STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 2012

Rule1. Apply the Law when it is CLEAR. Do not Interpret or CONSTRUE.

Rule2 in StatCon is IBC, interpret before you CONSTRUE. You CONSTRUE only when the written law is
not enough to give meaning and EFFECT to the INTENT of the LAW.
The RULES are simplified in the middle of this REVIEWER. Done by a Freshman, by ang aging Freshman
who shall be a Lawyer soooooon!!!
literal meaning or plain meaning rule
dura lex sed lex
doctrine of necessary implication
ejusdem generis
limitations of ejusdem generis
expressio unios est exclusio alterius
negative- opposite doctrine
application of expressio unius rule
doctrine of casus omissus
doctrine of last antecedent
reddeddo singula singulis
stare decisis
res judicata
obiter dictum
A legislature is a kind of deliberative assembly with the power to pass, amend, and repeallaws.[1] The
law created by a legislature is called legislation or statutory law. In addition toenacting laws, legislatures
usually have exclusive authority to raise or lower taxes and adopt thebudget and other money bills.
Legislatures are known by many names, the most common being parliament and congress, although
these terms also have more specific meanings.

Legislative intent
In law, the legislative intent of the legislature in enacting legislation may sometimes be considered by
the judiciary when interpreting the law (see judicial interpretation). The judiciary may attempt to assess
legislative intent where legislation is ambiguous, or does not appear to directly or adequately address a
particular issue, or when there appears to have been a legislative drafting error.
When a statute is clear and unambiguous, the courts have said, repeatedly, that the inquiry into
legislative intent ends at that point. It is only when a statute could be interpreted in more than one
fashion that legislative intent must be inferred from sources other than the actual text of the statute.
Sources of legislative intent
Courts frequently look to the following sources in attempting to determine the goals and purposes that
the legislative body had in mind when it passed the law:
the text of the bill as proposed to the legislative body,
amendments to the bill that were proposed and accepted or rejected,
the record of hearings on the topic,
legislative records or journals,
speeches and floor debate made prior to the vote on the bill,
legislative subcommittee minutes, factual findings, and/or reports,
other relevant statutes which can be used to understand the definitions in the statute on question,
other relevant statutes which indicate the limits of the statute in question,
legislative files of the executive branch, such as the governor or president,
case law prior to the statute or following it which demonstrates the problems the legislature was
attempting to address with the bill, or
constitutional determinations (i.e. "Would Congress still have passed certain sections of a statute 'had it
known' about the constitutional invalidity of the other portions of the statute?").
legislative intent- the reason for passing the law
literal meaning or plain meaning rule. If the statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be
given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.
you get the meaning of the law from the word per word written law. Literal meaning or plain rule means
INTERPRETATION of the LAW. ALL WORDS words in a statute should if possible, be given effect.
Where a statute defines a word or phrase employed therein, the word or phrase should not, by
CONSTRUCTION, be given a different meaning. When the legislature defines a word used in a statute, it
does not usurp the courts function to interpret the laws but it merely LEGISLATES what should form part
of the law itself.
It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to define words, words and phrases used in statute
should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning which is supported by the maxim
generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda or what is generally spoken shall be generally understood.
It is also the same as GENERALI DICTUM GENERALITIR EST INTERPRETANDUM a general statement is
understood in a general sense.
WORDS MUST BE SUBSERVIENT TO THE INTENT and not intent to words.
Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. When the law does not distinguish, do not
distinguish.

dura lex sed lex or HOC QUIDEM PERQUAM DURUM EST, SED ITA LEX SCRIPTA EST.
The law maybe harsh, but is still the law. It is exceedingly hard, but so the law is written.
doctrine of necessary implication this doctrine states that what is implied in a statute is as much a part
thereof as that which is expressed. Every statute is understand by implication to contain all such
provision as may be necessary to effectuate to its object and purpose, or to make effective rights,
powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary
consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its terms. The principle is expressed in the
maxim EX NECESSITATE LEGIS or from the necessity of the law.

ejusdem generis . THE SAME KIND OR SPECIE. This is to give effect to both the particular and general
words, by treating the particular words as indicating the class and the general words as indicating all
that is embraced in said class, although not specifically named by the particular words.
The rule of ejusdem generis is not of universal application; it should be used to carry out, not to defeat
the intent or purpose of the law; the rule must give way in favor of the legislative intent;
limitations of ejusdem generis
requisites:
1. Statue contains an enumeration of particular and specific words, followed by a general word or
phrase;
2. The particular and specific words constitute a class or are of the same kind;
3. The enumeration of the particular and specific words is not exhaustive or is not merely by examples;
4. There is no indication of legislative intent to give general words or phrases a broader meaning.
expressio unios est exclusio alterius.
the expression of 1 person, thing or consequence IMPLIES the EXCLUSION of OTHERS or
What is expressed puts an end to that which is implied.

EXPRESSUM FACIT CESSARE TACITUM, where a Statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain
matters, it may not, by interpretation or CONSTRUCTION, be extended to other matters.
These also follows that when a statute specifically lists downs the exceptions, what is not list down as an
exception is ACCEPTED express in the maxim EXCEPTIO FIRMAT REGULAM IN CASIBUS NON EXCEPTIS,
the express exception, exemption or savings excludes others.

application of expressio unius rule. This auxiliary rule is used in CONSTRUCTION of statutes granting
powers, creating rights and remedies, restricting common rights, and imposing penalties and forfeitures,
as well as those statutes which are strictly construed. It is only a tool and not a mandatory rule used for
ascertaining the legislative intent. The rule must also yield to legislative intent.

negative- opposite doctrine, WHAT IS EXPRESSED PUTS AN END TO WHAT IS IMPLIED is known as
negative-opposite doctrine or argumentum a contrario.

doctrine of casus omissus (case of omission) pro omisso habendus est. A person, object or thing omitted
from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. This rule is not absolute if it can
be shown that the legislature did not intend to exclude the person, thing or object from the
enumeration. If such legislative intent is clearly indicated, the COURT may supply the omission if to do
so will carry out the intent of the legislature and will not do violence to its language.
doctrine of last antecedent or AD PROXIMUM ANTECEDENS FIAL RELATIO NISI IMPEDIATUR SENTENTIA
or relative words refer to the nearest antecedents, unless the context otherwise requires. QUALIFYING
WORDS restrict or modify only the words or phrases to which they are immediately associated.
The last antecedent rule is a doctrine of interpretation of a statute, by which "Referential and qualifying
phrases, where no contrary intention appears, refer solely to the last antecedent." The rule is typically
bound by "common sense" and is flexible enough to avoid application that "would involve an absurdity,
do violence to the plain intent of the language, or if the context for other reason requires a deviation
from the rule." Evidence that a qualifying phrase is supposed to apply to all antecedents instead of only
to the immediately preceding one may be found in the fact that it is separated from the antecedents by
a comma."

reddendo singula singulis when two descriptions makes it impossible to reconcile, reconcile it to have a
singular meaning to settle the issue.
refers to each phrase or expression to its appropriate object, or let each be put in its proper place, that
is, the words should be taken DISTRIBUTIVELY to effect that each word is to be applied to the subject to
which it appears by context most appropriate related and to which it is most applicable.
REDDENDO SINGULA SINGULIS, construction. By rendering each his own; for example, when two
descriptions of property are given together in one mass, both the next of kin and the heir cannot take,
unless in cases where a construction can be made reddendo singula singulis, that the next of kin shall
take the personal estate and the heir at law the real estate. 14 Ves. 490. Vide 11 East,, 513, n.; Bac. Ab.
Conditions, L.
Stare Decisis [Latin, Let the decision stand.] The policy of courts to abide by or adhere to principles
established by decisions in earlier cases. (stah-ray duh-see-sis) n. Latin for "to stand by a decision," the
doctrine that a trial court is bound by appellate court decisions (precedents) on a legal question which is
raised in the lower court. Reliance on such precedents is required of trial courts until such time as an
appellate court changes the rule, for the trial court cannot ignore the precedent (even when the trial
judge believes it is "bad law")
Res Judicata [Latin, A thing adjudged.] A rule that a final judgment on the merits by a court having
jurisdiction is conclusive between the parties to a suit as to all matters that were litigated or that could
have been litigated in that suit.
The party asserting res judicata, having introduced a final judgment on the merits, must then show that
the decision in the first lawsuit was conclusive as to the matters in the second suit. For example, assume
that the plaintiff in the first lawsuit asserted that she was injured in an auto accident. She sues the driver
of the other auto under a theory of Negligence. A jury returns a verdict that finds that the defendant
was not negligent. The injured driver then files a second lawsuit alleging additional facts that would help
her prove that the other driver was negligent. A court would dismiss the second lawsuit under res
judicata because the second lawsuit is based on the same Cause of Action (negligence) and the same
injury claim.
Obiter Dictum[Latin, By the way.] Words of an opinion entirely unnecessary for the decision of the case.
A remark made or opinion expressed by a judge in a decision upon a cause, "by the way", that is,
incidentally or collaterally, and not directly upon the question before the court or upon a point not
necessarily involved in the determination of the cause, or introduced by way of illustration, or analogy
or argument. Such are not binding as precedent.
AEQUITAS NUNQUAM CONTRAVENIT LEGIS . EQUITY never acts in contravention of the law.
The reason of the Law is the Life of the Law or RATIO LEGIS ET ANIMA.
Interpretation and CONSTRUCTION of Statutes must be done to avoid evil and injustice. EA EST
ACCIPIENDA INTERPRETATIO QUAE VITIO CARET.
Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat, the interpretation that will give the thing the
EFFICACY is to be adopted. Law must receive sensible interpretation to promote the ends for which they
are enacted. They should be given practical CONSTRUCTION that will give LIFE to them, IF IT CAN BE
DONE without doing VIOLENCE to reason.
UT RES MAGIS VALEAT QUAM PEREAT, A STATUTE must be interpreted to give it efficient operation and
effect as a whole avoiding the nullification of provisions. IT is so that a legal provision must not be so
construed as to be a useless SURPLUSAGE. Accordingly, in case of Doubt or obscurity, that construction
should make the statute fully operative and effective. IT IS PRESUMED THAT THE LEGISLATURE DID NOT
DO A VAIN THING IN THE ENACTMENT OF THE STATUTE.
In PARE MATERIA, of the same person or thing.
INTERPRETARE ET CONCORDARE LEGES LEGIBUS EST OPTIMUS INTERPRETANDI MODUS, or every
statute must be so CONSTRUED and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of
Jurisprudence. ALL laws are presumed to be consistent with each other.
DISTINGUE TEMPORA ET CONCORDABIS JURA, distinguish times and you will harmonize laws.
IN enacting a STATUTE, the legislature is presumed to have been aware, and taken into account, PRIOR
LAWS on the subject of legislation. Thus, conflict on same subject is not intended and if such occur,
Court must construe, through reconciliation to give effect to the statute. If it is impossible to reconcile
and harmonize, one statute has to give way to the other. The latest statute shall prevail being the latest
expression of the legislative WILL.
A GENERAL LAW and a SPECIAL LAW are in pare materia. The fact that one is general and the other
special creates a presumption that the special act is to be considered as remaining an exception of the
General Act. One as a General Law of the Land, the other as a LAW for a Particular case. This shall apply
all the time regardless of which law was enacted first.
CONTEMPORANEOUS CONSTRUCTIONS or CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTIONS are made by the
EXECUTIVE Departments.
First type of Contemporary Constructions are the interpretations of the Executive on Statutes, for them
to implement it, they must understand it and interpret it if the language of the law is AMBIGUOUS. The
executive makes RULES or IRRs for this statutes, or ADMINISTRATIVE RULES and PROCEDURES. These
IRRs or RULES issued by the executive to execute the Statute are CONTEMPORARY Construction.
Second Type of Contemporary Constructions are the INTERPRETATIONS of the JUSTICE Secretary in
carrying out PENAL LAWS and all OTHER LAWS, under her are the PROSECUTORS, FISCALS of the
Philippine Republic. The issuances on how laws are to be prosecuted are CONTEMPORARY
CONSTRUCTION of the Justice Secretary.
The third type are the DECISIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES handling disputes in a QUASI-
JUDICIAL MANNER. These decisions are based on their UNDERSTANDING of Statutes passed by congress,
laws that are enforced. These are CONTEMPORARY INTERPRETATIONS and Constructions.
THESE CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTIONS STATUTES HAPPEN, WHEN THERE ARE NO ACTUAL
CONTROVERSIES QUESTIONING THE VALIDITY OF STATUTES IN THE SUPREME COURT, therefore,NO
STARE DECISIS HAVE YET BEEN MADE. IF THERE ARE JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS AND CONSTRUCTIONS,
THEN THE JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTIONS ARE governing and are THE ONES followed BY THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENTS once promulgated by the Supreme Court.
CONGRESS, NOT BEING THE CONSTITUTIONALLY POWER TO INTERPRET AND CONSTRUE THE LAWS THEY
MAKE, MAY ALSO DO CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTION IN FOLLOWING STATUTES THAT THEY
THEMSELVES ARE BOUND TO FOLLOW.
WITH THE GRANT OF POWERS, RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES IS ALSO THE RIGHT TO INCIDENTAL POWERS OF THE
POWERS, RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES. THE GREATER POWER IMPLIES INCIDENTAL LESSER POWER. This is
so because the greater includes the lesser as expressed in the maxim, in eo quod plus sit, simper inest et
minus.THERE SHALL BE NO CONSTRUCTION TO GIVE EFFECT TO A LAW THAT SHALL MAKE IT MORE
POWERFUL THAN WHAT WAS INTENDED BY THE LAW.
Every statute is understood by IMPLICATION, to contain such provisions as maybe necessary to
EFFECTUATE its object and purpose, or to make effective Rights, powers, privileges or JURISDICTION
which it grants, including all such COLLATERAL and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and
LOGICALLY inferred from its TERMS, as expressed in the maxim, Ex necessitate legis or from the
NECESSITY of the LAW. Doctrine of Necessary Implication.
WHAT CANNOT BE DONE DIRECTLY CANNOT BE DONE INDIRECTLY. QUANDO ALIQUID PROHIBETUR EX
DIRECTO, PROHIBETUR ET PER OBLIQUUM.
WHAT IS AUTOLIMITATION?
Doctrine of AutolimitationIt is the doctrine where the Philippines adheres to principles of
international law as a limitation to the exercise of its sovereignty.
Functus officio an officer or agency whose mandate has expired either because of the arrival of an
expiry date or because an agency has accomplished the purpose for which it was created. Function is
mere FORMALITY.
Sin perjuico judgments are judgment, w/o any stated facts in support of the conclusion.

RULES in STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
The solemn decisions of the judges upon a statute become part of the statute ; and the security of men's
lives and property, require that they should be adhered to: for precedents serve to regulate our conduct
; and there is more danger to be apprehended from uncertainty, than from any exposition; because,
when the rule is settled, men know how to conform to it; but, when all is uncertain, they are left in the
dark, and constantly liable to error; for the same offence which, at one time, was thought entitled to
clergy, at another, may be deemed capital ; and thus the life or death of the citizen will be made to
depend, not upon a fixt rule, but upon the opinion of the judge, who may happen to try him, than which
a more miserable state of things cannot be conceived.
1. Presumption of Correctness
a. "When testing the constitutional validity of statutes, courts shall presume the statute to be valid."
Consequently, the burden to show the constitutional defect is on the challenger. "Every act of the
legislature is presumed to be constitutional, and the Constitution is to be given a liberal construction so
as to sustain the enactment in question, if practicable." "When the constitutionality of an act is
challenged, a heavy burden of proof is thrust upon the party making the challenge. All laws are
presumed to be constitutional and this presumption is one of the strongest known to the law.
b. "Another rule of statutory construction requires the presumption that, in enacting statutes, the
CONGRESS has full knowledge of existing law and interpretations thereof . Although the repeal of
statutes by implication is not favored, if two statutes are in pari materia, then to the extent that their
provisions are irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant, the latter enactment repeals or amends the
earlier enacted statute.
c. "The legislature is presumed to know the law when enacting legislation.
d. When amendments are enacted soon after controversies arise "as to the interpretation of the original
act, it is logical to regard the amendment as a legislative interpretation of the original act, a formal
change-rebutting the presumption of substantial change.

e. " We "assume that the legislature chose, with care, the words it used when it enacted the relevant
statute."

f. when current and prior versions of a statute are at issue, there is a presumption that the CONGRESS,
in amending a statute, intended to effect a substantive change in the law. "Further, we assume that
CONGRESS amendments to a statute are purposeful, rather than unnecessary.
g. "The Supreme Court repeatedly has affirmed that it is a presumption of statutory construction
that, where both general and specific statutes appear to address a matter, CONGRESS intends
the specific statute to control the subject
h. "When a statute begins with the phrase "notwithstanding any other provision of law," it is presumed
that CONGRESS intended to override any potential conflicts with earlier legislation.
i. "The construction of statutes by agencies charged with administration of those statutes is entitled to
great weight. A decision of an agency specified to execute the law made by CONGRESS carries great
weight and is entitled to deference unless it is proven the agency erred. The grant of regulatory
authority extends only to duties or powers conferred by law. As such, "regulations, promulgated
pursuant to definitive statutory authority, have the force and effect of law. Moreover, those regulations
which "clearly and explicitly mirror" statutory authority are likeliest to be sustained. Any regulation of
the Department must be reasonably grounded in an identifiable and definitive statutory foundation.
"Generally, the court accords substantial deference to an agency's interpretations of its own regulations.
Provided the interpretation "does not violate the Constitution, it must be given 'controlling weight
unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.
j. we will overturn COURTs decision only if it can be fairly characterized as "arbitrary or capricious"
and thus a "clear abuse of delegated discretion." On the other hand, an "agency does not possess
specialized competence over the interpretation of a statute merely because it addresses topics within
the agency's delegable authority. Pure statutory construction, a matter within the "core competency of
the judiciary," . "This axiom stems from basic principles of separation of powers. It is emphatically the
province and duty of the JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT to say what the law is. It necessarily follows that the a
priori question whether the statute delegates or withholds discretion is itself a question of statutory
interpretation, one implicating our duty of de novo review."
k. "The circuit court nonetheless deferred to the Technical Review Board's reasoning, correctly noting
that courts give "great deference" to an agency's interpretation of its own regulations. This deference
stems from Code 2.2-4027, which requires that reviewing courts "take due account" of the
"experience and specialized competence of the agency" promulgating the regulation. Even so,
"deference is not abdication, and it requires us to accept only those agency interpretations that are
reasonable in light of the principles of construction courts normally employ. No matter how one
calibrates judicial deference, the administrative power to interpret a regulation does not include the
power to rewrite it. When a regulation is "not ambiguous," judicial deference "to the agency's position
would be to permit the agency, under the guise of interpreting a regulation, to create de facto a new
regulation." Though agencies may be tempted to adjudicate their way around unwanted regulations,
such overreaching undermines the notice and public hearing procedures of the rulemaking process -
thereby putting in jeopardy the "enhanced political accountability of agency policy decisions adopted
through the rulemaking process" and the democratic virtue of allowing "all potentially affected
members of the public an opportunity to participate in the process of determining the rules that affect
them.
l. "However, whenever an "agency's statutory interpretation conflicts with the language of the statute
or when the interpretation has not been consistently and regularly applied, the usual deference
accorded to an agency's interpretation should be withheld.
m. When Congress enacts an imprecise statute that it commits to the implementation of an executive
agency, it has no control over that implementation (except, of course, through further, more precise,
legislation). The legislative and executive functions are not combined. But when an agency promulgates
an imprecise rule, it leaves to itself the implementation of that rule, and thus the initial determination of
the rule's meaning. And though the adoption of a rule is an exercise of the executive rather than the
legislative power, a properly adopted rule has fully the effect of law. It seems contrary to fundamental
principles of separation of powers to permit the person who promulgates a law to interpret it as well.
Deferring to an agency's interpretation of a statute does not encourage Congress, out of a desire to
expand its power, to enact vague statutes; the vagueness effectively cedes power to the Executive. By
contrast, deferring to an agency's interpretation of its own rule encourages the agency to enact vague
rules which give it the power, in future adjudications, to do what it pleases.
Construed Against the State/ Vagueness
a. "It is an ancient maxim of the law that all such statutes must be construed strictly against the state
and favorably to the liberty of the citizen. The maxim is founded on the tenderness of the law for the
rights of individuals and on the plain principle that the power of punishment is vested in the legislature
and not in the judicial department. No man incurs a penalty unless the act which subjects him to it is
clearly within the spirit and letter of the statute which imposes such penalty. There can be no
constructive offenses, and before a man can be punished his case must be plainly and unmistakably
within the statute. If these principals are violated, the fate of the accused is determined by the arbitrary
discretion of the judges and not by the express authority of the law."
b. "When a statute is penal in nature, it "must be strictly construed against the STATE and in favor of an
accused.
c. "While it is true that penal statutes must be strictly construed against the STATE in criminal cases,
"we will not apply 'an unreasonably restrictive interpretation of the statute' that would subvert the
legislative intent expressed therein.
d. "In determining whether a legislative enactment is unconstitutionally vague, the Supreme Court has
considered whether the words used have a well-settled . . . meaning . . . (citing dictionary to determine
"generally understood" meaning for adjective in ordinance). "A penal statute is void for vagueness if it
both fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence notice that her contemplated conduct is forbidden by
the statute and encourages selective prosecution
Statutory Exceptions, Negative Element v. Affirmative Defense
1) "When construing PENAL STATUTES which contain qualifications, exceptions or exemptions to their
application, the limiting language may be viewed as a negative element of the offense which the
prosecution must disprove. Alternately, the court may determine that the exemption is a statutory
defense, which the accused can assert to defeat the prima facie case of the prosecution. In determining
whether specific limiting language is an element of the offense or a statutory defense, a court should
look both to the intent of the statute as a whole and the ability of the respective parties to assert the
existence or absence of the underlying facts sustaining the applicability of the limitation. When
determining whether the limiting language is a negative element or a statutory defense, this Court has
identified four factors to be considered: 'the wording of the exception and its role in relation to the
other words in the statute; whether in light of the situation prompting legislative action, the exception is
essential to complete the general prohibition intended; whether the exception makes an excuse or
justification for what would otherwise be criminal conduct, i.e., sets forth an affirmative defense; and
whether the matter is peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant.' An application of these factors
to the present case demonstrates that the phrase "except as provided by law," as used in Code 29.1-
553, establishes a statutory defense as opposed to a negative element
2) "In order to resolve whether there is a due process violation in this case, we first must address the
threshold issue of whether the absence of a valid prescription is an affirmative defense or a negative
element of the offense. If it is the latter, the burden of proof is on the STATE, and it cannot be shifted to
the accused...When construing penal statutes which contain qualifications, exceptions or exemptions to
their application, the limiting language may be viewed as a negative element of the offense which the
prosecution must disprove. Alternately, the court may determine that the exemption is a statutory
defense, which the accused can assert to defeat the prima facie case of the prosecution. The ACCUSED
BEARS THE BURDEN OF PRODUCING EVIDENCE OF THE NEGATION of circumstances sufficient to raise a
reasonable doubt of his guilt. In determining whether specific limiting language is an element of the
offense or a statutory defense, a court should look both to the intent of the statute as a whole and the
ability of the respective parties to assert the existence or absence of the underlying facts sustaining the
applicability of the limitation. Accordingly, we should consider the wording of the exception and its role
in relation to the other words in the statute; whether in light of the situation prompting legislative
action, the exception is essential to complete the general prohibition intended; whether the exception
makes an excuse or justification for what would otherwise be criminal conduct, i.e., sets forth an
affirmative defense; and whether the matter is peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant. (It is
undoubtedly the general rule that the state must prove all the essential facts entering into the
description of the offense. But it has been held in many cases that when a negation of a fact lies
peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant it is incumbent on him to establish that fact).
We next observe that the "valid prescription" exemption of Code 18.2-250 relates to a fact that would
be solely within the knowledge of the accused. If we accept appellant's contention that the STATE must
prove appellant had no valid prescription, the offense would be virtually unprovable. Under appellant's
theory, to obtain a conviction under the facts of this case, the STATE would be required to prove that no
medical professional, wherever located, in this Commonwealth or elsewhere, had prescribed the drug to
appellant. This would involve a nationwide search of chain drugstores, as well as independent
pharmacies, hospitals, prison infirmaries, etc. Appellant, at oral argument, conceded that such an
undertaking would most likely be impossible. CONGRESS clearly did not intend such a result, nor would
they enact such an impotent statute
Constitutional Construction
1) "The rights enumerated in this Bill of Rights shall not be construed to limit other rights of the people
not therein expressed.

2)The office and purpose of the constitution is to shape and fix the limits of governmental activity. It
thus proclaims, safeguards and preserves in basic form the pre-existing laws, rights, mores, habits, and
modes of thought and life of the people as developed under the common law and as existing at the time
of its adoption to the extent and therein statedThe purpose and object sought to be attained by the
framers of the constitution is to be looked for, and the will and intent of the people who ratified it is to
be made effective. As we have stated, CONGRESS may enact any law or take any action not prohibited
by express terms, or by necessary implications by the Constitution.
3)A fundamental right is one EXPLICITLY OR IMPLICITLY implied guaranteed by the constitution
4) "It is an "established principle of constitutional law that a court will not rule upon the constitutionality
of a statute unless such a determination is absolutely necessary to decide the merits of the case. A
statute will be construed to avoid a constitutional question whenever this is possible.
5) "The construction of a constitutional provision by CONGRESS (note it is congress construing, not the
supreme court, that is why it is CALLED CONTEMPORANEOUS CONSTRUCTION)is entitled to
consideration, and if the construction is contemporaneous with adoption of the constitutional
provision, it is entitled to great weight. In addition, Long acquiescence in such an announced
construction so strengthens it that it should not be changed unless plainly wrong.
6) Constitutional provisions are EITHER SELF-EXECUTING OR MANDATORY.
A self-executing provision does not require enabling legislation for its enforcement.
A mandatory provision declares or imposes a duty or requirement that must be followed.
A Directory provision sets forth procedures or " confers discretion on the legislature" for its
implementation.
7) "We review arguments regarding the CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A STATUTE DE NOVO. When the
constitutionality of a statute is challenged, we are guided by the principle that all acts of CONGRESS are
presumed to be constitutional. Where a statute is constitutional as applied to a litigant, the litigant has
no standing to challenge the statute on the ground that it may be unconstitutional on its face, that is, as
applied to a third person in a hypothetical situation. As a general rule, "a party has standing to challenge
the constitutionality of a statute only insofar as it has an adverse impact on his own rights
8) "However, when a court, in determining the constitutionality of a statute, departs from the express
limitations of the Constitution and relies instead on implied constitutional restrictions, the legislative
usurpation must be very clear and palpable to justify the courts holding that an enactment is
unconstitutional.
9) "This Courts jurisprudence with respect to Article IV, Section 12 is well established. The fact that
many things of a diverse nature are authorized or required to be done in the body of the act, though not
expressed in its title is not objectionable, if what is authorized by the act is germane to the object
expressed in the title, or has a legitimate and natural association therewith, or is congruous therewith,
the title is sufficient. *I+f there is doubt as to the sufficiency of the title, the doubt must be resolved in
favor of its sufficiency, as courts will not declare an act of the legislature unconstitutional unless it is
plainly so. The analysis of a particular act must necessarily stand on its own, and we must look to
both the body and to the title of the act under scrutiny to determine whether the act violates the
Constitution.
10) "As a general rule, where a statute is constitutional as applied to a litigant, the litigant has no
standing to challenge the statute on the ground that it may be unconstitutional on its face, that is, as
applied to a third person in a hypothetical situation." We have said that classification ordinarily will be
upheld "if any state of facts can be reasonably conceived that would support it." But where the statute
creates a "suspect classification" (e.g. race, sex, or religion) or where it affects a fundamental
constitutional right, the presumption of constitutionality fades, and the "strict scrutiny" test, rather
than the more relaxed "rational relationship" test applies.
11) "Statutory interpretation presents a pure question of law and is accordingly subject to de novo
review by this Court.
de novo is a Latin expression meaning "from the beginning," "afresh," "anew," "beginning again."
Retroactive Enactment of Laws
1) "Accordingly, when a statute is amended while an action is pending, the rights of the parties are to
be deemed in accordance with the law in effect when the action is begun, unless the amended statute
shows a clear intention to vary such rights. (Our analysis is guided by the fundamental principles of
statutory construction that retroactive laws are not favored, and that a statute is always construed to
operate prospectively unless a contrary legislative intent is manifest.); New laws will apply only to
future cases unless there is something in the very nature of the case, or in the language of the new
provision, which shows that the new law was intended to have a retrospective effect. Further, every
reasonable doubt is resolved against a retroactive operation of a statute, and words of a statute ought
not to have a retrospective operation unless they are so clear, strong and imperative that no other
meaning can be annexed to them . Retroactive effect will be given to a statute only when legislative
intent that a statute be so applied is stated in clear, explicit, and unequivocal terms.
Common Law
1) In construing statutes, the statutory definition must prevail over the common law definition
2) CONGRESS is presumed to have known and to have had the common law in mind in the enactment of
a statute. The statute must therefore be read along with the provisions of the common law, and the
latter will be read into the statute unless it clearly appears from express language or by necessary
implication that the purpose of the statute was to change the common law.


3) "We also apply the established principle that a statutory provision will not be held to change the
common law unless the legislative intent to do so is plainly manifested. Therefore, a statutory change in
the common law will be recognized only in that which is expressly stated in the words of the statute or is
necessarily implied by its language.

4) " A statutory provision will not be held to change the common law unless the legislative intent to do
so is plainly manifested. "Statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed and not
to be enlarged in their operation by construction beyond their express terms. Accordingly, "[a] statutory
change in the common law is limited to that which is expressly stated in the statute or necessarily
implied by its language because there is a presumption that no change was intended. "When an
enactment does not encompass the entire subject covered by the common law, it abrogates the
common-law rule only to the extent that its terms are directly and irreconcilably opposed to the rule
Previous Construction of a Statute
1) "Where a statute has been construed by the courts, and is then re-enacted by the legislature, the
construction given to it is presumed to be sanctioned by the legislature, and thenceforth becomes
obligatory upon the courts." Hence, when the court finds the old construction should be modified, it
cannot anymore, since the court is BOUND by its old construction because such statute was RE-Enacted.
2) "The term "battery" possesses "a long history of definition by" the courts, and therefore, it "carries its
historical construction" when used by CONGRESS in a statute.
3) "We have said that when judicial interpretations have settled the meaning of an existing statutory
provision, repetition of the same language in a new statute indicates, as a general matter, the intent to
incorporate its judicial interpretations as well. (STARE DECIS becomes the interpretation and
construction of a law or STATUTE that is ambiguous even if it was applied to a private case)
New Law New Remedy
4) "It is an established principle of statutory interpretation that "a statute prescribing a new remedy for
an existing right should never be construed to abolish a pre-existing remedy in the absence of express
words or necessary implication. Further, " 'when a statute gives a new remedy, and contains no
negative, express or implied, of the old remedy, the new one provided by it is cumulative, and the party
may elect between the two.'
Two Statutes Pertaining to the Same Subject
1) "It is well accepted that statutes relating to the same subject should not be read in isolation. Such
statutes should be considered in pari materia. Moreover, statutes dealing with the same subject matter
should be construed together to achieve a harmonious result, resolving conflicts to give effect to
legislative intent. An accepted principle of statutory construction is that, when it is not clear which of
two statutes applies, the more specific statute prevails over the more general. Also, when statutes
provide different procedures on the same subject matter, "the general must give way to the specific.
"As a preliminary matter applicable to all of your questions and in accord with the rule of statutory
construction in pari materia,
statutory provisions are not to be considered as isolated fragments of law. Such provisions are to be
considered as a whole, or as parts of a greater connected, homogeneous system of laws, or a single and
complete statutory compilation.
Statutes in pari materia are considered as if they constituted but one act, so that sections of one act
may be considered as though they were parts of the other act.
As a general rule, where legislation dealing with a particular subject consists of a system of related
general provisions indicative of a settled policy, new enactments of a fragmentary nature on that subject
are to be taken as intended to fit into the existing system and to be carried into effect conformably to it,
and they should be so construed as to harmonize the general tenor or purport of the system and make
the scheme consistent in all its parts and uniform in its operation, unless a different purpose is shown
plainly or with irresistible clearness. It will be assumed or presumed, in the absence of words specifically
indicating the contrary, that the legislature did not intend to innovate on, unsettle, disregard, alter or
violate a general statute or system of statutory provisions the entire subject matter of which is not
directly or necessarily involved in the act (noting that in absence of words to contrary, legislature did not
intend to alter or repeal general statute or system).
3) Closely related statutes must be read as being consistent with one another. Two statutes which are
closely interrelated must be read and construed together and effect given to all of their provisions.
Statutes should be construed, if possible, so as to harmonize, and force and effect should be given the
provisions of each.
4) The primary objective of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to legislative intent. 'In
interpreting statutes, "courts should give the fullest possible effect to the legislative intent embodied in
the entire statutory enactment. Potentially conflicting statutes should be harmonized to give force and
effect to each.

5) City and municipal ordinances must be consistent with the laws of the Constitution. Thus, if a statute
and a local ordinance both can be given effect, courts must harmonize them and apply them together.
The Meaning of Words
1) In the absence of a contrary definition, the words in a statute are presumed to have their usual and
ordinary meaning.
3) A fundamental rule of statutory construction requires that every part of a statute be presumed to
have some effect, and not be treated as meaningless unless absolutely necessary. "We must assume
that the legislature did not intend to do a vain and useless thing. "It is a well established rule of
construction that a statute ought to be interpreted in such a manner that it may have effect, and not
found to be vain and elusive. "A word or clause contained in a statute may only be rejected as
surplusage if it "appears to have been inserted through inadvertence or mistake, and which is incapable
of any sensible meaning," or is otherwise repugnant to the rest of the statute.
4) "We will not construe a statute by singling out a particular term or phrase, but will construe the
words and terms at issue in the context of the other language used in the statute.
5) While in the construction of statutes the constant endeavor of the courts is to ascertain and give
effect to the intention of the legislature, that intention must be gathered from the words used, unless a
literal construction would involve a manifest absurdity. "The Court has stated the related principle that
"the plain, obvious, and rational meaning of a statute is always to be preferred to any curious, narrow,
or strained construction." Statutes should not be interpreted in ways that produce absurd or irrational
consequences.
6) "A statute must be construed with reference to its subject matter, the object sought to be attained,
and the legislative purpose in enacting it; the provisions should receive a construction that will render
it harmonious with that purpose rather than one which will defeat it.
7)[i]f the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, and its meaning perfectly clear and definite,
effect must be given to it. It is unnecessary to resort to any rules of statutory construction when the
language of a statute is unambiguous. In those situations, the statute's plain meaning and intent govern.
"Language is ambiguous if it admits of being understood in more than one way, refers to two or more
things simultaneously, is difficult to comprehend, is of doubtful import, or lacks clearness and
definiteness.

9) "Black's Law Dictionary 1586 (8th ed. 2004) defines "valid" as "Legally sufficient; binding." (noting that
if the STATUTE does not provide a statutory definition we may look to the dictionary definition to
determine legislative intent
10) "In drafting the statute, the legislature separated the two prohibitions with a comma followed by
the disjunctive word "nor." We have noted that, pursuant to the rules of grammar, "phrases separated
by a comma and [a] disjunctive . . . are independent. The disjunctive serves to connect the two parts of
the sentence but also to keep them separate and independent.
12) "The word [willful] often denotes an act which is intentional, or knowing, or voluntary, as
distinguished from accidental. But when used in a criminal statute it generally means an act done with a
bad purpose; without justifiable excuse; stubbornly, obstinately, perversely[.] The word is also
employed to characterize a thing done without ground for believing it is lawful. The term "willful act"
imports knowledge and consciousness that injury will result from the act done. The act done must be
intended or it must involve a reckless disregard for the rights of another and will probably result in an
injury. [T]he term "gross, wanton, and culpable" describes conduct. The word "gross" means
"aggravated or increased negligence" while the word "culpable" means "deserving of blame or
censure." 'Gross negligence' is culpable or criminal when accompanied by acts of commission or
omission of a wanton or willful nature, showing a reckless or indifferent disregard of the rights of
others, under circumstances reasonably calculated to produce injury, or which make it not improbable
that injury will be occasioned, and the offender knows, or is charged with the knowledge of, the
probable result of his acts
13) "But, courts are not permitted to add language to a statute nor are they permitted to accomplish
the same result by judicial interpretation." Rather, when the language of a statute is unambiguous,
courts are bound by the plain meaning of that language and may not assign a construction that amounts
to holding that the General Assembly did not mean what it actually has stated.

14) "It is equally well established, however, that if the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous,
a regulatory interpretation by the Department that is in conflict with the plain language of the statute
cannot be sustained.

15) "Under the rule of ejusdem generis, when a particular class of persons or things is enumerated in a
statute and general words follow, the general words are to be restricted in their meaning to a sense
analogous to the less general, particular words. Likewise, according to the maxim noscitur a sociis
(associated words) when general and specific words are grouped, the general words are limited by the
specific and will be construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those things identified by the
specific words.
16) If a statute expressly excepts a class which would otherwise fall within its terms, the exception
negates the idea that any other class is to be excepted.
17) One such rule, sometimes referred to as the last antecedent doctrine, is particularly applicable here
and can be summarized as follows: Referential and qualifying words and phrases, where no contrary
intention appears, refer solely to the last antecedent. The last antecedent is 'the last word, phrase, or
clause that can be made an antecedent without impairing the meaning of the sentence.' Thus a
proviso usually is construed to apply to the provision or clause immediately preceding it. (explaining
and applying "the grammatical 'rule of the last antecedent,' according to which a limiting clause or
phrase . . . should ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or phrase that it immediately follows . . .
."); (noting that construction of a statute according to the last antecedent rule is "quite sensible as a
matter of grammar
19) "An erroneous interpretation of a statute by those charged with its enforcement cannot be
permitted to override [the statute's] clear meaning. Amendments of statutes can only be made by the
legislature and not by the courts or administrative officers charged with their enforcement
20) "But principles of statutory construction are not so rigid. Although we presume that the same term
has the same meaning when it occurs here and there in a single statute, the Court of Appeals
mischaracterized that presumption as effectively irrebuttable. We also understand that *m+ost words
have different shades of meaning and consequently may be variously construed, not only when they
occur in different statutes, but when used more than once in the same statute or even in the same
section. Thus, the natural presumption that identical words used in different parts of the same act are
intended to have the same meaning is not rigid and readily yields whenever there is such variation in
the connection in which the words are used as reasonably to warrant the conclusion that they were
employed in different parts of the act with different intent. Ibid. A given term in the same statute may
take on distinct characters from association with distinct statutory objects calling for different
implementation strategies."
Ibid. (Latin, short for ibidem, meaning "the same place") is the term used to provide an endnote or
footnote citation orreference for a source that was cited in the preceding endnote or footnote. It is
similar in meaning to idem (meaning something that has been mentioned previously; the same),
abbreviated Id., which is commonly used in legal citation.[1] To find the ibid.source, one must look at
the reference preceding it.
21) "Generally, phrases separated by a comma and the disjunctive "or," are independent. (finding that,
the word "or" connects two parts of a sentence, "'but disconnect[s] their meaning'"); (noting disjunctive
results in alternatives, which must be treated separately); (finding that limiting phrase in statute is
independent of and does not modify two earlier phrases because the limiting phrase is separated from
the first two by a comma and the disjunctive "or"); (interpreting the use of a comma and the disjunctive
"or" as implying two separate and independent phrases in a Virginia statute authorizing payment of
dividends by corporation "out of net earnings, or out of its net assets in excess of its capital").
Accordingly, the phrase, "made by the Defendant to any law enforcement officer," is independent of
and does not modify the phrase, "[a]ny written or recorded statement or confessions."

The Terms May/Shall
1) The term "may," as used in a statute, should be given its ordinary meaning intended by the
CONGRESS -permission, importing discretion.
2) It is also true, however, that the Supreme Court has held that the word "may," while ordinarily
importing permission, will be construed to be mandatory when it is necessary to accomplish the
manifest purpose of the legislature.
3) The use of the word "shall" in a statute generally implies that its terms are intended to be mandatory,
rather than permissive or directive.
4) "*T+he use of shall, in a statute requiring action by a public official, is directory and not mandatory
unless the statute manifests a contrary intent."14 "A statute directing the mode of proceeding by public
officers is to be deemed directory, and a precise compliance is not to be deemed essential to the validity
of the proceedings, unless so declared by statute.
The Term Aggrieved Locus Standi
1) ""The term 'aggrieved' has a settled meaning when it becomes necessary to determine who is a
proper party to seek court relief from an adverse decision. In order for a petitioner to be 'aggrieved,' it
must affirmatively appear that such person had some direct interest in the subject matter of the
proceeding that he seeks to attack. . . . The petitioner 'must show that he has an immediate, pecuniary
and substantial interest in the litigation, and not a remote or indirect interest.' . . . Thus, it is not
sufficient that the sole interest of the petitioner is to advance some perceived public right or to redress
some anticipated public injury when the only wrong he has suffered is in common with other persons
similarly situated. The word 'aggrieved' in a statute contemplates a substantial grievance and means a
denial of some personal or property right, legal or equitable, or imposition of a burden or obligation
upon the petitioner different from that suffered by the public generally.
Mens Rea/ Scienter/ Intent
1) "In the final analysis, the issue whether mens rea or scienter is a necessary element in the
indictment and proof of a particular crime becomes a question of legislative intent to be construed by
the court. Thus, to insert a mens rea element into the offense, and to require proof thereof, would
defeat the statutory purpose, which is to criminalize the introduction of firearms into a school
environment. So we will not add, by implication, language to the statute that the legislature expressly
has chosen not to include. Consequently, we hold that the trial court correctly decided, in refusing the
instruction in question, that this statute is one of strict criminal liability, and that the Commonwealth
was required to prove only that the defendant had possessed, on school property, a firearm of the type
described in the statute.
2) "The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention is no
provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in
freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose
between good and evil.
A relation between some mental element and punishment for a harmful act is almost as instinctive
as the child's familiar exculpatory "But I didn't mean to," and has afforded the rational basis for a tardy
and unfinished substitution of deterrence and reformation in place of retaliation and vengeance as the
motivation for public prosecution.
Unqualified acceptance of this doctrine by English common law in the Eighteenth Century was
indicated by Blackstone's sweeping statement that to constitute any crime there must first be a "vicious
will." Common-law commentators of the Nineteenth Century early pronounced the same principle,
although a few exceptions not relevant to our present problem came to be recognized.
Crime, as a compound concept, generally constituted only from concurrence of an evil-meaning mind
with an evil-doing hand, was congenial to an intense individualism.
As the states codified the common law of crimes, even if their enactments were silent on the subject,
their courts assumed that the omission did not signify disapproval of the principle but merely recognized
that intent was so inherent in the idea of the offense that it required no statutory affirmation.
Courts, with little hesitation or division, found an implication of the requirement as to offenses that
were taken over from the common law. The unanimity with which they have adhered to the central
thought that wrongdoing must be conscious to be criminal is emphasized by the variety, disparity and
confusion of their definitions of the requisite but elusive mental element.
However, courts of various jurisdictions, and for the purposes of different offenses, have devised
working formulae, if not scientific ones, for the instruction of juries around such terms as "felonious
intent," "criminal intent," "malice aforethought," "guilty knowledge," "fraudulent intent," "wilfulness,"
"scienter," to denote guilty knowledge, or "mens rea," to signify an evil purpose or mental culpability.
By use or combination of these various tokens, they have sought to protect those who were not
blameworthy in mind from conviction of infamous common-law crimes....The Government asks us by a
feat of construction radically to change the weights and balances in the scales of justice.
The purpose and obvious effect of doing away with the requirement of a guilty intent is to ease the
prosecution's path to conviction, to strip the defendant of such benefit as he derived at common law
from innocence of evil purpose, and to circumscribe the freedom heretofore allowed juries.
Such a manifest impairment of the immunities of the individual should not be extended to common-law
crimes on judicial initiative.
3) "The presence of a "vicious will" or mens rea was long a requirement of criminal responsibility. But
the list of exceptions grew, especially in the expanding regulatory area involving activities affecting
public health, safety, and welfare. Id., at 254. The statutory offense of embezzlement, borrowed from
the common law where scienter was historically required, was in a different category. 13 Id., at 260-
261.
"[W]here Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning [401
U.S. 601, 608] of centuries of practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were
attached to each borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken and the meaning its
use will convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise instructed."
The Dillon Rule and Grants of Authority
The Dillon Rule of strict construction controls our determination of the powers of local governing bodies.
This rule provides that municipal corporations have only those powers that are expressly granted, those
necessarily or fairly implied from expressly granted powers, and those that are essential and
indispensable.
"In determining legislative intent, the rule is clear that where a power is conferred and the mode of its
execution is specified, no other method may be selected; any other means would be contrary to
legislative intent and, therefore, unreasonable. A necessary corollary is that where a grant of power is
silent upon its mode of execution, a method of exercise clearly contrary to legislative intent, or
inappropriate to the ends sought to be accomplished by the grant, also would be unreasonable.
"Consistent with the necessity to uphold legislative intent, the doctrine of implied powers should never
be applied to create a power that does not exist or to expand an existing power beyond rational limits.
Always, the test in application of the doctrine is reasonableness, in which concern for what is necessary
to promote the public interest is a key element.
Finally, when a statute creates a specific grant of authority, the authority exists only to the extent
specifically granted in the statute. It can never go beyond the authority given .

6) When the legislature delegates authority to an administrative agency to promulgate regulations,
those regulations must neither exceed the scope of the authority delegated nor be inconsistent with it.
Furthermore, "delegations of legislative power are valid only if they establish specific policies and fix
definite standards to guide the official, agency, or board in the exercise of the power. Delegations of
legislative power which lack such policies and standards are unconstitutional and void." For example,
language in an enabling statute which provides merely "that the regulations be designed to protect and
promote the safety and health of employees" is insufficient.
7) "We consistently have held that when the primary purpose of an enactment is to raise revenue, the
enactment will be considered a tax, regardless of the name attached to the act. The General Assembly
is directly prohibited from enacting any local, special, or private law . . . *f+or the assessment and
collection of taxes. There is, however, an exception to this specific prohibition. The General Assembly
may by special act like RA 7160(Local Government Code) delegating the power of taxation to any
province, city, municipality.
Inconsistent Regulations/Laws
As a preliminary matter, we agree with Manassas' statements that regulations of Executive Departments
have the force of law, and that any Executive Department concerned with the execution of a statutes
interpretation of its governing statutes, as reflected in its regulations, is entitled to great weight.
Regulations, however, may not conflict with the authorizing statute. Whether a regulation is
inconsistent with its enabling legislation is properly a subject of judicial review.
If both the statute and the ordinance can stand together and be given effect, it is the duty of the courts
to harmonize them and not nullify the ordinance.
City and municipal ordinances must be consistent with STATUTES. Such ordinances are inconsistent
with state law when they cannot co-exist with a statute. The fact that a county or municipal ordinance
enlarges on a statute's provisions does not create a conflict with the statute unless the statute limits
the requirements (Separability Clause is inserted)for all cases to its own terms. Thus, if a statute and a
local ordinance both can be given effect, courts must harmonize them and apply them together.

A Single Body of Law
1) "When attempting to define terms in one part of the Code, courts should read a statute with "a view
toward harmonizing it with other statutes. "Ordinarily, when a particular word in a statute is not
defined therein, a court must give it its ordinary meaning.
2) "When asked to interpret various code sections, the SUPREME Court often examines other related
statutes that contain similar or contrasting language to help determine legislative intent.
The Exclusion Rule
Ambiguity
1) "Language is ambiguous when it may be understood in more than one way, or simultaneously refers
to two or more things.
2) "When the language of a statute is ambiguous, it must be interpreted in a manner that will give effect
to the intent of CONGRESS.
3) "The primary goal of statutory construction is to discern and give effect to legislative intent, with the
reading of a statute as a whole influencing the proper construction of ambiguous individual provisions
4) Doctrine of Contra proferentem: "Used in the connection with the construction of written documents
to the effect that an ambiguous provision is construed most strongly against the person who selected
the language." Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed.
5) "Instead, we find the restrictive covenant, in particular the phrase "residential purposes," to be
ambiguous in several respects....Indeed, even the circuit court's interpretation that the term "
'[r]esidence' means more than mere physical presence and less than domicile" is ambiguous. It can be
argued that a nightly or weekly rental is more than mere physical presence. Moreover, if the phrase
"residential purposes" carries with it a "duration of use" component, it is ambiguous as to when a rental
of the property moves from short-term to long-term. Under our case law, a restrictive covenant of
"substantial doubt or ambiguity" must be interpreted "in favor of the free use of property and against
restrictions
Criminal Versus Civil Intent of a Statute
The question whether a particular statutorily defined penalty is civil or criminal is a matter of statutory
construction." First, one must determine whether the legislature, in establishing the penalizing
mechanism, indicates either expressly or impliedly a preference for one label or the other. Second,
where the legislature has indicated an intention to establish a civil penalty, one must address "whether
the statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate that intention
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution
1) "By virtue of the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution supersedes any conflicting state law. The
preemption of Local laws by STATUTES may occur by express statutory language or other clear
indication that Congress intended to legislate exclusively in the area. Even if Congress does not intend
the enactment of a STATUTORY scheme completely to preempt Local laws in the area, congressional
enactments in the same field override Local laws with which they conflict.
The Supreme Court has identified three ways in which preemption may occur:
(1) Congress may adopt express language setting forth the existence and scope of preemption;
(2) Congress may adopt a framework for regulation that "occupies the field" and leaves no room for
states to adopt supplemental laws; and
(3) when statute actually conflicts with the constitution, typically when compliance with both laws is a
"physical impossibility" or the statute stands "as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
the full purposes and objectives of Congress.
2) "Settled legal principles provide that the Constitution, not a state court erroneous interpretation of
it, is controlling. (in context of determining whether to apply retroactively a new rule for the conduct of
criminal prosecutions, adopting Blackstonian view that judges...find the law rather than make the law
and that judicial declaration of law is merely a statement of what the law has always been.
Public Policy
1) "A court may not "second-guess the lawmakers on matters of economics, sociology and public policy.
. . . Those considerations belong exclusively in the legislative domain. Regardless of whether it "may or
may not be better public policy". Meaning COURTS do not interpret provisions for ECONOMICS,
SOCIOLOGY and PUBLIC POLICY.
2) "Judicial review does not evaluate the "propriety, wisdom, necessity and expediency" of legislation.
We ask only whether the statutory classification erects an irrational, arbitrary distinction - one that no
conceivable state of facts could reasonably sustain.