Professional Documents
Culture Documents
politicians had been more than worrying, the othering of Austria conveniently
ignored that some member states, such as Denmark, pursued at least equally
problematic policies when it came to immigration, and displayed similar tenden-
cies towards racism.
Old Europe, New Europe
The logic of the past as other argument was turned on its head by United States
Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld in his remarks to the foreign press in
Washington on 22 January 2003: Now, youre thinking of Europe as Germany
and France. I dont. I think thats old Europe. If you look at the entire NATO
Europe today, the centre of gravity is shifting to the east. And there are a lot of
new members (Rumsfeld 2003). Although Rumsfeld did not use the term new
Europe during the press conference, this soon became a widespread debate
about new versus old Europe, and both terms are now used widely in the
media in a stark contrast to their original post-1945 meanings.
Although this debate still has a temporal dimension to it, its geopolitical
connotations are overwhelming, and it ts a more traditional form of othering,
in which the other is represented as backward. These otherings follow the
structure of a typical logocentric practice (see Ashley 1989, 216): they dichoto-
mise two entities constructed as clearly separated, and then privilege one (new)
over the other (old). In the old Europe/new Europe debate, this is then used
to split a European identity. Compared with the traditional integration debate,
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328 Thomas Diez
new Europe now becomes old Europe, and old Europe (the incarnation of the
past as other in enlargement parlance) becomes new Europe (see also Joenniemi
2004).
Rumsfelds rhetorical move was particularly effective (and provocative to his
old Europeans) because it used an already existing discursive trope, turned its
meaning on its head and reinforced its geopolitical connotations. This seems to
t into a wider move towards a return to geopolitics, also by EU actors, as
reected most clearly in renewed efforts to contrast Europe to an Islamic world
or America. Europes temporal other, while still running alongside these identity
constructions as the quotes from Blair and Fischer at the beginning of this
section have shown, is losing in importance. The next section provides some
illustrations of this return of geopolitical othering.
Europes Geographical Others
Europe and Islam
An exhibition in Berlins Museum for Islamic Art in autumn 2003 showed
pictures by the artist Claudio Lange taken in French and Spanish cathedrals of
statues depicting Muslims, all of them as inferior creatures (see Lange 2003). The
representation of Islam as the other of a Christian Europe has a long tradition,
and is an integral part of many aspects of European (and Islamic) culture. It
would be na ve to assume that this discourse was irrelevant to the discussions
about a European identity even in the post-1945 age of integration. However,
during the predominance of the temporal other, the other of Islam played at
worst a secondary and at best a silent background role. Today, the construction
of Islam as Europes other is back in the headlines, ironically at a time when a
substantial number of EU citizens are Muslims.
The discursive site where most of the othering of Europe against Islam is
performed is Turkey. Turkeys representation in relation to Europe has always
been ambiguous. Historically, the Ottoman Empire was a synonym for the
Muslim other, while at the same time a power in Europe. Geographically, the
line dividing Europe and Asia has traditionally been drawn through Turkey,
large parts of which came to be known as Asia Minor, indicating that it wasnt
really part of Asia either. Kemal Atatu rk, and the Kemalists who dominated
Turkish politics until recently, wanted Turkey to modernise, which to some
extent also meant Europeanise, and thereby located Turkey on the road to,
rather than within Europe (and with diverging understandings of Europe and
the West; see Jung [1998]; Mu ftu ler-Bac [1997, 3]).
The contrast with Cyprus, itself for a long time part of the Ottoman Empire,
could not be starker. Its Europeanness was never in doubt during the accession
assessments, even though its geographical location (and its food) make it a clear
member of the Middle East. No one doubted the European credentials even of
the islands north, by and large populated by Muslims. Instead, the (Greek)
Cypriot government successfully represented the island as being the cradle of
European civilisation, stressing antiquity (the birthplace of Aphrodite; see dis-
cussion in Diez [2002, 14748]), and representing itself as a bridge to, but by
implication also separate from, the Middle East.
Interestingly, Turkey sent ve delegates to the International Council of the
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Europes Others and the Return of Geopolitics 329
European Movement in The Hague in 1949 (European Movement 1949, 39), and
subsequently became a member of the Council of Europe and NATO, but not of
the predecessors of the European Union. When it concluded an Association
Agreement with the then European Economic Community in 1963, this was not
seen as leading to Turkish membership, although membership was mentioned
as an option that the association process should facilitate (OJ 217, 29/12/1964,
3687 [preamble]). The European Union could, however, no longer evade the
issue of Turkeys Europeanness when the country led a membership appli-
cation in 1987: the EU Treaty stipulates in Article 49 that only European states
can join the Union.
The ambiguous representation of Turkey has since been continued. While the
Commission and the Council have in principle agreed to Turkeys eligibility and
accepted Turkey as a membership candidate, the discussion about Turkeys
membership operates on several levels. There are, on the one hand, serious
problems with the political system, although a large part of these are currently
being rectied by an overhaul of the constitution. There remains the problem of
human rights violations, which include the Turkish involvement in northern
Cyprus if the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights is taken as the
measure. And there are serious problems of economic performance and admin-
istrative capabilities. Yet on the other hand, Turkeys Europeanness continues to
be questioned, both openly, and often also indirectly in discussions about
political, economic and administrative criteria.
This is a well-known story; therefore three examples from the last decade can
sufce. In 1994, the then head of the Christian-Democrat and Christian-Social
(CDU/CSU) grouping in the German parliament, Wolfgang Schauble, argued
that Turkey was not part of the Christianoccidental tradition and therefore
could not be a member of the EU (Su ddeutsche Zeitung 1994). Three years later,
the heads of European Christian Democrats, after a meeting of the European
Peoples Party in Luxembourg, made their infamous statement to the same
effect.
2
Finally, when the President of the convention for a European consti-
tution, Giscard dEstaing, was interviewed on 7 November 2002, he also stated
that Turkey is not a European country (BBC 2002).
One of the reasons why the Europe versus Islam discourse remained a silent
and minor one during much of the Cold War period was that the Europeanness
of the then EU members had not been challenged. One exception was the
application by Morocco in 1987 (see Rumelili 2004, 4143), which was not even
considered because Morocco was not deemed to be a European country, and
therefore did not spark debates similar to those about Turkey. During the Cold
War, the then Soviet Union came perhaps closest to being an other for the then
European Community, although, as Iver Neumann (1999, 111) argues, its
specicity as Europes other resides not along the spatial but along the
temporal dimension, as the country that is perpetually seen as being in some
stage of transition to Europeanization. Neumann notes that this is reected in
discourses within Russiaas is the case with Turkey. The main complication
with the Soviet Union as a European other, however, was that it played that
function for the West as a whole, and that there is also an increasingly important
2
Turkish Press Review, 3 April 1997, http://www.byegm.gov.tr/yayinlarimiz/chr/
ing97/04/97x04x03.txt .
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330 Thomas Diez
discourse that represents America, or more specically, the United States, and
therefore part of the West, as Europes other.
Europe and the United States
When George W. Bush assumed power as the United States 43rd president, the
Dubya jokes in Europe were part of a double stereotype that serves to construct
and reproduce European cultural superiority: Bush seems like a caricature of the
Wild-West American, while, from a Bush-friendly perspective, this criticism
represents a caricature of European cultural arrogance. Both images operate
along the lines of standard practices of othering, and they are situated in a
longer history of European identity constructions against the United States.
When the then Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, declared 1973 to be the
Year of Europe without consulting the Europeans (see Urwin 1991, 160), he
unleashed a soul-searching enterprise that led to the Copenhagen Document
on European Identity, in which, among other things, the member states
declared their aim to be recognised by the international society as a single entity
with its own character (reprinted in Gasteyger 1994, 3025). For many, especially
those of a federalist persuasion, one aim of the integration process had always
been to turn Europe into a third superpower that would follow its own
economic and political path and could act as a mediator between the Soviet
Union and the United States. After World War II, the Socialist Movement for a
United States of Europe adopted the further aim of becoming a third force,
which found common ground with the conservative Count Coudenhove-Ka-
lergi, doyen of the European federalists, who thought a United States of Europe
would be the only way to survive in a world of Great Powers (Europe Unites
1949, 19).
Underlying these proposals, as well as later ones, was the notion of Europe
being different from the United States: less prone to laissez-faire capitalism, more
cultured, more concerned about the environment, as well as more peaceful. The
trade disputes between the EU and the US that have become more outspoken
since the 1990s are partly entanglements in these identity constructions, as is the
promotion of human rights and especially the abolition of the death penalty,
over which the EU regularly clashes with the US. The idea of the European
Union as a normative power (Manners 2002) is largely articulated in contrast
to the US, which is constructed as conducting its foreign policy by military
means rather than by the force of norms.
This process of othering works, of course, both ways. Located in this context
is a popular bestseller of 2003, Robert Kagans Paradise and Power (2003), where
Kagan sets the paradise EU, where peaceful means and condence in inter-
national norms dominate foreign policy, against the power US, which takes a
more realist(ic) view and relies on military force. While Europeans may
disagree with Kagan in the nal analysis (i.e. that the paradise needs power
to exist, and that Europes foreign policy emerges from weakness), there is no
doubt that the paradise/power imagery is shared by many (the book has been
widely discussed in the media and on endless discussion forums), and that it ties
into the past as other discourse in that the past is a past of power politics and
unilateralism. (Read the above quotes from Fischer and Blair against Kagan.)
To focus on these othering processes is not to say that there is no difference
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Europes Others and the Return of Geopolitics 331
between the conduct of foreign policy between the European Union and the
United States. Instead, foreign policy is itself interwoven with the discourse on
a European identity. In this respect, I would like to maintain an ambiguity in my
argument. On the one hand, I do believe that the EU constitutes a different kind
of power, both in its organisation of politics and in its pursuit of foreign policy,
and that its policies are less antagonistic. On the other hand, the dichotomisation
of paradise and power leads to forgetting the dark sides of Europethe still
present xenophobia and racism; the involvement of EU member states in the
arms trade; the waste of agricultural production; to name but a few. The
challenge therefore is to reinforce the difference without reinforcing the antago-
nism in the othering. The temporal othering offers a way to do so by inserting
a degree of self-reexivity. The return of geopolitics seems to move Europe away
from this opening.
The Geopoliticisation of European Identity and Its Alternatives
What we have been witnessing since the 1990s with the Maastricht Treaty and
the end of the Cold War is a move from the construction of European identity
through a temporal othering, which is not tied to xed geographical borders and
does not thematise territory explicitly, to the increasingly widespread construc-
tion of Europe through practices of othering, in which identity, politics and
geography are intimately linked with each other, and which can therefore be
called geopolitical otherings. Such an increase in geopolitical othering is not
surprising given the development of the EU, and the international society in
which it is embedded, since the beginning of the 1990s. The end of the Cold War
and the expansion of both NATO and the EU have raised questions of what it
means to be European that had been less urgent before, as the Turkish case
illustrates. In other words, these developments have led to the explication and
politicisation of the hitherto much less problematic ambiguity of the notion of
Europe. It is a common argument in a variety of literatures that it is in such
situations of ambiguity that attempts to x identities are staged.
3
In addition, the attacks of 9/11, as well as the 2004 Madrid bombings, have
intensied the making of a European territory that needs to be secured from
the threats of illegal immigration, and in particular from the threats of Islamism.
I have not elaborated these practices further in this article, but even though
European responses to 9/11 might have been less worrisome for civil liberties
than those of the Bush government (Rorty 2004), the securitisation of migration
has started to dominate public discourse in Europe, too, and in particular
in conation with the othering of Islam, from the intensication of border
controls and the construction of the wearing of a headscarf as a forbidden
religious symbol in schools, to the headlines of the tabloid press and the publi-
cation of more high-brow books (see Buonno 2004). All of this warrants further
investigation, but the central practices seem to be in line with what Campbell
describes as the writing of security and identity in the US: while professing to
be non-discriminatory, they single out a particular other, construct it as a
3
For different perspectives on this argument, see Norton (1987, 7), Campbell (1990,
272), but also, from a social constructivist angle, Marcussen et al. (2002, 103), where
critical junctures can be read as moments of ambivalence.
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332 Thomas Diez
potential existential threat and, despite large Muslim populations within EU
member states, locate the threat on the outside, as something against which
Europe must be defended.
This does not mean that there is no geopolitical dimension to the temporal
othering. There are three aspects to this discussion. First, the past as other
argument is still tied to a European space: it is Europes past and present. Yet
because it does not explicate the geographical contours of this Europe, it is
principally more open, geographically and culturally, than the geopolitical
othering. When temporal othering takes precedence, there is an opportunity to
articulate spatial or cultural difference without the articulation of existential
threats, because the main existential threat is related to the self. In this respect,
I agree with Bahar Rumelilis argument that any temporal-internal differen-
tiation requires the presumption be made that the community is unequivocally
bounded (Rumelili 2004, 46), but, in contrast to her, I nonetheless see a decisive
qualitative difference between the self-reexivity of the temporal othering, and
the antagonism and externalisation of threat in many forms of geopolitical
otherings.
Second, as indicated above, there has always been a subtext to the temporal
othering that presented Islam for instance as an other, but also the United States.
To the extent that this was thematised openly, however, until recently the past
as other argument provided effective boundaries for an antagonistic articulation
of difference. In that sense, while one might read the construction of Turkey as
the other that has to modernise as the temporalisation of a geographical
difference, similar to the construction of backwardness in the colonial discourse,
the signicance of the arguments about Turkey is that they have become a
central, if contested, part of the discourse about European identity only over the
past decade. Indeed, as the discussion of Ataturks modernisation strategy in the
previous section has shown, the temporal othering was articulated long before
then.
Third, the past as other discourse exhibits some signicant silencesthe
present dark sides of Europe referred to above, but also its colonial past and
the shaping of its identity through this historical context, and the shadows it
casts over the present. Yet, while this past cannot be eradicated, and while the
past as other discourse does not problematise Europes colonial past to any
signicant degree, it does at least provide a reference point to address this past
in a similar way as the nationalism and wars within Europe. A geopoliticised
identity discourse is much more problematic in this respect, because it is prone
to replicate colonial attitudes of supremacy in that it relies on the construction
of an inferior other and a superior self, which in turn is transposed onto the
other, while at the same time omitting the kind of self-reexivity exhibited in the
temporal othering outlined above.
The geopoliticisation of European identity constructions is, however, by no
means a necessary outcome. The ambiguity emerging in the 1990s is discursively
textured, and the responses discursively manufactured. Consider that the tem-
poral othering does not problematise the location and existence of Europe; it
knows where Europe is supposed to be (Walker 2000). The denition of and the
response to the ambiguity display modern traits supposed to have been over-
come. Their aim is to reinforce clear territorial boundaries rather than taking the
chance to rethink the possibilities of politics on the basis that Europe really
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Europes Others and the Return of Geopolitics 333
isnt there (ibid., 2829). Instead of opting for the maintenance of the ambiguity,
many, it seems, are opting for its abandonment, although it remains to be seen
whether this is met with the ultimate success of installing a hegemonic discourse
of the other.
The return of geopolitics closes the opening presented by European inte-
gration and undermines conceptions of integration as a network horizon, in
which the European polity is envisaged not as a unitary entity with xed
boundaries, but as a complex of interwoven regional and functional units (see
Diez 1997). Such a horizon is not devoid of differences. However, these are
constantly negotiated, overlapping and therefore not exclusive. They institution-
alise a discourse of radical interdependence (Campbell 1994), and therefore
empower subject positions different from state-centric conceptualisations of
European governance. Therefore, while the notion of Europe as a postmodern
polity is in itself a construction based on othering, its rendition as a temporal
other is far less exclusive than the conation of temporal and geographic other.
While the dangers of the modern/postmodern dichotomisation must be resisted,
a return to modernity and therefore geopolitics is also to be avoided if our
concern is the simultaneity of one Europe and many Europes,
4
and the
openness and diversity that this would bring with it.
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