拉岡講座200

The Presence of Analysts

精神分析師在現場

The Other, already there•

大它者已經在那裡

The unconscious is outside

無意識在外面。

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This brings us to the function of the transference. For this indeterminate of pure being that has no point
of access to determination, this primary position of the unconscious that is articulated as constituted by
the indetermination of the subject—it is to this that the transference gives us access, in an enigmatic
way. It is a Gordian knot that leads us to the following conclusion—the subject is looking for his
certainty. And the certainty of the analyst himself concerning the unconscious cannot be derived from
the concept of the transference.

這使我們又回到移情的功用。純粹存在的不確定性並沒有讓確定性有進入的點，無意識的原初
位置被表達為由主體的不確定性所組成，所以只有靠著移情才能接近這個地方。這似乎有點奧
秘，像高地安的三環相扣的結，因此我們得到以下的結論：主體正在尋找他自己的確定性。關
於無意識，從移情的觀念那裡，我們也無法得到精神分析師自己的確定性。

It is striking, therefore, to observe the multiplicity, the plurality, the plurivalence even, of the
conceptions of the transference that have been formulated in analysis. I do not claim to be able to
provide you with an exhaustive account of them. I shall simply try to guide you through the paths of a
chosen exploration.

因此，耐人尋味的，我們觀察到，精神分析學所闡釋的移情的觀念具有多重性、多樣性、甚至像
是多重原子價。我不敢確定，我能夠提供給你們詳盡的描述。我只是設法引導你們穿過這條我們
苦心孤詣探索的小徑。

At its emergence in the writings and teachings of Freud, a sliding-away (glissenzent), which we cannot
impute to him, lies in wait for us —this consists in seeing in the concept of the transference no more
than the concept of repetition itself. Let us not forget that when Freud presents it to us, he says —what
cannot be remembered is repeated in behaviour. This behaviour, in order to reveal what it repeats, is
handed over to the analyst's reconstruction.

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佛洛伊德的著作及學說出現時，等待我們去接觸的就是欠缺。這不能怪罪於他，倒是讓我們從
移情的觀念上看到僅僅是重複本身的觀念。我們不要忘記，佛洛伊德傳道授業時，他說：「我們
忘記的事，會在行為表現出來。」為了讓這個行為顯露它的重複，我們只好將它送到精神分析師
那裡重新建構。

One may go so far as to believe that the opacity of the trauma—as it was then maintained in its initial
function by Freud's thought, that is to say, in my terms, its resistance to signification—is then
specifically held responsible for the limits of remembering. And, after all, it is hardly surprising,
given my own theorization, that I should see this as a highly significant moment in the transfer of
powers from the subject to the Other, what I call the capital Other (le grand Autre), the locus of speech
and, potentially, the locus of truth.

有人甚至相信，我們的記憶所以受阻，是因為創傷的難於釋懷，這是佛洛伊德在早期的學說所
主張，換言之，我的說法是，創傷抗拒符號化。畢竟，從我的理論系統，我竟然會將這一點看
著是權力從主體轉移到大它者的非常重要的時刻，並不足為奇。我用大寫字母的這個大它者，
是言說的軌跡，潛藏著真理的軌跡。

Is this the point at which the concept of the transference appears? It would seem so, and one often goes
no further. But let us look at it more closely. In Freud, this moment is not simply the moment-limit that
seems to correspond to what I designated as the moment of the closing up of the unconscious, a
temporal pulsation that makes it disappear at a certain point of its statement (enonce). When Freud
introduces the function of the transference, he is careful to mark this moment as the cause of what we
call the transference. The Other, latent or not, is, even beforehand, present in the subjective revelation,
It is already there, when something has begun to yield itself from the unconscious.

移情的觀念就出現在這個時刻嗎？看起來似乎是這樣，然後有些人就不再探究下去。但是讓我
們更仔細觀察一下。佛洛伊德認為，這個時刻並不僅僅是限制的時刻，似乎對應於我所指明是
無意識封閉的時刻，一個瞬間的悸動，在表達的某個時刻消失。佛洛伊德介紹移情的功用時，
他很謹慎地將這個時刻標明為我們所謂的移情的原因。大它者，無論潛藏與否，存在於主體的
啟悟，甚是事先存在。大它者已經先在那裡，然後從無意識那裡，某種情愫開始產生。

The analyst's interpretation merely reflects the fact that the unconscious, if it is what I say it is, namely,
a play of the signifier, has already in its formations—dreams, slips of tongue or pen, witticisms or
symptoms—proceeded by interpretation.

精神分析師的解釋僅僅反映這個事實，無意識若是我說的那個樣子，換言之，是意符的運作，
它在形成時，我們解釋所運用的夢、口誤或筆誤、機智語或病徵等，都已經先存在。

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The Other, the capital Other, is already there in every opening, however fleeting it may be, of the
unconscious. What Freud shows us, from the outset, is that the transference is essentially resistant,
Ubertragungiwiderstand. The transference is the means by which the communication of the
unconscious is interrupted, by which the unconscious closes up again. Far from being the handing over
of powers to the unconscious, the transference is, on the contrary, its closing up.

大它者、字母大寫的它者，已經在無意識的每道開口的地方，無論是多麼的瞬間短暫。從一開始，
佛洛伊德就告訴我們，移情本質上具有抗拒作用。移情是一個媒介，無意識的溝通被這個媒介
所中斷，無意識因而又再關閉。

This is essential in noting the paradox that is expressed quite commonly in the fact —which may even
be found in Freud's writings—that the analyst must await the transference before beginning to give his
interpretation.

我們必須注意到一個時常聽到的矛盾，在佛洛伊德著作也可能找到的矛盾：精神分析師必須先
等待對方移情，才開始解釋。

I want to stress this question because it is the dividing line between the correct and incorrect conception
of the transference. In analytic practice, there are many ways of conceiving the transference. They are
not necessarily mutually exclusive. They may be defined at different levels. For example, although the
conceptions of the relation of the subject to one or other of• those agencies which, in the second stage
of his Topography, Freud was able to define as the ego-ideal or the super-ego, are partial, this is often
simply to give a lateralized view of what is essentially the relation with the capital Other.

我要強調這個問題，因為這是移情的觀念正確或不正確的分界線。在精神分析學領域，有關移
情的看法很多種。這些看法未必都互相排斥。他們可能有不同層次的定義。例如，在佛洛伊德用
地形學詮釋的第二階段，他能夠將主體與代理主體的關係的觀念，定義為自我的理想或超我。
雖然這個觀念只是部份說法，它時常被用來片面解釋，基本上它是跟大它者的關係。

But there are other divergences that are irreducible. There is a conception which, wherever it is
formulated, can only contaminate practice—I am referring to the conception which would have the
analysis of the transference proceed on the basis of an alliance with the healthy part of the subject's
ego, and consists in appealing to his common sense, by way of pointing out to him the illusory
character of certain of his actions in his relation with the analyst.

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但是有些其他的歧義無法如此一目了然。有一個不知是何方神聖提出的觀念，卻只會污染精神
分析的領域。這個觀念，將移情的分析牽扯到要維護主體的自我的建康，訴諸於他自己的俗見，
作為詮釋他跟精神分析師互動時的一廂情願的幻想。

This is a thesis that subverts what it is all about, namely the bringing to awareness of this split in the
subject, realized here, in fact, in presence. To appeal to some healthy part of the subject thought to be
there in the real, capable of judging with the analyst what is happening in the transference, is to
misunderstand that it is precisely this part that is concerned in the transference, that it is this part that
closes the door, or the window, or the shutters, or whatever—and that the beauty with whom one
wishes to speak is there, behind, only too willing to open the shutters again. That is why it is at this
moment that interpretation becomes decisive, for it is to the beauty one must speak.

這樣的觀點實在是顛倒是非，換言之，這個觀點忽略了，主體自己的這個分裂被醒悟到，事實
上，就在精神分析師在現場時被體會到。訴諸於被認為是處於真實界的主體的建康部份，以為
這樣就能夠跟分析師一起分享移情所發生的情愫，實在是誤解跟移情有關的這一部份，也誤解
門扉、窗戶、或窗簾等等被封閉的這一部份。甚至誤解我們樂於跟其交談的這位美麗的人，以為
她就在那裡，很願意將心扉再一次打開。這就是為什麼在這個時刻，解釋就非常重要，因為我
們必須交談的就是這位美麗的人。

I can do no more than suggest here the reversion involved in this schema in relation to the model one
has of it in one's head. I say somewhere that the unconscious is the discourse of the Other. Now, the
discourse of the Other that is to be realized, that of the unconscious, is not beyond the closure, it is
outside. It is this discourse, which, through the mouth of the analyst, calls for the reopening of the
shutter.

我在此只能建議，不妨將我們腦海裡若有類似剛才牽扯的思維模式反轉過來。我曾經說過，無
意識是大它者的真理表述。現在，即將要被實現的大它者的這個表述，也就是無意識的表述，
不是在封閉之外，而是在外面。只是這個真理的表述，透過精神分析師之口，要求心扉重新再
打開。

Nevertheless, there is a paradox in designating this movement of closure as the initial moment when
the interpretation may assume its full force. And here is revealed the permanent conceptual crisis that
exists in analysis concerning the way in which the function of the transference should be conceived.
The contradiction of its function, which causes it to be apprehended as the point of impact of the force
of the interpretation by the very fact that, in relation to the unconscious, it is a moment of closure—this
is why we must treat it as what it is, namely, a knot. Whether or not we treat it as a Gordian knot
remains to be seen. It is a knot, and it prompts us to account for it—as I have been doing for several
years—by considerations of topology. It will not be thought unnecessary, I hope, to remind you of

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these.

可是，有一個矛盾存在，當我們指明封閉的動作是最初的動作，各種解釋可能會就此紛至沓來。
這裡顯示，關於移情的功用應該如何構想的問題，有一個觀念上的危機，常久存在於精神分析
領域。移情功用的矛盾，使它被人理解為精神分析師解釋的力量產生影響的時刻，因為相較於
無意識，移情是一個封閉的時刻。這就是為什麼我們必須依照它的本質處理它，換言之，把它
當著一個結。至於這個結，是否能像高地安的三環結一般被我們解開，還有待觀察。它是一個結，
它激勵我們去解開它，如同我過去幾年來用地形學的思維方法一直在從事的。我不厭其煩再提
醒你們一次是有必要的。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw

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There is a crisis in analysis and, to show that there is nothing
biased in this, I would support my view by citing a recent
article that demonstrates this in the most striking way—and
it is the work of no mediocre mind. It is a closely argued, very
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THE TRANSFERENCE AND THE DRIVE
engaging article by Thomas S. Szasz—who hails from Syracuse,
which fact, unfortunately, does not make him any more closely
related to Archimedes, for this Syracuse is in New York State—
which appeared in the latest number of The International
Journal of
The author was inspired to write this article by an idea in
keeping with the line of investigation that inspired his earlier
articles, a truly moving search for the authenticity of the
analytic way.
It is quite striking that an author, who is indeed one of the
most highly regarded in his circle, which is specifically that of
American psycho-analysis, should regard the transference as
nothing more than a defence on the part of the psycho-analyst,
and should arrive at the following conclusion—the transference
is the pivot on which the entire structure of psycho-analytic treatment

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rests. This is a concept that he calls inspired—I am always
suspicious offaux arnie in English vocabulary, so I have tried to
tread warily when translating it. This inspired, it seemed to me,
did not mean inspire, but something like ojicieux. It is an inspired
and indispensable concept—I quote—jet it harbours the seeds, not
only of its own destruction, but of the destruction of psycho-analysis
itself. Why? Because it tends to place the person of the analyst beyond
the reality testing of patients, colleagues, and self This hazard must be
frankly recognized. Xeither professionalization, nor the 'raising of
standards', nor coerced training analyses can protect us from this danger.
And here the confusion arises—only the integrity of the analyst and
of the analytic situation can safeguard from extinction the unique
dialogue between analysand and analyst.
This blind alley that Szasz has created for himself is, for him,
necessitated by the very fact that he can conceive of the
analysis of the transference only in terms of an assent obtained
from the healthy part of the ego, that part which is capable of
judging reality and of separating it from illusion.
His article begins thus, quite logically— Transference is similar
to such concepts as delusion, illusion, and phantasy. Once the presence
of the transference has been established, it is a question of
agreement between the analysand and the analyst, except that
here the analyst is a judge against whom there is neither appeal
nor recourse, we are led to call any analysis of the transference
a field of pure, uncontrolled hazard.
132
PRESENCE OF THE ANALYST
I have taken this article only as an extreme case, but a very
revealing one, so as to encourage us to restore here a determination
that should bring into play another order—that of truth.
Truth is based only on the fact that speech, even when it
consists of lies, appeals to it and gives rise to it. This dimension
is always absent from the logical positivism that happens to
dominate Szasz's analysis of the concept of transference.
My own conception of the dynamics of the unconscious has
been called an intellectualization—on the grounds that I based
the function of the signifier in the forefront. Is it not apparent
that it is in this operational mode—in which everything makes

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light of the confrontation between a reality and a connotation
of illusion attributed to the phenomenon of the transference—
that this supposed intellectualization really resides?
Far from us having to consider two subjects, in a dual
position, to discuss an objectivity that appears to have been
posited there as the gravitational effect of a compression in
behaviour, we must bring out the domain of possible deception.
When I introduced you to the subject of Cartesian certainty as
the necessary starting-point of all our speculations as to what the
unconscious reveals, I pointed out the role of essential balancer
played in Descartes by the Other which, it is said, must on no
account be deceptive. In analysis, the danger is that this Other
will be deceived. This is not the only dimension to be apprehended
in the transference. But one has to admit that if there
is one domain in which, in discourse, deception has some
chance of success, it is certainly love that provides its model.
What better way of assuring oneself, on the point on which one
is mistaken, than to persuade the other of the truth of what one
says! Is not this a fundamental structure of the dimension of
love that the transference gives us the opportunity of depicting?
In persuading the other that he has that which may complement
us, we assure ourselves of being able to continue to
misunderstand precisely what we lack. The circle of deception,
in so far as it highlights the dimension of love at the point
named—this will serve us as an exemplary door to demonstrate
the trick next time.
But this is not all I have to show you, for it is not what
radically causes the closure involved in the transference. What
causes it, and this will be the other side of our examination of
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THE TRANSFERENCE AND THE DRIVE
the concepts of the transference, is—to come back to the
question mark inscribed in the left part, the shaded, reserved
part—what I have designated by the objet a.
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
F. WAHL: To what theory of knowledge, in the system of existing
theories, might what you said in the first half of the lecture be related?
LAC AN: Since I am saying that it is the novelty of the

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Freudian field to provide us in experience with something that
is fundamentally apprehended like that, it is hardly surprising
if you cannot find a model for it in Plotinus.
Having said this, I know that, despite my refusal to follow
Miller's first question on the subject of an ontology of the
unconscious, I nevertheless gave you a little rope with some
very precise references. I spoke of the 6,', of the oi'x. With the
öv, I was referring specifically to the formulation of it given by
Henri Ey, of whom it cannot be said that he is the best qualified
person to speak of the unconscious—he manages to situate the
unconscious somewhere in his theory of consciousness. I spoke
of the 1ui)öv, of the prohibition, of the says-no. This does not go
very far as a strictly metaphysical indication, and I do not
think that here I am transgressing the boundaries that I have
laid down for All the same, it does structure in a
perfectly transmissible way the points on which your question
bears. In the unconscious there is a corpus of knowledge
(un savoir), which must in no way be conceived as knowledge
to be completed, to be closed.
oi'x 6,', use these terms is still to over-substantify
the unconscious. This is why I have carefully avoided
them. What there is beyond, what a little while ago I called the
beauty behind the shutters, this is what is in question and which
I have not touched on today. It is a question of mapping out
how something of the subject is, behind the screen, magnetized,
magnetized to the profound degree of dissociation, of split.
This is the key-point at which we must see the Gordian knot.
P. KAUPMANN: What relation is there between what you have
designated as slag and what you earlier spoke of as remainder?
LACAN: In human destiny, the remainder is always fruitful.
The slag is the extinguished remainder. Here, the term slag is
used in an entirely negative way. It refers to that true regression
'34
PRESENCE OF THE ANALYST
that may occur on the plane of the theory of psychological
knowledge, in so far as the analyst finds himself placed in a
field in which he has no other course but to flee. He then seeks
for assurances in theories that operate in the direction of an

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orthopaedic, conformist therapeutics, providing access for the
subject to the most mythical conception of happiness [English in
the original—Tr.]. Together with an uncritical manipulation
of evolutionism, this is what sets the tone of our era. By slag, I
mean here the analysts themselves, nothing more—whilst the
discovery of the unconscious is still young, and it is an unprecedented
opportunity for subversion.
15 April 1964
I 35
II
ANALYSIS AND TRUTH OR
THE CLOSURE OF THE UNCONSCIOUS
Telling the truth, lying, being wrong• The I lie and the I think•
Homunculus or The validity ofpsyc/zolog, illusion and its rectsjication
The transference is the enaction of the reality of the unconscious
Last time, I introduced the concept of the transference. I did
so in a rather problematic way, from the standpoint of the
difficulties it presented to the analyst. I took the opportunity
offered me by an article published in a recent number of the
most official organ of psycho-analysis, The International Journal
of Psycho-Analysis, which went so far as to question the use in
analysis of the notion of transference. I now intend to return
to this article.
I
According to the author, the analyst is supposed to point out to
the patient the effects of more or less manifest discordances
that occur with regard to the reality of the analytic situation,
namely, the two real subjects who are present in it.
First, there are the cases in which the effect of discordance
is very obvious. It is illustrated, in a humourous way, by
Spitz, one of the old guard, and no fool, by way of amusing his
public. He takes as an example one of his patients, who, in a
dream that is called a transference dream—that is to say, a
dream involving the realization of erotic desires with one's