RAMOS VS.

DIRECTOR OF LANDS- Adverse

Possession
The general rule is that possession and cultivation of a portion of a tract of land under the claim of
ownership of all is a constructive possession of all, if the remainder is not in the adverse possession of
another.

FACTS:
Restituo Romero gained possession of a considerable tract of land located in Nueva Ecija. He took
advantage of the Royal Decree to obtain a possessory information title to the land and was registered as
such.

Parcel No. 1 included within the limits of the possessory information title of Romero was sold to Cornelio
Ramos, herein petitioner.

Ramos instituted appropriate proceedings to have his title registered.
Director of Lands opposed on the ground that Ramos had not acquired a good title from the Spanish
government.

Director of Forestry also opposed on the ground that the first parcel of land is forest land.
It has been seen however that the predecessor in interest to the petitioner at least held this tract of land
under color of title.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the actual occupancy of a part of the land described in the instrument giving color of title
sufficient to give title to the entire tract of land?

HELD:
The general rule is that possession and cultivation of a portion of a tract of land under the claim of
ownership of all is a constructive possession of all, if the remainder is not in the adverse possession of
another.

The claimant has color of title; he acted in good faith and he has open, peaceable, and notorious
possession of a portion of the property, sufficient to apprise the community and the world that the land
was for his enjoyment.

Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter
of ground before it can be said that he is in possession.
Ramos and his predecessor in interest fulfilled the requirements of the law on supposition that the
premises consisted of agricultural public land.

On the issue of forest land, Forest reserves of public land can be established as provided by law. When
the claim of the citizen and the claim of the government as to a particular piece of property collide, if the
Government desires to demonstrate that the land is in reality a forest, the Director of Forestry should
submit to the court convincing proof that the land is not more valuable for agricultural than for forest
purposes.

In this case, the mere formal opposition on the part of the Attorney-General for the Director of Forestry,
unsupported by satisfactory evidence will not stop the courts from giving title to the claimant.
Petitioner and appellant has proved a title to the entire tract of land for which he asked for registration.
Registration in the name of the petitioner is hereby granted.
Property 89

Banco Espanol Filipino v Peterson (1907)

Facts

On March 4, 1905, Banco Espanol Filipino (BEP) executed a contract of loan in favor of
Francisco Reyes for P141 702.00. Reyes was already indebted to the bank for P84 415.00.
His total debt was therefore P226 117.38.

To secure payment of the P141k and the P84k, Reyes executed a public instrument
1. Mortgaging several of his properties
2. Pledging part of his personal property to BEP (P90 591.75 worth of wines, liquors and
canned goods), which were stored at a warehouse he rented in Manila

BEP and Reyes agreed that the goods should be delivered to Ramon Garcia (depositary) for
safekeeping. Reyes turned over the goods to R. Garcia by giving him the warehouse keys.

On September 29, 1905, BEP and Reyes substituted Luis Sierra in place of R. Garcia as the
depositary.

On October 19, 1905, Juan Garcia (yes, related to Ramon) brought an action against
Francisco Reyes and Ramon Agtarat. CFI Manila ruled against Reyes and Agtarat for P15
000.00.

On the same day, Sheriff James Peterson entered the warehouse where the goods pledged
to BEP were stored under the custody of the depositary, Sierra. Peterson levied upon P30
000 worth of the goods pledged to the bank, depriving the latter of possession of the same,
as stipulated in the March 4 contract of loan.

Issues
Was the contract of pledge between BEP and Reyes to secure a loan valid?
Was Reyes still in possession of the pledged property, thereby making the contract
defective?

Held

The contract was valid. Reyes was no longer in possession of the pledged property. BEP
had symbolic possession of the same.

The contract complies with all the requisites of a valid pledge contract, as prescribed by the
Civil Code:
1. The property was pledged to secure a debt
2. The date of execution, the terms of the pledge, and the property pledged appeared in a
public instrument
3. The property pledged was placed in the hands of a third person (in this case, Sierra) by
common consent of the debtor and creditor, under the supervision of an agent (in this case,
Rodriguez) of the bank

Reyes, after the pledge, parted with the possession of his personal property, which was
delivered to a third person (R. Garcia, and subsequently, Sierra) who would take care of
them for BEP.

Sierra was the third person appointed by common consent of BEP (creditor) and Reyes
(debtor), to hold possession over the goods pledged in favor of the bank under the direct
supervision of Rodriguez, an agent specifically appointed by the bank.

The contract in question was, therefore, a perfect contract of pledge under articles 1857
and 1863 of the Civil Code, it having been conclusively shown that the pledgee (BEP) took
charge and possession of the goods pledged through a depositary (Sierra) and a special
agent (Rodriguez) appointed by it, each of whom had a duplicate key to the warehouse
wherein the said goods were stored, and that the pledgee (BEP), itself, received and
collected the proceeds of the goods as they were sold.

The legality of the pledge was not affected by the fact that the goods remained in the
warehouse formerly rented by Reyes the pledgor. This is because after the pledge had been
agreed upon, and after the depository appointed with common consent of the parties had
taken possession of the said property, Reyes could no longer dispose of the same because
BEP was the only party allowed to do so through Sierra and Rodriguez.

The symbolic transfer of the goods through delivery of the keys to the warehouse where
the goods were stored was sufficient evidence to show that Sierra, the depositary
appointed by both BEP and Rodriguez, was legally placed in possession of the goods.

Since the contract of pledge was valid, BEP had a better right to the goods compared to J.
Garcia. The Court ordered either the return of the improperly levied goods, or the payment
of their value, P30 000.