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Constitutional Law Doctrines (for Finals)

Ople v. Torres
Legislative power is the authority to make
laws, and to alter and repeal them. The
Constitution has vested this power in
the Congress. The grant of legislative power to
Congress is broad, general, and comprehensive. Any
power deemed to be legislative by usage and
tradition, is necessarily possessed by
Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it
elsewhere.
The executive power, on the other hand,
is vested in the President. It is generally defined
as the power to enforce and administer the
laws. It is the power of carrying the laws
into practical operation and enforcing their due
observance. As head of the Executive
Department, the President is the Chief
Executive. He represents the government as a
whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced
by the officials and employees of
his department. He has control over the
executive department, bureaus and
offices. Corollary to the power of control,
the President also has the duty of supervising
the enforcement of laws for the maintenance of
general peace and public order. Thus, he is
granted administrative power over bureaus
and offices under his control to enable him to
discharge his duties effectively.
Administrative power is concerned with t
he work of applying policies and enforci
ngorders as determined by proper
governmental organs. It enables the President
to fix a uniform standard of administrative
efficiency and check the official conduct of his
agents. To this end, he can issue
administrative orders, rules and regulations.

Aquino-Sarmiento v. Morato
The term private has been defined as
"belonging to or concerning, an
individual person, company, or interest";
whereas, public means "pertaining to, or
belonging to, or affecting a nation, state,
or community at large. (xxx) The right to
privacy belongs to the individual acting
in his private capacity and not to a
governmental agency or officers tasked
with, and acting in, the discharge of
public duties. The decisions of the
Board and the individual voting slips
accomplished by the members
concerned are acts made pursuant to
their official functions, and as such, are
neither personal nor private in nature
but rather public in character.
People v. Jalosjos
The immunity from arrest or detention of
Senators and members of the House of
Representatives arises from a provision
of the Constitution. The privilege has
always been granted in a restrictive
sense. The provision granting an
exemption as a special privilege cannot
be extended beyond the ordinary
meaning of its terms. It may not be
extended by intendment, implication or
equitable considerations. (xxx) The
members of Congress cannot compel
absent members to attend sessions if
the reason for the absence is a
legitimate one. The confinement of a
Congressman charged with a crime
punishable by imprisonment of more
than six years is not merely authorized
by law, it has constitutional foundations.
Trillanes IV vs. Pimentel
All persons, except those charged with
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua
when evidence of guilt is strong, shall,
before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties, or be released on recognizance as
may be provided by law. The right to bail
shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be
required. That the cited provisions apply
equally to rape and coup detat cases,
both being punishable by reclusion
perpetua, are beyond cavil. Within the
class of offenses covered by the stated
range of imposable penalties, there is
clearly no distinction as to the political
complexion of or moral turpitude
involved in the crime charged.
Jimenez vs Cabangbang
The determination of the issue depends
on whether or not the publication falls
within the purview of the phrase speech
or debate in Congress as used in Art.
VI, Sec. 15 (now Sec. 11). Said
expression refers to utterances made by
Congressmen in the performance of
their official functions, such as speeches
delivered, statements made, or votes
cast in the halls of Congress, while the
same is in session, as well as bills
introduced in Congress, whether the
same is in session or not, and other acts
performed by Congressmen, either in
Congress or outside the premises
housing its offices, in the official
discharge of their duties as members of
Congress and of Congressional
Committees duly authorized to perform
its functions as such, at the time of the
performance of the acts in question.

The publication involved in this case
does not belong to this category. It was
an open letter to the President, when
Congress presumably was not in
session, and defendant caused said
letter to be published in several
newspapers of general circulation. In
causing the communication to be so
published, he was not performing his
official duty, either as a member of the
Congress or as officer of any committee
thereof. Hence, said communication is
not absolutely privileged.
Osmea, Jr. vs Pendatun
Section 15, Article VI of the 1935
Constitution enshrines parliamentary
immunity upon members of the
legislature which is a fundamental
privilege cherished in every parliament
in a democratic world. It guarantees the
legislator complete freedom of
expression without fear of being made
responsible in criminal or civil actions
before the courts or any other forum
outside the Hall of Congress. However,
it does not protect him from
responsibility before the legislative body
whenever his words and conduct are
considered disorderly or unbecoming of
a member therein.
Dean Ulan Sarmiento v. Mison
Under the 1987 Constitution, there are
four (4) groups of officers whom the
President shall appoint. These four (4)
groups are:
First, the heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, officers of the armed forces from the
rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in him
in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government
whose appointments are not otherwise provided
for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be
authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose
appointments the Congress may by law vest in
the President alone.
The first groups above are the only
public officers appointed by the
president which require confirmation by
the COA. The second, third, and fourth
group do not require confirmation by the
COA. The position of Mison as the head
of the Bureau of Customs does not
belong to the first group hence he does
not need to be confirmed by the COA.

Deles vs Commission on
Constitutional Commissions
Sectoral representatives belong to the
phrase and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution. The provision of the
Constitution which provides power to the
president in this regard is Section 7,
Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution:
Until a law is passed, the President may fill by
appointment from a list of nominees by the
respective sectors the seats reserved for
sectoral representation in paragraph (1), Section
5 of Article VI of this Constitution.
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
Sec.
It is clear that the 1987 Constitution
seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-
President, members of the Cabinet, their
deputies or assistants from holding
during their tenure multiple offices or
employment in the government, except
in those cases specified in the
Constitution itself and as above clarified
with respect to posts held without
additional compensation in an ex-officio
capacity as provided by law and as
required by the primary functions of their
office, the citation of Cabinet members
(then called Ministers) as examples
during the debate and deliberation on
the general rule laid down for all
appointive officials should be considered
as mere personal opinions which cannot
override the constitutions manifest
intent and the peoples understanding
thereof.
Estrada v. Disierto
For the president to be deemed as
having resigned there must be intent to
resign and the intent must be coupled
by acts of relinquishment. It is important
to follow the succession of events that
struck petitioner prior his leaving the
palace. Furthermore, the quoted
statements extracted from the Angara
diaries, detailed Estradas implied
resignation On top of all these, the press
release he issued regarding is
acknowledgement of the oath-taking of
Arroyo as president despite his
questioning of its legality and his
emphasis on leaving the presidential
seat for the sake of peace. The Court
held that petitioner Estrada had
resigned by the use of the totality
test: prior, contemporaneous and
posterior facts and circumstantial
evidence bearing a material relevance
on the issue.
Soliven vs Makaisar
The rationale for the grant to the
President of the privilege of immunity
from suit is to assure the exercise of
Presidential duties and functions free
from any hindrance or distraction,
considering that being the Chief
Executive of the Government is a job
that, aside from requiring all of the
office-holders time, also demands
undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit
pertains to the President by virtue of the
office and may be invoked only by the
holder of the office; not by any other
person in the Presidents behalf. Thus,
an accused like Beltran et al, in a
criminal case in which the President is
the complainant cannot raise the
presidential privilege as a defense to
prevent the case from proceeding
against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws
that would prevent the President from
waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded
the President may shed the protection
afforded by the privilege and submit to
the courts jurisdiction. The choice of
whether to exercise the privilege or to
waive it is solely the Presidents
prerogative. It is a decision that cannot
be assumed and imposed by any other
person.

Gloria v. CA
Presidential decisions may be
questioned before the courts where
there is grave abuse of discretion or that
the President acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction
(xxx) Security of tenure is a fundamental
and constitutionally guaranteed feature
of our civil service. The mantle of its
protection extends not only to
employees removed without cause but
also to cases of unconsented transfers
which are tantamount to illegal removals
Neri vs Senate Committee
Several cases cited provide the
elements of presidential communications
privilege:
1) The protected communication must relate to a
quintessential and non-delegable presidential
power.
2) The communication must be authored or
solicited and received by a close advisor of the
President or the President himself. The judicial
test is that an advisor must be in operational
proximity with the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege
remains a qualified privilege that may be
overcome by a showing of adequate need, such
that the information sought likely contains
important evidence and by the unavailability of
the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority.
Senate v. Ermita
In other words, the power of inquiry
with process to enforce it is an
essential and appropriate auxiliary to the
legislative function. A legislative body
cannot legislate wisely or effectively in
the absence of information respecting
the conditions which the legislation is
intended to affect or change; and where
the legislative body does not itself
possess the requisite information
which is not infrequently true recourse
must be had to others who do possess
it.
(xxx) Section 22 on the other hand
provides for the Question Hour. The
Question Hour is closely related with the
legislative power, and it is precisely as a
complement to or a supplement of the
Legislative Inquiry. The appearance of
the members of Cabinet would be very,
very essential not only in the application
of check and balance but also, in effect,
in aid of legislation. Section 22 refers
only to Question Hour, whereas, Section
21 would refer specifically to inquiries in
aid of legislation, under which anybody
for that matter, may be summoned and
if he refuses, he can be held in
contempt of the House. A distinction
was thus made between inquiries in aid
of legislation and the question
hour. While attendance was meant to
be discretionary in the question hour, it
was compulsory in inquiries in aid of
legislation. Sections 21 and 22,
therefore, while closely related and
complementary to each other, should
not be considered as pertaining to the
same power of Congress. One
specifically relates to the power to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the
aim of which is to elicit information that
may be used for legislation, while the
other pertains to the power to conduct a
question hour, the objective of which is
to obtain information in pursuit of
Congress oversight function. Ultimately,
the power of Congress to compel the
appearance of executive officials under
Section 21 and the lack of it under
Section 22 find their basis in the
principle of separation of powers.
Soriano v. Lista
A party bringing a suit challenging the
constitutionality of an act or statute must
show not only that the law or act is
invalid, but also that he has sustained,
or is in immediate or imminent danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result
of its enforcement and not merely that
he suffers thereby in some indefinite
way.
Bengzon v. Drilon
The president has no power to set aside
and override the decision of the
Supreme Court neither does the
president have the power to enact or
amend statutes promulgated by her
predecessors much less to the repeal of
existing laws.
The Supreme Court also explained that
the veto is unconstitutional since the
power of the president to disapprove
any item or items in the appropriations
bill does not grant the authority to veto
part of an item and to approve the
remaining portion of said item. It
appears that in the same item, the
Presidents vetoed some portion of it and
retained the others. This cannot be
done. The rule is: the Executive must
veto a bill in its entirety or not at all; the
Executive must veto an entire line item
in its entirety or not at all. In this case,
the president did not veto the entire line
item of the general adjustment fund.
She merely vetoed the portion which
pertained to the pensions of the justices
but did not veto the other items covering
obligations to the other departments of
the government.
Nitafan vs CIR
The clear intent of the framers of the
Constitution, based on their
deliberations, was NOT to exempt
justices and judges from general
taxation. Members of the judiciary, just
like members of the other branches of
the government, are subject to income
taxation. What is provided for by the
constitution is that salaries of judges
may not be decreased during their
continuance in office. They have a fix
salary which may not be subject to the
whims and caprices of congress. But the
salaries of the judges shall be subject to
the general income tax as well as other
members of the judiciary.
But may the salaries of the members of the
judiciary be increased?
Yes. The Congress may pass a law
increasing the salary of the members of
the judiciary and such increase will
immediately take effect thus the
incumbent members of the judiciary (at
the time of the passing of the law
increasing their salary) shall benefit
immediately.
Congress can also pass a law
decreasing the salary of the members of
the judiciary but such will only be
applicable to members of the judiciary
which were appointed AFTER the
effectivity of such law.
Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425
(1886)
While acts of a de facto incumbent of an
office lawfully created by law and
existing are often held to be binding
from reasons of public policy, the acts of
a person assuming to fill and perform
the duties of an office which does not
exist de jure can have no validity
whatever in law.
An unconstitutional act is not a law; it
confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it
affords no protection; it creates no
office; it is in legal contemplation as
inoperative as though it had never been
passed.
Manila Motor Company vs. Flores
At any rate, although the general rule is
that an unconstitutional statute
confers no right, creates no office,
affords no protection and justifies no
acts performed under it, there are
several instances wherein courts, out of
equity, have relaxed its operation (or
qualified its effects since the actual
existence of a statute prior to such
declaration is an operative fact), and
may have consequences which cannot
justly be ignored and a realistic
approach is eroding the general doctrine
--End--
Ut in Omnibus, Glorificetur Deus

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