G.R. No.

182239 March 16, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
HERMIE M. JACINTO, Accused-Appellant.
D E C S O N
PEREZ, J.:
Once again, we recite the time-honored principle that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the victim's positive
identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime.
1
For it to prosper, the court must be convinced that there was
physical impossibility on the part of the accused to have been at the locus criminis at the time of the commission of the
crime.
2
Nevertheless, a child in conflict with the law, whose judgment of conviction has become final and executory only after his
disqualification from availing of the benefits of suspended sentence on the ground that he/she has exceeded the age limit of
twenty-one (21) years, shall still be entitled to the right to restoration, rehabilitation, and reintegration in accordance with
Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise known as "An Act Establishing a Comprehensive Juvenile Justice and Welfare System,
Creating the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council under the Department of Justice, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for
Other Purposes."
Convicted for the rape of five-year-old AAA,
3
appellant Hermie M. Jacinto seeks before this Court the reversal of the
judgment of his conviction.
4
The Facts
n an nformation dated 20 March 2003
5
filed with the Regional Trial Court and docketed as Criminal Case No. 1679-13-
141[1],
6
appellant was accused of the crime of RAPE allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 28th day of January, 2003 at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening more or less, at barangay xxx,
municipality of xxx, province of xxx and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, [Hermie M. Jacinto], with lewd design
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge with one AAA, a five-year old minor child.
CONTRARY TO LAW, with the qualifying/aggravating circumstance of minority, the victim being only five years old.
7
On 15 July 2003, appellant entered a plea of not guilty.
8
During pre-trial,
9
the defense admitted the existence of the following
documents: (1) birth certificate of AAA, showing that she was born on 3 December 1997; (2) police blotter entry on the rape
incident; and (3) medical certificate, upon presentation of the original or upon identification thereof by the physician.
Trial ensued with the prosecution and the defense presenting witnesses to prove their respective versions of the story.
Evidence for the Prosecution
The testimonies of AAA,
10
her father FFF,
11
and rebuttal witness Julito Apiki [Julito]
12
may be summarized in the following
manner:
FFF and appellant have been neighbors since they were born. FFF's house is along the road. That of appellant lies at the
back approximately 80 meters from FFF. To access the road, appellant has to pass by FFF's house, the frequency of which
the latter describes to be "every minute [and] every hour." Also, appellant often visits FFF because they were close friends.
He bore no grudge against appellant prior to the incident.
13
AAA likewise knows appellant well. She usually calls him kuya. She sees him all the time playing at the basketball court
near her house, fetching water, and passing by her house on his way to the road. She and appellant used to be friends until
the incident.
14
At about past 6 o'clock in the evening of 28 January 2003, FFF sent his eight-year-old daughter CCC to the store of Rudy
Hatague to buy cigarettes. AAA followed CCC. When CCC returned without AAA, FFF was not alarmed. He thought she
was watching television at the house of her aunt Rita Lingcay [Rita].
15
Julito went to the same store at around 6:20 in the evening to buy a bottle of Tanduay Rum.
16
At the store, he saw appellant
place AAA on his lap.
17
He was wearing sleeveless shirt and a pair of short pants.
18
All of them left the store at the same
time.
19
Julito proceeded to the house of Rita to watch television, while appellant, who held the hand of AAA, went towards
the direction of the "lower area or place."
20
AAA recalled that appellant was wearing a chaleko (sando) and a pair of short pants
21
when he held her hand while on the
road near the store.
22
They walked towards the rice field near the house of spouses Alejandro and Gloria Perocho [the
Perochos].
23
There he made her lie down on harrowed ground, removed her panty and boxed her on the chest.
24
Already
half-naked from waist down,
25
he mounted her, and, while her legs were pushed apart, pushed his penis into her vagina and
made a push and pull movement.
26
She felt pain and cried.
27
Afterwards, appellant left and proceeded to the
Perochos.
28
She, in turn, went straight home crying.
29
FFF heard AAA crying and calling his name from downstairs.
30
She was without slippers.
31
He found her face
greasy.
32
There was mud on her head and blood was oozing from the back of her head.
33
He checked for any injury and
found on her neck a contusion that was already turning black.
34
She had no underwear on and he saw white substance and
mud on her vagina.
35
AAA told him that appellant brought her from the store
36
to the grassy area at the back of the house of
the Perochos;
37
that he threw away her pair of slippers, removed her panty, choked her and boxed her breast;
38
and that he
proceeded thereafter to the Perochos.
39
True enough, FFF found appellant at the house of the Perochos.
40
He asked the appellant what he did to AAA.
41
Appellant
replied that he was asked to buy rum at the store and that AAA followed him.
42
FFF went home to check on his
daughter,
43
afterwhich, he went back to appellant, asked again,
44
and boxed him.
45
Meanwhile, at around 7:45 in the evening of even date, Julito was still watching television at the house of Rita.
46
AAA and
her mother MMM arrived.
47
AAA was crying.
48
Julito pitied her, embraced her, and asked what happened to her, to which
she replied that appellant raped her.
49
Julito left and found appellant at the Perochos.
50
Julito asked appellant, "Bads, did
you really rape the child, the daughter of [MMM]?" but the latter ignored his question.
51
Appellant's aunt, Gloria, told
appellant that the policemen were coming to which the appellant responded, "Wait a minute because will wash the dirt of
my elbow (sic) and my knees."
52
Julito did found the elbows and knees of appellant with dirt.
53
On that same evening, FFF and AAA proceeded to the police station to have the incident blottered.
54
FFF also had AAA
undergo a physical check up at the municipal health center.
55
Dr. Bernardita M. Gaspar, M.D., Rural Health Physician,
issued a medical certificate
56
dated 29 January 2003. t reads:
njuries seen are as follows:
1. Multiple abrasions with erythema along the neck area.
2. Petechial hemorrhages on both per-orbital areas.
3. Hematoma over the left upper arm, lateral area
4. Hematoma over the upper anterior chest wall, midclavicular line
5. Abrasion over the posterior trunk, paravertebral area
6. Genital and peri-anal area soiled with debris and whitish mucoid-like material
7. ntroitus is erythematous with minimal bleeding
8. Hymenal lacerations at the 5 o'clock and 9 o'clock position
mpression
MULTIPLE SOFT TISSUE INJURIES
HYMENAL LACERATIONS
Upon the recommendation of Dr. Gaspar,
57
AAA submitted herself to another examination at the provincial hospital on the
following day. Dr. Christine Ruth B. Micabalo, Medical Officer of the provincial hospital, attended to her and issued a
medico-legal certificate dated 29 January 2003,
58
the pertinent portion of which reads:
P.E. = Findings is consistent with Dr. Bernardita M. Gaspar findings except No. 6 and 7 there is no bleeding in this time of
examination. (sic)
59
Evidence for the Defense
nterposing the defense of alibi, appellant gave a different version of the story. To corroborate his testimony, Luzvilla
Balucan [Luzvilla] and his aunt Gloria took the witness stand to affirm that he was at the Perochos at the time of the
commission of the crime.
60
Luzvilla even went further to state that she actually saw Julito, not appellant, pick up AAA on the
road.
61
n addition, Antonia Perocho [Antonia], sister-in-law of appellant's aunt, Gloria,
62
testified on the behavior of Julito
after the rape incident was revealed.
63
Appellant claimed that he lives with his aunt, not with his parents whose house stands at the back of FFF's house.
64
He
denied that there was a need to pass by the house of FFF in order to access the road or to fetch water.
65
He, however,
admitted that he occasionally worked for FFF,
66
and whenever he was asked to buy something from the store, AAA always
approached him.
67
At about 8 o'clock in the morning of 28 January 2003, appellant went to the Perochos to attend a birthday party. At 6:08 in
the evening, while the visitors, including appellant and his uncle Alejandro Perocho [Alejandro], were gathered together in a
drinking session, appellant's uncle sent him to the store to buy Tanduay Rum. Since the store is only about 20 meters from
the house, he was able to return after three (3) minutes. He was certain of the time because he had a watch .
68
Appellant's aunt, Gloria, the lady of the house, confirmed that he was in her house attending the birthday party; and that
appellant went out between 6 and 7 in the evening to buy a bottle of Tanduay from the store. She recalled that appellant
was back around five (5) minutes later. She also observed that appellant's white shorts and white sleeveless shirt were
clean.
69
At 6:30 in the evening,
70
Luzvilla, who was also at the party, saw appellant at the kitchen having a drink with his uncle
Alejandro and the rest of the visitors.
71
She went out to relieve herself at the side of the tree beside the road next to the
house of the Perochos.
72
From where she was, she saw Julito, who was wearing black short pants and black T-shirt, carry
AAA.
73
AAA's face was covered and she was wiggling.
74
This did not alarm her because she thought it was just a
game.
75
Meanwhile, appellant was still in the kitchen when she returned.
76
Around three (3) minutes later, Luzvilla saw
Julito, now in a white T-shirt,
77
running towards the house of Rita.
78
AAA was slowly following behind.
79
Luzvilla followed
them.
80
Just outside the house, Julito embraced AAA and asked what the appellant did to her.
81
The child did not answer.
82
Luzvilla also followed FFF to the Perochos. She witnessed the punching incident and testified that appellant was twice
boxed by FFF. According to her, FFF tapped the left shoulder of the appellant, boxed him, and left. FFF came in the second
time and again boxed appellant. This time, he had a bolo pointed at appellant. Appellant's uncle Alejandro, a barangay
councilor, and another Civilian Voluntary Organization (CVO) member admonished FFF.
83
On sur-rebuttal, Antonia testified that, at 7 o'clock in the evening, she was watching the television along with other people at
the house of Rita. Around 7:10, Julito, who was wearing only a pair of black short pants without a shirt on, entered the
house drunk. He paced back and forth. After 10 minutes, AAA came in crying. Julito tightly embraced AAA and asked her
what happened. AAA did not answer. Upon Antonia's advice, Julito released her and went out of the house.
84
Appellant further testified that at past 7 o'clock in the evening, FFF arrived, pointed a finger at him, brandished a bolo, and
accused him of molesting AAA. FFF left but returned at around 8 o'clock in the evening. This time, he boxed appellant and
asked again why he molested his daughter.
85
On 26 March 2004, the Regional Trial Court rendered its decision,
86
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding accused Hermie M. Jacinto guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape committed upon a 5-year old girl,
the court sentences him to death and orders him to pay [AAA] P75,000.000 as rape indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral
damages. With costs
87
The defense moved to reopen trial for reception of newly discovered evidence stating that appellant was apparently born on
1 March 1985 and that he was only seventeen (17) years old when the crime was committed on 28 January 2003.
88
The trial
court appreciated the evidence and reduced the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua.
89
Thus:
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court imposing the death penalty upon the accused is amended in order to consider the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. The penalty impos[a]ble upon the accused, therefore[,] is reduced to
reclusion perpetua. xxx
Appealed to this Court, the case was transferred to the Court of Appeals for its disposition in view of the ruling inPeople v.
Mateo and the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court allowing an intermediate review by the Court of Appeals of cases where
the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment.
90
On 29 August 2007, the Court of Appeals AFFRMED the decision of the trial court with the following MODFCATONS:
xxx that Hermie M. Jacinto should suffer the ndeterminate penalty of from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years
of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Appellant Hermie
M. Jacinto is ordered to indemnify the victim in the sum of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages,
and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages and to pay the costs.
91
On 19 November 2007, the Court of Appeals gave due course to the appellant's Notice of Appeal.
92
This Court required the
parties to simultaneously file their respective supplemental briefs.
93
Both parties manifested that they have exhaustively
discussed their positions in their respective briefs and would no longer file any supplement.
94
Before the Court of Appeals, appellant argued that "THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED N CONVCTNG HEREN
ACCUSED-APPELLANT GULTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF RAPE"
95
by invoking the principle that "if the
inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more reasonable explanations, one of which is consistent with the
innocence of the accused and the other with his guilt, then the evidence does not pass the test of moral certainty and will
not suffice to support a conviction."
96
Our Ruling
We sustain the judgment of conviction.
n the determination of the innocence or guilt of a person accused of rape, we consider the three well-entrenched principles:
(1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the accused, though innocent,
to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape in which only two persons are usually involved, the
testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand
or fall on its own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.
97
Necessarily, the credible, natural, and convincing testimony of the victim may be sufficient to convict the accused.
98
More
so, when the testimony is supported by the medico-legal findings of the examining physician.
99
Further, the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the victim's positive identification of the perpetrator of the crime,
100
except
when it is established that it was physically impossible for the accused to have been at the locus criminis at the time of the
commission of the crime.
101

A man commits rape by having carnal knowledge of a child under twelve (12) years of age even in the absence of any of the
following circumstances: (a) through force, threat or intimidation; (b) when the offended party is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious; or (c) by means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority.
102
That the crime of rape has been committed is certain. The vivid narration of the acts culminating in the insertion of
appellant's organ into the vagina of five-year-old AAA and the medical findings of the physicians sufficiently proved such
fact.
AAA testified:
PROS. OMANDAM:
x x x x
Q You said Hermie laid you on the ground, removed your panty and boxed you, what else did he do to you?
A He mounted me.
Q When Hermie mounted you, was he facing you?
A Yes.
Q When he mounted you what did he do, did he move?
A He moved his ass, he made a push and pull movement.
Q When he made a push and pull movement, how were your legs positioned?
A They were apart.
Q Who pushed them apart?
A Hermie.
Q Did Hermie push anything at you?
A Yes.
Q What was that?
A His penis.
Q Where did he push his penis?
A To my vagina.
Q Was it painful?
A Yes.
Q What was painful?
A My vagina.
Q Did you cry?
A Yes.
103
The straightforward and consistent answers to the questions, which were phrased and re-phrased in order to test that AAA
well understood the information elicited from her, said it all she had been raped. When a woman, more so a minor, says
so, she says in effect all that is essential to show that rape was committed.
104
Significantly, youth and immaturity are
normally badges of truth and honesty.
105
Further, the medical findings and the testimony of Dr. Micabalo
106
revealed that the hymenal lacerations at 5 o'clock and 9
o'clock positions could have been caused by the penetration of an object; that the redness of the introitus could have been
"the result of the repeated battering of the object;" and that such object could have been an erect male organ.
107
The credible testimony of AAA corroborated by the physician's finding of penetration conclusively established the essential
requisite of carnal knowledge.
108

The real identity of the assailant and the whereabouts of the appellant at the time of the commission of the crime are now in
dispute.
The defense would want us to believe that it was Julito who defiled AAA, and that appellant was elsewhere when the crime
was committed.
109
We should not, however, overlook the fact that a victim of rape could readily identify her assailant, especially when he is not
a stranger to her, considering that she could have a good look at him during the commission of the crime.
110
AAA had
known appellant all her life. Moreover, appellant and AAA even walked together from the road near the store to the situs
criminus
111
that it would be impossible for the child not to recognize the man who held her hand and led her all the way to
the rice field.
We see no reason to disturb the findings of the trial court on the unwavering testimony of AAA.
The certainty of the child, unusually intelligent for one so young, that it was accused, whom she called "kuya" and who used
to play basketball and fetch water near their house, and who was wearing a sleeveless shirt and shorts at the time he raped
her, was convincing and persuasive. The defense attempted to impute the crime to someone else one Julito Apiki, but the
child, on rebuttal, was steadfast and did not equivocate, asserting that it was accused who is younger, and not Julito, who is
older, who molested her.
112
n a long line of cases, this Court has consistently ruled that the determination by the trial court of the credibility of the
witnesses deserves full weight and respect considering that it has "the opportunity to observe the witnesses' manner of
testifying, their furtive glances, calmness, sighs and the scant or full realization of their oath,"
113
unless it is shown that
material facts and circumstances have been "ignored, overlooked, misconstrued, or misinterpreted."
114
Further, as correctly observed by the trial court:
xxx His and his witness' attempt to throw the court off the track by imputing the crime to someone else is xxx a vain exercise
in view of the private complainant's positive identification of accused and other corroborative circumstances. Accused also
admitted that on the same evening, Julito Apiki, the supposed real culprit, asked him "What is this incident, Pare?", thus
corroborating the latter's testimony that he confronted accused after hearing of the incident from the child."
115
On the other hand, we cannot agree with the appellant that the trial court erred in finding his denial and alibi weak despite
the presentation of witnesses to corroborate his testimony. Glaring inconsistencies were all over their respective testimonies
that even destroyed the credibility of the appellant's very testimony.
Appellant testified that it was his uncle Alejandro Perocho who sent him to store to buy Tanduay; that he gave the bottle to
his uncle; and that they had already been drinking long before he bought Tanduay at the store.
This was contradicted by the testimony of his aunt Gloria, wife of his uncle Alejandro. On cross-examination, she revealed
that her husband was not around before, during, and after the rape incident because he was then at work.
116
He arrived
from work only after FFF came to their house for the second time and boxed appellant.
117
t was actually the fish vendor, not
her husband, who asked appellant to buy Tanduay.
118
Further, the drinking session started only after the appellant's errand
to the store.
119
Neither was the testimony of Luzvilla credible enough to deserve consideration.
Just like appellant, Luzvilla testified that Alejandro joined the drinking session. This is contrary to Gloria's statement that her
husband was at work.
Luzvilla's testimony is likewise inconsistent with that of sur-rebuttal witness Antonia Perocho. Antonia recalled that Julito
arrived without a shirt on. This belied Luzvilla's claim that Julito wore a white shirt on his way to the house of Rita. n
addition, while both the prosecution, as testified to by AAA and Julito, and the defense, as testified to by Gloria, were
consistent in saying that appellant wore a sleeveless shirt, Luzvilla's recollection differ in that Julito wore a T-shirt (colored
black and later changed to white), and, thus, a short-sleeved shirt.
Also, contrary to Luzvilla's story that she saw AAA walking towards Rita's house three (3) minutes after she returned to the
Perochos at 6:38 in the evening, Antonia recalled that AAA arrived at the house of Rita at 7:30. n this respect, we find the
trial court's appreciation in order. Thus:
xxx. The child declared that after being raped, she went straight home, crying, to tell her father that Hermie had raped her.
She did not first drop into the house of Lita Lingkay to cry among strangers who were watching TV, as Luzvilla Balucan
would have the court believe. When the child was seen at the house of Lita Lingkay by Julito Apiki and Luzvill a Balucan, it
was only later, after she had been brought there by her mother Brenda so that Lita Lingkay could take a look at her - just as
Julito Apiki said.
120
Above all, for alibi to prosper, it is necessary that the corroboration is credible, the same having been offered preferably by
disinterested witnesses. The defense failed thuswise. ts witnesses cannot qualify as such, "they being related or were one
way or another linked to each other."
121
Even assuming for the sake of argument that we consider the corroborations on his whereabouts, still, the defense of al ibi
cannot prosper.
We reiterate, time and again, that the court must be convinced that it would be physically impossible for the accused to have
been at the locus criminis at the time of the commission of the crime.
122
Physical impossibility refers to distance and the facility of access between the situs criminis and the location of the accused
when the crime was committed. He must demonstrate that he was so far away and could not have been physically present
at the scene of the crime and its immediate vicinity when the crime was committed.
123
n People v. Paraiso,
124
the distance of two thousand meters from the place of the commission of the crime was considered
not physically impossible to reach in less than an hour even by foot.
125
nasmuch as it would take the accused not more than
five minutes to rape the victim, this Court disregarded the testimony of the defense witness attesting that the accused was
fast asleep when she left to gather bamboo trees and returned several hours after. She could have merely presumed that
the accused slept all throughout.
126
n People v. Antivola,
127
the testimonies of relatives and friends corroborating that of the appellant that he was in their
company at the time of the commission of the crime were likewise disregarded by this Court in the following manner:
Ruben Nicolas, the appellant's part-time employer, and Marites Capalad, the appellant's sister-in-law and co-worker, in
unison, vouched for the appellant's physical presence in the fishpond at the time Rachel was raped. t is, however, an
established fact that the appeIIant's house where the rape occurred, was a stone's throw away from the
fishpond. Their cIaim that the appeIIant never Ieft their sight the entire afternoon of December 4, 1997 is
unacceptabIe. t was impossible for Marites to have kept an eye on the appellant for almost four hours, since she testified
that she, too, was very much occupied with her task of counting and recording the fishes being harvested. Likewise, Mr.
Nicolas, who, admittedly was 50 meters away from the fishpond, could not have focused his entire attention solely on the
appellant. It is, therefore, not farfetched that the appeIIant easiIy sneaked out unnoticed, and aI ong the way
inveigIed the victim, brought her inside his house and ravished her, then returned to the fishpond as if he never
Ieft.
128
(Emphasis supplied.)1avvphi1
As in the cases above cited, the claim of the defense witnesses that appellant never left their sight, save from the 5-minute
errand to the store, is contrary to ordinary human experience. Moreover, considering that the farmland where the crime was
committed is just behind the house of the Perochos, it would take appellant only a few minutes to bring AAA from the road
near the store next to the Perochos down the farmland and consummate the crime. As correctly pointed out by the Court of
Appeals, appellant could have committed the rape after buying the bottle of Tanduay and immediately returned to his
uncle's house.
129
Unfortunately, the testimonies of his corroborating witnesses even bolstered the fact that he was within the
immediate vicinity of the scene of the crime.
130
Clearly, the defense failed to prove that it was physically impossible for appellant to have been at the time and place of the
commission of the crime.
All considered, we find that the prosecution has sufficiently established the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.

n the determination of the imposable penalty, the Court of Appeals correctly considered Republic Act No. 9344(Juvenile
Justice and Welfare Act of 2006) despite the commission of the crime three (3) years before it was enacted on 28 April
2006.
We recognize its retroactive application following the rationale elucidated in People v. Sarcia:
131
[Sec. 68 of Republic Act No. 9344]
132
allows the retroactive application of the Act to those who have been convicted and are
serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this said Act, and who were below the age of 18 years at the time of the
commission of the offense. With more reason, the Act shouId appIy to this case wherein the conviction by the Iower
court is stiII under review.
133
(Emphasis supplied.)
Criminal Liability; Imposable Penalty
Sec. 6 of Republic Act No. 9344 exempts a child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age from criminal
liability, unless the child is found to have acted with discernment, in which case, "the appropriate proceedings" in
accordance with the Act shall be observed.
134
We determine discernment in this wise:
Discernment is that mental capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act.
135
Such capacity
may be known and should be determined by taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the
records in each case.
136
xxx The surrounding circumstances must demonstrate that the minor knew what he was doing and that it was
wrong.
137
Such circumstance includes the gruesome nature of the crime and the minor's cunning and shrewdness.
138
n the present case, we agree with the Court of Appeals that: "(1) choosing an isolated and dark place to perpetrate the
crime, to prevent detection[;] and (2) boxing the victim xxx, to weaken her defense" are indicative of then seventeen (17)
year-old appellant's mental capacity to fully understand the consequences of his unlawful action.
139
Nonetheless, the corresponding imposable penalty should be modified.
The birth certificate of AAA
140
shows that she was born on 3 December 1997. Considering that she was only five (5) years
old when appellant defiled her on 28 January 2003, the law prescribing the death penalty when rape is committed against a
child below seven (7) years old
141
applies.
The following, however, calls for the reduction of the penalty: (1) the prohibition against the imposition of the penalty of
death in accordance with Republic Act No. 9346;
142
and (2) the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority of the
appellant, which has the effect of reducing the penalty one degree lower than that prescribed by law, pursuant to Article 68
of the Revised Penal Code.
143
Relying on People v. Bon,
144
the Court of Appeals excluded death from the graduation of penalties provided in Article 71 of
the Revised Penal Code.
145
Consequently, in its appreciation of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority of
appellant, it lowered the penalty one degree from reclusion perpetua and sentenced appellant to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four
(4) months of reclusion temporal, in its medium period, as maximum.
146
We differ.
n a more recent case,
147
the Court En Banc, through the Honorable Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro, clarified:
Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, when the offender is a minor under 18 years, the penalty next lower than that
prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period. However, for purposes of determining the proper
penaIty because of the priviIeged mitigating circumstance of minority, the penaIty of death is stiII the penaIty to be
reckoned with. Thus, the proper imposable penalty for the accused-appellant is reclusion perpetua.
148
(Emphasis
supplied.)
Accordingly, appellant should be meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Civil Liability
We have consistently ruled that:
The litmus test xxx in the determination of the civil indemnity is the heinous character of the crime committed, which would
have warranted the imposition of the death penalty, regardless of whether the penalty actually imposed is reduced
to reclusion perpetua.
149
Likewise, the fact that the offender was still a minor at the time he committed the crime has no bearing on the gravity and
extent of injury suffered by the victim and her family.
150
The respective awards of civil indemnity and moral damages in the
amount of P75,000.00 each are, therefore, proper.
151
Accordingly, despite the presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority which effectively lowered the penalty
by one degree, we affirm the damages awarded by the Court of Appeals in the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity
and P75,000.00 as moral damages. And, consistent with prevailing jurisprudence,
152
the amount of exemplary damages
should be increased from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00.
Automatic Suspension of Sentence; Duration; Appropriate Disposition after the Lapse of the Period of Suspension of
Sentence
Republic Act No. 9344 warrants the suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with the law notwithstanding that he/she
has reached the age of majority at the time the judgment of conviction is pronounced. Thus:
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the
commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability
which may have resulted from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the
court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of
application: Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shaII stiII be appIied even if the juveniIe is aIready
eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guiIt. (Emphasis supplied.)
x x x x
Applying Declarador v. Gubaton,
153
which was promulgated on 18 August 2006, the Court of Appeals held that, consistent
with Article 192 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended,
154
the aforestated provision does not apply to one who has
been convicted of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
155
Meanwhile, on 10 September 2009, this Court promulgated the decision in Sarcia,
156
overturning the ruling inGubaton.
Thus:
The xxx provision makes no distinction as to the nature of the offense committed by the child in conflict with the law, unlike
P.D. No. 603 and A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC. The said P.D. and Supreme Court (SC) Rule provide that the benefit of suspended
sentence would not apply to a child in conflict with the law if, among others, he/she has been convicted of an offense
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. n construing Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344, the Court is guided by
the basic principle of statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. Since R.A.
No. 9344 does not distinguish between a minor who has been convicted of a capital offense and another who has been
convicted of a lesser offense, the Court should also not distinguish and should apply the automatic suspension of sentence
to a child in conflict with the law who has been found guilty of a heinous crime.
157
The legislative intent reflected in the Senate deliberations
158
on Senate Bill No. 1402 (Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention Act of 2005) further strengthened the new position of this Court to cover heinous crimes in the application of the
provision on the automatic suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with the law. The pertinent portion of the deliberation
reads:
f a mature minor, maybe 16 years old to below 18 years old is charged, accused with, or may have committed a serious
offense, and may have acted with discernment, then the child could be recommended by the Department of Social Welfare
and Development (DSWD), by the Local Council for the Protection of Children (LCPC), or by [Senator Miriam Defensor-
Santiago's] proposed Office of Juvenile Welfare and Restoration to go through a judicial proceeding; but the welfare, best
interests, and restoration of the child should still be a primordial or primary consideration. Even in heinous crimes, the
intention should still be the child's restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration. xxx (talics supplied in Sarcia.)
159
On 24 November 2009, the Court En Banc promulgated the Revised Rule on Children in Conflict with the Law,which
reflected the same position.
160
These developments notwithstanding, we find that the benefits of a suspended sentence can no longer apply to appellant.
The suspension of sentence lasts only until the child in conflict with the law reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21)
years.
161
Section 40
162
of the law and Section 48
163
of the Rule are clear on the matter. Unfortunately, appellant is now
twenty-five (25) years old.
Be that as it may, to give meaning to the legislative intent of the Act, the promotion of the welfare of a child in conflict with
the law should extend even to one who has exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21) years, so long as he/she committed
the crime when he/she was still a child. The offender shall be entitled to the right to restoration, rehabilitation and
reintegration in accordance with the Act in order that he/she is given the chance to live a normal life and become a
productive member of the community. The age of the child in conflict with the law at the time of the promulgation of the
judgment of conviction is not material. What matters is that the offender committed the offense when he/she was still of
tender age.
Thus, appellant may be confined in an agricultural camp or any other training facility in accordance with Sec. 51 of Republic
Act No. 9344.
164
Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other Training Facilities. A child in conflict with the
law may, after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular
penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised and
controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.
Following the pronouncement in Sarcia,
165
the case shall be remanded to the court of origin to effect appellant's
confinement in an agricultrual camp or other training facility.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 29 August 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00213 finding appellant
Hermie M. Jacinto guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified rape is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1)
the death penalty imposed on the appellant is reduced to reclusion perpetua; and (2) appellant is ordered to pay the victim
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages. The case is
hereby REMANDED to the court of origin for its appropriate action in accordance with Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 169641 September 10, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
RICHARD O. SARCIA, Accused-Appellant.
D E C S O N
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
On automatic review is the decision
1
dated July 14, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00717 which
affirmed, with modifications, an earlier decision
2
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ligao City, Branch 13, in Criminal Case
No. 4134, finding herein accused-appellant Richard O. Sarcia alias "Nogi" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape
3
committed against AAA,
4
and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the amount
of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and the cost of the suit. However, the CA modified the
penalties imposed by the RTC by imposing the death penalty, increasing the award of civil indemnity to P75,000.00, and
awarding P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, aside from the P50,000.00 for moral damages.
The crime of rape was allegedly committed sometime in 1996 against AAA, a five (5) year old girl. After almost four (4)
years, AAA's father filed a complaint
5
for acts of lasciviousness against herein accused-appellant on July 7, 2000. Upon
review of the evidence, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor at Ligao, Albay upgraded the charge to rape.
6
The
nformation
7
dated September 5, 2000 reads:
That sometime in 1996 at Barangay Doa Tomasa, Municipality of Guinobatan, Province of Albay, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd and unchaste design, and by means of force,
threats and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with [AAA], who was
then 6 years of age, against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.
At his arraignment on October 25, 2000, accused-appellant, with the assistance of his counsel, entered a plea of not
guilty.
8
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented the oral testimonies of the victim AAA; her minor cousin; her father; and Dr. Joana Manatlao, the
Municipal Health Officer of Guinobatan, Albay. The defense presented the accused-appellant himself, who vehemently
denied committing the crimes imputed to him and Manuel Casimiro, Clerk of Court of the Municipal Trial Court at
Guinobatan, Albay.
On January 17, 2003, the trial court rendered its Decision
9
finding the accused-appellant guilty of the crime of rape and
imposed the penalty mentioned above.
The record of this case was forwarded to this Court in view of the Notice of Appeal filed by the accused- appellant.
10
Accused-appellant filed his Appellant's Brief
11
on July 15, 2004, while the People, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
filed its Appellee's Brief
12
on December 15, 2004.
Pursuant to our pronouncement in People v. Mateo,
13
modifying the pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure insofar as they provide for direct appeals from the RTC to this Court in cases in which the penalty imposed by
the trial court is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the Resolution dated September 19, 1995 in "nternal
Rules of the Supreme Court," the case was transferred, for appropriate action and disposition, to the CA where it was
docketed as CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00717.
As stated at the beginning hereof, the CA, in its decision of July 14, 2005, in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 000717, affirmed with
modification the judgment of conviction pronounced by the trial court. We quote the fallo of the CA decision:
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction is AFFRMED. The accused, Richard Sarcia y Olivera, is ordered to suffer the
penalty of DEATH, and to pay the victim, [AAA], the amount of (1) P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; (2)P50,000.00 as moral
damages, and (3) P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Let the entire records of this case be elevated to the Supreme Court for review, pursuant to A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC
(Amendments to the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure to Govern Death Penalty Cases), which took effect on October
15, 2004.
SO ORDERED.
On September 30, 2005, the case was elevated to this Court for further review.
14
n our Resolution
15
of November 15, 2005, we required the parties to simultaneously submit their respective supplemental
briefs. Accused-appellant filed his Supplemental Brief
16
on April 7, 2006. Having failed to submit one, the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) was deemed to have waived the filing of its supplemental brief.
n his Brief filed before the CA, accused-appellant raised the following assignment of errors:

THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED N GVNG CREDENCE TO THE TESTMONY OF [AAA], [her cousin] and [her
father].

THE LOWER COURT GLARNGLY ERRED N REJECTNG THE DEFENSE OF ALB NTERPOSED BY THE ACCUSED
WHCH S MORE CREDBLE.

THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED N NOT ACQUTTNG THE ACCUSED RCHARD SARCA.
The evidence for the prosecution is summarized by the OSG in the Appellee's Brief, as follows:
On December 16, 1996, five-year-old [AAA], together with her [cousin and two other playmates], was playing in the yard of
Saling Crisologo near a mango tree.
Suddenly, appellant appeared and invited [AAA] to go with him to the backyard of Saling Crisologo's house. She agreed.
Unknown to appellant, [AAA's cousin] followed them.
Upon reaching the place, appellant removed [AAA's] shorts and underwear. He also removed his trousers and brief.
Thereafter, he ordered [AAA] to lie down on her back. Then, he lay on top of her and inserted his penis into [AAA's] private
organ. Appellant made an up-and-down movement ("Nagdapadapa tabi"). [AAA] felt severe pain inside her private part and
said "aray." She also felt an intense pain inside her stomach.
[AAA's cousin], who positioned herself around five (5) meters away from them, witnessed appellant's dastardly act.
Horrified, [AAA's cousin] instinctively rushed to the house of [AAA's] mother, her aunt Emily, and told the latter what she had
seen. [AAA's] mother answered that they (referring to {AAA and her cousin} were still very young to be talking about such
matters.
Meanwhile, after satisfying his lust, appellant stood up and ordered [AAA] to put on her clothes. Appellant then left.
Perplexed, [AAA's cousin] immediately returned to the backyard of Saling Crisologo where she found [AAA] crying.
Appellant, however, was gone. [AAA's cousin] approached [AAA] and asked her what appellant had done to her. When
[AAA] did not answer, [her cousin] did not ask her any further question and just accompanied her home.
At home, [AAA] did not tell her mother what appellant had done to her because she feared that her mother might slap her.
Later, when her mother washed her body, she felt a grating sensation in her private part. Thereafter, [AAA] called for [her
cousin]. [AAA's cousin] came to their house and told [AAA's] mother again that appellant had earlier made an up-and-down
movement on top of [AAA]. [AAA's mother], however did not say anything. At that time, [AAA's] father was working in
Manila.
Dr. Joana Manatloa is the Municipal Health Officer of Guinobatan, Albay. She testified that: (1) it was the rural health offi cer,
Dr. Reantaso, who conducted a physical examination on [AAA]; (2) Dr. Reantaso prepared and signed a medico-legal
certificate containing the result of [AAA]'s examination; (3) Dr. Reantaso, however, had already resigned as rural health
officer of Guinobatan, Albay; (4) as a medical doctor, she can interpret, the findings in said medico-legal certificate issued to
[AAA]; (5) [AAA]'s medical findings are as follows: "negative for introital vulvar laceration nor scars, perforated hymen,
complete, pinkish vaginal mucosa, vaginal admits little finger with resistance; (6) the finding "negative for introital bulvar
laceration nor scars" means, in layman's language, that there was no showing of any scar or wound, and (7) there is a
complete perforation of the hymen which means that it could have been subjected to a certain trauma or pressure such as
strenuous exercise or the entry of an object like a medical instrument or penis.
17
On the other hand, the trial court summarized the version of the defense as follows:
Richard Sarcia, 24 years old, single, student and a resident of Doa Tomasa, Guinobatan, Albay denied he raped [AAA].
While he knows [AAA's] parents, because sometimes they go to their house looking for his father to borrow money, he does
not know [AAA] herself. His father retired as a fireman from Crispa in 1991 while his mother worked as an agriculturist in the
Municipality of Teresa, Antipolo, Rizal. As an agriculturist of the Department of Agriculture, his mother would bring seedlings
and attend seminars in Batangas and Baguio. They were residing in Cainta, Rizal when sometime in 1992 they transferred
residence to Guinobatan, Albay. His father is from barangay Masarawag while his mother is from barangay Doa Tomasa
both of Guinobatan, Albay. After their transfer in Guinobatan, his mother continued to be an agriculturist while his father
tended to his 1-hectare coconut land. Richard testified he was between fourteen (14) and fifteen (15) years old in 1992
when they transferred to Guinobatan. Between 1992 and 1994 he was out of school. But from 1994 to 1998 he took his high
school at Masarawag High School. His daily routine was at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon after school before
proceeding home he would usually play basketball at the basketball court near the church in Doa Tomasa about 1
kilometer away from their house. When her mother suffered a stroke in 1999 he and his father took turns taking care of his
mother. Richard denied molesting other girls ... and was most surprised when he was accused of raping [AAA]. He knows
Saling Crisologo and the latter's place which is more than half kilometer to their house. Richard claimed Salvacion Bobier,
grandmother of Mae Christine Camu, whose death on May 7, 2000 was imputed to him and for which a case for Murder
under Criminal Case No. 4087 was filed against him with the docile cooperation of [AAA's] parents who are related to
Salvacion, concocted and instigated [AAA's] rape charge against him to make the case for Murder against him stronger and
life for him miserable. He was incarcerated on May 10, 2000 for the Murder charge and two (2) months later while he
already in detention, the rape case supposedly committed in 1996 was filed against him in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC)
of Guinobatan, Albay. He was to learn about it from his sister, Marivic, on a Sunday afternoon sometime on July 20, 2000
when his sister visited him in jail. He naturally got angry when he heard of this rape charge because he did not do such
thing and recalled telling his sister they can go to a doctor and have the child examine to prove he did not rape her.
Subsequently, from his sister again he was to learn that the rape case was ordered dismissed.
On cross-examination, Richard admitted [AAA's] mother, is also related to his father, [AAA mother's] father, being a second
cousin of his father. Richard is convinced it is not the lending of money by his father to the AAA's family as the motive for
the latter to file the rape case against him but the instigation of Salvacion Bobier.
Manuel A. Casimiro, Clerk of Court of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), Guinobatan, Albay, testified on the records of
Criminal Case No. 7078 filed in MTC Guinobatan, Albay against Richard Sarcia for Rape in relation to RA 7610 relative to
the alleged withdrawal of said rape case but the accused through counsel failed to formally offer the marked exhibits relative
to said case.
18
Accused-appellant alleges that the trial court erred in convicting him, as the prosecution was not able to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. He assailed the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, AAA, her cousin and her father on the
following grounds: (1) the testimonies of AAA and her cousin were inconsistent with each other; (2) the victim was confused
as to the date and time of the commission of the offense; (3) there was a four-year delay in filing the criminal case, and the
only reason why they filed the said case was "to help Salvacion Bobier get a conviction of this same accused in a murder
case filed by said Salvacion Bobier for the death of her granddaughter Mae Christine Camu on May 7, 2000." Accused-
appellant stressed that the same Salvacion Bobier helped AAA's father in filing the said case for rape. Accused-appellant
also claimed that the prosecution failed to prove that he employed force, threats or intimidation to achieve his end. Finally,
accused-appellant harped on the finding in the medical certificate issued by Dr. Reantaso and interpreted by Dr. Joana
Manatlao, stating "negative for introital bulvar laceration nor scar which means that there was no showing of any scar or
wound."
n his Appellee's Brief accused-appellant pointed out the inconsistencies between AAA's and her cousin's testimonies as
follows: (1) the cousin testified that she played with AAA at the time of the incident, while AAA testified that she was doing
nothing before accused-appellant invited her to the back of the house of a certain Saling; (2) the cousin testified that when
she saw accused-appellant doing the push-and-pull motion while on top of AAA, the latter shouted in a loud voice contrary
to AAA's testimony that when accused-appellant was inside her and started the up-and-down motion, she said "aray"; (3)
when the cousin returned to AAA after telling the latter's mother what accused-appellant had done to AAA, she found AAA
crying. AAA however testified that, after putting on her clothes, she invited the cousin to their house; and (4) the cousin
testified that other children were playing at the time of the incident, but AAA testified that there were only four of them who
were playing at that time.
As it is oft-repeated, inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses, which refer only to minor details and collateral matters,
do not affect the veracity and weight of their testimonies where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and
the positive identification of the accused. Slight contradictions in fact even serve to strengthen the credibility of the
witnesses and prove that their testimonies are not rehearsed. Nor are such inconsistencies, and even improbabilities,
unusual, for there is no person with perfect faculties or senses.
19
The alleged inconsistencies in this case are too
inconsequential to overturn the findings of the court a quo. t is important that the two prosecution witnesses were one in
saying that it was accused-appellant who sexually abused AAA. Their positive, candid and straightforward narrations of how
AAA was sexually abused by accused-appellant evidently deserve full faith and credence. When the rape incident
happened, AAA was only five (5) years old; and when she and her cousin testified, they were barely 9 and 11 years old,
respectively. This Court has had occasion to rule that the alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the witnesses can be
explained by their age and their inexperience with court proceedings, and that even the most candid of witnesses commit
mistakes and make confused and inconsistent statements. This is especially true of young witnesses, who could be
overwhelmed by the atmosphere of the courtroom. Hence, there is more reason to accord them ample space for
inaccuracy.
20
Accused-appellant capitalizes on AAA's inability to recall the exact date when the incident in 1996 was committed. Failure to
recall the exact date of the crime, however, is not an indication of false testimony, for even discrepancies regarding exact
dates of rapes are inconsequential and immaterial and cannot discredit the credibility of the victim as a witness.
21
n People
v. Purazo,
22
We ruled:
We have ruled, time and again that the date is not an essential element of the crime of rape, for the gravamen of the offense
is carnal knowledge of a woman. As such, the time or place of commission in rape cases need not be accurately stated. As
early as 1908, we already held that where the time or place or any other fact alleged is not an essential element of the crime
charged, conviction may be had on proof of the commission of the crime, even if it appears that the crime was not
committed at the precise time or place alleged, or if the proof fails to sustain the existence of some immaterial fact set out in
the complaint, provided it appears that the specific crime charged was in fact committed prior to the date of the filing of the
complaint or information within the period of the statute of limitations and at a place within the jurisdiction of the court.
Also in People v. Salalima,
23
the Court held:
Failure to specify the exact dates or time when the rapes occurred does not ipso facto make the information defective on its
face. The reason is obvious. The precise date or time when the victim was raped is not an element of the offense. The
gravamen of the crime is the fact of carnal knowledge under any of the circumstances enumerated under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code. As long as it is alleged that the offense was committed at any time as near to the actual date when the
offense was committed an information is sufficient. n previous cases, we ruled that allegations that rapes were committed
"before and until October 15, 1994," "sometime in the year 1991 and the days thereafter," "sometime in November 1995 and
some occasions prior and/or subsequent thereto" and "on or about and sometime in the year 1988" constitute sufficient
compliance with Section 11, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
n this case, AAA's declaration that the rape incident took place on December 15, 1996 was explained by the trial court, and
we quote:
The rape took place in 1996. As earlier noted by the Court the date December 15, 1996 mentioned by [AAA] may have been
arbitrarily chosen by the latter due to the intense cross-examination she was subjected but the Court believes it could have
been in any month and date in the year 1996 as in fact neither the information nor [AAA's] sworn statement mention the
month and date but only the year.
24
Likewise, witnesses' credibility is not affected by the delay in the filing of the case against accused-appellant. Neither does
the delay bolster accused-appellant's claim that the only reason why this case was filed against him was "to help Salvacion
Bobier get a conviction of this same accused-appellant in the case of murder filed by Salvacion Bobier for the death of her
granddaughter Mae Christine Camu on May 7, 2000."
The rape victim's delay or hesitation in reporting the crime does not destroy the truth of the charge nor is it an indication of
deceit. t is common for a rape victim to prefer silence for fear of her aggressor and the lack of courage to face the public
stigma of having been sexually abused. n People v. Coloma
25
we even considered an 8-year delay in reporting the long
history of rape by the victim's father as understandable and not enough to render incredible the complaint of a 13-year-old
daughter. Thus, in the absence of other circumstances that show that the charge was a mere concoction and impelled by
some ill motive, delay in the filing of the complainant is not sufficient to defeat the charge. Here, the failure of AAA's parents
to immediately file this case was sufficiently justified by the complainant's father in the latter's testimony, thus:
Q But, did you not say, please correct me if am wrong, you got angry when your wife told you that something
happened to Hazel way back in 1996?
A Yes, sir.
Q Yet, despite your anger you were telling us that you waited until June to file this case?
A After heard about the incident, and my wife had a talk for which reason that during that time we had no money
yet to use in filing the case, so we waited. When we were able to save enough amounts, we filed the case.
26
Accused-appellant also contends that he could not be liable for rape because there is no proof that he employed force,
threats or intimidation in having carnal knowledge of AAA. Where the girl is below 12 years old, as in this case, the only
subject of inquiry is whether "carnal knowledge" took place. Proof of force, intimidation or consent is unnecessary, since
none of these is an element of statutory rape. There is a conclusive presumption of absence of free consent when the rape
victim is below the age of twelve.
27
Accused-appellant harps on the medical report, particularly the conclusion quoted as follows: "negative for introital bulvar
laceration nor scars, which means, in layman language, that there was no showing of any scar or wound." The Court has
consistently ruled that the presence of lacerations in the victim's sexual organ is not necessary to prove the crime of rape
and its absence does not negate the fact of rape. A medical report is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape.
28
What is
important is that AAA's testimony meets the test of credibility, and that is sufficient to convict the accused.
Accused-appellant's defense of denial was properly rejected. Time and time again, we have ruled that denial like alibi is the
weakest of all defenses, because it is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove. Furthermore, it cannot prevail over the
positive and unequivocal identification of appellant by the offended party and other witnesses. Categorical and consistent
positive identification, absent any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over
the appellants' defense of denial and alibi.
29
The shallow hypothesis put forward by accused-appellant that he was accused
of raping AAA due to the instigation of Salvacion Bobier hardly convinces this Court. On this score, the trial court aptly
reached the following conclusion:
.True, Salvacion Bobier actively assisted AAA's family file the instant case against the accused, but the Court believes
[AAA's] parents finally decided to file the rape case because after they have come to realize after what happened to Mae
Christine Camu that what previously [AAA and her cousin] told her mother and which the latter had continually ignored is
after all true.
AAA was barely 9 years of age when she testified. t has been stressed often enough that the testimony of rape victims who
are young and immature deserve full credence. t is improbable for a girl of complainant's age to fabricate a charge so
humiliating to herself and her family had she not been truly subjected to the painful experience of sexual abuse. At any rate,
a girl of tender years, innocent and guileless, cannot be expected to brazenly impute a crime so serious as rape to any man
if it were not true.
30
Parents would not sacrifice their own daughter, a child of tender years at that, and subject her to the
rigors and humiliation of public trial for rape, if they were not motivated by an honest desire to have their daughter's
transgressor punished accordingly.
31
Hence, the logical conclusion is that no such improper motive exists and that her
testimony is worthy of full faith and credence.
The guilt of accused-appellant having been established beyond reasonable doubt, we discuss now the proper penalty to be
imposed on him.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659,
32
was the governing law at the time the
accused-appellant committed the rape in question. Under the said law, the penalty of death shall be imposed when the
victim of rape is a child below seven years of age. n this case, as the age of AAA, who was five (5) years old at the time the
rape was committed, was alleged in the information and proven during trial by the presentation of her birth certificate, which
showed her date of birth as January 16, 1991, the death penalty should be imposed.
However, this Court finds ground for modifying the penalty imposed by the CA. We cannot agree with the CA's conclusion
that the accused-appellant cannot be deemed a minor at the time of the commission of the offense to entitle him to the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority pursuant to Article 68(2)
33
of the Revised Penal Code. When accused
appellant testified on March 14, 2002, he admitted that he was 24 years old, which means that in 1996, he was 18 years of
age. As found by the trial court, the rape incident could have taken place "in any month and date in the year 1996." Since
the prosecution was not able to prove the exact date and time when the rape was committed, it is not certain that the crime
of rape was committed on or after he reached 18 years of age in 1996. n assessing the attendance of the mitigating
circumstance of minority, all doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused, it being more beneficial to the latter. n f act,
in several cases, this Court has appreciated this circumstance on the basis of a lone declaration of the accused regarding
his age.
34
Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, when the offender is a minor under 18 years, the penalty next lower than that
prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period. However, for purposes of determining the proper
penalty because of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, the penalty of death is still the penalty to be reckoned
with.
35
Thus, the proper imposable penalty for the accused-appellant is reclusion perpetua.
t is noted that the Court is granted discretion in awarding damages provided in the Civil Code, in case a crime is committed.
Specifically, Article 2204 of the Civil Code provides that "in crimes, the damages to be adjudicated may be respectively
increased or lessened according to the aggravating or mitigating circumstances." The issue now is whether the award of
damages should be reduced in view of the presence here of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority of the
accused at the time of the commission of the offense.
A review of the nature and purpose of the damages imposed on the convicted offender is in order. Article 107 of the
Revised Penal Code defines the term "indemnification," which is included in the civil liability prescribed by Article 104 of the
same Code, as follows:
Art. 107. ndemnification-What is included. ndemnification for consequential damages shall include not only those caused
the injured party, but also those suffered by his family or by a third person by reason of the crime.
Relative to civil indemnity, People v. Victor
36
ratiocinated as follows:
The lower court, however, erred in categorizing the award of P50,000.00 to the offended party as being in the nature of
moral damages. We have heretofore explained in People v. Gementiza that the indemnity authorized by our criminal law as
civil liability ex delicto for the offended party, in the amount authorized by the prevailing judicial policy and aside from other
proven actual damages, is itself equivalent to actual or compensatory damages in civil law. t is not to be considered as
moral damages thereunder, the latter being based on different jural foundations and assessed by the court in the exercise of
sound discretion.
One other point of concern has to be addressed. ndictments for rape continue unabated and the legislative response has
been in the form of higher penalties. The Court believes that, on like considerations, the jurisprudential path on the civil
aspect should follow the same direction. Hence, starting with the case at bar, if the crime of rape is committed or effectively
qualified by any of the circumstances under which the death penalty is authorized by the present amended law, the
indemnity for the victim shall be in the increased amount of not less than P75,000.00. This is not only a reaction to the
apathetic societal perception of the penal law, and the financial fluctuations over time, but also an expression of the
displeasure of the Court over the incidence of heinous crimes against chastity. (Emphasis Supplied)
The Court has had the occasion to rule that moral damages are likewise compensatory in nature. n San Andres v. Court of
Appeals,
37
we held:
x x x Moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in the category of an award designed tocompensate the
claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer. (Emphasis Supplied)
n another case, this Court also explained:
What we call moral damages are treated in American jurisprudence as compensatory damages awarded for mental pain
and suffering or mental anguish resulting from a wrong (25 C.J.S. 815).
38
(Emphasis Supplied)
Thus, according to law and jurisprudence, civil indemnity is in the nature of actual and compensatory damages for the injury
caused to the offended party and that suffered by her family, and moral damages are likewise compensatory in nature. The
fact of minority of the offender at the time of the commission of the offense has no bearing on the gravity and extent of inj ury
caused to the victim and her family, particularly considering the circumstances attending this case. Here, the accused-
appelant could have been eighteen at the time of the commission of the rape. He was accorded the benefit of the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority because of a lack of proof regarding his actual age and the date of the rape rather than a
moral or evidentiary certainty of his minority.
n any event, notwithstanding the presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, which warrants the lowering
of the public penalty by one degree, there is no justifiable ground to depart from the jurisprudential trend in the award of
damages in the case of qualified rape, considering the compensatory nature of the award of civil indemnity and moral
damages. This was the same stance this Court took in People v. Candelario,
39
a case decided on July 28, 1999, which did
not reduce the award of damages. At that time, the damages amounted toP75,000.00 for civil indemnity and P50,000.00 for
moral damages, even if the public penalty imposed on the accused was lowered by one degree, because of the presence of
the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority.
The principal consideration for the award of damages, under the ruling in People v. Salome
40
and People v. Quiachon
41
is
the penalty provided by law or imposable for the offense because of its heinousness, not the public penalty actually imposed
on the offender.
Regarding the civil indemnity and moral damages, People v. Salome explained the basis for increasing the amount of said
civil damages as follows:
The Court, likewise, affirms the civil indemnity awarded by the Court of Appeals to Sally in accordance with the ruling in
People v. Sambrano which states:
"As to damages, we have held that if the rape is perpetrated with any of the attending qualifying circumstances that require
the imposition of the death penalty, the civil indemnity for the victim shall P75,000.00 . Also, in rape cases, moral damages
are awarded without the need proof other than the fact of rape because it is assumed that the victim has suffered moral
injuries entitling her to such an award. However, the trial court's award of P50,000.00 as moral damages should also be
increased to P75,000 pursuant to current jurisprudence on qualified rape."
t should be noted that while the new law prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty provided for by law for a
heinous offense is still death and the offense is still heinous. Consequently, the civil indemnity for the victim is
still P75,000.00.
People v. Quiachon also ratiocinates as follows:
With respect to the award of damages, the appellate court, following prevailing jurisprudence, correctly awarded the
following amounts; P75,000.00 as civil indemnity which is awarded if the crime is qualified by circumstances warranting the
imposition of the death penalty; P75,000.00.00 as moral damages because the victim is assumed to have suffered moral
injuries, hence, entitling her to an award of moral damages even without proof thereof, x x x
Even if the penalty of death is not to be imposed on the appellant because of the prohibition in R.A. No. 9346, the civil
indemnity of P75,000.00 is still proper because, following the ratiocination in People v. Victor, the said award is not
dependent on the actual imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that qualifying circumstances warranting the
imposition of the death penalty attended the commission of the offense. The Court declared that the award of P75,000.00
shows "not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal law and the financial fluctuations over time but
also the expression of the displeasure of the court of the incidence of heinous crimes against chastity."
The litmus test therefore, in the determination of the civil indemnity is the heinous character of the crime committed, which
would have warranted the imposition of the death penalty, regardless of whether the penalty actually imposed is reduced to
reclusion perpetua.
As to the award of exemplary damages, Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that exemplary or corrective damages are
imposed in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. Exemplary damages are not recoverable
as a matter of right. The requirements of an award of exemplary damagees are: (1) they may be imposed by way of
example in addition to compensatory damages, and only after the claimant's right to them has been established; (2) they
cannot be recovered as a matter of right, their determination depending upon the amount of compensatory damages that
may be awarded to the claimant; (3) the act must be accompanied by bad faith or done in a wanton, fraudulent, oppressive
or malevolent manner.
42
Since the compensatory damages, such as the civil indemnity and moral damages, are increased
when qualified rape is committed, the exemplary damages should likewise be increased in accordance with prevailing
jurisprudence.
43
n sum, the increased amount of P75,000.00 each as civil indemnity and moral damages should be maintained. t is also
proper and appropriate that the award of exemplary damages be likewise increased to the amount ofP30,000.00 based on
the latest jurisprudence on the award of damages on qualified rape. Thus, the CA correctly awarded P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity. However the award of P50,000.00 as moral damages is increased toP75,000.00
44
and that of P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages is likewise increased to P30,000.00.
45
Meanwhile, when accused-appellant was detained at the New Bilibid Prison pending the outcome of his appeal before this
Court, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9344, the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 took effect on May 20, 2006. The RTC
decision and CA decision were promulgated on January 17, 2003 and July 14, 2005, respectively. The promulgation of the
sentence of conviction of accused-appellant handed down by the RTC was not suspended as he was about 25 years of age
at that time, in accordance with Article 192 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 603, The Child and Youth Welfare Code
46
and
Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.
47
Accused-appellant is now
approximately 31 years of age. He was previously detained at the Albay Provincial Jail at Legaspi City and transferred to the
New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City on October 13, 2003.
R.A. No. 9344 provides for its retroactive application as follows:
Sec. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentence. Persons who have been convicted and are
serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age of eighteen (18) years at the time of
the commission of the offense for which they were convicted and are serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the
retroactive application of this Act. x x x
The aforequoted provision allows the retroactive application of the Act to those who have been convicted and are serving
sentence at the time of the effectivity of this said Act, and who were below the age of 18 years at the time of the commission
of the offense. With more reason, the Act should apply to this case wherein the conviction by the lower court is still under
review. Hence, it is necessary to examine which provisions of R.A. No. 9344 shall apply to accused-appellant, who was
below 18 years old at the time of the commission of the offense.
Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344 provides for the automatic suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with the law, even if he/she
is already 18 years of age or more at the time he/she is found guilty of the offense charged. t reads:
Sec. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the
commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability
which may have resulted from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the
court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of application: Provided,
however, That suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18) of age or more at
the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the child, the court shall impose the
appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court on Juvenile in Conflict with the Law.
The above-quoted provision makes no distinction as to the nature of the offense committed by the child in conflict with the
law, unlike P.D. No. 603 and A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC.
48
The said P.D. and Supreme Court (SC) Rule provide that the benefit of
suspended sentence would not apply to a child in conflict with the law if, among others, he/she has been convicted of an
offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. n construing Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344, the Court is
guided by the basic principle of statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, we should not
distinguish.
49
Since R.A. No. 9344 does not distinguish between a minor who has been convicted of a capital offense and
another who has been convicted of a lesser offense, the Court should also not distinguish and should apply the automatic
suspension of sentence to a child in conflict with the law who has been found guilty of a heinous crime.
Moreover, the legislative intent, to apply to heinous crimes the automatic suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with
the law can be gleaned from the Senate deliberations
50
on Senate Bill No. 1402 (Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention Act of 2005), the pertinent portion of which is quoted below:
f a mature minor, maybe 16 years old to below 18 years old is charged, accused with, or may have committed a serious
offense, and may have acted with discernment, then the child could be recommended by the Department of Social Welfare
and Development (DSWD), by the Local Council for the Protection of Children (LCPC), or by my proposed Office of Juvenile
Welfare and Restoration to go through a judicial proceeding; but the welfare, best interests, and restoration of the child
should still be a primordial or primary consideration. Even in heinous crimes, the intention should still be the child's
restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration. xxx (talics supplied)1avvphi1
Nonetheless, while Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344 provides that suspension of sentence can still be applied even if the chil d in
conflict with the law is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt, Sec. 40
of the same law limits the said suspension of sentence until the said child reaches the maximum age of 21, thus:
Sec. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. f the court finds that the objective of the disposition
measures imposed upon the child in conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the law has
willfully failed to comply with the condition of his/her disposition or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the law
shall be brought before the court for execution of judgment.
f said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under suspended sentence, the court shall
determine whether to discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend the
suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.
(emphasis ours)
To date, accused-appellant is about 31 years of age, and the judgment of the RTC had been promulgated, even before the
effectivity of R.A. No. 9344. Thus, the application of Secs. 38 and 40 to the suspension of sentence is now moot and
academic.
51
However, accused-appellant shall be entitled to appropriate disposition under Sec. 51 of R.A. No. 9344, which
provides for the confinement of convicted children as follows:
Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other Training Facilities. A child in conflict with the
law may, after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular
penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised and
controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.
The civil liability resulting from the commission of the offense is not affected by the appropriate disposition measures and
shall be enforced in accordance with law.
52
WHEREFORE, the decision of the CA dated July 14, 2005 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00717 is hereby AFFRMED with the
following MODFCATONS: (1) the penalty of death imposed on accused-appellant is reduced to reclusion perpetua;
53
and
(2) accused-appellant is ordered to pay the victim the amount of P75,000.00 and P30,000.00 as moral damages and
exemplary damages, respectively. The award of civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00 is maintained. However, the
case shall be REMANDED to the court a quo for appropriate disposition in accordance with Sec. 51 of R.A. 9344.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 191366 December 13, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ARNOLD MARTINEZ Y NGELES, EDGAR DIZON Y FERRER, REZIN MARTINEZ Y CAROLINO, and RAFAEL
GONZALES Y CUNANAN, Accused-Appellants.
D E C S O N
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the August 7, 2009 Decision
1
of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. HC-NO. 03269, which
affirmed the February 13, 2008 Decision
2
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Dagupan City (RTC), in Criminal Case No.
2006-0525-D, finding the accused guilty of violating Section 13, in relation to Section 11, Article of Republic Act No. 9165
for Possession of Dangerous Drugs During Parties, Social Gatherings or Meetings.
The Facts
The nformation indicting the accused reads:
That on or about the 2nd day of September 2006, in the City of Dagupan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, ARNOLD MARTNEZ y ANGELES, EDGAR DZON y FERRER, REZN
MARTNEZ y CAROLNO, ROLAND DORA y DAZ and RAFAEL GONZALES y CUNANAN, without authority of law,
confederating together, acting jointly and helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally, sniff and
possess dangerous drugs (shabu residues) contained in empty plastic sachets and rolled aluminum foil, during a party, or at
a social gathering or meeting, or in the proximate company of at least two (2) person[s].
Contrary to Section 13, Article , R.A. 9165.
3
Version of the Prosecution
As culled from the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, Police Officer 1 Bernard Azardon (PO1 Azardon), one of the
apprehending officers, and Police nspector Lady Ellen Maranion (P/Insp. Maranion), the forensic chemical officer, it
appears that on September 2, 2006, at around 12:45 o'clock in the afternoon, PO1 Azardon was on duty at the Police
Community Precinct along Arellano Street, Dagupan City, when a concerned citizen entered the precinct and reported that
a pot session was going on in the house of accused Rafael Gonzales (Gonzales) in Trinidad Subdivision, Dagupan City.
Upon receipt of the report, PO1 Azardon, PO1 Alejandro Dela Cruz (PO1 Dela Cruz), and members of the Special Weapons
and Tactics (SWAT) team hied to Trinidad Subdivision, Dagupan City. Upon inquiry from people in the area, the house of
Gonzales was located.
As the police officers entered the gate of the house, they saw accused Orlando Doria (Doria) coming out of the side door
and immediately arrested him. nside the house, they saw accused Gonzales, Arnold Martinez (A. Martinez), Edgar
Dizon (Dizon), and Rezin Martinez (R. Martinez) in a room. The four were surprised by the presence of the police. n front of
them were open plastic sachets (containing shabu residue), pieces of rolled used aluminum foil and pieces of used
aluminum foil.
The accused were arrested and brought to the police precinct. The items found in the room were seized and turned over to
the Pangasinan Provincial Police Crime Laboratory Officer, P/nsp. Maranion. The latter conducted a laboratory examination
on the seized items and all 115 plastic sachets, 11 pieces of rolled used aluminum foil, and 27 of the 49 pieces of used
aluminum foil tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. The accused were subjected to a drug test and, except
for Doria, they were found to be positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Version of the Defense
The defense, through its witnesses, accused A. Martinez, Dizon, and R. Martinez, claimed that in the morning of September
2, 2006, the three of them were along Arellano Street in Trinidad Subdivision, Dagupan City, to meet with a certain Apper
who bumped the passenger jeep of R. Martinez and who was to give the materials for the painting of said jeep. As they
were going around the subdivision looking for Apper, they saw Gonzales in front of his house and asked him if he noticed a
person pass by. While they were talking, Doria arrived. t was then that five to seven policemen emerged and apprehended
them. They were handcuffed and brought to the police station in Perez, Dagupan City, where they were incarcerated and
charged with sniffing shabu.
The RuIing of the RTC
The case against Doria was dismissed on a demurrer to evidence.
On February 13, 2008, the RTC rendered its decision, the dispositve portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused ARNOLD MARTNEZ y Angeles,
EDGAR DZON y Ferrer, REZN MARTNEZ y Carolino, and RAFAEL GONZALES y Cunanan GULTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Possession of Dangerous Drugs During Parties, Social Gatherings or Meetings defined and penalized
under Section 13 in relation to Section 11, Article of Republic Act 9165, and each of them is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment and to pay the fine in the amount of P500,000.00, and to pay the cost of suit.
The subject items are hereby forfeited in favor of the government and to be disposed of in accordance with the law.
SO ORDERED.
4
The RTC was of the view that the positive testimony of prosecution witness PO1 Azardon, without any showing of ill -motive
on his part, prevailed over the defenses of denial and alibi put up by the accused. The accused were held to have been in
constructive possession of the subject items. A conspiracy was also found present as there was a common purpose to
possess the dangerous drug.
The RuIing of the CA
The CA ruled that there was sufficient evidence to support the findings of the RTC as to the constructive possession of the
dangerous drugs by the accused. t further held that although the procedure regarding the custody and disposition of
evidence prescribed by Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 was not strictly complied with, the integrity and evidentiary value of the
evidence were nonetheless safeguarded. The CA was of the view that the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty was not sufficiently controverted by the accused.
Not in conformity, the accused now interposes this appeal before this Court praying for the reversal of the subject decision,
presenting the following
Assignment of Errors
For accused Arnold Martinez, Edgar Dizon and Rezin Martinez
1. The Iower court erred in finding the accused-appeIIants to be having a pot session at the time of their
arrest;
2. The Iower court erred in not seeing through the antics of the poIice to pIant the shabu paraphernaIia to
justify the arrest of the accused-appeIIants without warrant;
3. The Iower court erred in not finding that the corpus delicti has not been sufficientIy estabIished;
4. The Iower court erred in not finding the uncorroborated testimony of PO1 Azardon insufficient to convict
the accused-appeIIants of the crime charged;
5. The Iower court erred in not acquitting the accused-appeIIants.
For accused Rafael Gonzales

THE TRAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED N CONVCTNG THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPTE THE PROSECUTON'S
FALURE TO OVERTHROW THE CONSTTUTONAL PRESUMPTON OF NNOCENCE.

THE TRAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED N CONVCTNG THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPTE THE PROSECUTON'S
FALURE TO ESTABLSH THE CHAN OF CUSTODY OF THE ALLEGED CONFSCATED DRUG.
After an assiduous assessment of the evidentiary records, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the
accused. The principal reasons are 1] that the evidence against the accused are inadmissible; and 2] that granting the same
to be admissible, the chain of custody has not been duly established.
llegal Arrest, Search and Seizure
ndeed, the accused is estopped from assailing the legality of his arrest if he fails to raise such issue before
arraignment.
5
However, this waiver is limited only to the arrest. The legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the
court over the person of the accused. A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest.
6
Although the admissibility of the evidence was not raised as in issue by the accused, it has been held that this Court has the
power to correct any error, even if unassigned, if such is necessary in arriving at a just decision,
7
especially when the
transcendental matter of life and liberty is at stake.
8
While it is true that rules of procedure are intended to promote rather
than frustrate the ends of justice, they nevertheless must not be met at the expense of substantial justice. Time and again,
this Court has reiterated the doctrine that the rules of procedure are mere tools intended to facilitate the attainment of
justice, rather than frustrate it. Technicalities should never be used to defeat substantive rights.
9
Thus, despite the
procedural lapses of the accused, this Court shall rule on the admissibility of the evidence in the case at bench. The clear
infringement of the accused's right to be protected against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be ignored.
The State cannot, in a manner contrary to its constitutional guarantee, intrude into the persons of its citizens as well as i nto
their houses, papers and effects.
10
Sec. 2, Art. , of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 2. - The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and
the persons or things to be seized.
This constitutional guarantee, however, is not a blanket prohibition against all searches and seizures without warrant.
Arrests and seizures in the following instances are allowed even in the absence of a warrant (i) warrantless search
incidental to a lawful arrest;
11
(ii) search of evidence in "plain view;" (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv) consented
warrantless search; (v) customs search; (vi) stop and frisk; and (vii) exigent and emergency circumstances.
12
This case would appear to fall under either a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest or a plain view search, both of
which require a lawful arrest in order to be considered valid exceptions to the constitutional guarantee. Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for the circumstances under which a warrantless arrest is lawful. Thus:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge
of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.
n cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the
nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
A review of the facts reveal that the arrest of the accused was illegal and the subject items were confiscated as an incident
thereof. According to the testimony of PO1 Azardon and his Joint Affidavit
13
with PO1 Dela Cruz, they proceeded to, and
entered, the house of accused Gonzales based solely on the report of a concerned citizen that a pot session was going on
in said house, to wit:
Q: go back to the information referred to you by the informant, did he not tell you how many persons were actually
conducting the pot session?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: When you went to the place of Rafael Gonzales, of course you were not armed with a search warrant, correct?
A: None, sir.
Q: Before the information was given to you by your alleged informant, you did not know personally Rafael
Gonzales?
A: have not met [him] yet but heard his name, sir.
Q: When this informant told you that he was told that there was [an] ongoing pot session in the house of Rafael
Gonzales, was this report to you placed in the police blotter before you proceeded to the house of Rafael
Gonzales?
A: think it was no longer recorded, sir.
Q: n other words, you did not even bother to get the personal data or identity of the person who told you that he
was allegedly informed that there was an ongoing pot session in the house of Rafael Gonzales?
A: What know is that he is a jeepney driver of a downtown jeepney but he does not want to be identified because
he was afraid, sir.
Q: And likewise, he did not inform you who told him that there was an ongoing pot session in the house of Rafael
Gonzales?
A: No more, sir.
Q: But upon receiving such report from that jeepney driver you immediately formed a group and went to the place of
Rafael Gonzales?
A: Yes, sir.
x x x
Q: When you were at the open gate of the premises of Rafael Gonzales, you could not see what is happening
inside the house of Rafael Gonzales?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You did not also see the alleged paraphernalia as well as the plastic sachet of shabu on the table while you were
outside the premises of the property of Rafael Gonzales?
x x x
Q: Before they entered the premises they could not see the paraphernalia?
COURT: Answer.
A: Of course because they were inside the room, how could we see them, sir.
Q: But still you entered the premises, only because a certain person who told you that he was informed by another
person that there was an ongoing pot session going on inside the house of Rafael Gonzales?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And that is the only reason why you barged in inside the house of Rafael Gonzales and you arrested the persons
you saw?
A: Yes, sir.
14
Paragraph (c) of Rule 113 is clearly inapplicable to this case. Paragraphs (a) and (b), on the other hand, may be applicable
and both require probable cause to be present in order for a warrantless arrest to be valid. Probable cause has been held to
signify a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious
man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.
15
Although this Court has ruled in several dangerous drugs cases
16
that tipped information is sufficient probable cause to
effect a warrantless search,
17
such rulings cannot be applied in the case at bench because said cases involve either a buy-
bust operation or drugs in transit, basically, circumstances other than the sole tip of an informer as basis for the arrest. None
of these drug cases involve police officers entering a house without warrant to effect arrest and seizure based solely on an
informer's tip. The case of People v. Bolasa
18
is informative on this matter.
n People v. Bolasa, an anonymous caller tipped off the police that a man and a woman were repacking prohibited drugs at
a certain house. The police immediately proceeded to the house of the suspects. They walked towards the house
accompanied by their informer. When they reached the house, they peeped inside through a small window and saw a man
and woman repacking marijuana. They then entered the house, introduced themselves as police officers, confiscated the
drug paraphernalia, and arrested the suspects. This Court ruled:
The manner by which accused-appellants were apprehended does not fall under any of the above-enumerated categories.
Perforce, their arrest is illegal. First, the arresting officers had no personal knowledge that at the time of their arrest,
accused-appellants had just committed, were committing, or were about to commit a crime. Second, the arresting officers
had no personal knowledge that a crime was committed nor did they have any reasonable ground to believe that accused-
appellants committed it. Third, accused-appellants were not prisoners who have escaped from a penal establishment.
Neither can it be said that the objects were seized in plain view. First, there was no valid intrusion. As already discussed,
accused-appellants were illegally arrested. Second, the evidence, i.e., the tea bags later on found to contain marijuana, was
not inadvertently discovered. The police officers intentionally peeped first through the window before they saw and
ascertained the activities of accused-appellants inside the room. n like manner, the search cannot be categorized as a
search of a moving vehicle, a consented warrantless search, a customs search, or a stop and frisk; it cannot even fall under
exigent and emergency circumstances, for the evidence at hand is bereft of any such showing.
On the contrary, it indicates that the apprehending officers should have conducted first a surveillance considering that the
identities and address of the suspected culprits were already ascertained. After conducting the surveillance and determining
the existence of probable cause for arresting accused-appellants, they should have secured a search warrant prior to
effecting a valid arrest and seizure. The arrest being illegal ab initio, the accompanying search was likewise illegal. Every
evidence thus obtained during the illegal search cannot be used against accused-appellants; hence, their acquittal must
follow in faithful obeisance to the fundamental law.
19
t has been held that personal knowledge of facts in arrests without warrant must be based upon probable cause, which
means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when the suspicion,
that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing an offense, is based on actual facts, that is, supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested.
20
As to paragraph (a) of Section 5 of Rule 113, the arresting officers had no personal knowledge that at the time of the arrest,
accused had just committed, were committing, or were about to commit a crime, as they had no probable cause to enter the
house of accused Rafael Gonzales in order to arrest them. As to paragraph (b), the arresting officers had no personal
knowledge of facts and circumstances that would lead them to believe that the accused had just committed an offense. As
admitted in the testimony of PO1 Azardon, the tip originated from a concerned citizen who himself had no personal
knowledge of the information that was reported to the police:
Q: Mr. Witness, you claimed that the reason for apprehending all the accused was based on a tip-off by an
informant?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What exactly [did] that informant tell you?
A: He told us that somebody told him that there was an ongoing pot session in the house of one of the accused
Rafael Gonzales, sir.
Q: You mean to say that it was not the informant himself to whom the information originated but from somebody
else?
A: That was what he told me, sir.
Q: Because of that you proceeded to where the alleged pot session was going on? [No Answer]
Q: Did you[r] informant particularly pinpointed [sic] to where the alleged pot session was going on?
A: No more because he did not go with us, sir.
Q: So you merely relied on what he said that something or a pot session was going on somewhere in Arellano but
you don't know the exact place where the pot session was going on?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And your informant has no personaI knowIedge as to the veracity of the alleged pot session because he
claimed that he derived that information from somebody else?
A: This is what he told us that somebody told him that there was an ongoing pot session, sir.
Q: Despite of [sic] that information you proceeded to where?
A: Trinidad Subdivision, sir.
x x x
Q: Mr. Witness, did your informant named [sic] those included in the alleged pot session?
A: No, sir.
Q: That was, because your informant don't [sic] know physically what was really happening there?
A: He was told by another person that there was an ongoing pot session there, sir.
21
[Emphasis supplied]
Neither can it be said that the subject items were seized in plain view. The elements of plainview are: (a) a prior valid
intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duti es; (b)
the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be
immediately apparent; and, (d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.
22
The evidence was not inadvertently discovered as the police officers intentionally entered the house with no prior
surveillance or investigation before they discovered the accused with the subject items. f the prior peeking of the police
officers in Bolasa was held to be insufficient to constitute plain view, then more so should the warrantless search in this
case be struck down. Neither can the search be considered as a search of a moving vehicle, a consented warrantless
search, a customs search, a stop and frisk, or one under exigent and emergency circumstances.
The apprehending officers should have first conducted a surveillance considering that the identity and address of one of the
accused were already ascertained. After conducting the surveillance and determining the existence of probable cause, then
a search warrant should have been secured prior to effecting arrest and seizure. The arrest being illegal, the ensuing search
as a result thereof is likewise illegal. Evidence procured on the occasion of an unreasonable search and seizure is deemed
tainted for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree and should be excluded.
23
The subject items seized during the
illegal arrest are thus inadmissible. The drug, being the verycorpus delicti of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous
drugs, its inadmissibility thus precludes conviction, and calls for the acquittal of the accused.
As has been noted previously by this Court, some lawmen, prosecutors and judges have glossed over illegal searches and
seizures in cases where law enforcers are able to present the alleged evidence of the crime, regardless of the methods by
which they were obtained. This attitude tramples on constitutionally-guaranteed rights in the name of law enforcement. t is
ironic that such enforcement of the law fosters the breakdown of our system of justice and the eventual denigration of
society. While this Court appreciates and encourages the efforts of law enforcers to uphold the law and to preserve the
peace and security of society, we nevertheless admonish them to act with deliberate care and within the parameters set by
the Constitution and the law.
24
Chain of Custody
Even granting that the seized items are admissible as evidence, the acquittal of the accused would still be in order for fail ure
of the apprehending officers to comply with the chain of custody requirement in dangerous drugs cases.
The accused contend that the identity of the seized drug was not established with moral certainty as the chain of custody
appears to be questionable, the authorities having failed to comply with Sections 21 and 86 of R.A. No. 9165, and
Dangerous Drug Board (DDB) Resolution No. 03, Series of 1979, as amended by Board Regulation No. 2, Series of 1990.
They argue that there was no prior coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency(PDEA), no inventory of the
confiscated items conducted at the crime scene, no photograph of the items taken, no compliance with the rule requiring the
accused to sign the inventory and to give them copies thereof, and no showing of how the items were handled from the time
of confiscation up to the time of submission to the crime laboratory for testing. Therefore, the corpus delicti was not proven,
thereby producing reasonable doubt as to their guilt. Thus, they assert that the presumption of innocence in their favor was
not overcome by the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty.
The essential requisites to establish illegal possession of dangerous drugs are: (i) the accused was in possession of the
dangerous drug, (ii) such possession is not authorized by law, and (iii) the accused freely and consciously possessed the
dangerous drug.
25
Additionally, this being a case for violation of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9165, an additional element of the
crime is (iv) the possession of the dangerous drug must have occurred during a party, or at a social gathering or meeting, or
in the proximate company of at least two (2) persons.
The existence of the drug is the very corpus delicti of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs and, thus, a
condition sine qua non for conviction. n order to establish the existence of the drug, its chain of custodymust be sufficiently
established. The chain of custody requirement is essential to ensure that doubts regarding the identity of the evidence are
removed through the monitoring and tracking of the movements of the seized drugs from the accused, to the police, to the
forensic chemist, and finally to the court.
26
Malillin v. People was the first in a growing number of cases to explain the
importance of chain of custody in dangerous drugs cases, to wit:
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. t would include
testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in
such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was
and what happened to it while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it
was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there
had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the
same.
27
Section 1(b) of DDB Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002,
28
defines chain of custody as follows:
b. "Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals
or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt
in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of
seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date
and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and used in court as evidence, and the
final disposition;
Paragraph 1, Section 21, Article of R.A. No. 9165, provides for safeguards for the protection of the identity and integrity of
dangerous drugs seized, to wit:
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of
Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory
Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof.
People v. Habana thoroughly discusses the proper procedure for the custody of seized or confiscated items in dangerous
drugs cases in order to ensure their identity and integrity, as follows:
Usually, the police officer who seizes the suspected substance turns it over to a supervising officer, who would then send it
by courier to the police crime laboratory for testing. Since it is unavoidable that possession of the substance changes hand
a number of times, it is imperative for the officer who seized the substance from the suspect to place his marking on its
plastic container and seal the same, preferably with adhesive tape that cannot be removed without leaving a tear on the
plastic container. At the trial, the officer can then identify the seized substance and the procedure he observed to preserve
its integrity until it reaches the crime laboratory.
f the substance is not in a plastic container, the officer should put it in one and seal the same. n this way the substance
would assuredly reach the laboratory in the same condition it was seized from the accused. Further, after the laboratory
technician tests and verifies the nature of the substance in the container, he should put his own mark on the plastic
container and seal it again with a new seal since the police officer's seal has been broken. At the trial, the technician can
then describe the sealed condition of the plastic container when it was handed to him and testify on the procedure he took
afterwards to preserve its integrity.
f the sealing of the seized substance has not been made, the prosecution would have to present every police officer,
messenger, laboratory technician, and storage personnel, the entire chain of custody, no matter how briefly one's
possession has been. Each of them has to testify that the substance, although unsealed, has not been tampered with or
substituted while in his care.
29
Section 21(a) of the mplementing Rules and Regulations (RR) of R.A. No. 9165 further elaborates, and provides for, the
possibility of non-compliance with the prescribed procedure:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such
items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the
search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever
is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further that non-compliance with these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. [Emphasis
supplied]
Accordingly, non-compliance with the prescribed procedural requirements will not necessarily render the seizure and
custody of the items void and invalid, provided that (i) there is a justifiable ground for such non-compliance, and (ii) the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved. n this case, however, no justifiable ground is
found availing, and it is apparent that there was a failure to properly preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items to ensure the identity of the corpus delicti from the time of seizure to the time of presentation in court. A review
of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and the documentary records of the case reveals irreparably broken links in
the chain of custody.
According to the apprehending police officers in their Joint Affidavit, the following were confiscated from the accused, to wit:
a) SeveraI pcs of used empty plastic sachets containing suspected shabu residues.
b) Eight used (8) disposable lighters ( two (2) pcs colored orange, two (2) pcs colored yellow, one (1) pc colored
green & one (1) pc colored white ).
c) SeveraI pcs of used rolled aluminum foil containing suspected shabu residues.
d) SeveraI pcs of used cut aluminum foil containing suspected shabu residues.
e) One (1) pc gIass tube containing suspected shabu residues.
30
[Emphases supplied]
At the police station, the case, the accused, and the above-mentioned items were indorsed to Duty nvestigator Senior
Police Officer 1 Pedro Urbano, Jr. (SPO1 Urbano) for proper disposition.
31
A letter-request for laboratory examination was
prepared by Police Superintendent Edgar Orduna Basbag for the following items:
a) Pieces of used empty small plastic sachets with suspected shabu residues marked "DC&A-1."
b) Pieces of used rolled and cut aluminum foil with suspected shabu residues marked "DC&A-2."
c) Pieces of used cut aluminum foil with suspected shabu residues marked "DC&A-3."
32
[Emphases supplied]
The letter-request and above-mentioned items were submitted to P/nsp. Maranion by SPO3 Froilan Esteban (SPO3
Esteban). Final Chemistry Report No. D-042-06L listed the specimens which were submitted for testing, to wit:
SPECMENS SUBMTTED:
A A1 to A115 One Hundred fifteen (115) open transparent plastic sachet with tag each containing suspected
shabu residue without markings.
B B1 to B11 EIeven (11) rolled used aluminum foil with tag each containing suspected shabu residuewithout
markings.
C C1 to C49 Forty-nine (49) used aluminum foil with tag each containing suspected shabu residuewithout
markings.
33
[Emphases supplied]
Three days after the subject items were seized, or on September 5, 2006, a Confiscation Receipt was issued by PO1
Azardon and PO1 Dela Cruz, which reads:
DCPS AD SOTG 05 September 2006
CONFISCATION RECEIPT
TO WHOM T MAY CONCERN:
THS S TO CERTFY that on or about 12:45 noon of September 4, 2006, we together with our precinct supervisor, SPO4
Pedro Belen Jr., and SWAT members composed of SPO1 Marlon Decano, PO3 Manuel Garcia, PO2 Adriano Cepiroto and
PO1 Aldrin Guarin apprehended the following names of persons of ARNOLD MARTNEZ Y ANGELES, 37 yrs old, married,
jobless, a resident of Lucao Dist., this city; EDGAR DZON Y FERRER, 36 yrs old, single, tricycle driver, a resident of 471
Lucao Dist., this city. REZN MARTNEZ Y CAROLNO, 44 yrs old, married, jitney driver, a resident of Lucao Disttrict this
city; ROLAND DORA Y DAZ, 39 yrs old, married, businessman, resident of Cabeldatan, Malasiqui, Pangasinan and
RAFAEL GONZALES Y CUNANAN, 49 yrs old, separated, jobless and a resident of Trinidad Subd., Arellano-Bani this city.
Suspects were duly informed of their constitutional rights and were brought to Dagupan City Police Station, Perez Market
Site Dagupan City and indorsed to Duty Desk Officer to record the incident andthe sachet of suspected Shabu
ParaphernaIias were brought to PNP Crime Laboratory, Lingayen, Pangasinan for Laboratory Examination.
Seizing Officer:
(sgd.)
PO1 Bernard B Azardon
Affiant
(sgd.)
PO1 Alejandro Dela Cruz
Affiant
Remarks:
Refused to Signed
Refused to Signed
Refused to Signed
Refused to Signed
Refused to Signed
34
[Emphases supplied]
The 115 open transparent plastic sachets, 11 pieces of rolled used aluminum foil, and 27 (of the 49) pieces of used
aluminum foil, all containing shabu residue, as identified in the Final Chemistry Report, were presented in court and marked
as Exhibits "H" and series, "" and series, and "J" and series, respectively. Said items were identified by PO1 Azardon and
P/nsp. Maranion at the witness stand.
35
The CA ruled that the integrity and evidentiary value of the subject items were properly preserved as there was sufficient
evidence to prove that the items seized from the accused were the same ones forwarded to the crime laboratory for
examination, as shown in the Confiscation Receipt and the letter-request for laboratory examination.
A review of the chain of custody indicates, however, that the CA is mistaken.
First, the apprehending team failed to comply with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. After seizure and confiscation of the subject
items, no physical inventory was conducted in the presence of the accused, or their representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the DOJ, and any elected public official. Thus, no inventory was prepared, signed, and
provided to the accused in the manner required by law. PO1 Azardon, in his testimony,
36
admitted that no photographs were
taken. The only discernable reason proffered by him for the failure to comply with the prescribed procedure was that the
situation happened so suddenly. Thus:
Q: But upon receiving such report from that jeepney driver you immediately formed a group and went to the place of
Rafael Gonzales?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Such that you did not even inform the PDEA before you barged in that place of Rafael Gonzales?
A: It was so suddenIy, [sic] sir.
Q: And that explains the reason why you were not able to have pictures taken, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
37
[Emphasis supplied]
The Court does not find such to be a justifiable ground to excuse non-compliance. The suddenness of the situation cannot
justify non-compliance with the requirements. The police officers were not prevented from preparing an inventory and taking
photographs. n fact, Section 21(a) of the RR of R.A. No. 9165 provides specifically that in case of warrantless seizures, t he
inventory and photographs shall be done at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending
officer/team. Whatever effect the suddenness of the situation may have had should have dissipated by the time they
reached the police station, as the suspects had already been arrested and the items seized. Moreover, it has been held that
in case of warrantless seizures nothing prevents the apprehending officer from immediately conducting the physical
inventory and photography of the items at their place of seizure, as it is more in keeping with the law's intent to preserve
their integrity and evidentiary value.
38
This Court has repeatedly reversed conviction in drug cases for failure to comply with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, resulting
in the failure to properly preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items. Some cases arePeople v.
Garcia,
39
People v. Dela Cruz,
40
People v. Dela Cruz,
41
People v. Santos, Jr.,
42
People v. Nazareno,
43
People v.
Orteza,
44
Zarraga v. People,
45
and People v. Kimura.
46
Second, the subject items were not properly marked. The case of People v. Sanchez is instructive on the requirement of
marking, to wit:
What Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rule do not expressly specify is the matter of "marking" of the seized
items in warrantless seizures to ensure that the evidence seized upon apprehension is the same evidence subjected to
inventory and photography when these activities are undertaken at the police station rather than at the place of arrest.
Consistency with the "chain of custody" rule requires that the "marking" of the seized items - to truly ensure that they are the
same items that enter the chain and are eventually the ones offered in evidence - should be done (1) in the presence of
the apprehended vioIator (2) immediateIy upon confiscation. This step initiates the process of protecting innocent
persons from dubious and concocted searches, and of protecting as well the apprehending officers from harassment suits
based on planting of evidence under Section 29 and on allegations of robbery or theft.
For greater specificity, "marking" means the placing by the apprehending officer or the poseur-buyer of his/her initials and
signature on the item/s seized. x x x Thereafter, the seized items shall be placed in an envelope or an evidence bag unless
the type and quantity of the seized items require a different type of handling and/or container. The evidence bag or
container shall accordingly be signed by the handling officer and turned over to the next officer in the chain of
custody.
47
[Emphasis in the original]
Nowhere in the testimony of PO1 Azardon or in his Joint Affidavit with PO1 Dela Cruz does it appear that the subject items
were at all marked. t was only in the letter-request for laboratory examination that the subject items were indicated to have
been marked with "DC&A-1," "DC&A-2" and "DC&A-3." There is no showing, however, as to who made those markings and
when they were made. Moreover, those purported markings were never mentioned when the subject items were identified
by the prosecution witnesses when they took the stand.
The markings appear to pertain to a group of items, that is, empty plastic sachets, rolled and cut aluminium foil, and cut
aluminium foil, but do not specifically pertain to any individual item in each group. Furthermore, it was only in the Chemistry
Report
48
that the precise number of each type of item was indicated and enumerated. The Court notes that in all documents
prior to said report, the subject items were never accurately quantified but only described as "pieces,"
49
"several pcs,"
50
and
"shabu paraphernallas."
51
Strangely, the Chemistry Report indicates that all the subject items had "no markings," although
each item was reported to have been marked by P/nsp. Maranion in the course of processing the subject items during
laboratory examination and testing.
52
Doubt, therefore, arises as to the identity of the subject items. t cannot be determined
with moral certainty that the subject items seized from the accused were the same ones subjected to the laboratory
examination and presented in court.
This Court has acquitted the accused for the failure and irregularity in the marking of seized items in dangerous drugs
cases, such as Zarraga v. People,
53
People v. Kimura,
54
and People v. Laxa.
55
Third, the Confiscation Receipt relied upon by the prosecution and the courts below gives rise to more uncertainty. nstead
of being prepared on the day of the seizure of the items, it was prepared only three days after. More important, the receipt
did not even indicate exactly what items were confiscated and their quantity. These are basic information that a confiscation
receipt should provide. The only information contained in the Confiscation Receipt was the fact of arrest of the accused and
the general description of the subject items as "the sachet of suspected Shabu paraphernallas were brought to the PNP
Crime Laboratory." The receipt is made even more dubious by PO1 Azardon's admission in his testimony
56
that he did not
personally prepare the Confiscation Receipt and he did not know exactly who did so.
Fourth, according to the Certification
57
issued by the Dagupan Police Station, the subject items were indorsed by PO1 Dela
Cruz to Duty nvestigator SPO1 Urbano for proper disposition. These were later turned over by SPO3 Esteban to P/nsp.
Maranion. There is, however, no showing of how and when the subject items were transferred from SPO1 Urbano to SPO3
Esteban.
Fifth, P/nsp. Maranion appears to be the last person in the chain of custody. No witness testified on how the subject items
were kept after they were tested prior to their presentation in court. This Court has highlighted similar shortcomings
in People v. Cervantes,
58
People v. Garcia,
59
People v. Sanchez,
60
and Malillin v. People.
61
More irregularities further darken the cloud as to the guilt of the accused. Contrary to PO1 Azardon's testimony
62
that they
were tipped off by a concerned citizen while at the police station, the Letter
63
to the Executive Director of the DDB states
that the apprehending officers were tipped off "while conducting monitoring/surveillance." Said letter also indicates, as does
the Confiscation Receipt, that the arrest and seizure occurred on September 4, 2006, and not September 2, 2006, as
alleged in the nformation. t was also mentioned in the aforementioned Certification of the Dagupan Police and Joint
Affidavit of the police officers that a glass tube suspected to contain shabu residue was also confiscated from the accused.
nterestingly, no glass tube was submitted for laboratory examination.
n sum, numerous lapses and irregularities in the chain of custody belie the prosecution's position that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the subject items were properly preserved. The two documents specifically relied on by the CA, the
Confiscation Receipt and the letter-request for laboratory examination, have been shown to be grossly insufficient in proving
the identity of the corpus delicti. The corpus delicti in dangerous drugs cases constitutes the drug itself. This means that
proof beyond reasonable doubt of the identity of the prohibited drug is essential before the accused can be found guilty.
64
Regarding the lack of prior coordination with the PDEA provided in Section 86 of R.A. No. 9165, in People v. Sta.
Maria,
65
this Court held that said section was silent as to the consequences of such failure, and said silence could not be
interpreted as a legislative intent to make an arrest without the participation of PDEA illegal, nor evidence obtained pursuant
to such an arrest inadmissible. Section 86 is explicit only in saying that the PDEA shall be the "lead agency" in the
investigation and prosecution of drug-related cases. Therefore, other law enforcement bodies still possess authority to
perform similar functions as the PDEA as long as illegal drugs cases will eventually be transferred to the latter.
Let it be stressed that non-compliance with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 does not affect the admissibility of the evidence but
only its weight.
66
Thus, had the subject items in this case been admissible, their evidentiary merit and probative value would
be insufficient to warrant conviction.
t may be true that where no ill motive can be attributed to the police officers, the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty should prevail. However, such presumption obtains only when there is no deviation from the
regular performance of duty.
67
Where the official act in question is irregular on its face, the presumption of regularity cannot
stand.
n this case, the official acts of the law enforcers were clearly shown and proven to be irregular. When challenged by the
evidence of a flawed chain of custody, the presumption of regularity cannot prevail over the presumption of innocence of the
accused.
68
This Court once again takes note of the growing number of acquittals for dangerous drugs cases due to the failure of law
enforcers to observe the proper arrest, search and seizure procedure under the law.
69
Some bona fidearrests and seizures
in dangerous drugs cases result in the acquittal of the accused because drug enforcement operatives compromise the
integrity and evidentiary worth of the seized items. t behooves this Court to remind law enforcement agencies to exert
greater effort to apply the rules and procedures governing the custody, control, and handling of seized drugs.
t is recognized that strict compliance with the legal prescriptions of R.A. No. 9165 may not always be possible. Thus, as
earlier stated, non-compliance therewith is not necessarily fatal. However, the lapses in procedure must be recognized,
addressed and explained in terms of their justifiable grounds, and the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized
must be shown to have been preserved.
70
On a final note, this Court takes the opportunity to be instructive on Sec. 11
71
(Possession of Dangerous Drugs) and Sec.
15
72
(Use of Dangerous Drugs) of R.A. No. 9165, with regard to the charges that are filed by law enforcers. This Court notes
the practice of law enforcers of filing charges under Sec. 11 in cases where the presence of dangerous drugs as basis for
possession is only and solely in the form of residue, being subsumed under the last paragraph of Sec. 11. Although not
incorrect, it would be more in keeping with the intent of the law to file charges under Sec. 15 instead in order to rehabilitate
first time offenders of drug use, provided that there is a positive confirmatory test result as required under Sec. 15. The
minimum penalty under the last paragraph of Sec. 11 for the possession of residue is imprisonment of twelve years and one
day, while the penalty under Sec. 15 for first time offenders of drug use is a minimum of six months rehabilitation in a
government center. To file charges under Sec. 11 on the basis of residue alone would frustrate the objective of the law to
rehabilitate drug users and provide them with an opportunity to recover for a second chance at life.
n the case at bench, the presence of dangerous drugs was only in the form of residue on the drug paraphernalia, and the
accused were found positive for use of dangerous drugs. Granting that the arrest was legal, the evidence obtained
admissible, and the chain of custody intact, the law enforcers should have filed charges under Sec. 15, R.A. No. 9165 or for
use of dangerous drugs and, if there was no residue at all, they should have been charged under Sec. 14
73
(Possession of
Equipment, nstrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs During Parties, Social Gatherings or
Meetings). Sec. 14 provides that the maximum penalty under Sec. 12
74
(Possession of Possession of Equipment,
nstrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs) shall be imposed on any person who shall possess
any equipment, instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs. Under Sec. 12, the maximum penalty
is imprisonment of four years and a fine of P50,000.00. n fact, under the same section, the possession of such equipment,
apparatus or other paraphernalia is prima facie evidence that the possessor has used a dangerous drug and shall be
presumed to have violated Sec. 15.1avvphi1
n order to effectively fulfill the intent of the law to rehabilitate drug users, this Court thus calls on law enforcers and
prosecutors in dangerous drugs cases to exercise proper discretion in filing charges when the presence of dangerous drugs
is only and solely in the form of residue and the confirmatory test required under Sec. 15 is positive for use of dangerous
drugs. n such cases, to afford the accused a chance to be rehabilitated, the filing of charges for or involving possession of
dangerous drugs should only be done when another separate quantity of dangerous drugs, other than mere residue, is
found in the possession of the accused as provided for in Sec. 15.
WHEREFORE, the August 7, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. HC-NO. 03269 is REVERSED and SET
ASDE and another judgment entered ACQUTTNG the accused and ordering their immediate release from detention,
unless they are confined for any other lawful cause.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City, for immediate
implementation. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to report to this Court within five days from receipt of
this decision the action he has taken. Copies shall also be furnished the Director-General, Philippine National Police, and
the Director-General, Philippine Drugs Enforcement Agency, for their information and guidance.
The Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Dagupan City, is directed to turn over the seized items to the Dangerous Drugs Board
for destruction in accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.
Objects of lawful commerce confiscated in the course of an enforcement of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002 (Republic Act No. 9165)that are the property of a third person are subject to be returned to the lawful ownerwho is not
liable for the unlawful act. But the trial court may not release such objects pending trial and before judgment.
Antecedents
On April 13, 2009, the State, through the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa City,charged RichardBrodett (Brodett)
and Jorge Joseph (Joseph) with a violation of Section 5, in relation to Section 26(b), of Republic Act No. 9165[1]in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in MuntinlupaCity,docketed as Criminal Case No. 09-208,the accusatory portion of the
information for which reads as follows:
That on or about the 19
th
day of September 2008, in the City of Muntinlupa, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping and aiding each
other, they not being authorized by law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sell, trade, deliver and give
away to another, sixty (60) pieces of blue-colored tablets with Motorala (M) logos, contained in six (6) self-sealing
transparent plastic sachets with recorded total net weight of 9.8388 grams, which when subjected to laboratory examination
yielded positive results for presence of METHAMPHETAMNE, a dangerous drug.[2]
Also on April 16, 2009, the State, also through the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa City, filed another information
charging only Brodett with a violation of Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165, docketed as Criminal Case No. 09-209, with the
information alleging:
That on or about the 19th day of September 2008, in the City of Muntinlupa, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being authorized by law, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously have in his possession, custody and control the following:
a. Four (4) yellow tablets with Playboy logos and ten (10) transparent capsules containing white powdery substance
contained in one self-sealing transparent plastic sachet having a net weight of 4.9007 grams, which when subjected to
laboratory examination yielded positive results for presence of METHYLENE DOXYMETHAMPHETAMNE (MDMA),
commonly known as "Ecstasy", a dangerous drug;
b. Five (5) self-sealing transparent plastic sachets containing white powdery substance with total recorded net weight of
1.2235 grams, which when subjected to laboratory examination yielded positive results for presence of COCCANE, a
dangerous drug;
c. Five (5) self-sealing transparent plastic sachets containing white powdery substance, placed in a light-yellow folded
paper, with total recorded net weight of 2.7355 grams, which when subjected to laboratory examination yielded positive
results for presence of COCCANE, a dangerous drug;
d. Three (3) self-sealing transparent plastic sachets containing dried leaves with total recorded net weight of 54.5331 grams,
which when subjected to laboratory examination yielded positive results for presence of TETRAHYDROCANNABNOL, a
dangerous drug.[3]
n the course of the proceedings in the RTC, on July 30, 2009, Brodett filed a MotionToReturn Non-Drug Evidence. He
averred that during his arrest, Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) had seized several personal non-drug effects
from him,including a 2004 Honda Accord car with license plate no. XPF-551;and that PDEArefused to return his personal
effects despite repeated demands for their return. He prayed that his personal effects be tendered to the trial court to be
returned to himupon verification.[4]
On August 27, 2009, the Office of the City Prosecutor submitted its Comment and Objection,[5]proposingthereby that the
delivery to the RTC of the listedpersonal effects for safekeeping, to be held there throughout the duration of the trial, would
be to enable the Prosecution and the Defense to exhaust their possible evidentiary value. The Office of the City Prosecutor
objected to the return of the car because it appeared to be the instrument in the commission of the violation of Section 5 of
R.A. No. 9165 due to its being the vehicle used in the transaction of the sale of dangerous drugs.
On November 4, 2009, the RTC directedthe release of the car, viz:
WHEREFORE, the Director of PDEA or any of its authorized officer or custodian is hereby directed to: (1) photograph the
abovementioned Honda Accord, before returning the same to its rightful owner Myra S. Brodett and the return should be
fully documented, and (2) bring the personal properties as listed in this Order of both accused, Richard S. Brodett and Jorge
J. Joseph to this court for safekeeping, to be held as needed.
SO ORDERED.[6]
PDEA moved to reconsider the order of the RTC, but its motion was denied on February 17, 2010 for lack of merit, to wit:
WHEREFORE,premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENED for lack of merit. The Order of the
Court dated November 4, 2009 is upheld.
SO ORDERED.[7]
Thence, PDEA assailed the order of the RTC in the Court of Appeals (CA) by petition for certiorari, claiming that the orders
of the RTC were issued in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
On March 31, 2011, the CA promulgated its Decision,[8]dismissing the petition for certiorari thusly:
xxxx
Here it is beyond dispute that the Honda Accord subject of this petition is owned by and registered in the name of Myra S.
Brodett, not accused Richard Brodett. Also, it does not appear from the records of the case that said Myra S. Brodett has
been charged of any crime, more particularly, in the subject cases of possession and sale of dangerous drugs. Applying
Section 20 of the law to the dispute at bar, We therefore see no cogent reason why the subject Honda Accord may not be
exempted from confiscation and forfeiture.
xxxx
We thus cannot sustain petitioner's submission that the subject car, being an instrument of the offense, may not be released
to Ms. Brodett and should remain in custodia legis. The letters of the law are plain and unambiguous. Being so, there is no
room for a contrary construction, especially so that the only purpose of judicial construction is to remove doubt and
uncertainty, matters that are not obtaining here. More so that the required literal interpretation is consistent with the
Constitutional guarantee that a person may not be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENED and consequently DSMSSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[9]
Hence, PDEA appeals.
ssues
Essentially,PDEA asserts that the decision of the CAwas not in accord with applicable laws and the primordial intent of the
framers of R. A. No. 9165.[10]t contends that the CA gravely erred in its ruling; that the Honda Accord car, registered under
the name of Myra S. Brodett (Ms.Brodett), had been seized from accused Brodettduring a legitimate anti-illegal operation
and should not be released from the custody of the law;that the Motion to Return Non-Drug Evidencedid not intimate or
allege that the car had belonged to a third person; and that even if the car had belonged to Ms. Brodett, a third person, her
ownership did not ipso facto authorize its release, because she was under the obligation to prove to the RTC that she had
no knowledge of the commission of the crime.
n hisComment,[11]Brodettcounters that the petitioner failed to present any question of law that warranted a review by the
Court;that Section 20 of R. A. No. 9165 clearly and unequivocally states that confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or
instruments of the supposed unlawful act in favor of the Government may be done by PDEA, unless such proceeds or
instruments are the property of a third person not liable for the unlawful act; that PDEA is gravely mistaken in its reading that
the third person must still prove in the trial court that he has no knowledge of the commission of the crime; and that PDEA
failed to exhaust all remedies before filing the petition for review.
The decisive issue is whether or not the CA erred in affirming the orderfor the release of the car to Ms.Brodett.
Ruling
The petition is meritorious.

Applicable laws and jurisprudence on releasing

property confiscated in criminal proceedings
t is not open to question thatin a criminal proceeding, the court having jurisdiction over the offense has the power to order
upon conviction of an accusedthe seizure of (a) the instruments to commit the crime, including documents, papers, and
other effects that are the necessary means to commit the crime; and (b) contraband, the ownership or possession of which
is not permitted for being illegal. As justification for the first, the accused must not profit from his crime, or must not acquire
property or the right to possession of property through his unlawful act.[12]As justification for thesecond, to return to the
convict from whom thecontraband was taken, in one way or another,is not prudent or proper, because doing so will give rise
to a violation of the law for possessing the contraband again.[13]ndeed, the court having jurisdiction over the offense has
theright to dispose of property used in the commission of the crime, such disposition being an accessory penalt y to be
imposed on the accused, unless the property belongs to a third person not liable for the offense that it was used as the
instrument to commit.[14]
n case of forfeiture of property for crime, title and ownership of the convict are absolutely divested and shall pass to the
Government.[15] But it is required that the property to be forfeited must be before the court in such manner that it can be
said to be within its jurisdiction.[16]
According to the Rules of Court, personal property may be seized in connection with a criminal offense either by authority of
a search warrant or as the product of a search incidental to a lawful arrest. f the search is by virtue of a search warrant, the
personal property that may be seized may be that which is the subject of the offense; or that which has been stolen or
embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; orthat which has been used or intended to be used as the means of
committing an offense.[17] f the search is an incident of a lawful arrest, seizure may be made of dangerous weapons or
anything that may have been used or may constitute proof in the commission of an offense.[18] Should there be no ensuing
criminal prosecution in which the personal property seized is used as evidence, its return to the person from whom it was
taken, or to the person who is entitled to its possession is but a matter of course,[19]except if it is contraband or illegal per
se. A proper court may order the return of property held solely as evidence should the Government be unreasonably
delayed in bringing a criminal prosecution.[20]The order for the disposition of such property can be made only when the
case is finally terminated.[21]
Generally, the trial court is vested with considerable legal discretion in the matter of disposing of property claimed as
evidence,[22] and this discretion extends even to the manner of proceeding in the event the accused claims the property
was wrongfully taken from him.[23]n particular, the trial court has the power to return property held as evidence to its
rightful owners, whether the property was legally or illegally seized by the Government.[24] Property used as evidence must
be returned once the criminal proceedings to which it relates have terminated, unless it is then subject to forfeiture or other
proceedings.[25]

Order of release was premature and made

in contravention of Section 20, R.A. No. 9165
t is undisputed that the ownership of the confiscated car belonged to Ms. Brodett, who was not charged either in connection
with the illegal possession and sale of illegal drugs involving Brodett and Joseph that were the subject of the criminal
proceedings in the RTC, or even in any other criminal proceedings.
n its decision under review, the CA held as follows:
A careful reading of the above provision shows that confiscation and forfeiture in drug-related cases pertains to "all the
proceeds and properties derived from the unlawful act, including but not limited to, money and other assets obtained
thereby, and the instruments or tools with which the particular unlawful act was committed unless they are the property of a
third person not liable for the unlawful act." Simply put, the law exempts from the effects of confiscation and forfeiture any
property that is owned by a third person who is not liable for the unlawful act.
Here, it is beyond dispute that the Honda Accord subject of this petition is owned by and registered in the name of Myra S.
Brodett, not accused Richard Brodett. Also, it does not appear from the records of the case that said Myra S. Brodett has
been charged of any crime, more particularly, in the subject cases of possession and sale of dangerous drugs. Applying
Section 20 of the law to the dispute at bar, We therefore see no cogent reason why the subject Honda Accord may not be
exempted from confiscation and forfeiture.
Basic is the rule in statutory construction that when the law is clear and unambiguous, the court has no alternative but to
apply the same according to its clear language. The Supreme Court had steadfastly adhered to the doctrine that the first
and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law according to its express terms, interpretation being called only when such
literal application is impossible. No process of interpretation or construction need be resorted to where a provision of law
peremptorily calls for application.
We thus cannot sustain petitioner's submission that the subject car, being an instrument of the offense, may not be released
to Ms. Brodett and should remain in custodia legis. The letters of the law are plain and unambiguous. Being so, there is no
room for a contrary construction, especially so that the only purpose of judicial construction is to remove doubt and
uncertainty, matters that are not obtaining here. More so that the required literal interpretation is not consistent with the
Constitutional guarantee that a person may not be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law.[26](emphases are in the original text)
The legal provision applicable to the confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of the unlawful act, including
the properties or proceeds derived from illegal trafficking of dangerous drugs and precursors and essential chemicals,is
Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165, which pertinently providesas follows:
Section 20.Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or nstruments of the Unlawful Act, ncluding the Properties or
Proceeds Derived from the llegal Trafficking of Dangerous Drugs and/or Precursors and Essential Chemicals. Every
penalty imposed for the unlawful importation, sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution, transportation
or manufacture of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical, the cultivation or culture of plants
which are sources of dangerous drugs, and the possession of any equipment, instrument, apparatus and other
paraphernalia for dangerous drugs including other laboratory equipment, shall carry with it the confiscation and forfeiture, in
favor of the government, of all the proceeds derived from unlawful act, including, but not limited to, money and other assets
obtained thereby, and the instruments or tools with which the particular unlawful act was committed, unless they are the
property of a third person not liable for the unlawful act, but those which are not of lawful commerce shall be ordered
destroyed without delay pursuant to the provisions of Section 21 of this Act.
After conviction in the Regional Trial Court in the appropriate criminal case filed, the Court shall immediately schedule a
hearing for the confiscation and forfeiture of all the proceeds of the offense and all the assets and properties of the accused
either owned or held by him or in the name of some other persons if the same shall be found to be manifestly out of
proportion to his/her lawful income: Provided, however, That if the forfeited property is a vehicle, the same shall be
auctioned off not later than five (5) days upon order of confiscation or forfeiture.
During the pendency of the case in the Regional Trial Court, no property, or income derived therefrom, which may be
confiscated and forfeited, shall be disposed, alienated or transferred and the same shall be in custodialegis and no bond
shall be admitted for the release of the same.
The proceeds of any sale or disposition of any property confiscated or forfeited under this Section shall be used to pay all
proper expenses incurred in the proceedings for the confiscation, forfeiture, custody and maintenance of the property
pending disposition, as well as expenses for publication and court costs. The proceeds in excess of the above expenses
shall accrue to the Board to be used in its campaign against illegal drugs.[27]
There is no question, for even PDEA has itself pointed out, that the text of Section 20 of R. A. No. 9165relevant to the
confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of the unlawful act is similar to that ofArticle 45 of the Revised
Penal Code, which states:
Article 45.Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or nstruments of theCrime. Every penalty imposed for the
commission of a felony shall carry with it the forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime and the instruments or tools with which it
was committed.
Such proceeds and instruments or tools shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the Government, unless they be the
property of a third person not liable for the offense, but those articles which are not subject of lawful commerce shall be
destroyed.
The Court has interpreted and applied Article 45of the Revised Penal Codein People v. Jose,[28]concerning the confiscation
and forfeiture of the car used by the four accused when they committed theforcible abduction with rape, although the car did
not belong to any of them, holding:
xxx Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code bars the confiscation and forfeiture of an instrument or tool used in the
commission of the crime if such "be the property of a third person not liable for the offense," it is the sense of this Court that
the order of the court below for the confiscation of the car in question should be set aside and that the said car should be
ordered delivered to the intervenor for foreclosure as decreed in the judgment of the Court of First nstance of Manila in
replevin case. xxx[29]
Such interpretation is extended by analogy to Section 20, supra. To bar the forfeiture of the tools and instruments belonging
to a third person,therefore, there must be an indictment charging such third person either as a principal, accessory, or
accomplice. Less than that will not suffice to prevent the return of the tools and instruments to the third person, for a mere
suspicion of that person's participation is not sufficient ground for the court to order the forfeiture of the goods seized.[30]
However, the Office of the City Prosecutorproposed throughits Comment and Objection submitted on August 27, 2009 in the
RTC[31]that the delivery to the RTC of the listed personal effects for safekeeping, to be held there throughout the duration
of the trial, would be to enable the Prosecution and the Defenseto exhaust their possible evidentiary value. The Office of the
City Prosecutor further objected to the return of the car because it appeared to bethe vehicle used in the transaction of the
sale of dangerous drugs, and, as such, was the instrument in the commission of the violation of Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165.
On its part, PDEA regards the decision of the CA to be not in accord with applicable laws and the primordial intent of the
framers of R. A. No. 9165,[32]and contends that the car should not be released from the custody of the law because it had
been seized from accused Brodett during a legitimate anti-illegal operation. t argues that the Motion to Return Non-Drug
Evidencedid not intimate or allege that the car had belonged to a third person; and that even if the car had belonged to Ms.
Brodett, a third person, her ownership did not ipso facto authorize its release, because she was under the obligation to
prove to the RTC that she had no knowledge of the commission of the crime. t insists that the car is a property in
custodialegis and may not be released during the pendency of the trial.
We agree with PDEA and the Office of the City Prosecutor.
We note that the RTC granted accusedBrodett'sMotion To Return Non-Drug Evidence on November 4, 2009 when the
criminal proceedings were still going on, and the trial was yet to be completed. Ordering the release of the car at that pointof
the proceedings was premature, considering that the third paragraph of Section 20, supra, expressly forbids the disposition,
alienation, or transfer of any property, or income derived therefrom, that has been confiscated from the accused charged
under R.A. No. 9165 during the pendency of the proceedings in the Regional Trial Court.Section 20 further expressly
requires that such property or income derived therefrom should remain in custodialegis in all that time and that no bond
shall be admitted for the release of it.
ndeed, forfeiture, if warrantedpursuant to either Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165,
would be a part of the penalty to be prescribed. The determination of whetheror not the car (or any other article confiscated
in relation to the unlawful act) would be subject of forfeiture could be made only when the judgment was to be rendered in
the proceedings. Section 20 is also clear as to this.
The status of the car (or any other article confiscated in relation to the unlawful act) for the duration of the trial in the RTCas
being in custodialegisisprimarily intended to preserve it as evidence and to ensure its availability as such. To release it
before the judgment is rendered is to deprive the trial court and the parties access to it as evidence. Consequently, that
photographs were ordered to be taken of the car was not enough, for mere photographs might not fill in fully the evidentiary
need of the Prosecution. As such, the RTC's assailed orders were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction for being in contravention with the express language of Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165.
Nonetheless, the Court need not annul the assailed orders of the RTC, or reverse the decision of the CA. t appears thaton
August 26, 2011 the RTC promulgated its decision on the merits in Criminal Case No. 09-208 and Criminal Case No. 09-
209, acquitting both Brodettand Joseph and further ordering the return to the accused of all non-drug evidence except the
buy-bust money and the genuine money,because:
The failure of the prosecution therefore to establish all the links in the chain of custody is fatal to the case at bar. The Court
cannot merely rely on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official function in view of the glaring blunder in the
handling of the corpus delicti of these cases. The presumption of regularity should bow down to the presumption of
innocence of the accused. Hence, the two (2) accused BRODETT and JOSEPH should be as it is hereby ACQUTTED of
the crimes herein charged for llegal Selling and llegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, for failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt, RCHARD BRODETT y SANTOS and JORGE JOSEPH y JORDANA are ACQUTTED of the crimes charged in
Criminal Case Nos. 09-208 and 09-209.
The subject drug evidence are all ordered transmitted to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for proper
disposition. All the non-drug evidence except the buy bust money and the genuine money are ordered returned to the
accused.
The genuine money used in the buy bust operation as well as the genuine money confiscated from both accused are
ordered escheated in favor of the government and accordingly transmitted to the National Treasury for proper disposition.
(emphasis supplied)[33]
The directive to return the non-drug evidence hasovertaken the petition for review as to render further action upon it
superfluous. Yet, the Court seizes the opportunity to perform its duty to formulate guidelines on the matter of confiscation
and forfeiture of non-drug articles, including those belonging to third persons not liable for the offense, in order to clarify the
extent of the power of the trial court under Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165.[34]This the Court must now do in view of the
question about the confiscation and forfeiture of non-drug objects being susceptible of repetition in the future.[35]
We rule that henceforth the Regional Trial Courts shall comply strictly with the provisions of Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165,
and should not release articles, whether drugs or non-drugs, for the duration of the trial and before the rendition of the
judgment, even if owned by a third person who is not liable for the unlawful act.
N VEW OF THE FOREGONG, the petition for review isDENED.
The Office of the Court Administrator is directed to disseminate this decision to all trial courts for their guidance.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 181861 October 17, 2011
RAUL DAVID, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
D E C S O N
PERALTA, J.:
For this Court's consideration is the Petition for Review on Certiorari
1
under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
dated April 11, 2008 of petitioner Raul David, assailing the Decision
2
dated August 31, 2007 and Resolution
3
dated
February 20, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 29746, affirming the Decision
4
dated April 27, 2005 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Capas, Tarlac in Criminal Cases No. 1811-1812, finding petitioner Raul David, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 11, Article of Republic Act (R.A.) 9165.
As shown in the records, the following are the antecedent facts:
After receiving an information from a certain Victor Garcia that a person was selling illegal drugs at L. Cortez St., Brgy. San
Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac, the ntelligence Operatives of the Concepcion Police Station, Concepcion, Tarlac, conducted a
surveillance on the place from May 25, 2003 until June 23, 2003 when they applied for a search warrant which was granted
on the same day. Before implementing the search warrant, the police officers conducted another surveillance from June 23
to June 24, 2003 during which, it was observed that several students were going inside the petitioner's house. t was also
during that time that the poseur-buyer was able to buy shabu(methamphetamine hydrochloride) from the petitioner.
On June 29, 2003, around 1:00 p.m., the search team composed of PO3 Mario Flores, PO2 Henry Balabat, SPO1 Rustico
Basco and PO1 Roger Paras, implemented the search warrant with the presence of Barangay Captain Antonio Canono.
The search team, before conducting the search, sought permission from the petitioner. The two-storey house had two
rooms
brother, Rael David, who was not present during the search, and the room upstairs was occupied by the former.
PO3 Flores found six (6) sachets of marijuana and three (3) plastic sachets of substance suspected to be shabu on top of a
padlocked cabinet underneath the stairs. During that time, appellant was around two (2) meters away in the sala.
Thereafter, the police operatives took pictures of the items searched and the barangay captain signed a certificate of good
search. The confiscated items were then turned over to nvestigator Simplicio Cunanan of the Concepcion Police Station for
investigation.
t was revealed in Chemistry Report No. D-143-2003
5
of Police nspector Jessica R. Quilang that the specimens in the three
(3) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets with "RB-A," "RB-B," and "RB-C" markings were positive for 0.327 gram
of shabu, a dangerous drug, while the specimen in the six (6) heat-sealed plastic sachets with markings "RB-1" up to "RB-6"
were positive for 3.865 grams of marijuana.
Thus, appellant was charged in the following nformations:
Criminal Case No. 1811
That on or about 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 29 June 2003, at Brgy. San Jose, [M]unicipality of Concepcion, [P]rovince
of Tarlac, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
criminally possessed Six (6) plastic heat-sealed sachets containing dried marijuana leaves weighing more or less 3.865
gram[s] without being authorized by law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
6
Criminal Case No. 1812
That on or about 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 29 June 2003, at Brgy. San Jose, [M]unicipality of Concepcion, [P]rovince
of Tarlac, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
criminally possessed three (3) plastic heat-sealed sachets containing [METHAMPHETAMNE] HYDROCHLORDE, better
known as Shabu, weighing more or less 0.327 gram without being authorized by law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
7
Upon arraignment on August 4, 2003, petitioner, assisted by his counsel, pleaded "not guilty" on both charges.
8
The trial on
the merits ensued, where the facts earlier stated were testified to by the witnesses for the prosecution, namely: PO3 Mario
Flores, SPO1 Rustico Basco and Officer Jessica Quilang. On the other hand, the defense presented the testimonies of the
petitioner; his brother, Rael David, and his sister-in-law, Lilibeth David, the summary of which follows:
Police operatives arrived at the house of the petitioner in the afternoon of June 29, 2003. PO3 Flores grabbed the petitioner
and pulled him through his clothes and announced their authority to search. This prompted the petitioner's sister-in-law,
Lilibeth David, to get out of the room in order to prevent the said policeman from grabbing the petitioner. To avoid any
implantation of evidence, petitioner took off his shirt. Lilibeth David summoned the barangay captain, afterwhich, policemen
Basco, Flores and Paras conducted the search which lasted for about thirty (30) minutes, while the other police officer
stayed outside with the barangay captain.
Police officers Basco and Paras searched the ground floor first and found nothing. Thereafter, police officer Flores allegedl y
saw marijuana on top of a cabinet inside the room downstairs. Upon the discovery, the item was photographed. Afterwards,
petitioner was asked about the whereabouts of the shabu. At the time of the search, petitioner's brother, Rael David, was
not present. Consequently, petitioner was taken to the police station for custodial investigation and during the interrogation,
he was not informed of his right to counsel.
The trial court found the petitioner guilty in its Decision dated April 27, 2005, the dispositive portion of which follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Possession of 3.865 grams of
Marijuana and 0.327 gram of [methamphetamine] hydrochloride (shabu), accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalties of Twelve (12) years & one day, as minimum, to Fourteen years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of
Three Hundred Thousand Pesos.
SO ORDERED.
9
On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction with modifications, the dispositive portion of its Decision dated August 31, 2007
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Capas, Tarlac, Branch 66 in Criminal Cases No. 1811-1812,
finding accused-appellant Raul David y Erese, GULTY beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 11, Article of R.A.
9165 is hereby AFFRMED with the following MODFCATONS:
1) n Criminal Case No. 1811 for illegal possession of marijuana, he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Twelve
(12) Years and One (1) day, as minimum, to Fourteen (14) Years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of THREE
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P300,000.00);
2) n Criminal Case No. 1812 for illegal possession of shabu, he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Twelve (12)
Years and One (1) day, as minimum, to Fourteen (14) Years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of THREE HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P300,000.00).
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
10
The CA, in its Resolution
11
dated February 20, 2008, denied appellant's Motion for Reconsideration,
12
hence, the present
petition where the appellant presented the following issues:
GROUND FOR THE ALLOWANCE OF THE PETTON
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED N AFFRMNG WTH MODFCATON THE PETTONER'S CONVCTON.
THE ASSALED DECSON S NOT N ACCORDANCE WTH LAW AND APPLCABLE JURSPRUDENCE, AND F NOT
CORRECTED, T WLL CAUSE GRAVE NJUSTCE AND [RREPARABLE] NJURY TO HEREN PETTONER.
SSUES PRESENTED FOR RESOLUTON

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED N GVNG CREDENCE TO THE TESTMONES OF THE
PROSECUTON WTNESSES.

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED N CONVCTNG THE PETTONER DESPTE THE FALURE OF THE
PROSECUTON TO PROVE THAT THE DANGEROUS DRUGS SUBMTTED FOR LABORATORY EXAMNATON AND
PRESENTED AS EVDENCE BEFORE THE TRAL COURT WERE THE SAME ONES ALLEGEDLY SEZED.

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED N MODFYNG THE DECSON OF THE TRAL COURT WHCH FOUND
THE PETTONER GULTY OF A SNGLE CHARGE OF VOLATON OF SECTON 11, ARTCLE OF REPUBLC ACT
NO. 9165.
The petition lacks merit.
The arguments presented in the petition are purely factual. This is contrary to what is allowed by law when filing a pet ition
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
13
Nevertheless, this Court, upon review of the records of this case, finds that the trial
court and the CA's findings of facts should be accorded respect.
For a prosecution for illegal possession of a dangerous drug to prosper, it must be shown that (a) the accused was in
possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug; (b) such possession is not authorized by
law; and (c) the accused was freely and consciously aware of being in possession of the drug.
14
Based on the evidence presented by the prosecution, it was proven that all the elements for illegal possession of dangerous
drugs are present in this case. PO3 Mario Flores, during the search in the house of petitioner, found six (6) sachets
of marijuana and three (3) sachets of shabu, both classified as dangerous drugs under the pertinent law, on top of a
padlocked cabinet underneath the stairs. Thus, PO3 Flores testified:
Q: According to you, you were able to discover or find six (6) teabags of marijuana, where did you see these teabags?
A: On top of their aparador, sir.
Q: And where is that aparador situated?
A: Underneath the stairs, sir.
Q: And according to you also, you found three (3) plastic bags of shabu, where did you discover these three (3) plastic
sachets?
A: Also on top of the aparador, sir.
Q: The same aparador where you discovered the six (6) teabags of marijuana?
A: Yes, sir.
15
The above testimony was corroborated by SPO1 Rustico Basco, who said:
Q: Upon entering the house, what did you do there?
A: Because we were already allowed by Lilibeth David to conduct the search, we started doing so, sir.
Q: By the way, who among your companions, or who among you in the group, actually entered the house?
A: Myself, PO3 Mario Flores and PO1 Roger Paras, sir.
COURT:
Q: At the time, where was the Barangay Captain?
A: He was then inside the house, you Honor, but he did not conduct the search.
Q: Who personally, what part of the house did he search?
A: went upstairs, sir.
Q: How about your companions Flores and Paras?
A: PO3 Flores conducted the search downstairs, while PO1 Paras was with me, sir.
COURT:
Q: At the time when you were upstairs, where was Raul David?
WTNESS:
A: He was downstairs, your Honor, seated on the sofa beside Lilibeth.
Q: How about the wife of Raul David?
A: The wife was near the stairs, your Honor.
Q: When you entered the elevated room, who were your companions?
A: PO1 Roger Paras and Lilibeth David were the ones who went with me when conducted the search upstairs since the
room is only small.
FSCAL Llobrera:
Q: What happened to your search?
A: PO3 Mario Flores was able to find six sachet(s) of marijuana, three sachet(s) of shabu.
Q: tems were discovered by whom?
A: By Officer Flores and PO1 Paras, sir.
16
However, petitioner questions the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution. He argues that the testimony of PO3
Flores that he found six (6) teabags of marijuana and three (3) sachets of shabu remains uncorroborated as SPO1 Basco
testified that he did not see PO3 Flores when the latter discovered the said dangerous drugs. Even so, this does not
diminish the fact that dangerous drugs were found during the search of the house. The Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), in its Comment
17
dated October 16, 2008, was correct in pointing out that during the operation, it is not incredible
that only one of the operatives found the dangerous drugs because they were scattered throughout the house. The OSG
stated:
x x x The fact that PO3 Flores was the only one who discovered the illegal substances is not incredible. t must be
considered that during the operation, the police operatives scattered themselves throughout the house in order to conduct
the search. SPO1 Basco searched the upper room, while PO3 Flores searched the lower portion of the house. Noteworthy,
the testimonies of SPO1 Basco and PO3 Flores jibed on material points, particularly on the illegal objects seized. SPO1
Basco corroborated PO3 Flores' testimony that he found six (6) sachets of marijuana and three sachets of shabu during the
search. x x x
18
Petitioner also claims that the prior surveillance before the issuance of a search warrant was not clearly established by the
testimonies of the witnesses. He insists that SPO1 Basco testified that a surveillance was conducted by PO3 Flores and
PO1 Joel Canlas from May 25, 2003 to June 24, 2003, but PO3 Flores denied having participated in the surveillance and
pointed to PO1 Canlas as the one who conducted the surveillance. According to petitioner, such inconsistency in the
testimony is damaging. This Court finds no significance in the said inconsistency as it is merely minor. What is important is
that they were able to establish through their testimonies that a surveillance indeed took place before and even after the
issuance of the search warrant. PO3 Flores testified during clarifications from the court that:
COURT:
Some questions from the court.
Q: Prior to the application of search warrant, was there any surveillance conducted by your office?
A: Yes, your Honor.
Q: Who conducted that surveillance?
A: PO1 Canlas, your Honor.
Q: Why did you still conduct surveillance after issuing the search warrant?
A: To collate concrete evidence against the suspects, sir.
COURT:
Q: Why? Are you not sure when you applied for search warrant that Raul and Rael were not in possession of the dangerous
drugs?
A: We were certain, your Honor; however, we were afraid that the shabu and the marijuana in their possession had already
been consumed that is why we waited for some more time, your Honor.
19
Although the same witness above confirmed that he was not involved in the surveillance conducted prior to the issuance of
the search warrant, he testified that he was involved in the surveillance after the issuance of the same search warrant, thus:
FSCAL LLOBRERA
Q: Officer, upon obtaining that search warrant, what did you do, if any?
A: We informed our Chief of Police that our application for the issuance of a search warrant was already approved, sir.
Q: After making that report, what else happened?
A: We ordered that a surveillance be conducted, sir.
Q: Do you know if that surveillance [was] actually conducted?
A: Not yet, sir.
Q: What actually finally was there any surveillance made?
A: Yes, sir, we were the ones who conducted the surveillance, sir.
20
x x x x
ATTY. GARCA
Q: How many times did you conduct surveillance?
A: Two (2) times, sir.
Q: Can you tell us the specific date?
A: June 23 and 24, sir.
Q: And in your surveillance on June 23 and 24, you were able to see young students going to the house of the accused in
buying dangerous drugs?
A: t was on June 24 when saw students going there, sir.
Q: At that time, you did not have (sic) in possession of the search warrant?
A: We were already equipped or armed with the search warrant, sir.
21
t is a settled rule that in cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is given to prosecution witnesses
who are police officers for they are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence
to the contrary.
22
t must be emphasized that their testimonies in open court are considered in line with the presumption that
law enforcement officers have performed their duties in a regular manner.
23
n the absence of proof of motive to impute
falsely a crime as serious as violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty, as well as the findings of the trial court on the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, shall
prevail over petitioner's self-serving and uncorroborated denial.
24
Moreover, the factual findings of the trial court, when
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are conclusive and binding on this Court.
25
Petitioner further contends that the testimonies of the defense witnesses were not considered; otherwise, it would have
been proven that the dangerous drugs found on top of the aparador were planted. t must be remembered that the defenses
of denial and frame-up have been invariably viewed by this Court with disfavor for it can easily be concocted and is a
common and standard defense ploy in prosecutions for violation of Dangerous Drugs Act.
26
n this case, petitioner was not
able to present any concrete or strong evidence that would support his allegation that he was the victim of a frame-up aside
from his insinuation that had the trial court considered the testimonies of the witnesses he presented, the same court could
have inferred the presence of a set-up or the planting of evidence on the part of the police operatives. n order to prosper,
the defenses of denial and frame-up must be proved with strong and convincing evidence.
27
n claiming that the identity of the drugs subject of the charges was not proven beyond reasonable doubt, petitioner states
that there was no marking of the substances seized immediately after the search and there was no proof that the drugs
presented in court were the same drugs seized from his house. Yet a close reading of the records shows the opposite.
Section 21, paragraph 1, Article of R.A. 9165 provides:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of
Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, nstruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory
Equipment.
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof;
The above provision is implemented by Section 21 (a), Article of the mplementing Rules and Regulations (RR) of R.A.
No. 9165, thus:
(a) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof: Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void
and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.
The prosecution was able to prove the unbroken chain of custody of the items seized. As earlier discussed, the witnesses
for the prosecution were able to categorically testify that the dangerous drugs were found in the residence of the petitioner
during their search. As shown in Chemistry Report No. D-143-2003, which was identified and testified on by Police
nspector Jessica Ramos Quilang, the three (3) plastic sachets containing a substance was positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride and marked as "RB-A," "RB-B," and "RB-C" and the six (6) plastic sachets were positive for marijuana and
marked as "RB-1," "RB-2," "RB-3," "RB-4," "RB-5" and "RB-6."
28
Thereafter, as testified by PO3 Flores, the items were
photographed and the barangay captain signed a certificate of good search, thus:
FSCAL LLOBRERA:
Q: And then after discovering the shabu and marijuana, what else happened?
A: We took pictures of the shabu and marijuana sir inside their house and we showed said pictures to the barangay officials,
sir.
Q: And where was Raul David when you were taking pictures of the marijuana and shabu?
A: He was inside their house seated, sir.
Q: How far was he from you?
A: Two (2) meters, sir.
Q: Was there any object that obstructed his view between you and him?
A: None, sir.
Q: After taking pictures of the shabu and marijuana, what else happened?
A: We requested the barangay captain to affix his signature on the certificate of good search, sir.
COURT:
Q: During the time of the search, where was the barangay captain?
A: He was with us, your Honor.
Q: n the conduct of your search, did you have any civilian component?
A: None, your Honor, only the barangay captain.
FSCAL LLOBRERA:
Q: Please give us the name of the barangay captain.
A: Barangay Captain Canono, sir.
Q: When you discovered the six (6) teabags of marijuana as well as the three (3) plastic sachets of shabu, where was
[B]arangay [C]aptain Canono then?
A: He was inside the house, sir.
COURT:
Q: [And] the aparador was visible to the barangay captain during that time when you first see (sic) the marijuana and the
shabu?
A: The aparador was visible to the barangay captain, your Honor.
FSCAL LLOBRERA:
Q: Was the aparador padlocked or not?
A: The aparador was padlocked and it is (sic) on top of it where we found the items, sir.
Q: Right on top of the aparador?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: t was not placed in a drawer?
A: No, sir, on top itself of the aparador.
Q: And so what did you do with the shabu and the marijuana?
A: We confiscated the items, sir.
Q: After confiscating it, what did you do with it?
A: We showed the shabu and the marijuana to the Spouses David, sir.
Q: After showing them to the spouses, what else happened?
A: We brought the evidence to the police station, sir.
Q: How about Raul David, what did you do with him?
A: We also brought him to the police station, sir.
Q: What happened in the police station?
A: We indorsed Raul David and the evidence we confiscated to our investigator, sir.
29
Therefore, it is apparent from the above disquisition that the integrity and evidentiary value of the items seized were well-
preserved. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as
it would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
30
Anyway, this Court has consistently ruled
that non-compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 will not necessarily render the items seized or
confiscated in a buy-bust operation inadmissible.
31
Strict compliance with the letter of Section 21 is not required if there is a
clear showing that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items have been preserved, i.e., the items being
offered in court as exhibits are, without a specter of doubt, the very same ones recovered in the buy-bust
operation.
32
Hence, once the possibility of substitution has been negated by evidence of an unbroken and cohesive chain of
custody over the contraband, such contraband may be admitted and stand as proof of the corpus delicti notwithstanding the
fact that it was never made the subject of an inventory or was photographed pursuant to Section 21 (1) of Republic Act No.
9165.
33
Anent petitioner's contention that having been caught in possession of shabu and marijuana in one occasion, he should
have been charged with, and convicted of, one offense only, this Court finds it meritorious.
Before the enactment of R.A. 9165, the governing law on dangerous drugs was R.A. 6425, which differentiated regulated
drugs from prohibited drugs. t laid down different provisions for possession of regulated and prohibited drugs. Under R.A.
9165, the distinction between regulated and prohibited drugs has been removed and both are now classified as dangerous
drugs. The eradication of such distinction was the real intention of the legislators. As read from the transcript of
stenographic notes of the Twelfth Congress on the deliberation of R.A. 9165, then Senate Bill No. 1858:
Senator Leviste. And we are in support of the good sponsor's conviction to give teeth to this new law and to go all out
against drugs.
Under the old law R.A. No. 6425 a classification was provided between a prohibited drug and a regulated drug. believe
in the new proposed measure, there is no distinction between the two categories. And in lieu of the two categories, the new
measure merely provides for an all-embracing category of dangerous drugs.
May we know, Mr. President, the significance of eliminating the two categories in the old law because there might be
adverse implications if we do not classify "prohibited" from "regulated" drugs. There are instances, for example, when a
cancer patient know am not a doctor but Senator Flavier might be able to enlighten us here is allowed to use with
prescription from a licensed physician regulated drugs. Morphine, for example, for pain killers. How would this
declassification affect this case?
Senator Barbers. Well, her point is very valid, Mr. President. The reason as to why under R.A. No. 6425 there was a
distinction between "prohibited" and "regulated" drugs is that this is in consonance with the nternational Treaties on Drugs
under the UN Convention of 1961, 1971, and 1988. Now, when we speak of narcotics under this treaty, it would mean
"prohibited" drugs. When we speak of psychotropic under the same convention, it would mean "regulated" drugs. n this
particular proposal, we did not make any distinction anymore. Why? Because whether these are regulated, whether these
are prohibited, these are considered as dangerous drugs unless authorized by law. That a patient, for example, is in need of
some drugs, morphine, for example, then that would be another story.
34
x x x x
Senator De Castro. Mr. President, on page 3, line 3, the term used is "dangerous," while under our present law, Republic
Act No. 6425, as amended, the term used is "prohibited." May we know from the sponsor the distinction between the words
"prohibited" and "dangerous."
Senator Barbers. Yes, Mr. President. Under Republic Act No. 6425, there is a distinction between prohibited drugs and
regulated drugs. When we speak of prohibited drugs, it would mean that there is no prescription needed. While in the
regulated drugs, a prescription is needed in order to purchase that kind of drug from the drugstore.
Under the present bill, Mr. President, we removed the distinction and we came up with the term "dangerous drugs" instead
of classifying these drugs into prohibited and regulated ones. Why? Because there are prohibited drugs that sometimes are
also being dispensed with prescription, like for example, morphine and opium. These could be used as pain relievers. There
are also regulated ones which become prohibited drugs when we use a proportion which could not be considered as
therapeutic in nature.
Senator De Castro. Therapeutic and that includes marijuana, Mr. President?
Senator Barbers. That is correct, Mr. President, although marijuana is not dispensed in drugstores. We classify marijuana
under RA 6425 as a prohibited drug, while under this measure marijuana is considered as a dangerous drug.
35
x x x x
Senator Cayetano. Mr. President, also note that there is no definition of "regulated drug" at least in my cursory
examination. Has the good sponsor deleted the provision of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 or Republic Act No. 6425
where there is a definition of "regulated drug?" And if so, just want to find out why this particular definition of what
constitutes a regulated drug is not included in this bill?
Senator Barbers. That is correct, Mr. President. n the present measure, we already deleted prohibited drugs as well as
regulated drugs. We came up with one item only from regulated, from prohibited, to dangerous drugs. That would be the
classification now. Whether it is regulated or prohibited, it is of no moment to us. What is important is that we define
dangerous drugs.
Senator Cayetano. No. The reason asked that, Mr. President, is, under the present law, "regulated drugs" is defined and
the penalties for transgression of the requirements of getting a regulated drug is different from the transgression of
committing any act in relation to what constitutes purely dangerous drugs.
So this is the reason am inquiring because it is important. Regulated drugs per se are not dangerous drugs, regulated in
the sense that it may be dispensed by a certified physician or members of the medical or dental profession.
The only transgression or penalty that may be included on regulated drug is, for instance, if one imports regulated drugs
without the necessary authority from the present Dangerous Drugs Board, and also the manufacture as well as the sale of
the same.
So that is the reason am inquiring, Mr. President.
Senator Barbers. have with me here, Mr. President, a definition of a "regulated drug," but this is applicable under Republic
Act No. 6425. Under my proposal, we deleted the definition. We concentrated on dangerous drugs.
Senator Cayetano. So am correct then that the omission is deliberate, but it does not repeal the provision of Republic Act
No. 6425 which is known as the "Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972," vis-a-vis the regulated drugs? t does not.1avvphi1
Senator Barbers. Mr. President, this proposed measure is practically a repeal of Republic Act No. 6425.
36
From the above-quoted, it is clear that the deliberate elimination of the classification of dangerous drugs is the main reason
that under R.A. 9165, the possession of any kind of dangerous drugs is now penalized under the same section. The
deliberations, however, do not address a case wherein an individual is caught in possession of different kinds of dangerous
drugs. n the present case, petitioner was charged under two nformations, one for illegal possession of six (6) plastic heat-
sealed sachets containing dried marijuana leaves weighing more or less 3.865 grams and the other for illegal possession of
three (3) plastic heat-sealed sachets containing shabuweighing more or less 0.327 gram. Under Section 11 of R.A. 9165,
the corresponding penalty for each charge, based on the weight of the dangerous drugs confiscated, is imprisonment for
twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, as maximum, and a fine of three hundred thousand
pesos (P300,000.00). The trial court imposed a single penalty of imprisonment for twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years, as maximum, and a fine of three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00), while the CA
modified it by imposing the corresponding penalty for each charge.
Absent any clear interpretation as to the application of the penalties in cases such as the present one, this Court shall
construe it in favor of the petitioner for the subject provision is penal in nature. t is a well-known rule of legal hermeneutics
that penal or criminal laws are strictly construed against the state and liberally in favor of the accused.
37
Thus, an accused
may only be convicted of a single offense of possession of dangerous drugs if he or she was caught in possession of
different kinds of dangerous drugs in a single occasion. f convicted, the higher penalty shall be imposed, which is still lighter
if the accused is convicted of two (2) offenses having two (2) separate penalties. This interpretation is more in keeping wit h
the intention of the legislators as well as more favorable to the accused.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated April 11, 2008 of petitioner Raul David is herebyDENIED.
Consequently, the Decision dated August 31, 2007 and Resolution dated February 20, 2008 of the Court of Appeals are
hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the penalty of imprisonment for Twelve (12) years & one (1) day, as
minimum, to Fourteen (14) years, as maximum, and a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00) be imposed.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 184760 ApriI 23, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
PATERNO LORENZO y CASAS, Defendant-Appellant.
D E C S O N
PEREZ, J.:
Assailed in this appeal via Notice of Appeal is the 14 June 2007 Decision
1
of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR HC No. 02184
which affirmed the 05 October 2005 Decision
2
promulgated by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Mateo, Rizal, in
Criminal Case Nos. 6991-93, finding accused-appellant Paterno Lorenzo y Casas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Sections 5 and 11, Article , of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
3
Accused-appellant was arrested and charged following a buy-bust operation.
On 12 September 2003, two (2) nformations were filed against accused-appellant Paterno Lorenzo y Casas (Lorenzo)
charging him with violating Sections 5 and 11, Article of Republic Act No. 9165, the accusatory portions thereof reading.
Criminal Case No. 6992
That on or about the 10th day of September 2003 in the Municipality of San Mateo, Province of Rizal, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being authorized by law, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession, direct custody and control a total of 2.04 grams of white crystalline
substance contained in two (2) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets which gave positive result to the test for
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
4
Criminal Case No. 6993
That on or about the 10th day of September 2003, in the Municipality of San Mateo, Province of Rizal, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being authorized by law, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and knowingly sell, deliver and give away to another 0.20 gram of white crystalline substance contained in one
(1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet which gave positive result to the test for Metamphetamine Hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug.
5
The cases were raffled to Branch 76 of the RTC of San Mateo, Rizal and docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 6992-93.
One Conrado Estanislao y Javier (Estanislao) was similarly charged in a different nformation, which case was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 6991. Estanislao was accused of possessing illegal drugs in violation of the provisions of Section 11,
Article of Republic Act No. 9165, the nformation containing the following averments:
Criminal Case No. 6994
That on or about the 10th day of September 2003, in the Municipality of San Mateo, Province of Rizal, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being authorized by law, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession, direct custody and control of 0.05 gram of white crystalline substance
contained in one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet which gave positive result to the test for Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
On arraignment, both accused, with the assistance of counsel, entered 'NOT GULTY' pleas.
The three (3) cases having been consolidated, joint trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented as its lone witness, Police Officer 1 (PO1) Noel P. Pineda, who was a member of the buy-bust
team.
The evidence for the prosecution sought to establish that on 9 September 2003, upon a series of reports relayed by a
confidential informant that a certain Paterno Lorenzo was peddling shabu in the Barangay Dulongbayan area, the team of
PO3 Pineda embarked on a buy-bust operation against said drug peddler. Anticipating the operation, PO3 Pineda prepared
two (2) pieces of marked P100.00 bills to be used as buy-bust money. At around 10:00 o'clock in the evening of the same
day, PO3 Pineda, along with SPO1 Arellano and PO3 Tougan, proceeded to Barangay Dulongbayan and secretly met with
their confidential informant. According to the confidential informant, he had not seen Lorenzo and raised the possibility that
he was not in the area at the time. Assessing the situation, the police officers instructed the confidential informant to
continue with his surveillance of the area and to inform them immediately if he comes across Lorenzo.
At around 1:00 o'clock in the morning of 10 September 2003, while PO1 Pineda and his companions were waiting at Gen.
Luna Street, the confidential informant reported that Lorenzo was already at the Daangbakal, Dulongbayan area and was
selling prohibited drugs. Riding an unmarked vehicle, the team proceeded to where Lorenzo was. On their arrival, Lorenzo
was talking to a man at the corner of Pulong Diablo and Daangbakal. PO3 Tougan stepped out of their vehicle and hid in a
place where he was not visible to Lorenzo. PO3 Pineda stayed close to SPO1 Arellano, who was then hiding inside a
tricycle near Lorenzo. While this was happening, the confidential informant approached Lorenzo for the transaction. Lorenzo
and the confidential informant were approximately four (4) meters away from PO3 Pineda. Because PO3 Pineda knew who
Lorenzo was and considering the place was illuminated, PO3 Pineda recognized the suspect. The confidential informant
and Lorenzo were talking for about one minute, after which the informant gave the marked money to Lorenzo. After taking
the marked money, Lorenzo handed the shabu to the informant. PO3 Pineda and SPO1 Arellano alighted from the tricycle
and approached Lorenzo, and introduced themselves as police officers. They arrested Lorenzo.
Upon being arrested, Lorenzo was bodily searched and PO1 Pineda was able to retrieve the marked money and 2 other
sachets of shabu from him. Seeing what had happened to Lorenzo, the man he was talking to and later on identified as a
certain Estanislao, attempted to escape the police officers and ran, but he was soon accosted by PO3 Tougan. A search of
his pockets yielded one (1) sachet of shabu.
After the buy-bust operation, Lorenzo and Estanislao were taken to the police station where the incident was recorded in the
police blotter. The plastic sachets containing 2.04 and 0.20 grams of white crystalline substance bought from Lorenzo was
sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory for laboratory examination. The results as contained in Chemistry Report no. D-1741-03E
showed that the substance sold by Lorenzo was positive for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu.
6
nterposing the twin defenses of denial and frame-up, accused-appellant Lorenzo and Estanislao stood before the witness
stand and presented their version of the facts.
Lorenzo was in his mountain bike on the way home to Dulongbayan sometime between 12:00 o'clock in the evening and
1:00 o'clock in the morning of 10 September 2003. Estanislao, who was also with him at the time, was riding in his motor
cross style bike and was supposed to buy food at said place after playing 'tong-its.'
While the two (2) were traversing Daangbakal and Delos Angeles Street, the chain on Estanislao's bike went loose. During
the time Estanislao was repairing his bike, PO3 Tougan, PO3 Pineda, and SPO1 Arellano, who were then on board an
owner type jeepney, arrived and arrested Lorenzo and Estanislao. According to the police officers, they were to be brought
to the Municipal Hall. The two (2) suspects protested, claiming not having done anything wrong but the police officers
continued with the arrest. t was later that they were informed that the arrest was for illegal drugs.
On 5 October 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision convicting Lorenzo for illegal possession and sale of dangerous drugs,
but acquitting Estanislao, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
(a) Finding accused Paterno Lorenzo y Casas guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 5, first
paragraph, Article of Republic Act No. 9165 (Criminal Case No. 6993) or illegal selling of 0.20 gram of
methylamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00).
(b) Finding accused Paterno Lorenzo y Casas guilty beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of Section 11, second
paragraph, No.3, Article of Republic Act No. 9165 (Criminal Case No. 6992) or illegal possession of 2.04 gram of
methylamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug, and is sentenced to suffer imprisonment of Twelve
(12) years and one (1) day as minimum to Twelve years and six (months) as maximum and to pay a fine of Three
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00).
(c) Finding accused Conrado Estanislao y Javier, for violation of Section 11, second paragraph, sub paragraph 3,
Article of Republic Act No. 9165, NOT GULTY for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
Detained accused Conrado Estanislao y Javier is ordered released from detention at the San Mateo Jail unless detained for
some other lawful cause.
The plastic sachets of shabu subject matter of the instant cases are ordered forfeited in favor of the government and the
Officer-n-Charge of the Court is hereby ordered to safely deliver or cause the safe delivery of the same to the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for proper disposition.
7
Weighing the testimonies of the prosecution and defense witnesses, as well as the other evidence presented during trial,
the trial court gave more veracity to the prosecution's version that Lorenzo was caught in flagrante delicto selling illegal
drugs to a poseur-buyer during a buy-bust operation. The trial court gave credence to the prosecution's evidence in
accordance with the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions accorded to police officers. According
to the trial court, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt the identity of the buyer in the buy-bust operation and the
seller, object and consideration, including the delivery of the shabu sold by Lorenzo and the payment of the buy-bust
money.
nvoking his innocence, Lorenzo appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals, questioning the procedure followed by the
police operatives in the seizure and custody of the evidence against him.
On 14 June 2007, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction rendered by the RTC, disposing to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, appeal is hereby dismissed and the assailed October 5, 2005 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of San Mateo Rizal, Branch 76, in Criminal Case Nos. 6991-93, is hereby AFFRMED.
Pursuant to Section 13 (C), Rule 124 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended by AM No. 00-5-03-SC dated
September 28, 2004, which became effective on October 15, 2004. This judgment of the Court of Appeals may be appealed
to the Supreme Court by notice of appeal filed with the Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals.
SO ORDERED.
Unyielding, Lorenzo appealed before this Court on Notice of Appeal,
8
adopting the same arguments raised before the Court
of Appeals:
.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED N FNDNG ACCUSED-APPELLANT GULTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF
VOLATON OF SECTONS 5 AND 11, REPUBLC ACT NO. 9165; AND
.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED N NOT GVNG WEGHT AND CREDENCE TO ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S
DEFENSE OF DENAL.
The presumption of innocence of an accused in a criminal case is a basic constitutional principle, fleshed out by procedural
rules which place on the prosecution the burden of proving that an accused is guilty of the offense charged by proof beyond
reasonable doubt. Corollary thereto, conviction must rest on the strength of the prosecution's evidence and not on the
weakness of the defense.
n fact, if the prosecution fails to meet the required quantum of evidence, the defense may logically not even present
evidence on its behalf. n which case, the presumption of innocence shall prevail and, hence, the accused shall be
acquitted. However, once the presumption of innocence is overcome, the defense bears the burden of evidence to show
reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused.
Whether the degree of proof has been met is largely left for the trial courts to be determined. Consistent with the rulings of
this Court, it is but a fundamental and settled rule that factual findings of the trial court and its calibration of the test imonies
of the witnesses and its conclusions anchored on its findings are accorded by the appellate court high respect, if not
conclusive effect, more so when affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The exception is when it is established that the trial court
ignored, overlooked, misconstrued or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances which, if considered, will change the
outcome of the case. Considering that what is at stake here is the liberty of accused-appellant, we have carefully reviewed
and evaluated the records of the case and find it necessary to reverse the appellate court's decision convicting accused-
appellant.
Essentially, Lorenzo questions his conviction on the basis of reasonable doubt. The defense anchors its claim on the failure
of the prosecution to adopt the required procedure under Section 21, Article , Republic Act No. 9165, on the custody and
disposition of confiscated, seized, or surrendered dangerous drugs. According to the defense, this alleged failure to follow
proper procedure, i.e. inventory and photographing of the retrieved evidence, raises doubts as to whether the specimen
examined by the forensic chemist and presented in court were indeed retrieved from accused-appellant. The defense also
faults the police operatives for not having coordinated with the PDEA regarding the buy-bust.
Thus, for resolution by this Court is the sole issue of whether the prosecution discharged its burden of proving Lorenzo's
guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged.
We rule in the negative. The prosecution's case fails for failure to establish the identity of the prohibited drug with moral
certainty.
n order to successfully prosecute an accused for illegal sale of drugs, the prosecution must be able to prove the following
elements: (1) identities of the buyer and seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and
the payment therefor.
9
Material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale
had actually taken place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti.
10
The term corpus
delicti means the actual commission by someone of the particular crime charged.
On the other hand, in illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the elements are: (1) the accused is in possession of an item
or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely
and consciously possessed the said drug. Similarly, in this case, the evidence of the corpus delicti must be established
beyond doubt.
n both illegal sale and illegal possession of prohibited drugs, conviction cannot be sustained if there is a persistent doubt on
the identity of the drug. The identity of the prohibited drug must be established with moral certainty. Apart from showing that
the elements of possession or sale are present, the fact that the substance illegally possessed and sold in the first place is
the same substance offered in court as exhibit must likewise be established with the same degree of certitude as that
needed to sustain a guilty verdict.
While buy-bust operations have been proven to be an effective way to flush out illegal transactions that are otherwise
conducted covertly and in secrecy, a buy-bust operation is susceptible to police abuse. Thus, courts have been mandated to
be extra vigilant in trying drug cases lest an innocent person is made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug
offenses.
Taking the aforementioned into consideration, specific procedures relating to the seizure and custody of drugs have been
laid down under the mplementing Rules and Regulations (RR) for Republic Act No. 9165 and it is the prosecution's burden
to adduce evidence that these procedures have been complied with in proving the elements of the offense.
The procedure for the custody and disposition of confiscated, seized and/or surrendered dangerous drugs, among others, is
provided under Section 21 (a), paragraph 1 of Article of Republic Act No. 9165, to wit:
(a) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof;
Section 21 (a), Article of the mplementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165, which implements said
provision, reads:
(a) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof; Provided, further that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officers/team, shall not render
void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.
Section 21(a), Article of the RR offers some flexibility in complying with the express requirements. ndeed, the evident
purpose of the procedure is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be
utilized in the determination of the guilt of or innocence of the accused. Thus, the proviso stating that non-compliance with
the stipulated procedure, under justifiable grounds, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said
items, for as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officers.
n People v. Sanchez,
11
we clarified that this saving clause applies only where the prosecution recognized the procedural
lapses, and thereafter explained the cited justifiable grounds.
Accused-appellant claims that no physical inventory and no photographing of the drugs took place. Non-compliance by the
police operatives with the foregoing requirements in the instant case is fatal to the prosecution's case. Although the
prosecution recognized its failure to coordinate with the PDEA because of the urgency of the situation, it ignored the issue
of specifically identifying the prohibited drug at the point of confiscation. There is absolutely nothing in the records to show
that the inventory and photography requirements, or their credible substitute to prove integrity and evidentiary value, were
ever followed.
n People v. Lim,
12
this Court held:
xxx any apprehending team having initial custody and control of said drugs and/or paraphernalia, should immediately after
seizure and confiscation, have the same physically inventoried and photographed in the presence of the accused, if there
be any, and or his representative, who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. The
failure of the agents to comply with such a requirement raises a doubt whether what was submitted for laboratory
examination and presented in court was actually recovered from the appellants. t negates the presumption that official
duties have been regularly performed by the PAOC-TF agents.
n Bondad, Jr. v. People,
13
where the prosecution did not inventory and photograph the confiscated evidence, this Court
acquitted therein accused reasoning that failure to comply with the aforesaid requirements of the law compromised the
identity of the items seized.
n People v. Ruiz,
14
this Court acquitted accused due to the failure of the prosecution to comply with the procedures under
Republic Act No. 9165 and its RR as no physical inventory was ever made, and no photograph of the seized items was
taken under the circumstances required.
n People v. Orteza,
15
the Court explained the implications of the failure to comply with Paragraph 1, Section 21, Article of
Republic Act No. 9165, to wit:
n People v. Laxa, where the buy-bust team failed to mark the confiscated marijuana immediately after the apprehension of
the accused, the Court held that the deviation from the standard procedure in anti-narcotics operations produced doubts as
to the origins of the marijuana. Consequently, the Court concluded that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of
the corpus delicti.1avvphi1
The Court made a similar ruling in People v. Kimura, where the Narcom operatives failed to place markings on the seized
marijuana at the time the accused was arrested and to observe the procedure and take custody of the drug.
More recently, in Zarraga v. People, the Court held that the material inconsistencies with regard to when and where the
markings on the shabu were made and the lack of inventory on the seized drugs created reasonable doubt as to the identity
of the corpus delicti. The Court thus acquitted the accused due to the prosecution's failure to indubitably show the identity of
the shabu.
To reiterate, the flexibility offered by the RR of Republic Act No. 9165 is coupled with the proviso that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items must be preserved.
Thus, in Malillin v. People,
16
the Court explained that the "chain of custody" requirement performs this function in that it
ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed. The chain of evidence is constructed
by proper exhibit handling, storage, labeling and recording, and must exist from the time the evidence is found until the time
it is offered in evidence.
17
Failure to prove that the specimen submitted for laboratory examination was the same one
allegedly seized from accused is fatal to the prosecution's case. There can be no crime of illegal possession or illegal sale
of a prohibited drug when nagging doubts persist on whether the item confiscated was the same specimen examined and
established to be the prohibited drug.
18
PO1 Pineda testified that it was their confidential agent who purchased the shabu from accused-appellant and that he only
retrieved it from said informant. He further testified that he marked the retrieved sachet of shabu together with the two other
sachets of shabu that were allegedly seized from the accused, but it was not certain when and where the said marking was
done nor who had specifically received and had custody of the specimens thereafter.
The Court also observes that the prosecution did not present the poseur-buyer who had personal knowledge of the
transaction. The lone prosecution witness was at least four meters away from where accused-appellant and the poseur-
buyer were. From this distance, it was impossible for him to hear the conversation between accused-appellant and the
poseur-buyer.
The foregoing facts and circumstances create doubt as to whether the sachets of shabu allegedly seized from accused-
appellant were the same ones that were released to Camp Crame and submitted for laboratory examination. We therefore
find that this failure to establish the evidence's chain of custody is damaging to the prosecution's case.
19
n sum, the totality of the evidence presented in the instant case failed to support accused-appellant's conviction for violation
of Sections 5 and 11, Article , Republic Act No. 9165, since the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the
elements of the offense.
Accordingly, the presumption of innocence should prevail.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Court of Appeals Decision dated 14 June 2007 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02184, is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant PATERNO LORENZO y CASAS is hereby ACQUTTED for failure
of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He is ordered immediately RELEASED from detention,
unless he is confined for any other lawful cause.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City for immediate
implementation. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to report to this Court within five days from receipt of
this Decision the action he has taken. Copies shall also be furnished the Director General, Philippine National Police, and
the Director General, Philippine Drugs Enforcement Agency, for their information.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 179939 September 29, 2008
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
GERALDINE MAGAT y PADERON, Appellant.
D E C I S I O N
TINGA, J.:
Two separate informations
1
for violations of Sections 5 and 11 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, were filed against appellant Geraldine Magat y Paderon. She pleaded not
guilty to both charges at the arraignment.
2
The prosecution presented PO1 Philip Santos (PO1 Santos) who was assigned at the Drug Enforcement Unit of the
Meycauayan Police Station and had acted as the poseur-buyer in the buy-bust operation. The testimony of forensic chemist
P/nsp. Nellson Cruz Sta. Maria was dispensed with in view of the defense's admission that if the chemist were placed on
the witness stand he could identify the Request for Laboratory Examination
3
and Chemistry Report No. D-403-2003,
4
with
the qualification that the chemist had no personal knowledge of the facts surrounding the arrest of appellant and the source
of the specimen examined.
5
The testimonies of PO1 Manuel Mendoza (Mendoza) and Michael Sarangaya (Sarangaya),
who were PO1 Santos's backup during the entrapment operation, were likewise dispensed with as the defense admitted
that it would merely corroborate the testimony of PO1 Santos.
6
According to the evidence for the prosecution, the facts are as follows:
On 7 and 8 of June 2003 and in the morning of 9 June 2003, a buy-bust team composed of policemen conducted
surveillance operations on appellant on account of a validated report from a concerned citizen that she was engaged in
selling illegal drugs.
7
With PO1 Santos to act as the poseur-buyer and two P100.00 bills as buy-bust money, in the afternoon of 9 June 2003 at
about 4:20 p.m. the policemen proceeded to the target place and reached appellant's premises 30 minutes later. They saw
appellant standing in front of her house. PO1 Santos asked appellant "Ate, meron bang dalawang piso?" After looking at
him, appellant said "Okay!" and then went inside her house. When appellant came back, she asked for money from him and
so PO1 Santos handed her the two marked P100.00 bills. n turn, appellant gave the plastic sachet of shabu to him.
Thereafter, PO1 Santos executed the pre-arranged signal by scratching his head, prompting his companions to approach
them. PO1 Santos, introducing himself as a policeman, arrested appellant. He informed appellant that she was being
arrested for violation of R.A. No. 9165. The policemen requested appellant to empty her pockets. Appellant complied; her
right pocket yielded another sachet of shabu. They got back the two marked P100.00 bills from appellant's left hand.
8
They brought appellant to the police station where they booked her. PO1 Santos marked the plastic sachets containing
shabu with his initials "PCS" and the letters "A" and "B" for examination. The plastic sachets were examined at the PNP
Crime Laboratory Office; the examination yielded positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.
9
PO1 Santos admitted
during cross-examination that although it was confirmed that appellant was selling illegal drugs he did not secure a search
warrant since their chief's instruction to them was to conduct a buy-bust operation.
10
He also admitted that he did not
coordinate the buy-bust operation with the barangay officials and did not verify whether appellant was a drug peddler.
11
Appellant denied the charges against her and testified that between 4:00 to 5:00 p.m. on 9 June 2003, while she was taking
a bath, policemen PO1 Santos, Sarangaya, and Mendoza barged into her house. Hearing the noise, she came out of the
comfort room and proceeded upstairs where she saw the policemen already searching the place. After the search, they
brought her to the Meycauayan Police Station and detained her for one day for alleged violations of the anti-drug law.
Appellant further testified that at the time the policemen arrested her, her children were playing about three meters away
from her house and that no one saw her being brought to the police station.
12
To corroborate appellant's testimony, Teresa Manebo (Manebo), her neighbor, testified that on 9 June 2003, at about 4:00
p.m., while she was at the artesian well inside appellant's compound, a man in civilian clothes arrived and knocked at the
door of the comfort room where appellant was taking a bath. Appellant informed the man to wait as she was dressing while
Manebo was looking at them. Another man arrived as appellant went out of the comfort room. The men talked to appellant
for about 30 minutes. They asked her about the whereabouts of her husband. Afterwards, four other men arrived. Appellant
and the men went inside the house. When they came out, she saw appellant crying as the men took her away.
13
On cross-examination, Manebo declared that the two persons who arrived came one after the other within a ten-minute
interval. They talked with appellant for about 30 minutes. She admitted that she did not hear the entire conversation. When
the four other men arrived, they went upstairs, and stayed there for an hour.
14
At the time appellant was talking with the two
men, she was just two meters away from them. The men asked appellant about her husband's whereabouts. She watched
them for 30 minutes.
15
n a Decision
16
dated 21 February 2006, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the City of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 78 found
her guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sections 5
17
and 11
18
of R.A. No. 9165. Appellant filed a notice of appeal
dated 7 March 2006 to the Court of Appeals.
19
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC in a decision promulgated on 7 June 2007.
20
Appellant filed a notice
of appeal dated 20 June 2007 with this Court.
21
Appellant raised before this Court and the Court of Appeals the lone issue of whether the trial court erred in convicting her
despite the prosecution's failure to establish the identity of the prohibited drugs, which constitute the corpus delicti of the
offense.
The appeal is meritorious.
n all prosecutions for violation of R.A. No. 9165, the following elements must be proven beyond reasonable doubt: (1) proof
that the transaction took place; and (2) presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence.
22
The
existence of dangerous drugs is a condition sine qua non for conviction for the illegal sale and possession of dangerous
drugs, it being the very corpus delicti of the crimes.
23
n the case at bar, it is indisputable that the procedures for the custody and disposition of confiscated dangerous drugs in
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165
24
were not complied with. PO1 Santos admitted that he marked the two plastic sachets
containing white crystalline substance in the police station.
25
He did not mark the seized items immediately after he arrested
appellant in the latter's presence. He also did not make an inventory and take a photograph of the confiscated materials in
the presence of appellant. Other than the three policemen, there were no other people who participated in the alleged buy-
bust operation.
26
There was no representative from the media and the Department of Justice, or any elected public official
who participated in the operation and who were supposed to sign an inventory of seized items and be given copies thereof.
None of the statutory safeguards were observed.
A review of jurisprudence, even prior to the passage of the R.A. No. 9165, shows that this Court did not hesitate to strike
down convictions for failure to follow the proper procedure for the custody of confiscated dangerous drugs. Prior to R.A. No.
9165, the Court applied the procedure required by Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979 amending
Board Regulation No. 7, Series of 1974.
27
http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/mar2006/G.R. No.
162064.htm - _ftn19
n People v. Laxa,
28
http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/mar2006/G.R. No. 162064.htm - _ftn16the
policemen composing the buy-bust team failed to mark the confiscated marijuana immediately after the alleged
apprehension of the appellant. One policeman even admitted that he marked the seized items only after seeing them for the
first time in the police headquarters. The Court held that the deviation from the standard procedure in anti-narcotics
operations produces doubts as to the origins of the marijuana and concluded that the prosecution failed to establish the
identity of thecorpus delicti.
29
Similarly, in People v. Kimura,
30
the Narcom operatives failed to place markings on the alleged seized marijuana on the
night the accused were arrested and to observe the procedure in the seizure and custody of the drug as embodied in the
aforementioned Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979. Consequently, we held that the prosecution
failed to establish the identity of the corpus delicti.
n Zaragga v. People,
31
involving a violation of R.A. No. 6425, the police failed to place markings on the alleged seized
shabu immediately after the accused were apprehended. The buy-bust team also failed to prepare an inventory of the
seized drugs which accused had to sign, as required by the same Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 3, Series of
1979. The Court held thathttp://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/mar2006/G.R. No. 162064.htm - _ftn19 the
prosecution failed to establish the identity of the prohibited drug which constitutes the corpus delicti.
32
n all the foregoing cited cases, the Court acquitted the appellants due to the failure of law enforcers to observe the
procedures prescribed in Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979, amending Board Regulation No. 7,
Series of 1974, which are similar to the procedures under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. Marking of the seized drugs alone
by the law enforcers is not enough to comply with the clear and unequivocal procedures prescribed in Section 21 of R.A.
No. 9165.
n the present case, although PO1 Santos had written his initials on the two plastic sachets submitted to the PNP Crime
Laboratory Office for examination, it was not indubitably shown by the prosecution that PO1 Santos immediately marked the
seized drugs in the presence of appellant after their alleged confiscation. There is doubt as to whether the substances
seized from appellant were the same ones subjected to laboratory examination and presented in court.
A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are not readily identifiable as in fact they have to be subjected to
scientific analysis to determine their composition and nature. Congress deemed it wise to incorporate the jurisprudential
safeguards in the present law in an unequivocal language to prevent any tampering, alteration or substitution, by accident or
otherwise. The Court, in upholding the right of the accused to be presumed innocent, can do no less than apply the present
law which prescribes a more stringent standard in handling evidence than that applied to criminal cases involving objects
which are readily identifiable.
R.A. No. 9165 had placed upon the law enforcers the duty to establish the chain of custody of the seized drugs to ensure
the integrity of the corpus delicti. Thru proper exhibit handling, storage, labeling and recording, the identity of the seized
drugs is insulated from doubt from their confiscation up to their presentation in court.
Recently, in People v. Santos, Jr.,
33
which involved violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article of R.A. No. 9165, the Court
agreed with the Office of the Solicitor General's observation that the identity of thecorpus delicti has not been sufficiently
established since the confiscated plastic sachets of shabu have been marked/initialed at the scene of the crime, according
to proper procedure. Citing People v.
Lim,
34
whichhttp://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2007/october2007/175593.htm - _ftn37specified that any
apprehending team having initial control of illegal drugs and/or paraphernalia should, immediately after seizure or
confiscation, have the same physically inventoried and photographed in the presence of the accused if there be any, and/or
his representative, who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. The failure of the
agents to comply with such requirement raises doubt whether what was submitted for laboratory examination and presented
in court is the same drug and/or paraphernalia as that actually recovered from the accused.
While the seized drugs may be admitted in evidence, it does not necessarily follow that the same should be given
evidentiary weight if the procedure in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 was not complied with. The Court stressed that the
admissibility of the seized dangerous drugs in evidence should not be equated with its probative value in proving the corpus
delicti. The admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and
competence while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince and
persuade.
35
The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty relied upon by the courts a quo cannot by itself overcome
the presumption of innocence nor constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2007/november2007/170180.htm - _ftn45
36
Although the evidence for
the defense is weak, the prosecution must rely on the weight of its own evidence and cannot draw strength from the
weakness of the defense.
37
All told, the corpus delecti in this case is not legally extant.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 21 February 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 78 in Criminal
Case Nos. 2158-M-2003 and 2159-M-2003 is REVERSED and SET ASDE. Appellant Geraldine Magat y Paderon
is ACQUITTED of the crimes charged on the ground of reasonable doubt and ordered immediately RELEASED from
custody, unless she is being held for some other lawful cause.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to implement this decision forthwith and to NFORM this Court,
within five (5) days from receipt hereof, of the date appellant was actually released from confinement.
Let a copy of this decision be forwarded to the PNP Director and the Director General of the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency for proper guidance and implementation. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 174198 January 19, 2010
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ZAIDA KAMAD y AMBING, Accused-Appellant.
D E C S O N
BRION, J.:
We review the decision
1
of the Court of Appeals
2
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00505 which affirmed in toto the decision
3
of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 259, Paraaque City
4
in Criminal Case Nos. 02-1236-7 finding Zaida
5
Kamad y
Ambing (accused-appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale of shabu under Section 5, Article of Republic
Act No. 9165 (RA 9165) or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
Along with her boyfriend Leo Ramirez y Acosta (Leo) who was charged for illegal possession of shabu, the accused-
appellant was charged under an nformation
6
that reads:
The above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess or otherwise use any dangerous drug and without the
corresponding license or prescription, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously give away, distribute and sel l to
a customer for P300.00 pesos one (1) small heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing crystalline substance (shabu)
weighing 0.20 gram, which when examined were found positive for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous
drug, in violation of the above-cited law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The accused-appellant pleaded not guilty on arraignment. Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.
The prosecution's version of events is summarized below.
On October 16, 2002, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Drug Enforcement Unit of the Southern Police District, Fort
Bonifacio, Taguig (Taguig police) received information from an asset that a certain "Zaida" was engaged in the illegal sale of
shabu at Purok V, Silverio Compound in Paraaque City. The Taguig police formed a buy-bust team composed of P/nsp.
Antonio Parillas,
7
PO3 Christopher Maulit
8
(PO3 Maulit), PO1 Manfoste,
9
SPO2 Arthur Velasco, and SPO2 Ernesto
Sanchez
10
(SPO2 Sanchez), as members. SPO2 Sanchez acted as poseur-buyer and received three (3) one hundred peso
bills for use as marked money.
After surveillance of the area, the buy-bust team and their asset proceeded at around 10:00 p.m. of October 16, 2002 to the
target area where they immediately saw the accused-appellant and Leo. The asset and SPO2 Sanchez approached the two
while the rest of the buy-bust team watched from a distance. The asset introduced SPO2 Sanchez as a buyer of shabu and
the accused-appellant asked him how much he would buy. SPO2 Sanchez asked for P300.00 worth of shabu and gave the
marked money; the accused-appellant thereafter handed him a plastic sachet containing a substance suspected to be
shabu. SPO2 Sanchez lighted a cigarette to give the pre-arranged signal for the buy-bust team to approach. SPO2 Sanchez
arrested the accused-appellant and recovered from her the P300.00 marked money. The buy-bust team arrested Leo who
was found in possession of one (1) plastic sachet also suspected to contain shabu.
The buy-bust team took the accused-appellant and Leo and the recovered plastic sachets to their office for investigation.
The recovered plastic sachets, marked as "ES-1-161009" and "ES-2-161002," were then brought to the PNP Crime
Laboratory for qualitative examination; the tests yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride.
11
The defense expectedly presented a different version of events.
The accused-appellant
12
denied the charge and claimed that she and Leo were framed-up. At around 2:30 p.m. of October
16, 2002, the accused-appellant and Leo went to Leo's cousin's house. Since Leo's cousin was not yet at home, she and
Leo waited. After waiting for an hour, four (4) men wearing civilian clothes and carrying firearms entered the house and
introduced themselves as police officers. The accused-appellant and Leo were frisked, but nothing was found in their
possession. The police officers asked the accused-appellant where she kept the shabu; she replied that she was not selling
shabu. Afterwards, she and Leo were taken to the police headquarters where they were again frisked and asked the same
question to which they gave the same response. The police detained Leo and the accused-appellant for about a day and
later brought them to the Prosecutor's Office for inquest without showing them any shabu.
The RTC Ruling
After consideration of the evidence, the RTC decreed:
WHEREFORE, PREMSES CONSDERED, finding both accused GULTY beyond reasonable doubt, this Court hereby
sentences Zaida Kamad to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 for Violation of Section 5, Art. , RA 9165 .
x x x x
SO ORDERED.
13
The accused-appellant appealed the RTC decision to the CA, attacking the RTC's reliance on the presumption of regularity
that the RTC found to have attended the conduct of the buy-bust operation by the police. She argued that no presumption of
regularity could arise considering that the police violated NAPOLCOM rules by using an asset; the rules prohibit the
deputation of private persons as PNP civilian agents.
14
The accused-appellant also pointed out the material inconsistencies
in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses that cast doubt on their credibility, namely: (a) the uncertainty of SPO2
Sanchez regarding the time the buy-bust team was dispatched to the target area; (b) the confusion of PO3 Maulit on the
identity of the team leader of the buy-bust team; (c) the admitted mistake of PO3 Maulit that only the recovered plastic
sachet was marked "ES" (standing for the initials of SPO2 Sanchez), while the marked money was marked "MF" (standing
for the initials of P/nsp. Mariano F. Fegarido as commanding officer); and (d) the contradictory statements of PO3 Maulit
who testified that it was Leo who sold the shabu and that of SPO2 Sanchez who testified that it was the accused-appellant
who sold him the shabu.
The CA Ruling
The CA rejected the defense arguments and affirmed in toto the RTC findings. The CA ruled that the prosecution
satisfactorily established the accused-appellant's guilt based on the positive testimony of SPO2 Sanchez on the conduct of
the buy-bust operation; his testimony bore badges of truth. Accordingly, the CA found the accused-appellant's
uncorroborated denial undeserving of any weight. The CA brushed aside as a minor inconsistency the uncertainty in the
testimony of SPO2 Sanchez on the time the buy-bust operation took place. The CA also brushed aside the violation of the
NAPOLCOM rules on the ground that the accused-appellant was arrested in flagrante delicto for illegal sale of shabu
committed in the presence of the prosecution witnesses who were police officers. Moreover, the CA held that the use of
assets to aid police officers in buy-bust operations has been judicially recognized. The CA found that while the asset
brokered the shabu transaction, he had no role in the apprehension of the accused-appellant and in the search and seizure
of the shabu from the accused-appellant.
The ssue
The only issue in this case is whether the accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5,
Article of RA 9165 for the illegal sale of 0.20 gram of shabu.
The Court's Ruling
We draw attention at the outset to the unique nature of an appeal in a criminal case; the appeal throws the whole case open
for review and it is the duty of the appellate court to correct, cite and appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether
they are assigned or unassigned.
15
We find the present appeal meritorious on the basis of such review.
As a general rule, the trial court's findings of fact, especially when affirmed by the CA, are entitled to great weight and will
not be disturbed on appeal. This rule, however, admits of exceptions and does not apply where facts of weight and
substance with direct and material bearing on the final outcome of the case have been overlooked, misapprehended or
misapplied.
16
After due consideration of the records of this case, the evidence adduced, and the applicable law and
jurisprudence, we hold that a deviation from the general rule is warranted.
n a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must be duly established: (1) proof that the
transaction or sale took place; and (2) the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence.
17
Proof of
the corpus delicti in a buy-bust situation requires evidence, not only that the transacted drugs actually exist, but evidence as
well that the drugs seized and examined are the same drugs presented in court. This is a condition sine qua non for
conviction as the drugs are the main subject of the illegal sale constituting the crime and their existence and identification
must be proven for the crime to exist. As we discuss below, the special characteristics of prohibited drugs necessitate their
strict identification by the prosecution.
18
Our examination of the records shows that while the prosecution established through the testimony of SPO2 Sanchez that
the sale of the prohibited drug by the accused-appellant took place, we find that both the RTC and the CA failed to consider
the following infirmities in the prosecution's case: (1) the serious lapses in the RA 9165 procedure committed by the buy-
bust team in handling the seized shabu; and (2) the failure of the police to comply with the chain of custody rule in handling
the seized shabu, resulting in the prosecution's failure to properly identify the shabu offered in court as the same shabu
seized from the accused-appellant on October 16, 2002.
Non-compliance with the prescribed procedure
under Section 21, Article of RA 9165
n People v. Garcia,
19
we emphasized the prosecution's duty to adduce evidence proving compliance by the buy-bust team
with the prescribed procedure laid down under paragraph 1, Section 21, Article of RA 9165. This provision reads:
1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shaII, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physicaIIy inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counseI, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any eIected pubIic officiaI who shaII be required to sign the copies
of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. [emphasis supplied]
The mplementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9165 under its Section 21(a) provides further details on how RA 9165 is to
be applied, and provides too for a saving mechanism in case no strict compliance with the requirements took place. Section
21(a) states:
(a) The apprehending office/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such
items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy thereof: Provided, further that non-compIiance with these requirements under justifiabIe grounds, as
Iong as the integrity and the evidentiary vaIue of the seized items are properIy preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shaII not render void and invaIid such seizures of and custody over said items. [Emphasis supplied.]
Strict compliance with the prescribed procedure is required because of the illegal drug's unique characteristic rendering it
indistinct, not readily identifiable, and easily open to tampering, alteration or substitution either by accident or
otherwise.
20
Hence, the rules on the measures to be observed during and after the seizure, during the custody and transfer
of the drugs for examination, and at all times up to their presentation in court.
n this case, SPO2 Sanchez testified on the seizure and the handling of the seized shabu. The records show that his
testimony and the identification he made in court constitute the totality of the prosecution's evidence on how the police
handled and preserved the integrity of the seized shabu. Significantly, SPO2 Sanchez merely stated in his testimony that:
Q: What else transpired when Zaida gave something to you and you, being the poseur buyer, gave the money to
Zaida?
A: We brought them to our office.
x x x x
Q: What did you do with those plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance?
A: We brought them to the SPD Crime Lab for examination.
21
Thus, he failed to provide specific details on how the seized shabu was marked although the evidence shows that the shabu
was marked as "ES-1-161009" before it was sent to a forensic laboratory. His testimony also failed to state whether the
marking of the shabu was done immediately after its seizure (as Section 21 of RA 9165 requires) or during the investigation.
His testimony likewise failed to disclose if a physical inventory and photography of the seized items had taken place, or if
they had, whether these were undertaken in the presence of the accused or his counsel, or a representative from the media
and the Department of Justice, and of an elective official.
In sum, his testimony faiIed to show how the integrity and evidentiary vaIue of the item seized had been preserved;
no expIanation was ever given by SPO2 Sanchez to justify the non-compIiance by the buy-bust team with the
prescribed procedures. In fact, the records cIearIy reveaI that the prosecution did not even acknowIedge the
proceduraI Iapses committed by the buy-bust team in the handIing of the seized shabu.
The consequences of the above omissions must necessarily be grave for the prosecution under the rule that penal laws,
such as RA 9165, are strictly construed against the government and liberally in favor of the accused.
22
One consequence is
to produce doubts on the origins of the illegal drug presented in court,
23
thus leading to the prosecution's failure to establish
the corpus delicti.
24
Unless excused by the saving mechanism, the acquittal of the accused must follow.
The non-compliance with the
chain of custody rule
Separately from Section 21 violations, we also find the prosecution fatally remiss in establishing an unbroken link in the
chain of custody of the seized shabu; its evidence is simply incomplete in establishing the necessary links in the handling of
the seized prohibited drug from the time of its seizure until its presentation in court.
n Mallillin v. People,
25
we explained the chain of custody rule and what constitutes sufficient compliance with this rule:
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. t would include
testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in
such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was
and what happened to it while in the witnesses' possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which
it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that
there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession
of the same. [emphasis supplied]
26
We applied this ruling in People v. Garcia,
27
People v. Gum-Oyen,
28
People v. Denoman
29
and People v. Coreche
30
where
we recognized the following links that must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation: first, the seizure
and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover
of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating
officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the
marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.
(a) The first link in the chain of custody
We observe that SPO2 Sanchez' testimony lacks specifics on how the seized shabu was handled immediately after the
accused-appellant's arrest. Although the records show that SPO2 Sanchez testified that he actually seized the shabu when
he arrested the accused-appellant, he never disclosed the identity of the person/s who had custody and possession of the
shabu after its seizure, nor that he retained possession of the shabu from the place of the arrest until they reached the
police station.
SPO2 Sanchez also failed to state the time and place as well as the identity of the person/s who made the markings on the
two (2) plastic sachets containing the recovered shabu seized from the accused-appellant and Leo on October 16, 2002.
(b) The second link in the chain of custody
We also observe that SPO2 Sanchez' testimony regarding the post-arrest police investigation failed to provide particulars on
whether the shabu was turned over to the investigator. The records only identify the name of the investigator as one SPO1
Nuestro before whom SPO2 Sanchez and PO3 Maulit executed a Joint Affidavit of Arrest dated October 17, 2002.
31
Thus, a
big gap exists on who had custody and possession of the shabu prior to, during and immediately after the police
investigation, and how the shabu was stored, preserved, labeled and recorded from the time of its seizure up to its receipt
by the forensic laboratory.
(c) The third link in the chain of custody
The third link in the chain is represented by two (2) pieces of documentary evidence adduced by the prosecution consisting
of the letter-request dated October 17, 2002
32
of Police Superintendent Mariano F. Fegarido as Chief of the Southern Police
District Drug Enforcement Group and the Physical Science Report No. D-1502-02 prepared by Engr. Richard Allan B.
Mangalip as the forensic chemist.
33
These documents reveal that the recovered plastic sachets of shabu bearing the markings "ES-1-161002" and "ES-2-
161002" were sent to the forensic laboratory sealed in one (1) small brown envelope bearing unidentified signatures. On the
same day, the PNP Crime Laboratory received this letter-request along with the submitted specimens. The specimens were
then subjected to qualitative examination which yielded positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride.
These pieces of evidence notably fail to identify the person who personally brought the seized shabu to the PNP Crime
Laboratory. They also fail to clearly identify the person who received the shabu at the forensic laboratory pursuant to the
letter-request dated October 17, 2002, and who exercised custody and possession of the shabu after it was examined and
before it was presented in court. Neither was there any evidence adduced showing how the seized shabu was handled,
stored and safeguarded pending its presentation in court.
(d) The fourth link in the chain of custody
The fourth link presents a very strange and unusual twist in the prosecution's evidence in this case. Although the forensic
chemist was presented in court, we find that his offered testimony related to a shabu specimen other than that seized in the
buy-bust operation of October 16, 2002. Specifically, his testimony pertained to shabu seized by the police on October 12,
2002. This is borne by the following exchanges:
FSCAL UY: The testimony of the witness is being offered to prove . . . that he is the one who cause [sic] the
examination of the physical evidence subject of this case containing with white crystalline substance placed inside
the plastic sachet weighing 0.20 grams and 0.30 grams with markings of EBC and EBC-1 that reduced findings
after the examination conducted.
x x x x
Q And with the cause of the performance of your duties, were you able to receive a letter request relevant to this
case specifically a drug test request, dated October 12, 2002 from PS/nsp. Wilfredo Calderon. Do you have the
letter request with you?
A Yes, sir.
Q The witness presented to this representation the letter request dated October 12, 2002 for purposes of
identification, respectfully request that it be marked in evidence as Exhibit A. n this Exhibit A Mr. Officer, were you
able to receive the evidence submitted specifically a small brown stapled wire envelope with signature containing
with white crystalline substance inside and with markings EBC- 12/10/02 and EBC-1 12/10/02. After you received
this specimen what action did you take or do?
A Upon receiving, read and understand the content of the letter request after which, stamped and marked the
letter request and then record it on the logbook and after recording it on the logbook, performed the test for
determination of the presence of dangerous drug on the specimen.
x x x x
Q Now, after those tests conducted what was the result of the examination?
A t gives positive result for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or otherwise known as shabu, a dangerous drug.
x x x x
Q At this juncture your Honor, the witness handed with this representation a brown envelope with markings D-1487-
02, and the signature and the date 12 October 02, now Mr. Witness tell us who placed these markings on this
brown envelope?
A am the one who personally made the markings, sir.
Q And in the face of this brown envelope there is a printed name PO1 Edwin Plopinio and the signature and the
date 12 October 2002. Do you know who placed who placed those markings?
A have no idea.
Q At this juncture your Honor, this representation proceeded to open the brown envelope. May respectfully request
that this brown envelope be marked in evidence as Exhibit B. And inside this brown envelope are three pieces of
plastic sachets inside which are white crystalline substance with markings EPC 12 October 02 and EPC-1 12
October 02. May respectfully request that these plastic sachets with white substance inside be marked in evidence
as Exhibit B-1 and B-2. And in these plastic sachets with white crystalline inside is a masking tape with the
signature and letters are RAM, do you know who placed those letters?
A am the one who placed that markings sir.
Q And what RAM stands for?
A That stands for my name Richard Allan Mangalip sir.
Q You mentioned that you reduced your findings in writing, do you have the official finding with you?
A Yes, sir.
Q At this juncture the witness handed to this representation the physical science report no. D-1487-2 for purposes
of identification respectfully request that this specimen be marked in evidence as Exhibit C. And in this Exhibit C,
there is a signature above the typewritten name Engineer Richard Allan B. Mangalip, do you whose signature is this
Mr. Witness?
34
[Emphasis supplied]
A That is my signature sir.
Q Respectfully request that the signature appearing in Exhibit C be marked in evidence as Exhibit C-1. You stated
earlier that you cause the weight of the white crystalline substance in this plastic sachet, what the weights of this
white crystalline substance?
A For the specimen A, it is .20 grams and the specimen B, it is .30 gram.
Q May respectfully request that this weight indicated in this physical science report now mark in evidence as
Exhibit C-2. have no further questions to the witness your Honor.
x x x x
Aside from the different dates of seizure, we note that the shabu identified and presented in court as evidence through the
testimony of the forensic chemist, showed characteristics distinct from the shabu from the buy-bust sale of October 16,
2002:
First, there were different markings made on the plastic sachets of the shabu recovered on October 12, 2002. As
testified to, one plastic sachet of shabu was marked, "EBC 12 October 02," while the other plastic sachet of shabu
was marked, "EBC-1 12 October 02";
35
Second, there was a different sealed brown envelope used where a printed name and signature of one "PO1 Edwin
Plopino" and the date "12 October 2002" were written;
36
Third, the examination of the shabu by the PNP Crime Laboratory was made pursuant to a different letter-request
for examination dated October 12, 2002 written by one P/nsp. Wilfredo Calderon;
37
and
Fourth, the results of the shabu testified to by the forensic chemist in court was contained in a different forensic
laboratory report known as Physical Science Report No. D-1487-2.
38
We highlight these characteristics because they are different from the documentary evidence the prosecution formally
offered
39
consisting of the letter-request dated October 17, 2002
40
and the Physical Science Report No. D-1502-02.
41
The
testimonies of SPO2 Sanchez and PO3 Maulit as well as the submitted documentary evidence referred to the plastic
sachets of shabu through their markings of "ES-1-161002" and "ES-2-161002."
42
From all these, we find it obvious that some mistake must have been made in the presentation of the prosecution's
evidence. The prosecution, however, left the discrepancies fully unexplained. To reiterate, the forensic chemist testified to a
specimen dated October 12, 2002, or one secured way before the buy-bust of October 16, 2002, but marked as evidence
documents relating to the specimen of October 16, 2002. Strangely, even the defense disregarded the discrepancies. n his
comment on the offer of evidence, the defense simply stated, among others, by way of stipulation, that "the forensic
chemical officer only conducted a qualitative examination of the specimen he examined and not the quantitative
examination."
43
Coming immediately after the offer of evidence that mentioned the plastic sachets containing white
crystalline substances with markings "ES-1 16/10/02" and "ES-2 16/10/02," and the Physical Science Report No. D-1502-
02,
44
the defense was clearly sleeping on its feet when it reacted to the prosecution's offer of evidence.
But the defense was not alone in glossing over the discrepancies between the testimony for the prosecution and the offered
evidence, as both the RTC and CA also failed to notice the glaring flaws in the prosecution's evidence. Apparently, because
the parties did not point out these discrepancies while the appellate court did not closely review the records of the
proceedings, the discrepancies were not taken into account in the decision now under review.
These observations bring us full circle to our opening statement under the Court's ruling on the kind and extent of review
that an appellate court undertakes in a criminal case; the appeal opens the whole case for review, with the appellate court
charged with the duty to cite and appreciate the errors it may find in the appealed judgment, whether these errors are
assigned or unassigned. This is one such instance where we are duty bound to rectify errors that, although unnoticed below
and unassigned by the parties, are clearly reflected in the records of the case.
The Conclusion
Given the flagrant procedural lapses the police committed in handling the seized shabu and the obvious evidentiary gaps in
the chain of its custody, a presumption of regularity in the performance of duties cannot be made in this case. A
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty is made in the context of an existing rule of law or statute
authorizing the performance of an act or duty or prescribing a procedure in the performance thereof. The presumption
applies when nothing in the record suggests that the law enforcers deviated from the standard conduct of official duty
required by law; where the official act is irregular on its face, the presumption cannot arise.
45
n light of the flagrant lapses
we noted, the lower courts were obviously wrong when they relied on the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty.
We rule, too, that the discrepancy in the prosecution evidence on the identity of the seized and examined shabu and that
formally offered in court cannot but lead to serious doubts regarding the origins of the shabu presented in court. This
discrepancy and the gap in the chain of custody immediately affect proof of the corpus delicti without which the accused
must be acquitted.1avvphi1
From the constitutional law point of view, the prosecution's failure to establish with moral certainty all the elements of the
crime and to identify the accused as the perpetrator signify that it failed to overturn the constitutional presumption of
innocence that every accused enjoys in a criminal prosecution. When this happens, as in this case, the courts need not
even consider the case for the defense in deciding the case; a ruling for acquittal must forthwith issue.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby REVERSE and SET ASDE the March 28, 2006 decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00505 affirming the decision of conviction dated October 27, 2004 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 259, Paraaque City in Criminal Case Nos. 02-1236-7 for illegal sale of shabu under Section 5, Article of
Republic Act No. 9165. Accused-appellant ZADA KAMAD y AMBNG is hereby declaredACQUITTED and ordered
immediately RELEASED from detention, unless she is confined for any other lawful cause.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to IMPLEMENT this Decision and to report to this Court the action
taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 177222 October 29, 2008
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
RANILO DE LA CRUZ Y LIZING, appellant.
D E C S O N
TINGA, J.:
On appeal is the Decision
1
dated 30 November 2006 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 01266 affirming
in toto the judgment
2
dated 14 June 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City, Branch 211, finding
appellant Ranilo Dela Cruz y
Lizing guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article of Republic Act No. 9165 (R.A. No. 9165) and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and ordering him to pay a fine of P500,000.00.
3
On 13 September 2002, Dela Cruz was charged with the violation of the aforesaid offense in an nformation
4
that reads:
That on or about the 12
th
day of September 2002, in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any lawful authority, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously deliver, distribute, transport or sell to poseur-buyer PO2 Nick Resuello[,] one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic
sachet containing 0.03 gram each of white crystalline substance, which were found positive to the test for
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, commonly known as "shabu," a dangerous drug, for the amount of P100.00 with Serial
No. XY588120, without the corresponding license and prescription, in violation of the above-cited law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
5
On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued with the prosecution presenting as
witnesses arresting officers PO2 Braulio Peregrino, PO2 Nick Resuello, PO2 Marcelino Boyles, PO2 Allan Drilon,
investigator-on-case PO3 Virgilio Bismonte and Forensic Chemist Joseph Perdido.
Prosecution evidence shows that on 12 September 2002, the Office of the Station Drugs Enforcement Unit (SDEU),
Mandaluyong City received information that appellant, alias "Boy Tigre," of No. 73, Dela Cruz Street, Barangay Old Zaniga,
Mandaluyong City was engaging in the trade of illegal drugs. A team composed of Peregrino, Boyles, Drilon and Resuello
was dispatched to conduct a buy-bust operation in the area at around 2:00 p.m. of the same day. Peregrino, Boyles, and
Drilon positioned themselves at a nearby area while Resuello, the designated poseur-buyer, approached appellant
described as a long-haired, medium built, not-so-tall male, sporting a moustache and frequently seen wearing short
pants.
6
At the time, appellant was standing outside of their gate and kept on glancing from side to side.
7
Resuello then told
appellant that he wanted to buy shabu. Dela Cruz looked surprised prompting Resuello to repeat what he had said and
handed him the P100 bill with Serial No. XY 588120. Appellant, in turn, handed him a plastic sachet containing the white
crystalline substance. At which point, Resuello executed the pre-arranged signal and Peregrino immediately rushed to the
scene.
8
Peregrino, identifying himself as a policeman, held appellant and informed him of his constitutional rights. Peregrino then
recovered the buy-bust money from appellant. Subsequently, appellant was brought to SDECU for investigation. Thereat,
Peregrino placed his initials (BP) on the plastic sachet containing the white crystalline substance before sending it to the
Eastern Police District Crime Laboratory for chemical examination. The sachet was later tested positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. Subsequently, Peregrino and Resuello accomplished the booking and
information sheets regarding the incident. Peregrino also executed an affidavit on the matter.
9
Appellant was later identified
as Ranilo Dela Cruz y Lising.
10
On cross-examination, Peregrino and Resuello admitted that the buy-bust money had neither been dusted with fluorescent
powder nor marked. They only made a photocopy of it prior to the operation for purposes of identification.
11
Peregrino also
testified that appellant had not been tested for the presence of fluorescent powder; neither was a drug examination
conducted on him. After the arrest, Peregrino narrated that his office made a report on the matter which was forwarded to
the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA).
12
Boyles testified likewise on cross-examination that at the time of the
arrest, they had no coordination with PDEA.
13
Drilon, on the other hand, testified that he had not actually seen the
transaction.
14
Forensic Chemist Perdido testified that the plastic sachet was found to contain methamphetamine hydrochloride. He,
however, admitted that he examined the specimen and had made the markings on the same without the presence of
appellant.
15
For the defense, appellant testified that on 12 September 2002, at around 1:00 to 2:00 p.m., he was in his house watching
television with his wife when he heard a knock at the door. Outside, he came upon two men looking for "Boy Tigre." After
admitting that it was he they were looking for, he was told that the barangay captain needed him. He went with the two men
to see the barangay captain. Thereat, the barangay captain asked whether he knew of anyone engaged in large-scale drug
pushing. Appellant replied in the negative and in response, the barangay captain stated that there was nothing more he (the
barangay captain) can do. Appellant was then told to go to the City Hall. At first, his wife accompanied him there but he later
asked her to go home and raise the money Bismonte had allegedly demanded from him in exchange for his freedom. When
appellant's wife failed to return as she had given birth, a case for violation of Section 5, Article of R.A. No. 9165 was filed
against him.
16
Appellant added that he used to be involved in "video-karera" and surmised that this involvement could have
provoked the barangay captain's wrath.
17
Appellant's wife, Jocelyn Dela Cruz, corroborated appellant's testimony. She further stated that after appellant had identifi ed
himself as "Boy Tigre," the two men held on to him and asked him to go with them to the barangay captain. There, the
barangay captain asked appellant if he knew a certain "Amon" of Pitong Gatang. When appellant replied that he did not, he
was then brought to the SDECU where Bismonte allegedly demandedP100,000.00 from them or else a case without bail will
be filed against appellant.
18
Finding that the prosecution had proven appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the RTC rendered judgment against
him, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and ordering him to pay a fine ofP500,000.00. On appeal to
the Court of Appeals, the challenged decision was affirmed in toto by the appellate court, after it ruled that the trial court did
not commit any reversible error in finding appellant guilty of the offense charged.
Before the Court, appellant reiterates his contention that the apprehending police officers' failure to comply with Sections
21
19
and 86
20
of R.A. No. 9165 and that failure casts doubt on the validity of his arrest and the admissibility of the evidence
allegedly seized from him.
21
Through his Manifestation (n Lieu of Supplemental Brief) dated 4 September 2007, appellant
stated that he had exhaustively argued all the relevant issues in his Brief filed before the Court of Appeals and thus, he is
adopting it as Supplemental Brief.
22
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) manifested that it was dispensing with the admission of a supplemental
brief.
23
Earlier,
in its Appellee's Brief, the OSG maintained that despite the non-compliance with the requirements of R.A. No. 9165, the
seized drugs are admissible in evidence because their integrity and evidentiary value were properly preserved in
accordance with the mplementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165.
24
At the outset, it is well to restate the constitutional mandate that an accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proven beyond reasonable doubt. The burden lies on the prosecution to overcome such presumption of innocence by
presenting the quantum evidence required. n so doing, the prosecution must rest on its own merits and must not rely on the
weakness of the defense. And if the prosecution fails to meet the required amount of evidence, the defense may logically
not even present evidence on its own behalf. n which case the presumption prevails and the accused should necessarily be
acquitted.
25
n prosecutions for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following must be proven: (1) that the transaction or sale took place;
(2) the corpus delicti or the illicit drug was presented as evidence; and (3) that the buyer and seller were identified.
26
The
dangerous drug is the very corpus delicti of the offense.
27
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 states that:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof;
The RR of the same provision adds a proviso, to wit:
Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or
at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of
warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not
render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items;
n the case at bar, the Court finds that the arresting officers failed to strictly comply with the guidelines prescribed by the law
regarding the custody and control of the seized drugs despite its mandatory terms. While there was testimony regarding the
marking of the seized items at the police station, there was no mention whether the same had been done in the presence of
appellant or his representatives. There was likewise no mention that any representative from the media, DOJ or any elected
official had been present during the inventory or that any of these people had been required to sign the copies of the
inventory. Neither does it appear on record that the team photographed the contraband in accordance with law. Peregrino
testified as follows:
Q While you were at the office, what did you do with the physical evidence, subject of the buy-bust operation?
A When we were at the office[,] we marked the subject physical evidence and requested for physical examination[,] Ma'am.
ACP ndunan:
What were the markings placed on the physical evidence?
A What we put is initial "BP"
Q What does this BP means [sic]?
A My initial Ma'am, Braulio Perigrino [sic].
28
Resuello likewise testified in this wise:
ACP ndunan:
Q Before you brought this item to the crime laboratory[,] what other markings you placed on the sachet?
A We put a marking BP, Ma'am.
Q That BP stands for what[,] Mr. witness?
A Braulio Perigrino[,] Ma'am.
29
Following the rule that penal laws shall be construed strictly against the government, and liberally in favor of the
accused,
30
the apprehending team's omission to observe the procedure outlined by R.A. 9165 in the custody and
disposition of the seized drugs significantly impairs the prosecution's case.
Now, the prosecution cannot seek refuge in the proviso of the RR in the absence of proof of entitlement to such leniency.
The prosecution rationalizes its oversight by merely stating that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were
properly preserved in accordance with law. The allegation hardly sways the Court save when it is accompanied by proof.
According to the proviso of the RR of Section 21(a) of R.A. No. 9165, non-compliance with the procedure shall not render
void and invalid the seizure of and custody of the drugs only when: (1) such non-compliance was under justifiable grounds;
and (2) the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending team. Clearly,
there must be proof that these two (2) requirements were met before any such non-compliance may be said to fall within the
scope of the proviso. Significantly, not only does the present case lack the most basic or elementary attempt at compliance
with the law and its implementing rules; it fails as well to provide any justificatory ground showing that the integrity of the
evidence had all along been preserved.
31
Failing to prove entitlement to the application of the proviso, the arresting officers' non-compliance with the procedure laid
down by R.A No. 9156 is not excused. This inexcusable non-compliance effectively invalidates their seizure of and custody
over the seized drugs, thus, compromising the identity and integrity of the same. We resolve the doubt in the integrity and
identity of the corpus delicti in favor of appellant
32
as every fact necessary to constitute the crime must be established by
proof beyond reasonable doubt.
33
Considering that the prosecution failed to present the required quantum of evidence,
appellant's acquittal is in order.
t is well to recall that in several cases that came before us, we have repeatedly emphasized the importance of compliance
with the prescribed procedure in the custody and disposition of the seized drugs. We have over and over declared that the
deviation from the standard procedure dismally compromises the integrity of the evidence.
34
Anent the argument that the buy-bust operation was conducted without the assistance or consent of PDEA, in violation of
Section 86 of R.A. No. 9165, it must be pointed out that the second paragraph of the same provision states that the transfer,
absorption and integration of the different offices into PDEA shall take effect within eighteen (18) months from the effectivity
of the law which was on 4 July 2002.
35
n view of the fact that the buy-bust operation was conducted on 12 September
2002, it is excusable that the same was not done in coordination with PDEA.
All told, the totality of the evidence presented in the instant case does not support appellant's conviction for violation of
Section 5, Article , R.A. No. 9165, since the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the
offense. Following the constitutional mandate, when the guilt of the appellant has not been proven with moral certainty, as i n
this case, the presumption of innocence prevails and his exoneration should be granted as a matter of right.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 14 June 2004 of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 211 in Criminal
Case No. MC02-5912-D is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant RANLO DELA CRUZ y LZNG isACQUITTED of the
crime charged on the ground of reasonable doubt and ordered immediately RELEASED from custody, unless he is being
held for some other lawful case.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to implement this Decision forthwith and to NFORM this Court,
within five (5) days from receipt hereof, of the date appellant was actually released from confinement.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 197371 June 13, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JOEL ANCHETA y OSAN, JOHN LLORANDO y RIGARYO, and JUAN CARLOS GERNADA y HORCAJO,Accused-
Appellants.
D E C S O N
SERENO, J.:
Before the Court is an appeal from the 30 November 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)
1
affirming the 17
September 2008 Decision of the Makati City Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Case Nos. 04-2777, 04-2778, and 04-
2779.
2
The RTC Decision convicted Joel Ancheta y Osan, John Llorando y Rigaryo, and Juan Carlos Gernada y Horcajo of
violation of Article of Republic Act No. 9165 (R.A. 9165), otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002.
We quote the narration of facts of the CA as follows:
[Version of the Prosecution]
On 10 August 2004, [Police Officer (PO) 1] Honorio Marmonejo, a police officer assigned at the Makati Police Station Anti
llegal Drugs Special Operation Task Force (SAD-SOTF), received a confidential information regarding the drug pushing
activities of a certain alias "Joker" at Llorando Compound, Barangay East Rembo, Makati City. This alias "Joker" was also
listed in the said office's watchlist of suspected drug pushers.
Thereafter, an anti narcotics operation was planned by the police officers in order to apprehend alias "Joker". A buy-bust
team was formed comprising of four policemen and eight [Makati Anti-Drug Abuse Council (MADAC)] operatives from
Cluster 5. PO1 Marmonejo was designated to act as poseur buyer while the rest of the team served as his back-up.
Thereafter, five pieces of P 100-bills were provided and marked for use in the operation. PO1 Voltaire Esguerra likewise
coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) by accomplishing the necessary coordination form which
was acknowledged and received by the PDEA.
At about 5:45 in the afternoon of the same day, the buy-bust team arrived at Llorando Compound, 25th Street, Barangay
East Rembo, Makati City for the conduct of the buy bust operation. As the rest of the team positioned themselves
strategically in places where they can monitor the transaction, PO1 Marmonejo as the poseur buyer, accompanied by PO1
Mendoza and the informant, entered a slightly opened gate through an alley way where they met a man who asked them
where they were going. The informant replied that they were looking for Joker as they were going to purchase shabu from
the latter. The man asked how much they were going to buy, to which the informant answered him that he was to
purchase P 500.00-worth of shabu. The man told them to wait for a while and then called for Joker. The same man
thereafter told Joker that there were people who were going to buy from him. Joker asked him how much they were going to
purchase, and the man replied that they were going to purchase P 500.00-worth of shabu. Joker came out from inside the
house, and it was at this instance that PO1 Marmonejo took out the marked money. Joker, in turn, gave him one plastic
sachet containing white crystalline powder. The man they met at the alley took the marked money from him and handed it
over to Joker. While the transaction was ongoing, the police officers noticed a man, more or less 3 to 4 meters away from
them, washing clothes. After having received the buy bust money, Joker faced the man washing clothes and gave the latter
one plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance as payment for his laundry service.
The transaction having been consummated, PO1 Marmonejo gave the pre-arranged signal of sending a missed call to PO1
Voltaire Esguerra, one of the back-up police officers. PO1 Mendoza, upon receiving the missed call, together with MADAC
[operative Juan Siborboro], immediately went inside the house where the entrapment took place and assisted in effecting
the arrest of the accused. PO1 Mendoza held alias Joker, who was later on identified as accused-appellant Joel Ancheta,
and placed him under arrest. PO1 Marmonejo, on the other hand, arrested the man they met at the alley, who was later
identified to be accused-appellant John Llorando. MADAC [operative] Siborboro, for his part, apprehended the man washing
clothes, who was later identified as accused-appellant Juan Carlos Gernada.
Recovered from the possession of accused-appellant Ancheta after the latter's arrest were the marked money and five (5)
other plastic sachets containing the white crystalline substance. On the other hand, accused-appellant Gernada yielded one
(1) plastic sachet of white crystalline substance when requested to empty the contents of his pockets.
After informing all of the accused-appellants of their violations and nature of their arrest as well as their constitutional rights,
they were subsequently brought to the office of the Makati City Police SAD-SOTF.
Consequently, the plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance were thereafter brought to the crime laboratory for
examination and analysis. The results of the laboratory examination revealed that the substance was positive for
"methylamphetamine hydrochloride", otherwise known as "shabu", a dangerous drug.
Version of the Defense
On the other hand, the defense presented as its witnesses the three (3) accused-appellants.
n his defense, the accused-appellant Llorando denied the charge against him and claimed that, at 8:30 p.m. on 10 August
2004, he was cooking inside his house at 25th Avenue, East Rembo, Makati City when three (3) men suddenly entered his
house and poked a gun at him and frisked him. When he was subsequently arrested by the three men, accused-appellant
Llorando tried to struggle, but to no avail. His brother, who was inside the house, tried to intervene, but was not able to do
anything.
Meanwhile, a few meters away from his house lived his brother-in-law, accused-appellant Ancheta and the latter's adopted
son, accused-appellant Gernada.
The accused-appellants Ancheta and Gernada testified that on 10 August 2004, while Gernada was at the kitchen doing the
dishes and Ancheta was sleeping in his room with his wife, five (5) men barged into their house without warning and
arrested them. They were brought to a white vehicle, where they saw the accused-appellant Llorando, who was likewise
apparently taken by the same group.
All the accused-appellants were subsequently brought by their unknown captors to the latter's office at J.P. Rizal, South
Avenue, where they were charged afterwards for their alleged illegal drug activities.
3
Thus, the following nformations were filed by the prosecutor before the Makati City RTC:
Criminal Case No. 04-2777:
The undersigned Prosecutor accuses JOEL ANCHETA y OSAN alias "Joker" and JOHN LLORANDO y RGARYO alias
"John" of the crime of Violation of Section 5 in relation to Section 26, Article of R.A. 9165, committed as follows:
That on or about the 10th day of August 2004, in the City of Makati, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and both of them mutually helping and aiding one
another, without the corresponding license or prescription, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, gi ve
away, distribute and deliver zero point ten (0.10) gram of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), which is a dangerous
drug.
Criminal Case No. 04-2778:
The undersigned Prosecutor accuses JOEL ANCHETA y OSAN alias "Joker" of the crime of Violation of Section 11, Article
of R.A. 9165, committed as follows:
That on or about the 10th day of August 2004, in the City of Makati, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession direct custody and control a total weight of zero point twenty nine (0.29) grams of
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu) which is a dangerous drug, in violation of the above-cited law.
Criminal Case No. 04-2779:
The undersigned Prosecutor accuses JUAN CARLOS GERNADA y HORCAJO of the crime of Violation of Section 11,
Article of R.A. 9165, committed as follows:
That on or about the 10th day of August 2004, in the City of Makati, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession direct custody and control zero point zero three (0.03) gram of Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride (shabu) which is a dangerous drug, in violation of the above-cited law.
Criminal Case No. 04-3015:
The undersigned Prosecutor [accuses] JOHN LLORANDO y RGARYO alias "Jake" of the crime of Use of Dangerous Drug
under Section 15 of Republic Act No. 9165, committed as follows:
That sometime on or before or about the 10th day of August 2004, in the City of Makati, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being authorized by law to use dangerous drug, and
having been arrested and found positive for use of Methamphetamine after a confirmatory test, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously use Methamphetamine, a dangerous drug in violation of the said law.
The RTC Ruling
n its 17 September 2008 Decision, the Makati City RTC found accused-appellants guilty of violating Article of R.A. 9165
as follows: (a) Ancheta and Llorando were found guilty of violating Section 5 (Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation,
Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals) and
sentenced to suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P 500,000; (b) Ancheta and Gernada were found guilty of violating
Section 11 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs) and sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of (12)
years and one (1) day as minimum to fourteen (14) years and one (1) day as maximum and to pay a fine of P 300,000; and
(c) Llorando was found guilty of violating Section 15 (Use of Dangerous Drugs) and sentenced to undergo rehabilitation for
a period not less than six (6) months at a government drug rehabilitation. According to the RTC, the prosecution was able to
establish the existence of all the elements necessary to convict a person of the offenses of illegal possession and sale of
dangerous drugs. t also gave credence to the arresting officers' narration of the incident, as they were presumed to have
performed their official duties in a regular manner. t then rejected accused-appellants' claims of frame-up. Llorando pled
guilty to the charge of violating Section 15 of R.A. 9165.
The CA Ruling
On 30 November 2010, the CA issued a Decision affirming the reasoning of the RTC in the latter's 17 September 2008
judgment. The appellate court also explained that the failure of the arresting officers to comply with the proper procedure f or
the confiscation and seizure of dangerous drugs embodied in R.A. 9165 was not fatal to the prosecution's case. The CA
then ruled that noncompliance with the procedure in Section 21 of R.A. 9165 would not absolve accused-appellants of the
crimes of which they were found guilty and would not render their arrest illegal or the seizure of the items inadmissible.
Since accused-appellant Llorando pled guilty of violating Section 15 of R.A. 9165, he no longer appealed to the CA his
conviction for the use of dangerous drugs.
ssue
Whether or not noncompliance of the arresting officers with the procedure drawn in Section 21 of R.A. 9165 would
discharge accused-appellants from the crimes of which they were convicted.
Discussion
Accused-appellants question the CA affirmation of their conviction by arguing
4
that the arresting officers failed to comply
with the requirements for the proper custody of seized dangerous drugs under R.A. 9165. They claim that the officers failed
to conduct the following: (1) make a physical inventory of the seized items; (2) take photographs of the items; and (3)
establish that a representative each from the media, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official had
been contacted and was present during the marking of the items. Accused-appellants then contend that the prosecution did
not prove that noncompliance with procedure was on justifiable grounds. They also aver that the prosecution was unable to
establish that the apprehending team properly preserved the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated items.
n contrast, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeks the affirmation of the CA Decision by asserting
5
that the
elements of the crimes of illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs were established beyond reasonable doubt. The
OSG insists that the positive testimonies of the arresting enforcers carry more weight than the negative assertions of
accused-appellants, especially because the officers were presumed to have performed their duties regularly. t then
maintains that there is no indication that the arresting officers were impelled by improper motive when they testified against
accused-appellants.
On the issue of noncompliance with Section 21 of R.A. 9165, the OSG posits
6
that any failure to conform to the procedure
therein would not cause the invalidity of the buy-bust operation and the inadmissibility of the confiscated items as evidence.
t stresses that the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items is the most important consideration
in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. t then claims that the marking of the items ensured that the
drugs seized from accused-appellants were the same as those presented during trial.
n the very recent case People v. Umipang,
7
we explained that the nature of a buy-bust operation necessitates a stringent
application of the procedural safeguards specifically crafted by Congress in R.A. 9165 to counter potential police abuses.
We held thus:
At the outset, we take note that the present case stemmed from a buy-bust operation conducted by the SAD-SOTF. We
thus recall our pronouncement in People v. Garcia:
A buy-bust operation gave rise to the present case. While this kind of operation has been proven to be an effective way to
flush out illegal transactions that are otherwise conducted covertly and in secrecy, a buy-bust operation has a significant
downside that has not escaped the attention of the framers of the law. t is susceptible to police abuse, the most notorious of
which is its use as a tool for extortion. n People v. Tan, this Court itself recognized that "by the very nature of anti -narcotics
operations, the need for entrapment procedures, the use of shady characters as informants, the ease with which sticks of
marijuana or grams of heroin can be planted in pockets of or hands of unsuspecting provincial hicks, and the secrecy that
inevitably shrouds all drug deals, the possibility of abuse is great. Thus, courts have been exhorted to be extra vigilant in
trying drug cases lest an innocent person is made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses." Accordingly,
specific procedures relating to the seizure and custody of drugs have been laid down in the law (R.A. No. 9165) for the
police to strictly follow. The prosecution must adduce evidence that these procedures have been followed in proving the
elements of the defined offense. (Emphasis supplied and citations omitted.)
Section 21 of R.A. 9165 delineates the mandatory procedural safeguards that are applicable in cases of buy-bust
operations:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of
Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory
Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof; (Emphasis supplied.)
x x x x x x x x x
Congress introduced another complementing safeguard through Section 86 of R.A. 9165, which requires the National
Bureau of nvestigation (NB), Philippine National Police (PNP), and Bureau of Customs (BOC) to maintain close
coordination with PDEA in matters of illegal drug-related operations:
x x x x x x x x x
Given the nature of buy-bust operations and the resulting preventive procedural safeguards crafted in R.A. 9165, courts
must tread carefully before giving full credit to the testimonies of those who conducted the operations. Although we have
ruled in the past that mere procedural lapses in the conduct of a buy-bust operation are not ipso facto fatal to the
prosecution's cause, so long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items have been preserved, courts must
still thoroughly evaluate and differentiate those errors that constitute a simple procedural lapse from those that amount to a
gross, systematic, or deliberate disregard of the safeguards drawn by the law. Consequently, Section 21(a) of the [2002
mplementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. 9165 (RR)] provides for a saving clause in the procedures outlined under
Section 21(1) of R.A. 9165, which serves as a guide in ascertaining those procedural aspects that may be relaxed under
justifiabIe grounds, viz:
x x x x x x x x x
We have reiterated that "this saving clause applies only where the prosecution recognized the procedural lapses, and
thereafter explained the cited justifiable grounds" after which, "the prosecution must show that the integrity and evidentiar y
value of the evidence seized have been preserved." To repeat, noncompliance with the required procedure will not
necessarily result in the acquittal of the accused if: (1) the noncompliance is on justifiable grounds; and (2) the integrity and
the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending team.
Accordingly, despite the presumption of regularity in the performance of the official duties of law enforcers, we stress that
the step-by-step procedure outlined under R.A. 9165 is a matter of substantive law, which cannot be simply brushed aside
as a simple procedural technicality. The provisions were crafted by Congress as safety precautions to address potential
police abuses, especially considering that the penalty imposed may be life imprisonment. n People v. Coreche, we
explained thus:
The concern with narrowing the window of opportunity for tampering with evidence found legislative expression in Section
21 (1) of RA 9165 on the inventory of seized dangerous drugs and paraphernalia by putting in place a three-tiered
requirement on the time, witnesses, and proof of inventory by imposing on the apprehending team having initial custody and
control of the drugs the duty to "immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in
the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public
official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof". (Emphasis supplied and
citations omitted.)
Here, the records are bereft of any indication that would show that the prosecution was able to establish the arresting
officers' compliance with the procedural safeguards under R.A. 9165. Neither do the records contain any physical inventory
report or photograph of the confiscated items. None of the arresting officers testified that they had conducted a physical
inventory or taken pictures of the items. Nor did they state that there was even any attempt to contact a representative from
the media and the DOJ, and an elected public official. Nowhere can it be found that the marking of the items was done in
the presence of any of the said third-party representatives. n all these major lapses, no one gave so much as an
explanation of why the procedure was not followed, or whether there was a justifiable ground for failing to do so. The
arresting officers and the prosecution simply did not bother discussing these matters. The OSG does not dispute these
assertions and instead counters that noncompliance was not fatal to the prosecution's case. t then argues that the marking
of the confiscated items was sufficient to protect the identity of the corpus delicti.
Though we have recognized that "[m]inor deviations from the procedures under R.A. 9165 would not automatically
exonerate an accused,"
8
we have also declared that "when there is gross disregard of the procedural safeguards prescribed
in the substantive law (R.A. 9165), serious uncertainty is generated about the identity of the seized items that the
prosecution presented in evidence."
9
We then ruled that such doubt "cannot be remedied by simply invoking the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties, for a gross, systematic, or deliberate disregard of the
procedural safeguards effectively produces an irregularity in the performance of official duties."
10
Accordingly, "the
prosecution is deemed to have failed to fully establish the elements of the crimes charged, creating reasonable doubt on the
criminal liability of the accused."
11
ndeed, it is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items that is of utmost importance in
determining the admissibility of the evidence presented in court, especially in cases of buy-bust operations. That is why
Congress saw fit to fashion a detailed procedure in order to ensure that the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated
items would not be compromised. The marking of the seized items was only a piece in a detailed set of procedural
safeguards embodied in R.A. 9165. f the arresting officers were unable to comply with the other requirements, they were
under obligation to explain why the procedure was not followed and prove that the reason provided a justifiable ground.
Otherwise, the requisites under the law would merely be fancy ornaments that may or may not be disregarded by the
arresting officers at their own convenience.
We now raise serious concerns about the drug enforcement operations of the arresting officers. Records reveal that PDEA
and the Makati City Police SAD-SOTF had been keeping accused-appellant Ancheta under surveillance. PO1 Marmonejo
testified that he was already on the watch list of suspected drug pushers. Ancheta was known to have been regularly selling
shabu at the same location in which he was arrested. Accused-appellants were arrested within the family compound of the
Llorandos. These particular facts bolster the impression that the buy-bust operation was a forthcoming action in which the
arresting officers had ample time to prepare, plan, coordinate, and follow processes. Their inability, then, to follow the legal
procedure in Section 21 under the present circumstances raises more questions on the facts surrounding the buy-bust
operation. Consequently, the need to observe procedural safeguards outlined in R.A. 9165 becomes even more important.
We reiterate that R.A. 9165 has a strict mandate for the arresting officers to comply with the afore-quoted procedural
safeguards. We further note that, before the saving clause provided under it can be invoked, Section 21(a) of the RR
requires the prosecution to prove the twin conditions of (a) existence of justifiable grounds and (b) preservation of the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items. n this case, the arresting officers neither presented nor explained
justifiable grounds for their failure to (1) make a physical inventory of the seized items; (2) take photographs of the items;
and (3) establish that a representative each from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public
official had been contacted and were present during the marking of the items. These errors were exacerbated by the fact
that the officers had ample time to comply with these legal requirements, as they had already monitored and put accused-
appellants on their watch list. The totality of these circumstances has led us to conclude that the apprehending officers
deliberately disregarded the legal procedure under R.A. 9165. "These lapses effectively produced serious doubts on the
integrity and identity of the corpus delicti, especially in the face of allegations of frame-up."
12
Accused-appellants would
thereby be discharged from the crimes of which they were convicted.
The disposition of this case reminds us of our observation in People v. Garcia, in which we took note of the statistics relating
to dismissal and acquittal in dangerous drugs cases. There we mentioned that "[u]nder PDEA records, the dismissals and
acquittals accounted for 56% because of the failure of the police authorities to observe proper procedure under the law,
among others."
13
We then noted an international study conducted in 2008, which showed that "out of 13,667 drug cases
filed from 2003 to 2007, only 4,790 led to convictions (most of which were cases of simple possession); the charges against
the rest were dismissed or the accused were acquitted."
14
Our own data
15
on the cases filed with us from 2006 to 2011
show that, out of those in which this Court made acquittals and reversals, 85% involved failure of the prosecution to
establish the arresting officers' compliance with the procedural requirements outlined in Section 21 of R.A. 9165.
t is truly distressing how courts are constrained to make acquittals, dismissals, or reversals because of the inadvertent
failure of arresting officers and the prosecution to establish compliance or justify noncompliance with a statutory procedure.
t is even more troubling when those cases involve apparently known or long-suspected drug pushers. Congress was clear
in its declaration on the eradication of the drug menace plaguing our country. Yet, also firm and stringent is its mandate to
observe the legal safeguards under R.A. 9165. This is the reason why we have emphasized countless times that courts
must remain vigilant in their disposition of cases related to dangerous drugs. Also, we have already called on the police,
PDEA, and the prosecution to reinforce and review the conduct of buy-bust operations and the presentation of evidence.
16
WHEREFORE, the appealed 30 November 2010 Decision of the CA, which affirmed the 17 September 2008 Decision of the
Makati City RTC, is SET ASDE. Accused-appellants Joel Ancheta y Osan, John Llorando y Rigaryo, and Juan Carlos
Gernada y Horcajo are hereby ACQUTTED of the charges in Criminal Case Nos. 04-2777, 04-2778, and 04-2779 on the
ground of reasonable doubt.1wphi1
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is hereby ORDERED to immediately RELEASE accused-appellants from custody,
unless they are detained for some other lawful cause.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 190321 ApriI 25, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
SAMMY UMIPANG y ABDUL, Accused-Appellant.
D E C S O N
SERENO, J.:
Before the Court is an appeal from the 21 May 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)
1
affirming the 24 July 2007 Joint
Decision of the Pasig City Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Cases No. 14935-D-TG and No. 14936-D-TG.
2
The RTC
Decision convicted Sammy Umipang y Abdul (Umipang) for violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article of Republic Act No.
9165 (R.A. 9165), otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
Facts
The pertinent facts, as determined by the CA, are quoted as follows:
Acting on a tip from a confidential informant that a person named Sam was selling drugs along Cagayan de Oro Street in
Maharlika Village, Taguig City, a buy-bust team from the [Station Anti-llegal Drugs Special Operation Task Force (SAD-
SOTF)] of the Taguig City Police was dispatched on April 1, 2006 at around 6:00 in the evening. [Police Officer (PO) 2]
Gasid was assigned to act as poseur buyer and he was given a P 500.00 marked money. The operation was coordinated
with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA).
Upon arrival at the area, PO2 Gasid and the confidential informant sauntered the length of the street while the other
members of the team strategically positioned themselves. The confidential informant saw the man called Sam standing near
a store. The confidential informant and PO2 Gasid then approached Sam. Straight off, the confidential informant said "Sam,
pa-iskor kami." Sam replied "Magkano ang iiskorin nyo?" The confidential informant said "Five hundred pesos." Sam took
out three (3) plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance with various price tags500, 300, and 100. After making
a choice, PO2 Gasid handed the marked P 500.00 to Sam who received the same.
Upon receipt by Sam of the marked money, PO2 Gasid took off his cap as the pre-arranged signal that the sale had been
consummated. Sensing danger, Sam attempted to flee but PO2 Gasid immediately grabbed and arrested Sam. n a few
seconds, the rest of the buy-bust team [comprised of their team leader, Police Senior nspector (PS/NSP.) Obong, Senior
Police Officer (SPO) 1 Mendiola, PO3 Hajan, PO3 Maglana, PO3 Salem, and PO1 Ragos] joined them. PO1 Ragos
handcuffed Sam. Five (5) more plastic sachets containing the same white crystalline substance were recovered from Sam.
PO2 Gasid marked the items with the initials "SAU" [which stood for Sammy A. Umipang, the complete name, including the
middle initial, of accused-appellant]. Sam was forthwith brought to the police station where he was booked, investigated and
identified as accused-appellant Sammy Umipang y Abdul. PO2 Gasid then brought the confiscated items to the crime
laboratory for testing. The specimens all tested positive for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, popularly known as "shabu,"
a dangerous drug.
On the other hand, the defense presented accused-appellant himself and his brother Nash Rudin Umipang. According to
them:
n the evening of April 1, 2006, while they were sleeping, accused-appellant and his family were awakened by loud knocking
on the door. The persons outside shouted "Mga pulis kami. Buksan mo ang pinto kung hindi gigibain namin ito." Accused-
appellant obliged and opened the door. Five (5) policemen barged into his house and pointed a gun at him. Against his will
and amid the screams of his wife, accused-appellant was brought to a waiting vehicle and brought to the police
headquarters. At the Taguig Police station, PO2 Gasid tried to extort from him P100,000.00 for his release. He denied the
charges and that the alleged evidence were all "planted" by the police.
3
Consequently, the following charges were brought against Umipang:
That on or about the 1st day of April 2006, in the City of Taguig, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, without having been authorized by law, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
knowingly sell deliver and give away to poseur buyer PO2 Ruchyl Gasid, one heat sealed transparent plastic sachet
containing 0.05 gram of white crystalline substance, which substance was found positive to the test for Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride also known as "shabu" a dangerous drug, in consideration of the amount of P 500.00, in violation of the
above-cited law.
That on or about the 1st day of April 2006, in the City of Taguig, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, without having been authorized by law, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
knowingly possess and have in his custody and control five (5) heat sealed transparent plastic sachets, each containing
0.05 gram, 0.05 gram, 0.05 gram, 0.04 gram and 0.04 gram with a total weight of 0.23 gram of white crystalline substance,
which substances were found positive to the tests for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride also known as "shabu" a
dangerous drug, in violation of the above-cited law.
RTC Ruling
n its 24 July 2007 Joint Decision, the Pasig City RTC found accused-appellant guilty of violating Section 5 (Sale, Trading,
Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors
and Essential Chemicals) and Section 11 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs), Article of R.A. 9165. The RTC gave more
weight to the testimonies of the arresting officers on how they conducted the buy-bust operation than to accused-appellant's
claim of frame-up by the police. Thus, for violating Section 5 (Criminal Case No. 14935-D-TG), Umipang was sentenced to
suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P 500,000. For violating Section 11 (Criminal Case No. 14936-D-TG), he was
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day as minimum to fourteen
(14) years one (1) day as maximum and to pay a fine of P 300,000.
CA Ruling
n its 21 May 2009 Decision, the CA affirmed in toto the 24 July 2007 Joint Decision of the RTC. According to the appellate
court, the elements necessary for the prosecution of the illegal possession and sale of dangerous drugs were present and
established. Thus, it no longer disturbed the RTC's assessment of the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. Furthermore,
the CA found that there was no showing of improper motive on the part of the police officers. With the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duties, it ruled against the denials of accused-appellant, and his defense of frame-up.
We have consistently declared that a review of the factual findings of the lower courts is not a function that is normally
undertaken in appeals before this Court. However, after a careful scrutiny of the CA Decision, we find it proper to reevaluate
the factual issues surrounding the present case, especially since it is not clear from the Decision whether the proper
implementation of the strict procedural safeguards laid down in R.A. 9165 was established.
ssue
Whether or not the RTC and the CA erred in finding that the testimonial evidence of the prosecution witnesses were
sufficient to convict accused-appellant of the alleged sale and possession of methylamphetamine hydrochloride, which are
violations under Sections 5 and 11, respectively, of R.A. 9165.
Discussion
Accused-appellant argues
4
that since there were two versions presented during trial one, that of the prosecution; and the
other, that of the accused the latter version must be adopted, because the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duties should not take precedence over the presumption of innocence of the accused. He also contends that a
surveillance of just 30 minutes was insufficient to establish that Umipang was engaged in the sale of illegal drugs. Lastly,
accused-appellant claims that the fact of possession of the confiscated plastic sachets was not clearly established, and t hat
the evidence allegedly confiscated from him was merely planted.
5
Alluding to the testimony of PO1 Ragos, he points out that
the former did not see him holding the drugs, and that the sachet was shown only to PO1 Ragos by PO2 Gasid.
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) prays for the affirmation of the RTC Joint Decision in all
respects, as it was decided in accord with law and evidence.
6
The OSG argues
7
that the necessary elements to convict a
person under Sections 5 and 11 were proven beyond reasonable doubt. t then contends that, absent independent proof
and substantiated evidence to the contrary, accused-appellant's bare-faced denial should be deemed merely as a self-
serving statement that does not hold merit. Finally, the OSG asserts that, where there is no evidence of improper motive on
the part of the prosecution witness to testify falsely against accused-appellant, the testimony must be given full faith and
credence.
Substantive law requires strict observance of the procedural safeguards outlined in R.A. 9165
At the outset, we take note that the present case stemmed from a buy-bust operation conducted by the SAD-SOTF. We
thus recall our pronouncement in People v. Garcia:
A buy-bust operation gave rise to the present case. While this kind of operation has been proven to be an effective way to
flush out illegal transactions that are otherwise conducted covertly and in secrecy, a buy-bust operation has a significant
downside that has not escaped the attention of the framers of the law. t is susceptible to police abuse, the most notorious of
which is its use as a tool for extortion. n People v. Tan, this Court itself recognized that "by the very nature of anti -narcotics
operations, the need for entrapment procedures, the use of shady characters as informants, the ease with which sticks of
marijuana or grams of heroin can be planted in pockets of or hands of unsuspecting provincial hicks, and the secrecy that
inevitably shrouds all drug deals, the possibility of abuse is great. Thus, courts have been exhorted to be extra vigilant in
trying drug cases lest an innocent person is made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses." Accordingly,
specific procedures relating to the seizure and custody of drugs have been laid down in the law (R.A. No. 9165) for the
police to strictly follow. The prosecution must adduce evidence that these procedures have been followed in proving the
elements of the defined offense.
8
(Emphasis supplied and citations omitted.)
Section 21 of R.A. 9165 delineates the mandatory procedural safeguards
9
that are applicable in cases of buy-bust
operations:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of
Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory
Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shallbe required to sign the copies
of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;
(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment,
the same shall be submitted to the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative examination;
(3) A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which shall be done under oath by the forensic
laboratory examiner, shall be issued within twenty-four (24) hours after the receipt of the subject item/s: Provided,
That when the volume of the dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and
essential chemicals does not allow the completion of testing within the time frame, a partial laboratory examination
report shall be provisionally issued stating therein the quantities of dangerous drugs still to be examined by the
forensic laboratory: Provided, however, That a final certificationshall be issued on the completed forensic laboratory
examination on the same within the next twenty-four (24) hours;
(4) After the filing of the criminal case, the Court shall, within seventy-two (72) hours, conduct an ocular inspection
of the confiscated, seized and/or surrendered dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, including the instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, and
through the PDEA shall within twenty-four (24) hours thereafter proceed with the destruction or burning of the same,
in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the DOJ, civil society groups and any elected public
official. The Board shall draw up the guidelines on the manner of proper disposition and destruction of such item/s
which shall be borne by the offender: Provided, That those item/s of lawful commerce, as determined by the Board,
shall be donated, used or recycled for legitimate purposes: Provided, further, That a representative sample, duly
weighed and recorded is retained;
(5) The Board shall then issue a sworn certification as to the fact of destruction or burning of the subject item/s
which, together with the representative sample/s in the custody of the PDEA, shall be submitted to the court having
jurisdiction over the case. n all instances, the representative sample/s shall be kept to a minimum quantity as
determined by the Board;
(6) The alleged offender or his/her representative or counsel shall be allowed to personally observe all of the above
proceedings and his/her presence shall not constitute an admission of guilt. n case the said offender or accused
refuses or fails to appoint a representative after due notice in writing to the accused or his/her counsel within
seventy-two (72) hours before the actual burning or destruction of the evidence in question, the Secretary of Justice
shall appoint a member of the public attorney's office to represent the former; x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
Congress introduced another complementing safeguard through Section 86 of R.A. 9165, which requires the National
Bureau of nvestigation (NB), Philippine National Police (PNP), and Bureau of Customs (BOC) to maintain close
coordination with PDEA in matters of illegal drug-related operations:
Section 86. Transfer, Absorption, and Integration of All Operating Units on Illegal Drugs into the PDEA and Transitory
Provisions. x x x.
x x x x x x x x x
Nothing in this Act shall mean a diminution of the investigative powers of the NB and the PNP on all other crimes as
provided for in their respective organic laws: Provided, however, That when the investigation being conducted by the NB,
PNP or any ad hoc anti-drug task force is found to be a violation of any of the provisions of this Act, the PDEA shall be the
lead agency. The NB, PNP or any of the task force shall immediately transfer the same to the PDEA: Provided, further,
That the NB, PNP and the Bureau of Customs shall maintain close coordination with the PDEA on all drug related matters.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the 2002 mplementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. 9165 (RR) set the following procedure for maintaining close
coordination:
SECTON 86. Transfer, Absorption, and Integration of All Operating Units on Illegal Drugs into the PDEA and Transitory
Provisions. x x x.
x x x x x x x x x
(a) Relationship/Coordination between PDEA and Other Agencies The PDEA shall be the lead agency in the
enforcement of the Act, while the PNP, the NB and other law enforcement agencies shall continue to conduct anti-drug
operations in support of the PDEA: Provided, that the said agencies shall, as far as practicable, coordinate with the PDEA
prior to anti-drug operations; Provided, further, that, in any case, said agencies shall inform the PDEA of their anti-drug
operations within twenty-four (24) hours from the time of the actual custody of the suspects or seizure of said drugs and
substances, as well as paraphernalia and transport equipment used in illegal activities involving such drugs and/or
substances, and shall regularly update the PDEA on the status of the cases involving the said anti-drug
operations; Provided, furthermore, that raids, seizures, and other anti-drug operations conducted by the PNP, the NB, and
other law enforcement agencies prior to the approval of this RR shall be valid and authorized; Provided, finally, that nothing
in this RR shall deprive the PNP, the NB, other law enforcement personnel and the personnel of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) from effecting lawful arrests and seizures in consonance with the provisions of Section 5, Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court. (Emphasis supplied.)
Given the nature of buy-bust operations and the resulting preventive procedural safeguards crafted in R.A. 9165, courts
must tread carefully before giving full credit to the testimonies of those who conducted the operations. Although we have
ruled in the past that mere procedural lapses in the conduct of a buy-bust operation are not ipso facto fatal to the
prosecution's cause, so long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items have been preserved,
10
courts
must still thoroughly evaluate and differentiate those errors that constitute a simple procedural lapse from those that amount
to a gross, systematic, or deliberate disregard of the safeguards drawn by the law. Consequently, Section 21(a) of the RR
provides for a saving clause in the procedures outlined under Section 21(1) of R.A. 9165, which serves as a guide in
ascertaining those procedural aspects that may be relaxedunder justifiabIe grounds, viz:
SECTON 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of
Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory
Equipment. x x x:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such
items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the
search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever
is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements
under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items; (Emphasis
supplied.)
We have reiterated that "this saving clause applies only where the prosecution recognized the procedural lapses, and
thereafter explained the cited justifiable grounds" after which, "the prosecution must show that the integrity and evidentiar y
value of the evidence seized have been preserved."
11
To repeat, noncompliance with the required procedure will not
necessarily result in the acquittal of the accused if: (1) the noncompliance is on justifiable grounds; and (2) the integrity and
the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending team.
12
Accordingly, despite the presumption of regularity in the performance of the official duties of law enforcers,
13
we stress that
the step-by-step procedure outlined under R.A. 9165 is a matter of substantive law, which cannot be simply brushed aside
as a simple procedural technicality. The provisions were crafted by Congress as safety precautions to address potential
police abuses, especially considering that the penalty imposed may be life imprisonment. n People v. Coreche,
14
we
explained thus:
The concern with narrowing the window of opportunity for tampering with evidence found legislative expression in Section
21 (1) of RA 9165 on the inventory of seized dangerous drugs and paraphernalia by putting in place a three-tiered
requirement on the time, witnesses, and proof of inventory by imposing on the apprehending team having initial custody and
control of the drugs the duty to "immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in
the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public
official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof". (Emphasis supplied.)
Consequently, in a line of cases,
15
we have lain emphasis on the importance of complying with the prescribed procedure.
Stringent compliance is justified under the rule that penal laws shall be construed strictly against the government and
liberally in favor of the accused.
16
Otherwise, "the procedure set out in the law will be mere lip service."
17
Material irregularities in the conduct of the buy-bust operations
n the recent case of People v. Relato, we reiterated the following:
n a prosecution of the sale and possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride prohibited under Republic Act No. 9165, the
State not only carries the heavy burden of proving the elements of the offense of, but also bears the obligation to prove the
corpus delicti, failing in which the State will not discharge its basic duty of proving the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. t is settled that the State does not establish the corpus delicti when the prohibited substance subject of
the prosecution is missing or when substantial gaps in the chain of custody of the prohibited substance raise grave doubts
about the authenticity of the prohibited substance presented as evidence in court. Any gap renders the case for the State
less than complete in terms of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, Relato deserves
exculpation, especially as we recall that his defense of frame-up became plausible in the face of the weakness of the
Prosecution's evidence of guilt.
18
(Emphasis supplied and citations omitted.)
The conduct of the buy-bust operations was peppered with defects, which raises doubts on the preservation of the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized items from accused-appellant.
First, there were material inconsistencies in the marking of the seized items. According to his testimony, PO2 Gasid used
the initials of the complete name, including the middle initial, of accused-appellant in order to mark the confiscated sachets.
The marking was done immediately after Umipang was handcuffed. However, a careful perusal of the testimony of PO2
Gasid would reveal that his prior knowledge of the complete initials of accused-appellant, standing for the latter's full name,
was not clearly established. Thus, doubt arises as to when the plastic sachets were actually marked, as shown by PO2
Gasid's testimony:
A [PO2 Gasid]: We conducted a buy-bust operation on April 1, 2006.
PROSEC. SANTOS: Against whom did you conduct this buy-bust operation?
A: Against alias Sam, sir.
PROSEC. SANTOS: What prompted you to conduct this operation against this alias Sam?
A: We received information from our confidential informant that one alias Sam is selling shabu at Cagayan De Oro Street,
Maharlika Village, Taguig.
PROSEC. SANTOS: Aside from this information that you received from your informant, was there anything more that your
informant told you about the real identity of this alias Sam?
A: Nothing more, sir, he gave us only his alias, sir.
19
x x x x x x x x x
PROSEC. SANTOS: So, after you have taken the item and paid alias Sam and then you executed the pre-arranged signal
that you have already purchased from him, what happened then?
A: After made the pre-arranged signal, mabilis po yung mata ni alias Sam, para ho bang balisa, siguro napansin nya na
hindi lang kami dalawa (2), aakma syang tatakbo, sinunggaban ko na po sya.
PROSEC. SANTOS: So, you held Sam already during that time?
A: Yes, sir.
PROSEC. SANTOS: What happened after that?
A: introduced myself as police officer and at that time arrested him.
PROSEC. SANTOS: What about your companions who serves [sic] as your immediate back up, what happened to them
when you were already hold and arrested [sic] this alias Sam?
A: noticed my companions approaching us.
x x x x x x x x x
PROSEC. SANTOS: And what did your colleague Ragos do when he arrived at your place?
A: When he arrived at the place, after arresting alias Sam, he was the one who handcuffed him.
PROSEC. SANTOS: Was there anything more that was done in that place of occurrence during that time, Officer?
A: Yes, sir.
PROSEC. SANTOS: Tell us please?
A: After arresting alias Sam, frisk [sic] him for the remaining items he showed me and the buy-bust money gave him.
x x x x x x x x x
PROSEC. SANTOS: Was there anything that you and your team did in the items that you confiscated from the possession
of the accused during that time and the shabu that you bought from him?
A: marked the items confiscated at the place of incident.
PROSEC. SANTOS: How did you marked [sic] the item that you bought from this alias Sam?
A: SAU, sir.
PROSEC. SANTOS: And what does that stand for? That SAU?
A: Stands for the initials of alias Sam.
PROSEC. SANTOS: s that the only thing that you placed on the plastic sachet containing the shabu that you bought from
this alias Sam during that time?
A: marked the shabu bought as SAU-1.
PROSEC. SANTOS: How about the other five (5) plastic sachets containing the suspected shabu, what happened to that?
A: marked them as SAU-2, SAU-3, SAU-4, SAU-5 and SAU-6.
20
x x x x x x x x x
PROSEC. SANTOS: Now, after you have marked and inventoried the items that you bought and confiscated from this alias
Sam during that time, what else happened?
A: After the inventory of the evidences, turn [sic] them over to the investigator.
PROSEC. SANTOS: Where did you turn these items to your investigator?
A: At the office, sir.
PROSEC. SANTOS: Who was your investigator during that time?
A: PO1 Alexander Saez, sir.
PROSEC. SANTOS: When you turn these items to your investigator, where were you?
A: At the office, sir.
PROSEC. SANTOS: What happened to these items that you turn it over [sic] to your investigator?
A: He made a request for laboratory examination of the items confiscated.
21
x x x x x x x x x
PROSEC. SANTOS: Now, Officer, this Sam when you have already arrested him, were you able to know his real name?
A: Yes, sir.
PROSEC. SANTOS: What was his real name?
A: Sammy Umipang, sir.
PROSEC. SANTOS: s he present here in Court?
A: Yes, sir.
22
x x x x x x x x x
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: When you arrived at the place, by the way, where was your target area, Mr. Witness?
A: Cagayan De Oro Street, Barangay Maharlika, Taguig City.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: When you were there, you did not buy [sic] anybody to buy shabu from the accused?
A: No, sir.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: So, you did not conduct any test buy?
A: No, sir.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: Nor did you make any inquiry with Cagayan De Oro Street regarding the accused?
A: Not anymore, sir.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: At that moment, you don't have any idea regarding the identity of the accused and also whether he
was engaged in illegal activity?
A: Regarding the identity, he was described by the informant.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: t was only the informant who knows the accused?
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: And also your other members, they did not know the accused?
A: Yes, sir.
23
(Emphasis supplied.)
A clearer picture of what transpired during the buy-bust operation, from the marking of the confiscated items to the arrest of
accused-appellant, is provided by the testimony of PO1 Ragos:
PROSEC. SANTOS: And what is the effect to you of the act of Gasid taking off his cap?
A: That is the sign that he already bought the shabu.
PROSEC. SANTOS: When you saw Gasid acting that way, being the back up of him during that time, what did you do?
A: run [sic] towards them.
PROSEC. SANTOS: Were you able to go near him when you run [sic] towards him?
A: Yes, sir.
PROSEC. SANTOS: What happened?
A: saw him holding Sam.
PROSEC. SANTOS: When you saw Gasid already holding Sam, what did you do?
A: handcuffed Sam.
PROSEC. SANTOS: After that, what happened?
A: The items confiscated by Gasid were marked with his initials.
PROSEC. SANTOS: Did you see Gasid marking those things that he took from this Sam during that time?
A: Yes, sir.
x x x x x x x x x
PROSEC. SANTOS: What marked [sic] did he put on these plastic sachets?
A: SAU, sir.
PROSEC. SANTOS: Do you know what SAU connotes?
A: Yes, sir.
PROSEC. SANTOS: Tell us?
A: Sammy Abdul Umipang.
PROSEC. SANTOS: After that, what happened?
A: He was apprising [sic] of his constitutional rights.
PROSEC. SANTOS: After this person was apprised of his rights, was there anything more that was done?
A: We went back to the office.
PROSEC. SANTOS: All the members of the team went back to the office?
A: Yes, sir.
PROSEC. SANTOS: And together with this alias Sam?
A: Yes, sir.
PROSEC. SANTOS: What happened in your office?
A: We turn [sic] over the evidence to the investigator.
PROSEC. SANTOS: Who was your investigator during that time?
A: PO1 Saez.
x x x x x x x x x
PROSEC. SANTOS: So, after the team has turn [sic] over the evidences to your investigator in the person of Officer Saez,
was there anything more that transpired in relation to this event, this incident?
A: We prepared an affidavit of arrest.
24
x x x x x x x x x
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: And this information regarding the accused was relayed to you by your immediate superior?
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: And this information was the first information regarding the accused, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: What was told you was that your target person was alias Sam?
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: No photographs of alias Sam was shown to you?
A: None, sir.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: You have no derogatory records of this alias Sam in your office?
A: None, sir.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: You have no warrant of arrest?
A: None, sir.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: This alias Sam was not included in your watch list?
A: No, sir.
25
x x x x x x x x x
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: So, the markings were placed on the plastic sachets?
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: After that Mr. Witness, you brought the accused together with the items to your office?
PROSEC. SANTOS: Already answered, Your Honor. We are just repeating the same pattern, Your Honor.
x x x x x x x x x
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: Mr. Witness, you investigated the accused?
A: No more, it was PO1 Saez who investigated the accused.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: So, you did not ask the full name of the accused?
A: t was PO1 Saez who investigated him, sir.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: t was PO1 Saez who got his full name and on you [sic] part, that was the first time that you were able
to learned [sic] the full name of the accused?
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: Because you knew him only as alias Sam?
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: How about Officer Gasid, it was also the first time that he learned the full name of the accused?
A: Maybe not, sir.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: Mr. Witness, you mentioned that it was Officer Saez who delivered the items to the crime lab?
A: No sir, it was Gasid.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: But you were not with him when he delivered the specimen to the crime laboratory?
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: No further question, Your Honor.
PROSEC. SANTOS: No re-direct, Your Honor. x x x
26
(Emphasis supplied.)
The circumstances surrounding the marking of the seized items are suspect. From their testimonies during the trial, PO2
Gasid and PO1 Ragos both admitted that they only knew their target by the name "Sam." They both testified that, after
accused-appellant was handcuffed, frisked, and read his rights, they immediately brought him to the police precinct. They
then said that it was a certain PO1 Saez who investigated him. n fact, in their joint affidavit, PO2 Gasid and PO1 Ragos
stated thus:
Na dinala namin siya [accused] sa aming opisina para sa pagsisiyasat at pagtatanong tungkol sa detalye ng kaniyang
pagkatao at sa layuning masampahan ng kaukulang reklamo sa paglabag ng Section 5 and 11 of RA 9165.
27
(Emphasis
supplied.)
Evidence on record does not establish that PO2 Gasid had prior knowledge of the complete name of accused-appellant,
including the middle initial, which enabled the former to mark the seized items with the latter's complete initials. This
suspicious, material inconsistency in the marking of the items raises questions as to how PO2 Gasid came to know about
the initials of Umipang prior to the latter's statements at the police precinct, thereby creating a cloud of doubt on the issues
of where the marking really took place and whether the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were preserved.
All that was established was that it was PO1 Saez who asked accused-appellant about the latter's personal circumstances,
including his true identity, and that the questioning happened when accused-appellant was already at the police station. We
thus reiterate:
Crucial in proving chain of custody is the marking of the seized drugs or other related items immediately after they are
seized from the accused. Marking after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link, thus it is vital that the seized
contraband[s] are immediately marked because succeeding handlers of the specimens will use the markings as reference.
The marking of the evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence
from the time they are seized from the accused until they are disposed of at the end of criminal proceedings, obviating
switching, "planting", or contamination of evidence.
Long before Congress passed RA 9165, this Court has consistently held that failure of the authorities to immediately mark
the seized drugs raises reasonable doubt on the authenticity of the corpus delicti and suffices to rebut the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duties, the doctrinal fallback of every drug-related prosecution. Thus, in People v.
Laxa and People v. Casimiro, we held that the failure to mark the drugs immediately after they were seized from the
accused casts doubt on the prosecution evidence, warranting acquittal on reasonable doubt. These rulings are refinements
of our holdings in People v. Mapa and People v. Dismuke that doubts on the authenticity of the drug specimen occasioned
by the prosecution's failure to prove that the evidence submitted for chemical analysis is the same as the one seized from
the accused suffice to warrant acquittal on reasonable doubt.
28
(Emphasis supplied and citations omitted.)
t is true that the failure of the arresting officers to mark the seized items at the place of arrest does not by itself impair the
integrity of the chain of custody and render the confiscated items inadmissible in evidence.
29
We have already clarified that
the marking upon "immediate" confiscation of the prohibited items contemplates even that which was done at the nearest
police station or office of the apprehending team.
30
We will analyze this possible seed of doubt that has been planted by the
unexplained marking of the shabu with the complete initials of Umipang, together with the other alleged irregularities.
Second, the SAD-SOTF failed to show genuine and sufficient effort to seek the third-party representatives enumerated
under Section 21(1) of R.A. 9165. Under the law, the inventory and photographing of seized items must be conducted in the
presence of a representative from the media, from the Department of Justice (DOJ), and from any elected public official.
The testimony of PO2 Gasid, as quoted below, is enlightening:
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: Mr. Witness, you also made the certificate of inventory, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: And since this is a drug operation, you are required by law to make a certificate of inventory?
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: And that inventory, you are required by law that there should be a signature of any representative
from the media, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: And also representative from the Department of Justice, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: And also elected official, Mr. Witness?
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: 'm showing to you Mr. Witness your certificate of inventory, do you confirm that there are no
signatures placed by any member of the media, representative from the Department of Justice and any elected official?
A: Yes, sir, there is none, sir.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: And there appears to be an initial of RS above the type written name Sammy Umipang, who wrote
this initial RS?
A: That stands for refuse [sic] to sign, sir.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: Who refuse [sic] to sign?
A: Sammy Umipang, sir.
31
x x x x x x x x x
PROSEC. SANTOS: Why was the certificate of inventory not witnesses [sic] and signed by any members of the media, t he
DOJ and elected officials, Officer?
A: That time there is no available representative, sir.
COURT: How did you exert effort to locate available representative of those officers or persons in the certificate of
inventory?
A: The investigator contacted representative from the media, Your Honor.
COURT: What barangay this incident happened?
A: Barangay Maharlika, Your Honor.
COURT: Did you talk to the barangay captain?
A: No, Your Honor.
COURT: What about the barangay councilman?
A: No, Your Honor.
32
(Emphasis supplied.)
ndeed, the absence of these representatives during the physical inventory and the marking of the seized items does not per
se render the confiscated items inadmissible in evidence. However, we take note that, in this case, the SAD-SOTF did not
even attempt to contact the barangay chairperson or any member of the barangay council. There is no indication that they
contacted other elected public officials. Neither do the records show whether the police officers tried to get in touch with any
DOJ representative. Nor does the SAD-SOTF adduce any justifiable reason for failing to do so especially considering that
it had sufficient time from the moment it received information about the activities of the accused until the time of his arrest.
Thus, we find that there was no genuine and sufficient effort on the part of the apprehending police officers to look for the
said representatives pursuant to Section 21(1) of R.A. 9165. A sheer statement that representatives were unavailable
without so much as an explanation on whether serious attempts were employed to look for other representatives, given the
circumstances is to be regarded as a flimsy excuse. We stress that it is the prosecution who has the positive duty to
establish that earnest efforts were employed in contacting the representatives enumerated under Section 21(1) of R.A.
9165,
33
or that there was a justifiable ground for failing to do so.
34
Third, the SAD-SOTF failed to duly accomplish the Certificate of nventory and to take photos of the seized items pursuant
to Section 21(1) of R.A. 9165. As pointed out by the defense during trial,
35
the Certificate of nventory did not contain any
signature, including that of PO2 Gasid the arresting officer who prepared the certificate
36
thus making the certificate
defective. Also, the prosecution neither submitted any photograph of the seized items nor offered any reason for failing to do
so. We reiterate that these requirements are specifically outlined in and required to be implemented by Section 21(1) of R.A.
9165.
37
Minor deviations from the procedures under R.A. 9165 would not automatically exonerate an accused from the crimes of
which he or she was convicted.
38
This is especially true when the lapses in procedure were "recognized and explained in
terms of [] justifiable grounds."
39
There must also be a showing "that the police officers intended to comply with the
procedure but were thwarted by some justifiable consideration/reason."
40
However, when there is gross disregard of the
procedural safeguards prescribed in the substantive law (R.A. 9165), serious uncertainty is generated about the identity of
the seized items that the prosecution presented in evidence.
41
This uncertainty cannot be remedied by simply invoking the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties, for a gross, systematic, or deliberate disregard of the
procedural safeguards effectively produces an irregularity in the performance of official duties.
42
As a result, the prosecution
is deemed to have failed to fully establish the elements of the crimes charged, creating reasonable doubt on the criminal
liability of the accused.
43
1wphi1
For the arresting officers' failure to adduce justifiable grounds, we are led to conclude from the totality of the procedural
lapses committed in this case that the arresting officers deliberately disregarded the legal safeguards under R.A. 9165.
These lapses effectively produced serious doubts on the integrity and identity of the corpus delicti, especially in the face of
allegations of frame-up. Thus, for the foregoing reasons, we must resolve the doubt in favor of accused-appellant, "as every
fact necessary to constitute the crime must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt."
44
As a final note, we reiterate our past rulings calling upon the authorities "to exert greater efforts in combating the drug
menace using the safeguards that our lawmakers have deemed necessary for the greater benefit of our society."
45
The
need to employ a more stringent approach to scrutinizing the evidence of the prosecution especially when the pieces of
evidence were derived from a buy-bust operation "redounds to the benefit of the criminal justice system by protecting civil
liberties and at the same time instilling rigorous discipline on prosecutors."
46
WHEREFORE, the appealed 21 May 2009 CA Decision affirming the 24 July 2007 RTC Joint Decision is SET ASDE.
Accused-appellant Sammy Umipang y Abdul is hereby ACQUTTED of the charges in Criminal Cases No. 14935-D-TG and
No. 14936-D-TG on the ground of reasonable doubt. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is hereby ORDERED to
immediately RELEASE accused-appellant from custody, unless he is detained for some other lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.