263

Nicario v. NLRC
295 SCRA 619
Entry Time Cards

FACTS
Petitioner Emelita Nicario was a saleslady (later on promoted as a sales supervisor) in Mancaos
Supermarket from 1986, until she was terminated in 1989. She filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with
prayer for backwages, wage differential, service incentive leave pay, overtime pay, 13
th
month pay and
unpaid wages before the NLRC in Butuan City. The Labor Arbiter dismissed her complaint for lack of
merit; upon appeal, the NLRC set aside the Labor Arbiters decision for lack of due process, because he
depended on the photocopies of the payrolls when the petitioner already assailed its validity. The case
was assigned to another Labor Arbiter, who awarded to her the claims for unpaid service incentive leave
pay, 13
th
month pay, overtime pay and rest day pay for the entire period of her employment, but
dismissed her claims for holiday premium pay and unpaid salaries from February 3-5, 1989. Petitioner
then appealed again to the NLRC, who affirmed in toto the latest decision. Upon filing of a motion for
reconsideration, the NLRC then modified the resolution by deleting the award for overtime pay and ruling
that Mancao, the owner of the supermarket and private respondent, is not jointly and severally liable with
Mancaos Supermarket to give the petitioner her overtime pay.

ISSUE
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to overtime pay

HELD
Yes. In determining whether or not the petitioner was entitled to overtime pay, the NLRC simply relied on
the daily time records (DTRs) presented by the respondent supermarket, which are unreliable evidence
because: 1.) the original DTRs were not presented, when the supermarket should have shown it to the
NLRC to disprove the petitioners allegation that the documents and her signatures were forged; 2.) the
DTRs make it appear that the petitioner had a two-hour rest period, which was highly unlikely in an
establishment which required their employees to always attend to the needs of their customers at all
times; and 3.) the entries showed that the petitioner consistently reported at 9:00 am sharp and always
left at 8:00 pm sharp. Furthermore, the NLRC also took judicial notice of the fact that Mancaos
Supermarkets are always open for twelve hours, from 8:00 am to 8:00 pm, which led them to believe that
the employees, indeed, rendered overtime work for four hours. Such judicial notice was not refuted by the
private respondent and the respondent supermarket. With regards to the uniform entries in the DTRs, the
Court has ruled that such unvarying recording of a daily time record is improbably and contrary to human
experience. It is impossible for an employee to arrive at the workplace and leave at exactly the same
time, day in and day out. The uniformity and regularity of the entries are badges of untruthfulness and as
such indices of dubiety. The instant petition was partially granted, and Nicario was awarded her overtime
pay.
















264
Aklan Electric Coop., Inc. v. NLRC
323 SCRA 258
Entry Time Cards

FACTS
Aklan Electric Coop., Inc. (AKELCO) transferred their office temporarily from Lezo, Aklan to Kalibo, Aklan,
due to the fact that it was dangerous for them to continue working at the former office. However, majority
of their employees still continued to report for work at the Lezo office. Upon another resolution, the
AKELCO Board withdrew the temporary designation of office at Kalibo and returned the operations at
Lezo. However, some of the employees continued working at Kalibo. However, some employees were
not paid their salaries from June 1992 to March 1993, but from March onwards, the complainants were
allowed to draw their salaries, with the exception of those who were not paid their salaries for April and
May 1993. AKELCO contended that the complainants voluntarily abandoned their work assignments and
that they defied the lawful orders of the AKELCO general manager, so the Board passed a resolution
resisting and denying the claims of the complainants under the principle of no work, no pay. The Labor
Arbiter dismissed the complaint, but the decision was reversed by the NLRC, who ordered AKELCO to
pay the complainants.

ISSUE
Whether or not the complainants (private respondents) were covered by the no work, no pay principle,
and thus, were not entitled to the claim of unpaid wages.

HELD
Yes. AKELCO was able to show that the private respondents did not render services from June 1992 to
March 1993. Petitioners contention that NLRCs reliance on the computation of the respondents with
regards to their claims for wages was improper, because such should be substantiated with evidence like
timecards, payslips, and other documents to prove that the respondents actually rendered compensable
service. However, due to the fact that the equipment, records, and facilities in Lezo were transferred to
Kalibo, the respondents were not able to prove that they actually rendered compensable work during that
period. AKELCOs transfer to Kalibo was an exercise of management prerogative, since their transfer was
done for safety reasons, and, therefore, was not tainted with bad faith or malice. The burden of proof lies
with the party who asserts the affirmative allegation, the private respondents have to prove such, but the
employees failed to do so.






















265
Pan-American Airlines v. Pan-American Employees Association
1 SCRA 527
Meal Time Free Time

FACTS
Respondent Pan-American Employees Association, particularly the fourteen aircraft mechanics and two
employees, were required to perform emergency work during their meal period by the petitioner, Pan-
American Airlines, by calling the mechanics from their meals in order to attend to the needs of the
company. If they did not hurry when they were called, the leadman reprimanded them. This fact was
proven to have happened in several occasions; thus, they filed a claim for payment of overtime pay, since
they alleged that their meal time should be compensated. The petitioner, on the other hand, contended
that their claim was not supported by substantial evidence.

ISSUE
Whether or not the respondents were entitled to payment of overtime pay for work performed during meal
periods

HELD
Yes. It is true that meal periods are generally non-compensable, but this is not without exception.
Employees should be paid overtime pay when they were required to work during their lunch period and
they could not rest completely. In the case at bar, it was clear that the employees were required to work
and, if they did not respond immediately, they will be reprimanded. Thus, they are rightly entitled to the
said compensation; furthermore, the Court ordered an implementation of the straight eight-hour work shift
inclusive of meal period, which is mutually beneficial to the parties.































266
Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. NLRC
302 SCRA 582
Meal Time Free Time

FACTS
Private respondent, Dr. Herminio A. Fabros, was a flight surgeon employed by the petitioner company,
and was assigned at the PAL Medical Clinic at Nichols and was on duty from 4:00 pm to 12:00 midnight.
One night in 1994, the respondent left the clinic to eat dinner at his house which was a five-minute drive
away from his office. After he left, another employee, Mr. Manuel Acosta, suffered a heart attack, so the
nurse on duty called back Dr. Fabros, who went back immediately. The patient was taken by the nurse to
the hospital; however, the patient died the next day. The respondent was then required to explain why he
should not be subjected to disciplinary action. Dr. Fabros asserted that he was entitled to a thirty-minute
meal break anyway, and that upon learning about the incident, he immediately rushed back to attend to
the patient. This explanation was found unacceptable by the respondent, and the former was charged
with abandonment of post while on duty. Later on, he was suspended for three months, which prompted
the private respondent to file a complaint for illegal suspension. The Labor Arbiter ruled for the private
respondent and nullified the suspension; the NLRC ruled likewise.

ISSUE
Whether or not the public respondents erred in nullifying the three-month suspension

HELD
No. PALs contention that Dr. Fabros abandoned his duty was untenable. As correctly argued by the
latter, he was entitled to a meal break, as espoused in Article 85 of the Labor Code. Although employees
should render work for eight hours, the period does not include the meal break; moreover, the law does
not say that employees must take their meals within the company premises. They are not prohibited from
going out of the premises as long as they return to their posts on time. In this case, Dr. Fabros travelled
back to his house (which was only five minutes away), and upon hearing about the incident, he
immediately went back to the office. Thus, his act of going home did not constitute abandonment of post.


























267
Philippine National Bank v. Philippine National Bank Employees Association
115 SCRA 507
Definition and Rationale Overtime Pay

FACTS
The petitioner and the respondent had a dispute regarding the proper computation of overtime pay.
PEMA, the respondent, wanted to include the cost of living allowance and longevity pay in the
computation, while PNB disagreed. Thus, the parties went to the CIR to resolve their issue. CIR decided
in favor of PEMA by ruling that the overtime pay should be computed based on their basic pay plus the
cost of living allowance and longevity pay. The CIR based their decision on the NAWASA v. NAWASA
Consolidated Unions case, which ruled that for purposes of computing overtime compensation, regular
wage includes all payments which the parties have agreed shall be received during the work week,
including differentiated payments for working at undesirable times, such as at night and the board and
lodging customarily furnished the employee.

ISSUE
Whether or not the cost of living allowance and longevity pay should be included in the computation of the
employees overtime pay

HELD
No. Overtime pay is the compensation for the work performed by the employees beyond eight hours
stipulated in their employment contract, whereas longevity pay and cost of living allowances were given
as gratuity for employees loyalty and for augmentation of salaries to address the changes of costs of
living, respectively. Overtime pay is paid for the reason that he is made to work longer than what is
commensurate with his agreed compensation for the statutorily fixed or voluntarily agreed hours of labor
he is supposed to do. When he thus spends additional time to his work, the effect upon him is multi-
faceted; he puts in more effort, physical and/or mental; he is delayed in going home to his family to enjoy
the comforts thereof; he might have no time for relaxation, amusement or sports; he might miss important
pre-arranged engagements; etc. It is thus the additional work, labor or service employed and the adverse
effects just mentioned of his longer stay in his place of work that justify and are the real reasons for the
extra compensation that is called overtime pay. Hence, when additional pay is given for any other
purpose, it is illogical to include the same in the basis for the computation of overtime pay.























268
Caltex Regular Employees, etc. v. Caltex (Philippines), Inc.
247 SCRA 398
Definition and Rationale Overtime Pay

FACTS
The parties entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), effective until 1988, which included
provisions regarding the hours of work, particularly the computations of payment for rest days and
overtime pays. Sometime in 1986, the Union called Caltex's attention to alleged violations by Caltex of
Annex "B" of the 1985 CBA, particularly the non-payment of night-shift differential, non-payment of
overtime pay and non-payment at "first day-off rates" for work performed on a Saturday. Caltex's
Industrial Relations manager immediately evaluated petitioner's claims and accordingly informed
petitioner Union that differential payments would be timely implemented. In the implementation of the re-
computed claims, however, no differential payment was made with respect to work performed on the first
2 1/2 hours on a Saturday.

This prompted the Union to file a complaint for unfair labor practice against the respondent, alleging that
the respondent violated the provisions of the CBA by shortchanging the employees when they
compensated work performed on the first 2 hours of Saturday (a rest day) at regular rates, when it
should have been paid at rest day rates. Caltex denied the accusations of the Union. It averred that
Saturday was never designated as a day of rest, much less a "day-off". It maintained that the 1985 CBA
provided only 1 day of rest for employees at the Manila Office, as well as employees similarly situated at
the Legazpi and Marinduque Bulk Depots. This day of rest, according to Caltex, was Sunday. The Union
alleged that it was entitled to two days off, while the employer contended that, as per Article III of the
CBA, the Union should only have one day off. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the Union; the NLRC,
however, reversed the decision.

ISSUE
Whether or not Caltex violated the statutory prohibition against off-setting undertime for overtime work on
another day by requiring the employees to render "overtime work" on a Saturday but compensating them
only at regular rates of pay

HELD
No. In the present case, under the 1985 CBA, hours worked on a Saturday do not, by that fact alone,
necessarily constitute overtime work compensable at premium rates of pay, contrary to petitioner's
assertion. These are normal or regular work hours, compensable at regular rates of pay, as provided in
the 1985 CBA; under that CBA, Saturday is not a rest day or a "day off". It is only when an employee has
been required on a Saturday to render work in excess of the forty (40) hours which constitute the regular
work week that such employee may be considered as performing overtime work on that Saturday. We
consider that the statutory prohibition against offsetting undertime one day with overtime another day has
no application in the case at bar. It must be remembered that overtime work consists of hours worked on
a given day in excess of the applicable work period, which here is eight (8) hours. It is not enough that the
hours worked fall on disagreeable or inconvenient hours. In order that work may be considered as
overtime work, the hours worked must be in excess of and in addition to the eight (8) hours worked during
the prescribed daily work period, or the forty (40) hours worked during the regular work week Monday thru
Friday.










269
Manila Terminal Co., Inc. v CIR
91 Phil. 625
Definition and Rationale Overtime Pay

FACTS
Petitioner company undertook arrastre service in some piers in Manila and hired some thirty men as
watchmen on twelve-hour shifts. They were compensated with P3/day for the day shift and P6/day for the
night shift. Petitioner also entered into a contract with the Bureau of Customs to provide the same
services. Members of the Manila Transit Mutual Aid Association then filed a petition with the CIR praying
that the watchmen or police force be paid overtime pay from the commencement of their employment.
However, the petitioner contended that the contracts signed by the employees are null and void because
the employer did not secure the permit to allow them to perform overnight work. In addition to this, the
employer argued that the wages of the employees already included their overtime pay, and since the
latter did not protest to it, they are estopped from claiming the pay for overtime work rendered.

ISSUE
Whether or not the employees are entitled to overtime pay

RULING
Yes. It has been held that, A contract of employment, which provides for a weekly wage for a specified
number of hours, sufficient to cover both the statutory minimum wage and overtime compensation, if
computed on the basis of the statutory minimum wage, and which makes no provision for a fixed hourly
rate or that the weekly wage includes overtime compensation, does not meet the requirements of the
Act." Furthermore, the blame with regards to the nullity of the contract cannot be imputed upon the
employees, since Commonwealth Act 444 imposes the duty of getting the permit upon the petitioner.

The law gives the Association the right to extra compensation. And they could not be held to have
impliedly waived such extra compensation, for the obvious reason that could not have expressly waived
it. The employee in rendering extra service at the request of his employer has a right to assume that the
latter has complied with the requirement of the law, and therefore has obtained the required permission
from the Department of Labor.
























270
Manila Terminal Co., Inc. v CIR
91 Phil. 625
No Computation Formula Basic Contract

FACTS
Petitioner company undertook arrastre service in some piers in Manila and hired some thirty men as
watchmen on twelve-hour shifts. They were compensated with P3/day for the day shift and P6/day for the
night shift. Petitioner also entered into a contract with the Bureau of Customs to provide the same
services. Members of the Manila Transit Mutual Aid Association then filed a petition with the CIR praying
that the watchmen or police force be paid overtime pay from the commencement of their employment.
However, the petitioner contended that the contracts signed by the employees are null and void because
the employer did not secure the permit to allow them to perform overnight work. In addition to this, the
employer argued that the wages of the employees already included their overtime pay, and since the
latter did not protest to it, they are estopped from claiming the pay for overtime work rendered.

ISSUE
Whether or not the employees are entitled to overtime pay

RULING
Yes. It has been held that, A contract of employment, which provides for a weekly wage for a specified
number of hours, sufficient to cover both the statutory minimum wage and overtime compensation, if
computed on the basis of the statutory minimum wage, and which makes no provision for a fixed hourly
rate or that the weekly wage includes overtime compensation, does not meet the requirements of the
Act." Furthermore, the blame with regards to the nullity of the contract cannot be imputed upon the
employees, since Commonwealth Act 444 imposes the duty of getting the permit upon the petitioner.






























271
Engineering Equipment, Inc. v. MOLE
138 SCRA 616
Built-In Compensation

FACTS
Private respondent Miguel Aspera was a mechanical engineer who worked for the petitioner in Saudi
Arabia. He worked for ten hours in his six-day work week, for a monthly salary of P750. He then filed a
claim for overtime pay, in accordance with Sections 83 and 87 of the Labor Code, stating that employees
should only work for eight hours a day and the work performed beyond the eight hours should be
considered as overtime work and should be duly compensated. The Director of Employment Services and
the NLRC both upheld his claim. The petitioner, on the other hand, appealed and contended that: a.)
private respondent was a managerial employee who should not be entitled to overtime pay (Section 82,
Labor Code), b.) private respondent signed a contract which contained a built-in overtime pay which
reflects the higher pay for the extra hours, whether worked or unworked, c.) the Director of Employment
Services, Jonathan dela Cruz, was the one who approved the said contract which the private respondent
signed.

ISSUES
a. Whether or not Director Dela Cruz committed grave abuse of discretion
b. Whether or not Aspera was entitled to overtime pay

HELD
a. YES. Dela Cruz committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in approving
Asperas claim for overtime pay when he was also the one who approved the contract that the private
respondent signed in the first place. The Director was supposed to be knowledgeable about the Eight-
Hour Labor Law (and the provisions of the Labor Code). Because of his approval, the petitioner, in effect,
acted in good faith in enforcing the contract.
b. No. Aspera did not deny that he was a managerial employee. Thus, he is not entitled to overtime pay.



























272
Lagatic v. NLRC
285 SCRA 251
Proof of Work

FACTS
Romeo Lagatic was employed by Cityland, first as a probationary sales agent, and later on as a
marketing specialist, who was tasked to solicit sales for the respondent company. Part of the job was
making cold calls, which is the practice of prospecting clients through the telephone directory; and all
marketing specialists were required to make cold calls, depending on the sales generated meaning that
if they generate more sales, they need to make less cold calls. In line with this, respondent company
required the submission of progress reports on the same. However, it was found that petitioner failed to
submit cold call reports on 28 different occasions. He was suspended and warned, but still he continued
the omission. When he was again given the order to submit cold call reports, he wrote a note saying, TO
HELL WITH COLD CALLS! WHO CARES? showed it to his co-workers, and left the note on his desk.
Cityland found him guilty of insubordination and dismissed him. Petitioner then filed a complaint against
the respondent company for illegal dismissal, illegal deduction, underpayment, overtime and rest day pay,
damages, and attorneys fees. Both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC dismissed the petition, hence the
appeal.

ISSUE
Whether or not Lagatic was entitled to overtime pay, rest day pay, unpaid commissions, moral and
exemplary damages, and attorneys fees.

HELD
No. Petitioner failed to show that he is entitled to such, due to lack of evidence as to the number of hours
and days when he rendered overtime and rest day work. Entitlement to overtime pay must first be
established by proof that said overtime work was actually performed. The petitioner only submitted the
minutes of meetings wherein he was assigned to work on weekends and holidays at Citylands housing
projects, but the same are not sufficient. It must be remembered that each party must prove his
affirmative allegations. Furthermore, since it was found that he was dismissed for a just and valid cause,
he is also not entitled to moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees.
























273
Social Security System v. Court of Appeals
348 SCRA 1
Proof of Work

FACTS
Margarita Tana was the widow of deceased Ignacio Tana, a former farmhand on the land of Conchita
Ayalde. Upon Ignacios death, the widow discovered that Ayalde never remitted Ignacio Tanas social
security contributions to the SSS, even though the same was regularly deducted from the farmhands
wages. Consequently, Margarita was deprived of the burial grant and pension benefits accruing to the
heirs of Tana had he been reported for coverage. In her defense, Ayalde contended that Ignacio was not
an employee, ie. There was no employer-employee relationship between her and the deceased, since
she never exercised control over the latter, and that she only hired him occasionally to plow, harrow, or
burrow in her land. Furthermore, she showed payrolls which showed that she only paid Ignacio on
pakyaw basis. The SSS found her liable for payment of the deceaseds contributions. However, upon
appeal, the CA reversed the decision.

ISSUE/S:
a. Whether or not the payrolls should be given credence to believe that Ignacio Tana was paid on
pakyaw basis.
b. What is the obligation of the employer with regards to the records of her business affairs?

HELD:
a. No. The payrolls should not be given credence, because 1.) they did not cover the 18 years from which
the Ignacio worked on the land of Ayalde, and 2.) the payrolls are doubtful because, since the employees
did not affix their signatures on it, it cannot be proven that the latter actually received their wages.
Margarita Tanas testimony, corroborated by witnesses, should therefore prevail.
b. The employer is duty-bound to keep faithful and complete records of her business affairs. In the case
at bar, the witnesses confirmed that Ayalde used intermediate pads where the workers signed when they
received their wages. Because of this, the private respondent gave incomplete and selective evidence
that did not convince the Court.

























274
Villar v. NLRC
331 SCRA 686
Proof of Work

FACTS
Petitioners were employees of Hi-Tech Corporations who were also members of the Federation of Free
Workers Union. They filed a petition for certification election among rank-and-file employees. This petition
was granted; however, upon election, the petitioners lost since the said employees voted for No Union.
Afterwards, the petitioners failed to report for work as they were allegedly prohibited from entering the
companys premises as retaliation to their attempt to form a union. They filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal and labor standards claims; however, the company stated that they did not dismiss the
petitioners and in fact, the latter were the ones who did not report for work because they were stung by
their defeat. The Labor Arbiter decided in favor of the petitioners; on the other hand, the NLRC set the
Arbiters ruling aside, stating that the petitioners were not summarily dismissed. However, they may go
back to work if they wish, but they were not entitled to back wages, based on the principle of fair days
work for a fair days pay.

ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to back wages and other benefits.

HELD
Yes. The burden to prove that payment of monetary claims is upon the employer, since they are in
possession of the necessary documents that can support their claim. Personnel files, payrolls, records,
remittances, etc. which will show the overtime, differentials, service incentive leave and other claims are
with the respondent company. In choosing not to present such evidence, Hi-Tech failed to discharge onus
probandi.