http://en.wikipedia.

org/wiki/Quinque_viae


St. Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologica

http://web.mnstate.edu/gracyk/courses/web%20publishing/aquinasFiveWays.ht
m

The existence of God can be proved in five ways.

The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain,
and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion.
Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be
in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion;
whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing else
than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing
can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a
state of actuality. Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood,
which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes
it. Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality
and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects. For
what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is
simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in the same
respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e.
that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in
motion by another. If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion,
then this also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another
again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no
first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent
movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover;
as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefore
it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this
everyone understands to be God.

The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world of
sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known
(neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient
cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in
efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient
causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause,
and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the
intermediate cause be several, or only one. Now to take away the cause is
to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient
causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause. But if in
efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first
efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate
efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to
admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.

The third way is taken from possibility and necessity, and runs thus. We
find in nature things that are possible to be and not to be, since they are
found to be generated, and to corrupt, and consequently, they are possible
to be and not to be. But it is impossible for these always to exist, for that
which is possible not to be at some time is not. Therefore, if everything is
possible not to be, then at one time there could have been nothing in
existence. Now if this were true, even now there would be nothing in
existence, because that which does not exist only begins to exist by
something already existing. Therefore, if at one time nothing was in
existence, it would have been impossible for anything to have begun to
exist; and thus even now nothing would be in existence--which is absurd.
Therefore, not all beings are merely possible, but there must exist
something the existence of which is necessary. But every necessary thing
either has its necessity caused by another, or not. Now it is impossible to
go on to infinity in necessary things which have their necessity caused by
another, as has been already proved in regard to efficient causes.
Therefore we cannot but postulate the existence of some being having of
itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from another, but rather
causing in others their necessity. This all men speak of as God.

The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things. Among
beings there are some more and some less good, true, noble and the like.
But "more" and "less" are predicated of different things, according as they
resemble in their different ways something which is the maximum, as a
thing is said to be hotter according as it more nearly resembles that which
is hottest; so that there is something which is truest, something best,
something noblest and, consequently, something which is uttermost being;
for those things that are greatest in truth are greatest in being, as it is
written in Metaph. ii. Now the maximum in any genus is the cause of all in
that genus; as fire, which is the maximum heat, is the cause of all hot
things. Therefore there must also be something which is to all beings the
cause of their being, goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call
God.

The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that things
which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is
evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as
to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but
designedly, do they achieve their end. Now whatever lacks intelligence
cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being
endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is shot to its mark
by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural
things are directed to their end; and this being we call God.


http://web.mnstate.edu/gracyk/courses/web%20publishing/aquinasfiveway
s_argumentanalysis.htm

The First Way: Argument from Motion
1. Our senses prove that some things are in motion.
2. Things move when potential motion becomes actual motion.
3. Only an actual motion can convert a potential motion into an actual
motion.
4. Nothing can be at once in both actuality and potentiality in the same
respect (i.e., if both actual and potential, it is actual in one respect
and potential in another).
5. Therefore nothing can move itself.
6. Therefore each thing in motion is moved by something else.
7. The sequence of motion cannot extend ad infinitum.
8. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by
no other; and this everyone understands to be God.
The Second Way: Argument from Efficient Causes
1. We perceive a series of efficient causes of things in the world.
2. Nothing exists prior to itself.
3. Therefore nothing is the efficient cause of itself.
4. If a previous efficient cause does not exist, neither does the thing
that results.
5. Therefore if the first thing in a series does not exist, nothing in the
series exists.
6. The series of efficient causes cannot extend ad infinitum into the
past, for then there would be no things existing now.
7. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which
everyone gives the name of God.
The Third Way: Argument from Possibility and Necessity (Reductio
argument)
1. We find in nature things that are possible to be and not to be, that
come into being and go out of being i.e., contingent beings.
2. Assume that every being is a contingent being.
3. For each contingent being, there is a time it does not exist.
4. Therefore it is impossible for these always to exist.
5. Therefore there could have been a time when no things existed.
6. Therefore at that time there would have been nothing to bring the
currently existing contingent beings into existence.
7. Therefore, nothing would be in existence now.
8. We have reached an absurd result from assuming that every being
is a contingent being.
9. Therefore not every being is a contingent being.
10. Therefore some being exists of its own necessity, and does not
receive its existence from another being, but rather causes them.
This all men speak of as God.
The Fourth Way: Argument from Gradation of Being
1. There is a gradation to be found in things: some are better or worse
than others.
2. Predications of degree require reference to the uttermost case
(e.g., a thing is said to be hotter according as it more nearly
resembles that which is hottest).
3. The maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus.
4. Therefore there must also be something which is to all beings the
cause of their being, goodness, and every other perfection; and this
we call God.
The Fifth Way: Argument from Design
1. We see that natural bodies work toward some goal, and do not do
so by chance.
2. Most natural things lack knowledge.
3. But as an arrow reaches its target because it is directed by an
archer, what lacks intelligence achieves goals by being directed by
something intelligence.
4. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things
are directed to their end; and this being we call God.


http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/aquinas3.asp

Summa Theologia
Article II. Whether the existence of God is demonstrable:
Let us proceed to the second point. It is objected (1) that the existence of God is
not demonstratable: that God's existence is an article of faith, and that articles of
faith are not demonstratable, because the office of demonstration is to prove,
but faith pertains (only) to things that are not to be proven, as is evident from
the Epistle to the Hebrews, 11. Hence that God's existence is not
demonstratable. Again, (2) that the subject matter of demonstration is that
something exists, but in the case of God we cannot know what exists, but only
what does not, as Damascenus says (Of the Orthodox Faith, I., 4.) Hence that
we cannot demonstrate God's existence. Again, (3) that if God's existence is to
be proved it must be from what He causes, and that what He effects is not
sufficient for His supposed nature, since He is infinite, but the effects finite, and
the finite is not proportional to the infinite. Since, therefore, a cause cannot be
proved through an effect not proportional to itself, it is said that God's exisence
cannot be proved.
But against this argument the apostle says (Rom. I., 20), "The unseen things of
God are visible through His manifest works." But this would not be so unless it
were possible to demonstrate God's existence through His works. What ought to
be understood concerning anything, is first of all, whether it exists. Conclusion. It
is possible to demonstrate God's existence, atthough not a priori (by pure
reason), yet a posteriori from some work of His more surely known to us.
In answer I must say that the proof is double. One is through the nature of a
cause and is called propter quid: this is through the nature of preceding events
sirnply. The other is through the nature of the effect, and is called quia, and is
through the nature of preceding things as respects us. Since the effect is better
known to us than the cause, we proceed from the effect to the knowledge of the
cause. From any effect whatsoever it can be proved that a corresponding cause
exists, if only the effects of it are sufficiently known to us, for since effects
depend on causes, the effect being given, it is necessary that a preceding cause
exists. Whence, that God exists, although this is not itself known to us, is
provable through effects that are known to us.
To the first objection above, I reply, therefore, that God's existence, and those
other things of this nature that can be known through natural reason concerning
God, as is said in Rom. I., are not articles of faith, but preambles to these
articles. So faith presupposes natural knowledge, so grace nature, and perfection
a perfectible thing. Nothing prevents a thing that is in itself demonstratable and
knowable, from being accepted as an article of faith by someone that does not
accept the proof of it.
To the second objection, I reply that, since the cause is proven from the effect,
one must use the effect in the place of a definition of the cause in demonstrating
that the cause exists; and that this applies especially in the case of God, because
for proving that anything exists, it is necessary to accept in this method what the
name signifies, not however that anything exists, because the question what it is
is secondary to the question whether it exists at all. The characteristics of God
are drawn from His works as shall be shown hereafter, (Question XIII). Whence
by proving that God exists through His works as shall be shown hereafter,
(Question XIII). Whence by proving that God exists through His works, we are
able by this very method to see what the name God signifies.
To the third objection, I reply that, although a perfect knowledge of the cause
cannot be had from inadequate effects, yet that from any effect manifest to us it
can be shown that a cause does exist, as has been said. And thus from the
works of God His existence can be proved, although we cannot in this way know
Him perfectly in accordance with His own essence.
Article III. Whether God exists.
Let us proceed to the third article. It is objected (1) that God does not exist,
because if one of two contradictory things is infinite, the other will be totally
destroyed; that it is implied in the name God that there is a certain infinite
goodness: if then God existed, no evil would be found. But evil is found in the
world; therefore it is objected that God does not exist. Again, that what can be
accomplished through a less number of principles will not be accomplished
through more. It is objected that all things that appear on the earth can be
accounted for through other principles, without supposing that God exists, since
what is natural can be traced to a natural principle, and what proceeds from a
proposition can be traced to the human reason or will. Therefore that there is no
necessity to suppose that God exists. But as against this note what is said of the
person of God (Exod. III., 14) I am that I am. Conclusion. There must be found
in the nature of things one first immovable Being, a primary cause, necessarily
existing, not created; existing the most widely, good, even the best possible; the
first ruler through the intellect, and the ultimate end of all things, which is God.
I answer that it can be proved in five ways that God exists.
The first and plainest is the method that proceeds from the point of view of
motion. It is certain and in accord with experience, that things on earth undergo
change. Now, everything that is moved is moved by something; nothing, indeed,
is changed, except it is changed to something which it is in potentiality.
Moreover, anything moves in accordance with something actually existing;
change itself, is nothing else than to bring forth something from potentiality into
actuality. Now, nothing can be brought from potentiality to actual existence
except through something actually existing: thus heat in action, as fire, makes
fire-wood, which is hot in potentiality, to be hot actually, and through this
process, changes itself. The same thing cannot at the same time be actually and
potentially the same thing, but only in regard to different things. What is actually
hot cannot be at the same time potentially hot, but it is possible for it at the
same time to be potentially cold. It is impossible, then, that anything should be
both mover and the thing moved, in regard to the same thing and in the same
way, or that it should move itself. Everything, therefore, is moved by something
else. If, then, that by which it is moved, is also moved, this must be moved by
something still different, and this, again, by something else. But this process
cannot go on to infinity because there would not be any first mover, nor,
because of this fact, anything else in motion, as the succeeding things would not
move except because of what is moved by the first mover, just as a stick is not
moved except through what is moved from the hand. Therefore it is necessary to
go back to some first mover, which is itself moved by nothing---and this all men
know as God.
The second proof is from the nature of the efficient cause. We find in our
experience that there is a chain of causes: nor is it found possible for anything to
be the efficient cause of itself, since it would have to exist before itself, which is
impossible. Nor in the case of efficient causes can the chain go back indefinitely,
because in all chains of efficient causes, the first is the cause of the middle, and
these of the last, whether they be one or many. If the cause is removed, the
effect is removed. Hence if there is not a first cause, there will not be a last, nor
a middle. But if the chain were to go back infinitely, there would be no first
cause, and thus no ultimate effect, nor middle causes, which is admittedly false.
Hence we must presuppose some first efficient cause---which all call God.
The third proof is taken from the natures of the merely possible and necessary.
We find that certain things either may or may not exist, since they are found to
come into being and be destroyed, and in consequence potentially, either
existent or non-existent. But it is impossible for all things that are of this
character to exist eternally, because what may not exist, at length will not. If,
then, all things were merely possible (mere accidents), eventually nothing among
things would exist. If this is true, even now there would be nothing, because
what does not exist, does not take its beginning except through something that
does exist. If then nothing existed, it would be impossible for anything to begin,
and there would now be nothing existing, which is admittedly false. Hence not all
things are mere accidents, but there must be one necessarily existing being. Now
every necessary thing either has a cause of its necessary existence, or has not.
In the case of necessary things that have a cause for their necessary existence,
the chain of causes cannot go back infinitely, just as not in the case of efficient
causes, as proved. Hence there must be presupposed something necessarily
existing through its own nature, not having a cause elsewhere but being itself
the cause of the necessary existence of other things---which all call God.
The fourth proof arises from the degrees that are found in things. For there is
found a greater and a less degree of goodness, truth, nobility, and the like. But
more or less are terms spoken of various things as they approach in diverse
ways toward something that is the greatest, just as in the case of hotter (more
hot) which approaches nearer the greatest heat. There exists therefore
something that is the truest, and best, and most noble, and in consequence, the
greatest being. For what are the greatest truths are the greatest beings, as is
said in the Metaphysics Bk. II. 2. What moreover is the greatest in its way, in
another way is the cause of all things of its own kind (or genus); thus fire, which
is the greatest heat, is the cause of all heat, as is said in the same book (cf. Plato
and Aristotle). Therefore there exists something that is the cause of the
existence of all things and of the goodness and of every perfection whatsoever---
and this we call God.
The fifth proof arises from the ordering of things for we see that some things
which lack reason, such as natural bodies, are operated in accordance with a
plan. It appears from this that they are operated always or the more frequently
in this same way the closer they follow what is the Highest; whence it is clear
that they do not arrive at the result by chance but because of a purpose. The
things, moreover, that do not have intelligence do not tend toward a result
unless directed by some one knowing and intelligent; just as an arrow is sent by
an archer. Therefore there is something intelligent by which all natural things are
arranged in accordance with a plan---and this we call God.
In response to the first objection, then, I reply what Augustine says; that since
God is entirely good, He would permit evil to exist in His works only if He were
so good and omnipotent that He might bring forth good even from the evil. It
therefore pertains to the infinite goodness of God that he permits evil to exist
and from this brings forth good.
My reply to the second objection is that since nature is ordered in accordance
with some defined purpose by the direction of some superior agent, those things
that spring from nature must be dependent upon God, just as upon a first cause.
Likewise, what springs from a proposition must be traceable to some higher
cause which is not the human reason or will, because this is changeable and
defective and everything changeable and liable to non-existence is dependent
upon some unchangeable first principle that is necessarily self-existent as has
been shown.



http://www.catholicforum.com/forums/showthread.php?3633-St-Thomas-
Aquinas-5-proofs-of-God-s-existence

Aquinas' Five Proofs

What real evidence can be supplied for God's existence?
St. Thomas, in his Summa Theologica, sets forth five
separate proofs for the existence of God, Unlike St.
Anselm's proof, which deals with pure concepts, St.
Thomas' proofs rely on the world of our experience-what
we can see around us. In these proofs we can easily see
the influence of Aristotle and his doctrine of the Four
Causes.

l) The Proof from Motion. We observe motion all around
us. Whatever is in motion now was at rest until moved by
something else, and that by something else, and so on.
But if there were an infinite series of movers, all waiting
to be moved by something else, then actual motion could
never have got started, and there would be no motion
now. But there is motion now. So there must be a First
Mover which is itself unmoved. This First Mover we call
God.

2) The Proof from Efficient Cause. Everything in the world
has its efficient cause--its maker--and that maker has its
maker, and so on. The coffee table was made by the
carpenter, the carpenter by his or her parents, and on and
on. But if there were just an infinite series of such makers,
the series could never have got started, and therefore be
nothing now. But there is something everything there is!
So there must have been a First Maker, that was not itself
made, and that First Maker we call God.

3) The Proof from Necessary vs. Possible Being. Possible,
or contingent, beings are those, such as cars and trees
and you and I, whose existence is not necessary. For all
such beings there is a time before they come to be when
they are not yet, and a time after they cease to be when
they are no more. If everything were merely possible,
there would have been a time, long ago, when nothing had
yet come to be. Nothing comes from nothing, so in that
case there would be nothing now! But there is something
now-the world and everything in it-so there must be at
least one necessary being. This Necessary Being we call
God.

4) The Proof from Degrees of Perfection. We all evaluate
things and people in terms of their being more or less
perfectly true, good, noble and so on. We have certain
standards of how things and people should be. But we
would have no such standards unless there were some
being that is perfect in every way, something that is the
truest, noblest, and best. That Most Perfect Being we call
God.

5) The Proof from Design. As we look at the world around
us, and ourselves, we see ample evidence of design--the
bird's wing, designed for the purpose of flight; the human
ear, designed for the purpose of hearing; the natural
environment, designed to support life; and on and on. If
there is design, there must be a designer. That Designer
we call God

triskelion, I interpret proof #3 as talking about the
creation of the elements; proof #2 as talking about the
forming of the elements into creation; and proof #1 as
creation being put into motion.

The irony of proving God exists is, to a non-believer it can
never be proven, but to a believer, proof of God can be
seen just about everywhere.

Of course, if you need to see it to believe it, do you really
have faith?




http://www.aquinasonline.com/Topics/5ways.html

http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1002.htm





http://www.catholicchapterhouse.com/blog/2013/05/20/proving-the-existence-
of-god-st-thomas-aquinas-five-ways-examined/

Briefly, the Five Ways of proving God are these:
The Way of Motion: Things move and change. Things are put into motion by
something else. There cannot be an infinite regress, therefore there must have
been an initial unmoved mover. This we call God.
The Way of Causation: All things have an immediate or efficient cause. The
efficient causes cannot go back infinitely, so there must be a first, uncaused
cause. This we call God.
The Way of Contingency: It is not necessary for any particular thing to exist,
they are, rather, contingent things. All possible things at one point did not
exist. If all things are merely contingent, then at one time things did not
exist. There must be a necessary essence that caused all contingent things to
be. This we call God.
The Way of Goodness: Things have degrees of perfectionlarger or smaller,
heavier or lighter, warmer or colder. Degrees imply the existence of a maximum
of perfection. This maximum perfection we call God.
The Way of Design: Things in this world are ordered to particular ends. Even
unintelligent things are predisposed to this and not that. This order inherent in
even inanimate things necessitates an intelligence to direct it. This intelligence
we call God.



http://www.sparknotes.com/philosophy/aquinas/section2.rhtml

Question 1 of part 1 of the Summa considers the nature and extent of sacred
doctrine, or theology. Aquinas concludes that, although theology does not
require philosophy to promote knowledge of God, philosophy nevertheless
can be of service to the aims of theology.

Question 2 of part 1 concerns the existence of God and is subdivided into
three Articles. In the First Article, Aquinas maintains that the proposition
God exists is self-evident in itself, but not to us, and thus requires
demonstration. The Second Article concludes that such a demonstration is
indeed possible, despite objections to the contrary. The famous Third Article
addresses the question of whether God exists, and in this Article, Aquinas
offers his Five Ways as proofs for the existence of God.
First, we observe that some things in the world are in motion. Whatever is in
motion is put into motion by another object that is in motion. This other
object, in turn, was put into motion by still another object preceding it, and
so forth. This series cannot go on backward to infinity, though, since there
would otherwise be no first mover and thus no subsequent movement.
Therefore, we must conclude that there is a first unmoved mover, which we
understand to be God.

Second, we observe that everything has an efficient cause and that nothing is
or can be the cause of itself. It is impossible, though, that the series of causes
should extend back to infinity because every cause is dependent on a prior
cause and the ultimate cause is thus dependent on a previous cause. So if
there is no first cause, there will be no intermediate causes and no final
cause. But the absence of such causes clearly does not square with our
observation, and so there must therefore be a first efficient cause, which
everyone calls God.
Third, we observe in nature things that are possible to be and not to be, as
they come into existence and pass out of existence. Such things could not
always exist, though, because something that could possibly not exist at
some time actually does not exist at some time. Thus, if it is possible for
everything not to exist, then, at some time, nothing did exist. But if nothing
ever did exist, then nothing would exist even now, since everything that
exists requires for its existence something that already existed. Yet it is
absurd to claim that nothing exists even now. Therefore, not all beings are
merely possible, but there must be something the existence of which is
necessary. Now, every necessary thing has its necessity caused by something
else or it does not. Since it is impossible for there to exist an infinite series of
causes of necessary things, we must conclude that there is something that is
necessary in itself. People speak of this thing as God.
Fourth, beings in the world have characteristics to varying degrees. Some are
more or less good, true, noble, and so forth. Such gradations are all
measured in relation to a maximum, however. Thus, there must be
something best, truest, noblest, and so on. Now, as Aristotle teaches, things
that are greatest in truth are also greatest in being. Therefore, there must be
something that is the cause of being, goodness, and every other perfection
that we find in beings in the world. We call this maximum cause God.

Finally, we observe in nature that inanimate and nonintelligent objects act
toward the best possible purpose, even though these objects are not aware of
doing so. It is clear that these objects do not achieve their purpose by sheer
chance but rather according to a plan. Any inanimate or nonintelligent object
that acts toward a purpose, though, must be guided by a being that possesses
knowledge and intelligence, just as an arrow is directed by an archer.
Therefore, there must be some intelligent being that directs all natural things
toward their purpose. We call this being God.
Having presented these proofs for the existence of God, Aquinas goes on to
discuss God in terms of his simplicity, perfection, goodness, infinity,
knowledge, and other attributes. This discussion leads into a protracted
consideration of questions pertaining to the Creation, the nature of angels,
demons, and the work done on the individual six days of the Creation, which
culminated with the creation of man.
The existence of God is the necessary foundation of any theology. Before
discussing any other topics, Aquinas needs to establish the crucial fact that
God exists, since, without certainty of Gods existence, the conclusions of
the rest of the Summa would be in doubt or even in vain. To this end, he
advances five arguments intended to prove the existence of God. Arguments
1, 2, and 5 are based on observation of the natural world, whereas
Arguments 3 and 4 are based on rational speculation. In Arguments 1, 2, 4,
and 5, Aquinas concludes that only the existence of God can provide a
sufficient explanation for the questions raised. In Argument 3, he concludes
that God must necessarily exist for his own sake. Thus, Arguments 1, 2, 4,
and 5 conclude that God exists because the world requires him as an
explanation, and Argument 3 concludes that God could not not exist.
Argument 1 considers and attempts to account for the presence of change in
the world. Aquinas draws his argument from Aristotelian physics, which
was known as natural philosophy in Aquinass day and which studied
motion and change in the physical world. Just as everything that exists in the
world is generated by something before it, so too must motion be passed
from one object to another. Rigidly applying this principle, though, we find
ourselves confronted with an infinitely regressive series and thus with the
need for a first unmoved mover to set the entire series into motion. Aquinas
is saying that an infinitely regressive series is impossible, and from the
impossibility of such a series, he concludes that the first unmoved mover can
be only God.
Argument 2 marks a transition from argumentation based on physics to
argumentation based on metaphysics and considers the existence of the
world as a whole. In this argument, Aquinas relies on the principle of
efficient causation, a cardinal assumption of physics which states that every
effect must have a cause. Aquinas reasons by analogy that, just as no object
in the world comes into being from nothing or by itself but every object is
caused, so too must the world as a whole come into being through a cause,
namely, through God.
Argument 3 carries the premise of Argument 2 into the realm of metaphysics
and rational speculation about being itself. Aquinas first defines possible
beings as those that can either exist or not exist, thereby implying that
necessary beings are those that necessarily must, and thus do, exist. All
objects in the world are possible beings and thus can either exist or not exist.
Aquinas reasons that, since these objects can, in principle, either exist or not
exist at any time, then they did in fact not exist at some time. Yet, Aquinas
continues, if they did not exist at some time, then we are at a loss to explain
the obvious existence of the world now, since all that exists requires a cause
for its existence. Aquinas concludes that there must be an absolutely
necessary being, that is, one that (1) must necessarily exist and (2) thus owes
its existence to no other being.
Argument 4 is unique among the five Arguments in that it considers not the
physical or metaphysical but the qualitative. By a leap of abstraction,
Aquinas, adopting Aristotle, concludes that there must be something in
relation to which all individual qualities, such as good, true, beautiful, and
noble, are measured and from which those qualities derive their existence.
For example, the existence of something good implies the existence of
something best that not only serves as the ultimate benchmark against which
the good thing is measured but also even causes the good thing to exist. The
idea that ultimate qualities are responsible for the existence of lesser
instances of qualities is strongly reminiscent of Platos idea that Forms (i.e.,
essences) are the real and true originals of which lesser beings (i.e.,
existences) are pale and inferior copies. Nevertheless, Aquinas, following
Aristotle, invests these ultimate qualities with beingin other words, with
existence.
Argument 5 appeals to our wonder in the face of the apparent purposive
activity of the animate and inanimate worlds alike. The world, functioning
with such smoothness, efficiency, detail, and aim, simply cannot be the
product of chance but must be the product of a sort of grand architect, that is,
of God. Aquinas is drawing two rather bold conclusions here: there is a
designer and that the designer is God.
There are strong conceptual ties between and among the first three
Arguments. Arguments 1 and 2 are similar in that both maintain that there
cannot be a series of causes stretching back infinitely. The two Arguments
are different, though, in that Argument 1 considers the cause of motion in
individual objects in the world, whereas Argument 2 considers the cause of
the entire world itself. Argument 1 takes the existence of the world for
granted and seeks to account for observable change in the physical world.
Argument 2, on the other hand, does draw on observation of the world but
attempts to account for the existence of the world. Argument 3 considers the
concept of being itself and casts its gaze toward theoretical, nonobservable
states of the world far beyond our possible experience. Thus, the first three
Arguments attempt to force one to accept the proposition that only the
existence of God can account for (1) change in the physical world, (2) the
existence of the physical world, and (3) existence itself.