Pt. dt 24.09.2010. 31-33
Annexure 12 Letter No.2000/Safety (A&R)/19/39 Pt. dated 15.12.2009. 34-35
Annexure 13 Letter No. 2000/Safety (A&R)/ 19/39/ Pt.dated 19.05.2010 36-38
Annexure 14 D.O No. 2008/Safety (A&R)/19/12 dated 31.05.2010 39-40
Annexure 15 Letter No.98/Safety (A&R)/19/16 dated 23.08.2010 41-49
Annexure 16 Letter No.98/Safety (A&R)/19/16 dated 25.08.2010 50-51
Annexure 17 Letter no 95/Safety-I/23/7 dated 12.07.2010 52-53
Annexure 18 Letter No. 2009/Safety(A&R) /19/29 dated 10.03.2010. 54-55
Annexure 19 Letter No. 2008/Safety (A&R)/19/5 dated 14.05.2010 56-57
Annexure 20 Letter No. 2008/Safety (A&R)/19/10 dated 24.03.2009 58-59
Annexure 21 Letter No.2009/Safety (A&R)/1/25 dated 10.09.2009 60
Annexure 22 Letter No.2009/Safety (A&R)/19/15 dated 06.08.2009 61
Annexure 23 Letter No. 2009/Safety-I/13/1 dated 19.5.2009 62-63
Annexure 24 Result of VCDs checking drive 64
Annexure 25 D.O. No.2009/Safety I/2/2 dated 29.07.2010 65
Annexure 26 Brief of Safety issues in Vision 2020 Documents. 66-67
Annexure 27 Letter No. 2010/Safety (A&R)/26/10 dated 13.07.2010 68-69
Annexure 28 Board's letter No.2009/Safety-I/23/2 dated: 16.09.2010 70
Annexure 29 Installation of Four CADAT centres one each in East, West,
North & South for conduct of psychological tests for high
speed drivers.
71
Annexure 30 Boards letter No.ERB-I/2010/23/21 dated 09.06.2010 72
Annexure 31 Letter No. 2010/Safety (DM)/Insp. Dated 07.09.2010 73-75
Annexure 32 Letter No.2010/Safety-I/11/2dated: 25.02.2010 76-77
I
Annexure No. Letter No. & Date Page No.
Annexure 33 Boards letter no.2005/Safety(DM)/Running staff duty dt.
6.9.2010
78-80
Annexure 34 Letter No. 2010/Safety(DM)/6/23 dt. 23.8.10 & No.96/M
(M&P)/175/3/A/T dt. 20.8.2010
81-82
Annexure 35 Boards leter No.99/M(M&P)/7/6 dt. 24.4.2003 83
Annexure 36 AM/ME's letter No. 99 M(M&P)/7/6 dated 24.09.99 84
Annexure 37 Boards letter No.2004/M(L)/466/710dt. 29.6.2010 85-86
Annexure 38 Boards letter No. 2010/Safety(A&R)/3/9 dt. 26.8.2010 87-88
Annexure 38-A Five Year Master Plan for Elimination of Un-manned LC 89
Annexure 39 Bd.s letter No. 2010/Safety (A&R)/3/9 dated 29.9.2010 90-91
Annexure 40 Boards letter No. 96/CE-I/LX/AC/6 dt. 31.5.1996 92
Annexure 41 Boards letter No. 2002/Sig/A/Misc. dated 25.09.2009, 28.7.10 93-94
Annexure 42 Letter No. 2009/Safety (A&R) /26/4 dated 11.8.10 95-97
Annexure 43 Position of block sections provided with BPAC. 98
Annexure 44 Position of level crossing gates interlocking. 98
Annexure 45 Board's letter No. 2000/Safety (A&R)/19/39Pt.II dated
27.09.2010.
99-101
Annexure 46 Boards letter No. 2009/Safety (A&R)/3/2 dated 24.9.2010. 102
Annexure 47 Position of data loggers installation. 103
Annexure 48 Board's letter No. 2010/Sig/SGF/12/Data Loggers dated 22nd
J uly 2010.
104-104A
Annexure 49 Letter No. 2009/Safety (A&R)/26/1 dated 12.8.10 and 13.8.10. 105-109
Annexure 50 Board's letter No.98/Safety (A&R)/19/16 dated 23.08.2010. 110-118
Annexure 51 Rly. Bd.s letter No. 2004/tele/WL/2/misc. dated 22.05.2007. 119-122
Annexure 52 Letter No. 2009/Safety (A&R)/19/29 dated 24.08.2010 123-125
Annexure 53 Letter No. 2009/Safety &Signal/26/2/Part file Dated
07.05.2010.
126
II
1. Role of Safety Officers
1.1 Redefined Role of Safety Officers
Each department on the Railways is responsible for safety in its own sphere of
working. The operating department has to issue rules for working of trains based on safety
parameters considered optimal, and it is no longer the domain of the Sr. DSOs/CSOs.
Tendency of the Operating Officers to pass on duties pertaining to Operating Safety
items to the Safety officers is to be curbed.
Safety officers have to monitor every department equally to ensure that the laid
down systems are being followed by all departments, including Operating Department.
Consequent upon the recommendations of the Railway Safety Review Committee,
1998, the Safety Organization has now been made multi-disciplinary. It is now required
to work more in an advisory role.
2.0 Safety Performance - 2009-10 ; 2010-11 (Apr to Sep 2010)
2.1 Safety Performance during 2009-10 vis--vis 2008-09
The number of consequential train accidents reduced in 2009-10 in comparison to
the previous year 2008-09 (162 during 2009-10 as against 177 in 2008-09) Category-wise
break-up of accidents is as under:-
Type of Accident 2008-09 2009-10
Collisions 13
(7.34%)
9
(5.56%)
Derailments 85
(48.02%)
80
(49.38%)
Manned Level Crossing
Accidents
7
( 3.95%)
5
(3.09%)
Unmanned Level Crossing
Accidents
62
(35.03%)
62
(38.27%)
Fire incidents 3
(1.69%)
2
(1.23%)
Miscellaneous 7
(3.95%)
4
(2.47%)
Total 177 162
Cause-wise analysis of accidents in 2009-10 reveals that railway staff failure
though decreased from 76 to 68, this constitutes 41.98% of the total accidents,
while Equipment failure constitutes 0.62% (1 case) of the total accidents in the
year.
1
Analysis of casualty in 2009-10 reveals that about 72% of the total fatalities were
at unmanned level crossing gates. (Out of total fatalities of 225, 161 fatalities
were at unmanned level crossing gates).
The details of Fatalities and Injuries in 2007-08, 2008-09 and 2009-10 are as
under:
Year Killed Injured
2007-08 191 412
2008-09 209 444
2009-10 225 385
2.2 Safety Performance during April to September, 2010
In the current financial year during April to September 2010, the number of
consequential train accidents has been 67 as against 69 during the corresponding period of
the previous year. Category-wise break-up of accidents is as under:-
Type of Accident April to September, 2009 April to September, 2010
Collisions 5 3
Derailments 35 41
Manned Level
Crossing Accidents
3 2
Unmanned Level
Crossing Accidents
24 20
Fire in Train 2 1
Miscellaneous - -
Total 69 67
The following Railways have shown an overall increase in accidents during April
to September 2010 over the corresponding period of the last year:-
Railway April to September
2009
April to September
2010
Difference
SCR 2 5 +3
ECoR 4 6 +2
SWR 2 4 +2
On ER, NR, NCR, NER, SER and WCR, consequential accidents increased during
April to September, 2010 by 1 each in comparison to the corresponding period of the last
year.
2
2.3 Collisions and SPAD cases
(i) 2009-10:
Out of 09 collisions in 2009-10, 7 collisions were solely due to negligence of
Loco Pilots (02 cases due to SPAD by Loco Pilots, 04 due to non-observance of
rules in Automatic Signalling Territory and in 01 case driver lost control over
engine during shunting), 1 due to failure of S&T (manipulation of signalling
gears) and 01 due to sabotage.
Most of the collisions (6 out of 9) have taken place in the Automatic Signalling
Territory.
In addition, 10 other cases of SPAD all due to fault of Loco Pilots were also
reported to have occurred during 2009-10 though these did not lead to accidents.
(ii) 2010-11 (April to September, 2010):
3 Collisions (Collision of Gyaneshwari Exp. on SER, Rear-end collision of Uttar
Banga Exp.with Vananchal Exp. on ER & Collision of Goods train with Indore-
Gwalior Intercity Express on WCR) took place during April to September, 2010
as against 5 during the corresponding period of the previous year.
SPAD cases The number of incidents of SPAD have shown a significant
increase. One of the major reasons noted is vulnerability on account of crews.
Out-of-beat crews booked.
If no earmarked/allotted crew is available, crew of the starting
station/yard (Division/Zonal Railways) is booked to perform duty. The
LR of such crews may not be there for the booked route; or they may
have performed only a very few trips on the section.
Inadequate trips on account of infrequent working of one Division/Zonal
Railways crews.
The number of such instances have increased over almost all Railways
consequent to one or two trains of other than the territorial jurisdiction
crew decided to work a few trains for the purpose of Equalization of
kilometres earned by crews between adjacent Railways.
3.0 Train Accidents on Account of Failure of Railway Staff
A review of the cause-wise analysis for the Consequential Train Accidents during
the last 8 years has revealed that, as a percentage, accidents on account of Failure of
Railway Staff constitute between 40 to 50% of the total number of accidents. Such a high
proportion on this account is a cause of concern despite the fact that in terms of numbers,
there is a reducing trend.
On the other hand, it is surprising that train accidents on account of Failure of
Equipment has come down to a negligible percentage of the total i.e 5% in the year 2002-
03 to less than 1% in the year 2009-10. During the year 2008-09, there was no accident on
account of equipment failure; and there was just one case of this account during the year
2009-10. The reasons for such low figures were gone into. It appears that the norms for
compilation of statistical data as recorded in the Manual of Statistical Instructions need a
review.
3
It is often the case that failure of equipment or assets precedes the human slip up.
Thus, the underlying cause of human failure never comes out as the root cause of the train
accidents. Care should be taken while reporting the cause of accidents as also during
accident inquires. For example, in case of an accident (derailment) on account of a weld
failure, the cause is presently attributed to Failure of Railway Staff. The staff
accordingly is held responsible on account of improper maintenance of rail, and for not
taking timely action either to detect the unsafe weld, or to replace the weld. This is not a
correct system of recording the cause of accident. In such cases, the cause of the Accident
should be on account of Failure of Equipment Pway.
A letter No. 2010/Safety(A&R)/3/16 dated 18.08.2010 (Annexure-1) addressed to
CSOs has been issued. COMs may also like to give their views, if any.
4.0 Accident Management
4.1 Ordering Excessive Number of ARTs
On some of the Zonal Railways it has been observed that more than the required
number of ARMEs/ARTs/Cranes are ordered subsequent to an accident. There have been
instances when as many as 3-4 ARTs have been ordered by Zonal Railways and
accordingly had to be returned even without reaching the accident site. Excessive
ordering of ARTs/ARMEs/Cranes results in undue congestion of accident site where
mobility is prime concern after an accident. The Block Stations adjacent to the site of
accident have to be kept free of any train or stabled load, as far as possible, so as to
provide faster clearance of re-railed wagons/coaches and facilitate reaching of urgently
required material/labour at the site. Prudence need to be observed by the Zonal Railways
keeping in view the objective of expeditious restoration and mobility/fluidity of the Block
Stations on either side of the accident site as also at the site itself.
A D.O letter no.2010/Safety (A&R)/3/19 dated 29.09.2010 (Annexure 2) from
MT/CRB addressed to all COMs regarding maintenance of mobility at and near the
accident sites is enclosed.
4.2 Delay in Ordering and Departure of ARTs/ARMEs/CRANES
Instances of delay in ordering and despatch of ARMEs/ARTs/Cranes subsequent to
an accident on some Zonal Railways is a matter of concern. Sometimes the delays in
ordering / departure have been much in excess of the laid down norms in the respective
Accident Manuals of the Zonal Railways.
The delays in ordering and dispatch of ARMEs/ARTs/Cranes result in delay in
reaching the relief and rescue machinery at the accident site and hampers the restoration
efforts. Sometimes, these delays invite adverse criticism by the public and the media.
A letter no.2010/Safety (A&R)/3/19 dated 08.09.2010 (Annexure 3) is enclosed in
this regard
4.3 Delays in Restoration of Traffic after Track/OHE Fit Subsequent to
Train Accident
Boards policy instructions regarding Reclassification of Accidents contained in
letter No. 2000/Safety (A&R)/19/20 dated 13.12.2000 has defined interruption to traffic in
Para 10(vii) as duration from the time of accident till starting of first train on line
clear from adjacent station for movement over the affected line in the section. It has
been decided vide CRBs D.O letter No.2010/Safety(A&R)/3/15 dated 09.08.2010
4
(Annexure 4) that the first train should be taken to mean a regular commercial train
(Goods or Passenger) to ensure the best utilization of the track consequent to dislocation
of traffic. Board has also laid down a time frame of 30 minutes within which the first
commercial train should start on line clear from adjacent station for movement over the
affected line. Cases of movement of Commercial Train after 30 minutes of fitness of
Track/OHE shall be categorized as delay in restoration of traffic vide Boards letter
No.2000/Safety(A&R)/19/20 dated 16.08.2010 (Annexure 5). In case, there is no
commercial train available to be run on that section after track fit/OHE fit, an exception
may be made at the level of COM who shall certify that there was no commercial train to
pass over the affected section within 30 minutes of track fit/OHE fit. Accordingly, para 4
(b) and para 10 (vii) of Boards letter dated 13.12.2000 mentioned above have been
amended to incorporate the above decision.
Vide Boards letter No.2010/Safety (A&R)/3/15 dated 28.09.2010 (Annexure 6)
COMs have been advised to incorporate these instructions in their Accident Manuals.
5.0 Threshold Value for Damage - Classifying Serious
Accidents
Serious Accidents, inter alia, involving loss to Railway Property exceeding Rs.
25 lakh were hitherto required to be reported to CRS as per section 113 and 114 of
Railways Act for conducting an inquiry by him or otherwise. Boards letter no.
2000/Safety (A&R)/19/20 dated 13.12.2000 on the subject has been amended to enhance
this value to Rs. 2 crore.
COMs have been advised vide Boards letter no. 2000/Safety (A&R)/19/20 dated
28.09.2010 (Annexure 7) to incorporate this provision in the Accident Manuals.
6.0 Preparation of Accident Manual and DM Plan
It has been laid down that the Accident Manual shall be prepared by the
Operating Department (COM) whereas Disaster Management Plan shall be prepared by
CSOs, vide letter No.2002/Safety(A&R)/19/29 dated 31.12.2008. The Accident Manual
shall have a relevant para on Disaster Management which shall be provided by the CSO
to COM.
Accident Manuals are required to be revised/reprinted and updated periodically,
at least once in 15 years, vide letter No.2002/Safety(A&R)/19/29 dated 21.08.2009
(Annexure 8). SCR have their Accident Manual which is more than 15 years old,
whereas Accident manual of ECoR and NCR is yet to be printed after formation of new
zones.
7.0 Draft Accident Manual of DFCCIL
A Draft Accident Manual to be used over DFC system has been submitted by
DFCCIL to the Railway Board for comments / suggestions. In the Draft Manual, DFCCIL
has mentioned about sharing of Relief / Rescue Equipments of the IR with the DFCCIL in
case of accidents, etc.
The availability of ART/ARME/Cranes at all times on the nominated locations of
the Divisions of IR is very essential, primarily to be in a state of preparedness at all times
to handle Train Accidents involving casualties to passengers on the existing IR system and
to restore through communication after accidents. Sharing of ART/ARME/ Cranes with
DFCCIL by IR may reduce their availability on IR.
5
The Zonal Railways (COMs/CMEs) may conduct a review as to whether they can
share the resources of existing ART/ARME/Cranes. They may send their comments to the
Railway Board.
In this regard Boards letter No.2009/Safety(A&R)/19/17, dated 29.09.2010
(Annexure 9) has been issued.
8.0 Operating Rules for Train Operations
8.1 Powers of Zonal Railways to amend Unified SRs/ SRs.
A review of the GRs and USRs issued in the past has revealed that broadly on
major issues, Railway Board has issued an amendment to the GR; on minor issues, Board
had advised Zonal Railways to issue USRs. The main reason of the practice/convention to
issue Unified Subsidiary Rules from Railway Board on issues of lesser importance was
to circumvent delays attendant with the protracted process involved in issue of a Gazette
Notification subsequent to an Amendment to the GR. For the last 2 years, however,
Safety Directorate, Railway Board, has modified this policy and has not issued any USR.
A new system of issue of Advance Amendment Slip to the GR as approved by Board
(MT) has been adopted. When the Gazette Notification is issued, the GR is finally
modified superseding the Advance Amendment Slip.
As a policy, it is now decided to have only GRs issued by Railway Board; and
SRs by Zonal Railways. As such the revised GR will not have any Unified SRs and the
Zonal Railways (Authorised Officers) shall continue to have powers to issue SRs.
A letter No. 2010/Safety(A&R)/19/18, dated 18.08.2010 has been issued
(Annexure 10).
8.2 Working Instructions for Manned LC Gates Powers to Railways
Detailed working instructions for Manned Level Crossing Gates were issued vide
letter No.2000/Safety(A&R)/19/39 dated 08.05.2002. The instructions were modified from
time to time. Some of the Zonal Railways faced difficulties in implementing these
instructions, especially those pertaining to Manned Non-interlocked Gates normally
Closed to Road Traffic.
A level crossing closed for long, once opened for road traffic, cannot be closed
again for passage of trains due to pressure of the large number of road vehicles held up.
This in effect reduces line capacity. A time has come when harassment to the Gateman
through pressure from irate road users held up for long periods at the LC gate needs to be
addressed. A system needs to be evolved for those manned non-interlocked level
crossings which are normally kept closed to road traffic, so that the road traffic can be
allowed to pass around every 20 minutes by opening the gate. Once the system is made
that the level crossing is opened around 20 minutes, the road traffic will not be able to
build up to an unmanageable level.
Some of the Railways have adopted a system which requires exchange of private
numbers between SM and the Gateman too many times especially at gates normally
Closed to Road Traffic. Due to this the SM is often not able to attend to the Gatemans
call seeking permission to open the gate. It is essential that the system is redesigned in
such a way that it becomes practicable for the SM to be able to respond to the call of the
Gateman on busy gates and also where the number of trains is large. To implement this,
the basis for framing revised Working Instructions for manned non-interlocked LC Gates
6
normally closed to road traffic (where either number of trains is more and/or there is heavy
road traffic) should be as under: -
As the gate is normally closed, the SM can dispatch (or give line clear for) the
train without every time exchanging a Private Number with the gateman. It can be safely
assumed by the SM that the Gate is normally kept closed by the Gateman, as for its
opening he has to take permission of the SM. The number of instances when a Private
Number is to be exchanged will be those occasions when the Gateman wants to open the
Gate to pass road traffic, and thereafter, after passing the road traffic when he has to
advise the SM of having closed the Gate.
While framing the detailed instructions for manned non-interlocked LC Gates
normally Closed to Road Traffic, the following broad principles may be kept in mind:-
(i) The instructions should enable the Gateman to open the gate at least every
20 minutes or so.
(ii) The number of transactions of exchange of private numbers between the
ASM and Gateman should be as less as possible, as detailed above.
(iii) Working instructions should suit the local conditions prevailing over the
section.
(iv) SWR of the respective stations and Gate Working Instructions of
concerned Gates should incorporate the provision of opening of Gates
around every 20 minutes.
With the approval of the Board (ME and MT) it has now been decided that the
Authorized Officers (COMs) of Zonal Railways may frame revised working instructions
for manned level crossing gates (non-interlocked, closed to road traffic) on their system on
the broad principles mentioned above, in consultation with the PCEs, depending upon
local conditions and the pattern of traffic. The COMs, in consultation with the PCEs, are
also empowered to frame Working Instructions for all type of manned level crossing gates,
whether interlocked or non-interlocked and normally open or closed to road traffic,
depending upon local conditions prevailing over their systems.
A letter No.2000/Safety (A&R)/19/39 Pt. dt 24.09.2010 is placed at (Annexure 11)
8.3 Change in Working Instructions for Manned LC on Double line
The working instructions for Manned Level Crossing Gates were modified to
authorize the gateman for opening of the gates (which have normal position Closed to
Road) after complete passage of train after observing tail board / tail lamp, for single line
sections, vide letter No.2000/Safety(A&R)/19/39 Pt. dated 18.08.2008.
Vide letter dated 15.12.2009 (Annexure 12), this provision has been extended to
double line sections also, provided the SM has not advised the gateman to keep the gate
closed for any other train from either direction under exchange of Private Number.
Besides, the gateman must ensure that conditions laid down in letter dated 18.08.08 are
fulfilled.
7
8.4 Change of Normal Position of Manned Non-interlocked
(Engineering & Traffic) Gates from Closed to Road Traffic to Open to
Road Traffic
At present Manned Non-interlocked LC Gates with TVUs less than 25000 are
generally supposed to have their normal position as closed to road traffic. However, on
sections which have low level of road traffic, it is difficult to keep the gate closed for long
durations due to build up of road traffic and pressure on the Gatekeeper. It has been
decided that at LC Gates where trains are less (say up to 14 or so in 24 hours period) the
Zonal Railways may decide to keep the normal conditions of gate as Open to Road
Traffic regardless of TVUs as advised vide Boards letter No. 2006/CE-I/LX/WP dated
07.05.2010.
This letter is enclosed with letter No. 2000/Safety (A&R)/ 19/39/ Pt.dated
19.05.2010, (Annexure 13).
8.5 Development of Level Crossing Gate Control Equipment using
wire/wireless data communication - Result of Field Trials
As a trial measure, Level Crossing Gate equipments for automatic exchange of
Private Numbers between ASM and Gateman were installed on NFR, NCR, SR, SECR
and SCR. Board (MT) had desired a feedback on the working of the system which is
awaited.
D.O No. 2008/Safety (A&R)/19/12 dated 31.05.2010 (Annexure 14) is enclosed.
8.6 Precautions for running of trains during fog
Detailed guidelines regarding precautions to be observed during the foggy weather
have been issued vide letter No.98/Safety (A&R)/19/16 dated 23.08.2010 (Annexure 15)
and a corrigendum dated 25.08.2010 (Annexure 16).
The Railways should ensure adequate availability of detonators, lime marking
across the track, painting of signaling warning, W/L boards, fog signal posts, availability
of adequate staff for placement of detonators, control of speed of the train by loco pilot
during fog depending upon brake power, road and visibility. It is essential that the
prescribed VTO is identified specially in the Station Working Rules; as also in certain
specific conditions it is physically provided at a distance of 180 meters from the place
where the ASM will stand to observe it . The VTO may be used to determine the onset of
fog.
Training of staff (crews and supervisors- TIs/LIs etc.) has to be ensured.
Availability of crews has to be increased by completing the refresher/PME etc. by
15.12.2010; no crew to be on stationary duty in this period.
8.7 Working of Twin Single Line Delegation of Powers to Zonal
Railways
Proposals for introduction of Twin Single Line working were hitherto referred by
Zonal Railways to Railway Board for approval separately in each case. This led to
avoidable delays. Board has now delegated the powers to introduce Twin Single Line
Working to Zonal Railways, with certain safety precautions. These are mentioned in letter
no 95/Safety-I/23/7 dated 12.07.2010 (Annexure 17).
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8.8 Use of Walkie-Talkie Sets
The revised instructions on use of Walkie-Talkie Sets have been issued vide letter
dated 10.03.2010 (Annexure 18). In case a train has come to an out of course halt in
Automatic Signalling Territory between two stations, and is not in a position to move
ahead and requires a train engine, Guard of that train can guide the crew of relief engine
over walkie-talkie sets/VHF, except in suburban territories.
Use of WT sets has been permitted in exceptional cases for exchange of signals
between LP and Guard when it is not possible to exchange the signals physically due to
length of a train. This can be done to Dispatch/Start a train from station and for trains
stopped at curvatures/tunnels in mid section.
8.9 Shunting During Reception of Trains GR 5.16
Some Zonal Railways had pointed out that shunting may be permitted upto a Stop
Shunt Signal short of Points over which an incoming train is scheduled to pass at major
yards. Zonal Railways have been authorized to provide operational flexibility by inserting
suitable SRs to GR 5.16 with certain safety precautions. This Supervised Shunting shall
not exceed 15 kmph and can be carried out upto a Stop Shunt Signal (or upto a relevant
signal if no Shunt Signal is provided) even towards points over which an incoming train is
to pass. This shall not contravene GR 5.16 (as it is actually only up to the shunt signal) in
anyway. A letter No. 2008/Safety (A&R)/19/5 dated 14.05.2010 (Annexure 19) has been
issued.
8.10 Provision of Intermediate Block Signal on gradients
Provision of Intermediate Block Signal on gradients upto 1 in 80 has been
permitted. Para 7.169 of SEM (Par-I) is now applicable for IBS also in addition to
Automatic Signalling. This implies that IBS shall not be provided on sections with heavy
and continuous falling gradients steeper than 1 in 80, unless the brake power of trains on
the section is adequate to enable the trains being stopped at the IBS.
Similarly Note (f) to item No. 2, of Chapter II Station Yard of schedule-I has
also been amended accordingly. This implies that maximum permissible gradients in
station yards as mentioned in Item 2 of Chapter II of Schedule Dimensions i.e. 1 in 400
(existing works) and 1 in 1200 (new works) do not apply to IBS as no station section
exists therein. (Letter No. 2008/Safety (A&R)/19/10 dated 24.03.2009 (Annexure 20).
8.11 Stabling of load on Main line with live Engine
No restrictions on stabling of load on main line with live engine can be imposed at
stations with gradients between 1 in 400 and 1 in 1200. Special precautions are required
only at those stations which are on gradients steeper than 1 in 400. It has been clarified
that the matter is within the purview of zonal railways and they should approach
concerned CRS if any restriction is imposed by him. The matter has been clarified vide
letter No.2009/Safety (A&R)/1/25 dated 10.09.2009 (Annexure 21).
8.12 Exchange of all right signals between train crew and station staff on
multiple line section
It has been laid down that any competent duly authorized staff can be nominated
by SM to exchange all right signal with the train running through from the off-side. Such
competent staff can even be a class IV Railway employee duly trained to do the jobs such
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training can be imparted in the Divisional Traffic Training schools/Centres (DTTCs).
Even traffic gateman can be authorized to exchange all right signals on multiple line
section in case a manned traffic gate is available on the off-side in the vicinity of the point
zone. Detailed guidelines have been issued to formulate SRs under relevant GRs. The SR
will then facilitate that such a provision is made in the Station Working Rules of the
Station letter No.2009/Safety (A&R)/19/15 dated 06.08.2009 (Annexure 22).
8.13 Training of Traffic Staff
Zonal Railways have been advised to depute their training managers to visit
nominated ZRTIs frequently and sort out the problems faced by the faculty and trainees at
ZRTIs vide letter No. 2009/Safety-I/13/1 dated 19.5.2009 (Annexure 23). Latest systems
deployed in the field like FOIS, ICMS, UTS, Data Loggers, BPAC, SSI/EI, etc. are not
available to the trainees for familiarization. A provision should be kept in the estimates of
these projects to cater for the requirement of Model Rooms in all ZRTIs.
9.0 Vigilance Control Devices (VCD) on Locomotives
In the year 2009-10, 10 SPAD cases were reported and in the current year from
April to 25
th
August, 5 SPAD cases took place, all due to the fault of Loco Pilots. Board
has decided for provision of Vigilance Control Device (VCD) in all locomotives. A two
day long drive was conducted to find out the working of VCD on locomotives. The results
are placed at Annexure-24. Out of 4395 numbers of VCDs provided 3958 were found in
working conditions.
Presently, Vigilance Control Device exists on some Diesel locos and on all 3 phase
Electric locomotives. After successful trial of this device in 30 conventional Electric
locomotives, it has been decided to install this device in all conventional Electric
locomotives. This has also been installed on 1500 diesel locomotives and it has been
decided to install it in the remaining diesel locomotives in a phased manner.
However, the effectiveness of the working of the device in the locos where this has
been installed needs to be closely monitored. A number of Loco Pilots have isolated this
device during run; as also as its functioning was not satisfactory. Zonal Railways may
conduct a drive at Divisional level to check whether the device is in working condition or
not, where provided.
10.0 Safety/ Security Teams
Honble MR has once again expressed her concern over the recent accidents which
have resulted in large number of casualties. Vide D.O. No.2009/Safety I/2/2 dated
29.07.2010 (Annexure 25), General Managers have been advised that all SAG officers at
the headquarters of the departments eligible to be posted as DRM/ GMs (Civil, Engg. S&T,
Electrical, Safety, Operating, Mechanical, Accounts, Stores, as also those working in the
Construction Organization) may be utilized to conduct inspections and look into allotted
areas so as to effect improvement in safety in train operations.
These officers may be directed to carry out inspections on all safety items
including the following:
(i) Two night inspections per month at road-side stations; LC gates or on Footplate.
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(ii) Regular day inspections of maintenance practices of all departments, which may
include working of crew; visit to running rooms; Crew lobbies, Surprise checks of
crew by mobile breathalyzer equipments.
(iii) Ambush checks at unmanned level crossings with Police.
(iv) Check on working of Vigilance Control Devices on Locos, where provided.
11.0 Vacancy Status
The recruitment process through RRBs has been streamlined. One of the RRBs has
been made the nodal agency to conduct exams of a particular category. It has been decided
to hold such exams on one particular day throughout India.
The vacancy status now requires immediate action before safety gets affected.
There were 89,024 vacancies in safety category on 01.0.2009 which have increased further
to 1,03,667 as on 01.04.2010. A lot of questions have also been raised in Parliament on
this issue.
12.0 Vision 2020 Safety Items Plans and Progress
The road map for the progress of Indian Railways into the future has been
presented to the Lok Sabha in the form of Vision 2020 document. Honble MR has now
directed that each department should make out detailed plans for implementing the targets
laid down in Vision 2020. She has asked for a well coordinated, detailed, year-wise
implementation plan, encompassing all major activities for achieving the targets,
indicating the annual requirement of funds as well.
Every department defines its own parameters for function, legislates procedures
and checks to be followed in the implementation of working systems. Therefore selection
of technology, manpower improvements (training and HRD), equipment modernization
and deciding targets on above, etc. for the required infrastructural inputs, may be prepared
by the respective PHODs on each Zonal Railway and submit details to respective
directorate in Railway Board. A brief of Safety issues mentioned in Vision 2020
Documents are enclosed in Annexure-26. COMs may like to prepare an Action Plan on
items pertaining to them.
The Vision 2020 Document prepared by the Railway Board has very ambitious
targets/ goals. Every effort is required by all departments as also by Zonal Railways to
work towards it. However, if any Zonal Railway has any reservation on these goals/
targets the same may be put across by them to their GM, expressing difficulty and
indicating help required from the respective departments. If, however, even the GMs feel
that the goals in one or two cases are not achievable the Board may be advised accordingly
with full justification.
It was mentioned that Vision 2020 document aims at zero failure of equipments.
CSOs mentioned that while there will be failure of equipments; we may aim at zero
accidents on account of equipment failures.
Faster restoration to traffic after an accident is equally important and zonal
railways should improve their preparedness.
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13.0 Rail Accident Investigation Cell
In J une 2010, Board (CRB) has approved for setting up of a Rail Accident
Investigation Cell (RAIC) in IRITM to compile and index accident inquiry reports, cause
wise accident, etc. in order to train officers to conduct Train Accident Inquires.
All CSOs have been informed vide letter No. 2010/Safety (A&R)/26/10 dated
13.07.2010 (Annexure 27) to help prepare a knowledge bank through data base of train
accidents in the last 10 to 12 years. COMs may also take note of it.
14.0 LED Type Red Colour Light in Rear of Train
A suggestion has been received from Northern Railway that LED type Red colour
light may be provided (on the SLRs) in the rear of passenger trains. The guard will switch-
ON the LED Red light in the event of foggy weather or during any unscheduled halt or a
derailment to indicate a danger signal to any train that would follow.
Another suggestion is regarding lime powder mixed in water is sprayed on the ballast
across the track to indicate the presence of an approaching level crossing or signal, etc.
Nowadays coloured flashing type Reflectors and Blinkers are used on the highways to
indicate curves or give directions of the road onwards and of the dividers. On a similar
pattern, Blinkers and Reflectors of suitable colour may be planned on Railways to indicate
position of oncoming level crossings, signals, etc. Railway Board vide letter
No.2009/Safety-I/23/2 dated: 16.09.2010 (Annexure 28) has advised COMs to ponder on
the above suggestions.
15.0 HS Lamp Specifications Trial
RDSO vide letter dated 29.04.2010 has advised General Managers that Signal
Directorate of RDSO has cleared for procurement of 750 numbers LED based torch light
cum flashing Hand Signal Lamps by each of the Zonal Railways from any of the vendors
approved by Signal Directorate (RDSO) for field trials.
There is an urgency that we complete this exercise before the onset of the next
foggy season. Zonal Railways may expedite procurement of newly developed HS lamps
and advise its performance to RDSO for any further improvement /revision in the
specification.
16.0 Tail Lamp- Problems Reported By Zonal Railways
It is noted that zonal railways have reported the problems in the Tail Lamps
procured according to RDSO specifications. RDSO has stated that to overcome the
problems reported by zonal Railways in the supplies of Tail Lamps, vendor development
may be carried out which will ensure the quality of the product.
In a similar case, RDSO had earlier obtained the samples of HS lamps procured by
the Zonal Railways and tested them. It was found that those did not conform to the RDSO
specifications to the full. Further, based on the feedback received from the zonal Railways
and its analysis, RDSO improved the specification again.
RDSO has been advised that similar exercise may be carried out for the Tail
Lamps also. The problems reported by the zonal Railways may be analyzed by RDSO and
changes in specification, if any, may be accordingly made. RDSO may test the samples, if
considered so. Recently by a gazette notification, the requirement of flashing amber colour
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in tail lamp has been removed. RDSO may therefore examine the required changes in
specification. Vendor development may be looked into thereafter.
17.0 Breathalyzer Integration in CMS together with Biometric
Identification Device (Thumb Imprint + Photo)
Integration of breathalyzer equipment in computerized CMS is under consideration
for quite some time. CRIS has to prepare the standards of interface as Board (MT) has
approved the above to make the system foolproof, photographing of the signing-on crew
also needs to be integrated in CMS. CAO (FOIS) has been advised to get specification
prepared and carry out the works.
During the GMs conference on 12.01.2010, the subject was discussed and it was
emphasized that in order to reduce the Train Accidents on account of human failures,
integration of Breathalyzer Equipments in CMS should be expedited. CRIS had earlier
confirmed that efforts are on to integrate the Breathalyzer equipment alongwith bio-metric
identification of signing-on crew in CMS. Some trials were also being conducted at GZB
crew lobby. COMs may like to watch on the implementation of Crew Management
System software by CRIS at crew lobbies on their Railways.
18.0 Drivers Biometric Vigilance & Telemetric Control Device
On 29-04-2009, in a miscreant activity at Chennai Southern Railway, an
unauthorized person entered the cab of an EMU train (around 05:00 hours) and drove it for
few kilometers and collided head-on with 350 UP pilot goods train at Veyasarpadi J eeva
station. To prevent such accidents, Electrical dte in Board has approved of a trial with a
Drivers Vigilance through Biometric Control Device. In this system, the driver wears a
device of the size of the wrist watch strapped to his wrist. The device measure short
interval variation in the electrodermal parameter of skin and communicate through
wireless to a monitoring device in the locomotive cab.
The data is interpreted to find if the driver is inside the locomotive and alert or not.
It is claimed that the system is capable of giving warning about a minute before the driver
is likely to dozeoff and applies brake if the driver does not acknowledges the alarm to
him. If the driver leaves the locomotive with the device strapped on his wrist, the
locomotive will not function till the driver with the device returns in cab. The will ensure
that the locomotive can be driven only in the physical and alert presence of the authorized
person.
The purchase order has been placed on a firm M/s Neurocom, Moscow Russia.
Above system is to be tried on ten electric locos each on ECoR and SCR. It is learnt
through CSO/ SCR that the device has been put under trial. However, there have been
instances of false alarm by the devices which is under examination. Such devices have not
yet been installed on ECoR. Having too many alarm system (devices) on the loco may
become counter productive and cause distraction to the LP/ ALP. Zonal Railway may
check if any similar trial is planned for diesel locos or not.
19.0 Overloading Of Wagons
CAG in its audit of Corporate Safety Plan works has pointed out that there is
overloading of wagons to the tune of 20% of those weighed on wayside weighbridges.
Now that the permitted loading has been increased to CC+8t, it is learnt that except iron-
ore and manganese, no other item can be overloaded due to dimension constraints of
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wagons. SER had advised overloading of wagons to the tune of 25% in the year 2008-09.
This figure has drastically reduced to 3% in 2009-10. It is suspected that reporting of SER
on the wagons found overloaded may be incorrect.
Zonal Railways may review the extent of over-loading detected at wayside weigh-
bridges.
20.0 CADAT Installation
In pursuance of recommendation No. 308 of RSRC-1998, a new Computer-aided
Test Scheme (CADAT) for screening of High Speed Train Drivers has been developed
and introduced w.e.f. September 2006 at RDSO. As all the Zonal Railways sent their
drivers to RDSO for the Aptitude Test for the High speed Train running, precious man
days were lost in transit for conduct of psychological tests for the selection of high speed
train drivers. Decentralization of CADAT was therefore required for saving man-hours
lost even though the number of drivers that need to undergo the test is small
It was accordingly decided that:
i) Four CADAT centres one each in East, West, North & South (Annexure 29)
will be established in addition to one at RDSO for conduct of psychological
tests for high speed drivers.
ii) RDSO shall be the agency to procure CADAT systems for setting up the
CADAT centres.
iii) CADAT centres will merge with psychological test Assessment centres when
these are established.
All the CADAT centres have been commissioned in March 2010. All other
procedures and norms of existing CADAT test remain unchanged. COMs may also take
note of it and review the system adopted.
21.0 Assessment Centres
Proposal for setting up of 8 such Assessment Centres at an estimated cost of
Rs.12.21 Cr at. Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata, Chennai, Secunderabad, Guwahati, Gorakhpur
and RDSO (Lucknow) has been sanctioned in the Supplementary Budget in Nov 2008.
Board vide letter no. 2004/Safety-I/8/1/4 dated 03.12.2008 has advised COMs of the
Railways where the Assessment Centres have to come up, to nominate a SAG Traffic
officer (other than CSO), who deals with operating safety rules, etc., to work as the Nodal
Officer to co-ordinate with RDSO. The respective COMs may also in the meanwhile
strengthen the class IV and class III staff in the Assessment Centres so as to be able to
undertake the workload.
The detailed specification for the procurement of modules for computerized
Aptitude Test is being prepared by RDSO. Tenders are likely to be floated by December
2010 and concluded by March 2011. COMs may extend help to RDSO in preparing the
estimates for Civil and E&M works at the assessment centre locations on their Railways
and ensure timely readiness of the locations.
22.0 Guard/ Drivers Boxes Committee formed by Board
A Committee has been formed vide Boards letter No.ERB-I/2010/23/21 dated
09.06.2010 (Annexure 30) to study the issues regarding replacement of Drivers and
Guards boxes with bags/briefcases.
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DG/ RDSO vide his letter dated 06.07.2010 has sent a report to Board on a study
conducted by Traffic Directorate of RDSO for rationalization of items for personal stores
of train crew and their carriage in light weight container. As a result of rationalization it is
possible to carry guards equipment in a trolley type suitcase and drivers equipment in a
canvas bag.
GR 4.9 prescribes certain equipments which driver and guard are required to
necessarily carry while on duty as his personal equipment. RDSO in its report has given
details about provisions as per GR, guards personal store, brake van equipment, drivers
personal store and items provided in locomotive cabs. RDSO has carried out the field
study on the items actually being carried by drivers and guards and made following
suggestions:
RDSO Suggestions for changes in guard box equipment.
(i) First aid box to be made an item of brake van equipment of Mail /Express/
Passenger guards.
(ii) Alternatively this item can be provided by station masters of the originating
station and stowed in the cupboard together with portable control telephone,
fire extinguishers, etc.
(iii) Small almirah may be provided in the brake van of passenger carrying trains
and freight trains to house rule books and stationery items.
(iv) Vacuum gauge may be removed from the personal equipment and issued to the
guard of vacuum trains at the lobby and deposited back at the lobby.
(v) As GR 4.16 - 1(a) permits an unlit red painted tail lamp. Therefore, an unlit red
painted tail lamp may be used during the day and same can be used by lighting
during the night. This will save carrying of tail board.
(vi) Torch cum Hand signal lamp, as per revised specification will way around 600
gms, excluding battery. Such a hand signal lamp may be provided by station
master of originating station alongwith other equipments. The guard only
carries the dry cells with him.
(vii) Flashing LED based HS lamp eliminates the requirement of fusee.
(viii) Only relevant extract rule books may be carried by the guards.
(ix) Complaint and suggestion books of smaller size with less number of pages will
reduce the weight.
(x) Use of telescopic type light weight aluminum sticks in the red and green flags
will reduce the weight.
RDSO Suggestion for drivers box
(i) A suitable small almirah in the loco may house tool box, rule books and
stationery. This will reduce driver box by about 4.5 kg.
(ii) Trolley type light weight suitcase for guards and canvas bag for drivers is
suggested in lieu of heavy weight steel box. The life of these is assessed as 3
years.
Director (Safety)-III during his inspection of KRCL has noted that Loco Pilots,
Assistant Loco Pilots and Guards have been provided with Brief cases and there are no
box porters on KRCL. Vide Letter No. 2010/Safety (DM)/Insp. Dated 07.09.2010
(Annexure 31). CSOs have been advised to examine emulation of such a practice on their
Railway. COMs may also like to ponder over it.
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23.0 Speed Guns to Detect Over-Speeding by Drivers
Vide letter No.2010/Safety-I/11/2dated: 25.02.2010 (Annexure 32), Zonal
Railways were informed that in order to monitor that the Loco Pilots are following
prescribed speed limits, Allahabad Division of NC Railway has procured hand held
portable speed measuring device (nicknamed Speed Gun). With this device, the speed of
the trains can be measured from a distance with a view to check the over-speeding by
Loco Pilots especially during fog. This will help in preventing SPAD cases & Collisions.
Board (MT) has expressed his keenness that the Speed Gun may be quickly
procured on each Zonal Railway. COMs may like to impress upon the TRO organization
to procure these equipments and carry out surprise checks.
24.0 Preparation of Accident Manual and DM Plan
The Accident Manuals is prepared by the Operating Department (COM) whereas
Disaster Management Plan is prepared by CSO. The Accident Manual should have a
relevant para on Disaster Management which shall be provided by the CSO to COM.
25.0 Implementation of 10 Hour Duty
Position needs improvement on the following Railways. ECR, ECoR, NCR, SCR,
SER, SECR and SWR
Details are as per Boards letter no.2005/Safety(DM)/Running staff duty dt.
6.9.2010 (Annexure 33). Railways may furnish the action plan to bring down these cases
as working for long hours at a stretch adversely affects the performance of Loco Pilots.
26.0 Equipment Failures
The position of equipment failures is compiled in the Railway Board based on
GMs MCDO. The number of failures reported are much less than the figures in the
ICMS. COMs may get these figures reconciled.
The System of reporting equipment failures needs review at Zonal Railways level.
27.0 Relief and Restoration Equipment- ARMV/ART
27.1 Mock Trials/Drills
Conducting mock drills is very important for checking the preparedness of our own
ARMVs/ ARTs. For maintenance and Mock Drills of 140 Tonne Cranes, instructions have
been issued to Zonal Railways (GMs & CSOs) vide letter No. 2010/Safety(DM)/6/23 dt.
23.8.10 & No.96/M (M&P)/175/3/A/T dt. 20.8.2010 (Annexure 34).
27.2 Review of Beats
As per recommendation No. 56 of HLC on DM, an exercise was to be undertaken
to review, rationalize, relocate ARMVs and ARTs to address the aberrations, if any, by
way of unreasonable clusters or long gap in their existing placements.
COM may like to review this item especially with completion of Gauge
Conversion and New Line Projects there may be a need to review this periodically.
16
Railways may advise and confirm that their sections have been adequately covered by the
beats of either their own ARMVs/ARTs or that of adjoining Railways.
27.3 Speed Potential of ARTs and 140 tonne BD Cranes
Mechanical directorate have instructions vide Boards leter No.99/M(M&P)/7/6 dt.
24.4.2003 (Annexure 35) for making fit all ARTs and 140 tonne BD cranes for the speed
of 100 Kmph. Railway may confirm that their ARTs and BD cranes are fit to run at 100
kmph.
27.4 Composition of ARTs
A longer composition of ART creates operational problems in backing/shunting etc.
It may result in a longer lead for material to be moved to reach the site of Accident.
AM/ME had advised vide letter No. 99 M(M&P)/7/6 dated 24.09.99 ( Annexure 36) that
the maximum composition of A Class ARTs should not exceed 8 in case of electrified
sections and 7 on other sections. However some of Railways are still having 8-18
vehicles in their ARTs.
Railways may confirm that their A Class ARTs are as per the stipulated
composition.
27.5 Double Entry/Exit ARMV/ART Siding
Conversion of single entry/exit sidings into double entry/exit sidings needs to be
undertaken on priority wherever possible. Railways may advise sidings identified for
conversion and the progress thereof.
27.6 Availability of diesel locomotives on electrified routes
Zonal railway must ensure that there should not be any inordinate delay in turning
out ARMVs/ARTs on account of non-availability of diesel locomotives. Individual
railways, therefore, need to check, plan and confirm the availability of diesel locomotives
near or at locations where their ARMVs/ARTs are based. In the recent accident cases, it
was observed that few ARTs/ARMEs were sent by Electric Locos which caused delay .
Adv TT (M) has issued instructions vide Boards letter No.2004/M(L)/466/710dt.
29.6.2010 (Annexure 37) which may be followed.
Zonal Railways may also check as to whether the 140 Tonne/crane is stabled
along with ART or kept on a separate line/depot.
28.0 SPAD Cases
The broad principle of allocation of beats of crews is the ownership of the major
portion of the crew run on a particular Railway. However, exceptions have been made for
Km equalization, when crew of one/two train per day have been earmarked to work on
adjoining Zonal Railway.
It has been observed that a large percentage of SPAD cases are due to:-
(a) Out of beat working of crews.
(b) Crew working on other territory on rare occasion.
(c) Maximum cases are during train working of 000-0800 hrs
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29.0 Expenditure on Road Safety Works
The expenditure on Road Safety Works in the last few years on Indian Railways
has been much less than the Budget allotment. This indicates less priority given by Zonal
Railways on Road Safety Works under plan head 29 and 30. The performance of almost
all the Zonal Railways has not been up to the mark. The total expenditure in ROB/RUB
and Level Crossings works in the year 2009-10 was 54.6% and 49% of budget allotment
respectively.
The Railway receives funds for Safety Works related to Level Crossings and ROBs
from Central Road Fund (CRF) @ 12.5% of 50% of Diesel cess and of 100% of Petrol
cess (Rs.1.50 per litre). Railways inability to spend money allocated from CRF may lead
to less allotment in future, therefore, it was emphasised that the funds allotted to Railways
from CRF for Safety Works of LCs and ROBs should be utilized fully. For ROB/RUBs
under Plan Head 29 the outlay for year 2010-11 is Rs.1000 Crores, and for Level
Crossing Works under Plan Head 30 it is Rs. 700 Crores for all over Indian Railways and
expenditure upto Aug10 is only Rs.269 crores .
It is advisable that adequate speed restriction and traffic blocks are granted as and
when demanded to expedite the utilisation of funds allocated for Road Safety Works.
29.1 Replacement of LC Gates with ROBs/RUBs
In 2009-10, a total of 120 ROBs/RUBs had been targeted out of which only 80
have been completed The progress of construction of ROBs/RUBs is not satisfactory.A
total of 787 ROBs/RUBs works have been sanctioned as on 01.04.2010 over Indian
Railways under cost sharing. . There are total 1421 ROB/RUB works sanctioned under all
heads i.e. Cost Sharing, Deposit, BOT, GC/New Line/Doubling, NHAI
(787+174+47+50+363) as on 01.04.2010. Railways needs to focus more as a large
number i.e. 146 of ROBs/RUBs are targeted in 2010-11 under cost sharing and only 37 are
completed till Aug10.
The work involved is clearly gigantic. It is advisable that adequate speed
restriction and traffic blocks are granted as and when demanded to expedite these works.
29.2 Replacement of LC Gates with Limited Height Subways
At present, 1525 locations have been identified to be replaced by Limited Height
Subways over Indian Railways. Out of these, 740 Nos. have been sanctioned as on
01.09.2010 and 211 Nos. are targeted to be constructed in the year 2010-11. The progress
is only 49. Railways need to focus more as a large number of Limited Height Subways are
targeted in 2010-11.
The powers of the GM have recently been revised to sanction limited sub-ways in
lieu of level crossings and increased to Rs.2.5 crore. Some of the Railways have done
encouraging work on this; others have yet to improve. Boards letter No.
2010/Safety(A&R)/3/9 dt. 26.8.2010(Annexure 38) may be looked into in this regard.
29.3 De-Manning of LC Gates having Low TVUs
With the decision taken to man all unmanned level crossings, it is imperative now
to do away with LCs with very low level of TVUs. Efforts should be made to identify LC
gates having low TVUs and to impress upon the State Govt. Authorities to reduce the
number of unmanned level crossings. Zonal Railways are not taking adequate initiative
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for de-manning of level crossings probably due to reluctance of State Government
Authorities to give consent. Railway need to make more efforts for De- manning of LCs.
The identified numbers is 1845 and progress is only 200 upto 01.09.10.
29.4 Closure of LC Gates by diverting the traffic and Merging/Combining
with adjacent LC gates
There has been emphasis on closure of LC Gates by diverting the traffic and
merging/combining of unmanned level crossings to adjoining level crossings. Zonal
Railways were advised to approach official of Panchayat and District Administration with
definite action plan indicating the gates in close proximity within a km or so which can be
closed by diverting road traffic to an adjoining gate for which even a small stretch of road,
if required may be acquired. Once TVUs are merged and sufficient TVUs are arrived at,
even up-gradation of some of those remaining gates may become justifiable and the
advantage thus gained should be explained to the local authorities. Railway may have to
acquire land for diverting the road traffic. At present, a large number of LCs are
sanctioned to be closed by merger on Indian Railways. Railway needs to focus more on
closure of LCs. The identified number is 986. The progress is only 16 as given by Zonal
Railways.
COMs may closely monitor the progress of closure of LC Gates by diverting the
traffic and Merging/Combining of LC Gates.
Five Year Master Plan for elimination of Unmanned Level Crossing (other than
cattle and canal crossing) is at Annexure 38 A.
29.5 Manning of Level Crossings
The Writ Petition (Civil) No. 162 of 2001 was filed by the Consumer Education
and Research Centre (CERC, Ahmadabad), seeking a direction to Union of India through
Ministry of Railway for immediate conversion of Unmanned Railway Crossing Gates into
Manning Level Crossing Gates. The Supreme Court in its judgement has mentioned that
Railways have since issue detailed guidelines in this regard and the role of the court ends
with the guidelines framed by the Railways. This has been circulated vide Bd.s letter No.
2010/Safety (A&R)/3/9 dated 29.9.2010 (Annexure 39).
Honble MR during budget 2010-11 has pronounced that 3000 LCs are
sanctioned for manning and further 1000 LCs will be sanctioned in 2010-11. All LCs will
be manned in next five years. The target fixed for manning in all Indian Railways for the
year 2009-10 was 304 against which 377 have been manned. The total target for manning
is fixed as 4000 gates in 2010-11 over Indian Railways and is a challenging task. Railways
need to focus more to achieve the desired target. Such large scale manning of LCs will
create a problem of reduced line capacity. Efforts be made for ROB/RUB/Limited Height
Subways and closure of Unmanned Level Crossing Gates. The progress is only 95 on IR.
29.6 Provision of Lifting Barriers & Basic Infrastructure at LC Gates
Board has advised that provision of lifting barriers in replacement to gate leafs on
manned LCs should be done on priority and accordingly the target fixed for All Indian
Railways was 374 Nos. for the year 2009-10, out of which 416 Nos. have been completed.
In 2010-11 total 250 Nos. of lifting barriers are targeted. Also, Railways were advised to
ensure Basic Infrastructure at unmanned LCs and accordingly target fixed for All
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Indian Railways was 1310 Nos. for the year 2009-10 out of which 2572 Nos. were
completed. The target fixed for the year 2010-11 is 1041 Nos. This may be followed up.
29.7 Shifting of LC Gates outside Station Limits
A manned crossing gate located within the outermost points in the station area is
particularly a major bottleneck for train operations. In case of stabling of a rake, within
the point Zone, on a complete track circuited station, the LC gate once closed cannot be
opened. Also, manned LC Gates within station limits are not desirable. Efforts need to be
made to shift the existing manned level crossings which are within station limits to outside
station limits. Boards letter No. 96/CE-I/LX/AC/6 dt. 31.5.1996(Annexure 40) may be
followed in this regard.
30.0 Safety Issues of Signal & Telecommunications
30.1 Signal without light - failure of Power - Back-up Power Supply
The following are a matter of concern from safety point of view:
(i) The blanking off of signals due to non-availability of back-up power supply;
and
(ii) Non-reversal of signal to the original aspect or the modified aspect if
movement has taken place, after restoration of power supply.
Signal Directorate has issued instructions on the subject vide Boards letter No.
2002/Sig/A/Misc. dated 25.09.2009, 28.7.10 (Annexure 41) Safety Dte vide letter No.
2009/Safety (A&R) /26/4 dated 11.8.10 (Annexure 42) has forwarded extracts of chapter
XVI of Signal Engineering Manual Pt.-II giving details of power supply arrangements and
asked Railways for carrying out a station wise check of Power Supply equipment and
take necessary action for removing the deficiencies.
30.2 Delay in Works of Track Circuiting, Replacement of over-aged
Signalling Assets by Panel / Route Relay / Electronic Interlocking
Provision of complete track circuiting of station section is one of the most
important & effective safety aid in preventing collisions. Delay in completion of track
circuiting works sanctioned is a matter of concern. At some of the locations, complete
track circuiting is not available even on A route (CR, NCR, WCR & ER), B route (ER,
NR, NCR, SCR ,ECR & ECoR), C route (ER) and D-Special route (NR, ECR, ECoR,
SER, SECR ,WR & NCR).
Priority is also to be given for replacement of sanctioned works of over-aged Signalling
assets by Panel/Route Relay/Electronic Interlocking (PI/RRI/EI).
30.3 Installation of BPAC
Out of a total target of 421 block sections to be provided with BPAC in the year
2010-11, 190 have been commissioned till Aug. 2010 ( Annexure 43) CR, NFR, SR, WR
& ECR are lagging behind the Proportionate target (upto Aug. 2010). A large number of
stations do not have sanctioned works of BPAC on almost all Railways. Provision of
BPAC not only enhances safety but also helps in operational efficiency. Follow-up action
needs to be taken by Zonal Railways for sanction and expeditious completion of these
works.
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30.4 Interlocking of Level Crossing Gates
30.4.1 Status of Interlocking of gates
Out of a total target of 333 level crossing gates to be interlocked in the year 2011-
12, 205 have been interlocked till Aug. 2010( Annexure 44). Eastern Railway, Northern
Railway, N.F. Railway, SE Railway, Western Railway, EC Railway , ECOR & SECR are
lagging behind the proportionate target (upto Aug). This may be followed up with CSTEs
for expeditious completion.
30.4.2 Policy on Interlocking of Level Crossing Gates
Comprehensive policy on Interlocking of Level Crossing Gates were issued by
Signal Directorate Railway Board vide Letter No. 77/W-3/SG/LX/2 dt. 16.8.79. As per
these guidelines, Traffic Level Crossings Gates which are of Special, A and B Class
were to be interlocked. However, C Class Manned Level Crossings were to be
interlocked, in other than suburban sections, only where such gates are operated by the
Cabin staff of Gates adjoining Level Crossings. Relevant provisions of this circular have
been incorporated as such, in IRPWM in para 904, Annexure 9/1 sub item 9(b).
As these guidelines have become outdated mainly due to the cabins have been
done away with the Panel Interlocking introduced, Board is in the process of issuing
revised Guidelines.
A copy of proposed guidelines under consideration in the Railway Board has been
circulated vide this office letter No. 2000/Safety (A&R)/19/39Pt.II dated 27.09.2010
(Annexure 45).
30.5 Communication at Level Crossing Gates
Zonal Railways have been advised to step up the pace of manning so as to
complete manning of qualifying unmanned level crossings at the earliest. One of the
problems faced by Railways in manning of Level Crossing is feasibility of exchange of
private nos. by gateman with the ASM of the station to which the gate is connected
with telephone communication. It has been noticed that some of the stations already
have large nos. of Level Crossings gates connected with them. If more gates are
connected to such stations, it may not be feasible for the ASM to exchange private
numbers. On the other side, there are adjacent stations, which are connected with
lesser nos. of Level Crossings.
It is, therefore, advised that in above situations, for both existing and new
gates, whenever the gate communication is to be provided through quad cable, which
runs through the block section (between two stations), some rationalization, about the
number of gates to be connected to each station should be done. Efforts should be
made to reduce as far as possible the imbalance in no. of gates connected with each of
the adjacent stations i.e. the guiding principle for provision of LC gate telephones
should be the number of gates to be connected to each block station instead of the
existing geographical location based criteria.
Boards letter No. 2009/Safety (A&R)/3/2 dated 24.9.2010 (Annexure 46) in
this regard may be followed.
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30.6 Provision/Maintenance of Data Loggers
A target for provision of 320 data loggers during 2010-11 has been fixed, out of
which 221 data loggers have been provided till Aug. 2010 (Annexure 47).
AM/Sig Railway Board vide letter No. 2010/Sig/SGF/12/Data Loggers dated 22nd
J uly 2010 (Annexure 48) has instructed Railways regarding proper upkeep and
maintenance of data loggers to ensure timely extraction of reports. The failure of data
loggers is not recorded in the statistical compilation of equipment failures. Due to this,
very little monitoring of these failures is done at Zonal Railway level. The Operating
officers must check the Data loggers during their inspections and follow up with the S&T
Deptt for removal of deficiencies, if any.
COMs are advised to follow up with CSTEs for provision of Data loggers at
stations not provided with it so far.
30.7 Provision of FOG-SAFE Device in locos
Board has approved provisions of Fog-safe device in the locos to indicate the
location of an approach stop signal during foggy season after ascertaining the reliability on
such a device. The reliability of Fog-Safe device has to be certified by the CSOs. In this
regard this office letter No. 2009/Safety (A&R)/26/1 dated 12.8.10 and 13.8.10
(Annexure 49) may be looked into.
Board vide letter No.98/Safety (A&R)/19/16 dated 23.08.2010 (Annexure 50) has
issued instructions for precautions to be taken for train operations during fog.
30.8 Exclusive Frequency for Walkie-Talkie/VHF sets for ASMs, Drivers
and Guard etc.
Standardization of the frequency for Walkie-Talkie sets to be used by different
departments and the staff has been done and circulated to all Zonal Railways vide Rly.
Bd.s letter No. 2004/tele/WL/2/misc. dated 22.05.2007 (Annexure 51). The
standardization has been done with a view to provide a common frequency to the staff of
different departments alongwith at least one exclusive frequency separately for each
department.
Board vide above referred letter had asked the Railways for the following action:
(i) Check whether guidelines of allocation of frequencies as circulated by
Telecom Directorates above mentioned letter are being followed on each
railway.
(ii) Whether VHF sets have been programmed with the allotted frequency before
issue to the respective departments or directly to the staff. The switch over
arrangement from one frequency to another is only as assigned to their
departments.
(iii) Whether the ASMs and Drivers/Guards communication through the
nominated frequency is exclusively provided only to them and cannot be
accessed by any other department.
(iv) Whether there is a provision for automatic switch over of the VHF sets
provided to the ASMs with the Driver/Guard communication channel in case
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of the Calling Station Master failure to switch over the channel manually
within 5 seconds after the talk is over.
In this reference Board (CRB) has also written to General Managers, All Indian
Railways vide letter No. 2009/Safety (A&R)/19/29 dated 24.08.2010 (Annexure 52) to
confirm whether the laid down system is followed.
30.9 Block Failures in SGE Block Instrument
In double line SGE Type Block Instruments, the ASM of the receiving station is
required to move the operating handle to TOL position once the train crosses the advance
starter of the dispatching station (marked by sounding of buzzer) and before the train
crosses Home signal of the receiving station. In case the train enters the home signal before
the handle is turned to TOL position, the block instrument fails and the next train has to be
sent on PLCT and the block instrument then is normalized by passage of this train.
NCR, ER, SR and SEC Rly. Have implemented an Auto TOL circuit which results
in normalization of the block instrument even when the handle is turned to TOL position
after the train has entered the home signal. This prevents running of train with PLCT and
thus improves safety as well as improves operations by reducing failures of block
instrument.
Other Zonal Railways may like to follow up with the S&T Department of their
Railways. Safety Directorates letter No. 2009/Safety &Signal/26/2/Part file Dated
07.05.2010 (Annexure 53) may be referred in this regard.

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