EN BANC

[G.R. No. 141284. August 15, 2000]

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, GEN. PANFILO M.
LACSON, GEN. EDGAR B. AGLIPAY, and GEN. ANGELO REYES, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
KAPUNAN, J.:
At bar is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of a temporary
restraining order seeking to nullify on constitutional grounds the order of President Joseph Ejercito
Estrada commanding the deployment of the Philippine Marines (the Marines) to join the Philippine
National Police (the PNP) in visibility patrols around the metropolis.
In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, like robberies, kidnappings and
carnappings, the President, in a verbal directive, ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint
visibility patrols for the purpose of crime prevention and suppression. The Secretary of National
Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (the AFP), the Chief of the PNP and
the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government were tasked to execute and implement the said
order. In compliance with the presidential mandate, the PNP Chief, through Police Chief Superintendent
Edgar B. Aglipay, formulated Letter of Instruction 02/2000
i[1]
(the LOI) which detailed the manner by
which the joint visibility patrols, called Task Force Tulungan, would be conducted.
ii[2]
Task Force
Tulungan was placed under the leadership of the Police Chief of Metro Manila.
Subsequently, the President confirmed his previous directive on the deployment of the Marines in a
Memorandum, dated 24 January 2000, addressed to the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the PNP Chief.
iii[3]

In the Memorandum, the President expressed his desire to improve the peace and order situation in
Metro Manila through a more effective crime prevention program including increased police patrols.
iv[4]

The President further stated that to heighten police visibility in the metropolis, augmentation from the
AFP is necessary.
v[5]
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other
for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing
criminal or lawless violence.
vi[6]
Finally, the President declared that the services of the Marines in the
anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time
when the situation shall have improved.
vii[7]

The LOI explains the concept of the PNP-Philippine Marines joint visibility patrols as follows:
x x x
2. PURPOSE:
The Joint Implementing Police Visibility Patrols between the PNP NCRPO and the Philippine Marines
partnership in the conduct of visibility patrols in Metro Manila for the suppression of crime prevention
and other serious threats to national security.
3. SITUATION:
Criminal incidents in Metro Manila have been perpetrated not only by ordinary criminals but also by
organized syndicates whose members include active and former police/military personnel whose
training, skill, discipline and firepower prove well-above the present capability of the local police alone to
handle. The deployment of a joint PNP NCRPO-Philippine Marines in the conduct of police visibility patrol
in urban areas will reduce the incidence of crimes specially those perpetrated by active or former
police/military personnel.
4. MISSION:
The PNP NCRPO will organize a provisional Task Force to conduct joint NCRPO-PM visibility patrols
to keep Metro Manila streets crime-free, through a sustained street patrolling to minimize or eradicate
all forms of high-profile crimes especially those perpetrated by organized crime syndicates whose
members include those that are well-trained, disciplined and well-armed active or former PNP/Military
personnel.
5. CONCEPT IN JOINT VISIBILITY PATROL OPERATIONS:
a. The visibility patrols shall be conducted jointly by the NCRPO [National Capital Regional Police
Office] and the Philippine Marines to curb criminality in Metro Manila and to preserve the internal
security of the state against insurgents and other serious threat to national security, although the
primary responsibility over Internal Security Operations still rests upon the AFP.
b. The principle of integration of efforts shall be applied to eradicate all forms of high-profile crimes
perpetrated by organized crime syndicates operating in Metro Manila. This concept requires the military
and police to work cohesively and unify efforts to ensure a focused, effective and holistic approach in
addressing crime prevention. Along this line, the role of the military and police aside from neutralizing
crime syndicates is to bring a wholesome atmosphere wherein delivery of basic services to the people
and development is achieved. Hand-in-hand with this joint NCRPO-Philippine Marines visibility patrols,
local Police Units are responsible for the maintenance of peace and order in their locality.
c. To ensure the effective implementation of this project, a provisional Task Force TULUNGAN
shall be organized to provide the mechanism, structure, and procedures for the integrated planning,
coordinating, monitoring and assessing the security situation.
xxx.
viii[8]

The selected areas of deployment under the LOI are: Monumento Circle, North Edsa (SM City),
Araneta Shopping Center, Greenhills, SM Megamall, Makati Commercial Center, LRT/MRT Stations and
the NAIA and Domestic Airport.
ix[9]

On 17 January 2000, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (the IBP) filed the instant petition to
annul LOI 02/2000 and to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines, null and void and
unconstitutional, arguing that:
I
THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MARINES IN METRO MANILA IS VIOLATIVE OF THE
CONSTITUTION, IN THAT:
A) NO EMERGENCY SITUATION OBTAINS IN METRO MANILA AS WOULD JUSTIFY, EVEN ONLY
REMOTELY, THE DEPLOYMENT OF SOLDIERS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT WORK; HENCE, SAID
DEPLOYMENT IS IN DEROGATION OF ARTICLE II, SECTION 3 OF THE CONSTITUTION;
B) SAID DEPLOYMENT CONSTITUTES AN INSIDIOUS INCURSION BY THE MILITARY IN A CIVILIAN
FUNCTION OF GOVERNMENT (LAW ENFORCEMENT) IN DEROGATION OF ARTICLE XVI, SECTION 5 (4), OF
THE CONSTITUTION;
C) SAID DEPLOYMENT CREATES A DANGEROUS TENDENCY TO RELY ON THE MILITARY TO PERFORM
THE CIVILIAN FUNCTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT.
II
IN MILITARIZING LAW ENFORCEMENT IN METRO MANILA, THE ADMINISTRATION IS UNWITTINGLY
MAKING THE MILITARY MORE POWERFUL THAN WHAT IT SHOULD REALLY BE UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION.
x[10]

Asserting itself as the official organization of Filipino lawyers tasked with the bounden duty to
uphold the rule of law and the Constitution, the IBP questions the validity of the deployment and
utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in law enforcement.
Without granting due course to the petition, the Court in a Resolution,
xi[11]
dated 25 January 2000,
required the Solicitor General to file his Comment on the petition. On 8 February 2000, the Solicitor
General submitted his Comment.
The Solicitor General vigorously defends the constitutionality of the act of the President in
deploying the Marines, contending, among others, that petitioner has no legal standing; that the
question of deployment of the Marines is not proper for judicial scrutiny since the same involves a
political question; that the organization and conduct of police visibility patrols, which feature the team-
up of one police officer and one Philippine Marine soldier, does not violate the civilian supremacy clause
in the Constitution.
The issues raised in the present petition are: (1) Whether or not petitioner has legal standing; (2)
Whether or not the Presidents factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is
subject to judicial review; and, (3) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in
joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and
the civilian character of the PNP.
The petition has no merit.
First, petitioner failed to sufficiently show that it is in possession of the requisites of standing to
raise the issues in the petition. Second, the President did not commit grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction nor did he commit a violation of the civilian supremacy clause
of the Constitution.
The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, to wit:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may
be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial
review only if the following requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and
appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question;
(3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional
question is the lis mota of the case.
xii[12]

The IBP has not sufficiently complied with the requisites of standing in this case.
Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is
being challenged.
xiii[13]
The term interest means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the
decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest.
xiv[14]

The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
xv[15]

In the case at bar, the IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the
rule of law and the Constitution. Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis in
support of its locus standi. The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and
nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too
general an interest which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. Based on the standards
above-stated, the IBP has failed to present a specific and substantial interest in the resolution of the
case. Its fundamental purpose which, under Section 2, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court, is to elevate the
standards of the law profession and to improve the administration of justice is alien to, and cannot be
affected by the deployment of the Marines. It should also be noted that the interest of the National
President of the IBP who signed the petition, is his alone, absent a formal board resolution authorizing
him to file the present action. To be sure, members of the BAR, those in the judiciary included, have
varying opinions on the issue. Moreover, the IBP, assuming that it has duly authorized the National
President to file the petition, has not shown any specific injury which it has suffered or may suffer by
virtue of the questioned governmental act. Indeed, none of its members, whom the IBP purportedly
represents, has sustained any form of injury as a result of the operation of the joint visibility patrols.
Neither is it alleged that any of its members has been arrested or that their civil liberties have been
violated by the deployment of the Marines. What the IBP projects as injurious is the supposed
militarization of law enforcement which might threaten Philippine democratic institutions and may
cause more harm than good in the long run. Not only is the presumed injury not personal in
character, it is likewise too vague, highly speculative and uncertain to satisfy the requirement of
standing. Since petitioner has not successfully established a direct and personal injury as a consequence
of the questioned act, it does not possess the personality to assail the validity of the deployment of the
Marines. This Court, however, does not categorically rule that the IBP has absolutely no standing to
raise constitutional issues now or in the future. The IBP must, by way of allegations and proof, satisfy
this Court that it has sufficient stake to obtain judicial resolution of the controversy.
Having stated the foregoing, it must be emphasized that this Court has the discretion to take
cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirement of legal standing when paramount interest is
involved.
xvi[16]
In not a few cases, the Court has adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a
petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people.
xvii[17]

Thus, when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, the Court may brush aside
technicalities of procedure.
xviii[18]
In this case, a reading of the petition shows that the IBP has advanced
constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and
weight as precedents. Moreover, because peace and order are under constant threat and lawless
violence occurs in increasing tempo, undoubtedly aggravated by the Mindanao insurgency problem, the
legal controversy raised in the petition almost certainly will not go away. It will stare us in the face
again. It, therefore, behooves the Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issue now,
rather than later.
The President did not commit grave abuse of discretion in calling out the Marines.
In the case at bar, the bone of contention concerns the factual determination of the President of
the necessity of calling the armed forces, particularly the Marines, to aid the PNP in visibility patrols. In
this regard, the IBP admits that the deployment of the military personnel falls under the Commander-in-
Chief powers of the President as stated in Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, specifically, the
power to call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. What
the IBP questions, however, is the basis for the calling of the Marines under the aforestated provision.
According to the IBP, no emergency exists that would justify the need for the calling of the military to
assist the police force. It contends that no lawless violence, invasion or rebellion exist to warrant the
calling of the Marines. Thus, the IBP prays that this Court review the sufficiency of the factual basis for
said troop *Marine+ deployment.
xix[19]

The Solicitor General, on the other hand, contends that the issue pertaining to the necessity of
calling the armed forces is not proper for judicial scrutiny since it involves a political question and the
resolution of factual issues which are beyond the review powers of this Court.
As framed by the parties, the underlying issues are the scope of presidential powers and limits, and
the extent of judicial review. But, while this Court gives considerable weight to the parties formulation
of the issues, the resolution of the controversy may warrant a creative approach that goes beyond the
narrow confines of the issues raised. Thus, while the parties are in agreement that the power exercised
by the President is the power to call out the armed forces, the Court is of the view that the power
involved may be no more than the maintenance of peace and order and promotion of the general
welfare.
xx[20]
For one, the realities on the ground do not show that there exist a state of warfare,
widespread civil unrest or anarchy. Secondly, the full brunt of the military is not brought upon the
citizenry, a point discussed in the latter part of this decision. In the words of the late Justice Irene Cortes
in Marcos v. Manglapus:
More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the Presidents powers as protector of the
peace. [Rossiter, The American Presidency]. The power of the President to keep the peace is not limited
merely to exercising the commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or to leading the State
against external and internal threats to its existence. The President is not only clothed with
extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day
problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign
foe appears on the horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential duties in
times of peace is not in any way diminished by the relative want of an emergency specified in the
commander-in-chief provision. For in making the President commander-in-chief the enumeration of
powers that follow cannot be said to exclude the Presidents exercising as Commander-in-Chief powers
short of the calling of the armed forces, or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or
declaring martial law, in order to keep the peace, and maintain public order and security.

xxx
xxi[21]

Nonetheless, even if it is conceded that the power involved is the Presidents power to call out the
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, the resolution of the
controversy will reach a similar result.
We now address the Solicitor Generals argument that the issue involved is not susceptible to
review by the judiciary because it involves a political question, and thus, not justiciable.
As a general proposition, a controversy is justiciable if it refers to a matter which is appropriate for
court review.
xxii[22]
It pertains to issues which are inherently susceptible of being decided on grounds
recognized by law. Nevertheless, the Court does not automatically assume jurisdiction over actual
constitutional cases brought before it even in instances that are ripe for resolution. One class of cases
wherein the Court hesitates to rule on are political questions. The reason is that political questions are
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not the legality, of a particular act or measure being
assailed. Moreover, the political question being a function of the separation of powers, the courts will
not normally interfere with the workings of another co-equal branch unless the case shows a clear need
for the courts to step in to uphold the law and the Constitution.
As Taada v. Cuenco
xxiii[23]
puts it, political questions refer to those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of government. Thus,
if an issue is clearly identified by the text of the Constitution as matters for discretionary action by a
particular branch of government or to the people themselves then it is held to be a political question. In
the classic formulation of Justice Brennan in Baker v. Carr,
xxiv[24]
*p+rominent on the surface of any case
held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards
for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly
for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a courts undertaking independent resolution without
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on the one question.
The 1987 Constitution expands the concept of judicial review by providing that (T)he Judicial
power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
xxv[25]
Under this definition, the Court cannot agree with the Solicitor
General that the issue involved is a political question beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to review.
When the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the issue of whether the
prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met or the limitations respected, is justiciable - the
problem being one of legality or validity, not its wisdom.
xxvi[26]
Moreover, the jurisdiction to delimit
constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court.
xxvii[27]
When political questions are involved, the
Constitution limits the determination as to whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is being
questioned.
xxviii[28]

By grave abuse of discretion is meant simply capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that is
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.
xxix[29]
Under this definition, a court is without
power to directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been delegated. But while
this Court has no power to substitute its judgment for that of Congress or of the President, it may look
into the question of whether such exercise has been made in grave abuse of discretion.
xxx[30]
A showing
that plenary power is granted either department of government, may not be an obstacle to judicial
inquiry, for the improvident exercise or abuse thereof may give rise to justiciable controversy.
xxxi[31]

When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. This is clear from
the intent of the framers and from the text of the Constitution itself. The Court, thus, cannot be called
upon to overrule the Presidents wisdom or substitute its own. However, this does not prevent an
examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it
was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. In view of the constitutional intent to
give the President full discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it
is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is totally bereft of factual basis.
The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden as there is no evidence to support the
assertion that there exist no justification for calling out the armed forces. There is, likewise, no evidence
to support the proposition that grave abuse was committed because the power to call was exercised in
such a manner as to violate the constitutional provision on civilian supremacy over the military. In the
performance of this Courts duty of purposeful hesitation
xxxii[32]
before declaring an act of another
branch as unconstitutional, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court
interfere with the Presidents judgment. To doubt is to sustain.
There is a clear textual commitment under the Constitution to bestow on the President full
discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such
power. Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which embodies the powers of the President as
Commander-in-Chief, provides in part:
The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever
it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a
period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the
Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.
x x x
The full discretionary power of the President to determine the factual basis for the exercise of the
calling out power is also implied and further reinforced in the rest of Section 18, Article VII which reads,
thus:
x x x
Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress.
The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special
session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the
President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such
proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion
shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or
suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of
the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the
extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the
functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on
military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically
suspend the privilege of the writ.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for
rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be
judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.
Under the foregoing provisions, Congress may revoke such proclamation or suspension and the
Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent
provision dealing with the revocation or review of the Presidents action to call out the armed forces.
The distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial
law and the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the
Constitution would have simply lumped together the three powers and provided for their revocation
and review without any qualification. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Where the terms are
expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to other
matters.
xxxiii[33]
That the intent of the Constitution is exactly what its letter says, i.e., that the power to
call is fully discretionary to the President, is extant in the deliberation of the Constitutional Commission,
to wit:
FR. BERNAS. It will not make any difference. I may add that there is a graduated power of the
President as Commander-in-Chief. First, he can call out such Armed Forces as may be necessary to
suppress lawless violence; then he can suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, then he can
impose martial law. This is a graduated sequence.
When he judges that it is necessary to impose martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, his judgment is subject to review. We are making it subject to review by the Supreme
Court and subject to concurrence by the National Assembly. But when he exercises this lesser power of
calling on the Armed Forces, when he says it is necessary, it is my opinion that his judgment cannot be
reviewed by anybody.
x x x
FR. BERNAS. Let me just add that when we only have imminent danger, the matter can be handled
by the first sentence: The President may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. So we feel that that is sufficient for handling imminent danger.
MR. DE LOS REYES. So actually, if a President feels that there is imminent danger, the matter can
be handled by the First Sentence: The President....may call out such Armed Forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. So we feel that that is sufficient for handling imminent
danger, of invasion or rebellion, instead of imposing martial law or suspending the writ of habeas
corpus, he must necessarily have to call the Armed Forces of the Philippines as their Commander-in-
Chief. Is that the idea?
MR. REGALADO. That does not require any concurrence by the legislature nor is it subject to
judicial review.
xxxiv[34]

The reason for the difference in the treatment of the aforementioned powers highlights the intent
to grant the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because
it is considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment
and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards
by Congress and review by this Court.
Moreover, under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, in the exercise of the power to suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or to impose martial law, two conditions must concur: (1)
there must be an actual invasion or rebellion and, (2) public safety must require it. These conditions are
not required in the case of the power to call out the armed forces. The only criterion is that whenever it
becomes necessary, the President may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion." The implication is that the President is given full discretion and wide latitude in
the exercise of the power to call as compared to the two other powers.
If the petitioner fails, by way of proof, to support the assertion that the President acted without
factual basis, then this Court cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings. The
factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is not easily quantifiable and cannot be objectively
established since matters considered for satisfying the same is a combination of several factors which
are not always accessible to the courts. Besides the absence of textual standards that the court may use
to judge necessity, information necessary to arrive at such judgment might also prove unmanageable for
the courts. Certain pertinent information might be difficult to verify, or wholly unavailable to the courts.
In many instances, the evidence upon which the President might decide that there is a need to call out
the armed forces may be of a nature not constituting technical proof.
On the other hand, the President as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence network to gather
information, some of which may be classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state.
In the exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency
situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of property. Indeed, the decision to
call out the military to prevent or suppress lawless violence must be done swiftly and decisively if it were
to have any effect at all. Such a scenario is not farfetched when we consider the present situation in
Mindanao, where the insurgency problem could spill over the other parts of the country. The
determination of the necessity for the calling out power if subjected to unfettered judicial scrutiny could
be a veritable prescription for disaster, as such power may be unduly straitjacketed by an injunction or a
temporary restraining order every time it is exercised.
Thus, it is the unclouded intent of the Constitution to vest upon the President, as Commander-in-
Chief of the Armed Forces, full discretion to call forth the military when in his judgment it is necessary to
do so in order to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. Unless the petitioner can
show that the exercise of such discretion was gravely abused, the Presidents exercise of judgment
deserves to be accorded respect from this Court.
The President has already determined the necessity and factual basis for calling the armed forces.
In his Memorandum, he categorically asserted that, *V+iolent crimes like bank/store robberies, holdups,
kidnappings and carnappings continue to occur in Metro Manila...
xxxv[35]
We do not doubt the veracity of
the Presidents assessment of the situation, especially in the light of present developments. The Court
takes judicial notice of the recent bombings perpetrated by lawless elements in the shopping malls,
public utilities, and other public places. These are among the areas of deployment described in the LOI
2000. Considering all these facts, we hold that the President has sufficient factual basis to call for
military aid in law enforcement and in the exercise of this constitutional power.
The deployment of the Marines does not violate the civilian supremacy clause nor does it infringe the
civilian character of the police force.
Prescinding from its argument that no emergency situation exists to justify the calling of the
Marines, the IBP asserts that by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian task of law enforcement is
militarized in violation of Section 3, Article II
xxxvi[36]
of the Constitution.
We disagree. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy
clause. The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian
law enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is
appropriately circumscribed. The limited participation of the Marines is evident in the provisions of the
LOI itself, which sufficiently provides the metes and bounds of the Marines authority. It is noteworthy
that the local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority
belonging to the PNP. In fact, the Metro Manila Police Chief is the overall leader of the PNP-Philippine
Marines joint visibility patrols.
xxxvii[37]
Under the LOI, the police forces are tasked to brief or orient the
soldiers on police patrol procedures.
xxxviii[38]
It is their responsibility to direct and manage the deployment
of the Marines.
xxxix[39]
It is, likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and
render logistical support to these soldiers.
xl[40]
In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that
military authority is supreme over civilian authority. Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist
the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police force. Neither does it amount to an
insidious incursion of the military in the task of law enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article
XVI of the Constitution.
xli[41]

In this regard, it is not correct to say that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the AFP, by his
alleged involvement in civilian law enforcement, has been virtually appointed to a civilian post in
derogation of the aforecited provision. The real authority in these operations, as stated in the LOI, is
lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military. Such being the case, it
does not matter whether the AFP Chief actually participates in the Task Force Tulungan since he does
not exercise any authority or control over the same. Since none of the Marines was incorporated or
enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian position to speak of. Hence,
the deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of the
PNP.
Considering the above circumstances, the Marines render nothing more than assistance required in
conducting the patrols. As such, there can be no insidious incursion of the military in civilian affairs
nor can there be a violation of the civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution.
It is worth mentioning that military assistance to civilian authorities in various forms persists in
Philippine jurisdiction. The Philippine experience reveals that it is not averse to requesting the
assistance of the military in the implementation and execution of certain traditionally civil functions.
As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, some of the multifarious activities wherein military aid
has been rendered, exemplifying the activities that bring both the civilian and the military together in a
relationship of cooperation, are:
1. Elections;
xlii[42]

2. Administration of the Philippine National Red Cross;
xliii[43]

3. Relief and rescue operations during calamities and disasters;
xliv[44]

4. Amateur sports promotion and development;
xlv[45]

5. Development of the culture and the arts;
xlvi[46]

6. Conservation of natural resources;
xlvii[47]

7. Implementation of the agrarian reform program;
xlviii[48]

8. Enforcement of customs laws;
xlix[49]

9. Composite civilian-military law enforcement activities;
l[50]

10. Conduct of licensure examinations;
li[51]

11. Conduct of nationwide tests for elementary and high school students;
lii[52]

12. Anti-drug enforcement activities;
liii[53]

13. Sanitary inspections;
liv[54]

14. Conduct of census work;
lv[55]

15. Administration of the Civil Aeronautics Board;
lvi[56]

16. Assistance in installation of weather forecasting devices;
lvii[57]

17. Peace and order policy formulation in local government units.
lviii[58]

This unquestionably constitutes a gloss on executive power resulting from a systematic, unbroken,
executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of Congress and, yet, never before questioned.
lix[59]

What we have here is mutual support and cooperation between the military and civilian authorities, not
derogation of civilian supremacy.
In the United States, where a long tradition of suspicion and hostility towards the use of military
force for domestic purposes has persisted,
lx[60]
and whose Constitution, unlike ours, does not expressly
provide for the power to call, the use of military personnel by civilian law enforcement officers is
allowed under circumstances similar to those surrounding the present deployment of the Philippine
Marines. Under the Posse Comitatus Act
lxi[61]
of the US, the use of the military in civilian law
enforcement is generally prohibited, except in certain allowable circumstances. A provision of the Act
states:
1385. Use of Army and Air Force as posse comitatus
Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act
of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as posse comitatus or otherwise to
execute the laws shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or
both.
lxii[62]

To determine whether there is a violation of the Posse Comitatus Act in the use of military
personnel, the US courts
lxiii[63]
apply the following standards, to wit:
Were Army or Air Force personnel used by the civilian law enforcement officers at Wounded Knee
in such a manner that the military personnel subjected the citizens to the exercise of military power
which was regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory
lxiv[64]
George Washington Law Review, pp. 404-433
(1986), which discusses the four divergent standards for assessing acceptable involvement of military
personnel in civil law enforcement. See likewise HONORED IN THE BREECH: PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY
TO EXECUTE THE LAWS WITH MILITARY FORCE, 83 Yale Law Journal, pp. 130-152, 1973. 64 in nature,
either presently or prospectively?
x x x
When this concept is transplanted into the present legal context, we take it to mean that military
involvement, even when not expressly authorized by the Constitution or a statute, does not violate the
Posse Comitatus Act unless it actually regulates, forbids or compels some conduct on the part of those
claiming relief. A mere threat of some future injury would be insufficient. (emphasis supplied)
Even if the Court were to apply the above rigid standards to the present case to determine whether
there is permissible use of the military in civilian law enforcement, the conclusion is inevitable that no
violation of the civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution is committed. On this point, the Court
agrees with the observation of the Solicitor General:
3. The designation of tasks in Annex A
lxv[65]
does not constitute the exercise of regulatory,
proscriptive, or compulsory military power. First, the soldiers do not control or direct the
operation. This is evident from Nos. 6,
lxvi[66]
8(k)
lxvii[67]
and 9(a)
lxviii[68]
of Annex A. These soldiers,
second, also have no power to prohibit or condemn. In No. 9(d)
lxix[69]
of Annex A, all arrested
persons are brought to the nearest police stations for proper disposition. And last, these soldiers
apply no coercive force. The materials or equipment issued to them, as shown in No. 8(c)
lxx[70]
of
Annex A, are all low impact and defensive in character. The conclusion is that there being no
exercise of regulatory, proscriptive or compulsory military power, the deployment of a handful of
Philippine Marines constitutes no impermissible use of military power for civilian law
enforcement.
lxxi[71]

It appears that the present petition is anchored on fear that once the armed forces are deployed,
the military will gain ascendancy, and thus place in peril our cherished liberties. Such apprehensions,
however, are unfounded. The power to call the armed forces is just that - calling out the armed forces.
Unless, petitioner IBP can show, which it has not, that in the deployment of the Marines, the President
has violated the fundamental law, exceeded his authority or jeopardized the civil liberties of the people,
this Court is not inclined to overrule the Presidents determination of the factual basis for the calling of
the Marines to prevent or suppress lawless violence.
One last point. Since the institution of the joint visibility patrol in January, 2000, not a single citizen
has complained that his political or civil rights have been violated as a result of the deployment of the
Marines. It was precisely to safeguard peace, tranquility and the civil liberties of the people that the
joint visibility patrol was conceived. Freedom and democracy will be in full bloom only when people feel
secure in their homes and in the streets, not when the shadows of violence and anarchy constantly lurk
in their midst.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., on official leave.
Puno, J., see separate opinion.
Vitug, J., see separate opinion.
Mendoza, J., see concurring and dissenting opinion.
Panganiban, J., in the result.
Quisumbing, J., joins the opinion of J. Mendoza.
SEPARATE OPINION
PUNO, J.:
If the case at bar is significant, it is because of the government attempt to foist the political
question doctrine to shield an executive act done in the exercise of the commander-in-chief powers
from judicial scrutiny. If the attempt succeeded, it would have diminished the power of judicial review
and weakened the checking authority of this Court over the Chief Executive when he exercises his
commander-in-chief powers. The attempt should remind us of the tragedy that befell the country
when this Court sought refuge in the political question doctrine and forfeited its most important role
as protector of the civil and political rights of our people. The ongoing conflict in Mindanao may
worsen and can force the Chief Executive to resort to the use of his greater commander-in-chief
powers, hence, this Court should be extra cautious in assaying similar attempts. A laid back posture
may not sit well with our people considering that the 1987 Constitution strengthened the checking
powers of this Court and expanded its jurisdiction precisely to stop any act constituting xxx grave
abuse of jurisdiction xxx on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
1

The importance of the issue at bar includes this humble separate opinion. We can best perceive
the different intersecting dimensions of the political question doctrine by viewing them from the
broader canvass of history. Political questions are defined as those questions which under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of government.
2
They
have two aspects: (1) those matters that are to be exercised by the people in their primary political
capacity and (2) matters which have been specifically delegated to some other department or particular
office of the government, with discretionary power to act.
3
The exercise of the discretionary power of
the legislative or executive branch of government was often the area where the Court had to wrestle
with the political question doctrine.
4






A brief review of some of our case law will thus give us a sharper perspective of the political
question doctrine. This question confronted the Court as early as 1905 in the case of Barcelon v. Baker.
5

The Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, pursuant to a resolution of the Philippine Commission,
suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Cavite and Batangas based on a finding of open
insurrection in said provinces. Felix Barcelon, who was detained by constabulary officers in Batangas,
filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus alleging that there was no open insurrection
in Batangas. The issue to resolve was whether or not the judicial department may investigate the facts
upon which the legislative (the Philippine Commission) and executive (the Governor-General) branches
of government acted in suspending the privilege of the writ.
The Court ruled that under our form of government, one department has no authority to inquire
into the acts of another, which acts are performed within the discretion of the other department.
6

Surveying American law and jurisprudence, it held that whenever a statute gives discretionary power to
any person, to be exercised by him upon his own opinion of certain facts, the statute constitutes him the
sole judge of the existence of those facts.
7
Since the Philippine Bill of 1902 empowered the Philippine
Commission and the Governor-General to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, this power
is exclusively within the discretion of the legislative and executive branches of government. The
exercise of this discretion is conclusive upon the courts.
8

The Court further held that once a determination is made by the executive and legislative
departments that the conditions justifying the assailed acts exists, it will presume that the conditions
continue until the same authority decide that they no longer exist.
9
It adopted the rationale that the
executive branch, thru its civil and military branches, are better situated to obtain information about
peace and order from every corner of the nation, in contrast with the judicial department, with its very
limited machinery.
10
The seed of the political question doctrine was thus planted in Philippine soil.
The doctrine barring judicial review because of the political question doctrine was next applied to
the internal affairs of the legislature. The Court refused to interfere in the legislative exercise of
disciplinary power over its own members. In the 1924 case of Alejandrino v. Quezon,
11
Alejandrino,
who was appointed Senator by the Governor-General, was declared by Senate Resolution as guilty of
disorderly conduct for assaulting another Senator in the course of a debate, and was suspended from
office for one year. Senator Alejandrino filed a petition for mandamus and injunction to compel the
Senate to reinstate him. The Court held that under the Jones Law, the power of the Senate to punish its
members for disorderly behavior does not authorize it to suspend an appointive member from the
exercise of his office. While the Court found that the suspension was illegal, it refused to issue the writ








of mandamus on the ground that "the Supreme Court does not possess the power of coercion to make
the Philippine Senate take any particular action. [T]he Philippine Legislature or any branch thereof
cannot be directly controlled in the exercise of their legislative powers by any judicial process."
12

The issue revisited the Court twenty-two (22) years later. In 1946, in Vera v. Avelino,
13
three
senators-elect who had been prevented from taking their oaths of office by a Senate resolution repaired
to this Court to compel their colleagues to allow them to occupy their seats contending that only the
Electoral Tribunal had jurisdiction over contests relating to their election, returns and qualifications.
Again, the Court refused to intervene citing Alejandrino and affirmed the inherent right of the
legislature to determine who shall be admitted to its membership.
In the 1947 case of Mabanag v. Lopez-Vito,
14
three Senators and eight representatives who were
proclaimed elected by Comelec were not allowed by Congress to take part in the voting for the passage
of the Parity amendment to the Constitution. If their votes had been counted, the affirmative votes in
favor of the proposed amendment would have been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either
House of Congress to pass the amendment. The amendment was eventually submitted to the people
for ratification. The Court declined to intervene and held that a proposal to amend the Constitution is a
highly political function performed by Congress in its sovereign legislative capacity.
15

In the 1955 case of Arnault v. Balagtas,
16
petitioner, a private citizen, assailed the legality of his
detention ordered by the Senate for his refusal to answer questions put to him by members of one of its
investigating committees. This Court refused to order his release holding that the process by which a
contumacious witness is dealt with by the legislature is a necessary concomitant of the legislative
process and the legislature's exercise of its discretionary authority is not subject to judicial interference.
In the 1960 case of Osmena v. Pendatun,
17
the Court followed the traditional line. Congressman
Sergio Osmena, Jr. was suspended by the House of Representatives for serious disorderly behavior for
making a privilege speech imputing "malicious charges" against the President of the Philippines.
Osmena, Jr. invoked the power of review of this Court but the Court once more did not interfere with
Congress' power to discipline its members.
The contours of the political question doctrine have always been tricky. To be sure, the Court did
not always stay its hand whenever the doctrine is invoked. In the 1949 case of Avelino v. Cuenco,
18

Senate President Jose Avelino, who was deposed and replaced, questioned his successor's title claiming
that the latter had been elected without a quorum. The petition was initially dismissed on the ground








that the selection of Senate President was an internal matter and not subject to judicial review.
19
On
reconsideration, however, the Court ruled that it could assume jurisdiction over the controversy in light
of subsequent events justifying intervention among which was the existence of a quorum.
20
Though the
petition was ultimately dismissed, the Court declared respondent Cuenco as the legally elected Senate
President.
In the 1957 case of Tanada v. Cuenco,
21
the Court assumed jurisdiction over a dispute involving the
formation and composition of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. It rejected the Solicitor General's claim that
the dispute involved a political question. Instead, it declared that the Senate is not clothed with "full
discretionary authority" in the choice of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the exercise of its
power thereon is subject to constitutional limitations which are mandatory in nature.
22
It held that
under the Constitution, the membership of the Senate Electoral Tribunal was designed to insure the
exercise of judicial impartiality in the disposition of election contests affecting members of the
lawmaking body.
23
The Court then nullified the election to the Senate Electoral Tribunal made by
Senators belonging to the party having the largest number of votes of two of their party members but
purporting to act on behalf of the party having the second highest number of votes.
In the 1962 case of Cunanan v. Tan, Jr.,
24
the Court passed judgment on whether Congress had
formed the Commission on Appointments in accordance with the Constitution and found that it did not.
It declared that the Commission on Appointments is a creature of the Constitution and its power does
not come from Congress but from the Constitution.
The 1967 case of Gonzales v. Comelec
25
and the 1971 case of Tolentino v. Comelec
26
abandoned
Mabanag v. Lopez-Vito. The question of whether or not Congress, acting as a constituent assembly in
proposing amendments to the Constitution violates the Constitution was held to be a justiciable and not
a political issue. In Gonzales, the Court ruled:
"It is true that in Mabanag v. Lopez-Vito, this Court characterizing the issue submitted thereto as a
political one, declined to pass upon the question whether or not a given number of votes cast in
Congress in favor of a proposed amendment to the Constitution-which was being submitted to the
people for ratification-satisfied the three-fourths vote requirement of the fundamental law. The force
of this precedent has been weakened, however, by Suanes v. Chief Accountant of the Senate, Avelino v.
Cuenco, Tanada v. Cuenco, and Macias v. Commission on Elections. In the first, we held that the officers









and employees of the Senate Electoral Tribunal are under its supervision and control, not of that of the
Senate President, as claimed by the latter; in the second, this Court proceeded to determine the number
of Senators necessary for a quorum in the Senate; in the third, we nullified the election, by Senators
belonging to the party having the largest number of votes in said chamber, purporting to act on behalf
of the party having the second largest number of votes therein, of two (2) Senators belonging to the first
party, as members, for the second party, of the Senate Electoral Tribunal; and in the fourth, we declared
unconstitutional an act of Congress purporting to apportion the representative districts for the House of
Representatives upon the ground that the apportionment had not been made as may be possible
according to the number of inhabitants of each province. Thus, we rejected the theory, advanced in
these four cases, that the issues therein raised were political questions the determination of which is
beyond judicial review.
27

The Court explained that the power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments thereto
is not included in the general grant of legislative powers to Congress. As a constituent assembly, the
members of Congress derive their authority from the fundamental law and they do not have the final
say on whether their acts are within or beyond constitutional limits.
28
This ruling was reiterated in
Tolentino which held that acts of a constitutional convention called for the purpose of proposing
amendments to the Constitution are at par with acts of Congress acting as a constituent assembly.
29

In sum, this Court brushed aside the political question doctrine and assumed jurisdiction
whenever it found constitutionally-imposed limits on the exercise of powers conferred upon the
Legislature.
30

The Court hewed to the same line as regards the exercise of Executive power. Thus, the respect
accorded executive discretion was observed in Severino v. Governor-General,
31
where it was held that
the Governor-General, as head of the executive department, could not be compelled by mandamus to
call a special election in the town of Silay for the purpose of electing a municipal president. Mandamus
and injunction could not lie to enforce or restrain a duty which is discretionary. It was held that when
the Legislature conferred upon the Governor-General powers and duties, it did so for the reason that he
was in a better position to know the needs of the country than any other member of the executive
department, and with full confidence that he will perform such duties as his best judgment dictates.
32

Similarly, in Abueva v. Wood,
33
the Court held that the Governor-General could not be compelled
by mandamus to produce certain vouchers showing the various expenditures of the Independence
Commission. Under the principle of separation of powers, it ruled that it was not intended by the








Constitution that one branch of government could encroach upon the field of duty of the other. Each
department has an exclusive field within which it can perform its part within certain discretionary
limits.
34
It observed that "the executive and legislative departments of government are frequently called
upon to deal with what are known as political questions, with which the judicial department of
government has no intervention. In all such questions, the courts uniformly refused to intervene for the
purpose of directing or controlling the actions of the other department; such questions being many
times reserved to those departments in the organic law of the state."
35

In Forties v. Tiaco,
36
the Court also refused to take cognizance of a case enjoining the Chief
Executive from deporting an obnoxious alien whose continued presence in the Philippines was found by
him to be injurious to the public interest. It noted that sudden and unexpected conditions may arise,
growing out of the presence of untrustworthy aliens, which demand immediate action. The President's
inherent power to deport undesirable aliens is universally denominated as political, and this power
continues to exist for the preservation of the peace and domestic tranquility of the nation.
37

In Manalang v. Quitoriano,
38
the Court also declined to interfere in the exercise of the President's
appointing power. It held that the appointing power is the exclusive prerogative of the President, upon
which no limitations may be imposed by Congress, except those resulting from the need of securing
concurrence of the Commission on Appointments and from the exercise of the limited legislative power
to prescribe qualifications to a given appointive office.
We now come to the exercise by the President of his powers as Commander-in-Chief vis-a-vis the
political question doctrine. In the 1940's, this Court has held that as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces, the President has the power to determine whether war, in the legal sense, still continues or has
terminated. It ruled that it is within the province of the political department and not of the judicial
department of government to determine when war is at end.
39

In 1952, the Court decided the landmark case of Montenegro v. Castaneda.
40
President Quirino
suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus for persons detained or to be detained for crimes
of sedition, insurrection or rebellion. The Court, citing Barcelon, declared that the authority to decide
whether the exigency has arisen requiring the suspension of the privilege belongs to the President and
his decision is final and conclusive on the courts.
41










Barcelon was the ruling case law until the 1971 case of Lansang v. Garcia came.
42
Lansang reversed
the previous cases and held that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was not a
political question. According to the Court, the weight of Barcelon was diluted by two factors: (1) it
relied heavily on Martin v. Mott, which involved the U.S. President's power to call out the militia which
is a much broader power than suspension of the privilege of the writ; and (2) the privilege was
suspended by the American Governor-General whose act, as representative of the sovereign affecting
the freedom of its subjects, could not be equated with that of the President of the Philippines dealing
with the freedom of the sovereign Filipino people.
The Court declared that the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is neither
absolute nor unqualified because the Constitution sets limits on the exercise of executive discretion
on the matter. These limits are: (1) that the privilege must not be suspended except only in cases of
invasion, insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof; and (2) when the public safety requires
it, in any of which events the same may be suspended wherever during such period the necessity for the
suspension shall exist. The extent of the power which may be inquired into by courts is defined by these
limitations.
43

On the vital issue of how the Court may inquire into the President's exercise of power, it ruled that
the function of the Court is not to supplant but merely to check the Executive; to ascertain whether the
President has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested
in him or to determine the wisdom of his act. Judicial inquiry is confined to the question of whether the
President did not act arbitrarily.
44
Using this yardstick, the Court found that the President did not.
The emergency period of the 1970's flooded the Court with cases which raised the political
question defense. The issue divided the Court down the middle. Javellana v. Executive Secretary
45

showed that while a majority of the Court held that the issue of whether or not the 1973 Constitution
had been ratified in accordance with the 1935 Constitution was justiciable, a majority also ruled that the
decisive issue of whether the 1973 Constitution had come into force and effect, with or without
constitutional ratification, was a political question.
46

The validity of the declaration of martial law by then President Marcos was next litigated before the
Court. In Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile,
47
it upheld the President's declaration of martial law. On whether the
validity of the imposition of martial law was a political or justiciable question, the Court was almost
evenly divided. One-half embraced the political question position and the other half subscribed to the
justiciable position in Lansang. Those adhering to the political question doctrine used different methods
of approach to it.
48









In 1983, the Lansang ruling was weakened by the Court in Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile.
49
The petitioners
therein were arrested and detained by the Philippine Constabulary by virtue of a Presidential
Commitment Order (PCO). Petitioners sought the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. The Court found
that the PCO had the function of validating a person's detention for any of the offenses covered in
Proclamation No. 2045 which continued in force the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. It held that the issuance of the PCO by the President was not subject to judicial inquiry.
50
It went
further by declaring that there was a need to re-examine Lansang with a view to reverting to Barcelon
and Montenegro. It observed that in times of war or national emergency, the President must be given
absolute control for the very life of the nation and government is in great peril. The President, it
intoned, is answerable only to his conscience, the people, and God.
51

But barely six (6) days after Garcia-Padilla, the Court promulgated Morales, Jr. v. Enrile
52

reiterating Lansang. It held that by the power of judicial review, the Court must inquire into every phase
and aspect of a person's detention from the moment he was taken into custody up to the moment the
court passes upon the merits of the petition. Only after such a scrutiny can the court satisfy itself that
the due process clause of the Constitution has been met.
53

It is now history that the improper reliance by the Court on the political question doctrine eroded
the people's faith in its capacity to check abuses committed by the then Executive in the exercise of
his commander-in-chief powers, particularly violations against human rights. The refusal of courts to
be pro-active in the exercise of its checking power drove the people to the streets to resort to
extralegal remedies. They gave birth to EDSA.
Two lessons were not lost to the members of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987
Constitution. The first was the need to grant this Court the express power to review the exercise of the
powers as commander-in-chief by the President and deny it of any discretion to decline its exercise.
The second was the need to compel the Court to be pro-active by expanding its jurisdiction and, thus,
reject its laid back stance against acts constituting grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of government. Then Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, a member of the Constitutional
Commission, worked for the insertion of the second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII in the draft
Constitution,
54
which reads:
"Sec. 1. x x x.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government."







The language of the provision clearly gives the Court the power to strike down acts amounting to grave
abuse of discretion of both the legislative and executive branches of government.
We should interpret Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution in light of our constitutional
history. The provision states:
"Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines
and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he
may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place
the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation
of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit
a report in person or in writing to Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority
of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which
revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress
may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by
Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or
suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency
of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or
the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
x x x."
It is clear from the foregoing that the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of the
Philippines, may call out the armed forces subject to two conditions: (1) whenever it becomes
necessary; and (2) to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. Undeniably, these
conditions lay down the sine qua requirement for the exercise of the power and the objective sought
to be attained by the exercise of the power. They define the constitutional parameters of the calling
out power. Whether or not there is compliance with these parameters is a justiciable issue and is not
a political question.
I am not unaware that in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Commissioner Bernas
opined that the President's exercise of the "calling out power," unlike the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus and the declaration of martial law, is not a justiciable issue but a political
question and therefore not subject to judicial review.
It must be borne in mind, however, that while a member's opinion expressed on the floor of the
Constitutional Convention is valuable, it is not necessarily expressive of the people's intent.
55
The
proceedings of the Convention are less conclusive on the proper construction of the fundamental law
than are legislative proceedings of the proper construction of a statute, for in the latter case it is the
intent of the legislature the courts seek, while in the former, courts seek to arrive at the intent of the
people through the discussions and deliberations of their representatives.
56
The conventional wisdom is
that the Constitution does not derive its force from the convention which framed it, but from the people



who ratified it, the intent to be arrived at is that of the people.
57

It is true that the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution expressly
gives the Court the power to review the sufficiency of the factual bases used by the President in the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the declaration of martial law. It does
not follow, however, that just because the same provision did not grant to this Court the power to
review the exercise of the calling out power by the President, ergo, this Court cannot pass upon the
validity of its exercise.
Given the light of our constitutional history, this express grant of power merely means that the
Court cannot decline the exercise of its power because of the political question doctrine as it did in
the past. In fine, the express grant simply stresses the mandatory duty of this Court to check the
exercise of the commander-in-chief powers of the President. It eliminated the discretion of the Court
not to wield its power of review thru the use of the political question doctrine.
It may be conceded that the calling out power may be a "lesser power" compared to the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to declare martial law. Even then, its
exercise cannot be left to the absolute discretion of the Chief Executive as Commander-in-Chief of the
armed forces, as its impact on the rights of our people protected by the Constitution cannot be
downgraded. We cannot hold that acts of the commander-in-chief cannot be reviewed on the ground
that they have lesser impact on the civil and political rights of our people. The exercise of the calling out
power may be "benign" in the case at bar but may not be so in future cases.
The counsel of Mr. Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, in his Dissenting and Concurring Opinion in
Lansang that it would be dangerous and misleading to push the political question doctrine too far, is
apropos. It will not be complementary to the Court if it handcuffs itself to helplessness when a
grievously injured citizen seeks relief from a palpably unwarranted use of presidential or military power,
especially when the question at issue falls in the penumbra between the "political" and the "justiciable.
"
58

We should not water down the ruling that deciding whether a matter has been committed by the
Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the action of that branch exceeds whatever
authority has been committed, is a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a
responsibility of the Court as ultimate interpreter of the fundamental law.
59
When private justiciable
rights are involved in a suit, the Court must not refuse to assume jurisdiction even though questions of
extreme political importance are necessarily involved.
60
Every officer under a constitutional government
must act according to law and subject to the controlling power of the people, acting through the courts,
as well as through the executive and legislative. One department is just as representative of the other,
and the judiciary is the department which is charged with the special duty of determining the limitations
which the law places upon all official action.
61
This historic role of the Court is the foundation stone of a






government of laws and not of men.
62

I join the Decision in its result.
SEPARATE OPINION
VITUG, J.:
In the equation of judicial power, neither of two extremes - one totalistic and the other bounded -
is acceptable nor ideal. The 1987 Constitution has introduced its definition of the term "judicial power"
to be that which -
x x x includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government.
1

It is not meant that the Supreme Court must be deemed vested with the awesome power of overseeing
the entire bureaucracy, let alone of institutionalizing judicial absolutism, under its mandate. But while
this Court does not wield unlimited authority to strike down an act of its two co-equal branches of
government, it must not wither under technical guise on its constitutionally ordained task to intervene,
and to nullify if need be, any such act as and when it is attended by grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The proscription then against an interposition by the Court into purely
political questions, heretofore known, no longer holds within that context.
Justice Feria, in the case of Avelino vs. Cuenco,
2
has aptly elucidated in his concurring opinion:
"x x x [I] concur with the majority that this Court has jurisdiction over cases like the present x x x so
as to establish in this country the judicial supremacy, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, to see
that no one branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution, not only in justiceable but
political questions as well."
3

It is here when the Court must have to depart from the broad principle of separation of powers that
disallows an intrusion by it in respect to the purely political decisions of its independent and coordinate
agencies of government.
The term grave abuse of discretion is long understood in our jurisprudence as being, and confined
to, a capricious and whimsical or despotic exercise of judgment amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Minus the not-so-unusual exaggerations often invoked by litigants in the duel of views, the
act of the President in simply calling on the Armed Forces of the Philippines, an executive prerogative,
to assist the Philippine National Police in "joint visibility patrols" in the metropolis does not, I believe,





constitute grave abuse of discretion that would now warrant an exercise by the Supreme Court of its
extraordinary power as so envisioned by the fundamental law.
Accordingly, I vote for the dismissal of the petition.
MENDOZA, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the opinion of the Court insofar as it holds petitioner to be without standing to question
the validity of LOI 02/2000 which mandates the Philippine Marines to conduct "joint visibility" patrols
with the police in Metro Manila. But I dissent insofar as the opinion dismisses the petition in this case
on other grounds. I submit that judgment on the substantive constitutional issues raised by petitioner
must await an actual case involving real parties with "injuries" to show as a result of the operation of the
challenged executive action. While as an organization for the advancement of the rule of law petitioner
has an interest in upholding the Constitution, its interest is indistinguishable from the interest of the rest
of the citizenry and falls short of that which is necessary to give petitioner standing.
As I have indicated elsewhere, a citizens' suit challenging the constitutionality of governmental
action requires that (1) the petitioner must have suffered an "injury in fact" of an actual or imminent
nature; (2) there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of; and
(3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action by this Court.
1
The "injury in fact" test
requires more than injury to a cognizable interest. It requires that the party seeking review be himself
among those injured.
2

My insistence on compliance with the standing requirement is grounded in the conviction that only
a party injured by the operation of the governmental action challenged is in the best position to aid the
Court in determining the precise nature of the problem presented. Many a time we have adverted to
the power of judicial review as an awesome power not to be exercised save in the most exigent
situation. For, indeed, sound judgment on momentous constitutional questions is not likely to be
reached unless it is the result of a clash of adversary arguments which only parties with direct and
specific interest in the outcome of the controversy can make. This is true not only when we strike down
a law or official action but also when we uphold it.
In this case, because of the absence of parties with real and substantial interest to protect, we do
not have evidence on the effect of military presence in malls and commercial centers, i.e., whether such
presence is coercive or benign. We do not know whether the presence of so many marines and
policemen scares shoppers, tourists, and peaceful civilians, or whether it is reassuring to them. To be
sure, the deployment of troops to such places is not like parading them at the Luneta on Independence
Day. Neither is it, however, like calling them out because of actual fighting or the outbreak of violence.
We need to have evidence on these questions because, under the Constitution, the President's
power to call out the armed forces in order to suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion is subject
to the limitation that the exercise of this power is required in the interest of public safety.
3





Indeed, whether it is the calling out of the armed forces alone in order to suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion or also the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the
proclamation of martial law (in case of invasion or rebellion), the exercise of the President's powers as
commander-in-chief, requires proof - not mere assertion.
4
As has been pointed out, "Standing is not `an
ingenious academic exercise in the conceivable' . . . but requires . . . a factual showing of perceptible
harm."
5

Because of the absence of such record evidence, we are left to guess or even speculate on these
questions. Thus, at one point, the majority opinion says that what is involved here is not even the
calling out of the armed forces but only the use of marines for law enforcement. (p. 13) At another
point, however, the majority opinion somersaults and says that because of bombings perpetrated by
lawless elements, the deployment of troops in shopping centers and public utilities is justified. (p. 24)
We are likely to err in dismissing the suit brought in this case on the ground that the calling out of
the military does not violate the Constitution, just as we are likely to do so if we grant the petition and
invalidate the executive issuance in question. For indeed, the lack of a real, earnest and vital
controversy can only impoverish the judicial process. That is why, as Justice Laurel emphasized in the
Angara case, "this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised
after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question
raised or the very lis mota presented."
6

We are told, however, that the issues raised in this case are of "paramount interest" to the nation.
It is precisely because the issues raised are of paramount importance that we should all the more forego
ruling on the constitutional issues raised by petitioner and limit the dismissal of this petition on the
ground of lack of standing of petitioner. A Fabian policy of leaving well enough alone is a counsel of
prudence.
For these reasons and with due appreciation of the scholarly attention lavished by the majority
opinion on the constitutional questions raised, I am constrained to limit my concurrence to the dismissal
of this suit on the ground of lack of standing of petitioner and the consequent lack of an actual case or
controversy.












Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993
JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA, minors, and represented
by their parents ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERTA NICOLE SADIUA, minor, represented by her
parents CALVIN and ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA SALUD and PATRISHA, all surnamed FLORES,
minors and represented by their parents ENRICO and NIDA FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor,
represented by her parents SIGRID and DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE II and MA. CONCEPCION, all
surnamed MISA, minors and represented by their parents GEORGE and MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN ALAN
V. PESIGAN, minor, represented by his parents ANTONIO and ALICE PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE ALFARO,
minor, represented by her parents JOSE and MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA CONCEPCION T.
CASTRO, minor, represented by her parents FREDENIL and JANE CASTRO, JOHANNA DESAMPARADO,
minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA DESAMPRADO, CARLO JOAQUIN T. NARVASA,
minor, represented by his parents GREGORIO II and CRISTINE CHARITY NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA,
JESUS IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA and MARIE GABRIELLE, all surnamed SAENZ, minors, represented by
their parents ROBERTO and AURORA SAENZ, KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN, MAY, GOLDA MARTHE and
DAVID IAN, all surnamed KING, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and HAYDEE KING,
DAVID, FRANCISCO and THERESE VICTORIA, all surnamed ENDRIGA, minors, represented by their
parents BALTAZAR and TERESITA ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and REGINA MA., all surnamed ABAYA, minors,
represented by their parents ANTONIO and MARICA ABAYA, MARILIN, MARIO, JR. and MARIETTE, all
surnamed CARDAMA, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and LINA CARDAMA, CLARISSA,
ANN MARIE, NAGEL, and IMEE LYN, all surnamed OPOSA, minors and represented by their parents
RICARDO and MARISSA OPOSA, PHILIP JOSEPH, STEPHEN JOHN and ISAIAH JAMES, all surnamed
QUIPIT, minors, represented by their parents JOSE MAX and VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO,
CRISANTO, ANNA, DANIEL and FRANCISCO, all surnamed BIBAL, minors, represented by their parents
FRANCISCO, JR. and MILAGROS BIBAL, and THE PHILIPPINE ECOLOGICAL NETWORK, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of
the RTC, Makati, Branch 66, respondents.
Oposa Law Office for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology
which the petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility"
and "inter-generational justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether the said petitioners have
a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest
the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother
Earth."
The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro
Manila) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein,
now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents.
Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-
stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action
geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources. The original defendant was the
Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala,
was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners.
1
The complaint
2
was instituted as a
taxpayers' class suit
3
and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines,
taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the
country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally
concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring
them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well
as generations yet unborn."
4
Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:
. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his
behalf to
(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new
timber license agreements.
and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises."
5

The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands has
a land area of thirty million (30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainforests
in which varied, rare and unique species of flora and fauna may be found; these rainforests contain a
genetic, biological and chemical pool which is irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of indigenous
Philippine cultures which have existed, endured and flourished since time immemorial; scientific
evidence reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology, the country's land area
should be utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six per
cent (46%) for agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and other uses; the distortion and
disturbance of this balance as a consequence of deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental
tragedies, such as (a) water shortages resulting from drying up of the water table, otherwise known as
the "aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b) salinization of the water table as a result of
the intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertible examples of which may be found in the island of
Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the consequential loss of soil
fertility and agricultural productivity, with the volume of soil eroded estimated at one billion

(1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum approximately the size of the entire island of Catanduanes,
(d) the endangering and extinction of the country's unique, rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the
disturbance and dislocation of cultural communities, including the disappearance of the Filipino's
indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds and consequential destruction of corals and
other aquatic life leading to a critical reduction in marine resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells of
drought as is presently experienced by the entire country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds
which result from the absence of windbreakers, (i) the floodings of lowlands and agricultural plains
arising from the absence of the absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation and shortening of the
lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and operated for the purpose of supplying water for
domestic uses, irrigation and the generation of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the earth's
capacity to process carbon dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes
such as the phenomenon of global warming, otherwise known as the "greenhouse effect."
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation
are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial
notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to present expert witnesses as well as
documentary, photographic and film evidence in the course of the trial.
As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:
CAUSE OF ACTION
7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.
8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million hectares of
rainforests constituting roughly 53% of the country's land mass.
9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than 1.2 million
hectares of said rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of the country's land area.
10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth
rainforests are left, barely 2.8% of the entire land mass of the Philippine archipelago and
about 3.0 million hectares of immature and uneconomical secondary growth forests.
11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have granted timber license
agreements ('TLA's') to various corporations to cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million
hectares for commercial logging purposes.
A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto attached as
Annex "A".
12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per annum or 25
hectares per hour nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included the
Philippines will be bereft of forest resources after the end of this ensuing decade, if not
earlier.

13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and irreparable damage
of this continued trend of deforestation to the plaintiff minor's generation and to
generations yet unborn are evident and incontrovertible. As a matter of fact, the
environmental damages enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof are already being felt,
experienced and suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults.
14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest the
remaining forest stands will work great damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs
especially plaintiff minors and their successors who may never see, use, benefit from
and enjoy this rare and unique natural resource treasure.
This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural
resource property he holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding
generations.
15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology
and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as the parens patriae.
16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant's office. On
March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to cancel all logging
permits in the country.
A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as Annex "B".
17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's to the continuing
serious damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.
18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's is an act violative
of the rights of plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors who may be left with a country that
is desertified (sic), bare, barren and devoid of the wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous
cultures which the Philippines had been abundantly blessed with.
19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is manifestly contrary to the
public policy enunciated in the Philippine Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part,
states that it is the policy of the State
(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature
can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other;
(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future
generations of Filipinos and;
(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conductive to a life of
dignity and well-being. (P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977)

20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is
contradictory to the Constitutional policy of the State to
a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth" and "make
full and efficient use of natural resources (sic)." (Section 1, Article XII of the
Constitution);
b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);
c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources (sic)" (Section 14,
Article XIV, id.);
d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in
accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature." (Section 16, Article II, id.)
21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of humankind the natural
law and violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and perpetuation.
22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the instant
action to arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and
continued rape of Mother Earth.
6

On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint
based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue
raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive
branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that
(1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the
action presents a justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss.
7
In
the said order, not only was the defendant's claim that the complaint states no cause of action
against him and that it raises a political question sustained, the respondent Judge further ruled that
the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by
the fundamental law of the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent
Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors
not only represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this case.
8

On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their
respective Memoranda after the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of the
respondents and the petitioners filed a reply thereto.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains
sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of

the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section
3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the
1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept
of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation
and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's correlative
obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthful environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in
granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is available
involves a judicial question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause, petitioners
maintain that the same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit
that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled that they may still be
revoked by the State when the public interest so requires.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific
legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. They see nothing
in the complaint but vague and nebulous allegations concerning an "environmental right" which
supposedly entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state in its capacity as parens patriae." Such
allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid cause of action. They then reiterate the theory that
the question of whether logging should be permitted in the country is a political question which should
be properly addressed to the executive or legislative branches of Government. They therefore assert
that the petitioners' resources is not to file an action to court, but to lobby before Congress for the
passage of a bill that would ban logging totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be done by
the State without due process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time
usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor cancelled
unless the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to have violated the terms of the
agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs
indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would be violative of the requirements of due
process.
Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters. Petitioners instituted Civil
Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. The original defendant and the present respondents did not take issue
with this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit. The subject
matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the
Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally
impossible, to bring all of them before the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are
numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all
the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are
present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the
former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for

themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their
personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.
Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety.
9
Such rhythm and
harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal
and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and
other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably
accessible to the present as well as future generations.
10
Needless to say, every generation has a
responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and
healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment
constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right
for the generations to come.
The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now proceed to the merits of
the petition.
After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration and evaluation of
the issues raised and arguments adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to find for the petitioners
and rule against the respondent Judge's challenged order for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of the said order reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court cannot help but
agree with the defendant. For although we believe that plaintiffs have but the noblest of
all intentions, it (sic) fell short of alleging, with sufficient definiteness, a specific legal
right they are seeking to enforce and protect, or a specific legal wrong they are seeking
to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the Court notes that the
Complaint is replete with vague assumptions and vague conclusions based on unverified
data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action in its Complaint against the herein
defendant.
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being impressed with
political color and involving a matter of public policy, may not be taken cognizance of by
this Court without doing violence to the sacred principle of "Separation of Powers" of
the three (3) co-equal branches of the Government.
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our
jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber
license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise
would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law.
11

We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient
definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is

replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data. A reading of the complaint
itself belies these conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the
fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of
the same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill
health consciousness among them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles
and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of
the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of
rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation aptly and
fittingly stressed by the petitioners the advancement of which may even be said to predate all
governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the
Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly
mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless
the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the
Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a
solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too
far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come
generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from
impairing the environment. During the debates on this right in one of the plenary sessions of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, the following exchange transpired between Commissioner Wilfrido
Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the section in question:
MR. VILLACORTA:
Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against all
forms of pollution air, water and noise pollution?
MR. AZCUNA:
Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic) environment
necessarily carries with it the correlative duty of not impairing the same
and, therefore, sanctions may be provided for impairment of
environmental balance.
12


The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the
country's forests.
Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversiby disrupted.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health, as
well as the other related provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation, development and
utilization of the country's natural resources,
13
then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10
June 1987 E.O. No. 192,
14
Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government agency responsible for the conservation,
management, development and proper use of the country's environment and natural resources,
specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources, including those in reservation and watershed
areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as
may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for
the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following
statement of policy:
Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the State to ensure the
sustainable use, development, management, renewal, and conservation of the country's
forest, mineral, land, off-shore areas and other natural resources, including the
protection and enhancement of the quality of the environment, and equitable access of
the different segments of the population to the development and the use of the
country's natural resources, not only for the present generation but for future
generations as well. It is also the policy of the state to recognize and apply a true value
system including social and environmental cost implications relative to their utilization,
development and conservation of our natural resources.
This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987,

15
specifically in Section 1 thereof which reads:
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the Filipino
people, the full exploration and development as well as the judicious disposition,
utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral,
land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources, consistent
with the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and
enhancing the quality of the environment and the objective of making the exploration,
development and utilization of such natural resources equitably accessible to the
different segments of the present as well as future generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes into
account social and environmental cost implications relative to the utilization,
development and conservation of our natural resources.
The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting
and enhancing the quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand,

specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular reference to the fact of the
agency's being subject to law and higher authority. Said section provides:
Sec. 2. Mandate. (1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall be
primarily responsible for the implementation of the foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the State's
constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development,
utilization, and conservation of the country's natural resources.
Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the
bases for policy formulation, and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes
already paid special attention to the "environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6
June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine Environment
Code) were issued. The former "declared a continuing policy of the State (a) to create, develop, maintain
and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony
with each other, (b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future
generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conducive
to a life of dignity and well-being."
16
As its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of each generation as
trustee and guardian of the environment for succeeding generations."
17
The latter statute, on the other
hand, gave flesh to the said policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as
clear as the DENR's duty under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No.
192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 to protect and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or obligation to respect or
protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which
they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful
ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.
A cause of action is defined as:
. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other;
and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the
defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right.
18

It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to
state a cause of action,
19
the question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of
the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth of
falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted.
The only issue to be resolved in such a case is: admitting such alleged facts to be true, may the court
render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the complaint?
20
In Militante vs. Edrosolano,
21

this Court laid down the rule that the judiciary should "exercise the utmost care and circumspection in

passing upon a motion to dismiss on the ground of the absence thereof [cause of action] lest, by its
failure to manifest a correct appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted, what
the law grants or recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens, there is a blot on the legal order. The
law itself stands in disrepute."
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements under the introductory
affirmative allegations, as well as the specific averments under the sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be
adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights. On the basis thereof, they
may thus be granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing, however, that insofar as
the cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there is the need to implead, as party defendants, the
grantees thereof for they are indispensable parties.
The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political question. Policy formulation
or determination by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue.
What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and
expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctrine is no
longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that
protects executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. The second paragraph of
section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law,
22
Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a
distinguished member of this Court, says:
The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power,
involving the settlement of conflicting rights as conferred as law. The second part of the
authority represents a broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to
review what was before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political
departments of the government.
As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court,
the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the
legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because
tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of "grave
abuse of discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or contract
according to the disposition of the judiciary.
In Daza vs. Singson,
23
Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and
decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before
us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from revolving it under the

expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the
political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides: . . .
The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-impairment of contracts
clause found in the Constitution. The court a quo declared that:
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our
jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber
license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise
would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law.
24

We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by such a sweeping
pronouncement. In the first place, the respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in
his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so, he would have acted with utmost
infidelity to the Government by providing undue and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the
timber license holders because he would have forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said
licenses according to their terms and conditions regardless of changes in policy and the demands of
public interest and welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every
timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:
. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may amend,
modify, replace or rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form
of privilege granted herein . . .
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a
contract, property or a property right protested by the due process clause of the Constitution. In
Tan vs. Director of Forestry,
25
this Court held:
. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and
disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber
license is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a license
or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or
public welfare as in this case.
A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is
not a contract between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the
person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create
a vested right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of
license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights
(People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576).
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary:
26

. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by
which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end

that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence
a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a
permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products
therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief
Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts
within the purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres.
Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548,
October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:
Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed.
27

cannot be invoked.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not
involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber
licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further
that a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be
stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose,
such as law could have only been passed in the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose
of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health and
enhancing the general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler
Corp.
28
this Court stated:
The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be absolute.
The same is understood to be subject to reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the
promotion of public health, moral, safety and welfare. In other words, the constitutional
guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the
police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and general
welfare.
The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York,
29
quoted in Philippine American Life
Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General,
30
to wit:
Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are
normally matters of private and not of public concern. The general rule is that both shall
be free of governmental interference. But neither property rights nor contract rights are
absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the
detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm. Equally
fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate it in the common
interest.
In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state.
31


Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could apply with
respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing or approving new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract would have as of
yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a
matter of right.
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged
Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The
petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of
the questioned timber license agreements.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Regalado, Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., Puno and Vitug, JJ., took no part.



Separate Opinions

FELICIANO, J., concurring
I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide, Jr., J., in this case which, to
my mind, is one of the most important cases decided by this Court in the last few years. The seminal
principles laid down in this decision are likely to influence profoundly the direction and course of the
protection and management of the environment, which of course embraces the utilization of all the
natural resources in the territorial base of our polity. I have therefore sought to clarify, basically to
myself, what the Court appears to be saying.
The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to sustain the bringing and,
maintenance of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not a function of petitioners' claim that
their suit is properly regarded as a class suit. I understand locus standi to refer to the legal interest which
a plaintiff must have in the subject matter of the suit. Because of the very broadness of the concept of
"class" here involved membership in this "class" appears to embrace everyone living in the country
whether now or in the
future it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to benefit from the course of action
petitioners seek to require public respondents to take, is vested with the necessary locus standi. The

Court may be seen therefore to be recognizing a beneficiaries' right of action in the field of
environmental protection, as against both the public administrative agency directly concerned and the
private persons or entities operating in the field or sector of activity involved. Whether such
beneficiaries' right of action may be found under any and all circumstances, or whether some failure to
act, in the first instance, on the part of the governmental agency concerned must be shown ("prior
exhaustion of administrative remedies"), is not discussed in the decision and presumably is left for
future determination in an appropriate case.
The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon "one specific fundamental
legal right the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There is no question that
"the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" is "fundamental" and that, accordingly, it has been
"constitutionalized." But although it is fundamental in character, I suggest, with very great respect, that
it cannot be characterized as "specific," without doing excessive violence to language. It is in fact very
difficult to fashion language more comprehensive in scope and generalized in character than a right to
"a balanced and healthful ecology." The list of particular claims which can be subsumed under this rubic
appears to be entirely open-ended: prevention and control of emission of toxic fumes and smoke from
factories and motor vehicles; of discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage and raw sewage into rivers,
inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines and whole communities; of dumping of
organic and inorganic wastes on open land, streets and thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after
strip-mining or open-pit mining; kaingin or slash-and-burn farming; destruction of fisheries, coral reefs
and other living sea resources through the use of dynamite or cyanide and other chemicals;
contamination of ground water resources; loss of certain species of fauna and flora; and so on. The
other statements pointed out by the Court: Section 3, Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987;
Section 1, Title XIV, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977 all
appear to be formulations of policy, as general and abstract as the constitutional statements of basic
policy in Article II, Section 16 ("the right to a balanced and healthful ecology") and 15 ("the right to
health").
P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine Environment Code," is, upon the other
hand, a compendious collection of more "specific environment management policies" and "environment
quality standards" (fourth "Whereas" clause, Preamble) relating to an extremely wide range of topics:
(a) air quality management;
(b) water quality management;
(c) land use management;
(d) natural resources management and conservation embracing:
(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;
(ii) wild life;
(iii) forestry and soil conservation;

(iv) flood control and natural calamities;
(v) energy development;
(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground water
(vii) mineral resources
Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither petitioners nor the Court has
identified the particular provision or provisions (if any) of the Philippine Environment Code which give
rise to a specific legal right which petitioners are seeking to enforce. Secondly, the Philippine
Environment Code identifies with notable care the particular government agency charged with the
formulation and implementation of guidelines and programs dealing with each of the headings and sub-
headings mentioned above. The Philippine Environment Code does not, in other words, appear to
contemplate action on the part of private persons who are beneficiaries of implementation of that Code.
As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal right comprised in the
constitutional statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) of
Article II of the Constitution are self-executing and judicially enforceable even in their present form. The
implications of this doctrine will have to be explored in future cases; those implications are too large and
far-reaching in nature even to be hinted at here.
My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal right a
right cast in language of a significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) of the Constitution
that is or may be violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public respondent by
petitioners so that the trial court can validly render judgment granting all or part of the relief prayed for.
To my mind, the Court should be understood as simply saying that such a more specific legal right or
rights may well exist in our corpus of law, considering the general policy principles found in the
Constitution and the existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and that the trial court should have
given petitioners an effective opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a
motion to dismiss.
It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of action be a
specific, operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons.
One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or disregarded is given specification in
operational terms, defendants may well be unable to defend themselves intelligently and effectively; in
other words, there are due process dimensions to this matter.
The second is a broader-gauge consideration where a specific violation of law or applicable regulation
is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded conception of judicial
power in the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution which reads:
Section 1. . . .
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine

whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
(Emphasis supplied)
When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and healthy ecology" and
"the right to health" are combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction," the result will be, it is respectfully
submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making. At
least in respect of the vast area of environmental protection and management, our courts have
no claim to special technical competence and experience and professional qualification. Where
no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the policy making
departments the legislative and executive departments must be given a real and effective
opportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms and standards, and to implement them
before the courts should intervene.
My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber companies, whose concession
agreements or TLA's petitioners demand public respondents should cancel, must be impleaded in the
proceedings below. It might be asked that, if petitioners' entitlement to the relief demanded is not
dependent upon proof of breach by the timber companies of one or more of the specific terms and
conditions of their concession agreements (and this, petitioners implicitly assume), what will those
companies litigate about? The answer I suggest is that they may seek to dispute the existence of the
specific legal right petitioners should allege, as well as the reality of the claimed factual nexus between
petitioners' specific legal rights and the claimed wrongful acts or failures to act of public respondent
administrative agency. They may also controvert the appropriateness of the remedy or remedies
demanded by petitioners, under all the circumstances which exist.
I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the environment, including the forest
cover of our territory, is of extreme importance for the country. The doctrines set out in the Court's
decision issued today should, however, be subjected to closer examination.


# Separate Opinions
FELICIANO, J., concurring
I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide, Jr., J., in this case which, to
my mind, is one of the most important cases decided by this Court in the last few years. The seminal
principles laid down in this decision are likely to influence profoundly the direction and course of the
protection and management of the environment, which of course embraces the utilization of all the
natural resources in the territorial base of our polity. I have therefore sought to clarify, basically to
myself, what the Court appears to be saying.

The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to sustain the bringing and,
maintenance of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not a function of petitioners' claim that
their suit is properly regarded as a class suit. I understand locus standi to refer to the legal interest which
a plaintiff must have in the subject matter of the suit. Because of the very broadness of the concept of
"class" here involved membership in this "class" appears to embrace everyone living in the country
whether now or in the
future it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to benefit from the course of action
petitioners seek to require public respondents to take, is vested with the necessary locus standi. The
Court may be seen therefore to be recognizing a beneficiaries' right of action in the field of
environmental protection, as against both the public administrative agency directly concerned and the
private persons or entities operating in the field or sector of activity involved. Whether such
beneficiaries' right of action may be found under any and all circumstances, or whether some failure to
act, in the first instance, on the part of the governmental agency concerned must be shown ("prior
exhaustion of administrative remedies"), is not discussed in the decision and presumably is left for
future determination in an appropriate case.
The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon "one specific fundamental
legal right the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There is no question that
"the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" is "fundamental" and that, accordingly, it has been
"constitutionalized." But although it is fundamental in character, I suggest, with very great respect, that
it cannot be characterized as "specific," without doing excessive violence to language. It is in fact very
difficult to fashion language more comprehensive in scope and generalized in character than a right to
"a balanced and healthful ecology." The list of particular claims which can be subsumed under this rubic
appears to be entirely open-ended: prevention and control of emission of toxic fumes and smoke from
factories and motor vehicles; of discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage and raw sewage into rivers,
inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines and whole communities; of dumping of
organic and inorganic wastes on open land, streets and thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after
strip-mining or open-pit mining; kaingin or slash-and-burn farming; destruction of fisheries, coral reefs
and other living sea resources through the use of dynamite or cyanide and other chemicals;
contamination of ground water resources; loss of certain species of fauna and flora; and so on. The
other statements pointed out by the Court: Section 3, Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987;
Section 1, Title XIV, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977 all
appear to be formulations of policy, as general and abstract as the constitutional statements of basic
policy in Article II, Section 16 ("the right to a balanced and healthful ecology") and 15 ("the right to
health").
P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine Environment Code," is, upon the other
hand, a compendious collection of more "specific environment management policies" and "environment
quality standards" (fourth "Whereas" clause, Preamble) relating to an extremely wide range of topics:
(a) air quality management;
(b) water quality management;
(c) land use management;
(d) natural resources management and conservation embracing:

(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;
(ii) wild life;
(iii) forestry and soil conservation;
(iv) flood control and natural calamities;
(v) energy development;
(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground water
(vii) mineral resources
Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither petitioners nor the Court has
identified the particular provision or provisions (if any) of the Philippine Environment Code which give
rise to a specific legal right which petitioners are seeking to enforce. Secondly, the Philippine
Environment Code identifies with notable care the particular government agency charged with the
formulation and implementation of guidelines and programs dealing with each of the headings and sub-
headings mentioned above. The Philippine Environment Code does not, in other words, appear to
contemplate action on the part of private persons who are beneficiaries of implementation of that Code.
As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal right comprised in the
constitutional statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) of
Article II of the Constitution are self-executing and judicially enforceable even in their present form. The
implications of this doctrine will have to be explored in future cases; those implications are too large and
far-reaching in nature even to be hinted at here.
My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal right a
right cast in language of a significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) of the Constitution
that is or may be violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public respondent by
petitioners so that the trial court can validly render judgment granting all or part of the relief prayed for.
To my mind, the Court should be understood as simply saying that such a more specific legal right or
rights may well exist in our corpus of law, considering the general policy principles found in the
Constitution and the existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and that the trial court should have
given petitioners an effective opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a
motion to dismiss.
It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of action be a
specific, operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons.
One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or disregarded is given specification in
operational terms, defendants may well be unable to defend themselves intelligently and effectively; in
other words, there are due process dimensions to this matter.

The second is a broader-gauge consideration where a specific violation of law or applicable regulation
is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded conception of judicial
power in the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution which reads:
Section 1. . . .
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
(Emphasis supplied)
When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and healthy ecology" and
"the right to health" are combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction," the result will be, it is respectfully
submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making. At
least in respect of the vast area of environmental protection and management, our courts have
no claim to special technical competence and experience and professional qualification. Where
no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the policy making
departments the legislative and executive departments must be given a real and effective
opportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms and standards, and to implement them
before the courts should intervene.
My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber companies, whose concession
agreements or TLA's petitioners demand public respondents should cancel, must be impleaded in the
proceedings below. It might be asked that, if petitioners' entitlement to the relief demanded is not
dependent upon proof of breach by the timber companies of one or more of the specific terms and
conditions of their concession agreements (and this, petitioners implicitly assume), what will those
companies litigate about? The answer I suggest is that they may seek to dispute the existence of the
specific legal right petitioners should allege, as well as the reality of the claimed factual nexus between
petitioners' specific legal rights and the claimed wrongful acts or failures to act of public respondent
administrative agency. They may also controvert the appropriateness of the remedy or remedies
demanded by petitioners, under all the circumstances which exist.
I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the environment, including the forest
cover of our territory, is of extreme importance for the country. The doctrines set out in the Court's
decision issued today should, however, be subjected to closer examination.
















Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-16263 July 26, 1960
DR. JOSE CUYEGKENG, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
DR. PEDRO M. CRUZ, as member of Board of Medical Examiners, respondent.
G. B. Guevara, R. P. Guevara and E. S. Tipon for petitioners.
J. W. Diokno for petitioners in Intervention.
Solicitor General Edilberto Barot, Solicitor E. D. Ignacio and Atty. J. A. Garcia for respondent.
CONCEPCION, J.:
This quo warranto proceeding was initiated on November 25, 1950. The prayer in the petition, as
amended on December 1, 1959, reads:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that judgment be rendered in favor of the
petitioners:
ON THE FIRST OF ACTION:

1. Declaring the petitioners as duly qualified for the position of member of the Board of
Medical Examiners and that any one of them is legally entitled to be appointed as
members of said Board;
2. Declaring the appointment of the respondent Dr. Pedro M. Cruz as members of the
Board of Medical Examiners illegal and therefore null and void and ousting him
therefrom and perpetually prohibiting him (unless appointed in accordance with law)
from exercising the rights and performing the duties and functions connected therewith.
ON THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION:
1. That pending the hearing on the merits of this case a writ of preliminary injunction be
issued forthwith ex parte ordering the respondent to cease, desist and refrain from
assuming the office of member of the Board of Medical Examiners and exercising the
rights and performing the duties and functions connected therewith, particularly to give
or conduct the next examinations for physicians scheduled on or about December 14,
1959, or to take part in any way in the giving or conducting thereof, and after due
hearing to make said injunction permanent;
2. Ordering the respondent to pay the costs of this suit.
Petitioners further pray for such further and other relief as this Honorable Court "may
deem just and proper under the premises."
By a resolution dated December 3, 1959, this Court denied the petition for a writ of preliminary
injunction.
The petitioners are doctors Jose Cuyegkeng, Pedro N. Mayuga, Benjamin Roa, Timoteo Alday,
Dominador Jacinto, Alejandro Gaerlan and Rosita Rivera-Ramirez. Their alleged cause of action is
predicated upon the fact that their names appear in a list of qualified physicians, approved and
submitted, to the President of the Philippines, by the Executive Council of the Philippine Medical
Association of the Philippines pursuant to the provisions of section 13 of Republic Act No. 2382, for
appointment as members of the Board of Medical Examiners, and that respondent Dr. Pedro M. Cruz,
whom the President appointed to said board was not named in said list.
Soon after the institution of this case, the officers and members of said Council of the Philippine Medical
Association, which is said to be an incorporated association of the medical profession in the Philippines,
were allowed to intervene and then filed a petition in intervention, joining the petitioners in praying for
the relief sought by them.
It appears that, on October 16, 1959, said Council, acting in conformity with section 13 of Republic Act
No. 2382, otherwise known as The Medical Act of 1959, approved and submitted to the President a
revised list of qualified physicians, including petitioners herein, for appointment to the aforementioned
Board. The letter of said Council transmitting the aforementioned list reads as follows:

October 16, 1959
Hon. Enrique C. Quema
Assistant Executive Secretary
Office of the President
Republic of the Philippines
Malacaang, Manila
Dear Sir:
In compliance with your request as contained in your letter of October 15, addressed to
the Executive Council of the Philippine Medical Association, and pursuant to a decision
reached by the said Council at a special meeting held yesterday, please be informed that
the nominee who placed 13th in our order of priority for recommendation as members
of the Board of Medical Examiners, namely, Dr. Rosita River-Ramirez, is now being
recommended as No. 12. With the disqualification of Dr. Dionisio R. Parulan (No. 11) by
virtue of his candidacy to an elective post, we hereunder enumerate our twelve
recommendees in the modified order:
1. Dr. Cesar Filoteo
2. Dr. Jose Cuyegkeng
3. Dr. Edgardo Caparas
4. Dr. Antonio Guytingco
5. Dr. Pedro N. Mayuga
6. Dr. Benjamin Roa
7. Dr. Jose Cocjin
8. Dr. Timoteo Alday
9. Dr. Dominador Jacinto
10. Dr. Alejandro Gaerlan
11. Dr. Oscar Chacon
12. Dr. Rosita Rivera-Ramirez
Thank you for your interest on this matter.
Very truly yours,
FOR THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL
S/ALBERTO Z. ROMUALDEZ
T/ALBERTO Z. ROMUALDEZ, MD.
By a letter of the Assistant Executive Secretary dated November 18, 1959, said Council was advised that
the President had decided to appoint, as member of the said Board, Dr. Cesar Filoteo, Dr. Oscar Chacon,
Dr. Edgardo Caparas, Dr. Jose Cocjin, Dr. Antonio Gutyingco and Dr. Pedro M. Cruz. Said letter as follows:
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OF THE PHILIPPINES

Manila, November 18, 1959
The Executive Council
Philippine Medical Association
1850 Taft Avenue, Manila
Gentlemen:
The President wishes me to thank you for your letter of October 16, 1959, submitted a
revised list of recommendees for appointment as members of the Board of Medical
Examiners under the provisions of Republic Act No. 2382.
After mature deliberation, the President had decided to appoint in the board two
graduated from the University of the Philippines, two from the University of Santo
Tomas and two government physicians irrespective of alma mater. The following were
the candidates selected and appointed by the President:
1. Dr. Cesar Filoteo U. P.
2. Dr. Oscar Chacon U. P.
3. Dr. Edgardo Caparas U. S. T.
4. Dr. Jose Cocjin U. S. T.
5. Dr. Antonio Guytingco Government Physician
6. Dr. Pedro M. Cruz Government Physician
Of the twelve(12) names submitted in your above-mentioned letter of October 16,
1959, Dr. Antonio Guytingco and Dr. Alejandro Gaerlan, government physicians, happen
to be both personal physicians of the President. For this reason, the President decided
on renewing the appointment of Dr. Pedro M. Cruz, also a government physician, whose
term under the old law would not have expired until August 7, 1960, were it not for the
enactment of Republic Act No. 2382.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) Enrique C. Quema
t/ENRIQUE C. QUEMA
Assistant Executive Secretary
The first five (5) persons mentioned in this letter were included in the list aforementioned, but the name
of the last, namely, that of respondent herein, did not appear in said list. Petitioner herein, as well as the
intervenors, maintain that, pursuant to section 13 of Republic Act No. 2382, the President cannot
appoint to the Board of Medical Examiners any person not named in the list submitted by the Executive
Council of the Philippine Medical Association, and that, accordingly, the aforementioned appointment of
respondent is null and void.

Respondent alleged in his answer that three(3) of petitioners herein are, pursuant to section 14 of
Republic Act No. 2382, not qualified for appointment to the Board for Medical Examiners, they being
members of the professional staff of certain private medical colleges; that there is no cause of action
againsts him none of the petitioners and intervenors claim to be entitled to the office in question; that
the aforementioned list, submitted by the executive Council of the Philippine Medical Association, is
merely recommendatory in nature and, as such, not binding upon the President; that insofar as Section
13 of Republic Act No. 2382 may be construed as limiting the choice of the President, in a mandatory
manner, in the selection of members of the Board of Medical Examiners, to the list aforementioned, said
legal provision is unconstitutional and void; and that inclusion in the list above referred to is not one of
the qualification prescribed in section 14 of Republic Act No. 2382 for appointment to said Board.
The members of this Court are split into three (3) groups in their views on the issues thus raised by the
pleadings. Section 13 of Republic Act No. 2382, upon which the petitioners and the intervenors rely,
provides:
The Board of Medical Examiners, its composition and duties. The Board of Medical
Examiners shall be composed of six members to be appointed by the President of the
Philippines from a confidential list of not more than twelve names approved and
submitted by the executive council of the Philippine Medical Association, after due
consultation with other medical associations, during the months of April and October of
each year. The chairman of the Board shall be elected from among themselves by the
members at a meeting called for the purpose. The President of the Philippines shall fill
any vacancy that may occur during any examination from the list of names submitted by
the Philippine Medical Association in accordance with the provisions of this Act.
No examiner shall handle the examination in more than four subjects or groups of
subjects to each member shall be agreed upon at a meeting called by the chairman for
the purpose. The examination papers shall be under the custody of the Commissioner of
Civil Service or his duly authorized representative, and shall be distributed to each
member of the Board who shall correct, grade, and sign, and submit them to the said
Commissioner within one hundred twenty days from the date of the termination of the
examinations.
A final meeting of the Board for the deliberation and approval of the grades shall be
called by the Commissioner of Civil Service immediately after receipt of the records from
the members of the Board of Medical Examiners. The secretary of the Board shall
submit to the President of the Philippines for approval the names of the successful
candidates as having been duly qualified for licensure in alphabetical order, without
stating the ratings obtained by each.
One group of members of this Court is of the opinion that the provisions of this section are mandatory in
character; that, although Congress may, by law, prescribe the qualifications for appointment to a public
office created by statute, such as membership of the Board of Medical Examiners, and has specified the
qualifications for eligibility to said Board in Section 14 of Republic Act No. 2382, reading:
Qualifications of examiners. No person shall be appointed a member of the Board of
Medical Examiners unless he or she (1) is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, (2) is

a duly registered physician in the Philippines, (3) has been in the practice of medicine for
at least ten years, (4) is of good moral character and of recognized standing in the
medical profession, (5) is not a member of the faculty of any medical school and has no
pecuniary interest, directly or indirectly, in any college of medicine or in any institution
where any branch of medicine is taught, at the time of his appointment: Provided, That
of the six members to be appointed, not more than two shall be graduates of the same
institution and not more than three shall be government physicians.
inclusion in the list submitted by the Executive Council of the Philippine Medical Association, in
compliance with section 13 of the same Act, is not one of the qualifications enumerated in said section
14; that by confining the selection of the six (6) members of the Board of Medical Examiners to the
twelve (12) person included in said list, the framers of the law have evinced the intent, not merely to
prescribe the qualifications for eligibility to said Board, but, also, to limit and curtail, and, hence, to
reduce and impair the power of appointment vested in the President by the Constitution, which
authority connotes necessarily a reasonable measure of freedom, latitude or discretion in the exercise
of the power to choose the appointees (67 C. J. S. 157-158); and that, consequently, the pertinent
portion of section 13 of Republic Act No. 2382 is unconstitutional and the appointment of respondent
herein lawful and valid.
It may not be amiss to note, in this connection, that none of the case cited in the memorandum of the
intervenors herein (Marks vs. Frantz [1956] 179 Kan. 638, 298 P 2nd 316; Railroad et al. vs. Willis [1947]
305 Ky. 224, 203 S. W. 2nd 18; Bradley vs. Board of Zoning Adjustment [1926], 255 Mass. 160, 150 N. E.
892) is in point for the constitutions of Kansas, Kentucky and Massachusetts contain no provision
identical or analogous to that found in our fundamental law, vesting in the President all executive
powers not conferred upon others, all explicitly stating that all officers of the Government whose
appointment are not otherwise provided for in the character of said states shall be appointed by him.
The authority of the chief executive of those states to appoint the officers involved in said cases springs
mostly from statutes, unlike the President of the Philippines, whose appointing power emanates from
our Constitution.
Another group adheres to the view that said portion of section 13 of Republic Act No. 2382 is merely
directory in nature. Indeed, in their respective pleadings, the petitioners, as well as the intervenors,
refer to the persons named in the list aforementioned as "recommendees". They are identically referred
to in the communication transmitting said list to the President of the Philippines, which communication
is, in turn, described in said pleadings as a letter of "recommendation". By their very acts therefore, the
intervenors have clearly expressed the belief, which was shared by the President, that the function of
the former under said section 13 is purely recommendatory. Needless to say, a "recommendation", as
such, implies merely an advice, exhortation or indorsement, which is essentially persuasive in character,
not binding upon the party to whom it is made. The members of the Court constituting this group feel,
therefore, that, although section 13 of Republic Act No. 2382 is constitutional, respondent herein has a
valid title to his office as member of the Board of Medical Examiners.
The third group, which is bigger than any of the two (2) groups already adverted to, deems it
unnecessary, either to inquire into the constitutionality of said section 13, or to determine whether the
same is mandatory or directory, for the reasons presently to be stated.

The letter to the Executive Council of the Philippine Medical Association dated November 18, 1959,
informing the Association of the action taken by the President, states that he "had decided to appoint in
the Board two graduates from the University of the Philippines, two government physicians irrespective
of alma mater". The list submitted by the Executive Council of the Philippine Medical Association
included two (2) government physicians, namely, Dr. Antonio Guytingco and Dr. Alejandro Gaerlan, both
of whom were "personal physicians of the President". Believing, perhaps, that their appointment to the
Board may either deprive him completely of the benefits of their professional services, or impair the
quality or usefulness thereof, or that a choice in favor of his two (2) personal doctors, as representatives
of the government physicians in said Board, may smack of, or be misconstrued as, an act of nepotism, it
was deemed best to appoint to the Board only one of them so that the other could continue giving his
undivided attention to the health of the President. Hence, the latter had to look for another government
physician for appointment to the Board. In this connection, it should be noted that respondent's
professional competency for the post he now holds is not disputed. In fact, he had been a member of
said Board twice before. What is more, when the questioned appointment was extended to him, on
November 18, 1959, respondent was a member of said Board, and his term as such would have expired
on August 7, 1960, had it not been for the approval of Republic Act No. 2383 on June 20, 1959. the
President made, therefore, said appointment, which, the members is sanctioned by section 15 of
Republic Act No. 2382, reading:
Tenure of office and compensation of members. The members of the Board of
Medical Examiners shall hold office for one year: Provided, That any member may be
reappointed for not more than more year. Each member shall receive as compensation
ten pesos for each candidate examined for registration as physician, and five pesos for
each candidate examined in the preliminary or final physician examination.
The President of the Philippines, upon the recommendation of the Commissioner of Civil
Service, after due investigation, may remove any member of the Board of Medical
Examiners for neglect of duty, incompetency, or unprofessional or dishonorable
conduct.
The members of said group opine that it is not absolutely necessary that the person reappointed under
this provision be included in the list mentioned in section 13 of Republic Act No. 2382, for, in case of
conflict between two (2) provisions of the same statute, the last in order of position is frequently held to
prevail (82 C. J. S. 718), unless it clearly appears that the intent of congress is otherwise, and no such
intent is patent in the case at bar. Furthermore, the purpose of section 13, in requiring the favorable
indorsement of the Philippine Medical Association, evidently, to reasonably assure that the members of
the Board of Medical Examiners are among the best in their profession, and one who has already held,
or who still holds a position in said Board, is presumed to belong to such class, in the absence of proof to
the contrary. There is not even the slightest suggestion that respondent does into live up to the
standard required for membership in said Board.
In conclusion, although none of the groups already adverted to have sufficient votes to constitute the
requisite majority, the members of this Court are unanimous in the opinion that respondent herein has
a good and valid title to his office.

Lastly, this is a a quo warranto proceeding, which, pursuant to Rule 68 of the Rules of Court, may be
brought either by the Government or by a private individual. Not every individual may, however, initiate
the proceedings. Section 6 of said Rule provides:
When an individual may commence such an action. A person claiming to be entitled
to a public office usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another may bring an action
therefor in his own name.
Thus, one who does not claim to be entitled to the office allegedly usurped or unlawfully held or
exercised by another cannot question his title thereto by quo warranto. In the case at bar, petitioners do
not claim to entitled to the office held by respondent herein. None of them has been appointed thereto
and none of them may, therefore, be placed in said office, regardless of the alleged flaws in
respondent's title thereto. They merely assert a right to be appointed to said office. Considering,
however, that there are seven (7) petitioners and that only one (1) office is involved in this case, none of
them can, or does, give an assurance that he will be the one appointed by the President, should said
office be declared vacant. In short, the claim of each petitioner is predicated solely upon a more or less
recipient of the appointment. It is obvious, therefore, that none of them has a cause of action against
respondent herein (Acosta vs. Flor, 5 Phil., 18, 22; Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez, 36 Phil., 401; Neuno vs.
Angeles, 76 Phil., 12).
Upon the other hand, the petition in intervention is predicated upon the right of the intervenors to
submit a list of recommendees for appointment to the Board of Medical Examiners. Such right does not
entitle the intervenors, under the above provision of Rule 68, to question the title of respondent herein.
Hence, the petition for quo warranto has no leg to stand on.
Wherefore, the writ prayed for should be, as it is hereby, denied, with costs against the petitioners. It is
so ordered.
Paras, C. J, Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia, and Barrera, JJ., concur.
Montemayor, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur in the result.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 118910 November 16, 1995
KILOSBAYAN, INCORPORATED, JOVITO R. SALONGA, CIRILO A. RIGOS, ERME CAMBA, EMILIO C.
CAPULONG, JR., JOSE T. APOLO, EPHRAIM TENDERO, FERNANDO SANTIAGO, JOSE ABCEDE, CHRISTINE
TAN, RAFAEL G. FERNANDO, RAOUL V. VICTORINO, JOSE CUNANAN, QUINTIN S. DOROMAL, SEN.

FREDDIE WEBB, SEN. WIGBERTO TAADA, REP. JOKER P. ARROYO, petitioners,
vs.
MANUEL L. MORATO, in his capacity as Chairman of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, and
the PHILIPPINE GAMING MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N

MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioners seek reconsideration of our decision in this case. They insist that the decision in the first case
has already settled (1) whether petitioner Kilosbayan, Inc. has a standing to sue and (2) whether under
its charter (R.A. No. 1169, as amended) the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office can enter into any
form of association or collaboration with any party in operating an on-line lottery. Consequently,
petitioners contend, these questions can no longer be reopened.
Because two members of the Court did not consider themselves bound by the decision in the first case,
petitioners suggest that the two, in joining the dissenters in the first case in reexamining the questions
in the present case, acted otherwise than according to law. They cite the following statement in the
opinion of the Court:
The voting on petitioners' standing in the previous case was a narrow one, with seven
(7) members sustaining petitioners' standing and six (6) denying petitioners' right to
bring the suit. The majority was thus a tenuous one that is not likely to be maintained in
any subsequent litigation. In addition, there have been changes in the membership of
the Court, with the retirement of Justices Cruz and Bidin and the appointment of the
writer of this opinion and Justice Francisco. Given this fact it is hardly tenable to insist
on the maintenance of the ruling as to petitioners' standing.
Petitioners claim that this statement "conveys a none too subtle suggestion, perhaps a Freudian
slip, that the two new appointees, regardless of the merit of the Decision in the first Kilosbayan
case against the lotto (Kilosbayan, et al. v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 (1994)) must of necessity
align themselves with all the Ramos appointees who were dissenters in the first case and
constitute the new majority in the second lotto case." And petitioners ask, "why should it be
so?"
Petitioners ask a question to which they have made up an answer. Their attempt at psychoanalysis,
detecting a Freudian slip where none exists, may be more revealing of their own unexpressed wish to
find motives where there are none which they can impute to some members of the Court.
For the truth is that the statement is no more than an effort to explain rather than to justify the
majority's decision to overrule the ruling in the previous case. It is simply meant to explain that because
the five members of the Court who dissented in the first case (Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug and Kapunan,
JJ.) and the two new members (Mendoza and Francisco, JJ.) thought the previous ruling to be erroneous

and its reexamination not to be barred by stare decisis, res judicata or conclusiveness of judgment, or
law of the case, it was hardly tenable for petitioners to insist on the first ruling.
Consequently to petitioners' question "What is the glue that holds them together," implying some
ulterior motives on the part of the new majority in reexamining the two questions, the answer is: None,
except a conviction on the part of the five, who had been members of the Court at the time they
dissented in the first case, and the two new members that the previous ruling was erroneous. The
eighth Justice (Padilla, J.) on the other hand agrees with the seven Justices that the ELA is in a real sense
a lease agreement and therefore does not violate R.A. No. 1169.
The decision in the first case was a split decision: 7-6. With the retirement of one of the original majority
(Cruz, J.) and one of the dissenters (Bidin, J.) it was not surprising that the first decision in the first case
was later reversed.
It is argued that, in any case, a reexamination of the two questions is barred because the PCSO and the
Philippine Gaming Management Corporation made a " formal commitment not to ask for a
reconsideration of the Decision in the first lotto case and instead submit a new agreement that would
be in conformity with the PCSO Charter (R.A. No. 1169, as amended) and with the Decision of the
Supreme Court in the first Kilosbayan case against on-line, hi-tech lotto."
To be sure, a new contract was entered into which the majority of the Court finds has been purged of
the features which made the first contract objectionable. Moreover, what the PCSO said in its
manifestation in the first case was the following:
1. They are no longer filing a motion for reconsideration of the Decision of this
Honorable Court dated May 5, 1994, a copy of which was received on May 6, 1994.
2. Respondents PCSO and PGMC are presently negotiating a new lease agreement
consistent with the authority of PCSO under its charter (R.A. No. 1169, as amended by
B.P. Blg. 42) and conformable with the pronouncements of this Honorable Court in its
Decision of May 5, 1995.
The PGMC made substantially the same manifestation as the PCSO.
There was thus no "formal commitment" but only a manifestation that the parties were not filing a
motion for reconsideration. Even if the parties made a "formal commitment," the six (6) dissenting
Justices certainly could not be bound thereby not to insist on their contrary view on the question of
standing. Much less were the two new members bound by any "formal commitment" made by the
parties. They believed that the ruling in the first case was erroneous. Since in their view reexamination
was not barred by the doctrine of stare decisis, res judicata or conclusiveness of judgment or law of the
case, they voted the way they did with the remaining five (5) dissenters in the first case to form a new
majority of eight.
Petitioners ask, "Why should this be so?" Because, as explained in the decision, the first decision was
erroneous and no legal doctrine stood in the way of its reexamination. It can, therefore, be asked "with
equal candor": "Why should this not be so?"

Nor is this the first time a split decision was tested, if not reversed, in a subsequent case because of
change in the membership of a court. In 1957, this Court, voting 6-5, held in Feliciano v. Aquinas, G.R.
No. L-10201, Sept. 23, 1957 that the phrase "at the time of the election" in 2174 of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917 meant that a candidate for municipal elective position must be at least 23
years of age on the date of the election. On the other hand, the dissenters argued that it was enough if
he attained that age on the day he assumed office.
Less than three years later, the same question was before the Court again, as a candidate for municipal
councilor stated under oath in her certificate of candidacy that she was eligible for that position
although she attained the requisite age (23 years) only when she assumed office. The question was
whether she could be prosecuted for falsification. In People v. Yang, 107 Phi. 888 (1960), the Court ruled
she could not. Justice, later Chief Justice, Benison, who dissented in the first case, Feliciano v. Aquinas,
supra, wrote the opinion of the Court, holding that while the statement that the accused was eligible
was "inexact or erroneous, according to the majority in the Feliciano case," the accused could not be
held liable for falsification, because
the question [whether the law really required candidates to have the required age on
the day of the election or whether it was sufficient that they attained it at the beginning
of the term of office] has not been discussed anew, despite the presence of new
members; we simply assume for the purpose of this decision that the doctrine stands.
Thus because in the meantime there had been a change in the membership of the Court with the
retirement of two members (Recess and Flex, JJ.) who had taken part in the decision in the first case and
their replacement by new members (Barrera and Gutierrez-David, JJ.) and the fact that the vote in the
first case was a narrow one (6 to 5), the Court allowed that the continuing validity of its ruling in the first
case might well be doubted. For this reason it gave the accused the benefit of the doubt that she had
acted in the good faith belief that it was sufficient that she was 23 years of age when she assumed
office.
In that case, the change in the membership of the Court and the possibility of change in the ruling were
noted without anyone much less would-be psychoanalysts finding in the statement of the Court
any Freudian slip. The possibility of change in the rule as a result of change in membership was accepted
as a sufficient reason for finding good faith and lack of criminal intent on the part of the accused.
Indeed, a change in the composition of the Court could prove the means of undoing an erroneous
decision. This was the lesson of Knox v. Lee, 12 Wall. 457 (1871). The Legal Tender Acts, which were
passed during the Civil War, made U.S. notes (greenbacks) legal tender for the payment of debts, public
or private, with certain exceptions. The validity of the acts, as applied to preexisting debts, was
challenged in Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wall. 603 (1869). The Court was then composed of only eight (8)
Justices because of Congressional effort to limit the appointing power of President Johnson. Voting 5-3,
the Court declared the acts void. Chief Justice Chase wrote the opinion of the Court in which four others,
including Justice Grier, concurred. Justices Miller, Swayne and Davis dissented. A private memorandum
left by the dissenting Justices described how an effort was made "to convince an aged and infirm
member of the court [Justice Grier] that he had not understood the question on which he voted," with
the result that what was originally a 4-4 vote was converted into a majority (5-3) for holding the acts
invalid.

On the day the decision was announced, President Grant nominated to the Court William Strong and
Joseph P. Bradley to fill the vacancy caused by the resignation of Justice Grier and to restore the
membership of the Court to nine. In 1871, Hepburn v. Griswold was overruled in the Legal Tender Cases,
as Knox v. Lee came to be known, in an opinion by Justice Strong, with a dissenting opinion by Chief
Justice Chase and the three other surviving members of the former majority. There were allegations that
the new Justices were appointed for their known views on the validity of the Legal Tender Acts, just as
there were others who defended the character and independence of the new Justices. History has
vindicated the overruling of the Hepburn case by the new majority. The Legal Tender Cases proved to be
the Court's means of salvation from what Chief Justice Hughes later described as one of the Court's
"self-inflicted wounds."
1

We now consider the specific grounds for petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
I. We have held that because there are no genuine issues of constitutionality in this case, the rule
concerning real party in interest, applicable to private litigation rather than the more liberal rule on
standing, applies to petitioners. Two objections are made against that ruling: (1) that the constitutional
policies and principles invoked by petitioners, while not supplying the basis for affirmative relief from
the courts, may nonetheless be resorted to for striking down laws or official actions which are
inconsistent with them and (2) that the Constitution, by guaranteeing to independent people's
organizations "effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political and economic
decision-making" (Art. XIII, 16), grants them standing to sue on constitutional grounds.
The policies and principles of the Constitution invoked by petitioner read:
Art. II, 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection life, liberty, and
property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by
all the people of the blessings of democracy.
Id., 12. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for
civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government.
Id., 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall
promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It
shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their
involvement in public and civic affairs.
Id., 17. The State shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts, culture,
and sports to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress, and promote
total human liberation and development.
As already stated, however, these provisions are not self-executing. They do not confer rights which can
be enforced in the courts but only provide guidelines for legislative or executive action. By authorizing
the holding of lottery for charity, Congress has in effect determined that consistently with these policies
and principles of the Constitution, the PCSO may be given this authority. That is why we said with
respect to the opening by the PAGCOR of a casino in Cagayan de Oro, "the morality of gambling is not a

justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. . . . It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees
fit." (Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc., 234 SCRA 255, 268 [1994]).
It is noteworthy that petitioners do not question the validity of the law allowing lotteries. It is the
contract entered into by the PCSO and the PGMC which they are assailing. This case, therefore, does not
raise issues of constitutionality but only of contract law, which petitioners, not being privies to the
agreement, cannot raise.
Nor does Kilosbayan's status as a people's organization give it the requisite personality to question the
validity of the contract in this case. The Constitution provides that "the State shall respect the role of
independent people's organizations to enable the people to pursue and protect, within the democratic
framework, their legitimate and collective interests and aspirations through peaceful and lawful means,"
that their right to "effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political, and economic
decision-making shall not be abridged." (Art. XIII, 15-16)
These provisions have not changed the traditional rule that only real parties in interest or those with
standing, as the case may be, may invoke the judicial power. The jurisdiction of this Court, even in cases
involving constitutional questions, is limited by the "case and controversy" requirement of Art. VIII, 5.
This requirement lies at the very heart of the judicial function. It is what differentiates decision-making
in the courts from decision-making in the political departments of the government and bars the bringing
of suits by just any party.
Petitioners quote extensively from the speech of Commissioner Garcia before the Constitutional
Commission, explaining the provisions on independent people's organizations. There is nothing in the
speech, however, which supports their claim of standing. On the contrary, the speech points the way to
the legislative and executive branches of the government, rather than to the courts, as the appropriate
fora for the advocacy of petitioners' views.
2
Indeed, the provisions on independent people's
organizations may most usefully be read in connection with the provision on initiative and referendum
as a means whereby the people may propose or enact laws or reject any of those passed by Congress.
For the fact is that petitioners' opposition to the contract in question is nothing more than an opposition
to the government policy on lotteries.
It is nevertheless insisted that this Court has in the past accorded standing to taxpayers and concerned
citizens in cases involving "paramount public interest." Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens and
legislators have indeed been allowed to sue but then only (1) in cases involving constitutional issues and
(2) under certain conditions. Petitioners do not meet these requirements on standing.
Taxpayers are allowed to sue, for example, where there is a claim of illegal disbursement of public
funds. (Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phi. 331 (1960); Sanidad v. Comelec, 73 SCRA 333
(1976); Bugnay Const. & Dev. v. Laron, 176 SCRA 240 (1989); City Council of Cebu v. Cuizon, 47 SCRA 325
[1972]) or where a tax measure is assailed as unconstitutional. (VAT Cases [Tolentino v. Secretary of
Finance], 235 SCRA 630 [1994]) Voters are allowed to question the validity of election laws because of
their obvious interest in the validity of such laws. (Gonzales v. Comelec, 21 SCRA 774 [1967]) Concerned
citizens can bring suits if the constitutional question they raise is of "transcendental importance" which
must be settled early. (Emergency Powers Cases [Araneta v. Dinglasan], 84 Phi. 368 (1949); Iloilo Palay
and Corn Planters Ass'n v. Feliciano, 121 Phi. 358 (1965); Philconsa v. Gimenez, 122 Phi. 894 (1965); CLU
v. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317 [1991]) Legislators are allowed to sue to question the validity of

any official action which they claim infringes their prerogatives qua legislators. (Philconsa v. Enriquez,
235 506 (1994); Guingona v. PCGG, 207 SCRA 659 (1992); Gonzales v. Macaraig, 191 SCRA 452 (1990);
Tolentino v. Comelec, 41 SCRA 702 (1971); Tatad v. Garcia, G.R. No. 114222, April 16, 1995 (Mendoza, J.,
concurring))
Petitioners do not have the same kind of interest that these various litigants have. Petitioners assert an
interest as taxpayers, but they do not meet the standing requirement for bringing taxpayer's suits as set
forth in Dumlao v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392, 403 (1980), to wit:
While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of public moneys,
nowhere in their Petition do said petitioners allege that their tax money is "being
extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional protections against abuses of
legislative power" (Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S., 83 [1960]), or that there is a misapplication
of such funds by respondent COMELEC (see Pascual vs. Secretary of Public Works, 110
Phil. 331 [1960]), or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose.
Neither do petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds through
the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. (Philippine Constitution
Association vs. Mathay, 18 SCRA 300 [1966]), citing Philippine Constitution Association
vs. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479 [1965]). Besides, the institution of a taxpayer's suit, per se, is
no assurance of judicial review. As held by this Court in Tan vs. Macapagal (43 SCRA 677
[1972]), speaking through our present Chief Justice, this Court is vested with discretion
as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be entertained. (Emphasis added)
Petitioners' suit does not fall under any of these categories of taxpayers' suits.
Neither do the other cases cited by petitioners support their contention that taxpayers have standing to
question government contracts regardless of whether public funds are involved or not. In Gonzales v.
National Housing, Corp., 94 SCRA 786 (1979), petitioner filed a taxpayer's suit seeking the annulment of
a contract between the NHC and a foreign corporation. The case was dismissed by the trial court. The
dismissal was affirmed by this Court on the grounds of res judicata and pendency of a prejudicial
question, thus avoiding the question of petitioner's standing.
On the other hand, in Gonzales v. Raquiza, 180 SCRA 254 (1989), petitioner sought the annulment of a
contract made by the government with a foreign corporation for the purchase of road construction
equipment. The question of standing was not discussed, but even if it was, petitioner's standing could be
sustained because he was a minority stockholder of the Philippine National Bank, which was one of the
defendants in the case.
In the other case cited by petitioners, City Council of Cebu v. Cuizon, 47 SCRA 325 (1972), members of
the city council were allowed to sue to question the validity of a contract entered into by the city
government for the purchase of road construction equipment because their contention was that the
contract had been made without their authority. In addition, as taxpayers they had an interest in seeing
to it that public funds were spent pursuant to an appropriation made by law.
But, in the case at bar, there is an allegation that public funds are being misapplied or misappropriated.
The controlling doctrine is that of Gonzales v. Marcos, 65 SCRA 624 (1975) where it was held that funds

raised from contributions for the benefit of the Cultural Center of the Philippines were not public funds
and petitioner had no standing to bring a taxpayer's suit to question their disbursement by the President
of the Philippines.
Thus, petitioners' right to sue as taxpayers cannot be sustained. Nor as concerned citizens can they bring
this suit because no specific injury suffered by them is alleged. As for the petitioners, who are members
of Congress, their right to sue as legislators cannot be invoked because they do not complain of any
infringement of their rights as legislators.
Finally, in Valmonte v. PCSO, G.R. No. 78716, September 22, 1987, we threw out a petition questioning
another form of lottery conducted by the PCSO on the ground that petitioner, who claimed to be a
"citizen, lawyer, taxpayer and father of three minor children," had no direct and personal interest in the
lottery. We said: "He must be able to show, not only that the law is invalid, but also that he has
sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and
not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining
has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is
about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute complained of." In the case
at bar, petitioners have not shown why, unlike petitioner in the Valmonte case, they should be accorded
standing to bring this suit.
The case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. 224 SCRA 792 (1993) is different. Citizens' standing to bring a suit
seeking the cancellation of timber licenses was sustained in that case because the Court considered Art.
II, 16 a right-conferring provision which can be enforced in the courts. That provision states:
The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. (Emphasis)
In contrast, the policies and principles invoked by petitioners in this case do not permit of such
categorization.
Indeed, as already stated, petitioners' opposition is not really to the validity of the ELA but to lotteries
which they regard to be immoral. This is not, however, a legal issue, but a policy matter for Congress to
decide and Congress has permitted lotteries for charity.
Nevertheless, although we have concluded that petitioners do not have standing, we have not stopped
there and dismissed their case. For in the view we take, whether a party has a cause of action and,
therefore, is a real party in interest or one with standing to raise a constitutional question must turn on
whether he has a right which has been violated. For this reason the Court has not ducked the
substantive issues raised by petitioners.
II. R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P No . 42, states:
1. The Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office. The Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
Office, hereinafter designated the Office, shall be the principal government agency for
raising and providing for funds for health programs, medical assistance and services and
charities of national character, and as such shall have the general powers conferred in

section thirteen of Act Numbered One Thousand Four Hundred Fifty-Nine, as amended,
and shall have the authority:
A. To hold and conduct charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar activities,
in such frequency and manner, as shall be determined, and subject to such rules and
regulations as shall be promulgated by the Board of Directors.
B. Subject to the approval of the Minister of Human Settlements, to engage in health
and welfare-related investments, programs, projects and activities which may be profit-
oriented, by itself or in collaboration, association or joint venture with any person,
association, company or entity, whether domestic or foreign, except for the activities
mentioned in the preceding paragraph (A), for the purpose of providing for permanent
and continuing sources of funds for health programs, including the expansion of existing
ones, medical assistance and services, and/or charitable grants: Provided, That such
investments will not compete with the private sector in areas where investments are
adequate as may be determined by the National Economic and Development Authority.
Petitioners insist on the ruling in the previous case that the PCSO cannot hold and conduct charity
sweepstakes, lotteries and other similar activities in collaboration, association or joint venture with any
other party because of the clause "except for the activities mentioned in the preceding paragraph (A)" in
paragraph (B) of 1. Petitioners contend that the ruling is the law of this case because the parties are
the same and the case involves the same issue, i.e., the meaning of this statutory provision.
The "law of the case" doctrine is inapplicable, because this case is not a continuation of the first one.
Petitioners also say that inquiry into the same question as to the meaning of the statutory provision is
barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The general rule on the "conclusiveness of judgment," however, is
subject to the exception that a question may be reopened if it is a legal question and the two actions
involve substantially different claims. This is generally accepted in American law from which our Rules of
Court was adopted. (Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 59 L.Ed.2d 147, 210 (1979); RESTATEMENT OF
THE LAW 2d, ON JUDGMENTS, 28; P. BATOR, D. MELTZER, P. MISHKIN AND D. SHAPIRO, THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1058, n.2 [3rd Ed., 1988]) There is nothing in the record of this case
to suggest that this exception is inapplicable in this jurisdiction.
Indeed, the questions raised in this case are legal questions and the claims involved are substantially
different from those involved in the prior case between the parties. As already stated, the ELA is
substantially different from the Contract of Lease declared void in the first case.
Borrowing from the dissenting opinion of Justice Feliciano, petitioners argue that the phrase "by itself or
in collaboration, association or joint venture with any other party" qualifies not only 1 (B) but also 1
(A), because the exception clause ("except for the activities mentioned in the preceding paragraph [A]")
"operates, as it were, as a renvoi clause which refers back to Section 1(A) and in this manner avoids the
necessity of simultaneously amending the text of Section 1(A)."
This interpretation, however, fails to take into account not only the location of the phrase in paragraph
(B), when it should be in paragraph (A) had that been the intention of the lawmaking authority, but also
the phrase "by itself." In other words, under paragraph (B), the PCSO is prohibited from "engag[ing] in . .

. investments, programs, projects and activities" if these involve sweepstakes races, lotteries and other
similar activities not only "in collaboration, association or joint venture" with any other party but also
"by itself." Obviously, this prohibition cannot apply when the PCSO conducts these activities itself.
Otherwise, what paragraph (A) authorizes the PCSO to do, paragraph (B) would prohibit.
The fact is that the phrase in question does not qualify the authority of the PCSO under paragraph (A),
but rather the authority granted to it by paragraph (B). The amendment of paragraph (B) by B.P. Blg. 42
was intended to enable the PCSO to engage in certain investments, programs, projects and activities for
the purpose of raising funds for health programs and charity. That is why the law provides that such
investments by the PCSO should "not compete with the private sector in areas where investments are
adequate as may be determined by the National Economic and Development Authority." Justice Davide,
then an Assemblyman, made a proposal which was accepted, reflecting the understanding that the bill
they were discussing concerned the authority of the PCSO to invest in the business of others. The
following excerpt from the Record of the Batasan Pambansa shows this to be the subject of the
discussion:
MR. DAVIDE. May I introduce an amendment after "adequate". The intention of the
amendment is not to leave the determination of whether it is adequate or not to
anybody. And my amendment is to add after "adequate" the words AS MAY BE
DETERMINED BY THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY. As a
mater of fact, it will strengthen the authority to invest in these areas, provided that the
determination of whether the private sector's activity is already adequate must be
determined by the National Economic and Development Authority.
Mr. ZAMORA. Mr. Speaker, the committee accepts the proposed amendment.
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
(2 RECORD OF THE BATASAN PAMBANSA, Sept. 6, 1979,
p. 1007)
Thus what the PCSO is prohibited from doing is from investing in a business engaged in sweepstakes
races, lotteries and other similar activities. It is prohibited from doing so whether "in collaboration,
association or joint venture" with others or "by itself." This seems to be the only possible interpretation
of 1 (A) and (B) in light of its text and its legislative history. That there is today no other entity engaged
in sweepstakes races, lotteries and the like does not detract from the validity of this interpretation.
III. The Court noted in its decision that the provisions of the first contract, which were considered to be
features of a joint venture agreement, had been removed in the new contract. For instance, 5 of the
ELA provides that in the operation of the on-line lottery, the PCSO must employ "its own competent and
qualified personnel." Petitioners claim, however, that the "contemporaneous interpretation" of PGMC
officials of this provision is otherwise. They cite the testimony of Glen Barroga of the PGMC before a
Senate committee to the effect that under the ELA the PGMC would be operating the lottery system
"side by side" with PCSO personnel as part of the transfer of technology.

Whether the transfer of technology would result in a violation of PCSO's franchise should be determined
by facts and not by what some officials of the PGMC state by way of opinion. In the absence of proof to
the contrary, it must be presumed that 5 reflects the true intention of the parties. Thus, Art. 1370 of
the Civil Code says that "If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the
contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control." The intention of the parties must
be ascertained from their "contemporaneous and subsequent acts." (Art. 1371; Atlantic Gulf Co. v.
Insular Government, 10 Phil. 166 [1908]) It cannot simply be judged from what one of them says. On the
other hand, the claim of third parties, like petitioners, that the clause on upgrading of equipment would
enable the parties after a while to change the contract and enter into something else in violation of the
law is mere speculation and cannot be a basis for judging the validity of the contract.
IV. It is contended that 1 of E.O. No. 301 covers all types of "contract[s] for public services or for
furnishing of supplies, materials and equipment to the government or to any of its branches, agencies or
instrumentalities" and not only contracts of purchase and sale. Consequently, a lease of equipment, like
the ELA, must be submitted to public bidding in order to be valid. This contention is based on two
premises: (1) that 1 of E.O. No. 301 applies to any contract whereby the government acquires title to or
the use of the equipment and (2) that the words "supplies," "materials," and "equipment" are distinct
from each other so that when an exception in 1 speaks of "supplies," it cannot be construed to mean
"equipment."
Petitioners' contention will not bear analysis. For example, the term "supplies" is used in paragraph (a),
which provides that a contract for the furnishing of "supplies" in order to meet an emergency is exempt
from public bidding. Unless "supplies" is construed to include "equipment," however, the lease of heavy
equipment needed for rescue operations in case of a calamity will have to be submitted to public
bidding before it can be entered into by the government.
In dissent Justice Feliciano says that in such a situation the government can simply resort to
expropriation, paying compensation afterward. This is just like purchasing the equipment through
negotiation when the question is whether the purchase should be by public bidding, not to mention the
fact that the power to expropriate may not be exercised when the government can very well negotiate
with private owners.
Indeed, there are fundamental difficulties in simultaneously contending (1) that E.O. No. 301, 1 covers
both contracts of sale and lease agreements and (2) that the words "supplies," "materials" and
"equipment" can not be interchanged. Thus, under paragraph (b) of 1, public bidding is not required
"whenever the supplies are to be used in connection with a project or activity which cannot be delayed
without causing detriment to the public service." Following petitioners' theory, there should be a public
bidding before the government can enter into a contract for the lease of bulldozers and dredging
equipment even if these are urgently needed in areas ravaged by lahar because, first, lease contracts are
covered by the general rule and, second, the exception to public bidding in paragraph (b) covers only
"supplies" but not equipment.
To take still another example. Paragraph (d), which does away with the requirement of public bidding
"whenever the supplies under procurement have been unsuccessfully placed on bid for at least two
consecutive times, either due to lack of bidders or the offers received in each instance were exorbitant
or nonconforming to specifications." Again, following the theory of the petitioners, a contract for the
lease of equipment cannot be entered into even if there are no bids because, first, lease contracts are

governed by the general rule on public bidding and, second, the exception to public bidding in
paragraph (d) applies only to contracts for the furnishing of "supplies."
Other examples can be given to show the absurdity of interpreting 1 as applicable to any contract for
the furnishing of supplies, materials and equipment and of considering the words "supplies," "materials"
and "equipment" to be not interchangeable. Our ruling that 1 of E.O. No. 301 does not cover the lease
of equipment avoids these fundamental difficulties and is supported by the text of 1, which is entitled
"Guidelines for Negotiated Contracts" and by the fact that the only provisions of E.O. No. 301 on leases,
namely, 6 and 7, concern the lease of buildings by or to the government. Thus the text of 1 reads:
1. Guidelines for Negotiated Contracts. Any provision of law, decree, executive order
or other issuances to the contrary notwithstanding, no contract for public services or for
furnishing supplies, materials and equipment to the government or any of its branches,
agencies or instrumentalities shall be renewed or entered into without public bidding,
except under any of the following situations:
a. Whenever the supplies are urgently needed to meet an emergency
which may involve the loss of, or danger to, life and/or property;
b. Whenever the supplies are to be used in connection with a project or
activity which cannot be delayed without causing detriment to the
public service;
c. Whenever the materials are sold by an exclusive distributor or
manufacturer who does not have subdealers selling at lower prices and
for which no suitable substitute can be obtained elsewhere at more
advantageous terms to the government;
d. Whenever the supplies under procurement have been unsuccessfully
placed on bid for at least two consecutive times, either due to lack of
bidders or the offers received in each instance were exhorbitant or non-
conforming to specifications;
e. In cases where it is apparent that the requisition of the needed
supplies through negotiated purchase is most advantageous to the
government to be determined by the Department Head concerned; and
f. Whenever the purchase is made from an agency of the government.
Indeed, the purpose for promulgating E.O. No. 301 was merely to decentralize the system of reviewing
negotiated contracts of purchase for the furnishing of supplies, materials and equipment as well as lease
contracts of buildings. Theretofore, E.O. No. 298, promulgated on August 12, 1940, required
consultation with the Secretary of Justice and the Department Head concerned and the approval of the
President of the Philippines before contracts for the furnishing of supplies, materials and equipment
could be made on a negotiated basis, without public bidding. E.O. No. 301 changed this by providing as
follows:

2. Jurisdiction over Negotiated Contracts. In line with the principles of
decentralization and accountability, negotiated contracts for public services or for
furnishing supplies, materials or equipment may be entered into by the department or
agency head or the governing board of the government-owned or controlled
corporation concerned, without need of prior approval by higher authorities, subject to
availability of funds, compliance with the standards or guidelines prescribed in Section 1
hereof, and to the audit jurisdiction of the commission on Audit in accordance with
existing rules and regulations.
Negotiated contracts involving P2,000,000 up to P10,000,000 shall be signed by the
Secretary and two other Undersecretaries.
xxx xxx xxx
7. Jurisdiction Over Lease Contracts. The heads of agency intending to rent
privately-owned buildings or spaces for their use, or to lease out government-owned
buildings or spaces for private use, shall have authority to determine the
reasonableness of the terms of the lease and the rental rates thereof, and to enter into
such lease contracts without need of prior approval by higher authorities, subject to
compliance with the uniform standards or guidelines established pursuant to Section 6
hereof by the DPWH and to the audit jurisdiction of COA or its duly authorized
representative in accordance with existing rules and regulations.
In sum, E.O. No. 301 applies only to contracts for the purchase of supplies, materials and equipment,
and it was merely to change the system of administrative review of emergency purchases, as
theretofore prescribed by E.O. No. 298, that E.O. No. 301 was issued on July 26, 1987. Part B of this
Executive Order applies to leases of buildings, not of equipment, and therefore does not govern the
lease contract in this case. Even if it applies, it does not require public bidding for entering into it.
Our holding that E.O. No. 301, 1 applies only to contracts of purchase and sale is conformable to P.D.
No. 526, promulgated on August 2, 1974, which is in pari materia. P.D. No. 526 requires local
governments to hold public bidding in the "procurement of supplies." By specifying "procurement of
supplies" and excepting from the general rule "purchases" when made under certain circumstances, P.D.
No. 526, 12 indicates quite clearly that it applies only to contracts of purchase and sale. This provision
reads:
12. Procurement without public bidding. Procurement of supplies may be made
without the benefit of public bidding in the following modes:
(1) Personal canvass of responsible merchants;
(2) Emergency purchases;
(3) Direct purchases from manufacturers or exclusive distributors;
(4) Thru the Bureau of Supply Coordination; and

(5) Purchase from other government entities or foreign governments.
Sec. 3 broadly defines the term "supplies" as including
everything except real estate, which may be needed in the transaction
of public business, or in the pursuit of any undertaking, project, or
activity, whether of the nature of equipment, furniture, stationery,
materials for construction, or personal property of any sort, including
non-personal or contractual services such as the repair and
maintenance of equipment and furniture, as well as trucking, hauling,
janitorial, security, and related or analogous services.
Thus, the texts of both E.O. No. 301, 1 and of P.D. No. 526, 1 and 12, make it clear that only
contracts for the purchase and sale of supplies, materials and equipment are contemplated by the rule
concerning public biddings.
Finally, it is contended that equipment leases are attractive and commonly used in place of contracts of
purchase and sale because of "multifarious credit and tax constraints" and therefore could not have
been left out from the requirement of public bidding. Obviously these credit and tax constraints can
have no attraction to the government when considering the advantages of sale over lease of equipment.
The fact that lease contracts are in common use is not a reason for implying that the rule on public
bidding applies not only to government purchases but also to lease contracts. For the fact also is that
the government leases equipment, such as copying machines, personal computers and the like, without
going through public bidding.
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the motion for reconsideration of petitioners is DENIED with finality.
SO ORDERED.

Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Francisco and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J. and Panganiban , JJ., took no part.
Padilla and Vitug, JJ., maintained their separate concurring opinion.
Feliciano, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Bellosillo, JJ., maintained their dissenting opinion.
Footnotes
1 The two other cases were Dred Scott v. Sanford, 19 How. 393 (1857) (which
invalidated an act of Congress forbidding slavery in the South) and Pollack v.
Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 158 U.S. 601 (1895) (which held a tax on
income derived from property to be a tax on the property itself which had to be

apportioned according to population under the U.S. Constitution) C. HUGHES,
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 50-54 (1928).
2 That is why in the main decision it was pointed out that petitioners might try
the Commission on Audit, the Ombudsman or the Solicitor General (except that
in this case the latter has found nothing wrong with the contract) in airing their
grievances, a point apparently overlooked by Davide, J. in his dissent noting an
alleged inconsistency in the majority's ruling that petitioners have no standing in
the courts but that they can complain to the COA, the Ombudsman or the
Solicitor General. The rules on standing do not obtain in these agencies;
petitioners can file their complaints there ex relatione.




Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-46267 November 28, 1938
FRANCISCO ZANDUETA, petitioner,
vs.
SIXTO DE LA COSTA, respondent.
Vicente J. Francisco and Francisco Zandueta for petitioner.
Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Ramon Diokno for respondent.

VILLA-REAL, J.:
This is a quo warranto proceeding instituted by the Honorable Francisco Zandueta against the Honorable
Sixto de la Costa to obtain from this court a judgment declaring the respondent to be illegally occupying
the office of Judge of the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Fourth Judicial District,
ousting him from said office, and holding that the petitioner is entitled to continue occupying the office
in question by placing him in possession thereof, with costs to said respondent.

Prior to the promulgation of Commonwealth Act No. 145, the petitioner, the Honorable Francisco
Zandueta was discharging the office of judge of first instance, Ninth Judicial District, comprising solely
the City of Manila, and was presiding over the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of said city, by
virtue of an ad interim appointment issued by the President of the Philippines in his favor on June 2,
1936, and confirmed by the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly on September 8th
of the same year.
On November 7, 1936, the date on which Commonwealth Act No. 145, otherwise known as the
Judicial Reorganization Law, took effect, the petitioner received from the President of the
Commonwealth a new ad interim appointment as judge of first instance, this time of the Fourth Judicial
District, with authority to preside over the Courts of First Instance of Manila and Palawan, issued in
accordance with said Act. As the National Assembly adjourned on November 20, 1937, without its
Commission on Appointments having acted on said ad interim appointment, another ad interim
appointment to the same office was issued in favor of said petitioner, pursuant to which he took a new
oath on November 22, 1937, before discharging the duties thereof. After his appointment and
qualification as judge of first instance of the Fourth Judicial District, the petitioner, acting as executive
judge, performed several executive acts, some of which consist in the designation of the assistant clerk
of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Ladislao Pasicolan, as administrative officer, under the orders of
the petitioner, as executive judge of said court, to take charge of all matters pertaining to the Court of
First Instance of Palawan, which are handled by said execute judge in Manila (Exhibit 2); in the
appointment of attorney Rufo M. San Juan as notary public for the Province of Palawan, said
appointment to expire on December 31, 1938 (Exhibit 3); in having authorized justice of the peace Iigo
R. Pea to defend a criminal case the hearing of which had begun during the past sessions in Coron,
Palawan (Exhibit 5); in having granted a leave of absence of ten days to justice of the peace Abordo (of
Puerto Princesa), Palawan (Exhibit 8); and in having granted a leave of absence of thirteen days to the
justice of the peace of Coron, Palawan (Exhibit 9).
On May 19, 1938, the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly disapproved the aforesaid
ad interim appointment of said petitioner, who was advised thereof by the Secretary of Justice on the
20th of said month and year.
On August 1, 1938, the President of the Philippines appointed the herein respondent, Honorable Sixto
de la Costa, judge of first instance of the Fourth Judicial District, with authority to preside over the Fifth
Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila and the Court of First Instance of Palawan, and his
appointment was approved by the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly. By virtue of
said appointment, the respondent took the necessary oath and assumed office. On the same date,
August 1, 1938, the President of the Philippines, pursuant to said appointment of judge of first instance
of the Fourth Judicial District and after confirmation thereof, issued the corresponding final
appointment in favor of the respondent, Honorable Sixto de la Costa (Exhibit 11).
The respondent, in answer to the petition, admits some of the facts alleged therein and denies the rest,
and alleges, as one of his special defenses, that the petitioner is estopped from attacking the
constitutionality of Commonwealth Act No. 145, for having accepted his new appointment as judge of
first instance of the Fourth Judicial District, issued by virtue thereof, to preside over the Courts of First
Instance of Manila and Palawan, and for having taken the necessary oath, entering into the discharge of
the functions of his office and performing judicial as well as administrative acts.

The defense of estoppel being procedural, we shall discuss it first to determine whether or not the
petitioner may proceed to question the constitutionality of the law by virtue of which the new ad
interim appointment of judge of first instance of the Fourth Judicial District, to preside over the Courts
of First Instance of Manila and Palawan, was issued in his favor.
As stated beforehand, while the petitioner Honorable Francisco Zandueta was presiding over the Fifth
Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Ninth Judicial District, by virtue of an appointment issued
to him on June 2, 1936, and confirmed by the National Assembly on September 8th of the same year, he
received, on November 7, 1936, a new ad interim appointment, issued in accordance with the
provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 145, which took effect on the same date, to discharge the office of
judge of first instance, Fourth Judicial District, with authority to preside over the Fifth Branch of the
Court of First Instance of Manila and the Court of First Instance of Palawan, upon which he immediately
took the corresponding oath and entered into the discharge of his office. Under his former appointment
of June 2, 1936, the petitioner had authority preside solely over the Fifth Branch of the Court of First
Instance of Manila but not over the Court of First Instance of Palawan, while, according to his new
appointment of November 7, 1936, he had authority to preside not only over said Fifth Branch of
said Court of First Instance of Manila but also over the Court of First Instance of Palawan. It should be
noted that the territory over which the petitioner could exercise and did exercise jurisdiction by virtue of
his last appointment is wider than that over which he could exercise and did exercise jurisdiction by
virtue of the former. Hence, there is incompatibility between the two appointments and, consequently,
in the discharge of the office conferred by each of them, resulting in the absorption of the former by the
latter. In accepting this appointment and qualifying for the exercise of the functions of the office
conferred by it, by taking the necessary oath, and in discharging the same, disposing of both judicial and
administrative cases corresponding to the courts of First Instance of Manila and of Palawan, the
petitioner abandoned his appointment of June 2, 1936, and ceased in the exercise of the functions of
the office occupied by him by virtue thereof.
The rule of equity, sanctioned by jurisprudence, is that when a public official voluntarily accepts an
appointment to an office newly created or reorganized by law, which new office is incompatible with
the one formerly occupied by him , qualifies for the discharge of the functions thereof by taking the
necessary oath, and enters into the performance of his duties by executing acts inherent in said newly
created or reorganized office and receiving the corresponding salary, he will be considered to have
abandoned the office he was occupying by virtue of his former appointment (46 Corpus Juris, 947, sec.
55), and he can not question the constitutionality of the law by virtue of which he was last appointed (11
American Jurisprudence, 166, par. 121; id., 767, par. 123). He is excepted from said rule only when his
non-acceptance of the new appointment may affect public interest or when he is compelled to accept it
by reason of legal exigencies (11 American Jurisprudence, 770, par. 124). lawphi1.net
In the case under consideration, the petitioner was free to accept or not the ad interim appointment
issued by the President of the Commonwealth in his favor, in accordance with said Commonwealth Act
No. 145. Nothing or nobody compelled him to do so. While the office of judge of first instance of public
interest, being one of the means employed by the Government to carry out one of its purposes, which is
the administration of justice, considering the organization of the courts of justice in the Philippines and
the creation of the positions of judges-at-large or substitutes, the temporary disability of a judge may be
immediately remedied without detriment to the smooth running of the judicial machinery. If the
petitioner believed, as he now seems to believe, that Commonwealth Act No. 145 is unconstitutional, he
should have refused to accept the appointment offered him or, at least, he should have accepted it with

reservation, had he believed that his duty of obedience to the laws compelled him to do so, and
afterwards resort to the power entrusted with the final determination of the question whether a law is
unconstitutional or not. The petitioner, being aware of his constitutional and legal rights and obligations,
by implied order of the law (art. 2, Civil Code), accepted the office of judge of first instance of the Fourth
Judicial District, with authority to preside over the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila
and the Court of First Instance of Palawan and entered into the performance of the duties inherent
therein, after taking the necessary oath, thereby acting with full knowledge that if he voluntarily
accepted the office to which he was appointed, he would later be estopped from questioning the
validity of said appointment by alleging that the law, by virtue of which his appointment was issued, is
unconstitutional. He likewise knew, or at least he should know, that his ad interim appointment was
subject to the approval of the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly and that if said
commission were to disapprove the same, it would become ineffective and he would cease discharging
the office.
It appears from all the foregoing that the petitioner having voluntarily abandoned his appointment of
June 2, 1936, and, consequently, the office of judge of first instance of Manila, Ninth Judicial District,
whose Fifth Branch was being presided over by him by virtue thereof, upon accepting the ad interim
appointment of November 7, 1936, to the office of judge of first instance of the Fourth Judicial
District, with authority to preside over said Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila together
with the Court of First Instance of Palawan, and entering into the discharge of the functions of said
office, he can not now claim to be entitled to repossess the office occupied by him under his said
appointment of June 2, 1936 (22 R. C. L., 560, par. 264), or question the constitutionality of
Commonwealth Act No. 145, by virtue of which he has been appointed judge of first instance of the
Fourth Judicial District, with authority to preside over the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of
Manila and the Court of First Instance of Palawan, which appointment was disapproved by the
Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly.
Having arrived at the conclusion that the petitioner is estopped by his own act from proceeding to
question the constitutionality of Commonwealth Act No. 145, by virtue of which he was appointed, by
accepting said appointment and entering into the performance of the duties appertaining to the office
conferred therein, and pursuant to the well settled doctrine established by both American and
Philippine jurisprudence relative to the consideration of constitutional questions, this court deems it
unnecessary to decide the questions constitutional law raised in the petition (Cruz vs. Youngberg, 56
Phil., 234; Walter E. Olsen and Co. vs. Aldanese and Trinidad, 43 Phil., 259; Yangco vs. Board of Public
Utility Commissioner, 36 Phil., 116; Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Municipality of Binagonan,
34 Phil., 518; McGirr vs. Hamilton and Abreu, 30 Phil., 563; 12 Corpus Juris, 699, section 40; id., 780,
section 212).
For the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and so hold when a judge of first instance,
presiding over a branch of a Court of First Instance of a judicial district by virtue of a legal and valid
appointment, accepts another appointment to preside over the same branch of the same Court of First
Instance, in addition to another court of the same category, both of which belong to a new judicial
district formed by the addition of another Court of First Instance to the old one, enters into the
discharge of the functions of his new office and receives the corresponding salary, he abandons his old
office and cannot claim to be to repossess it or question the constitutionality of the law by virtue of
which his new appointment has been issued; and, said new appointment having been disapproved by
the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly, neither can he claim to continue occupying

the office conferred upon him by said new appointment, having ipso jure ceased in the discharge of the
functions thereof.
Wherefore, the petition for quo warranto instituted is denied and the same is dismissed with costs to
the petitioner. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Abad Santos, Imperial and Concepcion, JJ., concur.



Separate Opinions

LAUREL, J., concurring:
I do not subscribe to the application of the doctrine of estoppel in this case. The ratio decidendi of the
majority is found in the following paragraph of their opinion:
The rule of equity, sanctioned by jurisprudence, is that when a public official voluntarily accepts
an appointment to an office newly created or reorganized by a
law, which new office is incompatible with the one formerly occupied by him , qualifies for
the discharge of the functions thereof by taking the necessary oath, and enters into the
performance of his duties by executing acts inherent in said newly created or reorganized office
and receiving the corresponding salary, he will be considered to have abandoned the office he
was occupying by virtue of his former appointment (46 Corpus Juris, 947, sec. 55), and he can
not question the constitutionality of the law by virtue of which he was last appointed (11
American Jurisprudence, 166, par. 121; id., 767, par. 123). He is excepted from said rule only
when his non-acceptance of the new appointment may affect public interest or when he is
compelled to accept it by reason of legal exigencies (11 American Jurisprudence, 770, par. 124).
To arrive at the conclusion reached, three important legal principles are invoked and applied: (a)
Incompatibility of public offices; (b) abandonment of public office; and (c) estoppel. As necessary
predicates for the application of the principle of estoppel reference has to be made to the doctrines of
incompatibility and abandonment of public offices: "Hence, there is incompatibility between the two
appointments and, consequently, in the discharge of the conferred by each of them, resulting in the
absorption of the former by the latter. In accepting this appointment and qualifying for the exercise of
the functions of the office conferred by it, taking the necessary oath, and in discharging the same,
disposing of both judicial and administrative cases corresponding to the Courts of First Instance of
Manila and of Palawan, the petitioner abandoned his appointment of June 2, 1936, and ceased in the
exercise of the functions of the office occupied by him by virtue thereof." (Underlining mine.) Thus runs
the decision of the majority of my brethren. Frankly, I do not see how the doctrine of incompatibility of

public offices could have any application here. If a judge of the Court of First Instance may be a judge of
one or more provinces, there can be no objection in principle to his being judge of one or more districts,
if the constitution or the law authorizes it. It should be observed that incompatibility in law is not
physical impossibility but inconsistency in the functions of the two public offices concerned. In the
language of Judge Folger, "where one office is not subordinate to the other, nor the relations of the one
to the other such as are inconsistent and repugnant, there is not that incompatibility from which the law
declares that the acceptance of the one is the vacation of the other. The force of the word, in its
application to this matter is, that from the nature and relations to each other, of the two places, they
ought not to be held by the same person, from the contrariety and antagonism which would result in
the attempt by one person to faithfully and impartially discharge the duties of one, toward the
incumbent of the other." (People vs. Green, 58 N. Y., 295, 304.) If the law as an expression of public
policy prohibits the acceptance by a public officer of any office other than that which he holds, it is not a
case of incompatibility but of legal prohibition. Acceptance of an incompatible office should be
distinguished from acceptance of a forbidden office. (Cf. sec. 18, Jones Law; sec. 8, Art. VI, Philippine
Constitution.) As to abandonment, in order that official relations may be terminated thereby, the
circumstances must be such as clearly indicate an absolute relinquishment. I find nothing in the conduct
of the petitioner indicative of clear intention to abandon the particular office involved and its duties and
emoluments. On the contrary, he appears to have clung to the office, until forced to vacate it.
A fortiori, the doctrine of estoppel is inapplicable. The petitioner, before the approval of Commonwealth
Act No. 145, was judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, fifth sala, Ninth Judicial District. On the
same day that the Act was approved he received his ad interim appointment for the new Fourth Judicial
District established by Commonwealth Act No. 145, which district comprises not only Manila but also
the Provinces of Rizal and Palawan. The appointment was made as well in the case of the petitioner as in
other cases to avoid a break of continuity in the performance of judicial functions. The petitioner
accepted the appointment and proceeded to discharge his duties as judge of the reorganized district in
the honest belief that enlargement was all that was done to his old district. I express the opinion that
the conduct of the petitioner does not warrant the application of the principle of estoppel or the
invocation of the maxim that "He who hath committed iniquity shall not have equity." I am not prepared
to say of the petitioner that he has performed what Lord Coke would call "an act which stoppeth or
closeth up his mouth to allege or plead the truth." The doctrine of estoppel is inherently founded on
equity and its application should not be predicated on strictly legal principles.
I do not see much utility in referring to adjudicated cases on this point as hardly any one of them tallies
with the facts of the present case. I should observe, however, that in applying the doctrine of estoppel
we should not overlook the significant fact that the principle originally arose almost entirely in relation
to transfers of property although it has now come to be applied to a variety of legal situations. From the
point of view of legal and somewhat arbitrary classification of the Anglo-American law, the principle
invoked and applied is the equitable estoppel, otherwise know as estoppel in pais. As such, it is,
according to Bigelow, estoppel by conduct, which is said to have its foundation in fraud, considered in its
general sense. (Bigelow, Estop., secs. 437-439.) Upon the other hand, I have a very serious doubt as to
whether the petitioner, on the hypothesis that the question involved is his security of tenure under
the Constitution could by acquiescence or consent be precluded from raising a question of public
interest. Security of tenure is certainly not a personal privilege of any particular judge. From this point of
view it cannot be said that his remaining silent when he ought to have spoken debars the petitioner
from speaking when conscience requires him to be silent (10 R. C. L., par. 21).

The petitioner in his vigorous and impassioned plea asks us to vindicate the independence of the
judiciary and up-hold the constitutional mandate relative to the security of tenure of judges, embodied
in section 9 of Article VIII of the Constitution. He claims that "Commonwealth Act No. 145 is
unconstitutional because the regrouping of the provinces into nine judicial districts as therein provided
for was effected by the National Assembly without constitutional authority." Upon the other hand, the
Solicitor-General directs our attention to the power of the legislature over courts inferior to the
Supreme Court, conferred by section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution. I think the constitutional issue
thus squarely presented should be met courageously by the court, instead of applying to the petitioner
the doctrine of estoppel which, in my humble opinion, is entirely inapplicable. The life and welfare of
this government depends upon close and careful observance of constitutional mandates. For this
reason, in clear cases, this court should not hesitate to strike down legislative acts in conflict with the
fundamental law. This court is perhaps the last bulwark of constitutional government. It shall not
obstruct the popular will as manifested through proper organs. It will adapt itself to the needs of an
ever-expanding present and face the future with a clear insight into economic and social values. It will
keep itself alive to the dictates of national policy. But, in the same way that it cannot renounce the life
breathed into it by the Constitution, so may it not forego its obligation, in proper cases, to apply the
necessary corrective so that, in the very language of this court, the course of Government may be
directed along constitutional channels" (Angara vs. Electoral Commission [1936], 35 Off. Gaz., p. 23), or
its return to them may be accelerated.
I am of the opinion that Commonwealth Act No. 145 in so far as it reorganizes, among other judicial
districts, the Ninth Judicial District, and establishes an entirely new district comprising Manila and the
provinces of Rizal and Palawan, is valid and constitutional. This conclusion flows from the fundamental
proposition that the legislature may abolish courts inferior to the Supreme Court and therefore may
reorganize them territorially or otherwise thereby necessitating new appointments and comissions.
Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution vests in the National Assembly the power to define, prescribe
and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts, subject to certain limitations in the case of the
Supreme Court. It is admitted that section 9 of the same article of the Constitution provides for the
security of tenure of all the judges. The principles embodied in these two sections of the same article of
the Constitution must be coordinated and harmonized. A mere enunciation of a principle will not decide
actual cases and controversies of every sort (Justice Holmes in Lochner vs. New York, 198 U. S., 45, 49
Law. ed., 937).
I am not insensible to the argument that the National Assembly may abuse its power and move
deliberately to defeat the constitutional provision guaranteeing security of tenure to all judges. But, is
this the case? One need not share the view of Story, Miller and Tucker on the one hand, or the opinion
of Cooley, Watson and Baldwin on the other, to realize that the application of a legal or constitutional
principle is necessarily factual and circumstantial and that fixity of principle is the rigidity of the dead
and the unprogressive. I do say, and emphatically, however, that cases may arise where the violation of
the constitutional provision regarding security of judicial tenure is palpable and plain, and that
legislative power of reorganization may be sought to cIoak an unconstitutional and evil purpose. When a
case of that kind arises, it will be the time to make the hammer fall and heavily. But not until then. I am
satisfied that, as to the particular point here discussed, the purpose was the fulfillment of what was
considered a great public need by the legislative department and that Commonwealth Act No. 145 was
not enacted purposely to affect adversely the tenure of judges or of any sustaining the power of the
legislative department under the Constitution. To be sure, there was greater necessity for
reorganization consequent upon the establishment of the new government than at the time Acts Nos.

2347 and 4007 were approved by the defunct Philippine Legislature, and although in the case of these
two Acts there was an express provision providing for the vacation by the judges of their offices whereas
in the case of Commonwealth Act No. 145 doubt is engendered by i silence, this doubt should be
resolved in favor of the valid exercise of the legislative power.
I, therefore, concur in the result.


















Norton v. Shelby County
118 U.S. 425 (1886)
Annotate this Case
Syllabus

Case
U.S. Supreme Court
Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425 (1886)
Norton v. Shelby County
Argued March 24-25, 1886
Decided May 10, 1886
118 U.S. 425
Syllabus
This Court follows the decisions of the highest court of a state in construing the constitution and laws of
the state unless they conflict with or impair the efficacy of some principle of the federal Constitution or
of a federal statute or a rule of commercial or general law.
The decisions of state courts on questions relating to the existence of its subordinate tribunals and the
eligibility and election or appointment of their officers and the passage of its laws are conclusive upon
federal courts.
Page 118 U. S. 426
Following the decision of the highest court of the Tennessee in Pope v. Phifer, 3 Heiskell 691, and other
cases, this Court holds that the Board of Commissioners of Shelby County, organized under the Act of
March 9, 1867, had no lawful existence; that it was an unauthorized and illegal body; that its members
were usurpers of the functions and powers of the justices of peace of the county; that their action in
holding a county court was void, and that their acts in subscribing to the stock of the Mississippi River
Railroad Company and issuing bonds in payment therefor were void.
While acts of a de facto incumbent of an office lawfully created by law and existing are often held to be
binding from reasons of public policy, the acts of a person assuming to fill and perform the duties of an
office which does not exist de jure can have no validity whatever in law.
An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it
creates no office; it is in legal contemplation as inoperative as though it had never been passed.
The action of a minority of the justices of the peace of the County Court of Shelby County, Tennessee,
prior to May 5, 1870, did not operate as a ratification by the county court of the previously invalid
subscription of the county to stock in the Mississippi River Railroad Company, and on and after that day,
on which the new Constitution of Tennessee took effect, no ratification could be made without previous
assent of three-fourths of the voters of the county.
This suit was brought to enforce payment of twenty-nine bonds for $1,000 each issued by the Board of
Commissioners of Shelby County in payment of a subscription by the county to stock in the Mississippi

River Railroad Company. The form of the bond appears in the opinion of the Court, post, p. 118 U. S.
434.
On the 25th February, 1867, the county court of any county through which that railroad might run was
authorized to subscribe to its capital stock. Laws of 1866-1867, page 131, c. 48, 6, [Footnote 1]
Page 118 U. S. 427
which power was enlarged November 5, 1867, Private Acts 1867-8, 5. [Footnote 2]
On the 7th day of the following March, the legislature reorganized the City of Memphis, and enacted
that the powers theretofore vested in the Quarterly Court should be vested in a Board of Commissioners
created by that act. Acts of 1867-1868, c. 46,
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Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-9396 August 16, 1956
MANILA MOTOR COMPANY, INC., plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MANUEL T. FLORES, defendant-appellant.

Delgado, Flores and Macapagal for appellant.
Zafra, Lara, De Leon and Veneracion for appellee.
BENGZON, J.:
In May 1954, Manila Motor Company filed in the Municipal Court of Manila a complaint to recover from
Manuel T. Flores the amount of P1,047.98 as chattel mortgage installments which fell due in September
1941. Defendant pleaded prescription: 1941 to 1954. The complaint was dismissed. On appeal, the
Court of First Instance saw differently, sustaining plaintiff's contention that the moratorium laws had
interrupted the running of the prescriptive period, and that deducting the time during which said laws
were in operation three years and eight months
1
the ten year term had not yet elapsed when
complainant sued for collection in May 1954. Wherefore said court ordered the return of the case to the
municipal judge for trial on the merits.
Defendant appealed, arguing principally that the moratorium laws did not have the effect of suspending
the period of limitations, because they were unconstitutional, as declared by this court in Rutter vs.
Esteban, 49 Off. Gaz. (5) 1807. He cites jurisprudence holding that when a statute is adjudged
unconstitutional it is as inoperative as if it had never been passed, and no rights can be built upon it.
2

Some members expressed doubts as to whether the order of the lower court was appealable in nature;
but we agreed not to discuss the point, inasmuch as the question submitted by appellant could speedily
be disposed of. In Montilla vs. Pacific Commercial
3
we held that the moratorium laws suspended the
period of prescription. That was rendered after the Rutter-Esteban decision. It should be stated
however, in fairness to appellant, that the Montilla decision came down after he had submitted his
brief. And in answer to his main contention, the following portion is quoted from a resolution of this
Court
4

2. Rutter vs. Esteban (93 Phil., 68) may be construed to mean that at the of the decision
the Moratorium law could no longer be validly applied because of the prevailing
circumstances. At any rate, although the general rule is that an unconstitutional statute

"confers no right, create no office, affords no protection and justifies no acts performed
under it." (11 Am. Jur., pp. 828, 829.)
there are several instances wherein courts, out of equity, have relaxed its operation (cf.
notes in Cooley's Constitutional Limitations 8th ed., p. 383 and Notes 53 A. L. R., 273) or
qualified its effects "since the actual existence of a statute prior to such declaration is an
operative fact, and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored (Chicot
County vs. Baster, 308 U. S., 371) and a realistic approach is eroding the general doctrine
(Warring vs. Colpoys, 136 Am. Law Rep., 1025, 1030).
Judgment affirmed, without costs.
Paras, C. J., Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia, and
Felix, JJ., concur.


Footnotes
1
See Alcantara vs. Chico, 49 Off. Gaz. No. 1, p. 150.
2
Norton vs. Shelby, 118 U. S., 425-454; Am. Jur. Vol. 11, p. 827.