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POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
ANGARA VS.
ELECTORAL
COMMISSION
Jose A. Angara, and the
respondents, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel
Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were
candidates voted for the position
of member of the National
Assembly for the first district of
the Province of Tayabas. The
provincial board of canvassers,
proclaimed Angara as member-
elect of the National Assembly so
he took his oath of office.
The National Assembly in session
assembled, passed Res. 8: which
confirmed the elected members
whose election were not protested
to (specifically applicable to
Angara)
The Electoral Commission on the
other had passed a Res. that
prescribed the period within to file
protests
Ynsua filed before the Electoral
Commission a "Motion of Protest"
against Angaras election being the
only protest filed after the passage
of Res. 8 and praying he be
declared elected member of the
National Assembly for the first
district of Tayabas
Angara filed a MTD because
Ynsuas protest had prescribed
Ynsua claimed that there is no legal
or constitutional provision barring
the presentation of a protest
against the election of a member
of the National Assembly after
confirmation

EC DISMISSED MTD

TIMELINE in 1935:

DOES THE SC HAVE JURISDICTION OVER THE EC AND THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE
CONTROVERSY? YES

Here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave constitutional nature
between the National Assembly on the one hand, and the Electoral Commission on the other. Although the
Electoral Commission may not be interfered with, when and while acting within the limits of its authority, it does
not follow that it is beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not
subject to constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the government,
and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law between department powers and
agencies of the government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in justifiable and appropriate cases.

HAS THE EC ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION IN ASSUMING THE
COGNIZANCE OF THE PROTEST FILED THE ELECTION OF THE YNSUA NOTWITHSTANDING THE
PREVIOUS CONFIRMATION OF SUCH ELECTION BY RESOLUTION OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY?
NO

Under the practice prevailing under the Jones Law, each House fixed the time when election protests should be
filed. As a matter of formality, after the time fixed by its rules for the filing of protests had already expired, each
House passed a resolution confirming the returns with no protest.

Under the 1935 Consti, the purpose was to transfer in its totality all the powers previously exercised by the
legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal.
It was to be devoid of partisan considerations which prompted the people, acting through their delegates to the
Convention, to provide for this body known as the EC. With this end in view, a composite body in which both
the majority and minority parties are equally represented to off-set partisan influence in its deliberations was
created, and further endowed with judicial temper by including in its membership 3 SC justices.

When, therefore, the National Assembly passed its resolution of December 3, 1935, confirming the election of
the petitioner to the National Assembly, the EC had not yet met; neither does it appear that said body had
actually been organized. If Resolution 8 of the National Assembly confirming non-protested elections of
members of the National Assembly had the effect of limiting or tolling the time for the presentation of protests,
the result would be that the National Assembly on the hypothesis that it still retained the incidental power of
regulation in such cases had already barred the presentation of protests before the Electoral Commission had
had time to organize itself and deliberate on the mode and method to be followed in a matter entrusted to its
exclusive jurisdiction by the Constitution. This result was not and could not have been contemplated, and should
be avoided.

a. That the government established by the Constitution follows fundamentally the theory of separation of
power into the legislative, the executive
b. and the judicial.
c. That the system of checks and balances and the overlapping of functions and duties often makes
difficult the delimitation of the powers granted.

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Nov. 15, 1935 Commonwealth
Government was inaugurated
Nov. 25, 1935 Legislature convened
Dec. 3, 1935 Confirmation of
Angaras election
Dec. 4, 1935 Designation of
legislative members to the EC
Dec. 6, 1935 Designation of justices
to the EC
Dec. 9, 1935 Ynsua files his protest

The pleadings do not show when the
Electoral Commission was formally
organized but it does appear that on
December 9, 1935, the Electoral
Commission met for the first time and
approved a resolution fixing said date
as the last day for the filing of election
protest.
d. That in cases of conflict between the several departments and among the agencies thereof, the
judiciary, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised
finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.
e. That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and
controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government
transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.
f. That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers and
functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of
the other two departments of the governments.
g. That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly.
h. That under the organic law prevailing before the present Constitution went into effect, each house of
the legislature was respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their
elective members.
i. That the present Constitution has transferred all the powers previously exercised by the legislature with
respect to contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of its members, to the Electoral
Commission.
j. That such transfer of power from the legislature to the Electoral Commission was full, clear and
complete, and carried with it ex necesitate rei the implied power inter alia to prescribe the rules and
regulations as to the time and manner of filing protests.
k. That the avowed purpose in creating the Electoral Commission was to have an independent
constitutional organ pass upon all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, devoid of partisan influence or consideration, which object would
be frustrated if the National Assembly were to retain the power to prescribe rules and regulations
regarding the manner of conducting said contests.
l. That section 4 of article VI of the Constitution repealed not only section 18 of the Jones Law making
each house of the Philippine Legislature respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns and
qualifications of its elective members, but also section 478 of Act No. 3387 empowering each house to
prescribe by resolution the time and manner of filing contests against the election of its members, the
time and manner of notifying the adverse party, and bond or bonds, to be required, if any, and to fix
the costs and expenses of contest.
m. That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election is contested or not, is not essential before
such member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National
Assembly.
n. That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member against whom no protest
had been filed prior to said confirmation, does not and cannot deprive the Electoral Commission of its
incidental power to prescribe the time within which protests against the election of any member of the
National Assembly should be filed.

The EC was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance
of the protest filed by Ynsua against the election of Angara, and that the resolution of the National Assembly of
December 3, 1935 can not in any manner toll the time for filing protests against the elections, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the

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rules of the EC might prescribe.

PETITION DENIED

JUDICIAL SUPREMACY
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent
of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way.
And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the
other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the Legislature, but only asserts the
solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority
under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument
secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which
properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution.

JUDICIAL REVIEW LIMITED TO ACTUAL LITIGATION; WISDOM, JUSTICE OR EXPEDIENCY OF
LEGISLATION
Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full
opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis
mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to
sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not
pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the
presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments not only because the Legislature is presumed to abide
by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must
reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and
legislative departments of the government.

JURISDICTION OVER THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION
The nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to determine the
conflict of authority between two agencies created by the Constitution. If the conflict were left undecided and
undetermined, a void would be created in our constitutional system which may in the long run prove destructive
of the entire framework. Natura vacuum abhorret, so must we avoid exhaustion in our constitutional system.
Upon principle, reason and authority, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the
subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the
constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly."
MARBURY VS.
MADISON
The election of 1800 proved to be a
disaster for the Federalist party. Their
candidate for the Presidency, John
Adams, was denied reelection, and
control of both Houses of Congress fell
to the Jeffersonians. The Federalists
sought to entrench themselves in the
federal judiciary.
HAS THE APPLICANT A RIGHT TO THE COMMISSION HE DEMANDS?

Mr. Marbury, then, since his commission was signed by the president, and sealed by the secretary of state, was
appointed; and as the law creating the office, gave the officer a right to hold for five years, independent of the
executive, the appointment was not revocable, but vested in the officer legal rights, which are protected by the
laws of his country. To withhold his commission, therefore, is an act deemed by the court not warranted by
law, but violative of a vested legal right.


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After the election, but before March 4
of the following year, the date on which
the Constitution prescribed that Thomas
Jefferson would take the oath of office,
Oliver Ellsworth, then Chief Justice,
conveniently resigned for reasons of ill
health, allowing President Adams to
name a new Chief Justice. He did by
appointing his Secretary of State, John
Marshall, an arch political enemy of
Jeffersons, though a cousin of the
President-Elect. Marshall also retained
his post in the Adams administration
until it went out of office.

The Federalist-controlled Congress also
obliged by passing legislation creating
some 58 additional judgeships to be
filled by the party faithful. On Feb. 3,
1801, it passed a law creating federal
circuit courts designed to relieve
Supreme Court Justices from the
burdensome task of riding circuit in
their dual capacity as appellate judges.
These 16 vacancies were promptly filled
by Adams delivered before March 4.
The men named to these vacancies are
historically referred to as the midnight
judges because of the late hour at
which their commissions were
delivered. Two weeks after it had
passed the circuit court legislation,
Congress passed an act that provided
42 justices of the peace for the District
of Columbia.

President Adams sent his nominations
for this second wave of judicial
appointments to the Senate, and they
were confirmed on March 3. The
commissions for these judgeships were
signed by the President and the Seal of
IF HE HAS A RIGHT, AND THAT RIGHT HAS BEEN VIOLATED, DO THE LAWS OF HIS COUNTRY
AFFORD HIM A REMEDY?

By the constitution, the president is invested with certain important political powers, in the exercise of which he
is to use his own discretion, and is accountable only to his country in his political character, and to his own
conscience. To aid him in the performance of these duties, he is authorized to appoint certain officers, who act
by his authority, and in conformity with his orders. In such cases, these acts are his acts; and whatever opinion
may be entertained of the manner in which executive discretion may be used, still there exists, and can exist, no
power to control that discretion. The subjects are political: they respect the nation, not individual rights, and
being entrusted to the executive, the decision of the executive is conclusive. This officer, as his duties were
prescribed by that act, is to conform precisely to the will of the president: he is the mere organ by whom that
will is communicated. The acts of such an officer, as an officer, can never be examinable by the courts. But
when the legislature proceeds to impose on that officer other duties; when he is directed peremptorily to
perform certain acts; when the rights of individuals are dependent on the performance of those acts; he is so
far the officer of the law; is amenable to the laws for his conduct; and cannot, at his discretion, sport away the
vested rights of others.

Where the heads of departments are the political or confidential agents of the executive, merely to execute the
will of the president, merely to execute the will of the president, or rather to act in cases in which the executive
possesses a constitutional or legal discretion, nothing can be more perfectly clear, than that their acts are only
politically examinable. But where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the
performance of that duty, it seems equally clear, that the individual who conducts himself injured, has a right to
resort to the laws of his country for a remedy.

The power of nominating to the senate, and the power of appointing the person nominated, are political
powers, to be exercised by the president, according to his own discretion. When he has made an appointment,
he has exercised his whole power, and his discretion, has been completely applied to the case. If, by law, the
officer be removable at the will of the president, then a new appointment may be immediately made, and the
rights of the officer are terminated. But as a fact which has existed, cannot be made never to have existed, the
appointment cannot be annihilated; and consequently, if the officer is by law not removable at the will of the
president, the rights he has acquired are protected by the law, and are not resumable by the president. They
cannot be extinguished by executive authority, and he has the privilege of asserting them in like manner, as if
they had been derived from any other source.

The question whether a right has vested or not, is, in its nature, judicial and must be tried by the judicial
authority.

That by signing the commission of Mr. Marbury, the President, appointed him a justice of peace for the county
of Washington and that the seal of the United States, is conclusive testimony of the verity of the signature, and
the completion of the appointment; and that the appointment conferred on him a legal right to the office for the
space of 5 years.

WHETHER HE IS ENTITLED TO THE REMEDY FOR WHICH HE APPLIES? NO

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the United States affixed by Marshall as
Secretary of State late the same day,
but Adams term expired before all the
commissions could be delivered John
Marshalls brother, James, who returned
four undelivered certificates to the
Secretary of States office. Upon
entering office, James Madison, the
new Secretary of State, under
instructions from President Jefferson,
refused to deliver these four remaining
commissions, whereupon William
Marbury, one of the four designated but
uncertified judges, brought suit to
recover his commission directly with the
Supreme Court to vindicate his right to
the commission under section 13 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789 by issuing a writ
of mandamus directing Secretary of
State Madison to deliver the certificate.

It is not by the office of the persons to whom the writ is directed, but the nature of the thing to be done, that
the propriety or impropriety of issuing a mandamus. Where the head of a department acts in a case, in which
executive discretion is to be exercised; in which he is the mere organ of executive will; any application to a
court would be rejected without hesitation. Where he is directed by law to do a certain act, affecting the
absolute rights of individuals, in the performance of which he is not placed under the particular direction of the
president. This, then is a plain case for mandamus.

It is emphatically, the province and duty of the judicial department, to say what the law is. If the legislature
shall do what is expressly forbidden, such act, notwithstanding the express prohibition, is in reality effectual.
The complaint must be discharged.
FUNCTIONS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
a. Legitimizing function
b. Checking function
c. Symbolic or Educational function
SALONGA VS. PANO A rash of bombings occurred in the MM
area in the 1980. On Sept. 1980, Victor
Burns Lovely almost killed himself and
injured his younger brother, Romeo as
a result of an explosion of a small bomb
inside his room. Found in his possession
were several pictures taken at the
birthday party of former Cong. Raul
Daza held at the latters residence.
Jovito Salonga and his wife were among
those whose likeness appeared in the
group pictures together with other
guests including Lovely.

Bombs again exploded in MM. The
younger brother of Lovely, Romeo, was
presented during the conference. In his
interview he had stated that he drove
WHETHER SALONGA MAY BE PROSECUTED UNDER THE AMENDED INFORMATION? NO.

The respondents admit that no evidence was presented directly linking Salonga to actual acts of violence or
terrorism. There is no proof of his direct participation in any overt acts of subversion. He is tagged as a leader of
subversive organizations for 2 reasons:
1. his house was used as a contact point;
2. he mentioned some kind of violent struggle in the Philippines being most likely should reforms be not
instituted by Pres. Marcos immediately.

A PI is imperative upon the fiscal or the judge to relieve the accused of the pain of going through trial once it is
ascertained that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a prima facie case or that no probable cause exists to
form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused. The judge or the fiscal should not go on with the
prosecution in the hope that some credible evidence might later turn up during trial for this would be a flagrant
violation of a basic right.

The court had already deliberated on this case, a consensus on the Courts judgment had been arrived at.
Insofar was the absence of a prima facie case to warrant the filing of subversion charges, such decision was
rendered moot and academic by the action of the prosecution. Pursuant to the instructions of the Min. of

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Lovely to Salongas house twice. The
day after, news contained almost
identical headlines stating in effect that
Salonga had been linked to the various
bombings in MM.

More bombs were reported to have
exploded. Minutes after the President
had finished delivering his speech
before an international conference, a
small bomb exploded. Within the next
24 hours, arrest search seizure orders
where issued against persons who were
apparently implicated by Victor Lovely.
One of them was Salonga. Lovely
offered himself to be a state witness.
Salonga was then confined at Manila
Med. Center wherein he was placed
under arrest without specifying the
charge or charges against him. He was
transferred in an army prison camp at
Fort Bonifacio. Subsequently, he was
released for humanitarian reasons from
military custody and placed under
house arrest in the custody of Mrs.
Salonga still without the benefit of any
investigation or charges.

Complaint was filed against Salonga
accusing him of violating RA No. 1700
in relation to Art. 142, RPC. He was
allowed to leave the country before the
date of preliminary investigation to
attend a series of church conferences
and comprehensive medical
examinations (victim of a bombing
where he suffered serious disabilities).

An amended complaint was filed
against him. Salonga filed a motion to
dismiss the charges for failure of the
prosecution to establish a prima facie
case against him. The motion was
Justice, the prosecution restudied its evidence and decided to seek the exclusion of Salonga as one of the
accused in the information.

The fiscal points out however that he is not precluded from filing new charges for the same acts because
Salonga has not been arraigned and double jeopardy does not apply.

THE SETTING ASIDE OR DECLARING VOID OF INTRUSIONS OF STATE AUTHORITY INTO AREAS RESERVED BY
THE BILL OF RIGHTS FOR THE INDIVIDUAL AS CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED SPHERES WHERE EVEN THE
AWESOME POWERS OF THE GOVERNMENT MAY NOT ENTER AT WILL IS NOT THE TOTALITY OF THE COURTS
FUNCTIONS.

THE COURT ALSO HAS THE DUTY TO FORMULATE GUIDING AND CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL
PRINCIPLES, PRECEPTS, DOCTRINES OR RULES. IT HAS THE SYMBOLIC FUNCTION OF EDUCATING BENCH
AND BAR ON THE EXTENT OF PROTECTION GIVEN BY CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES.

The prosecution has taken the initiative of dropping the charges against Salonga for miserably failing to
establish a prima facie case. The court will not validate the filing of an information based on the kind of
evidence against Salonga found in the records.

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denied and the judge ordered for the
filing of an information for violation of
the Revised Anti-Subversion Act.

JAVIER VS.
COMELEC
In the elections of November 12,
1963, petitioner Paterno Javier and
respondent Felix Lomugdang ran
and were voted for the position of
municipal mayor of Culasi, Antique.
During the canvassing, it was
found that in the election return for
Precinct No. 4, respondent
Lomugdang was credited with 23
votes only, whereas in the tally
board of the same precinct, he
appeared to have obtained 83
votes.
BEI Members filed a verified
petition with the Municipal Board of
Canvassers, requesting permission
to correct the election return.
COMELEC Rep instructed the BOC
to suspend the canvassing in
precinct No. 4.
BOC did not heed the petition.
Respondent Lomugdang filed a for
judicial recounting of the votes in
Precinct No. 4 in the CFI.
BOC proceeded with the
canvassing of the returns and
proclaimed petitioner Paterno
Javier as elected mayor.
In view of this proclamation, the
case for recounting filed in the
Court of First Instance, was
dismissed.
COMELEC resolution: holding that
as the canvass of the votes cast for
the office of mayor in the election
return of Precinct No. 4 was made
in disregard of a lawful order of the
duly authorized representative of
the Commission, the proclamation
WHETHER THE COMELEC CAN ISSUE ORDER

1. While it is true that the discrepancy here appears in the figures in the election return and the tally board,
nevertheless, in the face of the verified unanimous petition of the board of inspectors informing the board
of canvassers that a clerical mistake was committed in the process of transferring the figures from the
official count in the tally board to the election return, and praying for the correction thereof, a ground
sufficient to justify the correction or amendment of such return under Section 154 of the Election Code.

Even in the Resolution of COMELEC containing specific instructions for the guidance of all boards of
canvassers is enjoined to suspend the canvass of votes cast in an affected precinct where the entry of
votes in the election return is on its face clearly falsified or not legible.


Here, the falsity of the figure on the election return, brought about by error or clerical mistake, was not
only clear on its face but attested to as a fact by all the members of the board of election inspectors of the
precinct. The directive of the Commission representative directing, under the circumstances, the
suspension of the proclamation being in order, the continuation of the canvass and consequent
proclamation of petitioner, in violation of said directive, is null and void.

2. The canvass and proclamation were made in violation of the lawful order of the Commission on Elections.
Where an election return has been amended by court order or the election return from a certain precinct
has been wrongfully or erroneously excluded by the board of canvassers, the COMELEC has the power to
order a new canvass of the returns even after a proclamation had already been made.

The underlying
theory therefore is the ministerial duty of the board of canvassers to base the proclamation on the election
returns of all the precincts of the municipality.

Where the board of canvassers, with knowledge that the
return from one precinct is undoubtedly vitiated by clerical mistake, continued the canvass and proclaimed
a winner based on the result of such canvass, the proclamation cannot be said to have been in faithful
discharge of its ministerial duty under the law.

3. Under Section 167 of the Revised Election Code,

running for a public office is not the only instance when a
member is disqualified from acting in the board of canvassers. The provision does not exclude absence or
incapacity for any lawful cause as grounds for their substitution by registered voters belonging to the party
of the replaced member. The defiance by the original members of the board of canvassers of the lawful
order and instruction of the Commission on Elections is a valid cause for their removal and substitution by
qualified persons.

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of petitioner Paterno Javier was
null and void.
So, petitioner's proclamation as
mayor-elect by the BOC was
annulled. The members of the
Board of Canvassers were
suspended, and Atty. Del Castillo
was authorized to appoint any
qualified persons to act in place of
the suspended members of said
board, and to hold another canvass
of the votes cast for the office of
mayor of all the precincts, after the
true count of votes in Precinct No.
4 had been determined.
The candidates were also directed
to file the necessary petition in
court to determine the true result
of the votes cast in said precinct.
Paterno Javiers contentions:
1. COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion in issuing the
resolution for the reason that,
upon his proclamation, the
Commission had lost
jurisdiction to annul such
proclamation or the results of
the election;
2. after it had canvassed the
election returns and the
winners were proclaimed, the
municipal board of canvassers
became functus officio and can
no longer be suspended;
3. COMELEC cannot authorize its
representative, Atty. Tomas
del Castillo, to appoint new
members of the board of
canvassers its composition
being specifically designated
by law and may be substituted
only for causes and in the
manner provided in the law.

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JUSTIICIABLE QUESTION VS. POLITICAL QUESTION
AVELINO VS.
CUENCA
Senate session, Senator
Lorenzo M. Taada requested
that his right to speak on the
next session day to formulate
charges against the then
Senate President Jose Avelino
(SPA) be reserved. His request
was approved.
Senator Taada and Senator
Prospero Sanidad filed with the
Secretary of the Senate a
resolution enumerating
charges against then SPA and
ordering the investigation.
SPA has been delaying the
session first by delaying his
appearance at the session hall;
second, when he did not
dispense with the roll call;
third, when he did not
dispense with the reading of
the minutes.
Senator Taada repeatedly
stood up to claim his right to
deliver his speech but the SPA
continuosly ignored him; then,
when Sen David moved for
adjournment, SPA suddenly
recognized him and adjourned
the session and banged the
gavel and abandoning the
Chair.
Senator Arranz, Senate
President Pro-tempore, urged
by those senators present took
the Chair and proceeded with
the session.
Senate President Pro-tempore
Arranz suggested that
respondent be designated to
preside over the session which
suggestion was carried

Does the Court have jurisdiction over the subject-matter?
NO. In view of the separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy and the constitutional grant to
the Senate of the power to elect its own president, which power should not be interfered with, nor taken over,
by the judiciary. We refused to take cognizance of the Vera case even if the rights of the electors of the
suspended senators were alleged affected without any immediate remedy.
Selection of the presiding officer affect only the Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose
their officers, change or reinstate them. Anyway, if, as the petition must imply to be acceptable, the majority of
the Senators want petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall not in the Supreme Court.
The Court will not sally into the legitimate domain of the Senate on the plea that our refusal to intercede might
lead into a crisis, even a resolution. No state of things has been proved that might change the temper of the
Filipino people as a peaceful and law-abiding citizen. And we should not allow ourselves to be stampeded into a
rash action inconsistent with the calm that should characterized judicial deliberations.



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unanimously.
Senator Taada was able to
deliver his privilege speech.
Thereafter Senator Sanidad
read aloud the complete text
of said Resolution (No. 68),
and submitted his motion for
approval and the same was
unanimously approved.
Senator Sanidad introduced
Resolution No. 67, entitled
"Resolution declaring vacant
the position of the President of
the Senate and designated the
Honorable Mariano Jesus
Cuenco Acting President of the
Senate." Put to a vote, the
said resolution was
unanimously approved.
Senator Cuenco took the
oath.President of the
Philippines recognized the
respondent as acting president
of the Philippines Senate.

SANIDAD VS.
COMELEC
President Ferdinand Marcos issued PD
991 calling for a national referendum
for the Citizens Assemblies
("barangays") to resolve the issues of
martial law, the I. assembly, its
replacement, the powers of such
replacement, the period of its existence,
the length of the period for tile exercise
by the President of his present powers.

Twenty days after, the President issued
another related decree, PD 1031
amending the previous PD 991, by
declaring the provisions of PD 229,
providing for the manner of voting and
canvass of votes in "barangays"
WHETHER THE QUESTION ON THE REFERENDUM-PLEBISCITE IS A POLITICAL QUESTION?

The petitioners possess locus standi to challenge the constitutional premise of PD Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033.
The valid source of a stature PD are of such nature-may be contested by one who will sustain a direct injuries as
a in result of its enforcement. At the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public funds
may be enjoined, upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose
of executing an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds. The breadth of PD 991 carries all
appropriation for the effective implementation of its purposes.

The amending process both as to proposal and ratification, raises a judicial question. This is
especially true in cases where the power of the Presidency to initiate the of normally exercised by the
legislature, is seriously doubted. Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the power to propose amendments
to the constitution resides in the interim National Assembly in the period of transition. After that period, and the
regular National Assembly in its active session, the power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the
prerogative of the regular National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 constitution). The normal
course has not been followed. Rather than calling the National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent

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(Citizens Assemblies) applicable to the
national referendum-plebiscite. Quite
relevantly, PD 1031 repealed Section 4,
of PD 991.

On the same date, the President issued
PD 1033, stating the questions to be
submitted to the people in the
referendum-plebiscite. The Decree
recites in its "whereas" clauses that the
people's continued opposition to the
convening of the National Assembly
evinces their desire to have such body
abolished and replaced thru a
constitutional amendment, providing for
a legislative body, which will be
submitted directly to the people in the
referendum-plebiscite.

SANIDAD commenced this action for
Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction
seeking to enjoin the COMELEC from
holding and conducting the Referendum
Plebiscite; to declare without force and
effect PD Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as
they propose amendments to the
Constitution, as well as PD 1031,
insofar as it directs the COMELEC to
supervise, control, hold, and conduct
the Referendum-Plebiscite.

Petitioners contend that under the 1935
and 1973 Constitutions there is no
grant to the incumbent President to
exercise the constituent power to
propose amendments to the new
Constitution. As a consequence, the
Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16
has no constitutional or legal basis.
The Solicitor General principally
maintains that petitioners have no
standing to sue; the issue raised is
political in nature, beyond judicial
assembly the incumbent President undertook the proposal of amendments and submitted the proposed
amendments thru Presidential Decree 1033 to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16.
Unavoidably, the regularity of the procedure for amendments, written in lambent words in the very Constitution
sought to be amended, raises a contestable issue. The implementing PDs, which commonly purport to have the
force and effect of legislation are assailed as invalid, thus the issue of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a
justiciable one, within the competence of this Court to pass upon.

Section 2(2), Article X of the new Constitution provides: "All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty,
executive agreement, or law may shall be heard and decided by the Supreme Court en banc and no treaty,
executive agreement, or law may be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least ten Members.
..." The Supreme Court has the last word in the construction not only of treaties and statutes, but also of the
Constitution itself The amending, like all other powers organized in the Constitution, is in form a delegated and
hence a limited power, so that the Supreme Court is vested with that authorities to determine whether that
power has been discharged within its limits.

Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, of the legality of a particular act. Where
the vortex of the controversy refers to the legality or validity of the contested act, that matter is definitely
justiciable or non-political. What is in the heels of the Court is not the wisdom of the act of the incumbent
President in proposing amendments to the Constitution, but his constitutional authority to perform such act or to
assume the power of a constituent assembly. Whether the amending process confers on the President that
power to propose amendments is therefore a downright justiciable question. If the Constitution provides how it
may be amended, the judiciary as the interpreter of that Constitution, can declare whether the procedure
followed or the authority assumed was valid or not.



Whether, therefore, the constitutional provision has been followed or not is the proper subject of
inquiry, not by the people themselves of course who exercise no power of judicial but by the
Supreme Court in whom the people themselves vested that power, a power which includes the
competence to determine whether the constitutional norms for amendments have been observed
or not.

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cognizance of this Court; at this state of
the transition period, only the
incumbent President has the authority
to exercise constituent power; the
referendum-plebiscite is a step towards
normalization.
GONZALES VS.
COMELEC

Senate and the House of
Representatives passed the
following resolutions:
R. B. H. (Resolution of Both
Houses) No. 1, proposing that
Section 5, Article VI, of the
Constitution of the Philippines,
be amended so as to increase
the membership of the House
of Representatives from a
maximum of 120, as provided
in the present Constitution, to
a maximum of 180, to be
apportioned among the several
provinces as nearly as may be
according to the number of
their respective inhabitants,
although each province shall
have, at least, one (1)
member;
R. B. H. No. 2, calling a
convention to propose
amendments to said
Constitution, the convention to
be composed of two (2)
elective delegates from each
representative district, to be
"elected in the general
elections to be held on the
second Tuesday of November,
1971;" and
R. B. H. No. 3, proposing that
Section 16, Article VI, of the
same Constitution, be

Whether a Resolution of Congress acting as a constituent assembly violates the Constitution
and reviewable by the SC?-YES
As early as Angara vs. Electoral Commission,

SC declared that "the judicial department is the only constitutional
organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments
and among the integral or constituent units thereof." It is true that in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, this Court
characterizing the issue submitted thereto as a political one, declined to pass upon the question whether or not
a given number of votes cast in Congress in favor of a proposed amendment to the Constitution which was
being submitted to the people for ratification satisfied the three-fourths vote requirement of the fundamental
law. The force of this precedent has been weakened, however, by Suanes vs. Chief Accountant of the Senate,
Avelino vs. Cuenco, Taada vs. Cuenco, and Macias.
Thus we rejected the theory, advanced in these four (4) cases, that the issues therein raised were political
questions the determination of which is beyond judicial review.
The power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments is not included in the general grant of
legislative powers to Congress. It is part of the inherent powers of the people as the repository of sovereignty
in a republican state, such as ours to make, and, hence, to amend their own Fundamental Law. Congress may
propose amendments to the Constitution merely because the same explicitly grants such power.

Hence, when exercising the same, it is said that Senators and Members of the House of Representatives act, not
as members of Congress, but as component elements of a constituent assembly. When acting as such, the
members of Congress derive their authority from the Constitution, unlike the people, when performing the same
function, for their authority does not emanate from the Constitution they are the very source of all powers of
government, including the Constitution itself.

Since, when proposing, as a constituent assembly, amendments to the Constitution, the members of Congress
derive their authority from the Fundamental Law, it follows, necessarily, that they do not have the final say on
whether or not their acts are within or beyond constitutional limits. Otherwise, they could brush aside and set
the same at naught, contrary to the basic tenet that ours is a government of laws, not of men, and to the rigid
nature of our Constitution. Such rigidity is stressed by the fact that, the Constitution expressly confers upon the
Supreme Court, the power to declare a treaty unconstitutional, despite the eminently political character of

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amended so as to authorize
Senators and members of the
House of Representatives to
become delegates to the
aforementioned constitutional
convention, without forfeiting
their respective seats in
Congress.
Subsequently, Congress
passed a bill, which, upon
approval by the President,
became Republic Act No.
4913, providing that the
amendments to the
Constitution proposed in the
aforementioned Resolutions
No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for
approval by the people, at the
general elections.

treaty-making power.
In short, the issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress acting as a constituent assembly violates the
Constitution essentially justiciable, not political, and, hence, subject to judicial review, and, to the extent that
this view may be inconsistent with the stand taken in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, the latter should be deemed
modified accordingly. The Members of the Court are unanimous on this point.


MIRANDA VS.
AGUIRRE
Petitioners: Miranda (mayor of
Santiago City), Afiado (President of
the Liga ng mga Bgy ng Santiago
City), Dirige, Cabuyadao, Babaran
(residents of Santiago City)
Respondents: Aguirre (Exec
Sec), Velasco (Sec of Local Govt) et
al
RA 7720: converted the
municipality of Santiago, Isabela
into an independent component
City. This was ratified by the
people of Santiago in a plebiscite
on July 4, 1994.
In 1998, RA 8528 (amending RA
7720) was passed converting City
of Santiago, Isabela from an
INDEPENDENT COMPONENT CITY
to a COMPONENT CITY. In effect,
the law downgraded Santiago City
from an independent component
IS A PLEBISCITE NECESSARY? YES

1. On the issue of locus standi: the constitutionality of a law can be challenged by one who will sustain a
direct injury as a result of its enforcement. Petitioner Miranda was the mayor of Santiago City when he
filed the petition in his own right as mayor and not on behalf of the city. Hence, he did not need the
consent of the city council of Santiago City. It is also indubitable that the change of status of the city
of Santiago from independent component city to a mere component city will affect his powers as
mayor.

2. On the issue of the court should back off from assuming jurisdiction over the case at bar on the ground
that it involved a political question. The case involves a JUSTICIABLE ISSUE, not a POLITICAL
QUESTION.

Political Question Justiciable Issue
A question of policy. It refers to those questions
which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by
the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard
to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of
the government. It is concerned with issues
In Casibang vs Aquino
A purely justiciable issue implies a given right, legally
demandable and enforceable, an act or omission
violative of such right, and a remedy granted and
sanctioned by law, for said breach of right.
The case falls here. The petitioners claim that

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city to a mere component. This
meant that the city mayor will be
placed under the administrative
supervision of the provincial
governor. It also meant that
resolution and ordinances of the
city council of Santiago will have to
be reviewed by the Provincial
Board of Isabela. In addition,
taxes that will be collected by the
city will now have to be shared
with the province.
Thus, the petitioners assailed the
constitutionality of such law on the
ground that it was not submitted
for ratification of the people of
Santiago City in a proper plebiscite.
Respondents argue that RA 8528
need not be ratified in a plebiscite
because it merely RECLASSIFIED
Santiago City from an independent
component city to a component
city. It allegedly did not involve
any creation, division, merger,
abolition or substantial alteration of
boundaries of local govt units.
They also argue that; the
petitioners do not have locus
standi, the court has no jurisdiction
of the case, it being a political
question,
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a
particular measure.
under Sec 10 Art X of the 1987 Consti, they
have a right to approve or disapprove RA 8528
in a plesbiscite before it can be enforced. It
ought to be self-evident that WON petitioners
have the said right is a LEGAL and not a
political question. For WON laws passed by
Congress comply with the requirements of the
Constitution, pose questions that this Court
alone can decide.

3. The power to create, divide, merge abolish or substantially alter boundaries of local government unit
belongs to Congress. However, this power must also be in accord with the mandate of the
Constitution. The issue depends on WON the reclassification falls within the ambit of create, divide,
merge, abolish, or substantially alter A close analysis of the Constitutional provision

Sec 10 Art X: No province, city, municipality or bgy may be created, divded, merged, abolished or ts
boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local govt code and
subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast ina plebiscite in the political units directly affected

reveals that such provisions refers to a MATERIAL CHANGE in the political and economic rights of the
local govt units. It is precisely for this reason that the Constitution requires the approval of the people in
the political units directly affected.

PETITION IS GRANTED. RA 8528 is declared unconstitutional and the writ of prohibition is issued commanding
respondents to desist from implementing said law.
REQUISITES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
DAVID VS. ARROYO Requisites of Judicial Review
The concept of judicial review as enunciated in Marbury v. Madison rests on the extraordinary simple foundation --
The Constitution is the supreme law. It was ordained by the people, the ultimate source of all political authority. It confers limited
powers on the national government. x x x If the government consciously or unconsciously oversteps these limitations there
must be some authority competent to hold it in control, to thwart its unconstitutional attempt, and thus to vindicate
and preserve inviolate the will of the people as expressed in the Constitution. This power the courts exercise. This is
the beginning and the end of the theory of judicial review.
But the power of judicial review does not repose upon the courts a "self-starting capacity." Courts may exercise such power only when
the following requisites are present:

first, there must be an actual case or controversy-- An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal right, an opposite legal

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claims susceptible of judicial resolution. It is "definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interest;"
a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief.
second, petitioners have to raise a question of constitutionality;
third, the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and
fourth, the decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.

There is no question that the issues being raised affect the publics interest, involving as they do the peoples basic rights to freedom of
expression, of assembly and of the press. Moreover, the Court has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional precepts,
doctrines or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating the bench and the bar, and in the present petitions, the military and the
police, on the extent of the protection given by constitutional guarantees.
35
And lastly, respondents contested actions are capable of
repetition. Certainly, the petitions are subject to judicial review.

Mootness v. Ripeness
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration
thereon would be of no practical use or value. Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness.
The Court holds that President Arroyos issuance of PP 1021 did not render the present petitions moot and academic. During the eight
(8) days that PP 1017 was operative, the police officers, according to petitioners, committed illegal acts in implementing it. Are PP
1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitutional or valid? Do they justify these alleged illegal acts? These are the vital issues that must
be resolved in the present petitions. It must be stressed that "an unconstitutional act is not a law, it confers no rights, it
imposes no duties, it affords no protection; it is in legal contemplation, inoperative." The "moot and academic" principle is
not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and
academic, if:
first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution;
second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved;
third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and
fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
REQUISTES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW: ACTUAL CASE / CONTROVERSY: MOOTNESS VS. RIPENESS
DAVID VS. ARROYO
GONZALES VS.
NARVASA

Petitioner: Ramon Gonzales (in
his capacity as citizen and
taxpayer)
Respondents: Andres Narvsa
(Chairman of the Preparatory
Commission on Constitutional
Reforms), Ronaldo Zamora
(Exec Sec), Commission on Audit,
Robert Aventajado (Presidential
Consultant on Council of Economic
Advisers)
In this petition for prohibition and
mandamus filed on December 9,
1999, petitioner Ramon A.
HAS THE ISSUE BECOME MOOT AND ACADEMIC? YES

An action is considered "moot" when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues involved
have become academic or dead. Under E.O. No. 43, the PCCR was instructed to complete its task on or before
June 30, 1999. However, on February 19, 1999, the President issued Executive Order No. 70 (E.O. No. 70),
which extended the time frame for the completion of the commission's work, viz

SECTION 6. Section 8 is hereby amended to read as follows:
Time Frame. The Commission shall commence its work on 01 January 1999 and complete
the same on or before 31 December 1999. The Commission shall submit its report
and recommendations to the President within fifteen (15) working days from 31
December 1999.
The PCCR submitted its recommendations to the President on December 20, 1999 and was dissolved by
the President on the same day. It had likewise spent the funds allotted to it. Thus, the PCCR

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Gonzales, in his capacity as a
citizen and taxpayer, assails the
constitutionality of the creation of
the Preparatory Commission on
Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and
of the positions of presidential
consultants, advisers and
assistants.
He seeks to enjoin the PCCR and
the presidential consultants,
advisers and assistants from acting
as such, and to enjoin Executive
Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora from
enforcing their advice and
recommendations. In addition,
petitioner seeks to enjoin the
Commission on Audit from passing
in audit expenditures for the PCCR
and the presidential consultants,
advisers and assistants. Finally,
petitioner prays for an order
compelling respondent Zamora to
furnish petitioner with information
on certain matters.

(What is the PCCR? The
Preparatory Commission on
Constitutional Reform (PCCR) was
created by President Estrada on
November 26, 1998 by virtue of
Executive Order No. 43 (E.O. No.
43) in order "to study and
recommend proposed
amendments and/or revisions to
the 1987 Constitution, and the
manner of implementing the
same)

Petitioner disputes the
constitutionality of the PCCR on
two grounds. First, he contends
that it is a public office which only
the legislature can create by way of
has ceased to exist, having lost its raison d'etre. Subsequent events have overtaken the
petition and the Court has nothing left to resolve.

Other issues to take note of:
Petitioner was considered by the court as not have legal standing because he has not suffered nor is he in
danger of suffering some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of govt.
Petitioner was obliged and allowed to inspect the requested documents. But the court reminded him that in the
final analysis, it is for the courts to determine, on a case to case basis, whether the matter at issue is of interest
or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.

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a law. Secondly, petitioner asserts
that by creating such a body the
President is intervening in a
process from which he is totally
excluded by the Constitution the
amendment of the fundamental
charter.
It is alleged by respondents that,
with respect to the PCCR, this case
has become moot and academic.
REQUISITES FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW: ACTUAL CASE OR CONTOVERSY: STANDING OF A PARTY
PASCUAL VS.
SECRETARY
Pascual, the Provincial Governor of
Rizal, instituted an action for
declaratory relief with injunction
assailing RA 920 An Act Appropriating
Funds for Public Works "for the
construction, reconstruction, repair,
extension and improvement" of Pasig
feeder road terminal; that, at the time
of the passage and approval of said Act,
the feeder roads were "nothing but
projected and planned subdivision
roads, not yet constructed, which "do
not connect any government property
or any important premises to the main
highway"; that the Antonio Subdivision
(as well as the lands on which said
feeder roads were to be construed)
were private properties of Jose C.
Zulueta, who, at the time of the
passage and approval of said Act, was a
member of the Senate of the
Philippines.

Zulueta offered to donate said
projected feeder roads; that the offer
was accepted by the council, subject to
the condition "that the donor would
submit a plan of the said roads and
agree to change the names of two of
them"; that no deed of donation in
favor of the municipality of Pasig was,
however, executed.
WHETHER PASCUAL HAD THE LEGAL CAPACITY TO ASSAIL THE VALIDITY OF THE
APPROPRIATION? YES.
LC: since public interest is involved in this case, the Provincial Governor of Rizal and the provincial fiscal who
represents him therein, "have the requisite personalities" to question the constitutionality of the disputed item of
RA 920; that "the legislature is without power appropriate public revenues for anything but a public purpose",
that the instructions and improvement of the feeder roads in question, if such roads where private property,
would not be a public purpose; that, being subject to a condition:

upon the condition that the Government of the Republic of the Philippines will use the parcels of land hereby
donated for street purposes only and for no other purposes whatsoever;

which is onerous, the donation in question is a contract; that said donation or contract is "absolutely forbidden
by the Constitution" and consequently "illegal", for Article 1409 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, declares in
existence and void from the very beginning contracts "whose cause, objector purpose is contrary to law, morals
. . . or public policy"; that the legality of said donation may not be contested, however, by petitioner herein,
because his "interest are not directly affected" thereby; and that, accordingly, the appropriation in question
"should be upheld" and the case dismissed.

SC: As regards the legal feasibility of appropriating public funds for a public purpose, the principle according to
Ruling Case Law, is this:
It is a general rule that the legislature is without power to appropriate public revenue for anything but a public
purpose. It is the essential character of the direct object of the expenditure which must determine its validity as
justifying a tax, and not the magnitude of the interest to be affected nor the degree to which the general
advantage of the community, and thus the public welfare, may be ultimately benefited by their promotion.
Incidental to the public or to the state, which results from the promotion of private interest and
the prosperity of private enterprises or business, does not justify their aid by the use public
money.

Referring to the P85,000.00 appropriation for the projected feeder roads in question, the legality thereof
depended upon whether said roads were public or private property when the bill, which, latter on, became RA
920, was passed by Congress, or, when said bill was approved by the President and the disbursement of said
sum became effective. Inasmuch as the land on which the projected feeder roads were to be constructed

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Inasmuch as the projected feeder roads
in question were private property at the
time of the passage and approval of RA
920, the appropriation made, for the
construction, reconstruction, repair,
extension and improvement of said
projected feeder roads, was illegal and,
therefore, void ab initio"; that said
appropriation was made by Congress
because its members were made to
believe that the projected feeder roads
in question were "public roads and not
private streets of a private subdivision"';
that, "in order to give a semblance of
legality, Zulueta executed while he was
a member of the Senate of the
Philippines, an alleged deed of donation
in favor of the Government which was
accepted by the then Executive
Secretary; that being subject to an
onerous condition, said donation
partook of the nature of a contract;
that, such, said donation violated the
provision of our fundamental law
prohibiting members of Congress from
being directly or indirectly financially
interested in any contract with the
Government, and, hence, is
unconstitutional, as well as null and
void ab initio.

Respondents moved to dismiss the
petition on the ground that Pascual had
no legal capacity to sue.
belonged then to Zulueta, the result is that said appropriation sought a private purpose, and hence, was null
and void.

The validity of a statute may be contested only by one who will sustain a direct injury in consequence of its
enforcement. Yet, there are many decisions nullifying, at the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for
the disbursement of public funds, upon the theory that "the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the
State for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds," which
may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer.



The general rule is that not only persons individually affected, but also [exception:] taxpayers, have
sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of moneys raised by taxation and may
therefore question the constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure of public moneys.

Pascual is not merely a taxpayer. The Province of Rizal, which he represents officially as its Provincial Governor,
is our most populated political subdivision,and, the taxpayers therein bear a substantial portion of the burden of
taxation, in the Philippines.
BUGNAY
CONSTRUCTION VS.
LARON

The City of Dagupan awarded a lease
contract in favor of respondent P and M
Agro-Development Corporation (P and
M) over a city lot called the Magsaysay
Market Area. By reason of P and M's
failure to comply with the conditions of
the contract, the City filed an action to
rescind the lease contract.
WHETHER RAVANZO HAD THE LEGAL PERSONALITY TO ASSAIL THE CONTRACT OF LEASE? NO.

THE LEASE CONTRACT ENTERED INTO BETWEEN PETITIONER AND THE CITY SHOWS THAT NO PUBLIC
FUNDS HAVE BEEN OR WILL BE USED IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE MARKET BUILDING-- The terms of the
contract reveal that petitioner shall finance the project, the capital investment to be recovered from the rental
fees due from the stallholders.
There is regrettable vacuity in respondent Ravanzo's insistence that he is suing for "Injunction with Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order" whereas P and M's action is for "Injunction with Prayer

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This case was decided in favor of the
City on the basis of a "Joint
Manifestation" of both parties.

Upon
motion of the City, a writ of execution
was issued ordering the immediate
delivery of the possession of the
premises to the movant City.

Thereafter P and M filed a MR, through
counsel, private respondent Ravanzo.
However, it was only when the incident
was resolved by the court which set
aside the decision previously rendered
on the ground that the joint
manifestation on which it was based is
not in the nature of a compromise
agreement for the following reasons:
(1) the joint manifestation was not
signed by the party plaintiff; (2) the
said pleading did not pray that a
decision be rendered based thereon;
(3) if the parties really intended it to be
a compromise agreement, they should
have entitled it as such; (4) the parties
agreed that the joint manifestation is
without prejudice to the continuance of
the case, which is contrary to the very
nature of a compromise agreement in
that it terminates the case upon the
court's approval thereof ; (5) the joint
manifestation did not specify the
"proposed terms and conditions"
offered by P and M, hence it cannot be
a valid basis for a judgment on
compromise which requires that the
terms and conditions be spelled out
clearly in order that the court may
determine whether they are in
accordance with law, public policy,
public order, and good customs; and
(6) the alleged proposals are subject to
the review of the proper government
for Preliminary Injunction, Annulment of Contract and Temporary Restraining Order" which actions, so he
claims, seek distinct and different reliefs. Indeed, it is empty verbiage to deny that in Case No. D-8696 Ravanzo
is actually asking for the declaration of the nullity of the lease contract executed by the City and petitioner,
which is also what is prayed for by P and M in Case No. D-8664.

Undeniably, whatever judgment may be rendered in Case No. D-8664 (P&M) will necessarily constitute res
judicata in Case No. D-8696 (Ravanzo). And, it is too entrenched a rule brooking no dissent that a party cannot,
by varying the form of action or adopting a different method of presenting his case, escape theation of the
principle that one and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated.

As to the taxpayers suit to confer standing: only when the act complained of directly involves an illegal
disbursement of public funds raised by taxation win the taxpayer's suit be allowed. The essence of a
taxpayer's right to institute such an action hinges on the existence of that requisite pecuniary or monetary
interest. Accordingly, there was that absence of the requisite pecuniary or monetary interest.

Objections to a taxpayer's suit for lack of sufficient personality standing or interest are procedural
matters. Considering the importance to the public of a suit assailing the constitutionality of a tax law, and in
keeping with the Court's duty, specially explicated in the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the
other branches of the Government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and
that they have not abused the discretion given to them, the Supreme Court may brush aside
technicalities of procedure and take cognizance of the suit.

However, for the above rule to apply, it is exigent that the taxpayer-plaintiff sufficiently show that he
would be benefited or injured by the judgment or entitled to the avails of the suit as a real party in
interest. Before he can invoke the power of judicial review, he must specifically prove that he has
sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he will
sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient
that he has merely a general interest common to an members of the public.

No disbursement of public funds, legal or otherwise, being involved in the challenged transaction, the locus
stand claimed by Ravanzo is non-existent.

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agencies, which is not allowed in a
judgment on compromise wherein only
the court may determine the legality
thereof. The City's MR was denied.

During the pendency of the resolution
on the MR filed by P and M, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of
Dagupan adopted Resolution
"Authorizing the City Mayor to Enter
Into a Contract of Lease with Bugnay
Construction over that Parcel of Lot
owned by the City of Dagupan.

Pursuant to said resolution, Bugnay
entered into a contract of lease with the
City over the Magsaysay Market Area,
for a period of twenty (20) years to
begin from the date when the
stallholders in the area aforementioned
shall be relocated, with the obligation to
turn over, without demand, the entire
market building and all attached
appurtenances to the lessor City upon
the expiration of the lease period. Upon
the fulfillment of the condition for the
commencement of the term of the
lease, i.e., the relocation of the
stallholders in the area, petitioner
immediately started its construction
work.

P and M filed an action for "Injunction
with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction
and Temporary Restraining Order,
Annulment of Contract, and Damages"
against the City. In its complaint, P and
M averred that inasmuch as Civil Case
was still pending, its lease contract with
the City continued to exist, hence the
lease contract executed by the City with
Bugnay is allegedly null and void ab
initio and an ultra vires act. P and M
consequently prayed that petitioner be

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enjoined from continuing with the
construction of the market building.

Private respondent Ravanzo, Jr.,
professedly in his capacity as a resident
and taxpayer of Dagupan City, filed
with RTC in Dagupan City the present
action for "Injunction with Preliminary
Injunction and Temporary Restraining
Order and Damages" against the City of
Dagupan. As party plaintiff and on the
basis of the very same facts alleged in
Civil Case of P and M, Ravanzo attacked
the legality of the contract of lease
entered into between the City and
Bugnay alleging thirty (30) reasons in
his complaint why the contract should
be declared null and void

The City and its Acting Mayor filed a
motion to dismiss on the grounds that
plaintiff Ravanzo is not the real party in
interest; the complaint states no cause
of action; there is another action
pending between the same parties
involving the same subject matter,
issues, purpose and prayer; and, in
effect, there was forum-shopping.


types of standing: citizen
Tatad vs. Garcia Francisco S. Tatad, John H. Osmena and Rodolfo G. Biazon are
members of the Philippine Senate and are suing in their capacities as
Senators and as taxpayers. Respondent Jesus B. Garcia, Jr. is the
incumbent Secretary of the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC), while private respondent EDSA LRT
Corporation, Ltd. is a private corporation organized under the laws of
Whether Tatad et al has standing to file the instant suit? YES.
The prevailing doctrines in taxpayer's suits are to allow taxpayers to question contracts entered
into by the national government or government-owned or controlled corporations allegedly in
contravention of the law (Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona) and to disallow the same when only
municipal contracts are involved (Bugnay Construction and Development Corporation v. Laron).

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Hongkong.
Petitioners are assailing the grant of ownership of EDSA LRT III to EDSA
LRT Corporation, a foreign corporation. The Build-Lease-Transfer
scheme for the construction of the railway was also assailed as illegal.
OSG claimed that Tatad et al are not the real parties-in-interest and
have no legal standing to institute the present petition
For as long as the ruling in Kilosbayan on locus standi is not reversed, we have no choice but to
follow it and uphold the legal standing of petitioners as taxpayers to institute the present
action.
types of standing: associational
IBP vs. Zamora In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, the
President, in a verbal directive, ordered the PNP and the Marines to
conduct joint visibility patrols for the purpose of crime prevention and
suppression. The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (the AFP), the Chief of the PNP
and the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government were tasked to
execute and implement the said order. In compliance with the
presidential mandate, the PNP Chief, through Police Chief
Superintendent Edgar B. Aglipay, formulated Letter of Instruction
02/2000 (the LOI) which detailed the manner by which the joint
visibility patrols, called Task ForceTu lu n g an, would be conducted.
Task Force Tulungan was placed under the leadership of the Police
Chief of Metro Manila.
Subsequently, the President confirmed his previous directive on the
deployment of the Marines in a Memorandum, dated 24 January 2000,
addressed to the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the PNP Chief. In the
Memorandum, the President expressed his desire to improve the
peace and order situation in Metro Manila through a more effective
crime prevention program including increased police patrols. The
President further stated that to heighten police visibility in the
metropolis, augmentation from the AFP is necessary. Invoking his
powers as Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP
Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and
utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing
criminal or lawless violence. Finally, the President declared that the
Whether the Integrated Bar of the Philippines has legal standing to petition for the
annulment of the LOI and to assail the constitutionality of the declaration of deployment of
the Philippine Marines? NO.
In the case at bar, the IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold
the rule of law and the Constitution. Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no
other basis in support of its locus standi. The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve
the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with
standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups and the
whole citizenry. Based on the standards, the IBP has failed to present a specific and substantial
interest in the resolution of the case. Its fundamental purpose which, under Section 2, Rule 139-
A of the Rules of Court, is to elevate the standards of the law profession and to improve the
administration of justice is alien to, and cannot be affected by the deployment of the Marines.
It should also be noted that the interest of the National President of the IBP who signed the
petition, is his alone, absent a formal board resolution authorizing him to file the present
action. To be sure, members of the BAR, those in the judiciary included, have varying opinions
on the issue.
Moreover, the IBP, assuming that it has duly authorized the National President to file the
petition, has not shown any specific injury which it has suffered or may suffer by virtue of the
questioned governmental act. Indeed, none of its members, whom the IBP purportedly
represents, has sustained any form of injury as a result of the operation of the joint visibility
patrols. Neither is it alleged that any of its members has been arrested or that their civil
liberties have been violated by the deployment of the Marines. What the IBP projects as
injurious is the supposed militarization of law enforcement which might threaten Philippine
democratic institutions and may cause more harm than good in the long run. Not only is the
presumed injury not personal in character, it is likewise too vague, highly speculative and
uncertain to satisfy the requirement of standing. Since petitioner has not successfully

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services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely
temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time
when the situation shall have improved.
The selected areas of deployment under the LOI are: Monumento
Circle, North Edsa (SM City), Araneta Shopping Center, Greenhills, SM
Megamall, Makati Commercial Center, LRT/MRT Stations and the NAIA
and Domestic Airport.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (the IBP) filed the instant
petition to annul LOI 02/2000 and to declare the deployment of the
Philippine Marines, null and void and unconstitutional. Asserting itself
as the official organization of Filipino lawyers tasked with the bounden
duty to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution, the IBP questions
the validity of the deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist
the PNP in law enforcement.


established a direct and personal injury as a consequence of the questioned act, it does not
possess the personality to assail the validity of the deployment of the Marines. This Court,
however, does not categorically rule that the IBP has absolutely no standing to raise
constitutional issues now or in the future. The IBP must, byway of allegations and proof, satisfy
this Court that it has sufficient stake to obtain judicial resolution of the controversy.
(Having stated the foregoing, it must be emphasized that this Court has the discretion to take
cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirement of legal standing when paramount
interest is involved. In not a few cases, the Court has adopted a liberal attitude on the locus
standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance
to the people Thus, when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, the
Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure. In this case, a reading of the petition shows
that the IBP has advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in
view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Moreover, because peace and
order are under constant threat and lawless violence occurs in increasing tempo, undoubtedly
aggravated by the Mindanao insurgency problem, the legal controversy raised in the petition
almost certainly will not go away. It will stare us in the face again. It therefore, behooves the
Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issue now, rather than later.)
types of standing: taxpayers
ITF vs. COMELEC On January 24, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued
Executive Order No. 172, which allocated the sum of P2.5 billion to
fund the AES for the May 10, 2004 elections. Upon the request of
Comelec, she authorized the release of anadditional P500 million.
On January 28, 2003, the Commission issued an "Invitation to Apply for
Eligibility and to Bid".
The instant suit is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to
declare null and void Resolution No. 6074 of the Commission on
Elections (Comelec), which awarded Phase II of the Modernization
Project of the Commission to Mega Pacific Consortium (MPC).
Out of the 57 bidders, the BAC found MPC and the Total Information
Management Corporation (TIMC) eligible. For technical evaluation,
Whether the petitioners legal standing should be recognized and upheld? YES.
Our nations political and economic future virtually hangs in the balance, pending the outcome
of the 2004 elections. Hence, there can be no serious doubt that the subject matter of this case
is "a matter of public concern and imbued with public interest". In other words, it is of
"paramount public interest" and "transcendental importance." This fact alone would justify
relaxing the rule on legal standing, following the liberal policy of this Court whenever a case
involves "an issue of overarching significance to our society." Petitioners legal standing should
therefore be recognized and upheld.
Moreover, this Court has held that taxpayers are allowed to sue when there is a claim of "illegal
disbursement of public funds," or if public money is being "deflected to any improper purpose";
or when petitioners seek to restrain respondent from "wasting public funds through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law." In the instant case, individual petitioners,
suing as taxpayers, assert a material interest in seeing to it that public funds are properly and

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they were referred to the BACs Technical Working Group (TWG) and
the Department of Science and Technology (DOST).
In its Report on the Evaluation of the Technical Proposals on Phase II,
DOST said that both MPC and TIMC had obtained a number of failed
marks in the technical evaluation. Notwithstanding these failures,
Comelec en banc, on April 15, 2003, promulgated Resolution No. 6074
awarding the project to MPC. The Commission publicized this
Resolution and the award of the project to MPC on May 16, 2003.
lawfully used. In the Petition, they claim that the bidding was defective, the winning bidder not
a qualified entity, and the award of the Contract contrary to law and regulation. Accordingly,
they seek to restrain respondents from implementing the Contract and, necessarily, from
making any unwarranted expenditure of public funds pursuant thereto. Thus, we hold that
petitioners possess locus standi.


Jumamil vs. Caf In 1989, petitioner Jumamil filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Panabo, Davao del Norte a petition for declaratory relief with prayer
for preliminary injunction and writ of restraining order against public
respondents Mayor Jose J. Cafe and the members of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Panabo, Davao del Norte. He questioned the constitutionality
of a Municipal Resolution enacting an Appropriation Ordinance fr the
construction of stalls around a proposed terminal fronting the Panabo
Public Market which was destroyed by fire.
Petitioner prays for the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals
(CA) and a declaration of the unconstitutionality, illegality and nullity of
the questioned resolutions/ordinances and lease contracts entered
into by the public and private respondents
From the adverse decision, (i.e. the petitioners were not parties in the
agreement for the award of the market stalls by the public
respondents, in the public market of Panabo, Davao, and since the
petitioners were not parties to the award of the market stalls and
whose rights are never affected by merely stating that they are
taxpayers, they have no legal interest in the controversy and they
are not, therefore, entitled to bring an action for declaratory relief)
petitioner again appealed to the Court of Appeals.

Whether Jumamil has the legal standing to bring the petition for declaratory relief?
Legal standing or locus standi is a partys personal and substantial interest in a case such that he
has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act being challenged. It
calls for more than just a generalized grievance. The term interest means a material interest,
an interest in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question
involved, or a mere incidental interest. Unless a persons constitutional rights are adversely
affected by the statute or ordinance, he has no legal standing. Jumamil brought the petition in
his capacity as taxpayer of the Municipality of Panabo, Davao del Norte and not in his personal
capacity. He was questioning the official acts of the the mayor and the members of the
Sanggunian in passing the ordinances and entering into the lease contracts with private
respondents. A taxpayer need not be a party to the contract to challenge its validity. Parties
suing as taxpayers must specifically prove sufficient interest in preventing the illegal
expenditure of money raised by taxation. The expenditure of public funds by an officer of the
State for the purpose of executing an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such
funds. The resolutions being assailed were appropriations ordinances. Jumamil alleged that
these ordinances were passed for the business, occupation, enjoyment and benefit of private
respondents (that is, allegedly for the private benefit of respondents) because even before
they were passed, Mayor Cafe and private respondents had already entered into lease
contracts for the construction and award of the market stalls. Private respondents admitted
they deposited P40,000 each with the municipal treasurer, which amounts were made available
to the municipality during the construction of the stalls. The deposits, however, were needed to
ensure the speedy completion of the stalls after the public market was gutted by a series of
fires. Thus, the award of the stalls was necessarily limited only to those who advanced their
personal funds for their construction. Jumamil did not seasonably allege his interest in

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preventing the illegal expenditure of public funds or the specific injury to him as a result of the
enforcement of the questioned resolutions and contracts. It was only in the Remark to
Comment he filed in the Supreme Court did he first assert that he (was) willing to engage in
business and (was) interested to occupy a market stall. Such claim was obviously an
afterthought.
Whether the rule on locus standi should be relaxed?
Objections to a taxpayer's suit for lack of sufficient personality, standing or interest are
procedural matters. Considering the importance to the public of a suit assailing the
constitutionality of a tax law, and in keeping with the Court's duty, specially explicated in the
1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of the Government have
kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not
abused the discretion given to them, the Supreme Court may brush aside technicalities of
procedure and take cognizance of the suit. There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental
importance, the following determinants formulated by former Supreme Court Justice Florentino
P. Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case;
(2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the
public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any other
party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being raised. But, even if
the Court disregards Jumamils lack of legal standing, this petition must still fail. The subject
resolutions/ordinances appropriated a total of P2,280,000 for the construction of the public
market stalls. Jumamil alleged that these ordinances were discriminatory because, even prior to
their enactment, a decision had already been made to award the market stalls to the private
respondents who deposited P40,000 each and who were either friends or relatives of the mayor
or members of the Sanggunian. Jumamil asserted that there (was) no publication or invitation
to the public that this contract (was) available to all who (were) interested to own a stall and
(were) willing to deposit P40,000. Respondents, however, counter that the public
respondents act of entering into this agreement was authorized by the Sangguniang Bayan of
Panabo per Resolution 180 dated 10 October 1988 and that all the people interested were
invited to participate in investing their savings. Jumamil failed to prove the subject ordinances
and agreements to be discriminatory. Considering that he was asking the Court to nullify the
acts of the local political department of Panabo, Davao del Norte, he should have clearly
established that such ordinances operated unfairly against those who were not notified and
who were thus not given the opportunity to make their deposits. His unsubstantiated allegation
that the public was not notified did not suffice. Furthermore, there was the time-honored

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presumption of regularity of official duty, absent any showing to the contrary.
types of standing: legislative
PHILCONSA vs.
Enriquez
House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of
1994), was passed and approved by both houses of Congress on
December 17, 1993. As passed, it imposed conditions and limitations
on certain items of appropriations in the proposed budget previously
submitted by the President. It also authorized members of Congress to
propose and identify projects in the "pork barrels" allotted to them and
to realign their respective operating budgets.
On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into law. On the
same day, the President delivered his Presidential Veto Message,
specifying the provisions of the bill he vetoed and on which he imposed
certain conditions. No step was taken in either House of Congress to
override the vetoes.
The Philippine Constitution Association, Exequiel B. Garcia and Ramon
A. Gonzales as taxpayers, prayed for a writ of prohibition to declare as
unconstitutional and void: (a) Article XLI on the Countrywide
Development Fund, the special provision in Article I entitled
Realignment of Allocation for Operational Expenses, and Article XLVIII
on the Appropriation for Debt Service or the amount appropriated
Whether the petitioners have standing to sue? YES.
When issues of constitutionality are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial review
only if the following requisites are compresent: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate
case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3)
the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional
question is the lis mota of the case.
The legal standing of the Senate, as an institution, was recognized in Gonzales v. Macaraig.
We rule that a member of the Senate, and of the House of Representatives for that matter, has
the legal standing to question the validity of a presidential veto or a condition imposed on an
item in an appropriation bill.
Where the veto is claimed to have been made without or in excess of the authority vested on
the President by the Constitution, the issue of an impermissible intrusion of the Executive into
the domain of the Legislature arises. To the extent the power of Congress are impaired, so is
the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise
of the powers of that institution. An act of the Executive which injures the institution of
Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury, which can be questioned by a

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under said Article XLVIII in excess of the P37.9 Billion allocated for the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports; and (b) the veto of the
President of the Special Provision of Article XLVIII of the GAA of 1994.

member of Congress. In such a case, any member of Congress can have a resort to the courts.
This is, then, the clearest case of the Senate as a whole or individual Senators as such having a
substantial interest in the question at issue. It could likewise be said that there was the
requisite injury to their rights as Senators. It would then be futile to raise any locus standi issue.
Any intrusion into the domain appertaining to the Senate is to be resisted. Similarly, if the
situation were reversed, and it is the Executive Branch that could allege a transgression, its
officials could likewise file the corresponding action. What cannot be denied is that a Senator
has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the
Constitution in his office.
It is true that the Constitution provides a mechanism for overriding a veto (Art. VI, Sec. 27 [1]).
Said remedy, however, is available only when the presidential veto is based on policy or political
considerations but not when the veto is claimed to be ultra vires. In the latter case, it becomes
the duty of the Court to draw the dividing line where the exercise of executive power ends and
the bounds of legislative jurisdiction begin.
types of standing: governmental
People vs. Vera CFI of Manila on 8 January 1934, rendered a judgment of conviction
sentencing Cu Unjieng to indeterminate penalty ranging from 4 years
and 2 months of prision correccional to 8 years of prision mayor, to pay
the costs and with reservation of civil action to the offended party,
HSBC.
Cu Unjieng filed a motion for reconsideration and four successive
motions for new trial which were denied. Thereafter, Unjieng filed an
application for probation before the trial court, under the provisions of
Act 4221 of the defunct Philippine Legislature. Cu Unjieng states in his
petition, inter alia, that he is innocent of the crime of which he was
convicted, that he has no criminal record and that he would observe
good conduct in the future.
The Fiscal of the City of Manila filed an opposition to the granting of
probation to Cu Unjieng. The private prosecution also filed an
opposition alleging, among other things, that Act 4221, assuming that
it has not been repealed by section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution,
is nevertheless violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III of the
Whether the People of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General and Fiscal of the City of
Manila, is a proper party in the present case? YES.
The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustained, direct
injury as a result of its enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act 4221 really violates the
constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose name the present action is brought, has a
substantial interest in having it set aside. Of greater import than the damage caused by the
illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by
the enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that the state can challenge
the validity of its own laws.


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Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of the laws for the reason
that its applicability is not uniform throughout the Islands and because
section 11 of the said Act endows the provincial boards with the power
to make said law effective or otherwise in their respective or otherwise
in their respective provinces. The private prosecution also filed a
supplementary opposition elaborating on the alleged
unconstitutionality on Act 4221, as an undue delegation of legislative
power to the provincial boards of several provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI,
Constitution).
constitutionality is the very lis mota of the case
Arceta vs.
Mangrobang
For resolution are two consolidated

petitions under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with prayers
for a temporary restraining order. Both assail the constitutionality of
the Bouncing Checks Law, also known as Batas Pambansa Bilang 22.
Petitioner Ofelia V. Arceta prays that the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) of Navotas, Metro Manila, Branch 54, cease and desist from
hearing Criminal Case No. 1599-CR for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, and
then dismiss the case against her.

Whether the constitutionality of BP 22 can be questioned on the ground that it is the very lis
mota presented in the case? NO.
When the issue of unconstitutionality of a legislative act is raised, it is the established doctrine
that the Court may exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are
present: (1) an actual and appropriate case and controversy exists; (2) a personal and
substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial
review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question raised is the
very lis mota of the case.
7
Only when these requisites are satisfied may the Court assume
jurisdiction over a question of unconstitutionality or invalidity of an act of Congress. With due
regard to counsels spirited advocacy in both cases, we are unable to agree that the abovecited
requisites have been adequately met.
Nor do we find the constitutional question herein raised to be the very lis mota presented in
the controversy below. Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to
justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and
not one that is doubtful, speculative or argumentative. We have examined the contentions of
the petitioners carefully; but they still have to persuade us that B.P. Blg. 22 by itself or in its
implementation transgressed a provision of the Constitution. Even the thesis of petitioner that
the present economic and financial crisis should be a basis to declare the Bouncing Checks Law
constitutionally infirm deserves but scant consideration. As we stressed in Lozano, it is precisely
during trying times that there exists a most compelling reason to strengthen faith and
confidence in the financial system and any practice tending to destroy confidence in checks as
currency substitutes should be deterred, to prevent havoc in the trading and financial
communities. Further, while indeed the metropolitan trial courts may be burdened immensely

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by bouncing checks cases now, that fact is immaterial to the alleged invalidity of the law being
assailed.
effect of declaration of unconstitutionality of a law
Norton vs.
Shelby
This suit was brought to enforce payment of twenty-nine bonds for
$1,000 each issued by the Board of Commissioners of Shelby County in
payment of a subscription by the county to stock in the Mississippi
River Railroad Company.
The Board of Commissioners was constituted by an Act of the
Tennessee Legislature whereby the Board was authorized to perform
the functions of the County Court, in particular to subscribe to the
capital stock of the Mississippi River Railroad Company.
This act was subsequently held by the Supreme Court of Tennessee to
be unconstitutional and invalid, and the board created by it to have
had no legal existence. The board, however, before it was so held had
organized and had performed the functions of the County Court until
November, 1869, and, among other things, had subscribed in the name
of the county to stock of the Mississippi River Railroad Company and
had issued bonds in payment therefor, of which bonds those in suit
were part.
The ruling of the Supreme Court of Tennessee came on account of a
new constitution which came into force in Tennessee, which contained
the following provisions:
"But the credit of no county, city, or town shall be given or loaned to or
in aid of any person, company, association or corporation, except upon
an election to be first held by the qualified voters of such county, city,
or town, and the assent of three-fourths of the votes cast at said
election, nor shall any county, city, or town become a stockholder with
others in any company, association, or corporation except upon a like
election and the assent of a like majority."
" A large part of the payments of principal and interest above referred
Whether the Board of Commissioners had authority to perform the function of the County
Court? NO.
The adjudication by the Supreme Court of Tennessee that the constitution did not permit the
appointment of commissioners to take the place of the justices of the peace for the county, and
perform the duties of the county court, stands unimpaired, and as such is binding upon us.
Upon the construction of the constitution and laws of a state, this Court, as a general rule,
follows the decisions of her highest court, unless they conflict with or impair the efficacy of
some principle of the federal Constitution, or of a federal statute, or a rule of commercial or
general law. In these cases no principle of the federal Constitution, or of any federal law, is
invaded, and no rule of general or commercial law is disregarded. The determination made
relates to the existence of an inferior tribunal of the state, and that depending upon the
constitutional power of the legislature of the state to create it and supersede a preexisting
institution.
It would lead to great confusion and disorder if a state tribunal, adjudged by the state supreme
court to be an unauthorized and illegal body, should be held by the federal courts, disregarding
the decision of the state court, to be an authorized and legal body, and thus make the claims
and rights of suitors depend, in many instances, not upon settled law, but upon the contingency
of litigation respecting them being before a state or a federal court.
It follows that in the disposition of the case before us, we must hold that there was no lawful
authority in the board to make the subscription to the Mississippi River Railroad Company, and
to issue the bonds of which those in suit are a part.
While acts of a de facto incumbent of an office lawfully created by law and existing are often
held to be binding from reasons of public policy, the acts of a person assuming to fill and
perform the duties of an office which does not exist de jure can have no validity whatever in
law.
An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no
protection; it creates no office; it is in legal contemplation as inoperative as though it had

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to was made after this constitution came into force.
The court below ordered a verdict for the county, and from the
judgment entered on such verdict this writ of error was taken.
never been passed.
The action of a minority of the justices of the peace of the County Court of Shelby County,
Tennessee, prior to May 5, 1870, did not operate as a ratification by the county court of the
previously invalid subscription of the county to stock in the Mississippi River Railroad Company,
and on and after that day, on which the new Constitution of Tennessee took effect, no
ratification could be made without previous assent of three-fourths of the voters of the county.
"An officer de facto is one whose acts, though not those of a lawful officer, the law, upon
principles of policy and justice, will hold valid, so far as they involve the interests of the public
and third persons, where the duties of the office are exercised:"
First. Without a known appointment or election, but under such circumstances of reputation or
acquiescence as were calculated to induce people, without inquiry, to submit to or invoke his
action, supposing him to be the officer he assumed to be.
Second. Under color of a known and valid appointment or election, but where the officer had
failed to conform to some precedent, requirement, or condition, as to take an oath, give a
bond, or the like.
Third. Under color of a known election or appointment, void because the officer was not
eligible, or because there was a want of power in the electing or appointing body, or by reason
of some defect or irregularity in its exercise, such ineligibility, want of power, or defect being
unknown to the public.
Fourth. Under color of an election or an appointment by or pursuant to a public
unconstitutional law, before the same is adjudged to be such.
Of the great number of cases cited by the Chief Justice, none recognizes such a thing as a de
facto office, or speaks of a person as a de facto officer, except when he is the incumbent of a de
jure office.
In view of the new Constitution of Tennessee, the county court, as thus seen, was shorn of any
power to order a subscription to stock of any railroad company without the previous assent of
three-fourths of the voters of the county cast at an election held by its qualified voters, and of
course it could not afterwards, without such assent, give validity to a subscription previously
made by the commissioners.
Sheppard vs. This bill was filed in the circuit court of the United States for the Whether Sheppard et al (the owners of the land) can contest the assessment of the amount

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Barren southern district of Ohio, against Barron, as the treasurer of the county
of Franklin, in the state of Ohio, to enjoin him from taking any
proceedings towards the collection of the balance of an assessment for
a local improvement upon land belonging to the appellants near the
city of Columbus, in the state of Ohio, because the assessment to pay
for the improvement as provided for in the act was to be made by the
foot front, and not in proportion to the special benefit which might
result from the improvement to the property assessed.
The bill was dismissed by the circuit court, and from the judgment of
dismissal the plaintiffs have appealed directly to this court, because the
law of Ohio referred to in the bill is claimed to be in contravention of
the Federal Constitution.
The original plaintiffs were partners doing business under the name of
the Alum Creek Ice Company, and as such were the owners of the land
described in the bill
Upon the trial it appeared that the plaintiffs and others were separate
owners of distinct portions of a tract of land adjoining the city of
Columbus, Ohio, and bounded by the Columbus and Granville turnpike
road, which was a public highway leading to and from the city of
Columbus. The tract had a frontage on the road of 9,615.38 feet, of
which the plaintiffs owned 1,111 feet.
On March 26, 1890, an act was passed by the Ohio legislature which
authorized the county commissioners in counties in which there were
situate cities of the first grade of the second class to improve roads
extending from such cities, and other roads and streets in certain
cases. The act provided for an assessment by the foot front on the
adjoining land in order to pay the cost of the improvement.
Immediately upon the passage of the act, and on or about March 31,
1890, the owners of the tract, including the plaintiffs, who were
owners of a part thereof, inaugurated proceedings under the act, and
presented a petition to the county commissioners asking for the
improvement of the road through their property, as provided for in the
act.
payable for the cost of the improvement of their property? NO.
Both parties in this case seem to agree that the statute of 1890, under which these proceedings
were taken, is void, as in violation of the state Constitution. As authority for that proposition
the case of Hixson v. Burson, is cited. The case holds that a statute of a nature similar to the one
under consideration violated the provision of the Ohio Constitution, because, while its subject-
matter was general, its operation and effect were local, thus violating the provisions of 26 of
article 2 of the Constitution of that state, which provides that 'All laws of a general nature shall
have a uniform operation throughout the state.' The act under consideration in the case at bar
seems to come within the principle of the above case.
In this case the manner of payment was, as provided for in the act, by an assessment upon the
land by the foot front. The money thus collected would form a fund to be used to pay the bonds
which were to be issued in accordance with the act by the county commissioners, acting for the
county. The county thus became the debtor for a debt which was incurred entirely for the
benefit, and at the request, of the owners of the land. Under such facts the county has the right
to look at the assessment upon the land as the fund out of which to pay the bonds. In this view
the constant and frequent promises and representations made by the plaintiffs after the work
was embarked upon are material evidence of the implied contract to pay for the work, arising
from the request for its performance. It is, therefore, upon these facts, immaterial that the law
under which the proceedings were conducted was unconstitutional, because the work was
done at the special request of the owners, under the provisions of the act, and upon a contract,
both implied and in substance expressed, that the bonds would be paid, and the assessment to
be imposed for the raising of a fund to pay them would be legal and proper.
Although the landowners have been greatly disappointed in the results of the improvement,
and the affair has proved somewhat disastrous, yet they have obtained just such an
improvement as they asked for and expected, and they are the ones to bear the
disappointment and loss.
It is true this action is not between the bondholders and the owners of the land. The
representations and agreement of the landowners were, however, made for the purpose of
obtaining a market for the sale of the bonds, and, in order that there should not be any
suspicion of their invalidity, the landowners agreed that the work was legally done, and the
improvement legally constructed. The representation and agreement were, in fact, directed to
all who might be interested in the matter, including the county commissioners, who were to
issue the bonds as representatives of the county. The effect was to provide, in substance, that
the lien of the assessment should be valid and the assessment should create a fund for the

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The petition was granted, and the commissioners made an order to
that effect, and for the execution of the work at an expense of $7.25
per front foot. On or about August 1, 1890, a contract was entered into
for the construction of the improvement, and between that time and
October 16, 1891, the improvement was completed. An assessment
was, on October 15, 1891, laid upon the whole tract to pay for the
cost of the improvement, which amounted to $11.25 per front foot,
thus largely exceeding the amount originally contemplated as such
cost. This cost was thus enhanced by reason of changes of plans
regarding the improvement, made from time to time as the work
progressed, and which were assented to or asked for by the land
owners, including the plaintiffs.
In order to pay the cash for the cost of this improvement bonds were
issued and sold by the county commissioners as provided for in the
act, amounting to $110,000, in two issues, the first of $50,000 and the
second of $60,000.
The total amount of the assessment on the plaintiffs' land, assessed
per front foot, as provided for in the act, was $12,812.61, which, as
the plaintiffs insist, largely exceeded the special benefit arising from
the improvement, and would result, if enforced to its full extent, in
the confiscation of plaintiffs' property. The bonds not having been
paid, an action was brought on them against the county
commissioners in the Federal circuit court in Ohio, and judgment
recovered by the bondholders, which was affirmed by the United
States circuit court of appeals without, however, passing upon the
validity of the assessment now before this court.
After the plaintiffs had paid seven annual instalments of the
assessment, each installment amounting to $1,258.61, and the total
being $8, 810.27, there remained a balance due on the assessment of
$4,002.34, and this bill was filed on June 12, 1899, for the purpose of
enjoining the collection of the balance remaining unpaid on the
assessment.
payment of the bonds. The defendant, representing the county, must be permitted to take
advantage of the representations and agreement of the landowners, as the county has a direct
interest in sustaining the validity of the assessment, and the representations were made,
among others, to the county commissioners, who represented the county in issuing the bonds
and in doing the work.
On principles of general law, we are satisfied that the plaintiffs are not in a position to assert
the unconstitutionality of the act under which they petitioned that proceedings should be
taken, and that the assessment should be made in accordance with those provisions.
Provisions of a constitutional nature, intended for the protection of the property owner, may be
waived by him, not only by an instrument in writing, upon a good consideration, signed by him,
but also by a course of conduct which shows an intention to waive such provision, and where it
would be unjust to others to permit it to be set up. Certainly when action of this nature has
been induced at the request, and upon the instigation, of an individual, he ought not to be
thereafter permitted, upon general principles of justice and equity, to claim that the action
which he has himself instigated and asked for, and which has been taken upon the faith of his
request, should be held invalid, and the expense thereof, which he ought to pay, transferred to
a third person.
We concur in the remarks of the District Judge in this case, when he said that: 'The
complainants invoked the action of the county commissioners to enhance the value of their
land; they actively promoted the improvement, knowing that its [194 U.S. 553, 572] cost must
be paid by a front foot assessment on their property; they recognized the justice of the
assessment from time to time during the progress of the work, and afterwards by paying annual
installments of the assessment for seven years, and until they were tempted by the decision of
the Supreme Court, in Norwood v. Baker, to cast their burden upon the general public; and it is
now too late to complain of the method of the assessment or of the lack of the special
benefits which were dissipated by the collapse of the 'boom."
De Agbayani vs. During the 2
nd
World War, 2 laws were passed which suspended
enforcement of payment of all debts and monetary obligations payable
HAS THE CLAIM OF PNB PRESCRIBED? NO. The above laws are null and void for being

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PNB by war sufferers.
EO 32: Provided for a debt moratorium. enforcement of payment
of all debts and other monetary obligations payable within the
Philippines, except debts and other monetary obligations entered
into in any area after declaration by Presidential Proclamation
that such area has been freed from enemy occupation and control,
is temporarily suspended pending action by the Commonwealth
Govt (issued March 10, 1945)
RA 342 (1948): declared the EO 32 remains in full force and effect
for the war suferers as for them the emergency created by the last
war was still existent. It also contained all debts and other
monetary obligations payable by private parties within the
Philippines originally incurred or contracted before Dec 8. 1941,
and still remaining unpaid, x x x SHALL NOT BE DUE AND
DEMANDABLE FOR A PERIOD OF 8 YEARS FROM AND AFTER
SETTLEMENT OF THE WAR DAMAGE CLAIM OF THE DEBTOR B THE
US PHILIPPINE WAR DAMAGE COMMISSION, without prejudice,
however, to any voluntary agreement which the interested parties
may enter into after the approval of this Act for the Settlement of
said obligations.
Petitioner: Francisco Serrano de Agbayani
Respondent: Phil Natl Bank, Provincial Sheriff of Pangasinan
In this case, the petitioner made a loan of Php 450 from PNB on
July 19, 1939. It was to mature on July 19, 1944 and was secured
by a real estate mortgage durly registered covering property in
Pangasinan. However, after the war, the balance due on the loan
remains unpaid.
Meanwhile, on May 18, 1953, the debt moratorium laws were
declared unconstitutional
On July 13, 1959 that PNB sought to foreclose the property.
contrary to the constitution on the impairment of contracts. Thus, PNB may still foreclose.
First of all, the period was tolled from March 10, 1945 to May 18, 1953.
Further, when the legislation passed the above laws, the question before it was its satisfying the
rational basis test, not as of the time of its enactment but as of such date. Clearly, if then it
were found unreasonable, the right to non-impairment of contractual obligations must
prevail over the assertion of community power to remedy an existing evil. The Supreme Court
was convinced that such indeed was the case. As stated in the opinion of Justice Bautista
Angelo: "But we should not lose sight of the fact that these obligations had been pending since
1945 as a result of the issuance of Executive Orders Nos. 25 and 32 and at present their
enforcement is still inhibited because of the enactment of Republic Act No. 342 and would
continue to be unenforceable during the eight-year period granted to prewar debtors to afford
them an opportunity to rehabilitate themselves, which in plain language means that the
creditors would have to observe a vigil of at least twelve (12) years before they could affect a
liquidation of their investment dating as far back as 1941.

This period seems to us unreasonable, if not oppressive. While the purpose of Congress is
plausible, and should be commended, the relief accorded works injustice to creditors who are
practically left at the mercy of the debtors. Their hope to effect collection becomes extremely
remote, more so if the credits are unsecured. And the injustice is more patent when, under the
law, the debtor is not even required to pay interest during the operation of the relief, unlike
similar statutes in the United States."
The conclusion to which the foregoing considerations inevitably led was that as of the time of
adjudication, it was apparent that Republic Act No. 342 could not survive the test of validity.
Executive Order No. 32 should likewise be nullified.
An unconstitutional act, for that matter, an executive order or a municipal ordinance suffering
from infirmity, cannot be the source of any legal rights or duties. Nor can it justify any official
act taken under it.
When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void
and the latter shall govern. Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be
valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.

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Petitioner de Agbayani now argues that since 15 years have
elapsed (1944 to 1959), from the date of maturity, the mortgage
sought to be foreclosed has nor prescribed.
TC: decided in favor of De Agbayani
IAC: Reversed TC and decided in favor of PNB

Republic vs.
Hereda
Appellant executed three promissory notes in favor of the Bank of
Taiwan, Ltd. payable May 10, 1944, June 8, 1944 and June 10,
1944.. The loans were secured by two real estate mortgages
affecting six parcels of land.
November 10, 1944, EO. 25 was enacted suspending temporarily
the enforcement of all debts and other monetary obligations
contracted during the war.
It was amended by Executive Order No. 32 of 1945 and Act No.
342.
On May 18 1953, the above mentioned moratorium laws were
declared unconstitutional.
On September 22, 1954, the Bank demanded payment of
appellant's accounts but appellant failed and refused to pay.
Meanwhile, pursuant to Transfer Agreement dated July 20, 1954,
the Government of the Republic of the Philippines acquired all the
rights, title and interest of the U.S. Government in the Bank of
Taiwan, Ltd., the assets of which included the loans of appellant
secured by the mortgages. Consequently, the Republic of the
Philippines filed a complaint for collection against appellant.
TC: rendered judgment ordering appellant to pay the balance of
his account plus interest; and in case he fails to pay 90 days after
the decision has become final, ordering the sale of the mortgaged
properties at public auction to satisfy the judgment.
ISSUE: HAS THE ACTION PRESCRIBED? NO
On review, the SC held that during their effectivity, the moratorium laws suspended the running
of the prescriptive period for filing actions for payment of debts; and that the ten-year period
within which to institute such action began the day after the moratorium laws were declared
unconstitutional.
"The continued operation and enforcement of Republic Act 342 at the present time is
unreasonable and oppressive, and should not be prolonged a minute longer, and, therefore, the
same is declared null and void and without effect. And what is said here with respect to said Act
holds true as regards Executive Orders Nos. 25 and 32, perhaps with greater force and reason
as to the latter, considering that said Orders contain no limitation whatsoever in point of time
as regards the suspension of the enforcement and effectivity of monetary obligations.
Nonetheless, said laws were in effect from the time of their respective promulgations until May
18, 1953. As a consequence, before they were declared unconstitutional, they suspended the
running of the prescriptive period during their effectivity. Thus, the 10-year period within which
to institute the action against herein appellant began the day after the moratorium laws were
declared unconstitutional or, to be precise, on May 19, 1953.
Appellee's cause of action will therefore prescribe only on May 19, 1963. The complaint in this
case was filed in November 1961, which is within the 10-year period and, therefore, the action
has not yet prescribed.


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On appeal, appellant contended that the action has already
prescribed. The case was certified to the SC, the question involved
being one of law.
Republic vd. CFI Defendant, Dolores Infante obtained laons from the Bank of
Taiwan, LTD in 1943. It was payable at its office in Bacolod City.
Total amount was Php 683.10 at 6% per annum, compounded
quarterly.
WW2 intervened and the moratorium decrees (EO 25, 32 and RA
312) mandated that monetary obligations are temporarily
suspended, in light of sufferings from war.
The moratorium laws were then declared unconstitutional on
May 19, 1953
The debts remained unpaid. Thus, in 1961, the Petitioner (now
Republic, or RP because the assets of Bank of Taiwan who was
under the Japanese were now transferred to and vested in the
RP), filed a complaint in the Justice of the Peace Court of
Villadolid, Negros Occidental to collect the mount of Php 683.10.
Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of
prescription. The loan became due on June 1, 1944 and the
complaint was filed only on Jan 17, 1961 or after more than 16
years had elapsed, far beyond the period of 10 years when an
action based on a written contract should be brought to court.
CFI Negros Occidental: dismissed RPs claim on grounds of
prescription.
HAS THE ACTION PRESCRIBED? NO
In the case at bar, the loans which had no maturity dates were contracted in 1943, or during the
period of the Japanese occupation of the Philippines. Ordinarily, the counting of the
prescriptive period should be reckoned from the date the debt became due and demandable.
However, the moratorium decrees supervene suspending the enforcement of payments of all
debts and other monetary obligations contracted during the war, although in the case of Royal
L. Rutter vs. Placido J. Esteban, 93 Phil. 68, the moratorium laws (Executive Orders Nos. 25 and
32 and Republic Act No. 342) were declared unconstitutional. (Republic vs. Herida, G.R. No. L-
34486, December 27, 1982). Nevertheless, said laws were in effect from the time of their
respective promulgations until May 18, 1953.
As a consequence, before they were declared unconstitutional, they suspended the running of
the prescriptive period during their effectivity. Thus, the 10-year period within which to
institute the action against herein appellee began the day after the moratorium laws were
declared unconstitutional or, to be precise, on May 19, 1953. It was on September 27, 1954
when plaintiff (appellant) made extra-judicial written demand on defendant (appellee). As the
loans in question did not have any maturity dates and, therefore, payable on demand,
prescription could have accrued, if at all, only on September 27, 1954 when petitioner made the
extra-judicial demand.
Plaintiff's cause of action will therefore prescribe only on September 27, 1964. And, since the
complaint in this case was filed on September 15, 1961, which is within the 10-year period, the
action has not yet prescribed.
judicial power
Sec. 1, Art. 8 ARTICLE VIII


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Judicial Department
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
all courts can exercise judicial power
Badua vs. CBA Petitioner(s): Spouses Leonor and Rosa Badua (allegedly owns a farm
land in Lucaga, Lumaba, Villaviciosa, Abra.
Respondents: Cordillera Bodong Administration, Cordillera Peoples
Liberation Army, et al, David Quema (claimant of the petitioners
property)
Petitioner spouses were forcibly ejected from their land by virtue of a
decision by the Cordillera Bodong Adminsitration. The case was filed
by respondent David Quema.
It was alleged that in 1966, Quema, as the owner of two parcels of land
in Lucaga, Lumaba, Villaviciosa, Abra, evidenced by Tax Declarations
Nos. 4997 and 4998 mortgaged said parcels of land for P6,000 to Dra.
Erotida Valera. He was able to redeem the land twenty-two (22) years
later, on August 14, 1988, long after the mortgagee had already died.
He allegedly paid the redemption price of P10,000 to the mortgagee's
heir, Jessie Macaraeg.
On the other hand, Rosa Badua, alleged that the land was sold to her
by Dra. Erotida Valera when she was still alive. However, Rosa could
not produce the deed of sale because it is allegedly in the possession of
Vice-Governor Benesa.
As Quema was prevented by Rosa Badua from cultivating the land, he
filed a case before the Barangay Council, but it failed to settle the
dispute. A certain Judge Cacho advised Quema to file his complaint in
the provincial level courts. Instead, Quema filed it in the tribal court of
the Maeng Tribe. The tribal court conducted a trial on February 19,
CAN A TRIBAL COURT OF THE CORDILLERA BODONG ADMINISTRATION RENDER A VALID AND
EXECUTORY DECISION IN A LAND DISPUTE? NO
It should be moted that the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region was rejected by all
the provinces and cities (Benguet, Mountain Province, Abra, Kalinga-Apayao, and City of
Baguio), except for the IFUGAO PROVINCE. Thus, the Cordillera Autonomous Region did not
come to be.
As a logical consequence of that judicial declaration, the Cordillera Bodong Administration
created under Section 13 of Executive Order No. 220, the indigenous and special courts for the
indigenous cultural communities of the Cordillera region (Sec. 1, Art. VII, Rep. Act 6766), and
the Cordillera People's Liberation Army, as a regional police force or a regional command of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (Secs. 2 and 4, Article XVIII of R.A. 6766), do not legally exist.
Since the Cordillera Autonomous Region did not come into legal existence, the Maeng Tribal
Court was not constituted into an indigenous or special court under R.A. No. 6766. Hence, the
Maeng Tribal Court is an ordinary tribal court existing under the customs and traditions of an
indigenous cultural community.
Such tribal courts are not a part of the Philippine judicial system which consists of the SC and
the lower courts which have been established by law (Sec. 1, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). They
do not possess judicial power. Like the pangkats or conciliation panels created by P.D. No. 1508
in the barangays, they are advisory and conciliatory bodies whose principal objective is to bring
together the parties to a dispute and persuade them to make peace, settle, and compromise.
An amicable settlement, compromise, and arbitration award rendered by a pangkat, if not
seasonably repudiated, has the force and effect of a final judgment of a court (Sec. 11, P.D.
1508), but it can be enforced only through the local city or municipal court to which the
secretary of the Lupon transmits the compromise settlement or arbitration award upon

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1989 and rendered a decision IN FAVOR OF QUEMA.
However, the couple still did not immediately vacate the land. Thus
they were handed a warning order on June 30, 1989 by the
CORDILLERA PEOPLES LIBERATION ARMY.
Petitioners allege that the decision of the Cordillera Bodong
Administration is null and void because;
1. petitioners were denied due process or formal hearing;
and
2. the Cordillera Bodong Administration has no judicial
power nor jurisdiction over the petitioners nor over the
private respondent as neither of them are members of
the Maeng Tribe.
When the case reached the SC, respondents claim that the SC has no
jurisdiction over the tribal courts because the tribal courts are not part
of the judicial system. Respondents concede that if the petitioners
"want to test the wisdom of the decision of the council of elders," the
petitioners should file the necessary suit, not in the SC, but in the trial
courts where evidence can be presented. Respondents pray that the
decision of the tribal court be maintained and the petition for certiorari
and prohibition be dismissed.
expiration of the period to annul or repudiate it (Sec. 14, P.D. 1508). Similarly, the decisions of a
tribal court based on compromise or arbitration, as provided in P.D. 1508, may be enforced or
set aside, in and through the regular courts today.
Petition was thus GRANTED.

Lopez vs. Roxas Petitioner: Fernando Lopez (VP candidate who won in the general
elections held Nov 9, 1965)
Respondent: Gerardo Roxas (VP candidate who ran against Fernando
Lopez)
Petitioner was proclaimed Vice President in the 1965 elections. He
gathered 3,531,550 votes or a plurality of 26,724 votes over his closest
opponent, Gerardo Roxas.
Jan 5, 1966: Respondent Roxas filed Election Protest No. 2 with the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal contesting the election of petitioner,
upon the ground that it was he who obtained the largest number of
DOES THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL POSSESS JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE
OF THE ELECTION PROTEST FILED BY RESPONDENT GERARDO ROXAS? YES
Judicial power is the authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights that
are enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for
violations of such rights.
The proper exercise of said authority requires legislative action:
(1) defining such enforceable and demandable rights and/or prescribing remedies for violations
thereof; and
(2) determining the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide said controversies or disputes, in

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votes.
Feb 22, 1966: Petitioner Lopez instituted this action for prohibition
with preliminary injunction against Roxas to prevent the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal from hearing and deciding the election contest. His
basis was the UNCONSTITUTIONALITY of RA 1793 which created the
said Tribunal. Since, RA 1793 was unconstitutional, all proceedings
taken by it are a nullity, he claims.
Further, petitioner argues that Congress may not, by law, authorize an
election contest for Pres and VP because the Constitution is silent. The
contest tends to nullify the constitutional authority of Congress to
proclaim the candidates elected for Pres and VP. In effect RA 1493
amends the constitution.


the first instance and/or on appeal. For this reason, the Constitution ordains that "Congress
shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts",
subject to the limitations set forth in the fundamental law.
Prior to the approval of Republic Act No. 1793, a defeated candidate for president or vice-
president, who believed that he was the candidate who obtained the largest number of votes
for either office, despite the proclamation by Congress of another candidate as the President-
elect or vice president-elect, had no legal right to demand by election protest a recount of the
votes cast for the office concerned, to establish his right thereto. As a consequence,
controversies or disputes on this matter were not justiciable. Section 1 of Republic Act No.
1793, which provides that:
"There shall be on independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal . . . which shall be the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the president-elect and the
Vice-president elect of the Philippines."
has the effect of giving said defeated candidate the legal right to contest judicially the election
of the President-elect or Vice- President-elect and to demand a recount of the votes cast for the
office involved in the litigation, as well as to secure a judgment declaring that he is the one
elected president or vice-president, as the case may be 7and that, as such, he is entitled to
assume the duties attached to said office. And by providing, further, that the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal "shall be composed of the Chief Justice and the other ten Members of the
SC", said legislation has conferred upon such Court an additional original jurisdiction of an
exclusive character.
Republic Act No. 1793 has not created a new or separate court. It has merely conferred upon
the SC the functions of a Presidential Electoral Tribunal. The result of the enactment may be
likened to the fact that courts of first instance perform the functions of such ordinary courts
of first instance, those of courts of land registration, those of probate courts, and those courts
of juvenile and domestic relations. It is, also, comparable to the situation obtaining when the
municipal court of a provincial capital exercises its authority, pursuant to law, over a limited
number of cases which were previously within the exclusive jurisdiction of courts of first
instance.
In all of these instances, the court (court of first instance or municipal court) is only one,
although the functions may be distinct and, even, separate. Thus the powers of a court of first
instance, in the exercise of its jurisdiction over ordinary cases, are broader than, as well as
distinct and separate from, those of the same court acting as a court of land registration or a

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probate court, or as a court of juvenile and domestic relations. So too, the authority of the
municipal court of a provincial capital, when acting as such municipal court, is, territorially more
limited than that of the same court when hearing the aforementioned cases which are primarily
within the jurisdiction of courts of first instance. In other words, there is only one court,
although it may perform the functions pertaining to several types of courts, each having some
characteristics different from those of the others.
Indeed, the SC, the Court of Appeals and courts of first instance, are vested with original
jurisdiction, as well as with appellate jurisdiction, in consequence of which they are both trial
courts and appellate courts, without detracting from the fact that there is only one SC, one
Court of Appeals, and one court of first instance, clothed with authority to discharge said dual
functions. A court of first instance, when performing the functions of a probate court or a court
of land registration, or a court of juvenile and domestic relations, although with powers less
broad than those of a court of first instance, hearing ordinary actions, is not inferior to the
latter, for one cannot be inferior to itself. So too, the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is not
inferior to the SC, since it is the same Court, although the functions peculiar to said Tribunal
are more limited in scope than those of the SC in the exercise of its ordinary functions. Hence,
the enactment of Republic Act No. 1793 does not entail an assumption by Congress of the
power of appointment vested by the Constitution in the President. It merely connotes the
imposition of additional duties upon the Members of the SC.
Moreover, the power to be the "judge . . . of . . . contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications" of any public officer is essentially judicial. As such under the very principle of
separation of powers invoked by petitioner herein it belongs exclusively to the judicial
department, except only insofar as the Constitution provides otherwise. This is precisely the
reason why said organic law ordains that "the Senate and the House of Representatives shall
each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members" (Article VI, Section 11, of the
Constitution). In other words, the purpose of this provision was to exclude the power to decide
such contests relating to Members of Congress which by nature is judicial from the
operation of the general grant of judicial power to the SC and such inferior courts as may be
established by law."
Petition is hereby dismissed.
Santiago vs.
Bautista
Petitioner Teodoro Santiago Jr was a Grade 6 pupil at the Sero
Elementary School (Cotabato City) at the time this case was
ISSUE: DO TEACHERS FALL UNDER THE CLAUSE ANY TRIBUNAL, BOARD OR OFFICER
EXERCISING JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS? NO

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instituted. For the graduation ceremony slatd for May 21, 1965,
the ff were to be given the ff awards:
o Socorro Medina (1
st
honor)
o Patricia Lingat (2
nd
honor)
o Teodoro Santiago, Jr (3
rd
honor)

Respondents here are teachers, principal, administrators of the
Sero Elementary School.

However, 3 days before the graduation, petitioner, represented
by his mother, with his father as counsel, sought the invalidation
of the ranking. They claimed that Patricia Lingat was coached
during the summer of 1964. They also claimed that the
Committee on the Rating of Students for Honor was invalidly
constituted because the committee was composed of Grade VI
teachers only when it should have been composed of all teachers
in Grades V and VI. They also claim that there was an intention to
pull their son down because of the unjust and discriminating
abuses made by the teachers in unduly favoring one student over
the other.

Thus petitioners prayed that: the final list of honor students for
Grade VI be set aside; and that during the pendency of the suit,
the respondent teachers be enjoined from officially and formally
publishing and proclaiming the said honor pupils in Grade VI.

And MTD filed in the lower court by the respondents was granted

Held:

The committee on the rating of students for honor whose actions are questioned in this case
exercised neither judicial nor quasi judicial functions in the performance of its assigned task.

A judicial function is an act performed by virtue of judicial powers. The exercise of a judicial
function is the doing of something in the nature of the action of the court. In order that a
special civil action of certiorari may be invoked in this jurisdiction, the ff circumstances must
exist:
1. That there must be a specific controversy involving rights of persons or property and
said controversy is brought before a tribunal, board or officer for hearing and
determination of their respective rights and obligations.
2. The tribunal, board or officer before whom the controversy is brought must have the
power and authority to pronounce judgment and render a decision on the
controversy construing and applying the laws to that end.
3. The tribunal, board or officer must pertain to that branch of the sovereign power
which belongs to the judiciary, or at least, which does not belong to the legislative
or executive department.

Before a tribunal board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi judicial acts, it is necessary that
there be a law that gives rise to some specific rights of persons or property under which adverse
claims to such rights are made, and the controversy ensuing therefrom is brought, in turn,
before the tribunal, board or officer clothed With power and authority to determine what that
law is and thereupon adjudicate the respective rights of the contending parties.

There is nothing on record about any rule of law that provides that when teachers sit down to

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on the grounds that the petition is improper and academic.

Petitioners argue, among others, on the basis of Rule 65 Sec 1
which states: Rule 65, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides:

'Section 1.Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial functions, has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion and there is no appeal,
nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings, as the
law requires, of such tribunal, board or officer.'

'The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the
judgment or order subject thereof, together with copies of all pleadings
and documents relevant and pertinent thereto.'

assess the individual merits of their pupils for purposes of rating them for honors, such function
involves the determination of what the law is and that they are therefore automatically vested
with judicial or quasi judicial functions. Worse still, this Court has not even been appraised by
appellant of the pertinent provisions of the Service Manual of Teachers for Public Schools
appellees allegedly violated in the composition of the committee they constituted thereunder,
and, in the performance of that committee's duties.

Judgment of the lower court is affirmed.







Lina vs. Purisima Petitioner: Lualhati Lina (pharmacist by training but
working as a Bookkeeper in Phil Veterans Bank)
Respondents: Hon Amante Purisima (Judge CFI Manila)
Esteban Cabanos (President, Phil
Veterans Bank)

Petitioner was summarily removed from office by respondent
bank for notoriously being undesirable. She was considered as a
threat to the industrial peace having been involved in pro-labor
DOES THE COURT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER SUCH EXECUTIVE ACT? YES

o While the members of the Courts are not agreed on whether or not particular
instances of attack against the validity of certain Presidential Decrees raise
political questions which the judiciary would not interfere with, there is unanimity
among the members of the Court that it is for the Court rather than the Executive
to determine whether or not it may take cognizance of any given case involving
the validity of acts of the Executive Department done purportedly under the
authority of the martial law proclamation.

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activities. When she appealed, the respondent president, Esteban
Cabanos, denied her appeal.

TC: decided in favor of respondents, reasoning that since removal
of the petitioner was pursuant to a Letter of Instruction issued
under Proclamation 1081, the validity or legality of said act was
beyond the power of the courts to review, much less to modify or
reverse, as expressly provided in General Order No. 3

o General Order No 3 expressly limits the power of the
courts to pass upon the validity, legality or
constitutionality of act of the Executive Department.
This has already been deemed as practically inoperative
by the SC. While the members of the Courts are not
agreed on whether or not particular instances of attack
against the validity of certain Presidential Decrees raise
political questions which the judiciary would not
interfere with, there is unanimity among the members of
the Court that it is for the Court rather than the
Executive to determine whether or not it may take
cognizance of any given case involving the validity of
acts of the Executive Department done purportedly
under the authority of the martial law proclamation.

When raised on appeal, respondent issued an administrative
order for petitioners reinstatement with back salaries,
allowances, and reimbursement of all incidental expenses without
prejudice to the outcome of the case. However, petitioner failed
to report back to work and insisted on the final adjudication of her
claim for moral and exemplary damages.

Further, If a case is elevated to the Supreme Court for the correction of any supposed
procedural error of a lower court, and it was found that indeed there has been a mistake, and it
further appears that all the facts needed for a complete determination of the whole
controversy are already before the Court undisputed or uncontroverted by the parties, the
Supreme Court may at its option, whenever it feels the best interest of justice would be
thereby subserved, dispense with the usual procedure of remanding the case to the court of
origin for its own judgment and instead, may already resolved the pertinent determinative
issues and render the final judgment on the merits.


SHOULD THE PETITIONER BE REINSTATED? YES
Concomitant with the right of an employee or worker to reinstatement after an unlawful
dismissal. She is entitled to her back salaries and expenses. However, her refusal to return back
to work for the earlier return to work order disqualifies her from other damages prayed for.







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Ynot vs. IAC Petitioner: Restituto Ynot
Respondent: Intermediate Appellate Court, Station Commander,
Integrated National Police, Bureau of Animal Industry, etc

Ynot transported 6 carabaos in a pumpboat from Masbate to Iloilo
when they were confiscated by the police commander for
violation of an EO 626-A which prohibits any carabao regardless of
age, sex or physical conditionor purpose, including carabeef, to be
transported from one province to another.

The EO succinctly provides the penalty of confiscation in favor of
the government to be distributed to charitable institutions and
other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat
Inspection Comm may see fit, or in case of carabeef, to deserving
farmers as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit.

Ynot sued for recovery before the RTC. The lower court sustained
the confiscation.

Ynot appealed before the IAC assailing the constitutionality of the
EO insofar as it authorizes the outright confiscation of the carabao
or carabeef as a penalty without according the owner the
opportunity to be heard.


Issue: IS THE OUTRIGHT CONFISCATION CLAUSE IS A DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS AND AN
ENCROACHMENT OF JUDICIAL POWER BY THE EXECUTIVE? YES

Held:

Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be
heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the
administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a
clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of
powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers
mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties
arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we hereby declare Executive Order No. 626-A
unconstitutional.





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judicial power vs. power of judicial review
Fernandez vs.
Torres

Santos III vs.
Northwest
Airlines
Petitioner purchased from NOA a round trip ticket in SanFran for
his flight from SanFran to Manila via Tokyo and back.
No date was specified for his return to SanFran
Petitioner checked in at NOA SanFran for his scheduled departure
Despite a previous confirmation and reconfirmation, he was
informed that he had no reservation from Tokyo to Manila
Petitioner sued NOA for damages
NOA moved to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction citing
Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention Art. 28. (1)An action
for damage must be brought at the option of the plaintiff, in the
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, either before the
court of the domicile of the carrier or of his principal place of
business, or where he has a place of business through which the
contract has been made, or before the court at the place of
destination.
LC granted the motion and dismissed the case.

ISSUE OF CONSTITUTIONALITY
It is well-settled that courts will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question only if it is
shown that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first satisfied.
Thus, there must be an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights
susceptible of judicial determination; the constitutional question must have been
opportunely raised by the proper party; and the resolution of the question is unavoidably
necessary to the decision of the case itself.
Courts generally avoid having to decide a constitutional question. This attitude is based on the
doctrine of separation of powers, which enjoins upon the departments of the government a
becoming respect for each other's acts.
The treaty which is the subject matter of this petition was a joint legislative-executive act. The
presumption is that it was first carefully studied and determined to be constitutional before it
was adopted and given the force of law in this country.
The petitioner's allegations are not convincing enough to overcome this presumption.
It is true that at the time the Warsaw Convention was drafted, the airline industry was still in its
infancy. However, that circumstance alone is not sufficient justification for the rejection of the
treaty at this time.
The treaty has not been rejected by the Philippine government. The doctrine of rebus sic
stantibus does not operate automatically to render the treaty inoperative. There is a necessity
for a formal act of rejection, usually made by the head of State, with a statement of the reasons
why compliance with the treaty is no longer required.
Rejection of the treaty, whether on the ground of rebus sic stantibus or pursuant to Article 39,
is not a function of the courts but of the other branches of government. This is a political act.
The conclusion and renunciation of treaties is the prerogative of the political departments and
may not be usurped by the judiciary. The courts are concerned only with the interpretation and
application of laws and treaties in force and not with their wisdom or efficacy.

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Petitioner alleges that the expenses and difficulties he will incur in filing a suit in the United
States would constitute a constructive denial of his right to access to our courts for the
protection of his rights.
The constitutional guaranty of access to courts refers only to courts with appropriate
jurisdiction as defined by law. It does not mean that a person can go to any court for redress of
his grievances regardless of the nature or value of his claim. If the petitioner is barred from
filing his complaint before our courts, it is because they are not vested with the appropriate
jurisdiction under the Warsaw Convention, which is part of the law of our land.
Dumlao vs.
COMELEC
Petitioner Dumlao, who has filed his certificate of candidacy,
questions the constitutionality sec 4 BP Blg 52 as
discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due
process guarantees
Petitioner Igot, a taxpayer, qualified voter and member of
the Bar, and Petitioner Salapantan, a taxpayer, assail the
validity of Sec 7 of BP Blg 51; sec1, 4 and 6 of BP Blg 52
Igot and Salapantan also question the accreditation of some
political parties by COMELEC
They pray that the statutory provisions they have challenged
be declared null and void

Whether or not the petition may be granted? NO!
Petition suffers from basic procedural infirmities, hence, traditionally unacceptable for judicial
resolution. For one, there is a misjoinder of parties and actions. Petitioner Dumlao's interest is
alien to that of petitioners Igot and Salapantan Petitioner Dumlao does not join petitioners Igot
and Salapantan in the burden of their complaint, nor do the latter join Dumlao in his.
There are standards that have to be followed inthe exercise of the function of judicial review,
namely (1) the existence of an appropriate case:, (2) an interest personal and substantial by the
party raising the constitutional question: (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the
earliest opportunity and (4) the necessity that the constiutional question be passed upon in
order to decide the case.
Third requisite has been complied with, which is, that the parties have raised the issue of
constitutionality early enough in their pleadings. But has fallen far short of the other three
criteria.
Actual case and controversy
Power of judicial review is limited to the determination of actual cases and controversies.
Dumlao has not been adversely affected by the application of that provision. No petition
seeking Dumlao's disqualification has been filed before the COMELEC. There is no ruling of that
constitutional body on the matter, which this Court is being asked to review on Certiorari. His is
a question posed in the abstract, a hypothetical issue, and in effect, a petition for an advisory
opinion from this Court to be rendered without the benefit of a detailed factual record
Petitioner Dumlao's case is clearly within the primary jurisdiction of COMELEC.

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Proper Party
"the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest
in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement"
With regard to Igot and Salapantan, it cannot be denied that neither one has been convicted
nor charged with acts of disloyalty to the State, nor disqualified from being candidates for local
elective positions. Neither one of them has been calle ed to have been adversely affected by
the operation of the statutory provisions they assail as unconstitutional Theirs is a generated
grievance. They have no personal nor substantial interest at stake. In the absence of any litigate
interest; they can claim no locus standi in seeking judicial redress.
Statutory provisions questioned do not directly involve the disbursement of public funds. While,
concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of public moneys, nowhere in their
Petition do said petitioners allege that their tax money is "being extracted and spent in violation
of specific constitutional protections against abuses of legislative power" or that there is a
misapplication of such funds by COMELEC or that public money is being deflected to any
improper purpose. Neither do petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting public
funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.
Unavoidability of constitutional question
the constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be determined by the courts unless that
question is properly raised and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a
determination of the case; i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota
presented."
The present is not an "appropriate case" for either petitioner Dumlao or for petitioners Igot and
Salapantan. They are actually without cause of action. It follows that the necessity for resolving
the issue of constitutionality is absent, and procedural regularity would require that this suit be
dismissed.
Nepa vs. Ongpin Pres Marcos issued PD1789 Omnibus Investment Code.
Thereafter, he issued PD 1892 suspending for one year from date
of its effectivity the nationality requirement of at least 60%
Philippine Nationals for non-pioneer industries entitled to
Whether or not the petition may be granted? NO!
It is a well-settled rule that no constitutional question will be heard and resolved unless the
following requisites of a judicial inquiry are present:
(1) the existence of an appropriate case;

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registration under PD 1789
Petitioner NEPA filed the instant petition seeking to enjoin public
respondents from enforcing said decrees as well as the
Investment Priorities Plan
They maintain that the Pres has no absolute legislative power
during martial law but only limited to the decree-making power
relative to the suppression and prevention of the ground for its
imposition
SolGen contend that the petitioners have no personality and
standing to sue in the absence of an actual controversy
concerning the enforcement of the PDs in question

(2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question;
(3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and
(4) the necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case
Petitioners merely complied with the third requisite that of raising the issue of constitutionality
at the earliest instance in their pleadings. The petition is deficient as to the other three criteria.
The power of judicial review is limited to the determination of actual cases and controversies,
which are obviously absent in the instant case
Not even one of the petitioners has been adversely affected by the application of those
provisions. No actual conflict has been alleged wherein the petitioner could validly and possibly
say that the increase in foreign equity participation in non-pioneer areas of investment had any
direct bearing on them. Petitioners advance an abstract, hypothetical issue which is in effect a
petition for an advisory opinion from this Court.
The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugned the validity of a statute must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain direct
injury as a result of its enforcement.
Not one of them has averred to have been adversely affected by the operation of the statutory
provisions they assail as unconstitutional. They have no personal or substantial interest at
stake. In the absence of any legal conflict, they can claim no locus standi in seeking judicial
redress especially so, as the challenged laws do not relate to appropriation measures that
constitute misappropriation of public funds.
Courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a law upon the complaint of one who fails to
show that he is injured by its operation.
Lagamy vs. CA Adela Tuason, registered owner of 300 sq m lot, leased 164 sq m
to Lagmay, Basconvillo and Pinggan
These lessees built residential houses in their respective areas
Atty. Molina, counsel of Adela, sent lessees a letter notifying them
that Adela intends to sell the premised they were occupying
She gave first preference to the lessees to buy the lot and allowed
Can the Court decide questions of constitutional nature? NO.
The issue of constitutionality of a statute, executive order or proclamation must be the very lis
mota presented in a case. The Court does not decide questions of a constitutional nature unless
that question is properly raised and presented in an appropriate case and is necessary to its
determination.
Although the Court may deem it best for public policy to resolve the constitutional issue
considering that numerous persons are affected by the questioned proclamation, there are

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them 3 months to decide
Lessees did not make any reply, Adela, stopped collecting rentals.
Lessees did not even bother to pay
Adelas sisters requested the lessee to leave the premises to
enable their sister to sell the lots to meet her financial obligations
Lessees instead of leaving, sent a letter to Adela offering to buy
the land and assert their priority legal rights under PD 1517 with
issuance of preliminary injunction which was granted by LC
Adela did not make a reply
Lessees filed a complaint for the enforcement of their preemptive
right
Through another letter, they offered to buy at P800.00/sq.m.
LC dismissed the complaint and lifted the preliminary injunction
LC: lessees can exercise his "right of first refusal to purchase" the
leased land following preconditions that must be complied with:
(a) the lessor's proposal to sell must be duly accepted by the lessee;
(b) the terms and conditions of the said proposal must be determined
by the Urban Zone Expropriation and Land Management Committee;
and
(c) the said proposal must be declared to the Ministry of Human
Settlements.
The lower court held that these conditions had not been met in this
case.
CA: dismissed their appeal on the ground that the lessees
could not properly exercise their preemptive right to
purchase the property because their leased lots were not
other grounds by which this case may be resolved on a non-constitutional determination.
In this case, the resolution of the issue of whether or not Sec. 6 of P.D. No. 1517 is "self-
executing" will determine the legality of petitioners' claim for the preemptive right provided for
in said section. Petitioners assert their entitlement to said right but even a cursory reading of
said section points to a contrary conclusion.
The terms and conditions of the sale in exercise of the lessee's right of first refusal to purchase
shag be determined by the Urban Zone Expropriation and Land Management Committee.
Hence, the lower court rightfully ruled that certain prerequisites must be complied with by
anyone who wishes to avail himself of the benefits of the decree.



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included in the 244 urban sites proclaimed as urban land
reform areas under Proclamation No. 1967, which amended
Proclamation No. 1893
Lessees filed MR assailed the constitutionality of
Proclamation No. 1967 on the grounds that it is
discriminatory and not uniformly applied "to all tenants
wherever they are." --- CA denied
jurisdiction of the supreme court
Sec. 5(2d), Art.
8
SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

(1) xxx

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question.

(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto.

(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.

(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.


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(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
congressional power over the jurisdiction of the supreme court
Sec. 2(1), Art. 8 SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus.
Sec. 30, Art. 6 SECTION 30. No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and concurrence.
en banc vs. division
Sec. 4, Art. 8 SECTION 4.

(2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other
cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc, including those involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees,
proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.

(3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the
issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case, without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the required number is not obtained, the case
shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed
except by the court sitting en banc.
En Banc
Decisions
1. Constitutional questions
2. Conflict of decisions by its divisions
3. Referred by a division and receipts by en banc
4. Death penalty cases
composition of the supreme court

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SECTION 4. SECTION 4.
Vargas vs.
Rilloraza





appointments & qualifications of the judicial & bar council
Sec. 7(1), Art. 8 SECTION 7.
(1) No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. A Member of the
Supreme Court must be at least forty years of age, and must have been for fifteen years or more a judge of a lower court or engaged in the practice of law in the
Philippines.

(2) The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of judges of lower courts, but no person may be appointed judge thereof unless he is a citizen of the Philippines and a
member of the Philippine Bar.

(3) A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence.
Sec. 8, Art. 8 SECTION 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary
of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court,
and a representative of the private sector.

(2) The regular Members of the Council shall be appointed by the President for a term of four years with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Of the
Members first appointed, the representative of the Integrated Bar shall serve for four years, the professor of law for three years, the retired Justice for two years, and the
representative of the private sector for one year.


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(3) The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex officio of the Council and shall keep a record of its proceedings.

(4) The regular Members of the Council shall receive such emoluments as may be determined by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court shall provide in its annual budget
the appropriations for the Council.

(5) The Council shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to the Judiciary. It may exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may
assign to it.
Sec. 9, Art. 8 SECTION 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the
Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.

For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within ninety days from the submission of the list.
salary
Sec. 10, Art. 8 SECTION 10. The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their
continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased.
Sec. 17, Art. 18 SECTION 17. Until the Congress provides otherwise, the President shall receive an annual salary of three hundred thousand pesos; the Vice-President, the President of the
Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, two hundred forty thousand pesos each; the Senators, the Members of
the House of Representatives, the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and the Chairmen of the Constitutional Commissions, two hundred four thousand pesos each;
and the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, one hundred eighty thousand pesos each.
security of tenure
Sec. 2, Art. 8 SECTION 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its
jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof.

No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the security of tenure of its Members.

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Sec. 11, Art. 8 SECTION 11. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall hold office during good behavior until they reached the age of seventy years or become
incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a
vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.
De La Llana vs.
Alba

removal
Sec. 11, Art. 8 SECTION 11. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall hold office during good behavior until they reached the age of seventy years or become
incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a
vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.
Sec. 2, Art. 9
requirements as to decisions
Sec. 13, Art. 8 SECTION 13. The conclusions of the Supreme Court in any case submitted to it for decision en banc or in division shall be reached in consultation before the case is
assigned to a Member for the writing of the opinion of the Court. A certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice shall be issued and a copy thereof attached to the
record of the case and served upon the parties. Any Member who took no part, or dissented, or abstained from a decision or resolution must state the reason therefor.
The same requirements shall be observed by all lower collegiate courts.
Sec. 14, Art. 8 SECTION 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.

No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor.
Oil & Gas
Nature Corp. vs.
CA


Airfrance vs.
Carrascoso

Vda. De Espiritu
vs. CFI


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Buscayno vs.
Enrile
Buscayno is a civilian and a ranking leader of the Communist Party, the
Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan or the NPA was accused in 2 criminal
cases, one for violation of RA 1700 and another for murder, both
pending with respondent Military Commission 2. He contested the
proceedings had against him therein, claiming that the charges against
him are properly cognizable by the regular civil courts which have
remained open and have been regularly functioning notwithstanding
the imposition of martial law.
Whether a CPP member should be tried in a military tribunal? YES

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition sustaining the military tribunal's jurisdiction over the
accused and ruling that the proceeding before the respondent commission observe the
fundamental requisites of procedural due process, due notice, an essentially fair and impartial
trial and reasonable opportunity for the preparation of the defense.

The military tribunals were vested with jurisdiction 'exclusive of the civil courts,' among others,
over crimes against public order, violations of the Anti-Subversion Act, violations of the laws on
firearms, and other crimes which in the face of the emergency, are directly related to the
quelling of the rebellion and preservation of the safety and security of the Republic in order to
ensure a more orderly administration of justice, in the cases triable by the said, military
tribunals, PD 39. A state of rebellion existed in the country when Proc. 1081 was issued.

The guarantee of due process is not a guarantee of any particular form of tribunal in criminal
cases. A military tribunal of competent jurisdiction, accusation in due form, notice and
opportunity to defend and trial before an impartial tribunal, adequately meet the due process
requirement. Due process of law does not necessarily mean a judicial proceedings in the regular
courts. The guarantee of due process, viewed in its procedural aspect, requires no particular
form or procedure. It implies due notice to the individual of the proceedings, an opportunity to
defend himself and the problem of the propriety of the deprivations, under the circumstances
presented, must be resolved in a manner consistent with essential fairness. It means essentially
a fair and impartial trial and reasonable opportunity for the preparation of defense. The
procedure before the Military Commission, as prescribed in PD 39, assures observance of the
fundamental requisites of procedural due process, due notice, an essential fair and impartial
trial and reasonable opportunity for the preparation of the defense.

FAIRNESS AND LACK OF IMPARTIALITY PRESUMED
Prejudice cannot be presumed, especially if weighed against the great confidence and trust
reposed by the people upon the President and the latter's legal obligation under his oath to do

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justice to every man.
Mangelen vs. CA Habaluyas Ent. bound itself to pay P600,000.00 to Mangelen by
virtue of a Compromise Agreement. Instead of filing an Answer
within the reglementary period, Habaluyas Ent. submitted a MTD
for improper venue, which was denied.
A 2
nd
MTD lis pendens was filed, which was also denied
Although they received a copy of the denial order, Habaluyas still
did not file any answer to the complaint. Consequently, Mangelen
filed a motion to declare defendants in default, which was
granted.
Habaluyas filed a motion to set aside the order of default and to
hold in abeyance further proceedings because of the certiorari
with the IAC, but the same was denied since the defendants were
grossly and inexcusably negligent in failing to submit their
responsive pleading
TC: Mangelen
CA: Remanded the case for further proceedings
WHETHER THE DECISION OF THE CA WAS CORRECT? NO
What was filed before the CA was an ordinary appeal from a judgment by default. This
necessitated a full-blown decision taking into account substantive and procedural
matters.
Now, if such decision had to be completely overturned or set aside, upon the filing of
a motion for reconsideration, in a subsequent action via a resolution or modified
decision, such resolution or decision should likewise state the factual and legal
foundation relied upon. The reason is obvious: aside from being required by the
Constitution, the court should be able to justify such a sudden change of course; it
must be able to convincingly explain the taking back of its solemn conclusions and
pronouncements in the earlier decision. In the instant case, the CA miserably failed to
do so, this is reflected in the quoted resolution of 12 July 1989 which leaves in limbo
the trial court's challenged decision because it is not the latter which is reversed but
rather the public respondent's own decision of 30 January 1989. Public respondent
simply restored the parties to the status quo obtaining prior to 30 January 1989.
Clearly, therefore, an amended decision on the appeal proper or on the merits of the
decision of the trial court would be in order.
CA ordered the remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings, thereby
placing the latter in a quandary as to what it was supposed to do. The TC would not
know what "further proceedings" means as the public respondent neither nullified
the order of default nor set aside the evidence received ex-parte. Thus, the former
would be hard put at finding a satisfactory solution to the problem presented for its
resolution.
We are thus unable to see how further proceedings by the TC could produce a result
consistent with the theory of Habaluyas. Besides, the interpretation of the
Compromise Agreement involves a question of law; the remand of the case would
thus serve no useful purpose.
mandatory period for deciding cases
Sec. 15, Art. 8 SECTION 15.

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(1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme
Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower courts.

(2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pending, brief, or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by
the court itself.

(3) Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice or the presiding judge shall forthwith be issued and a copy
thereof attached to the record of the case or matter, and served upon the parties. The certification shall state why a decision or resolution has not been rendered or
issued within said period.

(4) Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the court, without prejudice to such responsibility as may have been incurred in consequence thereof, shall
decide or resolve the case or matter submitted thereto for determination, without further delay.
Sec. 18(3), Art. 7 SECTION 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces
to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty
days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting
jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside
by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by
the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.

The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without any need of a call.

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the

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conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.

The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with the invasion.

During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.
Sec. 12, Art. 18 SECTION 12. The Supreme Court shall, within one year after the ratification of this Constitution, adopt a systematic plan to expedite the decision or resolution of cases or
matters pending in the Supreme Court or the lower courts prior to the effectivity of this Constitution. A similar plan shall be adopted for all special courts and quasi-
judicial bodies.

Sec. 13, Art. 18 SECTION 13. The legal effect of the lapse, before the ratification of this Constitution, of the applicable period for the decision or resolution of the cases or matters
submitted for adjudication by the courts, shall be determined by the Supreme Court as soon as practicable.

Sec. 14, Art. 18 SECTION 14. The provisions of paragraphs (3) and (4), Section 15 of Article VIII of this Constitution shall apply to cases or matters filed before the ratification of this
Constitution, when the applicable period lapses after such ratification.

SECTION 15.

(1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme
Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower courts.

(2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pending, brief, or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by
the court itself.


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(3) Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice or the presiding judge shall forthwith be issued and a copy
thereof attached to the record of the case or matter, and served upon the parties. The certification shall state why a decision or resolution has not been rendered or
issued within said period.

(4) Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the court, without prejudice to such responsibility as may have been incurred in consequence thereof,
shall decide or resolve the case or matter submitted thereto for determination, without further delay.
administrative powers
Sec. 5(3), Art. 8 (3) Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may require. Such temporary assignment shall not exceed six months without the
consent of the judge concerned.
Sec. 5(4), Art. 8 (4) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
Sec. 5(6), Art. 8 (6) Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service Law.
Sec. 5(11), Art. 8
supervision over the lower courts
Maceda vs.
Vasquez

In Re Demeteria Justice Demetria filed this MR of the decision dated March 27, 2001
finding him guilty for interceding for suspected Chinese drug queen Yu
Yuk Lai. Demetria was accused of extending counseling services to SP
Formaran III. Mme. Justice Carolina Grino P. Aquino evaluated the case
and thru the testimonies of witnesses found him aiding the case of Yu
Yuk Lai.
WHETHER DEMETRIA IN EXTENDING COUNSELING SERVICES SHOULD BE PUNISHED? YES
In affirming the assailed decision, the Supreme Court held that great weight and highest respect
is accorded to the evaluation of Mme. Justice Carolina Grino P. Aquino, as her assessment of
the evidence are quite competent and convincing and in the absence of GAD; that the
conspiracy to clear Yu Yuk Lai has become clearer with the recent dismissal of Judge Manuel T.
Muro who is handling her case for misconduct, for being utterly inefficient and partial in favor
of Yu Yuk Lai, and respondent Justice has wittingly, perhaps unwittingly, become one of the co-
conspirators; that as a member of the Judiciary, respondent Justice should not act as lawyer for
an accused nor should he teach the prosecutors what to do; that the series of events that
transpired led to the conclusion that points to his guilt; and that his denial cannot prevail over
the positive declarations of the prosecutions who from all indications were never actuated by

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improper motives.
Respondent argues that his culpability must be established beyond reasonable doubt. But, as
often said, proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such absolute certainty as to exclude
the possibility of error. Only moral certainty is required, or that degree of proof which produces
conviction in an unprejudiced mind. In the instant case, we believe that that requisite degree of
proof has been met.
MR DENIED
temporary assignmentof judges to other stations in public interest


order a change of venue / place of trial to Avoid miscarriage of justice


Mondiguing vs.
Abad
Mondiguing was the mayor of Banawe Ifugao.
Mondiguing and Dunuan are 2 of 10 defendants accused of double
murder, frustrated murder and attempted murder in connection
with an ambuscade in Baag, Banaue where Governor Lumauig was
wounded and his executive assistant and his driver were killed. Up
to this time the accused in that case have not been arraigned. .
Accused filed in the SC a petition for transfer of venue Baguio or
Quezon City, claiming they could not expect a fair trial in Lagawe,
Ifugao because Judge Abad is a protege of Governor Lumauig and
that their witnesses would be afraid to testify because of
harassment.
Because of the incident and constant threats on his life,
Mondiguing resigned as mayor of Banaue and took refuge in
WHETHER A CHANGE OF VENUE SHOULD BE ORDERED? YES

In Paredes vs. Abad, Judge Abad was disqualified from trying the electoral protests filed by
Paredes against Lumauig.

Generally, a change of the place of trial in criminal cases should not be granted for whimsical or
flimsy reasons. The interests of the public require that, to secure the best results and effects in
the punishment of crime, it is necessary to prosecute and punish the criminal in the very place,
as near as may be, where he committed his crime. Except when it is to avoid a miscarriage of
justice.


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Baguio City.
The Acting Sol-Gen offered to be transferred in Isabela in view of
its proximity to Ifugao.
Respondent Judge Abad claimed that he was not biased.
In the interest of a fair and impartial trial and to avoid a miscarriage of justice and considering
that his life would be in danger if he were to be tried in Lagawe, Ifugao, he should be tried in
Baguio.
People vs. Sola The criminal case for 7 murders against Pablo Sola was pending
trial before CFI Negros Occidental.
A search warrant for the search and seizure of the 7 deceased
bodies believed in the possession of Pablo Sola in his hacienda at
Sta. Isabel. Diggings made in a canefield yielded 2 common graves
containing the 7 bodies
7 separate complaints for murder were filed against Sola, et.al.,
wherein warrants of arrest were issued. Without giving the
prosecution the opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt of
the accused is strong, the court granted them the right to post bail
for their temporary release.
The prosecutions witness claimed their safety could be
jeopardized because at least 2 of the accused are officials with
power and influence in Kabankalan and they have been released
on bail. In addition, most of the accused remained at large.
Indeed, there have been reports made to police authorities of
threats made on the families of the witnesses.
WHETHER THERE SHOULD BE A CHANGE OF VENUE? YES

The prosecutions witnesses were not able to testify because of several death threats so there
was a compelling need to change the venue in order to promote a fair trial.
appointment of officials & employees of the entire judiciary


promulgation of rules concerning the enforcement & protection of constitutional rights


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promulgation of rules concerning pleading, practice & procedure
Bustos vs.
Lucero
The petitioner is an accused in a criminal case, filed a petition to
remand the case to the justice of the peace court (court of origin), in
order for him to cross-examine the complainant and her witnesses in
connection with their testimony that led to his warrant of arrest. The
motion was denied and that denial is the subject matter of this
proceeding.
Petitioner claims that when he was summoned for investigation, the
justice of the peace informed him of the charges and asked him if he
pleaded guilty or not guilty, upon which he entered the plea of not
guilty. Then his counsel moved that the complainant present her
evidence so that she and her witnesses could be examined and cross-
examined in the manner and form provided by law. The fiscal and the
private prosecutor objected, invoking section 11 of Rule 108, and the
objection was sustained. The accused's counsel announced his
intention to renounce his right to present evidence, and the justice of
the peace forwarded the case to the court of first instance.
Whether the accused, after renouncing his right to present evidence, and by reason of that
waiver he was committed to the corresponding court for trial, is estopped from questioning
the same? yes
Section 11 of Rule 108 does not curtail the sound discretion of the justice of the peace on the
matter. While section 11 of Rule 108 defines the bounds of the defendant's right in the
preliminary investigation, there is nothing in it or any other law restricting the authority,
inherent in a court of justice, to pursue a course of action reasonably calculated to bring out the
truth. But the "defendant can not, as a matter of right, compel the complainant and his
witnesses to repeat in his presence what they had said at the preliminary examination before
the issuance of the order of arrest." The constitutional right of an accused to be confronted by
the witnesses against him does not apply to preliminary hearings; nor will the absence of a
preliminary examination be an infringement of his right to confront witnesses. As a matter of
fact, preliminary investigation may be done away with entirely without infringing the
constitutional right of an accused under the due process clause to a fair trial.
The foregoing decision was rendered by a divided court. The minority went farther than the
majority and denied even any discretion on the part of the justice of the peace or judge holding
the preliminary investigation to compel the complainant and his witnesses to testify anew.
Upon the foregoing considerations, the present petition is dismissed with costs against the
petitioner.
Nunez vs.
Sandiganbayan
Petitioner, accused before the Sandiganbayan of estafa through
falsification of public and commercial documents, assailed the validity
of PD 1486, as amended by PD 1606 creating this special court on the
ground that its creation is violative of the due process, equal protection
and ex post facto clauses of the Constitution.

WHETHER THE PRESIDENT (DURING MARTIAL LAW) CAN CREATE AN ANTI-GRAFT COURT? YES

While the 1973 Constitution would contemplate that an act creating a special court such as the
Sandiganbayan should come from the National Assembly, the 1976 Amendments made clear
that the incumbent President "shall continue to exercise legislative powers until martial law
shall have been lifted.'' As affirmed in Aquino, Jr. v. COMELEC, "it is not a grant of authority to
legislate but a recognition of such power as already existing in favor of the incumbent President
during the period of Martial law.

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That SC, in dismissing the petition, held that the unconstitutionality of such decree cannot be
adjudged. The requirements of due process as applied to criminal proceedings are considered
complied with where the accused is heard in a court of competent jurisdiction and proceeded
against under the orderly process of law, and only punished after inquiry and investigation,
upon notice to him, with an opportunity to be heard and a judgment awarded within the
authority of a constitutional law. The equal protection clause has not been violated either
despite the limitation in the accused's right to appeal as the classification satisfies the test of
substantial distinctions, germane to the purposes of the law, the Sandiganbayan having been
specially created in response to the problem of dishonesty in the public service. The challenged
decree is likewise not contrary to the ex post facto provision of the Constitution on the
allegation that petitioner's right of appeal is being diluted or eroded efficacy wise as the
omission of the Court of Appeals as an intermediate tribunal does not deprive petitioner of a
right vital to the protection of his liberty. As held in the case of Duncan v. Missouri, "the
prescribing, of different modes of procedure and the abolition of courts and the creation of new
ones, leaving untouched all the substantial protections with which the existing laws surrounds
the person accused of crime, are not considered within the constitutional inhibition."

EX POST FACTO LAW:
In re: Kay Villegas Kami Inc., it was held that an ex post facto law is one which: (1) makes
criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was innocent when done, and
punishes such an act; (2) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed;
(3) changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the
crime when committed; (4) alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon
less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense;
(5) assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or deprivation
of a right for something which when done was lawful; and (6) deprives a person accused of a
crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a
former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.
Maniago vs. CA Ruben Maniago was the owner of shuttle buses which were used
in transporting employees of the Texas Instruments from Baguio
City proper to its plant site at the Export Processing Authority in
Loakan, Baguio. 1 of his buses figured in a vehicular accident with
In the present case, the criminal action was filed against the employee, bus driver. Had the
driver been convicted and found insolvent, his employer would have been held subsidiarily
liable for damages. But if the right to bring a separate civil action (whether arising from the
crime or from quasi-delict) is reserved, there would be no possibility that the employer would

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a passenger jeepney owned by Boado. As a result of the accident,
a criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property and multiple physical injuries was filed against his driver.
A month later, a civil case for damages against Maniago himself.
Maniago moved for the suspension of the proceedings in the civil
case against him, citing the pendency of the criminal case against
his driver. But it was denied because action could proceed
independently of the criminal action, in addition to the fact that
Maniago was not the accused in the criminal case.
Maniago went to the CA maintaining that the civil action could not
proceed independently of the criminal case because no
reservation of the right to bring it separately had been made in
the criminal case.
CA: DISMISSED because a civil action for damages to be filed
independently of the criminal action even though no reservation
to file the same has been made.
be held liable because in such a case there would be no pronouncement as to the civil liability
of the accused. In such a case the institution of a separate and independent civil action under
the Civil Code would not result in the employee being held liable for the same act or omission.
The rule requiring reservation in the end serves to implement the prohibition against double
recovery for the same act or omission. As held in Barredo v. Garcia, 25 the injured party must
choose which of the available causes of action for damages he will bring. If he fails to reserve
the filing of a separate civil action he will be deemed to have elected to recover damages from
the bus driver on the basis of the crime. In such a case his cause of action against the employer
will be limited to the recovery of the latter's subsidiary liability under Art. 103 of the Revised
Penal Code.
.
Nor does it matter that the action is against the employer to enforce his vicarious liability under
Art. 2180 of the Civil Code. Though not an accused in the criminal case, the employer is very
much a party, as long as the right to bring or institute a separate action (whether arising from
crime or from quasi delict) is not reserved. The ruling that a decision convicting the employee is
binding and conclusive upon the employer "not only with regard to its civil liability but also with
regard to its amount because the liability of an employer cannot be separated but follows that
of his employee" It is true not only with respect to the civil liability arising from crime but also
with respect to the civil liability under the Civil Code. Since whatever is recoverable against the
employer is ultimately recoverable by him from the employee, the policy against double
recovery requires that only one action be maintained for the same act or omission whether the
action is brought against the employee or against his employer. Thus in Dulay v. Court of
Appeals this Court held that an employer may be sued under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code and
that the right to bring the action did not have to be reserved because, having been instituted
before the criminal case against the employee, the filing of the civil action against the employer
constituted an express reservation of the right to institute it separately.

On the basis of Rule 111, 1-3, a civil action for the recovery of civil liability is, as a general
rule, impliedly instituted with the criminal action, except only (1) when such action arising from
the same act or omission, which is the subject of the criminal action, is waived; (2) the right to
bring it separately is reserved or (3) such action has been instituted prior to the criminal action.
Even if an action has not been reserved or it was brought before the institution of the criminal
case, the acquittal of the accused will not bar recovery of civil liability unless the acquittal is
based on a finding that the act from which the civil liability might arise did not exist because of

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Art. 29 of the Civil Code.

Complaint against Maniago is DISMISSED.
admission to the practice of the law
SC Circular No.
19
SUBJECT: ADOPTION OF RULE 138A OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT TO PERMIT LIMITED LAW STUDENT PRACTICE.
RULE 138A
LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE
SEC. 1. Conditions for Student Practice. - A law student who has successfully completed his third year of the regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in
a recognized law schools clinical legal education program approved by the SC, may appear, without compensation, in any civil, criminal or administrative case before any
trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent any indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law school.
SEC. 2. Appearance. - The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be under the direct supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines duly accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed by the supervising
attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic.
SEC. 3. Privileged communications. - The Rules safeguarding privileged communications between attorney and client shall apply to similar communications made to or
received by the law student, acting for the legal clinic.
SEC. 4. Standards of conduct and supervision. - The law student shall comply with the standards of professional conduct governing members of the Bar. Failure of an
attorney to provide adequate supervision of student practice may be a ground for disciplinary action.
INTEGRATION OF THE BAR
In Re Edillon IBP Board of Governors, unanimously adopted a Resolution in an
Administrative case recommending to the Court the removal of the
name Edillon from its Roll of Attorneys for 'stubborn refusal to pay his
membership dues' to the IBP since the latter's constitution
notwithstanding due notice.
The IBP, through its then President Neri, submitted the said resolution
to the Court for consideration and approval,. Pursuant to paragraph 2,
WHETHER EDILLON MAY BE COMPELLED TO PAY IBP DUES in order to maintain his name in
the roll of attorneys? yes.
From the time the decision was rendered, there were various pleadings filed by Edillon for
reinstatement starting with a MR. Characterized as it was by persistence in his adamantine
refusal to admit the full competence of the Court on the matter, it was not unexpected that it
would be denied. Since respondent could not be said to be that deficient in legal knowledge and
since his pleadings in other cases coming before this Tribunal were quite literate, even if rather
generously sprinkled with invective for which he had been duly taken to task, there was the

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Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP:
... Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29,
the Board shall promptly inquire into the cause or causes of the
continued delinquency and take whatever action it shall deem
appropriate, including a recommendation to the SC for the removal of
the delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of
the action taken should be submit by registered mail to the member
and to the Secretary of the Chapter concerned.'
The Court required Edillon to comment on the resolution and letter. He
submitted his comment reiterating his refusal to pay the membership
fees due from him.
Reference was then made to the authority of the IBP Board of
Governors to recommend to the SC the removal of a delinquent
member's name from the Roll of Attorneys as found in Rules of Court:
'Effect of non-payment of dues. Subject to the provisions of Section
12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months
shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and
default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal
of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.
Edillion submitted that "the above provisions constitute an invasion of
his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a
pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to
be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as
a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said
organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is
being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him
by the Constitution. Hence, he concludes, the above provisions of the
Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and
effect.

It was pointed out in the resolution that such issues was raised on a
previous case before the Court, entitled 'Administrative Case No. 526,
In the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the
Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners.' The unanimous
impression that his recalcitrance arose from and sheer obstinacy. Necessary, the extreme
penalty of disbarment visited on him was more than justified.
Since then, however, there were other communications to this Court where a different attitude
on his part was discernible. The tone of defiance was gone and circumstances of a mitigating
character invoked the state of his health and his advanced age. He likewise spoke of the
welfare of former clients who still rely on him for counsel, their confidence apparently
undiminished. For he had in his career been a valiant, if at times unreasonable, defender of the
causes entrusted to him.
This Court, in the light of the above, felt that reinstatement could be ordered. It made certain
that there was full acceptance on his part of the competence of this Tribunal in the exercise of
its plenary power to regulate the legal profession and can integrate the bar and that the dues
were duly paid. Moreover, the fact that more than two years had elapsed during which he was
barred from exercising his profession was likewise taken into account. It may likewise be said
that as in the case of the inherent power to punish for contempt, the power to discipline,
especially if amounting to disbarment, should be exercised on the preservative and not on the
vindictive principle.
One last word. It has been pertinently observed that there is no irretrievable finality as far as
admission to the bar is concerned. So it is likewise as to loss of membership. What must ever be
borne in mind is that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. Failure to
abide by any of them entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof warrant such drastic
move.

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conclusion reached by the Court was that the integration of the
Philippine Bar raises no constitutional question and is therefore legally
unobjectionable, "and, within the context of contemporary conditions
in the Philippine, has become an imperative means to raise the
standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice,
and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility fully and
effectively."
legal assistance to the underprivileged


No quasi-judicial & administrative work for judges
Sec. 12, Art. 8 SECTION 12. The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative
functions.
Manila electric
Co. vs. Pasay
Trans.
Act No. 1446 is entitled. "An Act granting a franchise to Charles M.
Swift to construct, maintain, and operate an electric railway, and to
construct, maintain, and operate an electric light, heat, and power
system from a point in Manila in an easterly direction to the town of
Pasig, in the Province of Rizal."
Section 11 of the Act provides: "Whenever any franchise or right of way
is granted to any other person or corporation, now or hereafter in
existence, over portions of the lines and tracks of the grantee herein,
the terms on which said other person or corporation shall use such
right of way, and the compensation to be paid to the grantee herein by
such other person or corporation for said use, shall be fixed by the
members of the SC, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a
majority of whom shall be final."
Manila Electric Company presented a petition the members of the SC,
sitting as a board of arbitrators, to fix the terms upon which certain
transportation companies shall be permitted to use the Pasig bridge of
the Manila Electric Company and the compensation to be paid to the
WHETHER THE SC HAS THE POWER TO SIT AS BOARD OF ARBITRATORS? NO
The SC holds that section 11 of Act No. 1446 contravenes the maxims which guide the operation
of a democratic government constitutionally established, and that it would be improper and
illegal for the members of the SC, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a majority of
whom shall be final, to act on the petition of the Manila Electric Company.
The law calls for arbitration which represents a method of the parties' own choice. A submission
to arbitration is a contract. The parties to an arbitration agreement may not oust the courts of
jurisdiction of the matters submitted to arbitration.
We can also perceive a distinction between a private contract for submission to arbitration and
agreements to arbitrate falling within the terms of a statute enacted for such purpose and
affecting others than the parties to a particular franchise. Here, however, whatever else may be
said in extenuation, it remains true that the decision of the board of arbitrators is made final,
which if literally enforced would leave a public utility, not a party to the contract authorized by
Act No. 1446, without recourse to the courts for a judicial determination of the question in
dispute.

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Manila Electric Company by such transportation companies. Either the members of the SC, sitting as a board of arbitrators, exercise judicial functions, or the
members of the SC, sitting as board of arbitrators, exercise administrative or quasi judicial
functions. The first case would appear not to fall within the jurisdiction granted the SC. Even
conceding that it does, it would presuppose the right to bring the matter in dispute before the
courts, for any other construction would tend to oust the courts of jurisdiction and render the
award a nullity.
The SC of the Philippine Islands represents one of the three divisions of power in our
government. It is judicial power and judicial power only which is exercised by the SC. Just as the
SC, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any other
department of the government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the
powers expressly or by implication conferred on it by the Organic Act. The SC and its members
should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume
any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administering of judicial functions.
The Organic Act provides that the SC of the Philippine Islands shall possess and exercise
jurisdiction as heretofore provided and such additional jurisdiction as shall hereafter be
prescribed by law (sec. 26). When the Organic Act speaks of the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the
SC, it could not only mean the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the SC acting as a court, and could
hardly mean the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the members of the SC, sitting as a board of
arbitrators. There is an important distinction between the SC as an entity and the members of
the SC. A board of arbitrators is not a "court" in any proper sense of the term, and possesses
none of the jurisdiction which the Organic Act contemplates shall be exercised by the Supreme
Court.
The power conferred on this court is exclusively judicial, and it cannot be required or
authorized to exercise any other. . . . Its jurisdiction and powers and duties being defined in the
organic law of the government, and being all strictly judicial, Congress cannot require or
authorize the court to exercise any other jurisdiction or power, or perform any other duty. . . .
The award of execution is a part, and an essential part of every judgment passed by a court
exercising judicial power. It is no judgment, in the legal sense of the term, without it. Without
such an award the judgment would be inoperative and nugatory, leaving the aggrieved party
without a remedy. It would be merely an opinion, which would remain a dead letter, and
without any operation upon the rights of the parties, unless Congress should at some future
time sanction it, and pass a law authorizing the court to carry its opinion into effect. Such is not
the judicial power confided to this court, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; yet it is the
whole power that the court is allowed to exercise under this act of Congress. . . . And while it

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executes firmly all the judicial powers entrusted to it, the court will carefully abstain from
exercising any power that is not strictly judicial in its character, and which is not clearly confided
to it by the Constitution.
in re judge
rodolfo
manzano
Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano, Executive Judge, RTC, Bangui, Ilocos Norte,
Branch 19, sent this Court a letter which reads:
Sir:
By Executive Order RF6-04 issued on June 21, 1988 by the Honorable
Provincial Governor of Ilocos Norte, Hon. Rodolfo C. Farinas, I was
designated as a member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on
Justice created pursuant to Presidential Executive Order No. 856 of 12
December 1986, as amended by Executive Order No. 326 of June 1,
1988. In consonance with Executive Order RF6-04, the Honorable
Provincial Governor of Ilocos Norte issued my appointment as a
member of the Committee. For your ready reference, I am enclosing
herewith machine copies of Executive Order RF6-04 and the
appointment.
Before I may accept the appointment and enter in the discharge of the
powers and duties of the position as member of the Ilocos (Norte)
Provincial Committee on Justice, may I have the honor to request for
the issuance by the Honorable Supreme Court of a Resolution, as
follows:
(1) Authorizing me to accept the appointment and to as assume and
discharge the powers and duties attached to the said position;
(2) Considering my membership in the Committee as neither violative
of the Independence of the Judiciary nor a violation of Section 12,
Article VIII, or of the second paragraph of Section .7, Article IX (B), both
of the Constitution, and will not in any way amount to an
abandonment of my present position as Executive Judge of Branch XIX,
Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, and as a member of the
Judiciary; and
(3) Consider my membership in the said Committee as part of the
WHETHER AN RTC JUDGE CAN VALIDLY HOLD a provincial/city committee on justice position
while being an appointed judge?
An examination of EO 856, as amended, reveals that Provincial/City Committees on Justice are
created to insure the speedy disposition of cases of detainees, particularly those involving the
poor and indigent ones, thus alleviating jail congestion and improving local jail conditions.
It is evident that such Provincial/City Committees on Justice perform administrative functions.
Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct
and affairs of individuals for; their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to
better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative
agency by the organic law of its existence.
Furthermore, under Executive Order No. 326 amending Executive Order No. 856, it is provided
that
Section 6. Supervision.The Provincial/City Committees on Justice shall be under the
supervision of the Secretary of justice Quarterly accomplishment reports shall be submitted to
the Office of the Secretary of Justice.
Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and other courts established by
law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi- judicial or administrative
functions (Section 12, Art. VIII, Constitution).
Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on
Justice, which discharges a administrative functions, will be in violation of the Constitution, the
Court is constrained to deny his request.
While the doctrine of separation of powers is a relative theory not to be enforced with pedantic
rigor, the practical demands of government precluding its doctrinaire application, it cannot
justify a member of the judiciary being required to assume a position or perform a duty non-
judicial in character. That is implicit in the principle. Otherwise there is a plain departure from
its command. The essence of the trust reposed in him is to decide. Only a higher court, as was
emphasized by Justice Barredo, can pass on his actuation. He is not a subordinate of an

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primary functions of an Executive Judge.
May I please be favored soon by your action on this request.
Very respectfully yours,
(Sgd) RODOLFO U. MANZANO Judge

executive or legislative official, however eminent. It is indispensable that there be no exception
to the rigidity of such a norm if he is, as expected, to be confined to the task of adjudication.
Fidelity to his sworn responsibility no less than the maintenance of respect for the judiciary can
be satisfied with nothing less.
This declaration does not mean that RTC Judges should adopt an attitude of monastic
insensibility or unbecoming indifference to Province/City Committee on Justice. As incumbent
RTC Judges, they form part of the structure of government. Even as non-members of
Provincial/City Committees on Justice, RTC judges should render assistance to said Committees
to help promote the laudable purposes for which they exist, but only when such assistance may
be reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of their judicial duties.
fiscal autonomy
Nitafan vs.
Commissioner

report on the judiciary
Sec. 16, Art. 8
Corpus vs. CA BACKGROUND CASE:
Corpus was charged administratively by several employee of the
Central Bank Export Department of which he is the director. Pending
the investigation, he was suspended from office. After the investigating
committee found the administrative charges to be without merit, and
subsequently recommended the immediate reinstatement, then
Governor of Central Bank, Miguel Cuaderno, Sr., recommended that
the Corpus be considered resigned on the ground of lost confidence.
The Monetary Board declared Corpus as resigned as of the date of
suspension.
Corpus then filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus and quo warranto
with preliminary mandatory injuction and damages against Miguel
Cuaderno, Sr., the Central Bank and Mario Marcos who was appointed
to his previous position. The case was dismissed for failure to exhaust
whether or not David is entitled to attorney's fees? YES.
While there was express agreement between petitioner Corpus and respondent David as
regards attorney's fees, the facts of the case support the position of respondent David that
there was at least an implied agreement for the payment of attorney's fees.
However, David and Judge Jose H. Tecson is guilty of contempt of court because of David's
petitions filed with the Supreme Court to remand the case to the trial court for execution and
for the issuance of such certification had not yet been acted upon as the same were still
pending consideration by this Court.
David filed a motion with the court a quo for the issuance of a writ of execution to enforce its
decision knowing fully well that it was then still pending appeal before this Court. In addition,
no certification that the aforesaid decision is already deemed affirmed had as yet been issued
by the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 11, paragraph 2, Article X of the New Constitution; In
fact, this Court has not as of this time made any pronouncement on the aforesaid provision of

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administrative remedies.
MAIN CASE:
According to plaintiff David, 6 or 7 days prior to the expiration of the
period for appeal from the order of dismissal, he chanced to meet the
father of Corpus. After talking about Corpus's having lost his case, and
knowing that David and Corpus were both members of the CLU, the
father requested David to go over the case and that he would send his
son to him to find out what could be done about the case. Corpus
called up David the following morning for an appointment. Corpus
requested David to handle the case because Atty. Alvarez had already
been disenchanted and wanted to give up the case. Although at first
reluctant to handle the case, the David finally agreed on condition that
he and Atty. Alverez would collaborate in the case.
Corpus's version of how David came into the case is as follows:
After the order of dismissal was published in the newspapers, David
sought a conference with Corpus. Even before the case was dismissed,
David had shown interest in the same by being present during the
hearings in the sala of Judge Lantin. When David and Corpus met, David
handed Corpus a memorandum prepared by him on how he can secure
the reversal of the order of dismissal by means of a formula stated in
said memorandum. Corpus wrote David, sending with it a copy of the
order (Corpus contends that it was not six or seven days prior to the
expiration of the period of appeal) but on a date even earlier.

The SC in the background case rendered a decision declaring illegal the
resolution of the Monetary Board. Corpus made a formal demand upon
the defendants in that case for collection of the amount as back
salaries and other emoluments from the CB. Corpus likewise wrote the
Governor of CB requesting that the amount representing the back
salaries be made out in two: one in his favor and the other
representing the professional fees equivalent to 50% of the said back
salaries being claimed by Corpus.
To obtain the relief from the Governor of Central Bank, DAVID
the New Constitution.
This act of David constitutes disrespect to, as well as disregard of, the authority of this Court as
the final arbiter of all cases duly appealed to it, especially constitutional questions. It must be
emphasized that as a member of the Philippine Bar he is required "to observe and maintain the
respect due to the court of justice and judicial officers" (Section 20 (b), 138 of the Revised Rules
of Court). Likewise, Canon 1 of the Canons of Professional Ethic expressly provide that: "It is the
duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the
temporary incumbent of the judgement office, but for the maintenance of its supreme
importance." And this Court had stressed that "the duty of an attorney to the courts 'can only
be maintained by rendering no service involving any disrespect to the judicial office which he is
bound to uphold'.
This Court takes judicial notice of the fact that David, in the previous case of Integrated
Construction Services, Inc. and Engineering Construction, Inc. v. Relova had sent letters
addressed to the then Chief Justice Makalintal and later to the late Chief Justice Castro,
requesting for the issuance of certification on the basis of the aforementioned provision of the
New Constitution which were not given due consideration. And knowing this, David should have
been more prudent and cautious with the court a quo for any motion for execution.
There was even a taint of arrogance and defiance on the part of David in not filing his comment
to the letter-complaint and instead, he sent a letter requesting to be excused from the filing of
his comment on the lame excuse that petitioner's letter-complaint was not verified.
On the part of Judge Tecson, his presumptuous and precipitate act of granting the motion for
execution of David likewise constitutes disrespect to, as well as of, the authority of this Court
because he know for a fact that the case was still pending, as not yet been remanded to it and
that no certification has been issued by this Court. As a judicial officer, Judge Tecson is charged
with the knowledge of the fact that this Court has yet to make a definite pronouncement on
Section 11, paragraph 2, Article X of the New Constitution. Judge Tecson should know that only
the Supreme Court can authoritatively interpret Section 11 (2) of Article X of the 1973
Constitution. Yet, Judge Tecson assumed the role of the Highest Court of the Land.
A becoming modesty of inferior courts demands conscious realization of the position that
they occupy in the interrelation and operation of the integrated judged system of the nation.
It may also be added that the improvident act of respondent David in firing the motion for
execution and the precipitate act of Judge Tecson in issuing the writ of execution are intriguing

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instituted this action against CORPUS.
Corpus contends that respondent David is not entitled to attorney's
fees because there was no contract to that effect. On the other hand,
respondent David contends that the absence of a formal contract for
the payment of the attorney's fees will not negate the payment thereof
because the contract may be express or implied, and there was an
implied understanding between the petitioner and private respondent
that the former will pay the latter attorney's fees when a final decision
shall have been rendered in favor of the petitioner reinstating him to -
his former position in the Central Bank and paying his back salaries.
as they invite suspicion that there was connivance between the two. Respondent David would
seem to imply that his claim for attorney's fees should be given preference over the other cams
now pending in this Court. Certainly, such should not be the case because there are cases which
by their nature require immediate or preferential attention by this Tribunal like habeas corpus
cases, labor cases and c cases involving death sentence, let alone cases involving properties and
property rights of poor litigants pending decision or resolution long before the New Constitution
of 1973. Nobility and exempt forbearance were expected of Atty. David, who is old and
experienced in the practice of the legal profession, from which he has derived a great measure.
of economic well-being and independence
Consequently, the filing of the motion for immediate execution and the issuance of the writ of
execution constitute a defiance and usurpation of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. As a
disciplinary measure for the preservation and vindication of the dignity of this Supreme Tribunal
respondent Atty. David should be REPRIMANDED for his precipitate action of filing a motion for
execution as well as Judge Tecson for his improvident issuance of a writ of execution while the
case is pending appeal before the Supreme Court, and a repetition of said acts would be dealt
with more severely.
Malacora vs. CA CAR CASE:
"Dionisio Malacora and Lucia Marabulas vs. Rodrigo Libarnes and
Consuelo Libarnes", both were ordered to pay 50-50 the court fees, the
plaintiffs (MM) to pay their one-half share upon receipt of the
payments for one-half of the improvements.
CA:
Defendants (LL) appealed, CA modified the judgment. After the
decision became final and the case returned to CAR, MM filed a motion
for execution. A writ of execution was issued which commanded LL to
pay MM.
The Provincial Sheriff enforced the writ of execution by levying upon
the property of LL. In the ensuing auction sale, the property was sold to
MM, who were then issued the corresponding certificate of sale. As LL
failed to exercise their right of redemption, a final deed of sale was
issued in favor of MM. MM filed a motion for issuance of a writ of
possession, which was opposed on the ground 'that the writ of
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY ANNULLED THE WRIT OF EXECUTION, SHERIFFS
CERT. OF SALE AND FINAL DEED OF SALE? YES.
Under the provision of Article X, Section 11 of the 1973 Constitution provides for a period of
(18) months within which an appealed case should be decided by this Court.
That provision is mandatory. The provision is mandatory and should have been complied with
immediately after the effectivity of the New Constitution. All provisions of the Constitution
which direct specific acts to be done, or prohibit certain acts to be done, should be construed
as mandatory.
The provision in question states:
Section 11. (1) Upon the effectivity of this Constitution, the maximum period within which a case
or matter shall be decided or solved from the date of its submission, shall be eighteen (18)
months for the Supreme Court, and unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve (12) months
for an inferior collegiate courts, and three (3) months for all other inferior courts.
(2) With respect to the Supreme Court and other collegiate appellate courts, when the
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execution did not conform to the judgment of the trial court as
modified by the decision of the CA. In resolving the motion the CA:
This is a motion for the issuance of writ of possession on the ground
that LL, the losing party, refuse to surrender the possession of the
property subject of execution of which the Sheriff's final Deed of Sale
has already been issued in favor of MM.
The decision of this Court granted unto MM a sum corresponding to
one-half of P5,190.00 which is the total valuation of the fruit bearing
coconut trees and 62 non-bearing coconut trees. On appeal, the
valuation was modified by the CA per coconut tree, be it fruit bearing
or not.
The Court feels that the variance in amount is not sufficient to cancel
and/or declare as null and void an otherwise regular and lawful
execution proceedings undertaken by the Sheriff. A simple restitution
would better serve the ends of justice than have us follow the
complexities of technical rules of procedure and of law.
Therefore MM were ordered to restore/return and/or reimburse unto
LL a particular sum. MM filed an MR where the court ordered to place
MM in possession as owners of the property and to reimburse LL an
amount.
Thereafter, MM filed a petition in the CA. Despite the Resolution of this
Court requiring the parties to submit their memorandum
simultaneously within thirty (30) days from notice, after the petition
was given due course, MM failed to file their memorandum, while LL
filed their own. MM as the appellants, should feel more under
obligation to file his memorandum, just like the appellant in an
ordinary appeal, which would be dismissed for failure to file the
appellant's brief.
CA annulled the writ of execution, the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale and
Sheriff's Final Deed of Sale.
decision or resolution because the necessary vote cannot be had, the judgment, order, or
resolution appealed from shall be deemed affirmed except in those cases where a qualified
majority is required and in appeals from judgment of conviction in criminal cases; and in original
special civil actions and proceedings for habeas corpus, the petition in such cases shall be
deemed dismissed; and a certification to this effect signed by the chief magistrate of the court
shall be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case.
The Constitution could not have intended anything but full and immediate compliance
therewith. The manifest purpose is to avoid delay in the disposition of cases, which always is a
cause of injustice, under the familiar aphorism that "justice delayed is justice denied." It would,
at the same time, ease up the clogged dockets of the courts.
What may be impossible is for example, to decide a case on the merit within the eighteen (18)
months given to it from its submission for decision, because so many other appealed cases had
already accumulated. The automatic affirmance of the appealed provision in case of failure to
decide or resolve within the time limit is precisely the alternative prescription, believed to
better serve the cause of justice than waiting, no matter how long, for a decision on the merit.
Under Section 2 of Article X of the Constitution, eight (8) votes are required for a decision of the
Court en banc, five (5) votes, for a decision of a Division. If the necessary vote is not obtained,
the petition is dismissed, and the appealed decision, order or resolution is then deemed
affirmed. This is what happens when this Court acts on the case within the period fixed in
Section 11 of Article X of the Constitution, but fails to obtain the necessary vote.
The Constitution intends that aside from the way an appealed decision, order or resolution is
deemed affirmed because of lack of necessary vote under Section 2 of Article X, the same effect
is contemplated by reason of the lapse of the period fixed without the case being decided on
the merits. Both Section 2 and Section 11, each be given distinct Identity achieving a common
objective but through two different and separate ways: (1) the necessary vote could not be
had, under Section 2, and (2) the period fixed had lapsed, under Section 11.
All that paragraph 2 of Section 11 requires for the appealed decision to be deemed affirmed and
original special civil actions, dismissed, is that the applicable maximum period has lapsed
without the decision of the merits being rendered, because of failure to act on the case and put
it to a vote, not that it was put to a vote, but "the necessary vote could not be had." What the
Constitution has in and, therefore, is "inaction" on the part of the court during the applicable
period, as the reason or cause for the failure to render a decision or resolution within the

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applicable period, not that "the necessary vote cannot be had.
The express mention by Section 11 itself of exceptions to the automatic affirmance of appealed
decisions, orders or resolutions when not reversed or modified within the prescribed period,
namely, (1) cases where a qualified majority is required and (2) appeals from judgment of
conviction in criminal cases, which even after the lapse of the fixed period may still be
decided on the merits, clearly, means under the maxim "expressio inius est exclusio alterius,"
that aside from the exceptions expressly mentioned, all other cases may no longer be decided
on the merits after the lapse of the applicable maximum period. The appealed decision, order
and resolution would be deemed affirmed, and shall then be so certified by the chief magistrate
of the court, as provided in the last part of paragraph 2 of Section 11.
No member of the Court is meant to be singled out for any culpability or dereliction of duty.
Neither is any adverse reflection meant to be made against the Court as a whole, because there
is in the Constitution an implicit recognition of the probability of many appealed cases not being
decided or resolved within the period as short as that prescribed, not because of culpable
neglect, inefficiency or incompetence of any member of the Court or of the Court itself as a
body, but because of sheer physical impossibility. The particular right to demand for the
certification of the Chief Magistrate that the appealed decision is deemed affirmed by the lapse
of the specified period without a decision on the merits having been rendered, is waivable, and
is deemed waived if not invoked within a reasonable time from notice of the questioned
decision.
The Constitution provides that the conclusion of the Court shall be reached in consultation
before the case is assigned to a member for the writing of the opinion of the Court (Section 8,
Article X). Setting a case for that required consultation can reasonably be done within just
months from its submission for decision, long before the lapse of the applicable period. This
same case had already been discussed among the members, and dismissing it or giving due
course to it is not so difficult a matter to determine. Either of these actions is usually taken in
the session when the agenda in which the new petition is placed is discussed just one day or so
after the new cases are assigned to the members for report and recommendation as to what
action to take. There should perhaps be less difficulty in reaching the final conclusion when,
after a long period. After the voting, the case is actually decided on the merits, or the appealed
decision, order or resolution is deemed affirmed by operation of the Constitution, depending on
the result of the voting.
If this procedure is adopted, no unnecessary delay need be incurred in. What really takes some
time is the writing of the decision by the ponente who is chosen after a final conclusion is

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reached. But if by appropriate Resolution, which may be just a Minute Resolution, it would be
made of record that in that session when the voting was held after the required consultation,
the Court had reached its conclusion the case has, in fact, been already decided, at least for the
purpose of compliance with the Constitution. The decision complete with the opinion as
written by the ponente chosen for the purpose may be actually released later, as indeed,
there have been instances when decisions were promulgated without prejudice to the writing
of the extended opinion.
As to the original special civil actions including habeas corpus, all that the Constitution
mandates is that the petitions in such cases shall be deemed dismissed if the necessary vote
cannot be had within the period fixed, which is actually another way of saying that no decision
has been rendered.
Marcelino vs.
Cruz
A petition for prohibition and writ of habeas corpus to enjoin Judge
Fernando Cruz, Jr. from promulgating his decision in a Criminal Case
and for release from detention of the accused in said case, on the
ground of loss of jurisdiction of trial court for failure to decide the same
within the period of ninety [90] days from submission.
Marcelino was charged with the crime of rape before the CFI. Trial was
conducted and the same was concluded when the accused rested his
case. On the same date, however, the attorneys for both parties moved
for time within which to submit their respective memoranda. The trial
court granted the motion. Counsel for Marcelino submitted his
memorandum in due time, but no memorandum was filed by the
People.
Judge Cruz filed with the Deputy Clerk of Court his decision for
promulgation. The decision was also dated November 28, 1975. A
certification dated January 26, 1976 was executed by Postmaster
Santos to the effect that registered letters addressed to Marietta
Ferrer, the complaining witness, and Atty. Angel P. Purisima, counsel
for the accused, respectively, were posted in said office on December
4, 1975. These notices were received by the respective addressees on
December 8 and 9, 1975. Similar notices were sent to the Provincial
Fiscal and to the Provincial Warden of Pasig, Rizal, who both received
them on December 2,1975.
WHETHER THE Three-month period prescribed by Section 11[l] of Article X of the 1973
Constitution, being a constitutional directive, is mandatory in character and that non-
observance thereof results in the loss of jurisdiction of the court over the unresolved case?
NO.
November 28, 1975 or 85 days from the date the case was deemed submitted for decision,
respondent judge filed with the deputy clerk of court the decision. He had thus veritably
rendered his decision on said case within the three-month period prescribed by the
Constitution.
The rendition of the judgment in trial courts refers to the filing of the signed decision with the
clerk of court. Thus, it is this date that should be considered in determining whether or not
respondent judge had resolved the case within the allotted period. Indeed, the date of
promulgation of a decision could not serve as the reckoning date because the same necessarily
comes at at a later date, considering that notices have to be sent to the accused as well as to
the other parties involved, an event which is beyond the control of the judge. The promulgation
of a judgment in the trial court does not necessarily coincide with the date of its delivery by the
judge of the clerk of court.
Section 11 [1], Article X of the New Constitution provides in full, to wit:
SEC. 11 [1]. Upon the effectivity of this Constitution, the maximum period within which a case
or matter shall be decided or resolved from the date of its submission, shall be eighteen months
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On the date set for promulgation of the decision, counsel for accused
moved for postponement, raising for the first time the alleged loss of
jurisdiction of the trial court for failure to decide the case within 90
days from submission thereof for decision. Acceding to counsel's
request that he be given time to consider the proper remedial measure
to take, the judge reset the promulgation of the decision to January 19,
1976 at 8:30 AM.
On January 19, 1976, counsel for Marcelino moved anew for the
resetting of the promulgation of decision. Granting the motion, Judge
Cruz rescheduled the promulgation to January 26, 1976.
inferior collegiate courts, and three months for all other inferior courts.
The established rule is that "constitutional provisions are to be construed as mandatory, unless
by express provision or by necessary implication, a different intention is manifest." "The
difference between a mandatory and a directory provision is often determined on grounds of
expediency, the reason being that less injury results to the general public by disregarding than
by enforcing the letter of the law."
"the statutory provisions which may be thus departed from with impunity, without affecting the
validity of statutory proceedings, are usually those which relate to the mode or time of doing
that which is essential to effect the aim and purpose of the Legislature or some incident of the
essential act.
It falls within the exception rather than the general rule. By the phrase "unless reduced by the
Supreme Court," it is evident that the period prescribed therein is subject to modification by
this Court in accordance with its prerogative under Section 5[5] of Article X of the New
Constitution to "promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts ...
" And there can be no doubt that said provision, having been incorporated for reasons of
expediency, relates merely to matters of procedure. Constitutional provisions are directory,
and not mandatory, where they refer to matters merely procedural.
De Roma vs. CA
automatic release of appropriation for the judiciary
Sec. 3, Art. 8 SECTION 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the
previous year and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly released.